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26 Sep 24. Benin: Alleged coup attempt is unlikely to represent substantial threats to government stability. On 25 September, the state prosecutor announced that a former government minister, a businessman and the head of the republican guard were arrested for an alleged coup plot. Investigators claim that the three individuals had paid the chief of Beninese President Patrice Talon’s security not to resist a coup they planned to stage on 27 September. Investigations to identify other conspirators are ongoing. Authoritarianism has increased under President Talon. Recent elections were marred by allegations of fraud, elevating tensions with the political opposition. However, Talon and his supporters dominate government institutions and the opposition is fragmented, diluting substantial threats to the stability of the government. Nonetheless, the security forces are highly likely to adopt a heightened posture in the capital Porto-Novo and Cotonou (Littoral department) in the coming days, particularly on 27 September. We assess that the possible erection of checkpoints and roadblocks around government buildings will likely drive city-wide movement disruption, impacting the movement of goods to and from ports. (Source: Sibylline)
26 Sep 24. Congo (DRC)-Rwanda: Rising pressure to impose sanctions is unlikely to raise compliance concerns. On 25 September, Congolese President Felix Tshisekedi called for international sanctions against Rwanda for supporting the M23 rebel group. Despite signing a ceasefire in July, clashes between the Congolese armed forces (and allied ethno-religious militias) and the M23 have persisted in North Kivu and South Kivu provinces (both DRC), sustaining significant security risks. Even so, broad sanctions on Rwanda remain highly unlikely given Western governments’ interests in preserving ties with Kigali, moderating compliance concerns. Nevertheless, on 26 September, the East African Court of Justice began preliminary hearings in the DRC’s case against Rwanda for violating its sovereignty by backing the M23. We assess that the trial will likely trigger additional calls for sanctions against Rwanda, increasing reputational concerns for firms operating therein. Developments in the trial will also likely trigger protests in the DRC against assets associated with Western states linked to Rwanda. This will increase unrest risks, particularly in the capital Kinshasa, Goma (North Kivu) and Lubumbashi (Haut-Katanga province, all DRC). (Source: Sibylline)
26 Sept 24. AUKUS Collaboration Advancing Capabilities in Indo-Pacific Region, Austin Says. The trilateral security partnership among the U.S., United Kingdom and Australia, also known as AUKUS, offers a unique opportunity for these nations to enhance their military capabilities, deepen interoperability and strengthen deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, said Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III.
Austin met in London today with his AUKUS counterparts: British Defense Secretary John Healey and Australian Defense Minister Richard Marles, who also serves as his country’s deputy prime minister.
Progress has been made toward providing Australia with a conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarine, Austin said, noting that over the past year, the number of Australian sailors attending U.S. and U.K. nuclear reactor schools has increased and a U.S. nuclear-powered submarine visited an Australian port.
“This was just the first step toward ensuring that Australia has a sovereign nuclear-powered submarine capability. We’re also making progress toward having a rotational presence of U.S. submarines by as early as 2027,” Austin said.
The United States also remains committed to supporting Australia’s efforts to recruit and train the skilled workforce needed to build, maintain, sustain and operate a nuclear-powered submarine, Austin said.
The AUKUS partnership has two pillars. The first is to enable Australia’s acquisition of conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarine capability as rapidly as possible, most likely in the early 2030s, the official said.
The second pillar is to accelerate emerging capabilities, the official said.
Areas of focus within the Pillar II include uncrewed maritime systems, artificial intelligence, autonomy, electronic warfare, quantum, cyber and hypersonics, the official said.
Japan will be working on the maritime autonomy aspect. Conversations with Canada, South Korea and New Zealand are underway on how each can contribute to Pillar II, the official said.
Also, as part of Pillar II, Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States have committed to reducing export control restrictions to facilitate secure trade among AUKUS partners, including the sale of U.S. Virginia-class submarines to Australia, the official said.
Congress amended the International Traffic in Arms Regulations as part of the 2024 National Defense Authorization Act and implemented an export licensing exemption for Australia and the United Kingdom, the official said. (Source: U.S. DoD)
26 Sept 24. Australia – Squeezing every penny: Getting the most out of our Defence spending. With Defence spending tipped to hit the AU$100bn mark by the end of the decade and the rise of “megaprojects” dominating much of this spending, how can Defence squeeze the most out of every dollar in its budget?
