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23 Dec 24. Sudan: RSF control of key logistical base will intensify ethno-religious tensions in North Darfur. On 22 December, the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) retook control of the al-Zurug key logistical base in North Darfur after the Joint Forces, which are aligned with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), seized control of the base on 21 December. The RSF uses the base to channel supplies over the Chadian and Libyan borders. The Joint Forces have accused the RSF of using al-Zurug as a launching point for its operations in the city of El Fasher (North Darfur). As such, the RSF’s continual control of the base will support its sustained operations in Darfur. Further armed clashes, including shelling and SAF airstrikes against populated areas of El Fasher, will sustain the heightened risks facing civilians and NGO staff. In addition, the RSF has accused the Joint Forces, which mainly comprise the Zaghawa tribe, of ‘ethnically cleansing’ Arab civilians in al-Zurug; we assess this will inflame ethno-religious tensions in the area and increase the likelihood of escalatory violence in the coming weeks. (Source: Sibylline)
27 Dec 24. Singapore spends $63bn on defense during 2020-24, reveals GlobalData. Singapore’s commitment to modernization of its armed forces has driven the country to consistently allocate an average of 3.5% of its GDP to defense expenditure over the period 2020 to 2024. Recognizing the challenges of maintaining a small military, the government has prioritized leveraging advanced technology and the acquisition of modern defense platforms to enhance its operational capabilities. This strategic focus has resulted in a cumulative defense budget of $63 bn between 2020 and 2024, according to GlobalData, a leading data and analytics company.
GlobalData’s latest report, “Singapore Defense Market Size and Trends, Budget Allocation, Regulations, Key Acquisitions, Competitive Landscape and Forecast, 2024–29,” reveals that the country’s defense expenditure is projected to reach a record high of $19.7bn by 2029. As part of its modernization drive, Singapore has undertaken significant acquisitions, such as the F-35A/B multirole aircraft, Invincible-class (Type 218SG) Submarine Multi-Role Combat Vessels (MRCVs), and Hunter Armored Fighting Vehicles.
Akash Pratim Debbarma, Aerospace & Defense Analyst at GlobalData, comments: “Singapore has long relied on international partnerships for technological transfer, knowledge sharing, and digital innovation. This approach was evident when Singapore signed a $2.7bn deal in 2020 with Lockheed Martin to procure 12 F-35B multirole aircraft to replace its aging fleet of F-16s.
“As the first Southeast Asian country to acquire the F-35 aircraft, Singapore demonstrates its ambition to be a key military power in the region. Additionally, the country awarded a contract to acquire four Invincible-class (Type 218SG) submarines from Thyssenkrupp Marine Systems, which will enable the country to safeguard key maritime trade choke points in its vicinity, such as the Straits of Singapore and Malacca.
In parallel with its international collaborations, Singapore has also placed a strong emphasis on nurturing its domestic defense industry. As part of these efforts, the government has partnered with leading domestic defense company ST Engineering to indigenously produce 580 Next-Generation Armored Fighting Vehicles (AFVs) also known as the Hunter AFVs, and six Multi-Role Combat Vessels (MRCVs).
Debbarma concludes: “Singapore, alongside Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia, faces ongoing challenges in safeguarding the Malacca Strait, which is prone to piracy. The acquisition of advanced defense platforms by Singapore demonstrates its strategic efforts to combat piracy and ensure secure navigation through the Malacca Strait.
