Sponsored by Bertin Exensor
www.exensor.com
————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————–
31 Oct 24. Moldova: Opposition’s refusal to recognise EU vote will sustain political instability risks, polarisation. On 30 October, the pro-Russia Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova (PSRM) declared that it does not recognise the results of a recent referendum on EU membership. PSRM noted that it opposes amendments to the Moldovan constitution enshrining the country’s pro-EU trajectory and called on the ruling Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) to abandon any constitutional modifications. The referendum was held on 20 October alongside the first round of the presidential election (see Sibylline Special Report – 1 October 2024). Moldovans narrowly voted in favour of European integration (with 50.35% voting in favour and 49.65% against) amid Russian and pro-Russia efforts to subvert the key votes. The referendum aims to make it harder for future governments to derail Molddova’s path towards EU membership. PSRM’s comments raise concerns that, if elected in the run-off vote on 3 November, the party’s candidate (Alexandr Stoianoglo) will undermine Moldova’s pro-EU path. Irrespective of the outcome of the presidential election, we assess that PSRM and other pro-Russia actors will leverage the close result in favour of EU membership to deepen already-entrenched societal polarisation. (Source: Sibylline)
31 Oct 24. Georgia: Contestation of electoral results will likely drive elevated short-term protest risks. On 30 October, the European Commission (EC) published a report warning of severe backsliding regarding the judiciary and fundamental rights in Georgia over recent months. The EC also released a press statement noting irregularities in the parliamentary elections on 26 October. Meanwhile, Georgian President Salome Zurabishvili refused to appear at the Prosecutor’s Office, which summoned her for questioning as part of an investigation into alleged vote rigging. Zurabishvili justified her move by saying that independent electoral observers have provided sufficient evidence of electoral fraud. The four opposition parties that ran in the elections (and Zurabishvili) have rejected the electoral outcome, which saw the ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party secure 54% of the vote. Since the elections, peaceful anti-government rallies have occurred. We assess that the opposition’s refusal to recognise the electoral results will lead to heightened unrest risks, particularly in the coming days. (Source: Sibylline)
31 Oct 24. Kuwait: Deals bolstering naval capacity will increase border security; socio-economic risks remain. On 30 October, Kuwaiti officials signed separate deals with the UAE and a UK-based company to bolster its navy, particularly its national coastguard. The deals are part of a broad overhaul of the country’s security apparatus amid reoccurring maritime border tensions with Iraq and the increasing threats to its oil shipments through the Red Sea. Bolstering its maritime capabilities and security also aligns with Kuwait’s 2040 vision, looking to diversify its income away from oil by developing its blue economy. Increasing the capabilities of the navy will allow the country to better combat illegal fishing and bolster maritime border security against smugglers. However, we assess that the lack of policies and continued infrastructure issues leading to congestion in its ports will likely continue, challenging economic diversification efforts in the coming months and sustaining socio-economic health risks. (Source: Sibylline)
31 Oct 24. India-China: Disengagement at disputed border raises possibility of increased economic ties. On 30 October, disengagement efforts at the Depsang and Demchok friction points of disputed eastern Ladakh were completed (according to reports citing an Indian army source). A mutual verification process is ongoing. Ground commanders are now expected to agree on patrolling arrangements that minimize the potential for clashes. This follows a development on 21 October, when India’s external minister announced that the Indian authorities had reached a deal with Beijing on troop disengagement along the disputed Line of Actual Control (LAC) to return to the situation as it was in 2020 before a deadly clash escalated tensions. Beijing also confirmed this arrangement. The incident in 2020 prompted the Indian authorities to introduce stricter vetting of Chinese investment in India and greater scrutiny of Chinese imports. While the border dispute has still not been fully resolved and troops will remain stationed in the area, the disengagement at the last remaining key friction points along the LAC reduces the likelihood of a sudden spike in tensions and a wider armed conflict. We assess that the easing of tensions also opens the door for more economic co-operation, likely creating a favourable environment for cross-border trade and investment. (Source: Sibylline)
31 Oct 24. SANDF allocated more money but still badly underfunded. The South African National Defence Force (SANDF) has been allocated an additional R3.6bn in the latest ‘mini budget’ tabled on Wednesday, but is still underfunded and battling to meet its mandate.
Minister of Finance Enoch Godongwana presented the Medium Term-Budget Policy Statement (MTBPS) on 30 October, revealing a R3.673bn increase to bring the 2024/25 defence budget to R55.483bn.
R3.4bn is going towards Force Employment while R153 m has been allocated to Air Defence (Helicopter Capability). The majority of extra funding (R2.1bn) falls under “use of funds in emergency situations” and is allocated to cover expenses related to the deployment of SANDF personnel as part of the Southern African Development Community Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (SAMIDRC) through Operation Thiba.
The SANDF also continues to deploy troops with the United Nations peacekeeping mission in the DRC (Monusco) and received R739 m in reimbursements from the UN for its contribution to the. R6 m was generated from the sale of equipment and spares procured through the Special Defence Account.
“These funds will be used for operational expenses related to the continued deployment of two Oryx and three Rooivalk helicopters in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and to provide for critical elements outlined in the 2015 South African Defence Review, such as the upgrading of prime mission equipment,” the MTBPS document stated. Of the R745 m, R583m is going towards Force Employment; R8 m to Landward Defence; and R153 m to Air Defence.
For the first half of 2024/25 (April to September) the SANDF was involved in three external deployments – 150% of its target – mainly due to due to the additional deployment of SANDF personnel as part of SAMIDRC.
President Cyril Ramaphosa told parliament the SAMIDRC contribution would be extended, with 1 198 troops remaining in the DRC until 20 December this year. Defence expert Dean Wingrin said the revised budget allocation is “not nearly enough”, with the DRC and Mozambique missions still underfunded by R300 m and R100 m respectively. “Bns are needed just to arrest the decline of the SANDF, never mind improve it,” he warned.
According to the MTBPS, the SANDF remains financially stressed, with total 2023/24 expenditure reaching 106% of the adjusted appropriation (R55.8bn). For 2024/25, expenditure increased due to an additional allocation to cater for adjustments arising from the 2023/24 public sector wage agreement and for the deployments in the DRC and Mozambique.
Funding shortcomings can be seen in the SANDF missing force employment targets. “Although the department had conducted only one maritime coastal patrol by mid-year against an annual target of four, it remains on track to meet the target by the fourth quarter. Similarly, only 3 290 hours were spent at sea by mid-year against an annual target of 12 000, with the expectation that this target will be met in the fourth quarter,” the MTBPS stated.
“Delays in the maintenance and repair of vessels resulted in only 1 721 hours at sea against an annual target of 8 000 hours. Performance is expected to improve in the second half of the year once the maintenance and repair work is completed.”
For April to September 2024, 3 290 hours were flown by the Air Force against a target of 12 000 for the year, indicating the Air Force is 50% behind schedule in terms of hours flown.
Only halfway through the 2024/25 financial year, the Department of Defence used 1 803 690 reserve force person days against an annual target of 1 997 872. “This high achievement was largely because of the ad hoc deployment of the South African National Defence Force to support the South African Police Service in preventing and combating illicit mining, and guarding power stations as part of Operation Prosper.”
(Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
31 Oct 24. SA Public Procurement Act regulations coming. Public procurement in South Africa, according to Finance Minister Enoch Godongwana, will account for 19% – R1.5trn – of government spend over the next three years – all of which will eventually fall under the ambit of the Public Procurement Act (PPA). The Act was signed into law by President Cyril Ramaphosa late in July following the May national and provincial elections. There’s still a way to go before implementation, Godongwana warned when presenting his medium term budget policy statement (MTBPS) in the Nieuwmeester marquee opposite the fire damaged Parliament building in Cape Town yesterday (Wednesday, 30 October).
The minister gave no indication of where the spend will be, but it can be safely assumed defence and security features, not necessarily high on the list but accounting for a sizeable amount via the three national security organisations requiring increasingly sophisticated equipment to ensure South Africans are and feel safe as per the Constitution. The agencies are the SA National Defence Force (SANDF), SA Police Service (SAPS) and the one-year-old Border Management Authority (BMA).
All three use defence and security acquisition and project management company Armscor for procurement. As examples the Pretoria east headquartered State-owned company (SOC) is currently running tenders for bow tents – end user not specified; submarine spares for the SA Navy (SAN); “fast ferries” – again end user not specified; “reaction/boarding boat systems” for the BMA and “transforming” an Armscor dockyard workshop into a canteen.
Existing procurement legislation including the Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA) and the PPPFA (Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act) remain in place until the relevant provisions of PPA regulations take effect. These regulations, according to Godongwana, will be published next year and have to pass Parliamentary scrutiny ahead of implementation. He gave no possible implementation date with an August National Treasury (NT) advisory stating PPA provisions will become operational on different dates using a phased approach. This will see different categories of “procuring institutions such as national and provincial departments, national and provincial public entities and municipalities and municipal entities” having own dates for PPS regulations implementation.
At its core the PPA aims to create a single framework that regulates public procurement, including preferential procurement, by all organs of state, with the necessary efficiency, cost effectiveness and integrity. (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
30 Oct 24. Regional Cooperation Framework for U.S.-ROK Alliance Contributions to Security in the Indo-Pacific. The United States (U.S.) – Republic of Korea (ROK) Alliance remains the linchpin of peace and security not only on the Korean Peninsula but also in the Indo-Pacific region.
Today the U.S. Department of Defense and ROK Ministry of National Defense announce the following Regional Cooperation Framework for U.S.-ROK Alliance Contributions to Security in the Indo-Pacific to facilitate deeper collaboration between our two countries and to demonstrate our commitment to maintaining a free, peaceful, and prosperous Indo-Pacific region.
Our two nations share fundamentally common interests and values that underpin regional security efforts, such as respect for democratic governance, the rule of law, territorial integrity, and sovereignty. We seek to better align our efforts in the Indo-Pacific to help realize the vision of a global comprehensive strategic alliance and to advance the security and prosperity of our people, the region, and the globe.
This framework builds upon our respective strategies for the region – the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy, and the ROK Strategy for a Free, Peaceful, and Prosperous Indo-Pacific region – to help develop and maintain a sustainable, secure, and resilient regional order. Our cooperative efforts also draw upon the 2023 Defense Vision of the U.S.-ROK Alliance, which identifies strengthening solidarity and regional security cooperation with like-minded partners as one of our key bilateral priorities, and are intended to support the Republic of Korea’s goal of becoming a “Global Pivotal State.”
To advance this cooperation, the U.S. Secretary of Defense and the ROK Minister of National Defense endorse the following general principles and seek to chart a path forward that ensures our common national interest:
• Our cooperative efforts should seek to create a region that is more connected, prosperous, secure, and resilient. We intend to utilize approaches and pursue initiatives that are based on mutual confidence, trust, reciprocity, and respect for relevant international laws, standards, and norms.
• Both the U.S. and ROK recognize that our national interests, as well as those of our bilateral Alliance, can be advanced by firmly upholding and strengthening the rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific region; this includes the freedoms of navigation and overflight, and other uses of the sea guaranteed to all nations under international law.
• Both sides reaffirm their strong support for Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) centrality, unity, and the ASEAN-led regional architecture; we commit to partnering closely with ASEAN to advance implementation of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific in defense-related areas; we are also determined to work closely with Pacific Island countries and the Pacific Islands Forum to build capacity in the region.
• Both sides intend to pursue initiatives and activities together that more comprehensively build partner capacity, bolster maritime security, and foster collaboration and interoperability with like-minded countries in the region.
• Through increased participation in multilateral exercises, both sides are determined to enhance the readiness, capability, and resilience of combined forces to be prepared to respond to evolving and complex threats in the region.
• To expand comprehensive security cooperation, the U.S. and ROK intend to pursue initiatives that strengthen collaboration in the areas of non-proliferation, counter-terrorism, humanitarian aid and disaster relief, climate change, and the prevention of infectious diseases as well as empower regional organizations to contribute to greater regional stability; both sides also intend to increase information sharing with like-minded countries to better address challenges in the region.
• In the area of defense exports and defense industrial cooperation, both sides intend to work together on issues of mutual interest including: sharing best practices on export controls, foreign direct investment, and technology security; exchanging information on expert planning and decision-making; and cooperating effectively to secure supply chains.
• Both sides are also determined to work together to increase information sharing in the cyber domain to enhance regional cybersecurity practices and situational awareness, and build cyber resilience to defend against globally-expanding malicious cyber threats.
• Finally, both sides also pledge to continue using established forums such as the Regional Cooperation Working Group (RCWG), and other existing bilateral mechanisms, to develop and sustain dialogue between the U.S. and ROK on defense cooperation in priority areas identified in both the government and industrial sectors. The mechanisms will report to the annual Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) through the Korea-U.S. Integrated Defense Dialogue (KIDD).
To implement this framework, both sides intend to present concepts for cooperative projects through government channels and, where appropriate, facilitate business-to-business connections that may advance opportunities for collaboration and cooperation. These projects should complement other efforts being undertaken by other like-minded countries in the region and seek to effectively utilize public sector resources.
Initiatives and projects under this framework will focus on the following areas, which both sides have identified as priority areas for cooperation, with a particular focus on cooperation with ASEAN and Pacific Island countries:
Maritime Security
MMultilateral Exercises
MCapacity Building
CDefense Exports and Defense Industrial Cooperation
DTechnical Cooperation (e.g., cyber security and emerging capabilities)
TInformation Sharing
Both sides intend to identify points of contact responsible for coordinating engagements and tracking the implementation of cooperative projects decided upon under this framework. The lead points of contact should review potential opportunities and prioritize actions, with the goal of presenting at least one project or initiative each year before the SCM. (Source: U.S. DoD)
30 Oct 24. 56th Security Consultative Meeting Joint Communique.
1. The 56th United States (U.S.)-Republic of Korea (ROK) Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) was held in Washington, D.C., on October 30, 2024. U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III and ROK Minister of National Defense Kim Yong Hyun led their respective delegations, which included senior defense and foreign affairs officials. On October 17, 2024, the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Charles Q. Brown Jr., and ROK Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Kim Myung-soo, presided over the 49th ROK-U.S. Military Committee Meeting (MCM).
