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28 Nov 24. Ruble Plunges Against Dollar as Sanctions and Inflation Weigh on Russian Economy. The Russian ruble has fallen to its lowest level since March 2022, trading at 113 to the U.S. dollar this week. This decline reflects mounting economic pressures, including Western sanctions, reduced export revenues, and soaring inflation. The ruble’s slide follows new sanctions targeting Gazprombank, a major conduit for Russian gas payments, further restricting Moscow’s ability to engage in international transactions. Coupled with declining export revenues and rising military spending, these sanctions have weakened Russia’s trade balance and contributed to the ruble’s depreciation. Russia’s inflation rate has reached 8.5%, more than double the Central Bank’s target. Rising costs for basic goods, such as food, are straining household budgets. The Central Bank raised interest rates to 21% in October to curb inflation and stabilize the currency, with further increases expected in December. To manage the ruble’s volatility, the Central Bank announced it would halt foreign currency purchases until the end of 2024. Finance Minister Anton Siluanov argued that a weaker ruble benefits exporters by increasing their earnings in foreign currencies. However, the devaluation raises the cost of imports, reducing purchasing power and fueling inflation. Economic analysts warn that Russia is entering a period of stagflation, characterized by high inflation and stagnant growth. Non-military sectors of the economy are showing signs of decline, while military spending continues to dominate the budget. Nearly a third of the 2024 budget is allocated to defense expenditures. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
28 Nov 24. Syrian rebels launch surprise attack against Assad. First major offensive by jihadists in four years takes Russian and Iranian-backed Assad regime by surprise. Syrian jihadists launched their first major offensive in four years against government positions near Aleppo, claiming to have captured several villages on the edge of the city. The surprise offensive by rebel forces belonging to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and allies saw heavy fighting on the western side of the city where front lines had become largely frozen. At least 57 people were killed in the clashes, a group monitoring the war said. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said “26 members of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and allied factions” were killed, as well as “31 members of the regime forces”. There were also unconfirmed reports that the jihadists had captured the base of the Syrian army’s 46th Regiment base, only three miles from Aleppo. The air forces of both Syria and its ally Russia struck the attacking jihadists in the area for the first time in years, the UK-based Observatory said. HTS is the main active rebel group in northwestern Syria where it controls an enclave of around half of Idlib province and small parts of neighbouring Aleppo, Latakia and Hama, where around 2.9m displaced people are living. (Source: Daily Telegraph)
28 Nov 24. Syria: Major offensive in western Aleppo governorate will exacerbate regional geopolitical tensions. On 27 November, Syrian opposition armed groups, led by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), launched the largest offensive targeting the Syrian Armed Forces (SAF) in north-western Syria since 2020. At the time of writing, the opposition has captured at least 19 villages in western Aleppo governorate, as well as the key 46th Regiment base, killing and capturing dozens of SAF personnel and members of Iran-backed militias. While HTS and its jihadist allies are operating nearly 4.3 miles (7km) to the west of Aleppo (around Kafr Naha), it is highly unlikely that the opposition will attempt to capture the city in the coming days; its main goal is likely to deter the SAF from conducting attacks on opposition territories in Idlib governorate. However, given the fast pace of the ongoing operations, the offensive will likely expand to broader parts of western Aleppo; it will also possibly cut the key M5 provincial highway. As such, we assess that the offensive will likely exacerbate regional geopolitical tensions. There is also a realistic possibility that it will mutate into a new phase of active armed conflict in Syria. (Source: Sibylline)
27 Nov 24. Iraq: Evacuations of Shia militant groups signal elevated regional tensions, possible Israeli strikes. On 26 November, the prominent Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr ordered Saraya al-Salam (SAS, the military wing of the Sadr movement) to relocate its regional offices and headquarters away from residential areas. The relocation will allegedly be completed in 40 days. However, the decision has notably excluded SAS posts in Samarra (Saladin governorate). The move coincides with reports of evacuations of bases, weapons depots and lodgings since early November (these sites belong to several Iran-backed militias in Iraq). While Iran does not back SAS, the developments signal growing preparations for possible Israeli strikes against Iraqi Shia militant groups in response to the daily drone and missile attacks targeting Israel. This will elevate security and bystander risks near offices, bases and weapons depots belonging to the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) umbrella group and SAS nationwide. We assess these risks will be particularly heightened in the capital Baghdad as well as in al-Anbar, Basra, Najaf and Saladin governorates, particularly if drone attacks against Israel continue in the coming weeks. (Source: Sibylline)