“Furthermore, the country also faces the vulnerability of being dragged into regional power struggles between bigger players such as the US and China. Owing to this, Singapore will continue to invest steadily in defense over this decade. Thus, the country’s forward-looking defense strategy underscores its determination to adapt to evolving security challenges while bolstering its regional standing and safeguarding critical maritime trade routes.” (Source: GlobalData)
26 Dec 24. Government of the United States of America- Government of Japan Guidelines for Extended Deterrence. The Alliance faces an increasingly severe strategic and nuclear threat environment. The Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America are committed to reinforcing extended deterrence in order to promote regional stability and deter the outbreak of conflict. Based upon accumulated discussion primarily through the Extended Deterrence Dialogue (EDD), the Governments of Japan and the United States have formulated the Guidelines for Extended Deterrence. This document reinforces the Alliance’s existing consultation and communication procedures related to extended deterrence. The Guidelines also address strategic messaging to maximize deterrence and enhance measures for U.S. extended deterrence, bolstered by Japan’s defense capabilities. The Alliance will continue to explore how best to ensure extended deterrence is strong and credible. (Source: U.S. DoD)
22 Dec 24. China says US ‘playing with fire’ after latest military aid for Taiwan. The Chinese government protested Sunday the latest American announcements of military sales and assistance to Taiwan, warning the United States that it is “playing with fire.” U.S. President Joe Biden on Saturday authorized the provision of up to $571m in Defense Department material and services and in military education and training for Taiwan. Separately, the Defense Department said Friday that $295 m in military sales had been approved. A Chinese Foreign Ministry statement urged the U.S. to stop arming Taiwan and stop what it called “dangerous moves that undermine peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.” The $571m in military assistance comes on top of Biden’s authorization of $567m for the same purposes in late September. The military sales include $265m for about 300 tactical radio systems and $30m for 16 gun mounts. Taiwan’s Foreign Ministry welcomed the approval of the two sales, saying in a social media post on X that it reaffirmed the U.S. government’s “commitment to our defense.” (Source: Defense News)
25 Dec 24. France’s military is being ousted from more African countries. It’s been a tumultuous month for France and its relationship with former colonies in Africa, as its influence on the continent faces the biggest challenge in decades. As Paris was devising a new military strategy that would sharply reduce its permanent troop presence in Africa, two of its closest allies struck a double blow. The government of Chad, considered France’s most stable and loyal partner in Africa, announced on its Independence Day it was ending defense cooperation to redefine its sovereignty. And in an interview published hours later by Le Monde, Senegal’s new president said it was “obvious” that soon French soldiers wouldn’t be on Senegalese soil.
“Just because the French have been here since the slavery period doesn’t mean it’s impossible to do otherwise,” President Bassirou Diomaye Faye said.
The announcements came as France was making efforts to revive waning influence on the continent. Foreign minister Jean-Noël Barrot was completing a visit to Chad and Ethiopia, and President Emmanuel Macron for the first time had recognized the killing of as many as 400 West African soldiers by the French Army in 1944.
French authorities stayed silent for almost 24 hours after Chad’s announcement, finally saying they were in “close dialogue” on the future of the partnership.
“Chad’s decision marks the final nail in the coffin of France’s post-colonial military dominance in the entire Sahel region,” said Mucahid Durmaz, a senior analyst at global risk consultancy Verisk Maplecroft, referring to the arid region south of the Sahara.
The decisions by Senegal and Chad “are part of the wider structural transformation in the region’s engagement with France, in which Paris political and military influence continues to diminish,” Durmaz added.
They follow the ousting of French forces in recent years by military-led governments in Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso, where local sentiments turned sour following years of French forces fighting alongside local ones in the face of stubborn Islamic extremist insurgencies.
What is France’s new strategy in Africa?
Jean-Marie Bockel, Macron’s personal envoy for Africa, last month presented to Macron his report on the evolution of the French military presence in Africa.
It was part of the “renewal of our partnership with African countries” that Macron announced in a 2017 speech in Burkina Faso in the early days of his presidency.
The details of Bockel’s report have not been made public. But three French top officials, speaking on condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive talks with the concerned countries, said France aimed for a sharp reduction of its military in all its bases in Africa except the Horn of Africa nation of Djibouti — where Macron is expected to travel in the coming days.
The officials said it doesn’t mean France would necessarily reduce military cooperation but instead would respond to needs expressed by countries. It could mean providing more specific training in airspace surveillance or drones and other aircraft. France also could deploy troops on a temporary basis.
The officials declined to confirm numbers of troop reductions but called it significant.
The French army earlier this year also set up a command for Africa, similar to the U.S. AFRICOM. Newly appointed commander Pascal Ianni specializes in influence and information warfare — a need highlighted by Russia’s growing presence in Africa.
“You can carry on your military cooperation like many countries do. But the idea of having permanent military bases, which then can be used as political ammunition against you and spun up in kind of a disinformation war, is maybe not the best way of going about things,” said Will Brown, a senior policy fellow at the European Center for Foreign Relations.
Meanwhile, France is trying to boost its economic presence in Africa’s anglophone countries like Nigeria, analysts said. Already, its two biggest trading partners on the continent are Nigeria and South Africa.
At the time of Chad’s announcement, Macron was hosting talks with Nigerian President Bola Tinubu.
Where does France have troops in West Africa, and why?
Since the independence of French colonies in Africa, France has maintained a policy of economic, political and military sway dubbed Françafrique, which included having thousands of permanent troops in the region.
France still has 600 troops in Ivory Coast, 350 in Senegal and 350 in Gabon, as well as around 1,500 in Djibouti. It has had 1,000 troops in Chad.
