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02 Jan 25. China hits Lockheed Martin, Raytheon and Boeing with export ban after US arms sales to Taiwan. China hits Lockheed Martin, Raytheon and Boeing with export ban after US arms sales to Taiwan China banned the export of dual-use products to over two dozen US defence contractors, targeting top players like Lockheed Martin and Raytheon, as it objected to Washington’s latest arms sales to Taiwan. Beijing imposed the ban on 28 US defence contractors, placing 10 of them on an unreliable entities list over weapons sales to Taiwan, the commerce ministry said on Thursday. The decision, “based on China’s export control law and regulation on export control of dual-use items”, was taken to “safeguard national security and interests and fulfil international obligations including non-proliferation,” the ministry said. The targeted firms also included General Dynamics and Boeing. The 10 “unreliable entities” were engaged in the American weapons sales to Taiwan “despite strong opposition” from Beijing.
“The so-called military technology cooperation seriously undermines China’s national sovereignty and territorial integrity, violates the One China principle and the provisions of the three joint communiques between China and the US, and significantly threatens peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait,” a ministry spokesperson said.
China considers Taiwan a part of its territory and does not rule out the use of force to “reunite” the island. The export ban mimics last month’s sanctions on defence and aerospace entities involved in a previous sale of weapons to Taiwan. The sanctions targeted Insitu, Hudson Technologies, Saronic Technologies, Raytheon Canada, Raytheon Australia, Aerkomm, and Oceaneering International Inc. The firms under the latest ban will be barred from import and export activities in China and from making new investments. Their officials cannot enter the country and their work permits or residency will be revoked. It was not immediately clear how many individuals would be impacted by the decision. Taiwan last month received a batch of 38 advanced Abrams battle tanks from the US in a significant boost to the island’s land defence capabilities. Another 42 tanks, considered the heaviest in the world, are due to be delivered this year, and 28 the year after. The island has been upgrading its defence capabilities – acquiring F-16 fighter jets, missiles, submarines and artillery systems from the US – in the face of increasing military drills by China. (Source: Yahoo!/MSN)
02 Jan 25. Montenegro: Mass killing will likely prompt measures against illegal possession of weapons. On 1 January, a local resident killed 12 people and wounded four across four locations in the town of Cetinje (Cetinje municipality). The shooting started after a verbal argument in a restaurant where the gunman killed four people including the owner and his children. He then moved to different locations before ultimately shooting himself when surrounded by the police. He had a history of illegal possession of weapons. While the authorities are still investigating the motive, Interior Minister Danilo Šaranović stated that the incident was not related to organised crime but was instead a ‘consequence of disturbed interpersonal relations’. Most of the victims were closely related to the perpetrator. The government has declared three days of mourning and all outdoor events have been cancelled. The incident will likely prompt new measures to curb illegal possession of weapons, a pressing issue in Montenegro. We assess that demonstrations calling for more robust enforcement of the rule of law around illegal firearm possession and violent behaviour are possible in the coming weeks. (Source: Sibylline)
02 Jan 25. Pakistani Airstrikes Against Taliban Kill 46 in Afghanistan. Recent Pakistani military airstrikes in Afghanistan’s Paktika province killed at least 46 people, mostly women and children, according to Afghan officials. Six others were injured in the attacks, which have heightened tensions between the two countries. The strikes carried out on December 24, targeted alleged members of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a militant group operating from Afghan territory. Four locations have been hit including Paktika, near the border with Pakistan. Afghan authorities stated that most of the victims were refugees from Pakistan’s Waziristan region. A source from Pakistan, speaking anonymously, confirmed that the airstrikes targeted a TTP camp, accusing the