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12 Nov 24. North Korea ratifies defence treaty with Russia. The treaty outlines that if one of the signatory parties faces attack, the other will provide military aid. North Korea has ratified a mutual defence treaty on a comprehensive strategic partnership with Russia, reported state radio Voice of Korea.
The treaty was first signed on 19 June 2024 during Russian president Vladimir Putin’s visit to North Korean capital Pyongyang. The deal will formally take effect once both nations exchange documents confirming the ratification.
The law ratifying the treaty was signed by Putin on 9 November while the corresponding decree was signed by North Korea’s supreme leader Kim Jong Un yesterday (11 November).
The treaty outlines that if one of the signatory parties faces an armed attack, military and other forms of assistance will be provided immediately, in line with Article 51 of the UN Charter.
Additionally, the agreement obligates both parties to refrain from forming agreements with third countries that could undermine the sovereignty, security, territorial integrity, or the right of the other party to determine its own political, social, economic, and cultural systems.
Last month, Nato’s secretary-general Mark Rutte confirmed the deployment of North Korean troops to Russia, as well as the presence of North Korean military units in the Kursk border region.
A delegation from South Korea also briefed the North Atlantic Council and Indo-Pacific partners on North Korea’s growing involvement in Russia’s war in Ukraine.
According to South Korea’s spy agency, North Korea has dispatched more than 13,000 containers of artillery, missiles, and other conventional arms to Russia since August 2023 to refill its weapons stockpiles.
Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated yesterday that Moscow had gathered a force of 50,000 soldiers, including North Korean troops, in Kursk. (Source: army-technology.com)
12 Nov 24. Centcom Conducts Strikes in Yemen, Syria. Since Friday, U.S. Central Command has conducted strikes against Iranian-backed Houthi targets in Yemen and against targets in Syria as part of the defeat-ISIS mission there.
On Saturday and Sunday, Centcom forces executed airstrikes against multiple Houthi weapons storage facilities within Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen, said Pentagon Press Secretary Air Force Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder during a briefing today.
“These facilities housed a variety of advanced conventional weapons used by the Iran-backed Houthis to target U.S. and international military and civilian vessels navigating international waters in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden,” Ryder said.
Both Air Force and Navy assets, including F-35C fighter aircraft, were involved in the strikes, which were in response to Houthi attacks on commercial, U.S. and coalition vessels in the Red Sea, Bab al-Mandab Strait and Gulf of Aden.
“As you’ve heard us say before, we will continue to make clear to the Houthis that there will be consequences for their illegal and reckless attacks,” Ryder said.
Yesterday, Ryder said, Centcom also conducted strikes against nine targets in two locations associated with Iranian groups in Syria. The strikes, he said, were in response to two attacks on U.S. personnel in Syria that happened Nov. 10 at Mission Support Site Green Village in northeast Syria.
One of those attacks involved a UAV, while the second attack involved an indirect fire incident with two rockets. There were no U.S. injuries involved with either attack.
Ryder said the U.S. strikes will degrade the ability of Iranian-backed groups to plan and launch future attacks on U.S and coalition forces who are in the region to conduct the defeat-ISIS operations.
Centcom commander Army Gen. Michael Erik Kurilla said the U.S. will do what’s needed to defend its personnel in the Centcom area of responsibility.