It is not hyperbole to say that the release of the Albanese government’s Defence Strategic Review and supporting National Defence Strategy and Integrated Investment Program have heralded a major shift in the way the nation thinks about and funds Defence spending.
This ambitious plan has been described by the government in the May budget as being a “generational investment” in the nation’s defence capabilities, which will see the National Defence Strategy and “rebuilt” Integrated Investment Program promising the “allocation of $330bn over the decade to 2033–34”.
We are told that when broken down further, this will see the nation’s Defence budget hit $100bn by the end of the decade to 2033–34 and will come as a result of an additional $5.7bn over the forward estimates and an additional $50.3bn to be invested over the next decade.
Yet despite the enormity of the money being promised to Defence over the next decade, the rise of massive, complex and costly “megaprojects” like the nation’s fleet of future nuclear-powered submarines, Hunter Class and general purpose frigate programs, let alone the Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance (GWEO) program are all promising to break the bank.
This has prompted a series of questions and debate about the level of Australian Defence spending as a proportion of gross domestic product (GDP) with much of the emphasis focused on the sacrosanct 2 per cent spending floor, but as is always the case no matter the scenario, more money isn’t always the answer.
Indeed, sometimes being smarter with the way we spend money and “squeezing” the most out of every dollar is the best way to maximise the impact of Defence spending at a time when the nation’s budget situation is increasingly constrained and the geopolitical and strategic environment continues to deteriorate.
So how do we maximise the efficiency of our Defence spending and get the most out of every dollar without compromising capability for the warfighter?
This prompted me to do some digging and speak to a series of experts who could shed some light on this sensitive matter, without it sounding like I was just an angry man yelling at the clouds (although that sometimes may be the case).
Disruption, transparency are key
Over the past two decades, we have witnessed the immense power of disruption in sectors as varied as at-home food deliveries, telecommunications, artificial intelligence and space systems, yet it is something that Defence, as an ecosystem, seems reluctant to embrace.
Highlighting the importance of disruption and the broader idea of “creative destruction” in the defence context is Dr Marcus Hellyer, head of research at Strategic Analysis Australia, who said, “Defence occupies a space in the middle of a comfortable monopoly-monopsony relationship. It is a monopoly provider of security services to the Australian government. It is also a monopsony consumer of security goods and services from industry. In that construct, Defence is the innovation bottleneck. It is also the bottleneck preventing Australia from getting better value for money for its defence dollar…
“One way to disrupt that model is to bring in suppliers from outside the monopsony, i.e. companies from outside the traditional defence industrial space, just as the comfortable and incredible inefficient space market has been disrupted by Space X and Starlink. We can see signs of this starting to happen, for example with Anduril entering the defence space.”
Equally important is transparency in the way in which Defence spends tax dollars, particularly on the aforementioned costly megaprojects that continue to serve as fodder for senators during the biannual Senate estimates hearings.
Dr Hellyer’s colleague and Strategic Analysis Australia founder and director, Michael Shoebridge, said, “Disrupting the Defence business model by pushing it to work closely with the most innovative companies on the planet – start-ups and small and medium enterprises like the ones equipping the Ukrainian military is an essential start. Simplifying the Defence organisation so that it can understand itself and engage rapidly and effectively with its external environment is also essential.”
Explaining the importance of increasing the transparency for defence spending, Dr Hellyer said, “Increasing the Defence budget is pointless unless Defence can spend it well. To ensure it does that, we need much greater transparency around how well Defence is spending public money. Unfortunately the trajectory of transparency in Defence is going backwards.
“The current government has been profoundly disappointing in this regard; it talked a good game in opposition but has done nothing to increase disclosure and transparency. This is not acceptable if the government and Defence want the Australian public to support increased spending on Defence and high-risk activities like the SSN program.”
Unpacking the impact of this lacking transparency, particularly in the context of inquiry and investigation by the elected representatives and custodians of the Australian taxpayer’s money, Dr Hellyer said, “To provide an example, the system is weighted against our representatives. At Estimates, officials come with thick folders of Estimates briefs containing vast amounts of detail around Defence activities and programs, for example the SSN enterprise.
“These briefs are unclassified, yet they are not provided to the Parliament or published unless in response to a FOI request or an explicit Senate order. This means that there is a vast imbalance in information between the Parliament and departmental officials. Officials may get frustrated at the questions senators ask, but if they provided actual information in advance, the quality of discussion and disclosure would be greatly improved.”