group of planning attacks on Pakistani soil. The TTP, which seeks to impose Islamic law in Pakistan, has launched numerous attacks across the border, including an assault in South Waziristan that killed 16 Pakistani security personnel. Afghanistan’s Ministry of National Defence called the strikes a “blatant violation” of international law and sovereignty. Kabul summoned Pakistan’s chargé d’affaires to formally protest and warned of consequences. Afghan officials pledged retaliation but did not specify how. The incident follows similar Pakistani airstrikes in March 2024, which reportedly killed five women and children. Pakistan has accused Afghanistan of harboring TTP militants, while Afghan officials deny this and blame Pakistan for destabilizing the region through its past support of militant groups. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
02 Jan 25. Libya: Seizure of camp in Wadi al Hayaa district is unlikely to break 2020 ceasefire agreement. On 30 December 2024, the 101 Brigade, which is affiliated with the Libyan National Army (LNA) seized the Tendi military camp in Ubari (Wadi al Hayaa district) in a sudden raid without any armed resistance. The camp was under the control of the commander of the Sabha military region, Ali Kanna, who is affiliated with the Tripoli-based Presidential Council. While this development underscores the heightened tensions between the militias affiliated with Sadam Haftar (son of the LNA commander Khalifa Haftar) and the armed groups affiliated with the Tripoli government, the move is unlikely to trigger a significant breach of the 2020 ceasefire agreement. However, we assess that there is a realistic possibility of further localised armed clashes between militias affiliated with rival governments in Libya’s south-western districts in the coming weeks. Such clashes will moderately elevate risks of operational disruption to oil fields in the region (such as Sharara) and El Feel, located in the nearby Murzuq district. (Source: Sibylline)
02 Jan 25. Iraq: Heightened security presence in border areas will likely disrupt traffic, business operations. On 1 January, the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) fortified their positions and increased troop numbers in Al Anbar governorate along the Iraqi-Syrian border. The heightened security measures follow visits by PMF Chief of Staff Abdul Aziz al-Muhammadawi to combat and border command brigades in Al-Anbar on 29 and 30 December 2024. These actions are likely aimed at countering increased activity by the Islamic State (IS) and other militant or criminal groups in border regions following the collapse of former president Bashar al-Assad’s rule in Syria. Iraq will also likely enhance co-operation with the forces of Syria’s new government to strengthen border security. Enhanced security measures will likely focus on Akashat, Al-Qa’im border crossing and Al Waleed border crossing (all Al Anbar governorate) in the coming weeks. We assess that increased checkpoints and stop-and-search operations in border areas are likely in the coming days, mildly elevating the risk of disruption to traffic and business operations. (Source: Sibylline)
02 Jan 25. Moldova: Termination of Russian gas supply will likely elevate government instability, unrest risks. On 1 January, Russian state-owned energy firm Gazprom ceased supplying gas to Moldova’s breakaway Transnistria region. Gazprom announced its intentions to stop supplies on 28 December 2024 citing what it described as Moldova’s failure to settle its debts. Nevertheless, the decision came ahead of the expiration of an agreement allowing Russian gas to transit Ukraine on 1 January. The Russia-backed Transnistria region has received around 2 bn cubic metres of Russian gas via Ukraine annually since 2022; Transnistria would then sell electricity to Chișinău-controlled Moldova. Notably, on 31 December 2024, Gazprom did not reserve capacity for Moldova using an alternate pipeline via Turkey. The termination of gas supplies is highly likely aimed at driving tensions between the central Moldovan and Transnistrian authorities and part of destabilisation operations ahead of parliamentary elections this year in Chișinău-controlled Moldova. We assess that challenging socio-economic health conditions and energy insecurity will elevate domestic unrest and government instability risks over the coming weeks and increase energy pressures. (Source: Sibylline)