“Our message is clear. Attacks against U.S. and coalition partners in the region will not be tolerated,” said Kurilla. “We will continue to take every step necessary to protect our personnel and coalition partners and respond to reckless attacks.” (Source: U.S. DoD)
12 Nov 24. Georgia: Russia’s growing economic footprint will remain trigger for unrest in separatist Abkhazia. Earlier on 12 November, Aslan Bzhania, the president of Georgia’s separatist Abkhazia region, convened an emergency meeting of Abkhazia’s Security Council. This was due to protests that broke out on 11 November in Abkhazia’s capital, Sokhumi, following the detention of five opposition activists. The five activists were detained after protesting against the Abkhazian government’s decision to sign the Investment Activity Agreement with Russia without parliamentary approval. The agreement allows Russian entities to invest in construction projects and own land and property in the breakaway region. Initially, Sokhumi was reluctant to sign the deal, but Moscow exerted significant pressure, particularly by suspending funding for the region to force Abkhazia to agree to the deal. Abkhazian opposition parties plan to hold a rally in Sokhumi on 15 November. We assess that the deal will allow Russia to expand its economic footprint in the region, which will represent a trigger for localised domestic unrest. The Abkhazian authorities will likely adopt heavy-handed measures to repress any such protests, leading to elevated arrest and bystander risks. (Source: Sibylline)
12 Nov 24. Syria: US strikes highlight elevated tensions, will drive risk of armed conflict. On 11 November, the US military conducted strikes against at least nine targets in two locations in Deir ez-Zor governorate; the targets were associated with Iran-backed militants. The strikes targeted militant headquarters as well as a communications and monitoring checkpoint in Mayadin district (Deir ez-Zor). They killed four individuals and injured at least seven others. The US Central Command (CENTCOM) confirmed that the strikes were in response to several attacks against US forces in Syria on 10 November, including attacks against the al-Omar Oil Field and Conoco Gas Field military bases (both Deir ez-Zor). Following the US strikes, Iran-backed militants are likely to subside their attacks against US forces in Syria in the short term. However, in the coming month, we assess there is a realistic possibility of a gradual uptick in attacks and subsequent US retaliation, elevating the risk of armed conflict. This will consequently raise security and bystander risks in Syria, particularly in Deir ez-Zor, and especially in areas near US military and Iran-backed militant positions. (Source: Sibylline)
12 Nov 24. Pakistan: China’s push to join security efforts underscores growing safety concerns. On 12 November, news outlets reported that Beijing is pushing the Pakistani authorities to allow Chinese security to protect thousands of Chinese workers in Pakistan. There has reportedly been an agreement regarding the establishment of a joint security management system; however, Pakistan has not yet agreed to direct Chinese involvement in on-the-ground security operations. This development follows a series of attacks targeting Chinese investments and personnel in recent months, heightening China’s security concerns. On 6 October, an IED attack near Jinnah International Airport (KHI) in Karachi (Sindh province) killed two Chinese citizens on 5 November, two Chinese workers were shot and injured at a textile mill in Karachi. China has repeatedly urged Pakistan to improve security and permit Chinese security outfits to protect assets and investments in Pakistan (a proposal rejected by Pakistan in 2022). Given recent security lapses, we assess that, if further attacks continue, there is a realistic possibility of increased Chinese involvement in the security of its assets in Pakistan, which will likely drive tensions. (Source: Sibylline)
08 Nov 24. Nigeria: New group possibly reflects closer ties between Nigerian armed groups, Sahelian jihadists. On 7 November, defence spokesperson Major-General Edward Buba claimed that a new affiliation of insurgent militias, known as Lakurawas (coming from Mali and Niger) was active in the north-western Kebbi and Sokoto states. The Deputy Governor of Sokoto state has also claimed that Lakurawas is active in five local government areas on the border of Niger and Kebbi state. Details concerning the nature and size of the group are limited though they have been identified as a ‘faith-based group’ which has attempted to enforce its religious beliefs on surrounding communities. It is unclear whether the group represents the entry of a genuinely new actor, with state officials claiming the militants have been active in the area for years. There is a realistic possibility that the Lakurawas simply reflect a more formal organisation drawn from the armed groups, known locally as bandits. However, with security deteriorating in Niger and Mali, it is possible that references to the religious nature of the group reflect increasing ties to jihadist groups active in the Sahel, enabling the expansion of this conflict into north-western Nigeria. (Source: Sibylline)
12 Nov 24. Minister of defence hiding true state of SANDF fleet – Rise Mzansi. Rise Mzansi believes Minister of Defence and Military Veterans Angie Motshekga is hiding the state of the South African National Defence Force’s (SANDF’s) prime mission equipment, and has warned that if the decline of the military continues, South Africa will soon have an SANDF in name only. Rise Mzansi leader Songezo Zibi asked Motshekga to provide details on the percentage of SANDF equipment that has reached the end of its lifespan but is still being operated, and a breakdown of this in each division as well as the cost to replace outdated equipment. He was told in a written parliamentary reply last month that, “the RSA has established a practice and norm consistent with international practices that matters of combat readiness of the country’s military capabilities are only discussed in a closed session, the Joint Standing Committee on Defence (JSCD) at the behest of the legislative authority. Should the Parliament schedule such, the DoD will comprehensively discuss its readiness inclusive of the history, serviceability and availability of its platforms.”