But these factors are only part of the equation when it comes to maximising the efficiency of Defence spending and capability delivery.
‘Mature designs’, reinventing the wheel and exquisite ‘bespoke’ platforms
Over the past three decades, Australia, like many comparable nations across the Western world, has been seduced by the promise of prohibitively expensive, boutique, bespoke or niche platform solutions to problem sets that result in limited production runs, thus creating a death spiral of rising costs throughout the acquisition, maintenance and sustainment cycles.
In the Australian context, platforms like Australia’s troubled MRH-90 Taipans and ARH Tiger helicopters, the future Hunter Class frigates, the now-cancelled Attack Class submarines and even the EF-88/EF-90 Austeyr service rifle are examples. In the broader context, think of problems like the British Army’s Ajax infantry fighting vehicles, Germany’s PzH 2000 self-propelled howitzer and as much as it pains me to say it, even the US Air Force’s F-22 Raptor is an example (although the collapse of the Soviet Union as a peer competitor has more to do in this context than anything else).
This reality has prompted Australia and many other countries to seek “mature designs” with varying degrees of success off established production lines that provide economies of scale through the life of a capability. However, Australia, in particular, is guilty of a process called “Australianisation”, in which we seek to make these otherwise “mature designs” bespoke and fit for Australian purpose.
Again, this has resulted in varying degrees of success and isn’t without its detractors, particularly when one again looks at the Hunter Class frigate program (I also don’t mean to harp on about it, it is just the most visible and visceral program at the moment).
Dr Hellyer added some colour to this picture, saying, “We also need to disrupt by forcing Defence to break its addiction to the exquisitely complex. All Western militaries are being sucked down the cost-complexity death spiral. The bizarre thing is that they seem to be happy to go along for the ride. Simplicity needs to replace complexity as the key driver of military capability. That will allow new industry entrants. It will also allow Defence to expand rapidly in time of crisis, produce key consumables of war domestically, replace losses and keep fighting beyond the first few days of war.
“Defence is a classic example of a space where it prefers to pay 50 per cent of its budget for the last 10 per cent of capability [pick your exact numbers]. There are cases where that is warranted. But there are many cases where it isn’t. We can see from both historical conflicts and the rebirth of industrialised warfare in recent years that having more is better. Having much more is much better.”
Shoebridge echoed these sentiments, particularly in light of the growth and projected growth in Australia’s Defence spending, saying, “As Australia’s Defence budget has grown from around an annual $32 bn before the 2016 White Paper to $56.5 bn now on its way to over $100 bn per annum, our military has got weaker and more fragile, with Navy ships being retired early years before replacements are even scheduled to turn up, Army helicopters doing the same and with the services unable to maintain the size of their workforces, let alone grow by the 5,000 they are funded to have achieved but haven’t.”
Direct, don’t ‘represent’
One of the consistent points raised by analysts, media pundits and even ministerial staff is the way in which Defence, particularly the bureaucracy, leads the minister, rather than the minister leading the department. This has prompted all sorts of criticism from across the spectrum of ministers and, indeed, their staff being “captured” by Defence.
While this isn’t an entirely fair assessment, particularly given the limited exposure many average Australians have with defence, military, geopolitical or strategic matters, let alone having an understanding of the complex engineering marvels being delivered under these programs, so it is entirely reasonable that they “trust” the information Defence is providing them.
Nevertheless, it is a problem, particularly when a department is meant to follow the direction of the minister of the day.
Highlighting this, Shoebridge said, “[Defence needs] a minister engaged in directing – not representing – Defence, with a commitment to openness and transparency on how and where taxpayers’ money is being spent.”
This only becomes more important as Defence will be asked to justify its spending in the face of mounting pressure to balance multiple competing funding streams across the Commonwealth budget.
Final thoughts
Based on the figures, I am at a loss to see how the lofty ambitions articulated by the government in the Defence Strategic Review, the Independent Analysis into Navy’s Surface Combatant Fleet, the National Defence Strategy and supporting Integrated Investment Program will be delivered if they’re already off to a rocky start.
Equally, the more “failure” becomes the standard in Defence spending, the less likely the average Australian is likely to support increased spending in the area, when we are forced to balance with other spending areas like the National Disability Insurance Scheme, health and education that have a more “direct” impact on their day-to-day lives.