2. The Secretary and the Minister reaffirmed that the U.S.-ROK Alliance is the linchpin of peace, stability, and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula and beyond based on our shared values, including freedom, human rights, and the rule of law. The two leaders reviewed progress taken during 2024 to implement the “Defense Vision of the U.S.-ROK Alliance,” including enhancing extended deterrence against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), modernizing Alliance capabilities based on science and technology cooperation, and strengthening solidarity and regional security cooperation with like-minded partners. They noted that the SCM has played a pivotal role in developing the ROK-U.S. Alliance into a Global Comprehensive Strategic Alliance and would continue maintaining its role as a core consultative mechanism to discuss the future development of the Alliance and provide strategic direction. The two leaders also provided direction and guidance for continued progress in 2025 through a newly endorsed framework of U.S.-ROK bilateral defense consultative mechanisms that effectively and efficiently support Alliance objectives. Both concurred that the current U.S.-ROK Alliance is stronger than ever and reaffirmed the two nations’ unwavering mutual commitment to a combined defense posture to defend the ROK as stated in the U.S-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty, and as reflected in the Washington Declaration. The two leaders also resolved to continue to strengthen the Alliances’ deterrence and defense posture against DPRK aggression and promote stability on the Korean Peninsula and throughout the region.
3. The Secretary and the Minister reviewed the current security environment in and around the Korean Peninsula and discussed cooperative measures between the two nations. The Secretary and Minister expressed grave concern that the DPRK continues to modernize and diversify its nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities. The two sides condemned the DPRK’s multiple missile launches, including ballistic missiles, its attempted launches of a space launch vehicle, and Russian-DPRK arms trade as clear violations of existing UN Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs). They noted that these actions present profound security challenges to the international community and pose an increasingly serious threat to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and throughout the Indo-Pacific region, as well as in the Euro-Atlantic region.
4. Secretary Austin reiterated the firm U.S. commitment to provide extended deterrence to the ROK, utilizing the full range of U.S. defense capabilities, including nuclear, conventional, missile defense, and advanced non-nuclear capabilities. He noted that any nuclear attack by the DPRK against the United States or its Allies and partners is unacceptable and would result in the end of the Kim regime in line with the 2022 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review. He highlighted the increased frequency and routinization of U.S. strategic asset deployments as committed to by President Biden in the Washington Declaration, and noted that these were tangible evidence of the U.S. commitment to defend the ROK.
5. The two leaders highly appreciated the work of the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) inaugurated following the Washington Declaration. Both applauded the completion on July 11, 2024, of “United States and Republic of Korea Guidelines for Nuclear Deterrence and Nuclear Operations on the Korean Peninsula,” which represents tremendous progress of the NCG commended and endorsed by President Biden and President Yoon. The two leaders affirmed that the completion of the Guidelines established the foundation for enhancing ROK-U.S. extended deterrence in an integrated manner. Minister Kim noted that, through such progress, the ROK-U.S. Alliance was elevated to a nuclear-based alliance. The two leaders stressed that the principles and procedures contained in the Guidelines enable Alliance policy and military authorities to maintain an effective nuclear deterrence policy and posture. The Secretary and Minister also welcomed the successful execution of the ROK-U.S. NCG table-top simulations and table-top exercises to enhance decision-making about nuclear deterrence and operations, and planning for potential nuclear contingencies on the Korean Peninsula. Both sides affirmed that the full capabilities of the two countries would contribute to the Alliance’s combined deterrence and defense posture, and in this regard the Secretary welcomed the recent establishment of the ROK Strategic Command. The Secretary and Minister directed the NCG to continue swift progress on NCG workstreams, including security protocols and expansion of information sharing; nuclear consultation processes in crises and contingencies; nuclear and strategic planning; ROK conventional support to U.S. nuclear operations in a contingency through conventional-nuclear integration (CNI); strategic communications; exercises, simulations, training, and investment activities; and risk reduction practices. They noted that such efforts would be coordinated to strengthen capabilities of the ROK and United States to enhance U.S.-ROK extended deterrence cooperation in an integrated manner, and looked forward to receiving regular updates on NCG progress activities at future SCMs.
6. The two sides pledged to continue coordinating efforts to deter DPRK’s nuclear threat with the Alliance’s overwhelming strength, while continuing to pursue efforts through sanctions and pressure to dissuade and delay DPRK’s nuclear development. Both leaders stressed the importance of full implementation of UNSCRs by the entire international community, including the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russia, both permanent members of the UN Security Council. The two leaders urged the international community to prevent and respond to DPRK’s sanctions evasion so that it abandons its illegal nuclear and ballistic missile development. To this end, they decided to work closely with each other and the international community to combat the DPRK’s illegal and malicious cyber activities, cryptocurrency theft, overseas laborer dispatches, and ship-to-ship transfers. The Secretary and Minister expressed concern that Russia-DPRK military cooperation, which has been intensified since the signing of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty between the two, is deepening regional instability. The two leaders made clear that military cooperation, including illegal arms trade and high-technology transfers between Russia and the DPRK, constitute a clear violation of UNSCRs, and called on Russia to uphold its commitments. The two leaders also strongly condemned in the strongest terms with one voice that the military cooperation between Russia and the DPRK has expanded beyond transfers of military supplies to actual deployment of forces, and pledged to closely coordinate with the international community regarding this issue.
7. Both leaders reiterated the willingness of their Presidents to pursue dialogue and diplomacy, backed by a robust and credible deterrence and defense posture. In this regard, Secretary Austin expressed support for the goals of the ROK’s Audacious Initiative and President Yoon’s vision of a free, peaceful, and prosperous unified Korean Peninsula, and welcomed President Yoon’s desire to open a path for serious and sustained diplomacy with the DPRK. Both sides reaffirmed that they remain open to dialogue with the DPRK without preconditions and pledged to continue close coordination.
8. The Minister and the Secretary noted concerns that the DPRK’s claims of “two hostile countries,” and activities near the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) could threaten peace and the Armistice on the Korean Peninsula. The two leaders strongly condemned DPRK’s activities that raise tension on the Korean Peninsula, such as multiple unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) infiltrations in the past, as well as the recent unilateral detonation of sections of inter-Korean roads and ongoing launches of “filth and trash balloons,” and urged the DPRK to immediately cease such activities. The Secretary and the Minister concurred that the Armistice Agreement remains in effect as an international norm guaranteeing the stable security order on the Korean Peninsula, and that all parties of the Korean War should abide by it while it remains in force. Both sides noted that the Northern Limit Line (NLL) has been an effective means of separating military forces and preventing military tension over the past 70 years, and urged the DPRK to respect the NLL.
9. Secretary Austin and Minister Kim reaffirmed the role of the United Nations Command (UNC) in implementing, managing, and enforcing the Korean Armistice Agreement, deterring DPRK aggression, and coordinating a multinational, united response in case of contingencies on the Korean Peninsula. They reaffirmed that UNC has successfully contributed to those aims for more than 70 years and continues to carry out its mission with the utmost respect for the sovereignty of ROK, the primary host nation. Both sides welcomed the successful organization of the second ROK-UNC Member States Defense Ministerial Meeting and expressed their appreciation for UNC Member State contributions. They welcomed the addition of Germany to UNC, and noted that peace and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific, including the Korean Peninsula, and Euro-Atlantic regions are increasingly connected. The two leaders are determined to continue seeking the expanded participation in UNC by like-minded countries that share the values of the 1953 Washington Declaration, anchored in the principles of the UN Charter and mandates of relevant UNSCRs. Secretary Austin thanked Minister Kim for the ROK’s efforts to support the UNC’s role to maintain and enforce the Armistice Agreement, and to support the defense of the ROK against DPRK aggression. In this regard, the Secretary and Minister both highlighted their desire to expand combined exercises, information sharing, and interoperability between the ROK, the Combined Forces Command, and UNC Member States.