Rise Mzansi MP and National Assembly Caucus Whip Makashule Gana responded to this “non-response” by saying this is “a selective application of the aforementioned ‘norm and standard’ given that the Ministry has previously provided responses to written questions that relate to maintenance of if its fleet and the capabilities of the Force to defend the Republic’s sovereignty, for an example.”
Gana said in a statement that the Minister’s non-response reeks of an attempt to hide what the true state of the SANDF’s fleet is and its ability to fulfil its constitutional mandate.
In 2023, three SA Navy submariners lost their lives during a training accident described as a “freak accident”. The Chief of the SA Navy, Vice Admiral Monde Lobese, said before a Board of Inquiry to investigate the incident that training does not happen as it should “due to ongoing budget constraints that impede platform or vessel maintenance, resulting in reduced sea time, which impedes training and, ultimately, experience.”
“The SANDF is in distress, and it is costing lives both locally and on foreign missions, as we learned when two SANDF soldiers lost their lives in the Democratic Republic of Congo in June of this year,” Gana said. “The veil of secrecy thrown over the SANDF’s fleet comes off the back of the Auditor-General’s report painting a picture of a defence force that is financially crippled and with a stretched mandate. For example –
- The SANDF is seeing a decline in prime-mission equipment
- The SA Air Force is seeing a decline in the number of hours flown
- The SA Navy is seeing a decline in the number of hours at sea
- A whopping 62.5% of SANDF commitments are unfunded.
“If these matters, among others, are not addressed, we will soon, if not already, only have an SANDF in name. Therefore, as a matter of urgency, Minister Motshekga needs to commission a Defence Review, which considers the current economic climate, the effectiveness of the current SANDF leadership and management, our involvement in foreign missions and the Force’s aging personnel, to name a few issues.”
Gana pledged that Rise Mzansi will continue to hold the Executive accountable by conducting oversight, asking questions, and doing the work of Parliament. “South Africans expect honesty and transparency from its public represents, Departments and Entities,” he concluded. (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
10 Nov 24. US Strikes Houthi Weapons Depots in Yemen. USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69) conducts flight operations in response to increased Iranian-backed Houthi malign behavior in the Red Sea, Jan. 22, 2024.
The United States (U.S.) on Saturday conducted a series of airstrikes against Houthi-controlled weapons storage facilities in Yemen, targeting sites in the capital Sanaa, Amran governorate, and other areas.
A U.S. defense official confirmed to ABC News that the strikes aimed at facilities containing advanced weapons used in recent Houthi attacks on civilian and military vessels in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. U.S. fighter jets were used in the operation.
Houthi media reported that around nine strikes took place in and around Sanaa and Amran, with specific impacts in the Al Sabeen district. While American officials confirmed their involvement in the airstrikes, the United Kingdom, which has previously conducted joint operations against the Houthis, did not confirm participation.
In October, the U.S. heightened its military presence in the region, deploying additional fighter jets, attack aircraft, and a carrier strike group to counter potential threats posed by Houthi and Iranian forces in the Red Sea corridor.
Meanwhile, tensions in Yemen further intensified with an unrelated internal attack against Saudi soldiers by a member of Yemen’s government-aligned military. The incident, which occurred Friday night at a Saudi-led base in Hadramawt province, resulted in the deaths of two Saudi soldiers and the wounding of another. While the motives remain unclear, a Houthi official, Hamid Rizq, praised the attack, describing it as “the beginning” of a future escalation. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
10 Nov 24. Iran-Backed Cyber Attack Disrupts Payments Across Israel. Street view from the Allenby area, a central district around the Allenby Street in Tel Aviv, Israel. (ColorMaker / Shutterstock.com)
A cyberattack temporarily shut down thousands of credit card readers in Israel Sunday, leaving customers unable to make payments at many gas stations, supermarkets, and other stores for several hours. The issue was traced to a Distributed Denial of Service attack targeting Credit Guard, a payment processing service owned by Hyp, which manages transactions for multiple major businesses across Israel.
Credit Guard confirmed that the attack disrupted its services and affected connected communication providers, disabling payment terminals. According to the company, the attack lasted about an hour before being blocked, allowing services to return to normal. Credit Guard stated that they are working with security agencies to prevent future incidents.
