Sponsored by Bertin Exensor
www.exensor.com
———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
23 Oct 24. Equatorial Guinea announces formation of Rapid Intervention Brigade. Teodoro Nguema Obiang Mangue, Equatorial Guinea’s vice-president and heir apparent to his father, announced on 19 October that the new Rapid Intervention Brigade (BIR) has completed its training.
“Equatorial Guinea now has a Rapid Intervention Brigade,” Nguema wrote in a social media post on X (formerly Twitter). “Today I presided over the closing ceremony of the first promotion of this elite force that I launched in 2019. This batch has 684 personnel trained in six specialties.
“After seeing their effectiveness in field exercises, I have committed to providing them with more sophisticated equipment, including long-range missiles,” he added.
In a televised speech during the ceremony, Nguema said, “We are going to acquire more sophisticated materiel… We will also have long-range missiles, we are being serious. But the foundation has to be solid, we have to be the strongest military in the region. This is my ambition with the BIR, it is also the ambition of the head of state.”
He also thanked the team of Chinese military instructors that has been training the BIR.
The ceremony included a demonstration of the Chinese-made armoured vehicles that have been acquired for the BIR, which include the armoured personnel carrier, infantry fighting vehicle, self-propelled gun, mortar carrier, command, and recovery variants of the WZ551 6×6 armoured vehicle. (Source: Janes)
24 Oct 24. ‘Maritime Big Play’ in Pacific Demonstrates AUKUS Partner Compatibility.
This month Australia, the U.K. and the U.S. — all members of the AUKUS trilateral partnership — participated in “Maritime Big Play,” a series of integrated experiments and exercises held in the Indo-Pacific region, meant to enhance capability development and improve interoperability between the partners.
As part of the experiments and exercises, the AUKUS partners tested and refined their ability to jointly operate uncrewed maritime systems, share and process naval data, and provide real-time maritime domain awareness in support of decision-making, said Madeline Mortelmans, who is performing the duties of the assistant secretary of defense for strategy, plans and capabilities.
“These experiments address the need to expand the reach, capability and capacity of our forces in the maritime environment through the use of artificial intelligence and autonomous systems,” Mortelmans said during a virtual discussion on Wednesday. “Over the past several weeks, we’ve been testing and refining the ability to jointly operate uncrewed maritime systems to share and process maritime data from all three nations and to provide real-time maritime domain awareness to support decision making.”
As part of Maritime Big Play, various private sector companies brought forth technologies and equipment that could be evaluated by all three nations as part of scenarios created for the event. Included were autonomous air, surface and sub-surface vessels, balloons and networking systems.
“All the testing experimentation was driven by specific scenarios,” a defense official said on background. “Think of the need to use a mix of uncrewed and crewed assets to do very-large-area , for example, and to maintain a common operating picture.”
That official also said an important aspect of the evaluation was ensuring interoperability. When partners bring in new equipment, it’s impractical to wait for weeks or months to integrate that new capability into existing systems.
Among other things, the Maritime Big Play event, Mortelmans said, allows AUKUS partner nations to practice fielding and maintaining uncrewed systems and gain experience operating in coalitions to solve operational problems such as improving undersea situational awareness.
“Our work will inform AUKUS partners’ understanding of how crewed and uncrewed capabilities can be integrated to get an operational advantage, and where we can achieve cost savings and improve efficiencies in acquisition, maintenance and sustainment activities,” she said.
As part of AUKUS, partner nations are investing in their own and in each other’s industrial bases to make their supply chains more resilient, integrated and productive. In part, the Maritime Big Play event enhances those partner nation efforts. The experiments and exercises also allow AUKUS nations to improve interoperability of sensors and uncrewed systems and take advantage of the economies of scale expected to reduce capability acquisition costs, along with maintenance and training costs.
The first pillar of the AUKUS partnership is aimed at delivering to Australia a conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarine capability to Australia. The second pillar of that partnership involves enhancing joint capabilities and interoperability. The Maritime Big Play, series of integrated experiments and exercises was in part designed to enhance the second pillar of AUKUS. (Source: U.S. DoD)
23 Oct 24. Department of Defence tops government irregular expenditure list. The Department of Defence (DoD) accounted for the vast majority of irregular expenditure recorded by the Auditor General of South Africa (AGSA) over the last five years, at R14.39bn.
The AGSA made this known during a briefing to the Standing Committee on Appropriations (SCOA) on Tuesday 22 October. Cumulative irregular expenditure by 38 government departments over the last five years amounted to R50.65bn, with the DoD accounting for nearly triple that of the next worse offender, the Department of Basic Education (R6.89 bn).