France’s defense ministry said the role of French troops in Africa is to train local soldiers and reinforce their capacities to fight extremism, mainly in peacekeeping, intelligence and logistics. But critics say keeping boots on the ground also has allowed Paris to retain influence and protect political regimes favorable to France.
“The countries of Francophone Africa want a change in the nature of this relationship,” said Gilles Yabi, head of the West Africa Citizen Think Tank.
Why are West African countries expelling French troops?
Growing anti-French sentiment has led to street protests in several West and North African countries, while governments that gained power on pledges of redefining relationships with the West say ties with France have not benefited the population. They want to explore options with Russia, China, Turkey and other powers.
Chad’s President Mahamat Deby “would not have made this decision if he did not have security guarantees from another actor,” Brown said. “We know he’s received serious support from the United Arab Emirates, who are very interested in what’s going on in neighboring Sudan and Darfur. We know that Turkey also made some outreach.”
Chad borders four countries with Russian military presence. In January, Deby traveled to Moscow to reinforce relations with the “partner country.”
Military leaders of Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso who expelled the French military have moved closer to Russia, which has mercenaries deployed across the Sahel who have been accused of abuses against civilians.
But the security situation has worsened in those countries, with increasing numbers of extremist attacks and civilian deaths from both armed groups and government forces. Over the first six months of this year, 3,064 civilians were killed, according to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, a 25% increase over the previous six months.
It is impossible to say whether the departure of French forces led to the increased violence. But it created a “huge security vacuum,” said analyst Shaantanu Shankar with the Economist Intelligence Unit, adding that it cannot be filled by Russia. Troops from the Russian private military company Wagner are being financed by the junta governments with fewer financial resources, he said. (Source: C4ISR & Networks)
27 Dec 24. China Unveils Potential Sixth-Generation Fighter Aircraft in Test Flights. China appears to have test-flown a sixth-generation crewed combat aircraft. The aircraft, described as a triangular, tailless design, was reportedly sighted over Chengdu, Sichuan Province.
Footage of the aircraft in flight emerged on Chinese social media, showing it being escorted by a fifth-generation Chengdu J-20 fighter jet, used as a chase plane. The prototype appears to incorporate cutting-edge stealth capabilities and endurance technologies.
The test flight reportedly took place near the Chengdu Aerospace Corporation facility.
Open-source intelligence analysts have pointed out the aircraft’s resemblance to speculative sixth-generation designs, though its exact specifications remain unconfirmed. Analysts caution that it could potentially be a fifth-generation fighter-bomber prototype under the J/H-XX program.
Within hours of the first reveal, imagery of a second, smaller tailless aircraft began circulating. While fewer details are available, it is believed to originate from the Shenyang Aircraft Corporation. This aircraft was shown being pursued by a Flanker-series fighter jet, possibly a two-seat J-16.
The test flights, which coincide with the birthday of Chairman Mao Zedong, the leader and founder of the People’s Republic of China, underscore China’s efforts to modernize its military and achieve parity with global airpower leaders.
The Pentagon has identified China as its “top pacing challenge,” citing the rapid modernization of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force and naval aviation. A senior U.S. defense also official recently noted that China’s unmanned aerial systems and advanced fighter programs are quickly approaching U.S. standards.
Globally, multiple countries are working on sixth-generation fighter programs. The U.S. is advancing its Next Generation Air Dominance program to replace the F-22 Raptor. Meanwhile, the U.K., Italy, and Japan are collaborating on the Global Combat Air Program, which aims to introduce the Tempest fighter jet by 2035. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
20 Dec 24. Joint statement on Afghanistan. Joint statement on the situation in Afghanistan following a G7+ meeting in Geneva. Special Envoys and Representatives for Afghanistan of Canada, the European Union, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Norway, the Republic of Korea, Switzerland, Türkiye, the United Kingdom, and the United States met in Geneva on December 16, 2024 to discuss the situation in Afghanistan. Deputy Special Representative for Afghanistan in the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights, Representatives of the World Bank (WB) and of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) also participated in the meeting as observers.
The Special Envoys and Representatives for Afghanistan:
- Expressed grave concern over the Taliban’s decisions in December 2024 to ban women and girls from attending public and private medical training institutions; and expressed concern that this new ban will have devastating consequences for all Afghans, especially mothers and infants – both born and unborn, both boys and girls – and will further destabilize an already fragile healthcare system. These decisions, which come on the back of the Taliban’s “Law on the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice” announced in August 2024, expand upon the already over 80 repressive, discriminatory edicts aimed at excluding Afghan women and girls from education, public and economic life. We call for the immediate reversal of these unacceptable practices and policies.