27 Nov 24. Russia: Restrictions on foreign investment underscore rising regulatory framework risks, hostility. Earlier on 27 November, Russia’s State Duma passed a bill in the second and third readings that imposes restrictions on companies with more than 25% foreign ownership. The bill excludes such companies from benefiting from state support under capital investment protection and promotion agreements (IPPA), as well as from using dispute resolution methods under IPPAs. The bill clearly underscores the growing hostility towards foreign investment. At the same time, the Russian authorities have imposed significant obstacles for foreign corporate exits, in particular by forcing foreign entities to sell their assets in Russia at discounted prices. By deterring foreign investment, the bill will shift Russian businesses’ investment strategy, which will increasingly seek investment from domestic actors. Russian elites with close links to the Kremlin (and who account for a large share of the country’s wealth) are highly likely to invest more in Russian businesses, further expanding their footprint in the country’s economy. Ultimately, we assess that the latest bill underscores the growing regulatory framework risks and hostility to foreign investment in Russia’s business environment. (Source: Sibylline)
27 Nov 24. China: Reported anti-graft probe into defence minister points to ongoing military corruption concerns. Earlier on 27 November, international media reported that Chinese Minister of National Defense Dong Jun is under investigation for corruption. A Chinese foreign ministry spokeswoman claimed that the reports were ‘chasing wind and shadows’, though references to Dong have been censored on Chinese social media. If the reports are confirmed, Dong would be the third successive defence minister to be investigated for graft. In June, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) expelled Dong’s predecessors, Li Shangfu and Wei Fenghe, for ‘serious violations of discipline’ (a euphemism for corruption). Over the past 18 months, the CCP has purged senior military personnel. If the reports are accurate, this would highlight that the CCP’s probe into military graft remains unfinished and that further purges are likely. It would also indicate that President Xi Jinping lacks confidence in the military’s capabilities, particularly as he only appointed Dong in December 2023. In the coming months, we assess that Xi will likely continue to focus on rooting out corruption in the military, while also ensuring personal loyalty and ideological purity within its upper echelon. (Source: Sibylline)
25 Nov 24. Pakistan: Ongoing clashes, march in capital Islamabad underscore elevated risk of violence. Earlier on 26 November, thousands of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) supporters entered the capital Islamabad and reached D-Chowk (where they plan to stage a sit-in). The protesters are demanding the release of their incarcerated leader, Imran Khan. Overnight, heavy clashes were reported between the police and the protesters, with the police using tear gas and rubber bullets to disperse the crowds. In response, the government has invoked Article 245 and deployed the army in Islamabad to maintain law and order and protect government buildings. At least four paramilitary personnel have been killed by speeding vehicles, with the government blaming protesters. Two police officers have also been killed in protest-related violence. Additionally, two protesters have allegedly been killed and four others injured due to firing from rangers. Additional convoys, particularly from Punjab province, are expected to join the protesters at D-Chowk today. Given the deployment of thousands of paramilitary force personnel at D-Chowk, clashes between protesters and security forces are highly likely, especially if the security forces resort to the use of live ammunition and tear gas. (Source: Sibylline)
26 Nov 24. Myanmar: Insurgent group’s call for peace talks underscores China’s more active support for junta. On 25 November, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), an ethnic armed organisation (EAO) operating in Shan state and Mandalay region, stated that it was ready for peace talks with the junta. The TNLA, along with two other EAOs, launched an offensive against the Tatmadaw (Myanmar’s military) in October 2023 and has made significant territorial gains. The TNLA cited the impact of junta airstrikes on civilians as well as China’s mediation efforts in its call for negotiations. We assess that recent military setbacks in Nawnghkio township (Shan) and pressure from China were also probable factors. After clashes in August threatened Myanmar’s second-largest city of Mandalay, China closed border crossings to TNLA-controlled areas and warned the group to cease fighting. Beijing also appears increasingly willing to support the Tatmadaw in regaining control of several more central areas following junta leader Min Aung Hlaing’s visit to the country earlier this month. We assess a ceasefire between the junta and the TNLA would unlikely be tenable or long-lasting. (Source: Sibylline)
26 Nov 24. Mozambique the most overt manifestation of terrorism in southern Africa. Terrorist activity in Mozambique is the most prominent and overt manifestation of jihadi terrorism in southern Africa, according to a new report. The Middle East Africa Research Institute (MEARI), in a recent publication entitled ‘Tracking Terrorism Trends in Africa,’ reported that although southern Africa is yet to fully see the massive “explosion” of jihadi terror on the scale that has been witnessed elsewhere on the continent, terrorism firmly emerged in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province.