02 Jan 25. Azerbaijan-Russia: Plane crash underscores deteriorating environment for civilian aviation sector. Early on 25 December 2024, an AZAL Embraer 190 jet operated by Azerbaijan Airlines crash-landed in Kazakhstan, near the city of Aktau (Mangystau region). The flight had departed from the capital Baku in Azerbaijan and was scheduled to land in the Republic of Chechnya (Russia) in the capital Grozny. Of the 67 people on board, 29 survived the crash. We assess that the aircraft was likely hit by Russian air defences operating in the proximity of Grozny, where Russian authorities reported Ukrainian drone attacks earlier that day. Thick fog was reported during the flight, increasing the likelihood of air defences mistaking the aircraft for a drone. Footage of the aircraft after the crash-landing appears to show marks resembling damage caused by shrapnel from an anti-aircraft missile. We assess that the incident underscores the growing security threats to civilian aircraft flying in Russian regions targeted by Ukrainian long-range strikes. Such attacks, particularly against Russian airports, have previously led several Eurasian countries to temporarily halt flight operations to Russia; further such measures are possible. (Source: Sibylline)
02 Jan 25. Pakistan: Militant attacks underscore elevated security threats in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. On 31 December 2024, three people were killed, and 18 others, including security personnel, were injured in separate incidents in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. Two explosions occurred in the Lower South Waziristan district while another IED attack targeting a Frontier Corps vehicle took place in Bannu district. Separately, a police check post was attacked on 30 December 2024 in Dera Ismail Khan district. While no group has claimed responsibility, the incidents follow an uptick in attacks targeting security personnel in the province, as well as increased activity by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The attacks also come amid heightened tensions between Islamabad and Kabul after Pakistan conducted airstrikes in Afghanistan, allegedly targeting TTP hideouts following a TTP attack on a military outpost in Pakistan that killed 16 soldiers on 21 December 2024. We assess that there is a realistic possibility of further attacks targeting the security forces in the coming days (particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), increasing bystander risks. Additionally, given the elevated tensions, there is a realistic possibility of clashes between Pakistan military and Afghan forces at the border, possibly further driving bilateral tensions. (Source: Sibylline)
02 Jan 25. RoK: Impeached president faces potential arrest; domestic unrest risks are heightened. Earlier on 2 January, the police dispersed several dozen supporters of the impeached President Yoon Suk-yeol outside the presidential residence in the capital Seoul. There is a high police presence there following scuffles between supporters and opponents of Yoon. This comes after a court issued arrest and search warrants for Yoon on charges of insurrection and abuse of power on 31 December 2024. The National Assembly impeached Yoon after his short-lived declaration of martial law in December 2024. The Constitutional Court is deliberating whether to confirm his impeachment; it will hold a second hearing on 3 January. Acting President Choi Sang-mok came to office on 27 December 2024 after his predecessor, Han Duck-soo, was impeached by the National Assembly for refusing to immediately appoint judges to the court; Choi has since filled two of the three vacancies at the Constitutional Court. We assess that domestic unrest risks in major cities will likely remain elevated over the coming days. There is also a latent risk of politically motivated violence; the police detected an online violent threat targeting Choi. Policy paralysis and government instability will highly likely persist over the coming months. (Source: Sibylline)
BATTLESPACE Comment: On January 3rd, Reuters reported that South Korea’s presidential guards and military troops prevented authorities from arresting impeached President Yoon Suk Yeol on Friday in a tense six-hour stand-off inside Yoon’s compound in the heart of Seoul. Yoon is under criminal investigation for insurrection over his Dec. 3 martial law bid that stunned South Korea and led to the first arrest warrant to be issued for a sitting president. “It was judged that it was virtually impossible to execute the arrest warrant due to the ongoing stand-off,” the Corruption Investigation Office for High-ranking Officials (CIO) said in a statement.