For 2018/19 the DoD recorded R3.5bn of irregular expenditure, followed by R2.8bn the next year, R2.4bn the year after, R4.7bn in 2021/22, and R741m in 2022/23.
This is arising from the compensation of employees bill reaching a total of R10.1 bn and R4.9bn coming from within the procurement environment and logistics division.
Due to the underfunding of the wage bill (compensation of employees), the DoD has recorded R2.6bn in unauthorised expenditure this year alone, set to top R5.6bn by the end of the 2023/24 financial year.
The DoD Audit Committee earlier this year observed that with irregular expenditure, “management has failed to prevent or clear irregular, fruitless and wasteful expenditure balances, with failing investigations, and ineffective consequence management.”
Meanwhile, the AGSA found that the Department of Correctional Services was responsible for R3.77bn in irregular expenditure and the Police Department R2bn over the last five years.
When it comes to fruitless and wasteful expenditure, the Department of Defence fared better, accumulating only R75m over the last five years. This is better than Police (R208m in fruitless and wasteful expenditure) and the Department of Correctional Services (R81m).
Denel recorded R163m in fruitless and wasteful expenditure over the last five years and R1.538bn in irregular expenditure. (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
23 Oct 24. India and China reach agreement to end Ladakh border standoff. The latest move is expected to resolve the prolonged border conflict that erupted in 2020. Patrolling arrangements have been reached along the LAC in the India-China border areas. Credit: Omri Eliyahu/Shutterstock.
The foreign ministries of India and China have confirmed that an agreement has been reached regarding military patrolling along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).
This confirmation coincides with the leaders of both nations attending the 16th BRICS Summit in Kazan, Russia. It finishes the “disengagement process” between the two nations.
In 2020, a “violent face-off” with Chinese troops along the countries’ de facto border in the Himalayas saw at least 20 Indian soldiers killed.
Partner Content
The deadly border clash took place during a de-escalation effort in the Galwan Valley, located in the contested Aksai Chin-Ladakh region.
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian said: “Over a recent period of time, China and India have reached resolutions on issues concerning the border area following close communication through diplomatic and military channels.
“China commends the progress made and will continue working with India for the sound implementation of these resolutions.”
High-level discussions between Indian and Chinese army commanders have been ongoing to facilitate the disengagement of forces.
India Foreign Secretary Shri Vikram Misri said: “I can share with you that over the last several weeks, Indian and Chinese diplomatic and military negotiators have been in close contact with each other in a variety of forums.
“And as a result of these discussions, agreement has been arrived at on patrolling arrangements along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China border areas, leading to disengagement and a resolution of the issues that had arisen in these areas in 2020. And we will be taking the next steps on this.” (Source: army-technology.com)
23 Oct 24. ROK-UK Joint Statement on DPRK-Russia Cooperation. Joint statement between the Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs of the United Kingdom David Lammy and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea Cho Tae-yul.
We condemn in the strongest terms the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)’s continued unlawful arms transfers and the reported deployment of its troops to the Russian Federation to support Russia’s unlawful war of aggression in Ukraine. Such cooperation between Russia and the DPRK is not only in violation of multiple UNSC resolutions, but also prolongs the suffering of the Ukrainian people and threatens global security, including those in the ROK and the UK, and demonstrates the desperation of the DPRK and Russia. We are committed to providing the support Ukraine requires to secure a just and lasting peace.
We are closely monitoring what Russia provides to the DPRK in return for its provision of arms and military personnel, including Russia’s possible provision of materials and technology to the DPRK in support of Pyongyang’s military objectives. We are also deeply concerned about the possibility for any transfer of nuclear or ballistic missile-related technology to the DPRK, which would jeopardize the international non-proliferation efforts and threaten peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and across the globe. We take note that the security of the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic are more closely intertwined than ever, and commit ourselves to closely monitoring the situation and actively pursuing necessary measures together with the international community to deter further unlawful, reckless and destabilising behaviour.
(Source: https://www.gov.uk/)
22 Oct 24. Canberra plans new defence precinct for Western Australia. Australia’s Department of Defence (DoD) has announced plans to establish a Commonwealth Defence Precinct at Henderson shipyard in Western Australia. The new facility will support Australia’s operation of nuclear-powered AUKUS submarines as well as new vessels Canberra plans to build for the Australian Defence Force (ADF). The plans – funded by government investment of AUD127m (USD85m) over three years – are framed by a co-operation agreement signed by the Australian federal government and the state government of Western Australia on 16 October.