“The group now known as Islamic State Mozambique (ISM) emerged as an armed group in October 2017, known locally both as Ahlu-Sunnah wal Jama’a (ASWJ) for its ideological underpinnings and al-Shabaab for its extensive use of violence,” MEARI stated.
Al-Shabaab has not been particularly outspoken about the goals of its insurgency, but it has articulated a desire to establish rule by a hardline version of Islamic law in Cabo Delgado. The group’s aims appear to centre on undermining and degrading the Mozambican government’s military and political authority. Religious and ethnic tensions, alongside poor regional economic conditions, are also reportedly prominent factors motivating the violence. The militants are believed by local leaders and community members to be primarily “disaffected” youth motivated by complex political, economic, and social factors including feelings of marginalisation and disagreements with religious authorities in Cabo Delgado. The insurgency’s socio-economic roots were also raised, linked to Cabo Delgado’s perceived “resource curse”, whereby despite abundant natural fossil resources, the local population remains impoverished and does not reap the benefits of their exploitation, according to the report. Decades of government neglect and systematic underinvestment have left Cabo Delgado the poorest province in Mozambique. This has created a widespread sense of resentment and frustration, especially among Mwani and Makua ethnic groups, who blame the dominance of Maconde ethnic business elites and local officials—the ethnic group of President Filipe Nyusi—for the Mwani and Makua’s political and economic exclusion. The discovery of rubies in Montepuez in 2009 and liquid natural gas in the seabed off Palma in 2010 have exacerbated tensions, as communities who lost access to their fishing grounds or were cleared off their cultivated land in Cabo Delgado are yet to see promises of job opportunities and prosperity materialize. Scores of Mwani and Makua youth eventually joined ASWJ. Mozambican armed forces were ill-equipped and poorly trained to handle a militant Islamist insurgency. They responded to ASWJ’s brutal acts of violence with their own ruthless tactics that reportedly included the widespread use of torture, extrajudicial executions of civilians suspected of supporting the group, and the mutilation of bodies of presumed ASWJ fighters. This only further increased ASWJ recruitment and violent reprisals against civilians, MEARI research found. Severe feelings of collective discontent among the Northern locals have served as a fertile recruitment basis for the extremist group. Despite its rapid growth up to 2021, it has been one of the Islamic State’s (IS) most opaque affiliates. ISM was first recognized far later as a distinct IS province – only in May 2022, having previously been under the broader Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP) organization from as early as 2018. In terms of the growth period from 2017-2019 – the insurgency’s early years, the group was marked by a lack of a clear identity. The names ‘ASWJ’ and ‘al-Shabaab’ signalled violent jihadist ideology, but public messaging from the militants themselves was rare. Nevertheless, the targeting of civilians by insurgents obscured any political objectives, MEARI reported.
“At first Islamic State Mozambique’s political objectives were not immediately apparent or overt. They first became clearer when formal affiliation of the insurgents with ISCAP was issued through IS media channels in June 2019. The Islamic State’s Central Africa Province (ISCAP), with the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) operating in DRC, at its centre, had formally been acknowledged by IS in 2018. The ADF/ISCAP relations with Cabo Delgado’s insurgent group predated June 2019 considerably. The United Nations Group of Experts presented evidence of movement between ADF and Cabo Delgado’s insurgent group as early as 2017. The affiliation with IS sharpened the Cabo Delgado insurgents’ ideology and would translate into both technical assistance and external financial support.”