This combination of factors will only serve to place greater strain and stress on the capacity of Defence to meet the tactical and strategic objectives set out by government, so getting it right now becomes more important than ever.
As I have said numerous times before, ultimately, Australia will face a myriad of interconnected challenges to the order upon which our security, prosperity and stability is built; how we confront these challenges and turn them into opportunities is fast becoming the greatest challenges of our age.
Being able to protect our economic, political, and strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific will become the most important responsibility of the Australian government and policymakers in the coming decades, whether they recognise it or not.
So what way Australia? Do we want to be competitive, engaged, consequential and thriving, or do we wish to remain “steady and sturdy” in our managed decline?
In the second part of this short series, we will speak to former senator for South Australia, Rex Patrick, and the CEO of the Australian Industry and Defence Network, Brent Clark, to unpack their ideas for how we can squeeze the most out of the nation’s Defence spending. (Source: Defence Connect)
27 Sept 24. Putin draws a nuclear red line for the West. President Vladimir Putin has drawn a “red line” for the United States and its allies by signalling that Moscow will consider responding with nuclear weapons if they allow Ukraine to strike deep inside Russia with long-range Western missiles.
But some in the West are asking: does he actually mean it?
The question is critical to the course of the war. If Putin is bluffing, as Ukraine and some of its supporters believe, then the West may feel ready to deepen its military support for Kyiv regardless of Moscow’s threats.
If he is serious, there is a risk – repeatedly stated by Moscow and acknowledged by Washington – that the conflict could turn into World War Three.
In the latest in a long series of warning signals, Putin on Wednesday extended the list of scenarios that could lead to Russia using nuclear weapons.
It could do this, he said, in response to a major cross-border conventional attack involving aircraft, missiles or drones. A rival nuclear power that supported a country attacking Russia would be considered a party to that attack.
Both those criteria apply directly to the situation that would arise if the West allows Ukraine to strike deep inside Russian territory with Western long-range missiles such as U.S. ATACMS and British Storm Shadows, something Putin has said would need Western satellite and targeting support.
“It was a very clear message: ‘Don’t make a mistake – all these kind of things may mean nuclear war,'” said Nikolai Sokov, a former Soviet and Russian diplomat.
U.S. President Joe Biden announced more than $8 bn in additional aid to Ukraine during a visit by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy to Washington D.C.
Bahram Ghiassee, a London-based nuclear analyst at the Henry Jackson Society think-tank, linked the timing of Putin’s remarks to Ukraine’s lobbying of the West for long-range missiles and the fact that President Volodymyr Zelenskiy is making his case to U.S. President Joe Biden this week.
“Putin is saying: just stop it right there,” Ghiassee said.
‘NUCLEAR BLACKMAIL’
Reaction from Kyiv was swift, with Zelenskiy’s chief of staff accusing Putin of “nuclear blackmail”.
“In my opinion, this is yet another bluff and demonstration of Putin’s weakness. He will not dare to use nuclear weapons because that will make him a complete outcast,” Anton Gerashchenko, a former adviser to Ukraine’s internal affairs minister, said on X.
U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said Putin’s warning was irresponsible and poorly timed, and that it was not the first time he had been “rattling the nuclear sabre”.
Andreas Umland, an analyst at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, accused Putin of playing mind games.
“This is a psychological PR operation, by the Kremlin, without much substance. It is designed to scare leaders & voters of countries supporting Ukraine,” he wrote.
Fabian Hoffmann, a doctoral research fellow and defence expert in Oslo, said he did not believe Putin’s comments could be ignored, but that it was important not to overreact.
“Russian nuclear use is not imminent,” he said on X. “Concern is warranted only when Russia signals actual preparations.”
Hoffmann said next steps could be removing warheads from storage and pairing them with delivery vehicles for a tactical strike, before ratcheting up preparations for large-scale nuclear use by readying silos and putting bombers on alert – all of which U.S. intelligence agencies would detect.
And Russia security expert Mark Galeotti wrote: “Talk is easy and has political impact, but evidence of actual willingness to use nuclear weapons is both absent and something we can detect if it ever happens.”
LOWER THRESHOLD
Nevertheless, Putin was more specific than in the past about the circumstances that could prompt nuclear use. His spokesman said on Thursday that his comments were meant as a signal to Western countries that there would be serious consequences if they participated in attacks on Russia.