Defence Minister Richard Marles said, “The defence precinct at Henderson will optimise Australia’s shipbuilding and sustainment industry while supporting continuous naval shipbuilding in Western Australia and Australia’s nuclear-powered submarine pathway.”
According to the DoD, the new precinct, which is expected to become operational over the next few years, will support the construction of 18 new Littoral Manoeuvre Vessel–Medium (LMV-M) craft for the Australian Army and 11 general purpose frigates planned for the Royal Australian Navy. The DoD said the precinct will also “be the home of depot-level maintenance and contingency docking” for Australia’s AUKUS submarines, which Canberra is procuring through a partnership with the UK and US.
The precinct is expected to co-ordinate on AUKUS submarine support activities with the Submarine Rotational Force (SRF)-West that will be developed at HMAS Stirling – located on a peninsula facing the Henderson precinct – from 2027. The Australian government has already committed to invest AUD8 bn to support the development of SRF-West. The DoD said the new co-operation agreement provides a foundation for collaboration on the Commonwealth Defence Precinct project.
(Source: Janes)
22 Oct 24. Mali-Algeria: Migrant expulsion highlights ongoing counter-insurgency efforts, security concerns. On 22 October, the Algerian authorities ordered thousands of Malian ethnic-Tuaregs residing in Tin Zaouatine (In Guezzam province) to return to Mali. The impacted populations are primarily irregular migrants displaced by long-standing conflict in northern Mali. Since 2012, the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) have faced numerous insurgencies from groups including ethnic-Tuareg separatists and regional al Qaeda and Islamic State affiliates. The expulsion comes after the FAMa launched a failed attempt to recapture Tinzaouatène (Kidal region) from ethnic-Tuareg militants in early October. Given significant cross-border militant activity, Mali has frequently accused Algeria of sheltering ethnic-Tuareg secessionists, sustaining significant bilateral tension. However, we assess that the targeted expulsion possibly represents a moderate improvement in relations, and further deportation orders are likely in the coming weeks. Migrant expulsions will likely moderate Algerian concerns over the establishment of informal settlements along the border, while possibly boosting the effectiveness of Malian crackdowns on militant activity (including weapons, drugs and human trafficking) in border regions; this will undercut ethnic-Tuareg militant activity. (Source: Sibylline)
22 Oct 24. Are Rwandan troops becoming Cabo Delgado’s main security provider?
In three years, the Rwandan contingent in Mozambique has grown dramatically and expanded its operations across five districts.
In July 2021, around 1 000 personnel from the Rwanda Defence Force and Rwanda National Police arrived in the terrorist-hit Mozambique province of Cabo Delgado. The province faced a severe threat from violent extremism characterised by increased attacks on civilians and public infrastructure.
The Rwandan mission’s official objective was to help restore Mozambican state authority by conducting combat and security operations and security sector reform, as well as stabilising the province.
Notably, the Rwandan troops were first deployed in two districts, Palma and Mocímboa da Praia, home to liquefied natural gas (LNG) projects worth bns of dollars. The projects are led by Western multinational companies, notably TotalEnergies, ExxonMobil and Eni.
These enterprises are key for Mozambique’s economic development, and were threatened by the terrorist attacks. Deploying the Rwandan forces to these areas created the impression that their purpose was to protect these vital economic assets rather than meet the official mission objectives.
At the same time, the Southern African Development Community Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) was also deployed to Cabo Delgado, but to areas further from the gas projects. SAMIM aimed to support Mozambique in combatting terrorism and acts of violent extremism, and it seemed to have the primary role of protecting the local population and restoring security.
Although deployed in the same province, there was no proper coordination or sharing of strategic information between the Rwandan, SAMIM and host country forces, which resulted in several friendly fire incidents. SAMIM’s mandate in Cabo Delgado ended in mid-2024.
The bilateral agreement to deploy Rwandan troops in Mozambique was, and remains, secret. It is known only to the two countries’ top leadership and was never submitted to the Mozambique Parliament. This led to contestation, especially by Mozambique’s defence and security sector watchdogs such as the parliamentary opposition, the media and civil society organisations.
Three years after their deployment to Cabo Delgado, the Rwandan troops undoubtedly succeeded on the battlefield. They have reduced the insurgents’ firepower, dislodged them from their main bases, and restored stability around the LNG projects. Yet their capacity and inclination for hot pursuit have displaced the problem, with terror groups dispersing and regrouping in other locations.
At the end of 2023, in somewhat triumphalist speeches, Mozambican military commanders claimed that with the help of Rwandan forces, security had been re-established in roughly 90% of Cabo Delgado. This claim was amplified by academic and media articles that praised Rwanda’s effective and successful offensive strategy that ‘degraded the capability of the jihadist insurgents terrorising northern Mozambique.’