According to ACLED analysis, tactical training was provided as early as 2020. There is also evidence of payments to Mozambique as early as 2020, through the remittance of money that had been raised in Somalia and South Africa and sent to Mozambique and DRC through agents in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda.
The impact of Islamic State support from Somalia became increasingly apparent in 2020 and 2021. This permitted ISM to increase its operations and allowing the insurgency to reach the peak of engagement in political violence events in June 2020. Insurgents targeted urban centres, seized control of Mocímboa da Praia town in August 2020, for at least a year and twice threatened the LNG project at Palma. Insurgents targeted state institutions such as garrisons, police stations, health centres, and schools. They also regularly targeted neighbourhoods dominated by state employees and the homes of prominent figures in the ruling Frelimo party or business people. The shift in operations and targets was seen to be indicative of an increased interest in taking on the state and undermining LNG investment in the region. Between January and November 2020, the group was responsible for over 400 violent incidents that left more than 1,300 people dead. The insurgents’ attack on Palma town on 24 March 2021 presented a real threat to the LNG project. Total had to declare force majeure in April 2021 because of the degrading security situation. In response both SADC (SAMIM) and Rwanda intervened in July 2021. As a reflection of the critical importance of the LNG project to both the Mozambican government and to the insurgents, the Rwandan military deployed in Palma and Mocimboa da Praia districts. The Rwanda Security Forces (RSF) successfully gained control of both district headquarters by August 2021, less than two months after the initial RSF deployment. The terrorist group officially began operating as ‘Islamic State Mozambique Province’ in May 2022, identifying itself as such in its communications through IS media channels, as well as in its direct messaging in Cabo Delgado communities. The number of violent incidents linked to militant Islamist groups in northern Mozambique increased by 29% in 2022 to 437—a reversal of the 23% drop in 2021. Dislodged from the cities of Palma and Mocimboa da Praia along the coast, smaller groups of militants relocated to more rural districts west and south, preying on villages—committing killings, beheadings, abductions, looting, and the destruction of property. In 2023, the group was estimated by some to have as few as 300 active fighters, compared to up to 2 500 in 2020. For the first eight months of 2023, ISM was involved in an average of just 11 political violence events per month, compared to an average of 36 per month in 2022. In terms of funding, international efforts had been undertaken to disrupt the financing of Islamic State Mozambique. “Alarmingly South Africa was named as a major financing hub for ISM. The US designated four ‘Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and ISIS-Mozambique (ISIS-M) financial facilitators based in South Africa.’ Financial sanctions were imposed upon Farhad Hoomer, Siraaj Miller and Abdella Hussein Abadigga for ‘playing an increasingly central role in facilitating the transfer of funds from the top of the ISIS hierarchy to branches across Africa’ or serving as leaders of ISIS cells in South Africa’. An individual known as Peter Charles Mbaga had allegedly also assisted in transferring funds and equipment from South Africa to ISIS-M and sought to procure weapons from Mozambique. South Africa’s financial system had been considerably exploited towards funding ISIS branches and networks across Africa,” MEARI found. The report added that the concern that South Africa already to some extent is operating as an evolving Islamic State Province in Southern Africa in own right poses a significant threat to South Africa’s national security and regional security if left unchecked. In October 2022, the US embassy in Pretoria issued a security alert about a possible terrorist attack in the upmarket Sandton commercial district. The attack didn’t happen, though this might have been due to heightened security because of the alert. “South Africa had not suffered any major terrorist attacks over the past few year, but the country remains highly vulnerable to ISIS overtures. Of even greater concern is that the country’s financial system provided a critical conduit for funding extremism. In February 2023, the Financial Action Task Force placed South Africa on a list of countries under increased monitoring, commonly known as the grey list, after it failed to address all of the shortcomings on preventing money laundering and the financing of terrorism that the task force identified in its 2019 evaluation of the country.”