At the same time, the announced changes fell short of what some hawkish commentators have been calling for. The best-known of them, Sergei Karaganov, has argued for a limited nuclear strike in Europe that would “sober up” Russia’s enemies and make them take its nuclear deterrent seriously.
In practical terms, the changes extend Russia’s nuclear umbrella to cover neighbouring Belarus, a close ally. They lower the threshold for nuclear use by stating, for example, that it could happen in response to a conventional strike that posed a “critical threat to our sovereignty”.
Previously, the nuclear doctrine talked about a threat to “the very existence of the state”.
Putin made the announcement in a four-minute video in which he was seen addressing the nine members of a security council that meets twice-yearly to discuss nuclear deterrence.
He said nuclear use was an extreme measure and Russia had always approached the issue responsibly.
Ministers and intelligence chiefs listened intently, occasionally fidgeting or shuffling papers. One participant – Alexei Likhachev, head of state nuclear corporation Rosatom – took detailed notes.
But the real addressees of Putin’s message were in Kyiv, Washington and London.
Yevgeny Minchenko, a Russian political consultant, said the thrust of the revised doctrine was a blunt message to Ukraine and the West not to escalate the war further into Russia.
“If you try to kill us with your proxy’s hands, we will kill both your proxy and you,” was the message, he said.
Sergei Markov, a former Kremlin adviser, said the changes opened the door to Russia using tactical nuclear battlefield weapons in certain scenarios, namely against Ukraine.
“The threshold for the use of nuclear weapons has been lowered. Now it will be easier for Russia to use nuclear weapons,” Markov said on his official blog.
“The reason for changing the nuclear doctrine was the threat of a full escalation by the West. The West is sure that Russia will not use tactical nuclear weapons first. Russia is now saying it is ready to do so.”
Markov suggested Russia could use tactical nuclear weapons against Ukraine, or air bases in Romania or Poland if Ukrainian warplanes flew sorties from there and if Kyiv – backed by U.S. or British satellite support – used the jets to strike Moscow itself or parts of central Russia.
‘NO RESPECT’
Igor Korotchenko, a military analyst who often appears on state TV, said the changes were necessary because the West had ignored a slew of previous warning signals against further escalation, including Russian exercises in the summer rehearsing the use of tactical nuclear arms.
“We see that Western adversaries no longer respect any ‘red lines’, believing that any acts to arm Ukraine and Western-assisted strikes against facilities deep inside Russian territory will not be met with nuclear escalation,” Korotchenko told the daily Izvestia newspaper.
Vladimir Avatkov, who sits on an official body that offers advice to Putin on international relations, said announcing the changes to the doctrine had allowed Moscow to get ahead of any Western decision on missiles for Ukraine.
“Let them think now,” he said on Telegram. “This is an attempt to not just warn them, but to give them back the fear that they have completely lost. And perhaps even some strategic thinking.”
The changes were strongly welcomed by Russian nationalists and war bloggers, some of whom have long advocated Moscow use nuclear weapons to force a Ukrainian capitulation, and led to a discussion about what could trigger a nuclear response.
Dmitry Medvedev, deputy chairman of Russia’s Security Council and a former president, warned that Putin’s words should give Ukraine and the West pause for thought.
“The very change in the regulatory conditions for our country’s use of nuclear components may cool the fervour of those opponents who have not yet lost their sense of self-preservation,” he said in a statement.
‘LIKE SMALL KIDS’
Sokov, the former Russian diplomat, said there was a palpable sense of frustration in Moscow that the West appeared deaf to its many nuclear warnings.
He said that when Russia staged three rounds of exercises this year to simulate preparations for the launch of tactical nuclear missiles, there were complaints in the media and among experts that Western countries were not paying attention.
“So now they decided to strengthen the signal,” Sokov said. “Putin decided the West is like small kids, and you have to explain every small thing because they just don’t get it.”
Sokov said he was concerned about “loose talk” among politicians and commentators who argue that the West has crossed a series of Russian red lines with impunity – by supplying Ukraine with tanks and F-16 fighter jets, for example – and that Moscow’s warnings can therefore be ignored.
In fact, he said, the West had yet to breach two red lines that Russia had spelt out clearly: sending NATO troops to fight in Ukraine, and letting Ukraine fire Western long-range missiles into Russia.