10. The Secretary and the Minister also noted the critical role that U.S. forces in the ROK have played for more than 70 years and reaffirmed that U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) continues to play a decisive role in preventing armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula, and in promoting peace and stability in Northeast Asia. Secretary Austin reiterated the U.S. commitment to maintain current USFK force levels to defend the ROK.
11. The Secretary and Minister also reviewed the work of the various bilateral mechanisms such as the U.S.-Korea Integrated Defense Dialogue (KIDD). They welcomed efforts to enhance information sharing through the U.S. Shared Early Warning System (SEWS) for strengthening the Alliance’s detection capabilities in response to advancing DPRK missile threats. They also commended the work of the Counter-Missile Working Group (CMWG) and reviewed “the Joint Study on Alliance Comprehensive Counter-Missile Strategy” aimed at informing recommendations for counter-missile capabilities and posture of ROK and United States. The Secretary and Minister also discussed concrete efforts to strengthen cooperation in space and cyber to robustly deter and defend against growing threats. They endorsed efforts by the Space Cooperation Working Group (SCWG) to improve space situational awareness information sharing and interoperability, and acknowledged the need to expand ROK participation in exercises and training that can strengthen Alliance space capability and improve resilience against growing space threats. In particular, the Secretary also welcomed ROK participation in the Joint Commercial Operations (JCO) cell to leverage space industry and strengthen allied space capabilities. The Secretary and Minister also pledged to deepen cyber cooperation through the Cyber Cooperation Working Group and improve coordination through cyber defense exercises, such as Cyber Alliance and Cyber Flag. Overall, both leaders expressed appreciation for the continuing cooperation to ensure the Alliance’s space, cyber, and counter-missile efforts to keep pace with the evolving threats posed by the DPRK.
12. Noting the importance of science and technology (S&T) cooperation, the Secretary and Minister decided to establish the Defense Science and Technology Executive Committee (DSTEC) at the Vice-Minister-Under Secretary level within this year, to guide and prioritize Alliance defense S&T cooperation. They noted priority areas for cooperation including autonomy, artificial intelligence, and crewed-uncrewed teaming are particularly vital to ensure the ROK is able to achieve the goals of Defense Innovation 4.0 and modernize Alliance capabilities. Both leaders also welcomed future S&T cooperation related to quantum technologies, future-generation wireless communication technologies, and directed energy to ensure that S&T advancements enhance the combined capabilities of the Alliance. This included efforts to identify potential areas of collaboration on AUKUS Pillar II. The Secretary welcomed the Minister’s proposal to host a Defense Science and Technology conference in 2025, and concurred that the DSTEC should leverage this conference to baseline and prioritize Alliance defense S&T collaboration.
13. The Secretary and Minister also reviewed efforts to improve the interoperability, interchangeability, and resilience of the U.S. and ROK defense industrial base. They underscored the need to improve efficient and effective collaboration in the development, acquisition, fielding, logistics, sustainment, and maintenance of defense capabilities, and to ensure that S&T advancements are swiftly and seamlessly transitioned into acquisition and sustainment efforts. Both leaders welcomed progress under the U.S. Regional Sustainment Framework (RSF) and welcomed ROK participation in a Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul (MRO) pilot project on Air Force aviation maintenance. The two leaders noted that this pilot project could lead to more bilateral co-sustainment opportunities, and also expand defense industrial collaboration with like-minded partners in the region in light of the ROK’s key role in the Partnership for Indo-Pacific Industrial Resilience (PIPIR) contact group. The Secretary and Minister also noted with satisfaction the recent U.S. Navy contract with ROK shipyards to conduct MRO services for U.S. vessels, and underscored the potential to expand such work to improve the resilience of the Alliance’s posture in the Indo-Pacific Region. The Secretary and Minister also recognized the need to improve reciprocal market access to deepen defense industrial cooperation and enhance supply chain resiliency, and are committed to accelerate cooperation with the goal of signing the Reciprocal Defense Procurement Agreement next year based on guidance from both Presidents.
14. The Secretary and the Minister received and endorsed the MCM Report to the SCM presented by the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Charles Q. Brown. They welcomed the efforts of General Brown, Admiral Kim, and the MCM to enhance military plans, posture, training, exercises, and efforts to coordinate U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command (CFC) activities and enhance military strength of the Alliance. The Secretary and Minister concurred that the Freedom Shield 24 (FS 24) and Ulchi Freedom Shield 24 (UFS 24) exercises, which included realistic threats from the DPRK advancing nuclear, missile, space, and cyber threats, enhanced the Alliance’s crisis management and strengthened deterrence and defense capabilities. In addition, they assessed that combined field training exercises (FTX), which were more extensive than the past year and conducted in land, maritime and air domains, enhanced interoperability and combined operations execution capabilities. Based on such outcomes, both leaders decided to continue strengthening combined exercises and training in line with the rapidly changing security environment of the Korean Peninsula, and further decided that future combined exercises should include appropriate and realistic scenarios including responses to DPRK nuclear use. The Secretary and the Minister also emphasized that ensuring consistent training opportunities for USFK is critical to maintaining a strong combined defense posture. Secretary Austin noted the efforts of ROK Ministry of National Defense (MND) to improve the training conditions for U.S. and ROK forces and stressed the importance of maintaining close cooperation between USFK and MND for the joint use of ROK facilities and airspace for training.
15. Given the growth and diversification of the DPRK’s chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons and delivery systems, both leaders assessed efforts and works to ensure execution of Alliance missions under a CBRN-challenged environment. In particular, they welcomed progress by the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Committee (CWMDC), including the expansion of information sharing required for nuclear elimination operations consistent with the Nuclear Weapons Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), and the strengthening of cooperation to prevent proliferation of WMD in the Indo-Pacific region. Both leaders welcomed continued multinational counter-proliferation activities in the region amidst advancements of DPRK nuclear and missile program and intensification of arms trade between Russia and the DPRK following the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty. Secretary Austin expressed appreciation for ROK contributions to various global security efforts such as Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), and the Minister and the Secretary concurred on the importance of maintaining cooperative efforts to enforce relevant counter-proliferation UNSCRs.