02 Jan 25. Kenya: Anti-government protests will likely continue in coming weeks, increasing bystander risks. On 30 December 2024, the police utilised tear gas and batons against hundreds of demonstrators in the capital Nairobi protesting an alleged increase in police abductions of anti-government protesters and activists, resulting in 50 arrests. Smaller-scale demonstrations also emerged in Eldoret (Uasin Gishu county) and Mombasa (Mombasa county). Although President William Ruto acknowledged that members of the police had engaged in ‘excessive and extrajudicial’ action, anti-government protests will likely continue in the coming weeks, driving risks of operational disruption. In response to continued demonstrations, the police and the security forces will almost certainly adopt an elevated posture in target locations, particularly Nairobi’s Central Business District and Mombasa’s port facilities. This posture will likely disrupt overland movement, undermining supply chain continuity. Further clashes between anti-government protesters and the security forces are highly likely, increasing bystander and collateral risks in protest hotspots. In the event of escalating unrest, we assess that the security forces will also possibly restrict access to cellular services in major cities, disrupting communication with on-the-ground staff. (Source: Sibylline)
02 Jan 25. Cote d’Ivoire-France: Force drawdown highlights shifting regional force posture. On 31 December 2024, President Alassane Ouattara announced that France would withdraw from its positions and bases by 31 January. France currently maintains approximately 600 personnel in the country and operates the Port Bouët military base in Abidjan (Abidjan district). The announcement comes amid a broader reduction in France’s regional military presence. In November 2024, Chad’s President Mahamat Idriss Deby announced the end of defence co-operation agreements with France, resulting in a rapid drawdown scheduled to finish by 31 January. Similarly, Senegal’s President Bassirou Diomaye Faye has repeatedly called for the closure of France’s military bases without setting a timeline for any such withdrawal. We assess that, in the coming months, France will likely continue reducing its troop presence from established positions throughout the region, particularly in former colonies, increasing pressure on security force capacity therein. Even so, given relatively warm bilateral relations, France will possibly maintain an advisory force or a small-scale, remote military presence to facilitate drone operations in Cote d’Ivoire in co-operation with Ivorian security forces. (Source: Sibylline)
02 Jan 25. Terrorism is spreading in west Africa – foreign and regional collaboration are needed to fight the threat. The United States military has completed its withdrawal from Niger after 11 years of military cooperation with the west African country. This follows a major disagreement earlier in 2024 when the Nigerien government accused the US of a condescending attitude during negotiations. The US withdrew military support after the junta in Niger seized power in July 2023. The junta then said the US was trying to force it to pick between Russia and the US. Although the US was given some time to leave Niger, the immediate suspension of military cooperation was announced after a meeting between Niger military leadership and US diplomats in March 2024. Shortly after the ejection notice, the US military began shopping for another base in the region. I have been researching insecurity and politics in the region for over a decade and previously analysed the impact of the US drone base in Niger. Prior to the opening of the base, I analysed why it was unlikely to reduce terrorism in the country or region. I argue that despite the current fracture within the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) and animosity with western partners, especially the US, regional and international collaboration is needed to fight terrorism in west Africa. In the search for a new US base in the region, Côte d’Ivoire and Benin are the two most probable options at this stage. However, both are likely to present logistical problems.
Chad, a former ally of the US, would have been the most suitable option, but the country also ejected US special forces in April 2024, a few weeks before the country’s presidential election.
As the security forecast for the region remains dim with terrorism on the increase, it is evident that countries in the region need help to fight terrorism.
With Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso refusing to rejoin Ecowas, other areas of security cooperation must be strengthened. The Multinational Joint Task Force and the Accra Initiative, which all the three countries are still associated with, must be strengthened. This will be in the interests of all the countries in the region.
Importance of fighting terrorism in the Sahel
The number of terrorist attacks and fatalities in the region has increased since 2019 despite the presence of foreign military partners.
Despite the military regimes of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger forming an alliance of Sahel states to fight terrorism and to promote economic development, recent attacks with mass fatalities indicate that terrorist groups might already be taking advantage of the lack of a coordinated counter-terrorism strategy in the region.
There’s also a risk of terrorism spreading to other coastal countries in west Africa. Recently, the UN special representative for the Sahel and west Africa, Leonardo Simão, highlighted the threats terrorism poses to the entire region.
The US and the search for new partners
Months before the US finally left Niger, the United States Africa Command had begun searching for new partners to establish a new base in the region.