“How can we say how (Putin) is going to react, if so far we have not actually crossed any Russian red lines?” he said in a phone interview, arguing that such an approach was based on guesswork, not data.”I’m really concerned about all the loose talk, precisely because we run head-on into a situation which is completely unfamiliar to us … If you do not factor in the risks, you are likely to have a very unpleasant surprise.” (Source: Reuters)
26 Sep 24. Taiwan raises alarm about renewed military threats from ‘unstable’ China.
- Summary
- Reports 2nd day of large-scale Chinese military activity
- Taiwan calls China a serious challenge to neighbours
- China says drills around Taiwan are ‘legitimate’ activity
- China views Taiwan as its own territory
TAIPEI, Sept 26 (Reuters) – Taiwan’s defence ministry raised the alarm on Thursday about a renewed surge of Chinese military activity around the island and live fire drills, accusing Beijing of policy instability that presented a serious challenge to its neighbours.
Democratically governed Taiwan, which Beijing views as its own territory, has complained of stepped-up Chinese military activity over the past five years. Taiwan’s government rejects China’s sovereignty claims.
On Thursday, the defence ministry said it had detected a second day of large-scale Chinese military activities nearby, with 29 aircraft engaged in a “joint combat readiness patrol” with Chinese warships.
The day before it warned of 43 Chinese military aircraft operating around the island.
Of these 23 flew to the south of Taiwan through the Bashi Channel separating it from the Philippines and then up along Taiwan’s east coast, a ministry map showed, although without entering territorial air space.
Pointing to a visit from Sept. 18 to 20 by the chief of China’s southern military command to the U.S. military in Hawaii, the ministry said that at the same time China carried out “multiple waves of live-fire attacks” in drills in the Yellow and Bohai seas near the Korean peninsula and Japan.
China is doing all it can to build up its military while creating the illusion of dialogue, the ministry added.
The effort “highlights the hegemonic nature of an authoritarian regime that lacks policy stability, posing a serious challenge to neighbouring countries”, it added.
In Beijing, China’s defence ministry defended the drills around Taiwan, with spokesperson Zhang Xiaogang telling reporters they were a “legitimate” activity.
China will continue to strengthen its combat readiness and organise military exercises, he added.
SIMULATED ATTACKS
A security source familiar with the situation, speaking on condition of anonymity as the matter is a sensitive one, told Reuters Wednesday’s flights were part of annual Chinese drills.
The People’s Liberation Army was conducting simulated attacks in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, meant to practice access denial to “stop foreign assistance” in the event of conflict in the region, the source added.
The Chinese air force also held drills to seize “air dominance” in waters off Taiwan’s southwestern coast and practiced air refuelling around the Bashi Channel, the source said.
This week China also said it successfully held a rare launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile into the Pacific Ocean.
“China has been carrying out a variety of military exercises in the region recently, which threatens the status quo of peace,” Taiwan’s presidential office said, urging its neighbour to exercise self-restraint.
Tension around Taiwan has been a persistent source of concern for the United States and its allies, which have been sailing warships through the Taiwan Strait to assert freedom of navigation rights.
Vessels from New Zealand and Australia had sailed through the Strait on Wednesday, New Zealand Defence Minister Judith Collins said.
China last staged full-fledged war games around Taiwan in late May, shortly after the new president, Lai Ching-te, took office. Beijing detests him, calling him a “separatist”.
Lai says only Taiwan’s people can decide their future and has repeatedly offered talks with Beijing only to be rebuffed.
26 Sept 24. Taiwan raises alarm about renewed military threats from ‘unstable’ China.
- Summary
- Reports 2nd day of large-scale Chinese military activity
- Taiwan calls China a serious challenge to neighbours
- China says drills around Taiwan are ‘legitimate’ activity
- China views Taiwan as its own territory
Taiwan’s defence ministry raised the alarm on Thursday about a renewed surge of Chinese military activity around the island and live fire drills, accusing Beijing of policy instability that presented a serious challenge to its neighbours.
Democratically governed Taiwan, which Beijing views as its own territory, has complained of stepped-up Chinese military activity over the past five years. Taiwan’s government rejects China’s sovereignty claims.
On Thursday, the defence ministry said it had detected a second day of large-scale Chinese military activities nearby, with 29 aircraft engaged in a “joint combat readiness patrol” with Chinese warships.