16. The Secretary and Minister also reviewed the progress and works to fulfill the Conditions-based Wartime Operational Control (OPCON) Transition Plan (COTP). Both leaders reaffirmed that the conditions stated in the bilaterally approved COTP must be met before wartime OPCON is transitioned in a stable and systematic manner. They received the results of the annual U.S.-ROK bilateral evaluation on the capabilities and systems for conditions #1 and #2 based on the bilaterally-approved assessment criteria and standards. Both leaders affirmed that there was a significant progress of this year’s bilateral evaluation on readiness posture and capabilities, and pledged to continue close consultations between the ROK and the United States. for the establishment of the Future-CFC. The Secretary and the Minister also reaffirmed that Future-CFC Full Operational Capability (FOC) Certification would be pursued when the results of the bilateral evaluation on the capabilities and systems of conditions #1 and #2 meet the mutually approved levels. Regarding condition #3, the Secretary and the Minister decided to remain in close consultation for the assessment of the security environment. Both sides pledged to support continued evaluation and progress in wartime OPCON transition implementation through annual MCMs and SCMs, and affirmed that the wartime OPCON transition would strengthen ROK and Alliance capabilities and the combined defense posture.
17. The Secretary and the Minister reviewed the regional security environment, and plans to expand U.S.-ROK security cooperation throughout the Indo-Pacific region to support maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific that is connected, prosperous, secure, and resilient. They also reaffirmed support for Association of Southeast Asian Nation (ASEAN) centrality and the ASEAN-led regional architecture as well as regional efforts of the Pacific Islands Forum. In particular, the two leaders noted the importance of enhancing cooperation during the implementation of both the ROK and U.S. respective strategies for the Indo-Pacific region. To this end, the Secretary and the Minister endorsed the “Regional Cooperation Framework for U.S.-ROK Alliance Contributions to Security in the Indo-Pacific,” and discussed priorities areas and partners to better respond to the complex regional and global security situation. After reviewing the work of the ROK-U.S. Regional Cooperation Working Group (RCWG), both leaders reaffirmed their commitment to strengthen defense cooperation with ASEAN members and work together with the Pacific Island Countries to contribute to regional security. The Secretary and the Minister also acknowledged the importance of preserving peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait as reflected in the April 2023 “Joint Statement in Commemoration of the 70th Anniversary of the Alliance between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea.”
18. The Secretary and the Minister reflected on the remarkable progress made during 2024 to fulfill the historic understandings at the Camp David Summit. They welcomed the Memorandum of Cooperation on the Trilateral Security Cooperation Framework (TSCF), signed by the Ministers and the Secretary of the United States, ROK, and Japan in July, along with enhanced sharing of missile warning information and efforts to systematically conduct trilateral exercises, including the first execution of the multi-domain trilateral exercise FREEDOM EDGE. The Secretary and the Minister reaffirmed their commitment to continuing to promote and expand trilateral security cooperation including senior-level policy consultations, trilateral exercises, information sharing, and defense exchange cooperation.
19. The two sides also took the opportunity to reaffirm that expediting the relocation and return of U.S. military bases in the ROK is in the interests of both countries, and decided to work closely to ensure the timely return of the bases in accordance with the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and related agreements. The two leaders noted the significance of the complete construction of Yongsan Park, and pledged to expedite the remaining return of Yongsan Garrison. The Minister and the Secretary also reaffirmed their mutual commitment to discuss the return of other U.S. military bases through regular consultations through SOFA channels to reach mutually acceptable outcomes in the future.
20. Secretary Austin expressed his gratitude that the ROK is contributing toward ensuring a stable environment for U.S. Forces Korea. The Secretary and Minister also welcomed the recent conclusion of consultations related to a 12th Special Measures Agreement (SMA), and concurred that it would greatly contribute to the strengthening of the U.S.-ROK combined defense posture.
21. Secretary Austin and Minister Kim affirmed that the discussions during the 56th SCM and the 49th MCM contributed to strengthening the U.S.-ROK Alliance with a vision toward the further development of a truly global alliance. The two leaders commended the U.S. and ROK military and civilian personnel that worked to strengthen the bond of the Alliance, and expressed appreciation for their shared commitment and sacrifice. Both sides expect to hold the 57th SCM and 50th MCM in Seoul at a mutually convenient time in 2025. (Source: U.S. DoD)
31 Oct 24. North Korea leader says longest ICBM test ‘appropriate military action’ against enemies.
Summary
• Kim Jong Un says ICBM test ‘appropriate military action’ showing will to counter enemies
• Missile flight time was longest ever; possible new or improved booster
• Launch comes amid backlash over troop deployment to Russia-Ukraine war
• North Korea shows belligerence under international pressure-expert
North Korea said it tested an intercontinental ballistic missile on Thursday, upgrading what it called the “world’s most powerful strategic weapon”, as Seoul warned Pyongyang could get missile technology from Russia for helping with the war in Ukraine.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un was on hand and said the test was a warning to enemies that have been threatening the country’s security, KCNA state news agency said.
“The test-fire is an appropriate military action that fully meets the purpose of informing the rivals, who have intentionally escalated the regional situation and posed a threat to the security of our Republic recently, of our counteraction will,” Kim was quoted as saying by KCNA.
The muscle-flexing comes amid a storm of international condemnation and rising alarm over what the U.S. and others say is North Korea’s deployment of 11,000 troops to Russia – 3,000 of them close to the western frontlines with Ukraine.
The launch drew swift condemnation from South Korea, Japan and the United States.
A day earlier, Seoul reported signs the North may test-launch an ICBM or conduct a seventh nuclear test around the U.S. presidential election on Tuesday, seeking to draw attention to its growing military prowess.
Shin Seung-ki, head of research on North Korea’s military at the state-run Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, said the launch was likely to test improved booster performance of an existing ICBM – possibly with the help of Russia.
“North Korea will want to keep getting help like this, because it saves times and costs while improving performance and upgrading the stability of weapons system,” he said.
Having come under pressure over its engagement with Russia, “the intention may be to show that it will not bow to pressure, that it will respond to strength with strength, and also to seek some influence on the U.S. presidential election,” Shin added.
Most of the long range missiles were test fired on steep vertical trajectories, known as lofted trajectories.
NEW RECORDS
The launch early on Thursday was the longest ballistic missile test by the North with a flight-time of 87 minutes, according to South Korea.
KCNA said the test set new records of its missile capabilities.
The missile took off on a sharply lofted trajectory from an area near the North’s capital and splashed down about 200 km (125 miles) west of Japan’s Okushiri island, off Hokkaido.
It reached an altitude of 7,000 km and flew a distance of 1,000 km, the Japanese government said.
The so-called lofted trajectory of a projectile flying at a sharply raised angle is intended to test its thrust and stability over much shorter distances relative to the designed range, partly for safety and to avoid the political fallout of sending a missile far into the Pacific.
North Korea’s last ICBM, dubbed the Hwasong-18, was tested in December last year. Fuelled by solid-propellant and fired from a road launcher, it was also launched at a sharply raised angle and flew for 73 minutes, translating to a potential range of 15,000 km (9,300 miles) on a normal trajectory.
That is a distance that puts anywhere in the mainland United States within range.
Pyongyang’s latest test came just hours after U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and his South Korean counterpart Kim Yong-hyun met in Washington to condemn the North Korean troop deployment in Russia.
Neither Moscow or Pyongyang have directly acknowledged the deployment, but Russia’s U.N. Ambassador Vassily Nebenzia on Wednesday questioned why its allies like North Korea could not help Moscow in its war against Ukraine given Western countries claim the right to help Kyiv.