- Noted with grave concern recent terrorist attacks in Kabul and the region, as well as the continuing threat terrorism poses to security and stability in Afghanistan; and acknowledged the Taliban actions to tackle terrorist threats from ISIS-K, while recalling the need for the Taliban to pursue actions to tackle terrorist threats, in accordance with Resolution 2593 of the United Nations Security Council and underscoring that some terrorist groups still reside safely inside Afghanistan and are able to plan and carry-out internal and cross-border terrorist strikes.
- Underscored that achieving long-term stability in Afghanistan requires a credible and inclusive national dialogue leading to a constitutional order with a representative and inclusive political system, as well as accountable political leaders and the State of Afghanistan meeting its international obligations.
- Emphasized the need for implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2721 (2023), which took positive note of the UN’s independent assessment prepared pursuant to UNSCR 2679 (2023), encouraged member states and all other relevant stakeholders to consider implementation of its recommendations and requested the UN Secretary General to appoint a Special Envoy for Afghanistan to take forward a process between Afghan stakeholders and the international community for long term peace and stability in Afghanistan.
- Commended the work of the United Nations, including the UN-led Doha Process, and recognized the important and specific work of UNAMA, UN agencies present in the country, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the many international and local NGOs and other humanitarian actors that continue to support the people of Afghanistan through ongoing social and humanitarian crisis.
- Reaffirmed that international NGOs are indispensable to humanitarian work in Afghanistan; and reinforced the importance of a united humanitarian response that includes representation from UN agencies, international and national NGOs, and other humanitarian actors.
- Highlighted the necessity to continue helping Afghans who are suffering in the ongoing humanitarian crisis with appropriate consideration for vulnerable populations, including women and women-led households, children and members of ethnic and religious minority communities.
- Looked forward to deepening engagement with neighbouring countries and other countries of the region on a joint response to the developing situation in Afghanistan, including countering potential threats such as terrorism and illegal migration to regional security and stability emanating from Afghanistan; commended the efforts of Muslim-majority countries and the OIC in engaging with the Taliban on women’s and girls’ rights and welcomed the leadership they have demonstrated on issues such as access to education and encouraged them to continue their active engagement on these and related issues.
- Expressed their appreciation to Switzerland for organizing these consultations and hosting the meeting; and looked forward to this Group of Special Envoys and Representatives meeting again in the near future.
- (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)
20 Dec 24. Brazil: Arrest of Islamic State propagandist is unlikely to raise attack, international terrorism risks. According to reports on 19 December, the authorities arrested an individual in São Carlos (São Paulo state) accused of leading an online Islamic State (IS) propaganda cell. The man led a group on the online platform TechHaven called ‘Comando 860’ in which he recruited minors; he shared instructions to develop Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and other propagandistic materials. In his home, the security forces found bladed weapons, chemical products and fake firearms. Additionally, earlier in July, an individual was sentenced to prison in São Paulo state after he attempted to flee to Turkey and join IS in 2023. Extremist groups are likely attracted to the Latin American region by the financial benefits offered through the illicit drug trade and money laundering networks. In turn, the arrests do not indicate an expansion of IS’s operational capabilities or those of other groups in the Latin American region. As such, we assess that the incidents are unlikely to elevate attack risks or international terrorism across the region in the medium-to-long term. However, given the financial importance of Latin America, there is a realistic possibility that groups such as IS or Hezbollah look to increase their regional presence, increasing organised crime risks in the long term. (Source: Sibylline)
20 Dec 24. Syria: Doubling of US troop numbers in Syria will partially mitigate prospects of IS resurgence. On 19 December, Pentagon spokesperson Pat Ryder revealed that the number of US soldiers operating in Syria has recently increased temporarily to nearly 2000 soldiers, more than double previous estimates. Ryder didn’t mention a specific timeframe but he added that the additional forces have been in Syria since before the ousting of former President Bashar al-Assad. The additional forces will partially mitigate the threat of Islamic State (IS) resurgence as the group will attempt to capitalise on the current security vacuum. The troops will also support the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in maintaining security in eastern Syria as the SDF prisons still hold thousands of jihadist fighters. However, the security situation in eastern Syria remains highly volatile amid persistent SDF clashes with Turkey-backed militias and ongoing domestic unrest by Arabic clans. We assess that this will elevate risks of wider security deterioration in Kurdish-held territories in 2025 despite increasing US troops in the area. (Source: Sibylline)