By July 2023, the insurgency in Mozambique had reportedly killed around 6 700 people and displaced 950 000 more since its inception. As of April 2024, the militants had once again been consolidating territorial gains whilst the Southern African Mission was in the process of withdrawing. More Rwandan forces, however, entered the Mozambican battle space.
“The Mozambican armed forces, the FADM, have so far proven unsuccessful in preventing the growth of militant cells. The improvement of the situation is likely largely attributable to foreign assistance. This began with the deployment of the SAMIM forces from the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in July 2021, and the additional support of the Rwandan Defence Forces (RDF) in December 2022,” MEARI stated.
From May 2023 reports emerged that ISM leadership had adopted a new strategy that excludes excessive violence against civilians. Data released by the non-profit Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) shows a noticeable decline in violence across Cabo Delgado. While Islamist violence in northern Mozambique dropped 71% between 2022 and 2023, MEARI cautioned that the possibility of the group gaining further ground and recapturing lost ground as 2024 unfolds should not be ruled out.
“In Southern Africa, and despite the worrying developments in Mozambique, South Africa is the country to watch. Like Nigeria in West Africa, South Africa dominates Southern Africa completely. Consequently, what happens in this regional superpower will have a profound impact on its neighbourhood. So, the March 2024 reports that Islamic State continues to receive funds from Johannesburg through robberies and the like is disconcerting to say the least. It suggests the greylisting of South Africa by the FATF was a prudent measure. It also suggests that because of endemic corruption and the lack of political will on the part of Pretoria, South Africa remains a permissive environment in which terrorists and their networks continue to thrive. Indeed, this has a long history with terrorist and their support networks from Al Qaeda to Hamas and Hezbollah as well as the Taliban finding refuge in the country for three decades. There is a real danger that the war in Gaza, which has been inflaming anti-Israel and anti-West sentiment may well create the ideal opportunity for Islamists to exploit,” MEARI cautioned. (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
25 Nov 24. Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III Concludes Twelfth Visit to the Indo-Pacific. Pentagon Press Secretary Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder provided the following release: Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III concluded his twelfth official visit to the Indo-Pacific today. During his trip, Secretary Austin participated in the Australia-U.S.-Japan Trilateral Defense Ministers’ Meeting, attended the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) Plus, conducted meetings with regional counterparts, and held engagements with Fijian leaders. At each stop, he announced concrete steps that the United States is taking with allies and partners to strengthen deterrence and advance unprecedented cooperation in the region.
In Australia, Secretary Austin met with Australian Deputy Prime Minister Richard Marles and Japanese Minister of Defense Nakatani Gen for a historic Trilateral Defense Ministers’ Meeting (TDMM). They announced initiatives to expand the scale and scope of trilateral cooperation and enhance force posture in the region. Of note, Japan will increase its participation in United States-Australia force posture cooperation activities through annual trilateral amphibious training among the Australian Defence Force, the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force’s Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade, and the United States Marine Rotational Force-Darwin in northern Australia and the Indo-Pacific region from 2025, beginning with Exercise TALISMAN SABRE 2025. In addition to holding bilateral meetings with Deputy Prime Minister Marles and Minister Nakatani, the three officials also toured Royal Australian Air Base – Darwin (RAAF-D), where they underscored the decisive steps they are taking together to achieve lasting peace and security in the Indo-Pacific.
Secretary Austin then met with President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. and Secretary of National Defense Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr in the Philippines. Together, they reaffirmed the strength of the U.S.-Philippines alliance as well as their shared vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific. While there, Secretary Austin participated in a groundbreaking ceremony for a new bilateral Combined Coordination Center (CCC) and signed a General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), both of which will increase information flow and deepen interoperability. He also visited an Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) site in the Philippines island of Palawan, where U.S. and Philippine troops work side by side, to observe an unmanned surface vessel demonstration that reinforced efforts to modernize our alliance capabilities.