South Korea said the deployment was a direct threat to its security because the North would gain valuable combat experience in a modern warfare and it will likely be rewarded by Moscow with “technology transfers” in areas such as tactical nuclear weapons, ICBMs, ballistic missile submarines and military reconnaissance satellites. (Source: Reuters)
29 Oct 24. UK, EU and Canada impose new sanctions targeting Myanmar military regime and its associates.
The UK, EU and Canada have announced further sanctions targeting the Myanmar military’s access to military material, equipment and funds.
• The UK, EU and Canada have announced a further round of sanctions to increase pressure on the Myanmar military regime and its associates.
• UK sanctions target entities supplying aviation fuel and equipment to the Myanmar military. August 2024 saw the highest number of airstrikes on record by the Myanmar military, killing dozens of civilians.
The UK, EU and Canada have announced further sanctions targeting the Myanmar military’s access to military material, equipment and funds.
UK action will help to constrain the Myanmar military’s ability to conduct airstrikes on civilians, which amount to gross human rights violations.
The latest round of UK sanctions is against six entities involved either in providing aviation fuel to the Myanmar military or in the supply of restricted goods, including aircraft parts. Today’s announcement bolsters previous sanctions against suppliers of aviation fuel to the military in February and March 2023 and arms dealers in October 2023.
The UK will continue to work with partners to restrict the sale and transfer of arms and finance to the Myanmar military. Since the coup, the UK has provided more than £150 m for life-saving humanitarian assistance, healthcare, education and support for civil society and local communities in Myanmar.
Minister for the Indo-Pacific, Catherine West said: “The human rights violations taking place across Myanmar, including airstrikes on civilian infrastructure, by the Myanmar military is unacceptable and the impact on innocent civilians is intolerable.
That is why today the UK is announcing fresh sanctions targeting the suppliers of equipment and aviation fuel to the Myanmar military. Alongside the EU and Canada, we are today further constraining the military’s access to funds, equipment and resources.”
These sanctions will increase pressure on the Myanmar military. The UK remains steadfast in our support for the Myanmar people and their aspirations for a peaceful and democratic future.
On 1 February 2021, the Myanmar military overthrew the democratically elected government, led by Aung San Suu Kyi, and installed a military regime. Since then, they have used violence and atrocities to maintain power and suppress any opposition voices. Increasingly brutal tactics have been implemented as the military continue to cling on to power, leading to the highest number of airstrikes on record by the Myanmar military this August (2024), killing dozens of civilians.
Over 3.4 m people are now displaced from their homes due to the fighting, over 18 m people are in need of humanitarian assistance, and Myanmar is now seeing a proliferation in serious and organised crime.
Background
Since the coup, the UK has designated 25 individuals and 33 entities under the Myanmar Sanctions Regime. The UK continues to lead international efforts to undermine the regime’s credibility and constrain their access to revenue and arms.
Today the UK has sanctioned:
1. Asia Sun Group Company Limited – for being owned or controlled by Zaw Min Tun, a Myanmar businessman previously sanctioned by the UK in 2023 for making available economic resources, namely aviation fuel, directly or indirectly to or for the benefit of the Myanmar security forces.
2. Swan Energy Company Limited – for being associated with Asia Sun Trading Company Limited and by for making available economic resources (aviation fuel) directly or indirectly to or for the benefit of the Myanmar security forces.
3. Myan-Oil Company Limited – for being associated with Asia Sun Trading Company Limited.
4. Rich Ray Trading Company Limited – for being associated with Asia Sun Trading Company Limited and by making available economic resources (aviation fuel) directly or indirectly to or for the benefit of the Myanmar security forces.
5. Progress Technology Support Company (a.k.a Royal Shune Lei Co) – for being involved in the supply to Myanmar of restricted goods or restricted technology or of material related to such goods or technology.
6. King Royal Technologies Company Limited- for being involved in the supply to Myanmar of goods or technology which could contribute to a serious human rights violation or abuse. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)
29 Oct 24. North Korean Presence Underscores Russia’s Struggle, Pentagon Press Secretary Says. The Pentagon expressed concern today over North Korea’s escalating support for Russia in its war against Ukraine.
Pentagon Press Secretary Air Force Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder confirmed that North Korea dispatched approximately 10,000 soldiers to Russia’s Far Eastern Federal District, where they are expected to train alongside their Russian counterparts. A small number of North Korean soldiers are already present in Russia’s Kursk Oblast, near Ukraine’s eastern border.
“Initial indications are that these troops will be employed in some type of infantry role,” Ryder stated. “We remain concerned that Russia intends to use these soldiers in combat or to support combat operations against Ukrainian forces in Kursk.”
The North Korean presence in Kursk underscores Russia’s struggle to man and reinforce its forces as they fight to recapture the region.
“The fact that they now need to outsource for foreign troops to help support their forces inside Russia indicates that there’s some serious questions in terms of their ability to continue to sustain their personnel requirements,” Ryder added.
North Korea’s expanded contribution to the war comes on the heels of Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III’s visit to Kyiv last week, where he reaffirmed the United States’ steadfast support for Ukraine. The trip marked his fourth visit to the besieged country since taking office. The visit allowed Austin to encourage countries around the globe to remain steadfast in their support for Ukrainian freedom and sovereignty.
“When the largest military in Europe becomes a force of aggression, the whole continent feels the shock,” Austin said in his prepared remarks at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine. “And when a dictator puts his imperial fantasies ahead of the rights of a free people, the whole international system feels the outrage.”
On Oct. 21, the Defense Department announced its latest aid package containing critical capabilities for Ukraine valued at nearly $400 m. Since February 2022, the U.S. has provided more than $59.5 bn in critical assistance including air defense, artillery, armored vehicles and other critical munitions.
Today, Ryder reconfirmed Ukraine’s right to use that equipment to defend itself.
“The weapons and capabilities that the United States and other international partners have provided to Ukraine are Ukrainian weapons and Ukrainian capabilities,” he said. “Ukraine employ those capabilities to defend their sovereign territory from threats that are either emanating from across the border or inside Ukrainian territory.”
Potential Iranian Retaliation Against Israel
Ryder addressed the likelihood of an Iranian response to Israel’s recent airstrikes targeting Iran’s defense capabilities and acknowledged that Pentagon officials were closely monitoring the situation.
“We have to be prepared for all contingencies,” Ryder said. “We are fully aware of the tensions in the Middle East, and we continue to support the defense of Israel from potential attacks by Iran and its proxies, as well as our forces.”
Ryder’s comments are aligned with the United States’ “ironclad support for Israel’s defense.”
Earlier this month, Austin authorized a crewed Terminal High Altitude Area Defense battery’s deployment to Israel. The THAAD anti-aircraft contingent will augment Israel’s missile defense capabilities in the wake of two large-scale Iranian ballistic missile attacks.
On Oct. 13, Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh expanded on Austin’s decision to send the THAAD battery forward. “This decision was made as part of the broader adjustments the U.S. military has made in recent months to support the defense of Israel and protect Americans from attacks by Iran and Iranian-aligned militias,” she explained.
Humanitarian Assistance in Gaza
Ryder addressed a related Middle East crisis, conveying the Pentagon’s apprehension to Israeli legislation that could hinder United Nations Relief and Works Agency’s humanitarian initiatives.
“We are deeply troubled by … legislation that would shutter the UNRWA operations,” Ryder said, arguing that the policy shift “posed significant risks for those … dependent on … aid.”