20 Dec 24. Taiwan: Political polarisation drives risk of further domestic unrest in medium term. Earlier on 20 December, several thousand protesters gathered outside the Legislative Yuan in the capital Taipei. Protesters reportedly attempted to breach barricades around the building, leading to scuffles with the police. The rally was the last of a three-day series of demonstrations titled ‘Winter Bluebird in Taipei’ organised by two civic groups. The protests opposed three amendments proposed by the opposition Kuomintang (KMT) party regarding judicial and electoral processes as well as fiscal governance. The governing Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has called on the public to resist the bills. Political tensions remain elevated following January’s elections in which the DPP won the presidency while the KMT, along with the opposition Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), attained a majority in the Legislative Yuan. In recent days, lawmakers have scuffled with each other inside parliament, leading to injuries. Given the conflicting agendas of the opposition-controlled legislature and the DPP-led Executive Yuan, we assess that further spikes in tensions are likely surrounding legislative reforms; this sustains the risk of large-scale protests, which will likely remain largely peaceful. (Source: Sibylline)
20 Dec 24. Ethiopia: Attacks underscore growing cross-fire and misidentification risks. On 18 December, Fano militants killed at least one person and wounded several others in a series of IED and grenade attacks in the regional capital Bahir Dar (Amhara region) during regional pro-government rallies. On the same day, artillery, explosives and small arms attacks were also recorded in several other towns and cities across Amhara region, including Debre Berhan and Weldiya. Before the demonstrations, Fano had stated that those who participated were engaging in treason. While Fano has largely been unable to hold larger towns and cities against the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF), the attacks underline their enduring capacity to conduct limited operations throughout the region. While such attacks have typically primarily targeted government and military figures as representatives of the Ethiopian state, these latest incidents underline a broader willingness to target private citizens deemed supportive of the federal government. We assess that this will raise the risk of more indiscriminate violence in public spaces and misidentification over the coming months, elevating crossfire risks to local and visiting staff in Amhara. (Source: Sibylline)
20 Dec 24. Chad: Likely Russian efforts to secure strategic partnership will likely drive anti-French sentiment. On 19 December, sources reported that Chad requested the departure of all French troops before 31 January 2025. The possible deadline will almost certainly result in significant logistical challenges for the French security forces, given the presence of over 1,000 soldiers in Chad. There is a possibility that this represents an attempt to increase pressure on Paris for the sake of negotiating better terms for a strategic partnership. However, even if this is the case, it’s possible that France will rebuff such efforts, reducing Chad’s aerial and surveillance capabilities. This will likely increase Chad’s vulnerability to jihadist attacks emanating from the Lake Chad area. Russia will likely view these security deficiencies as an opportunity to secure new security contracts, driving attempts to bolster local support for a strategic partnership with Moscow. We assess that this will increase the risk of anti-French protests and growing hostility facing French business and investment over the coming months. (Source: Sibylline)
19 Dec 24. Italy bristles at prospect of Russia moving ships from Syria to Libya. Russia is moving military assets from Syria to Libya, creating a security threat in the central Mediterranean, Italy’s defense minister has said.
“Moscow is transferring resources from its Syrian base at Tartus to Libya,” Guido Crosetto told Italian daily La Repubblica.
“That is not a good thing. Russian ships and submarines in the Mediterranean are always a concern, and even more so if instead of being 1,000 kilometers away they are two steps from us,” he said.
Since Syrian dictator Bashar Assad fled rebels this month, the Russian forces backing him have moved personnel and material to two bases it manages in the country: one at the port of Tartus and one at Hmeimim air base.
Amid speculation Russia may leave the country, satellite images show Russian warships previously docked at Tartus have put out to sea, prompting theories they might head to Tobruk in eastern Libya, where Moscow has been negotiating a formal deal to use the city’s port withlocal leader Gen. Khalifa Haftar.
If Russia loses use of Tartus it would be denied a port to base naval vessels in the Mediterranean, making Libya a highly desirable alternative.
Analyst Jalel Harchaoui said that while there was no evidence of naval vessels heading for Libya – yet – there was plenty of evidence of increased Russian flights arriving.
“Russian activity in Libya has been more intense of late,” said Harchaoui, an analyst at the Royal United Services Institute think tank in London.
“Three cargo flights recently arrived from Belarus as well as at least one cargo flight direct from Russia, which reminds us that Syria was a very useful stepping stone for flights from Russia to Africa, but not essential,” he said.
Moscow already has military bases in eastern Libya which are staging posts for troops and material being sent to back military coup leaders in sub-Saharan Africa.