Secretary Austin traveled to Laos where he participated in the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) Plus and met with regional counterparts. He delivered plenary remarks and announced the first-ever Department of Defense Vision Statement for a Prosperous and Secure Southeast Asia that details ways to increase practical cooperation between the United States and Southeast Asia. He also announced the second-ever ASEAN-United States Maritime Exercise in 2025 to advance maritime safety and rule of law in the region. During his meetings, Secretary Austin emphasized the U.S. commitment to strengthen security in Southeast Asia through unwavering support for ASEAN centrality. On the margins of ADMM Plus, Secretary Austin convened the first-ever meeting with defense leaders from Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and the Republic of Korea to discuss their shared commitment to advance a free and open Indo-Pacific, where international law and sovereignty are respected.
Secretary Austin’s final stop in Fiji marked the first-ever visit to the Pacific nation by a U.S. Secretary of Defense. He met with key leaders including Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka and Pacific Islands Forum Secretary General Baron Waqa, as well as Acting Minister for Home Affairs and Immigration Filimoni Vosarogo and Chief of Defence Force Major General Jone Kalouniwai. While there, Secretary Austin signed an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) and announced initiation of negotiations on a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) to promote increased cooperation between the United States and Fiji.
Secretary Austin’s nine-day trip to the Indo-Pacific came as the Department of Defense continues to achieve historic results with allies and partners to strengthen peace, stability, and deterrence in the region. (Source: U.S. DoD)
25 Nov 24. Pakistan has put the capital Islamabad under lockdown as thousands of supporters of jailed former prime minister Imran Khan marched towards the city to demand his release, in the latest threat to the legitimacy of the military-backed government. Protesters from across the country are descending on Islamabad in support of Khan, who remains a widely popular figure in Pakistan and was imprisoned last year on corruption charges. He has been acquitted or received bail in five cases, but faces criminal charges in more than 100 others, ranging from graft to terrorism, according to his party. Khan has denied all of the charges, which his supporters say are politically motivated. The latest protests, which began on Sunday, are the largest in the country since elections in February, when candidates loyal to Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf party won the most seats but were blocked from power by the military and traditional dynastic parties. Hundreds of PTI members have also been imprisoned since May 2023, after riots that targeted military installations. Khan’s party has demanded the government, now led by Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, release “political prisoners” and “return the stolen mandate”, a reference to allegations that the election was rigged against the PTI, according to a statement posted to Khan’s X account on Tuesday. Supporters of Imran Khan decry the charges against him as politically motivated © Sohail Shahzad/EPA/Shutterstock Authorities in Pakistan have mobilised riot police and paramilitary forces to block the protesters from reaching Islamabad © Sohail Shahzad/EPA/Shutterstock Sharif’s military-backed government has responded by bringing Islamabad to a standstill for the second time in as many months. Police sealed off main routes on Saturday with shipping containers, and riot police and paramilitary forces were deployed throughout the city. Mobile and internet services were also blocked in “areas with security concerns”, according to an interior ministry statement on X, which is banned in Pakistan and only accessible via a virtual private network. “Whoever comes, you must arrest them, do not let them go,” Mohsin Naqvi, Pakistan’s interior minister, told a gathering of police officers on Saturday that was broadcast on television. Islamabad’s High Court last week also ruled the PTI gathering as unlawful. Officials have banned gatherings of five or more people for two months. Authorities also closed many of the roads leading out of Lahore, Khan’s hometown and political stronghold, as they hope to throttle convoys headed towards the capital 400km away. Local authorities have dug trenches into motorways in other parts of the country. The PTI estimated at least 3,000 party members, including three parliamentarians, had been arrested since last week. Pakistan’s interior ministry did not respond to a request for comment. (Source: FT.com)
25 Nov 24. Philippines: Vice president’s threat against president will sustain government stability concerns. Earlier on 25 November, the Philippine justice department labelled Vice President Sara Duterte the ‘mastermind’ of a plot to assassinate President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. She has five days to respond to a subpoena. On 23 November, Sara Duterte threatened to have someone ‘kill’ Marcos if she was killed herself. This represents a substantial escalation in a feud between the two politicians, which has grown in recent months. The latest dispute concerns efforts by allies of the president to detain Duterte’s chief of staff. The authorities consider Duterte’s comments to be an ‘active threat’ and have tightened security protocols around Marcos. These actions are likely precautionary, with Duterte later claiming that her remarks were ‘maliciously taken out of logical context’. However, we assess that hostile relations between Duterte and Marcos will drive government stability risks over the coming months. Mid-term elections due in May 2025 will highlight the level of their respective power bases and potentially indicate who is best placed to succeed Marcos when his term ends in 2028. (Source: Sibylline)
23 Nov 24. Austin Bolsters U.S. Cooperation with Fiji, Concludes 12th Trip to Indo-Pacific. Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III signed a new agreement today aimed at enhancing the United States’ logistics cooperation with Fiji today as he closed out his 12th trip to the Indo-Pacific since taking office. The Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement is aimed at enabling the efficient transfer of fuel and medical supplies and the use of maintenance facilities during emergencies, culminating nearly a decade of negotiations between the two countries and underscoring the United States’ commitment to building lasting partnerships throughout the region.