Since January 2024 the commander, General Michael Langley, has visited several west African countries to strengthen bilateral relationships.
He visited Nigeria in January. In April it was Côte d’Ivoire, to “reinforce the longstanding partnership between the United States and the Ivoirian government”. He said the US Africa Command would provide more than $65 m in 2024 towards counter-terrorism operations in the region.
Next was the Republic of Benin in May. Benin is being considered partly because of its membership of the Multi-National Joint Task Force, which was established to fight terrorism in the region. The task force worked closely with the US in the fight against Boko Haram and its affiliates.
Shortly after the US visits to Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire and Benin, leaders from northern Nigeria cautioned the government against allowing the US and France to relocate their Sahel bases to Nigeria.
They argued that the attempt by the US and its allies to fight terrorism in the Sahel had been “quite unimpressive, if not a complete failure”.
Citing data from the Pentagon, the leaders said (as have I) that terrorism had risen dramatically in the region since the US began operations.
The US eventually denied that it intended to establish a military base in Nigeria.
The future of US operations in west Africa and the Sahel
Although Côte d’Ivoire and Benin remain the two probable options, successful US operations from these countries are unlikely. This is for three main reasons.
First, both countries are too far from the epicentre of terrorism in the region. Most of the terrorist activities are around the tri-border area of Mali, Burkina Faso and Algeria, which are hundreds of kilometres away from Côte d’Ivoire and Benin. Flying reconnaissance drones from either country would create huge logistical challenges for the US.
Second, operational drones to cover the Sahel would need to fly over Mali and Niger, which are currently both unfriendly to the US. Niger is now working with Russia, which has provided it with air defence systems.
The recent incursion of Ukraine into the Sahel in support of Tuareg forces backed by terrorist groups created further suspicion of US partners in the region.
The US, being a staunch ally of Ukraine, has remained silent on the attack, which resulted in the deaths of dozens of Malian soldiers. Despite its differences with Mali, Ecowas has condemned “external interference” in the region.
What is the way forward for the US?
The best available option for the US remains Chad. The US has had a working relationship with the country as part of the multinational joint task force and has previously deployed troops to Chad in limited numbers.
In September 2024 the US and Chad agreed on the return of a “limited number” of special forces to the country – just four months after they’d left. This might eventually lead to the return of the US to the region.
The US needs to review what went wrong with its previous operations in the region. This includes its mode of diplomacy, transparency in host countries and a genuine desire to help these countries fight terrorism.
In the meantime, there is a need to strengthen the Multinational Joint Task Force and implement the Accra Initiative. While the task force remains operational, the Accra Initiative has not been implemented fully. I believe these platforms offer the best opportunities for counter-terrorism in west Africa and the Sahel at the moment.