According to reports, an Iran-linked hacker group claimed responsibility for the cyberattack, though details of this claim were not verified. The incident came shortly after a similar attack on another Israeli payment service, sparking concerns about ongoing cyber threats to the country’s financial systems.
Credit Guard’s clients include the Maccabi health fund, taxi service Gett, the Wolt food ordering app, and public transportation systems like Rav Kav Online and Hop-On. The widespread usage of their services caused significant disruptions for both consumers and businesses. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
08 Nov 24. Colombia: Resumption of peace negotiations elevate supervision quality risks. On 7 November, the Colombian government resumed peace negotiations with the guerilla group National Liberation Army (ELN), announcing further negotiation dates between 19 and 25 November. Meanwhile, the ELN halted hostile activities in Chocó department and presented 13 conditions necessary for negotiations. Previously, on 17 September, the government suspended peace talks after the ELN killed three soldiers and injured 28 in Arauca department. On 31 October, media reports indicated that the ELN had undermined military leadership in Chocó. Additionally, reports citing intelligence information have alleged that organised crime groups (OCGs) have influenced promotions within the Colombian armed forces. Should these allegations be true, the resumption of negotiations indicates that the ELN has likely secured a limited degree of influence on the cabinet of President Gustavo Petro. In the short term, this will likely raise supervision quality risks, given the possible penetration of the OCGs in government. In the long term, we assess that this influence undermines the capabilities of the security forces, in turn elevating governmental stability and socio-economic health risks. (Source: Sibylline)
08 Nov 24. Philippines-China: New maritime laws will sustain tensions in disputed South China Sea. Earlier on 8 November, Beijing summoned the Philippine ambassador to voice its opposition to two new laws introduced by the Philippines to strengthen its claims of sovereignty over disputed parts of the South China Sea. Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. signed the Philippine Maritime Zones Act and the Archipelagic Sea Lanes Act into law on the same day; these explicitly designate the maritime areas the Philippines claim and the legal powers they can exercise there. The National Mapping and Resource Information Authority (NAMRIA) will release a map based on these regulations. The latest development highlights the Philippines’ continued intention to assert its claims in disputed waters in the South China Sea despite ongoing pressure from China and a degree of uncertainty concerning future US support given the recent election of former president Donald Trump. Consequently, we asses that tensions between Beijing and the Philippines are highly likely to continue for the foreseeable future, though both sides will likely aim to avoid a significant armed escalation. (Source: Sibylline)
08 Nov 24. New Somali piracy threats require partnerships and holistic responses. Signs of a potential Somali piracy resurgence have emerged in 2024, most recently with the European Union Naval Force Operation ATALANTA reporting a suspected pirate group off Somalia’s coast. On 23 October, the operation’s Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa issued an alert to ships, noting that 13 armed pirates had departed from Ceel Huur and Hobyo – traditional Somali piracy hubs.
Predictions of a resurgence have resurfaced regularly during the 2010s, often due to suspicious events. Although a full-scale return to the levels seen in 2008-12 (Chart 1) remains improbable, the growing number of successful attacks raises concerns about whether traditional counter-piracy measures are working.
Unlike previous years, when incidents were more sporadic, there has been a steady build-up of piracy activity since late 2023, with several attempted attacks and two confirmed hijackings of commercial vessels. The MV Ruen and MV Abdullah were the first vessels to be successfully captured by pirates since 2017 (Chart 2).
The last reported pirate activity in the region before the recent alert occurred on 7 June – a suspicious approach on the cargo ship Pacific Honor.
There are several factors behind the rise in attacks. The pattern suggests pirate groups have again developed sophisticated operational capacity. Also, the seasonal monsoon winds have dropped. The rough seas and high winds of the southwest monsoon from June to September make small-boat operations difficult. With the season subsiding until March next year, piracy could resurface.
The uptick is also linked to Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, which are pushing shipping routes south. This has increased vessel activity along Somalia’s coast, creating opportunities for pirates to exploit maritime vulnerabilities.
With ships deviating from established routes, maritime security forces have been stretched thin as naval forces such as the United Kingdom and United States are redeployed in the Red Sea. This has created gaps that pirates can exploit.
These developments also highlight the growing roles of new partners, such as India and Türkiye, whose recent involvement underscores a shift towards diversified international responses to piracy in the Indian Ocean.