“We don’t know if the warships from Tartus will pop up in Libya but it already looks like Russia is increasing its presence there. And even if Russia keeps a presence in Syria, it counts as a downgrade and the Russians will likely look to recreate their level of comfort in Libya,” he said.
“If they do move into Tobruk, it would be seen as a brazen gesture by NATO and the U.S., and a sign that Haftar is no longer even pretending to listen to the West. The question is, will the U.S. and the U.K. then use coercion?”
Ben Fishman, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, told Defense News, “I would be totally unsurprised if Russia is moving assets to Libya – they have been courting Haftar precisely for scenarios like this.”
He added, “I think the U.S. should go on record with any evidence it has of a Russian build-up, as it has on previous occasions.”
In recent months, Haftar has met with U.S. officials who want to discuss reunifying the eastern half of Libya he controls with western Libya, which is run by a UN-recognized administration in Tripoli.
A U.S. chargé d’affaires in Libya, Jeremy Berndt, kept channels open on Wednesday by meeting with two of Haftar’s increasingly influential sons in Benghazi.
Mohamed Eljarh, a Benghazi-based managing partner at consultancy firm Libya Desk, said, “Unlike the Syria case, there is no evidence of any formal agreement between Haftar and Russia for a Russian military presence in Libya. Russia’s access to Libya has come through informal agreements and understandings that it will supply training and equipment to the LNA.”
The Libyan National Army, or LNA, is Haftar’s military force.
Eljarh added, “I sense there could be a temporary arrangement with Russia to host more Russian assets now that Moscow in on the back foot in Syria. But Haftar has a history of saying no to the Russians when certain lines are crossed.”
This week, CNN quoted unnamed U.S. officials claiming Russian naval vessels were already moving from Tartus to Libya.
Eljarh said, “LNA contacts tell me reports have been exaggerated and that the LNA is sending signals to the U.S. saying, ‘We are worried you are targeting us with all this exaggerated media campaign – please make your intentions clear.’”
Amid talk of Russia shifting assets to Libya, analyst Claudia Gazzini said one state was being forgotten – Turkey, which provides military support to the Tripoli government.
“You would need Turkish acquiescence here,” said Gazzini, a Libya expertat the Crisis Group.
“I cannot imagine the Turks and the Russians have not discussed the matter. What have been the contours of that conversation?” (Source: Defense News)
19 Dec 24. DOD Announces 2,000 Troops in Syria, Department Prepared for Government Shutdown. The Defense Department today announced that there are approximately 2,000 U.S. troops deployed to Syria, which is roughly 1,100 more than had been reported in the past. “We have been briefing regularly that there are approximately 900 U.S. troops in Syria,” Pentagon Press Secretary Air Force Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder told reporters.
” in light of the situation in Syria and the significant interest, we recently learned that those numbers higher, there are approximately 2,000 U.S. troops in Syria,” he continued.
Ryder elaborated by making the distinction that the additional 1,100 personnel are considered “temporary rotational forces” — often in theater for 30 to 90 days — that are deployed to meet the fluid mission requirements of U.S. Central Command’s area of responsibility.
Conversely, the other 900 personnel are considered “core” assets who are on longer term deployments that typically last approximately nine to 12 months.
Ryder explained that such fluctuations in numbers of personnel are often quite common, and that the additional forces have been in place since before the Dec. 8 downfall of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime.
Also, during today’s briefing, Ryder said the Defense Department is prepared to continue carrying out its mission despite the potential for a partial government shutdown beginning Saturday.
“In the event of a lapse in funding and a shutdown of the government, the Department of Defense will continue to carry out our fundamental responsibility and mission to defend our nation and the American people,” Ryder said.
“Military personnel on active duty — including reserve component personnel on federal active duty — would continue to report for duty and carry out assigned missions worldwide to defend our nation and protect our national security interests,” he continued.
Ryder said that, as DOD is a planning organization, the department has been conducting “prudent planning and preparations for a potential shutdown,” noting that senior Defense Department leadership has been continually updating contingency plans.
” and DOD leaders are monitoring the situation closely and remain committed to doing everything possible to mitigate the significant impacts that a lapse in funding and subsequent shutdown would have on the department,” Ryder said.
Though Ryder made clear that active component personnel and reserve component personnel currently on federal active duty would continue to report for duty in the event of a shutdown, he did point out the caveat that those service members would not be paid until new funds are appropriated by Congress.
“Additionally,” Ryder continued, ” civilian personnel — including military technicians — who are not necessary to carry out or support accepted activities would be furloughed with a lapse in appropriations.”