The day before it warned of 43 Chinese military aircraft operating around the island.
Of these 23 flew to the south of Taiwan through the Bashi Channel separating it from the Philippines and then up along Taiwan’s east coast, a ministry map showed, although without entering territorial air space.
Pointing to a visit from Sept. 18 to 20 by the chief of China’s southern military command to the U.S. military in Hawaii, the ministry said that at the same time China carried out “multiple waves of live-fire attacks” in drills in the Yellow and Bohai seas near the Korean peninsula and Japan.
China is doing all it can to build up its military while creating the illusion of dialogue, the ministry added.
The effort “highlights the hegemonic nature of an authoritarian regime that lacks policy stability, posing a serious challenge to neighbouring countries”, it added.
In Beijing, China’s defence ministry defended the drills around Taiwan, with spokesperson Zhang Xiaogang telling reporters they were a “legitimate” activity.
China will continue to strengthen its combat readiness and organise military exercises, he added.
SIMULATED ATTACKS
A security source familiar with the situation, speaking on condition of anonymity as the matter is a sensitive one, told Reuters Wednesday’s flights were part of annual Chinese drills.
The People’s Liberation Army was conducting simulated attacks in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, meant to practice access denial to “stop foreign assistance” in the event of conflict in the region, the source added.
The Chinese air force also held drills to seize “air dominance” in waters off Taiwan’s southwestern coast and practiced air refuelling around the Bashi Channel, the source said.
This week China also said it successfully held a rare launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile into the Pacific Ocean.
“China has been carrying out a variety of military exercises in the region recently, which threatens the status quo of peace,” Taiwan’s presidential office said, urging its neighbour to exercise self-restraint.
Tension around Taiwan has been a persistent source of concern for the United States and its allies, which have been sailing warships through the Taiwan Strait to assert freedom of navigation rights.
Vessels from New Zealand and Australia had sailed through the Strait on Wednesday, New Zealand Defence Minister Judith Collins said.
China last staged full-fledged war games around Taiwan in late May, shortly after the new president, Lai Ching-te, took office. Beijing detests him, calling him a “separatist”.
Lai says only Taiwan’s people can decide their future and has repeatedly offered talks with Beijing only to be rebuffed.
25 Sept. 24. China fired an intercontinental ballistic missile into the Pacific Ocean on Wednesday in its first major missile launch since twin hypersonic weapons tests in the summer of 2021. The test comes as the People’s Liberation Army is conducting intensive air and naval drills around the region ahead of a call between Chinese leader Xi Jinping and US President Joe Biden expected in the coming weeks. The ICBM carrying a dummy warhead was launched into international waters at 8.44am, China’s defence ministry said, adding that it was a “routine arrangement in our annual training plan” in line with international law and not directed against any country or target. But observers interpreted the launch as a political message and show of force, saying it could heighten concerns in the US and among China’s neighbours about Beijing’s modernisation of its nuclear weapons. “They are signalling that China has the capability to hit US territory with nuclear weapons,” said Lin Ying-yu, a Taiwanese PLA expert. “This show of force could be intended to give them more bargaining power in the upcoming call between Xi and Biden.” In July 2021, the PLA launched a rocket that used a “fractional orbital bombardment” system to propel a nuclear-capable “hypersonic glide vehicle” around the Earth for the first time. It held a second hypersonic test the next month. Beijing did not specify which missile it tested on Wednesday. “Most of the PLA’s ballistic missile firing training uses test ranges in Xinjiang or the Bohai Sea as target areas,” said Hsu Yen-chi, a researcher at the Council on Strategic and Wargaming Studies think-tank in Taipei. “It is very rare for them to use a range other than these two as an ICBM firing range, the last time being in 1980.” Lin said the test could indicate the increasing maturity of China’s Beidou satellite navigation system, which the PLA uses for missile guidance. He added that it could also reflect an effort by the Rocket Force, the PLA arm in charge of conventional and nuclear missile operations, to show that its combat power had not been weakened by Xi’s purges of the force’s leadership and an ongoing anti-corruption crackdown. (Source: FT.com)
24 Sept. 24. Joint Press Statement for the 25th Korea-U.S. Integrated Defense Dialogue. The Republic of Korea (ROK) Ministry of National Defense (MND) and the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) held the 25th Korea-U.S. Integrated Defense Dialogue (KIDD) from September23-24, 2024, in Seoul.