India has played an active role, particularly since the resurgence of Somali piracy. Its navy’s presence adds a layer of deterrence against piracy and a robust response capacity. India was pivotal in rescuing hijacked vessels, such as the MV Ruen following a prolonged hostage situation in early 2024.
The country’s naval operations are part of its broader interest in safeguarding its maritime trade routes and ensuring regional stability in the Indian Ocean – crucial for its economic and security interests. India’s ongoing counter-piracy efforts complement international operations, including ATALANTA, by reinforcing patrols as pirates increasingly target ships in crucial shipping routes.
From 2008-22, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) issued annual resolutions authorising international naval forces to combat piracy in Somali waters. These included allowing foreign navies to operate in Somalia’s territorial seas. The resolutions established the legal framework to pursue and detain pirates through operations such as ATALANTA and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s Operation Ocean Shield.
By 2022, Somali piracy had significantly declined, prompting the UNSC to recognise the shift in responsibility for maritime security to Somalia and its neighbouring countries. Somalia had opposed extending the resolutions, seeing them as infringing on its sovereignty and feeling it had acquired sufficient capacity to secure its own territorial waters.
But current attacks far out into the High Seas may lead to fresh discussions on how best to support Somalia and the region in the absence of UNSC mandates.
The country’s 2025-26 UNSC seat should allow it to directly shape international maritime security policy. Somalia should use its council position to advocate for sustainable maritime security and development, which is vital to addressing piracy. It should invite international stakeholders to participate in a holistic strategy that benefits Somali communities and global shipping interests.
But it could also face heightened pressure to do more about piracy, strengthen its coast guard capabilities, and build regional partnerships that deter pirates and address root causes.
If Somalia advocates for renewed international collaboration through advice and capacity building without reinstating UNSC resolutions, attention will likely shift towards Türkiye in 2025. This is due to Türkiye’s deepening partnership with Somalia, formalised through a memorandum of understanding requiring substantial capacity building by Türkiye as a major maritime security provider.
Through a new maritime security and economic agreement, Türkiye will gain increased influence over crucial aspects of Somalia’s maritime sector. This will include a 30% revenue share from Somalia’s exclusive economic zone activities in exchange for supporting Somalia’s transition through training, joint operations, information sharing and naval acquisitions.
The resurgence of Somali piracy is underscored by ongoing socio-economic problems throughout Somalia. Despite international efforts to curb piracy, local grievances continue to mount, particularly around illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing by foreign vessels and related environmental impacts.
Many Somali fishers are left with depleted stocks and diminished livelihoods, increasing the appeal of piracy as an alternative source of income, and buoyed by a deep belief that pirates are fighting illegal fishing.
Addressing piracy sustainably requires a multifaceted approach that goes beyond military patrols and focuses on economic development, job creation and sustainable fisheries management in Somali waters. This reality should prompt serious reflection on the success of UNSC-mandated initiatives that have, since 2008, aimed to achieve these developmental goals.
India and Türkiye’s expanding roles in the region highlight a growing recognition that a long-term solution must incorporate regional voices and invest in local capacity building. Collaborative initiatives to empower Somalia’s coast guard and enforce local fisheries laws, combined with sustainable development projects, may prove more effective than military patrols in curbing piracy.
Somalia’s impending role on the UNSC is an opportunity to advocate for these approaches. The country could influence international maritime policy to emphasise capacity building and sustainable solutions rather than solely relying on foreign military intervention.
(Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
08 Nov 24. Lack of serviceable vessels sees SA Navy miss time at sea target. SAS Amatola in False Bay during Ex Ibsamar. Picture: Ricardo Teixeira.
By its own admission and not entirely its own fault, the SA Navy (SAN) fell woefully short of its planned time at sea in the 2023/24 financial year, with some improvement on the way according to the October Medium Term Budget Policy Statement (MTBPS).
The latest Department of Defence (DoD) annual report has it the maritime service of the SA National Defence Force (SANDF) logged a paltry 2 641 hours at sea. Of these 1 680 are listed as force preparation hours with the balance of 961 being force employment time.
The hours logged make up a third of the planned target – 8 000 hours – set by Vice Admiral Monde Lobese’s service for the 2023/24 financial year.
On the maritime defence programme, the DoD annual report notes “most of the SAN vessels in commission were undergoing maintenance and repair during the reporting period. An added constraint was the unavailability of SAN vessels at the directed level of capability due to a lack of repair capacity at the Armscor Dockyard and related procurement challenges”.