Written by Olayinka Ajala, Associate professor in Politics and International Relations, Leeds Beckett University. (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
31 Dec 24. Russia’s military prepared detailed target lists for a potential war with Japan and South Korea that included nuclear power stations and other civilian infrastructure, according to secret files from 2013-2014 seen by the Financial Times. The strike plans, summarised in a leaked set of Russian military documents, cover 160 sites such as roads, bridges and factories, selected as targets to stop the “regrouping of troops in areas of operational purpose”. Moscow’s acute concern about its eastern flank is highlighted in the documents, which were shown to the FT by western sources. Russian military planners fear the country’s eastern borders would be exposed in any war with Nato and vulnerable to attack from US assets and regional allies. The documents are drawn from a cache of 29 secret Russian military files, largely focused on training officers for potential conflict on the country’s eastern frontier from 2008-14 and still seen as relevant to Russian strategy. The FT has this year reported on how the documents contain previously unknown details on operating principles for the use of nuclear weapons and outline scenarios for war-gaming a Chinese invasion and for strikes deep inside Europe. Asia has become central to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s strategy for pursuing the full-scale invasion of Ukraine and his broader stance against Nato. In addition to its increased economic reliance on China, Moscow has recruited 12,000 troops from North Korea to fight in Ukraine while bolstering Pyongyang economically and militarily in return. After firing an experimental ballistic missile at Ukraine in November, Putin said “the regional conflict in Ukraine has taken on elements of a global nature”. William Alberque, a former Nato arms control official now at the Stimson Center, said that, together, the leaked documents and recent North Korean deployment proved “once and for all that the European and Asian theatres of war are directly and inextricably linked”. “Asia cannot sit out conflict in Europe, nor can Europe sit idly by if war breaks out in Asia,” he said. The target list for Japan and South Korea was contained in a presentation intended to explain the capabilities of the Kh-101 non-nuclear cruise missile. Experts who reviewed it for the FT said the contents suggested it was circulated in 2013 or 2014. The document is marked with the insignia of the Combined Arms Academy, a training college for senior officers.] (Source: FT.com)
31 Dec 24. Iran’s Energy Crisis Has Halted Half of its Industrial Capacity, Says Report. Iran is facing a severe energy crisis that has shut down half of its industrial parks and caused nationwide power outages. In an interview with Revolutionary Guards-affiliated Tasnim on Saturday, Ali-Asghar Ahaniha, a representative of employers in Iran’s Supreme Labor Council said several power plants in Iran are offline and some industries have shut down due to energy shortages.
“We faced power issues in the summer, and now in winter, we are dealing with both electricity and gas shortages,” Ahaniha said.
Employers also report significant losses due to power outages. Damages are estimated in the hundreds of billions of rials. Daily gas shortages of 260 m cubic meters and electricity cuts have forced closures of factories and businesses. The poultry industry, among others, has suffered, with warnings that Iran may have to import eggs due to power-related losses. The Iranian rial has plummeted in value, now trading at around 820,000 rials to the dollar, with inflation and rising prices further straining households. Reports indicate that the ongoing crisis is due to years of underinvestment, sanctions, and inefficient energy use, which have left Iran unable to meet seasonal energy demands. According to a New York Times report, another factor contributing to Iran’s energy crisis is Israel’s pair of attacks on major gas pipelines in February. The attacks reportedly disrupted gas supplies to ms across Iran, leading to widespread outages in five provinces. The ongoing crisis prompted protests in Tehran province and other areas, with residents frustrated over the blackouts and economic difficulties. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
31 Dec 24. A South Korean court has approved an arrest warrant for President Yoon Suk Yeol, who was impeached by parliament earlier this month over his failed attempt to impose martial law in the east Asian country. The move on Tuesday marked the first time in South Korea that an arrest warrant has been issued against an incumbent president. The Seoul Western District Court also issued a search warrant for Yoon’s residence, following a request from the Corruption Investigation Office for High-ranking Officials (CIO), which is investigating the president for treason and abuse of power. The warrants came after Yoon ignored the agency’s repeated summons for questioning, and marked the latest blow in an escalating political crisis that has raised concerns about the health of democracy in Asia’s fourth-largest economy. Last week, opposition parties impeached acting president Han Duck-soo after he refused to appoint three justices to fill vacancies on the Constitutional Court, which is deliberating whether to remove Yoon from office. It remains unclear whether the agency will carry out the warrants, which are valid until Monday. The CIO said it planned to execute the warrants, but the president’s security service blocked a prior police attempt to raid his office following Yoon’s impeachment on December 14 under a law that bans searches of locations with state secrets without approval. The presidential security service said on Tuesday that security measures would be taken according to the legal process. Yoon, who has denied wrongdoing, is facing a criminal investigation into possible insurrection after he allegedly dispatched troops to the national assembly in an attempt to prevent lawmakers from rejecting his martial law decree. His lawyers said they planned to file an injunction to the Constitutional Court to dispute the warrants’ validity and prevent his arrest, claiming that the martial law decree did not constitute insurrection. (Source: FT.com)
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