However, this was an exaggeration. Although weakened, the terrorist threat is far from over. On the contrary, insurgents have demonstrated an ability to adapt to the new and evolving security context, and are increasingly using improvised explosive devices.
Realising they have lost ground, the insurgents’ strategy has evolved from attacking civilians to ‘winning hearts and minds’ – a new development for Cabo Delgado but one used by other extremists in Africa, like Boko Haram in Nigeria.
Also, narratives on the success of the Rwandan troops don’t cover all the mission’s stated objectives. For instance, commentators are silent on the aim of ‘supporting efforts to restore Mozambican state authority and security-sector reform.’ Research reveals that for all the work of the Rwandan forces in Cabo Delgado, very little has been achieved regarding the restoration of the Mozambican state.
Indeed, government authority in Cabo Delgado remains fragile, and security sector reform is still only an aspiration, with Mozambican forces operating under poor standards of professionalism.
This has led security analysts to question the long-term strategy of Rwandan forces in Cabo Delgado. ‘Today Mozambique is vulnerable to Rwandan power,’ says Calton Cadeado, a Mozambican security studies expert and researcher at the Center for Strategic and International Studies at Joaquim Chissano University in Maputo. ‘It happens because Rwanda has a privileged space in Mozambique’s security infrastructure and even in the economic projects of gas exploration.’
Cadeado says there are suspicions that Rwandan forces could adopt a more lax stance to their operations, especially since SAMIM’s withdrawal. This could worsen the security situation, ultimately making the Rwandan troops more necessary for the safety of locals and businesses.
The media also reports that despite the good relations Rwandan forces have cultivated with some community members, others question their growing role in Cabo Delgado. For example, in Mocímboa da Praia, the population refused to use a market built by the Rwandan forces as part of their civil-military relations strategy.
The local media quote members of the community as saying the Rwandans ‘came to Mocímboa da Praia to provide support in the fight against terrorism, and when they start building infrastructure, it’s not clear what the real intention of those troops is.’
This scepticism is not unfounded. As time goes by, Rwandan security forces have become a presence in more and more districts in Cabo Delgado, conducting operations that Mozambican troops should perform. Moreover, three years after their deployment, there is still no clarity on when they will withdraw.
Instead, the number of Rwandan troops in Mozambique has risen from 1 000 to around 5 000. They have established positions in at least five districts in Cabo Delgado (Mocímboa da Praia, Palma, Ancuabe, Macomia and Quissanga). From there, the troops launch operations covering over half of Cabo Delgado’s 17 districts and parts of Nampula Province.
Both Mozambique and Rwanda should revisit the Rwandan mission’s objective in Cabo Delgado. They must ensure that while Rwandan troops support the host country’s counter-terrorism strategy, they don’t replace government security forces in their role as primary security guarantor. The latter would have long-term implications for state authority over Mozambique’s territory and its people. (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
21 Oct 24. Drone maker DJI sues Pentagon over Chinese military listing. China-based DJI sued the U.S. Defense Department on Friday for adding the drone maker to a list of companies allegedly working with Beijing’s military, saying the designation is wrong and has caused the company significant financial harm. DJI, the world’s largest drone manufacturer that sells more than half of all U.S. commercial drones, asked a U.S. District Judge in Washington to order its removal from the Pentagon list designating it as a “Chinese military company,” saying it “is neither owned nor controlled by the Chinese military.” Being placed on the list represents a warning to U.S. entities and companies about the national security risks of conducting business with them. DJI’s lawsuit says because of the Defense Department’s “unlawful and misguided decision” it has “lost business deals, been stigmatized as a national security threat, and been banned from contracting with multiple federal government agencies.” (Source: glstrade.com/Reuters)
23 Oct 24. Sudan: Paramilitary interception of aircraft highlights rising risks to commercial, humanitarian planes. On 21 October, the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) shot down an aircraft near Malha (North Darfur region). The RSF claimed that the converted cargo jet was assisting the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and bombing civilian population centres in the region. However, images from the plane’s wreckage indicate that the aircraft was likely affiliated with an airline used by the UAE to supply the RSF with weapons via Chad. This would indicate that the RSF misidentified the plane before intercepting it. The incident underlines the substantial threat to aircraft moving through RSF-controlled airspace due to risks of misidentification and targeting, regardless of affiliation, increasing threats to staff and assets in the aviation sector. Although the majority of Sudanese airspace remains closed to commercial aviation, dispensations for humanitarian operations remain in place. As such, we assess that humanitarian aircraft operating at low altitudes in the Darfur region and along the Chad-Sudan border will face acute risks of targeting, increasing risks of operational disruption.