This has been echoed by Lobese on, among others, the official SAN publication Navy News and a Simon’s Town medal parade. He is on record as saying he is prepared to “divorce” his service from the Armscor facility.
Aside from budget restrictions, he told the medal parade another factor severely limiting the SAN’s ability to get ships to sea, is the “non-performance of the Armscor Dockyard”.
“As Chief of the Navy, I have reached the end of my patience with their inability to repair the SAN ships. I have engaged the Chief Executive of Armscor on numerous opportunities to resolve this situation,” he said at the Martello sports ground parade.
“The SA Air Force and the SA Navy were detrimentally impacted by the lack of maintenance contracts for prime mission equipment not being in place, resulting in the unavailability of spares, which affected the number of hours flown/hours at sea, level of force preparation and accreditation of pilots,” the annual report read.
“Given the lead times required to finalise maintenance and repair of specific naval platforms designated to conduct long-range maritime patrols, and given that most naval platforms were undergoing maintenance and repair, no Op Copper long-range maritime patrols were conducted during the strategic period.”
The lack of performance at sea in the 2024/25 financial year was noted by Finance Minister Enoch Godongwana in last month’s MTBPS.
The MTBPS reads, in part: “Although the department [of defence] had conducted only one maritime coastal patrol by mid-year against an annual target of four, it remains on track to meet the target by the fourth quarter”.
“Similarly, only 3 290 hours were spent at sea by mid-year against an annual target of 12 000, with the expectation that this target will be met in the fourth quarter. Delays in the maintenance and repair of vessels resulted in only 1 721 hours at sea against an annual target of 8 000 hours. Performance is expected to improve in the second half of the year once the maintenance and repair work is completed.”
Respected defence analyst Helmoed Heitman has long been against the use of hours at sea as a performance indicator saying days is widely used internationally. Using his preference the SAN planned to spend 333 days at sea in 2023/24 but managing to log a third – 110 – of the target.
The major contributor to Godongwana’s expectation of increased time at sea will be the Valour Class frigate SAS Amatola (F145). Following participation in last month’s Exercise Ibsamar she is scheduled for an extended anti-piracy mission in the Mozambique Channel. It is in line with the Southern African Development Community (SADC) anti-piracy initiative off the east coast of the region involving Mozambique, South Africa and Tanzania. The South African commitment is codenamed Operation Copper by the Joint Operations Division of the SANDF.
The 2023/24 DoD annual report noted that “Maritime Defence continues to experience challenges with sourcing critical ship spares that are required to effect repairs on the SA Navy legacy vessels. Progress is being made to ensure the availability of combat-ready ships to meet the Joint Force Employment Requirements. With additional funding received from the National Treasury during FY2023/24 for the refit of Strategic Defence Package platforms, the Armscor Dockyard is in progress with the refit(s) of the frigate SAS Isandlwana. The appointment of a Commercial Refit Partner/Specialist Engineering Service for the Submarine is still to be finalised and will be unpacked during the next reporting cycle.”
Last year, the SAS Mendi and elements of the Maritime Reaction Squadron conducted three Operation Corona maritime coastal patrols in conjunction with the SAPS and Department of Forestry, Fisheries and Environment, namely in the Eastern Cape over the period 3 July to 1 August; in the Gansbaai area from 11 October to 8 November; and in the False Bay and Saldanha area from 20 October to 17 November 2023.
The annual report explained that the SA Navy’s inability to meet the set target of four coastal patrols for FY2023/24 was due to ongoing challenges experienced with preparing ships to be operationally available for deployments.
“The underachievement can be attributed to the unavailability of the SA Navy vessels at the Directed Level of Capability due lack of repair capacity at Armscor Dockyard and related procurement challenges. The Concept of Operations for Op Copper is being reviewed and efforts are being undertaken to improve the situation and ensure the availability of platforms for East Coast patrols.”
Other Navy highlights for the 2023/24 financial year were deploying its Chemical Biological Radiation Defence Team under Operation Prosper between 5 December 2023 and 28 April 2024 in support of the South African Police Service to neutralise illegal mining activities in South Africa; hosting Exercise Good Hope with Germany in January/February 2024 in the Saldanha area; and carrying out force preparation Exercise Red Lion in November 2023. (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
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