Ryder expressed concern for Palestinian civilians affected by Israel’s campaign in Gaza and emphasized UNRWA’s role in preserving human life.
“Much more aid needs to Gaza,” he added. “We believe that UNRWA plays an important role in … providing aid to ms of Palestinians.”
Nevertheless, Ryder expressed optimism at the possibility of de-escalation, highlighting Austin’s ongoing diplomatic efforts to reduce tensions in the region. He concluded by forwarding the DOD’s position, which encourages initiatives aimed at achieving lasting peace.
“The window for diplomacy is always open,” he said. (Source: U.S. DoD)
29 Oct 24. US-China: Restricted US investment will increase compliance risks for tech, defence sectors. On 28 October, the US Treasury Department cemented a rule that limits those in the US from investing in certain technologies in China that could bolster Beijing’s military. The investments covered in the rule include semiconductors, artificial intelligence and quantum information technologies. The new operating regulations (which come into force on 2 January 2025) will almost certainly raise compliance risks for firms with existing investments in China, particularly in the defence and tech sectors. Any firm looking to establish operations in China will face similar risks. The rule underscores the Biden administration’s aim to prevent Beijing from having a military or technological edge over the US. Before the end of President Joe Biden’s term on 20 January 2025, it remains possible that his administration will seek to establish a ban on Chinese drones and vehicles in the US due to national security concerns. We assess that the next presidential administration, formed by either party, will ultimately continue to restrict US investment in specific sectors in China and limit Beijing’s access to US markets. (Source: Sibylline)
28 Oct 24. US targets Russia-Sudan “port-for-weapons exchange.”
Moscow has sought a naval base along Sudan’s Red Sea coast since 2017 and talks are still in progress between Russia and the Sudanese Armed Forces.
The US State Department imposed new sanctions against a chief official in the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), Mirghani Idris Suleiman, responsible for weapons procurement.
The SAF continue to prioritise weapons acquisition – including procuring drones from Iran and Russia – to use against an independent paramilitary group, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), in an 18-month long civil war over government control.
Individuals on both sides have been sanctioned to hold those accountable for fueling the conflict, which has led to mass displacement and acute food insecurity. More than 11 m people have been forcibly displaced, and the widespread hunger effecting 21 m people is said to be the “largest modern famine” according to experts affiliated with the United Nations.
Sudan’s civil war has served as an opportunity for some states to build on their interests in the region. As part of the latest sanctions, the State Department singled out a “port-for-weapons exchange with Russia” which it says will only escalate the conflict further.
Moscow has sought a naval base along Sudan’s Red Sea coast since 2017. During the summer, Russia’s deputy foreign minister, Sergei Ryabkov, noted talks regarding a potential Russian naval base are still in progress, though no firm agreements have been reached at this time.
“A naval base in Sudan would provide Russia with three significant advantages,” Albert Vidal, a research analyst at the International Institute for Strategic Studies told Army Technology.
Secure supply lines
“First it would enhance Moscow’s supply lines for weapons and equipment into Sudan and beyond, facilitating the support for its Africa Corps (formerly the Wagner Group) and several other partners across Africa – a lot of which is currently being done through the Libyan port of Tobruk.”
A pariah in the West, Russia has too few options to prop up its expanding war economy for its invasion of Ukraine through trade and cooperation on the world stage. However, exploiting domestic crises around the world enables the rogue state to expand its influence.
“The Russian Federation and [the Russian President Vladimir] Putin are increasingly isolated due to their premeditated, unprovoked, and unjustified war against Ukraine,” a US State Department spokesperson told Army Technology. “Should Sudanese authorities elect to allow Russia to establish a logistics facility, it would prove inimical to Sudan’s long-term interests and the aspirations of the Sudanese people for an end to the war. ”
In early-April 2024, Russian cargo ships delivered 6,000 tonnes of equipment to Southern Libya with the support of the commander of the Libyan Armed Forces, General Khalifa Haftar. It included light and heavy pickups, transportation trucks, and anti-aircraft artillery.
With further military infrastructure in the Eastern Sahel region the Russians will more easily disperse the flow of equipment and goods around the world to support other regimes and secure its own interests.
Project power
“Second, it would strengthen Russia’s ability to project power in the Mediterranean and the Western Indian Ocean, complementing the role of its other base in the Syrian port of Tartus. This could lead to increased naval diplomacy with the Arab Gulf states, Iran, India, and the East African partners.”
This kind of military presence also serves as a form of strategic deterrence, demonstrating Russia’s ability to mobilise near key theatres of war such as that in the Red Sea and the wider Middle East.
Just as the US Armed Forces support Israeli air defence on land, sea and air, Russia’s close proximity would reinforce their existing efforts to disrupt navigation, Houthi attacks and support Iran if the conflict deteriorates following Israel’s recent strikes against military targets in Iran.
Practical benefits
“Third, the base could serve as an intelligence-gathering outpost for monitoring commercial and military shipping and it might be used to disrupt maritime traffic in the Red Sea if necessary.
“A base may also, very indirectly, give some leverage to Russia over Saudi Arabia in future negotiations of oil policies.”
A Russian base in Sudan would be able to monitor Western presence and shipping in the Red Sea in the same way that the Yemeni Houthi militants are bottle-necking the global trade route. Credit: Crown copyright/UK MoD.
Realpolitik in the Global South
So far, the Human Rights Watch have identified new forms of military equipment being funnelled into Sudan, including armed drones, drone jammers, anti-tank guided missiles, truck-mounted multi-barrel rocket launchers, and mortar munitions.
All this is produced by companies registered in China, Iran, Russia, Serbia, and the United Arab Emirates. Though, the watchdog is unable to establish how the warring parties acquired the equipment.
Crucially, this demonstrates how some regimes are securing their interests on world stage by tapping into the interests of the so-called Global South and finding common ground.
“Western states would benefit from acknowledging that – just like their own – Global South countries’ decisions can be shaped by realpolitik considerations,” IISS analysis recently observed. “They might find therefore that engaging with these countries on their most pressing concerns and legitimate demands is an effective way to foster more constructive partnerships.”
The US acknowledges this with India’s late strategic pivot toward them through the so-called INDUS-X collaboration wherein the two governments, and their respective industries and academia, cooperate in developing military technologies. Though, the importance of this project to India may reduce following the recent agreement between China and India to bring an end to their enduring border conflict.
So far, the State Department are calling for an end to Sudan’s domestic crises and employing the tools it has to try to curb the transfer of military equipment.
“We and many international partners… have repeatedly called for an end to all external support to the belligerents and have urged all members of the international community to use their influence to press all parties to agree to a comprehensive cessation of hostilities,” the State Department spokesperson added.
The West must respond more appropriately to the Russia-Sudan deal by bringing the local conflict into the wider geopolitical discourse. Because right now China, Russia and Iran, among others, are putting forward a compelling narrative that seeks to upend the Liberal International Order.