“This agreement will mean closer ties and closer logistics cooperation between our forces, including for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief,” Austin said during a press conference today.
The secretary signed to new agreement alongside Fijian officials during a ceremony today at Black Rock Camp. Ahead of the ceremony, Austin met with Fiji’s Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka and Pacific Islands Forum Secretary General Baron Waqa for discussions on bilateral cooperation between the U.S. and Fiji. In addition to finalizing the ACSA agreement, the two countries announced the beginning of formal negotiations on a Status of Forces Agreement that will empower the two countries to work more closely together. Austin also announced that the U.S. will provide $4.9m in foreign military financing for small-arms recapitalization for Fijian forces, pending Congressional approval. Austin said continuing to strengthen the U.S.-Fijian relationship remains as a key focal point in the region.
“Our relationship is rooted in common values and our shared vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific,” he said. “The Indo-Pacific is our priority theater and our partnership with Fiji and other Pacific Island Countries is vital to a free and open Indo-Pacific.”
Austin’s visit to Fiji, the first by a U.S. defense secretary, caps a series of engagements with regional counterparts showcasing the United States’ unwavering commitment to the Indo-Pacific amid what Austin sees as a “new convergence” of like-minded partners throughout the region. In addition to Fiji, Austin met with key U.S. partners in Australia, the Philippines and Laos in a continuation to the regional momentum he has built throughout his tenure. In Darwin, Australia, Austin met with Australian Defense Minister Richard Marles and Japanese Defense Minister Nakatani Gen as part of the 14th Trilateral Defense Minister’s Meeting. In a joint statement following the TDMM, the three leaders announced that Japan will increase its participation in Australia-U.S. force posture cooperation activities, including through annual trilateral amphibious training among the Australian Defense Force, Japan Ground Self Defense Force’s Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade and the U.S. Marine Rotational Force – Darwin. The joint statement also outlines steps to increase intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance cooperation throughout the Indo-Pacific, to include Australia’s participation in the Japan-U.S. Bilateral Information Analysis Cell. Following his visit to Darwin, Austin proceeded to the Philippines where he met with President Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. and Philippine Secretary of National Defense Gilbert Teodoro. While there, Austin and Teodoro attended an official signing ceremony for the newly established General Security of Military Information Agreement, that provides a legal framework enabling enhanced and expanded sharing of information and defense technology between the two countries. The agreement serves as a foundation for further enhancing interoperability between U.S. and Philippine forces and paves the way for additional security agreements in the future. Austin and Teodoro also broke ground on a new combined coordination center at Camp Aguinaldo in Manila to further enable information sharing between U.S. and Philippine forces. Later, Austin met with Marcos at Malacanang Palace in Manila where the secretary further underscored the strong ties between the two countries. Before departing the Philippines, Austin observed a Philippine Navy technical demonstration showcasing T-12 unmanned surface vessels provided by the U.S. through foreign military financing. The T-12 is a key capability used by Philippine forces to protect its sovereignty and operate throughout its exclusive economic zone in the South China Sea. Austin’s stop in the Philippines was his fourth visit to the country since taking office, the most visits ever by a U.S. secretary of defense. In Laos, Austin attended the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Defense Ministers’ Meeting-Plus. U.S. defense secretaries have participated in the forum since 2010 when it was established by the 10-member block of Southeast Asian nations. Austin met with a range of regional allies and partners on during the forum and reaffirmed the United States’ commitment to regional security. He also announced the first-ever U.S. Defense Department vision statement for a prosperous and secure Southeast Asia. The statement outlines the U.S. vision for deepening our practical cooperation across Southeast Asia. Austin also announced during the two-day series of engagements that ASEAN member states approved a second iteration of a U.S.-led maritime exercise with ASEAN countries, which was first held in 2019.