Ryder added that, as a lapse in funding could cause “serious disruptions” for the Defense Department, such a shutdown is still avoidable.
“DOD urges Congress to reach a bipartisan, bicameral agreement on Fiscal Year 2025 appropriations and avoid a — or worse — a government shutdown,” Ryder said.
Prior to this article’s publication, House Republicans had agreed to a new government funding bill that would include a debt limit increase.
A vote on the bill is expected at 6 p.m. ET. (Source: U.S. DoD)
19 Dec 24. Libya: Negotiations over unified government are unlikely to lead to elections in H1 2025. On 18 December, representatives from Libya’s two rival legislative bodies resumed talks in Morocco, in the capital Rabat, amid renewed attempts to resolve the political deadlock and internal divisions between the eastern and western governments. The talks come days after the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) announced the formation of a technical committee that would identify key milestones for a unified government. We assess there is a realistic possibility the new committee will serve as a basis for further discussions over the coming weeks. However, any progress will highly likely be challenged by multiple complex issues including the unification of the armed forces, militia influence and the role of the Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Khalifa Haftar in any future government. This will likely further delay the presidential and parliamentary elections beyond H1 2025, sustaining policy stagnation and governance challenges in addition to driving unrest and energy security risks. (Source: Sibylline)
19 Dec 24. Pakistan: Latest US sanctions highlight risk of further sanctions targeting defence companies. On 18 December, the US State Department announced new sanctions against four entities related to Pakistan’s long-range ballistic missile programme. The sanctions target the state-owned National Development Complex (NDC, cited as responsible for the programme) as well as three private firms based in Karachi (Sindh province) for working with NDC to procure components for the country’s long-range ballistic missile program and missile-testing equipment. The State Department stated that the sanctions, imposed under an executive order, ‘target proliferators of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery’. The new sanctions will reportedly freeze any US-based property belonging to the targeted entities and prohibit US citizens and US firms from engaging in business with them. We assess that the latest sanctions will increase compliance risks for defence companies operating in the country, including those working with state agencies and entities, heightening the risk of further sanctions. (Source: Sibylline)
19 Dec 24. South Korea: Policy stagnation is highly likely as legislative deadlock persists during interim period. Earlier on 19 December, Acting President Han Duck-soo vetoed six bills sponsored by the opposition Democratic Party (DP). This is the first time Han has used the presidential veto power since assuming South Korea’s interim leadership on 14 December following the impeachment and suspension of President Yoon Suk-yeol. Two of the bills address parliamentary processes and four concern agricultural-related policies; this included the contentious Grain Management Act amendment, relating to government intervention in rice markets, which Han stated would cause ‘massive financial burdens’ for the government. While the DP has sufficient seats in the National Assembly to pass bills without the support of the governing People Power Party (PPP), it lacks the 200-seat supermajority required to override vetoes, limiting its legislative power. Under Yoon’s administration, this contributed to frequent deadlock, and the situation will likely persist during the transitional period as the Constitutional Court reviews the impeachment motion. We assess that this will highly likely drive further policy stagnation over the coming months as partisan divisions stall the legislative process. (Source: Sibylline)
19 Dec 24. EU land and naval ops in the Horn of Africa and Somalia extended. Further evidence of the strategic importance attached to the Horn of Africa/Somalia region comes from the European Union (EU). The council of the 27 country European bloc this week extended the mandate of Operation Atalanta and its EUTM (EU Training Mission) Somalia to 28 February 2027. This follows a 5 December decision to maintain the EU civilian capacity building mission (EUCAP Somalia) to the same date.
“The decisions,” an EU statement has it, “were taken following the holistic strategic review of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSP) engagement in Somalia and the Horn of Africa, with the aim to strengthen the EU’s response to an evolving security context and to enhance its role as a maritime security provider”.
The Operation Atalanta mandate is extended to enhance maritime security off the coast of Somalia, in the Gulf of Aden, the West Indian Ocean and parts of the Red Sea and “better support building a wider regional maritime security architecture”. With the new Atalanta, the EU will continue its fight against piracy and reduce illicit trafficking at sea. Synergies with Operation Aspides, currently protecting merchant shipping in the Red Sea, will be enhanced. In parallel, the Maritime Security Centre (MSC) Horn of Africa, supporting both Atalanta and Aspides, will be rebranded as MSC Indian Ocean with what the statement says is a “reinforced role”.
“In Somalia, the EU CSDP action was widened to support the build-up of Somali Security Forces and institutions with a view to take over responsibility for its own security in the future, in line with the Joint EU-Somalia roadmap.