Russian President Vladimir Putin described this conception in an article in 2023 ahead of the Russia-Africa Summit to commence that July:
“We are sure that a new multipolar world order… will be more just and democratic. And there is no doubt that Africa, along with Asia, the Middle East and Latin America will take its worthy place in it and finally free itself from the bitter legacy of colonialism and neo-colonialism, rejecting its modern practices.” (Source: army-technology.com)
29 Oct 24. Chad: Jihadist attack highlights increasing security risks, threats to staff. Overnight on 27-28 October, alleged Boko Haram militants attacked an army garrison on Barkaram Island (Lac province) and killed over 40 soldiers. This marks the largest jihadist attack in Chad this year. While attributed to Boko Haram, the attack was likely conducted by the Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP) faction which has conducted several attacks from its bases in Lake Chad into Lac and Hadjer-Lamis provinces this year. Following the attack, President Mahamat Idriss Déby announced the launch of a renewed counter-insurgent operation in the coming days. The operation will likely complement ongoing Nigerian offensives against jihadist positions on Lake Chad, intensifying clashes across the multi-border Lake Chad area and elevating security and bystander risks. ISWAP and Boko Haram will also possibly launch attacks on softer targets (such as schools), increasing threats to NGO staff engaged in rural development and education projects. While the operation will likely temporarily degrade local jihadist capabilities, we assess that sporadic attacks on isolated forward bases and rural communities in the Lac and Hadjer-Lamis provinces will persist in the coming months. Attack risks in the capital N’Djamena are unlikely to increase. (Source: Sibylline)
30 Oct 24. North Korea: Warning of potential ICBM launch around US election will drive regional tensions. Earlier on 30 October, South Korean MP Lee Seong-kweun stated that North Korea has prepared a launch site for an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Lee was briefed by South Korean Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) officials. He warned that Pyongyang will possibly launch an ICBM to coincide with the US presidential election on 5 November. Another MP claimed that the DIA assesses that the missile is yet to be fitted to the launcher. North Korea has reportedly carried out 12 ICBM tests since February 2022; several of these launches were unsuccessful. Pyongyang often carries out missile tests as a show of force or to display new weapons systems. Regional tensions have elevated in recent weeks; North Korea has blown up roads linking the country to South Korea and deployed troops to Russia (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 28 October 2024). We assess that any missile launched by North Korea would land in the Sea of Japan; in a less likely scenario, it would possibly fly over Japan and into the Pacific Ocean. The risks facing shipping and business operations would be minimal. However, a missile test would possibly trigger emergency alerts in South Korea and/or Japan, driving temporary disruption therein. (Source: Sibylline)
28 Oct 24. Ghana: Jihadist groups active in northern areas will drive likelihood of imminent security clampdown. On 26 October, Ghana’s security ministry released a statement denying the existence of any ‘non-aggression policy’ towards jihadist groups. This follows reporting from Reuters which cited several Ghanaian security officials and diplomats who claimed that jihadist groups were using parts of Ghana’s northern border region as a hub for resupplying and resting fighters. It is highly likely that the al-Qaeda-aligned Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) is operating across porous border areas in northern Ghana and that the current lack of offensive operations in the country (unlike in Benin, Cote d’Ivoire and Togo) has resulted in Ghana’s current status as a jihadist logistics hub. Such activity will raise the likelihood of JNIM establishing local networks, which will raise the risks stemming from attacks and kidnapping across northern Ghana in the long term. However, increased international attention will possibly prompt Ghana to launch a security clampdown against border incursions. We assess this would raise the likelihood of JNIM attacks against border posts and checkpoints in the coming weeks and months, driving bystander and supply chain risks (particularly for staff and assets conducting overland transit between Ghana and Burkina Faso). (Source: Sibylline)
25 Oct 24. US approves $2bn arms sale to Taiwan including Ukraine tested missile system.
• Summary
• Arms sale announcement comes week after Chinese war games
• U.S. bound by law to provide Taiwan with means to defend itself
• China views Taiwan as its own territory
The United States has approved a potential $2bn arms sale package to Taiwan, the Pentagon said on Friday, including the delivery for the first time to the island of an advanced air defense missile system battle tested in Ukraine.
The United States is bound by law to provide Chinese-claimed Taiwan with the means to defend itself despite the lack of formal diplomatic ties, to the constant anger of Beijing. China has been stepping up military pressure against Taiwan, including holding a new round of war games around the island last week, the second time it has done so since Lai Ching-te took office as Taiwan’s president in May. The Pentagon’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency said the new sale consisted of $1.16bn in missile systems and radar systems worth an estimated $828m. The principal contractor for the missile system will be RTX Corp (RTX.N) the Pentagon said. (Source: Reuters)
25 Oct 24. Pakistan: Attack against security forces underscores elevated militant threat. Earlier on 25 October, ten Frontier Constabulary personnel were killed and seven were injured in a shootout with militants in Dera Ismail Khan district (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province). At least 20 militants attacked a security post using grenades and assault rifles. The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has reportedly claimed responsibility for the attack. The attack comes amid an uptick in militant activity in the province, particularly targeting the security forces. In July, the TTP targeted an army cantonment in Bannu (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province), killing eight soldiers. The attack also follows increased intelligence-based operations by the security forces in the province, especially after the government launched a counter-insurgency operation, Azm-e-Istehkam, in June. We assess that bystander risks will likely remain heightened in the province, particularly near security sites, as the TTP remains intent on targeting the security forces. Counter-terrorism operations will also likely intensify in the coming days. (Source: Sibylline)
25 Oct 24. SA Defence ministry has plans in place to handle Auditor-General concerns. A three-part overview of the first 100 days of South Africa’s second government of national unity (GNU) focusing on defence and military veterans by Bantu Holomisa, one of two deputy ministers to Angie Motshekga, has drawn official media reaction from the Defence Ministry.
Among issues raised by the United Democratic Front (UDM) leader are tardiness in recordkeeping; procurement compliance and financial discipline; “unmet” key annual performance targets as well as fruitless and wasteful expenditure. The issues are not confined to the Department of Defence (DoD) and the SA National Defence Force (SANDF) and include the Department of Military Veteran (DMV) and Armscor.
Holomisa makes it clear he is responding in the wake of a Ministerial tasking to analyse an Auditor-General (AG) report to the Portfolio Committee on Defence and Military Veterans (PCDMV) and the Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA). Development of “a strategic plan” is underway as well as a road map to “fix misclassification problems, improve transparency and restore financial integrity”. Each AG concern will be addressed with specific actions, he noted.
Responding to a report in a Johannesburg daily on Holomisa’s reports, a joint statement by DoD HoC (Head of Communication), Siphiwe Dlamini, and Onnika Kwakwa, Ministry Communications and Liaison Officer, has it the DoD “has already developed an action plan “ to address issues raised by the AG.
On the fourth of his seven-page report, circulated to senior DoD and SANDF officers, Holomisa has it management of “secret funds” is “troubling”. These funds, he maintains, are critical to national security and lack transparency.
“To address this we are developing new monitoring and contingency plans for the use of secret funds with the aim of satisfying both the AG and the Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA). We cannot allow these funds to be misused as they are vital to the functioning of the [national] defence force and the safety of the country.”
Earlier this week the Auditor General of South Africa reported that over the last five years, the Department of Defence accounted for the vast majority of irregular expenditure within government departments, at R14.39 bn, due to overspending on salaries.
When it comes to fruitless and wasteful expenditure, the Department of Defence accumulated R75 m in such spending over the last five years. (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
——————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.
A CNIM Group Company
——————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————–