“We’ve been focused on working with countries, like minded countries to promote an open and secure Indo-Pacific region where countries can protect their interests and also feel free to sail international waterways and fly international skies wherever international law will allow,” Austin said today in discussing his most recent trip to the Indo-Pacific and, more broadly, the United States’ progress over the past four years in strengthening ties throughout the region.
“We’ve accomplished a great deal,” he said. (Source: U.S. DoD)
22 Nov 24. Iran: Enrichment with new technology will drive diplomatic tensions, elevate regional security risks. Earlier on 22 November, Iran announced it would activate new and advanced centrifuges to enrich uranium for its nuclear program. This comes after the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) censured Iran at its board meeting on 21 November for continuing to enrich uranium to 60% purity. The move will likely further frustrate the IAEA, compounding diplomatic tensions between Iran and the West and significantly reducing international cooperation and transparency over Iran’s nuclear program. Iran will also likely prohibit IAEA experts from entering the country to monitor centrifuge production and use, driving nuclear safety risks. While Iran claims the new technology is intended for producing energy, it will bolster international concern regarding the prospective development of a nuclear weapon, elevating regional security risks. Although Iran has previously signalled openness to negotiations, this move will likely undermine efforts to revive the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and elevate the threat of further sanctions, driving compliance challenges. We assess that concerns regarding nuclear proliferation will also likely escalate ongoing hostilities with Israel, elevating the risk of further direct strikes in the long term. (Source: Sibylline)
22 Nov 24. Pakistan: Attack underscores elevated ethno-religious tensions, worsening security environment. On 21 November, at least 42 people were killed and over 30 others were injured when gunmen opened fire on a Shia convoy in Kurram tribal district (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province). The gunmen opened fire on two separate convoys of Shia pilgrims, including women and children, who were being escorted by the police. No group has claimed responsibility for the attack. Separately, 26 people belonging to the Shia community, who were being held hostage by Sunni groups, were recovered by police in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The incident comes amid a rise in sectarian violence and clashes between Sunnis and Shias in the region in recent months and an overall deteriorating security environment in the province. In October, 11 people were killed in tribal clashes in Kurram. Given elevated ethno-religious tensions and the concentration of the Shia community (45% of the total population of 800,000) in the district, we assess there is a realistic possibility of further targeted attacks (mostly aimed at the Shia community in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), sustaining ethno-religious tensions. (Source: Sibylline)
23 Nov 24. North Korea condemns US military drills with South Korea and Japan. U.S. Navy aircraft carrier USS George Washington is pictured during Freedom Edge trilateral exercise among United States, Japan and South Korea in the East China Sea, south of the Korean peninsula and west of Japan’s main islands November 14, 2024. North Korea condemned on Saturday recent joint military drills by the United States, South Korea and Japan, warning that it would take immediate actions if needed to defend the state. Last week, the three countries held a three-day joint exercise, dubbed “Freedom Edge”, featuring fighter jets and marine patrol aircraft as well as the U.S. nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, USS George Washington. “We strongly warn the U.S. and its followers hostile towards the DPRK to immediately stop the hostile acts of further causing provocation and instability that can drive the military confrontation in the Korean peninsula and its vicinity into a real armed conflict,” the North’s defence ministry said, using the country’s official name. The military would keep all options available and take immediate actions if needed to preemptively control risk, while closely watching military activity by the U.S. and its allies, it said in a statement carried by state media KCNA. (Source: Reuters)
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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.
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