“With the renewed mandates, EUCAP and EUTM Somalia will support the build-up of capable, sustainable and accountable Somali security institutions through strategic advice, mentoring and training, accompanied by EU-funded equipment support through the European Peace Facility (EPF). To strengthen the regional approach, the missions and the operation will support capacity-building efforts of the regional and, in particular, Djibouti maritime security forces within their means and capabilities.
“In order to uphold EU core values, all activities will pay particular attention to international humanitarian law, human rights, preventing gender-based violence, protecting children in armed conflicts and promoting the agenda of women, peace and security and climate, security and defence,” the statement reads. (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
19 Dec 24. South Africa – and others – watching developments in Mozambique. It’s not only South Africa as an immediate neighbour keeping a weather eye on Mozambique where post-election protests and violence are ongoing. The European Union (EU) – with an 80 personnel strong military assistance mission (MAM) and the United States (US) by way of its embassy in the Southern African country – are also keeping a close watch on the situation. Another indicator was a brief visit to Kruger Mpumalanga International Airport (KMIA), 85 nautical miles from Maputo International Airport (MPM/FQMA), by a US Air Force (USAF) C-17 Globemaster III last week, reportedly part of US over-watch.
The airlifter, reports have it, flew with a special mission call sign, not the call sign used by the USAF for its embassy support flights to Africa.
A demonstration alert issued by the US Embassy in Mozambique has it “protests, roadblocks, looting and civil unrest related to national election results are expected to continue throughout the holiday season, beginning 17 December”.
“Police regularly fire tear gas, rubber bullets, and live ammunition to disperse crowds,” the alert notes, continuing, “many protest events have seen large groups blocking roads and stopping vehicle traffic”.
“Cars have been attacked and vehicle occupants forced to pay sums of money to continue safely or forced to turn around. In addition, there have been temporary closures of major roads and toll gates across Mozambique. Entry and exit to Maputo International Airport and regional airports may be temporarily blocked due to protests and physical barriers. Land border crossings to neighbouring South Africa and Eswatini have been similarly blocked and these may happen at border crossings with Zimbabwe, Malawi, and Tanzania. Closures are likely to be sporadic and last several hours.”
In response to a defenceWeb inquiry an EU spokesperson said: “In the light of current events, a significant part of EUMAM training activities have been adapted”.
“Advisory and mentor teams are not in field and are preparing the staff officers’ course for the administrative command element. Similarly, future activities are being prepared by EUMAM legal, cultural and gender advisors.
“The work of EUMAM continues and the mission has taken additional security measures and conducts regular meetings with FADM (Forças Armadas de Defesa de Moçambique),” defenceWeb was told with the rider that the mission’s mandate is to help the Mozambican armed forces in the fight against terrorists in Cabo Delgado.
“The mission has no role in other events taking place in the country.”
A South African government delegation led by International Relations and Co-operation Minister Ronald Lamola yesterday (Wednesday, 18 December) used the eastern Mpumalanga town Malelane as the venue for bilateral talks with Mozambican government representatives. The South African delegation included representatives from the departments of Defence and Military Veterans; Home Affairs, and Trade, Industry and Competition as well as the Border Management Authority (BMA), SA Police Service (SAPS) and SA Revenue Service (SARS).
Government news agency SANews, quoting a statement issued after the Malelane briefing has it, among others, there would be “frequent and continuous engagements at diplomatic and bilateral levels to mitigate disruptions to trade and supply chains”. Lamola and his Mozambican counterpart Pascoal Ronda further committed to identifying alternative routes and deploy additional resources to expedite and facilitate trade to limit “disruptions”. (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
19 Dec 24. Vietnam PM eyes expansion of defence cooperation, U.S. offers to play role. Vietnam wants to expand its international defence cooperation to build trust and prevent wars, its prime minister said on Thursday, and the United States said it was hopeful its defence industry could play a key role. In remarks to open Vietnam’s second international arms fair, Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh said the expo was “a message of peace, cooperation and development”. The arms fair, which will run until Sunday, is being held at Gia Lam Airport in Hanoi, with nearly 250 exhibitors from dozens of countries, including the United States, China, Russia, Britain, Iran and Israel. Chinh said Vietnam would maintain its “four no” policy of not participating in military alliances, not aligning with one country to oppose another, not allowing foreign military bases or the use of its territory against another country, and not using force or the threat of it in international relations. On the sidelines of the expo, U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam Marc Knapper said U.S. defence firms could team up with Vietnamese counterparts in multiple areas, including joint production and technology transfers. (Source: Google/Reuters)
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