(Source: Sibylline)
23 Oct 24. Belarus: Repression ahead of January election will aim to limit unrest, government stability risks. Earlier on 23 October, Belarusian state media reported that Belarus will hold its presidential election on 26 January 2025. Russia’s ambassador to Belarus, Boris Gryzlov, disclosed on 22 October that Moscow will provide Belarus assistance ‘on the ground’ in case of mass domestic unrest and destabilisation after the presidential election, if necessary. Gryzlov did not specify what form this could take, though his comments likely reflect Russia’s readiness to intervene in the event of similar large-scale protests akin to those after the last presidential election in August 2020. The 2020 vote handed incumbent Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka a sixth consecutive term in office. Despite declaring his intention to seek re-election in February, Lukashenka hinted at his eventual retirement in August. Nevertheless, we assess that Lukashenka is unlikely to relinquish power soon. The authorities are highly likely to ramp up the repression of civil society ahead of the vote to minimise domestic unrest and government stability risks. (Source: Sibylline)
22 Oct 24. China-Taiwan: Chinese live-fire drills near outlying island underscore elevated cross-strait tensions. Earlier on 22 October, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) carried out live-fire military exercises around Niushan (Fujian province, China), an island 102 miles (165km) from the capital Taipei in Taiwan. On 21 October, China’s Maritime Safety Administration announced the four-hour drills and detailed the coordinates of a 58 square mile (150 sq km) exclusion zone, prohibiting civilian vessels from entering the area. This came after US and Canadian naval vessels transited the Taiwan Strait on 20 October. Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) claimed that the PLA exercises were ‘routine’; however it also suggested that the exercises were possibly part of China’s ‘deterrence effect’. On 14 October, the PLA carried out much larger military drills dubbed ‘Joint Sword – 2024B’ in the Taiwan Strait days after Taiwan celebrated its National Day (see Sibylline Alert – 14 October 2024). These drills did not feature any live-fire exercises. China will likely continue to carry out semi-regular drills in the Taiwan Strait and near China’s (and Taiwan’s) outlying islands over the coming months and years. We assess that such drills will possibly cause minor maritime disruption; this will be exacerbated if the drills last more than one day and involve a larger exclusion zone.
(Source: Sibylline)
21 Oct 24. Congo (DRC): M23 attack indicates likely spike in conflict in coming weeks, increased security risks. On 20 October, the Rwanda-backed M23 rebel group launched an attack against pro-DRC government militia forces (known as Wazalendo) near Kalemba (North Kivu province, DRC). The attackers allegedly captured the town. The clashes follow several weeks of relative calm in line with an ongoing ceasefire agreement. The governments of both the DRC and Rwanda recently stated their commitment to fulfil the Luanda peace process and to hold further talks this coming weekend. If confirmed, the capture of Kalemba would facilitate the M23’s westwards expansion, enabling it to increase its attacks in the mineral-rich Walikale territory. Efforts to contest these deposits would likely threaten to disrupt the peace process and increase displacement, with any rapid spike in the conflict elevating threats to NGO staff attempting to support communities across North Kivu. We assess this would elevate the risk of protests in both Goma (North Kivu) and the capital Kinshasa; in this scenario there is a possibility of protesters targeting UN facilities and embassies of Western states deemed to support Rwanda, elevating bystander risks for staff. (Source: Sibylline)
18 Oct 24. Georgia: Halted EU accession prospects will drive domestic unrest risks ahead of election. On 17 October, the EU effectively announced the suspension of Georgia’s path towards membership due to the trajectory of the Georgian Dream (GD)-led government. As per a document concluding the meeting of the European Council (EC), the course of the Georgian government ‘de facto halts the accession process’. Meanwhile, we expect pro-EU demonstrations to take place on 20 October in the capital Tbilisi and other major urban centres. Protesters will meet at 1700hrs (local time) at different locations in the capital before heading to Freedom Square; these locations include Heroes Square, Republic Square and the 300 Aragveli and Marjanishvili metro stations. Such demonstrations will highly likely attract a large turnout ahead of the parliamentary election on 26 October. A heavy security presence is almost certain in proximity to the locations mentioned above, as well as at government institutions. We assess that there is a credible possibility of clashes between law enforcement and protesters, which will increase the risk of the authorities deploying heavy-handed techniques to disperse demonstrators, elevating bystander risks. (Source: Sibylline)
————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————–
Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.
A CNIM Group Company
———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————–