Deputy Minister (DEPMIN) for National Defense Policy, Mr. Cho Chang Lae, led the ROK delegation. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for East Asia, Mr. Anka Lee, led the U.S. delegation. Key senior ROK and U.S. defense and foreign affairs officials also participated in the dialogue.
Both sides had an in-depth discussion focusing on the three pillars of the “Defense Vision of the U.S.-ROK Alliance”: enhancing extended deterrence efforts against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), modernizing Alliance capabilities based on science and technology cooperation, and strengthening solidarity and regional security cooperation with like-minded partners. They acknowledged the importance of faithfully implementing the Defense Vision to strengthen the U.S.-ROK Alliance, and reviewed implementation of specific tasks. In addition, the two sides noted progress to align U.S.-ROK bilateral defense mechanisms under the Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) to effectively and efficiently support strengthening the Alliance through the implementation of the Defense Vision, and pledged to continue assessing them.
The two sides reaffirmed their common goal of the complete denuclearization of the DPRK, and concurred on the importance of the Alliance’s close coordination to maintain a vigilant combined defense posture. Both sides exchanged views on ever-changing DPRK threats, as well as its advancing nuclear and missile capabilities, which are destabilizing the Korean Peninsula and the region. Both sides strongly condemned DPRK provocations and threats that undermine regional peace and stability, including its diversification of nuclear delivery systems and continuing space launch attempts.
Both sides commended the Alliance’s efforts to enhance extended deterrence in an integrated manner since President Biden and President Yoon’s April 2023 Washington Declaration and committed to continue strengthening extended deterrence cooperation through the work of the Nuclear Consultative Group.
The United States reaffirmed its enduring and ironclad commitment to the defense of the ROK, utilizing the full range of U.S. defense capabilities – including nuclear, conventional, missile defense, and advanced non-nuclear capabilities – and reiterated that any nuclear attack by the DPRK against the United States or its Allies and partners is unacceptable and will result in the end of the Kim regime. Both sides affirmed that the full capabilities of the two countries would contribute to the Alliance’s combined defense posture.
Both sides reviewed the progress from a joint study of the Alliance’s comprehensive counter-missile strategy and also discussed future enhancements in information sharing through the U.S. Shared Early Warning System (SEWS) to respond to DPRK’s advancing missile threats. The two sides pledged to continue developing response capabilities and posture through the Counter-Missile Working Group (CMWG).
The two sides expressed grave concern over the DPRK’s continuing sending of filth balloons. They also recognized the need for closely coordinated responses to intensifying DPRK’s gray zone provocations, such as cyber and electromagnetic attacks, and threats in the vicinity of the Northwest Islands and Northern Limit Line (NLL). Both sides noted that the NLL has been an effective means of separating military forces and preventing military tension over the past 70 years, and the ROK side urged the DPRK to accept the practical value of, and abide by, the NLL.
The two sides shared assessments of the recent ULCHI FREEDOM SHIELD 24 (UFS 24) exercise, which included realistic threats such as DPRK’s advancing nuclear and missile threats, GPS jamming and cyber attacks. They agreed that UFS further enhanced the Alliance’s crisis management and strengthened deterrence and defense capabilities. In addition, they assessed that combined field training exercises (FTX), which were more extensive than the past year in land, maritime and air domains, enhanced interoperability and combined capabilities to execute Alliance operations as well as demonstrated a robust ability to defend the ROK. Based on these achievements, both sides agreed to strengthen combined exercises and trainings in line with rapidly changing security environment of the Korean Peninsula.
The two delegations also discussed the danger of DPRK-Russian military cooperation following the signing of the “Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership” between Russia and the DPRK. In particular, they expressed grave concern over illegal arms trade and transfer of high-technology between Russia and the DPRK that violate United Nations Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs), and pledged to respond by working closely together with the international community. The two sides reaffirmed the importance of full implementation of UNSCRs by the entire international community, including China and Russia, and concurred that such endeavors back the complete denuclearization of the DPRK.
The ROK and United States agreed to continue strengthening efforts made to date for further modernizing Alliance capabilities and evolving based on science and technology cooperation. The two delegations applauded the progress establishing a Defense Science and Technology Executive Committee under the SCM, and pledged to expedite efforts for practical cooperation under this consultative body within the year. In addition, based on such cooperation, they shared the understanding that areas of cooperation need to be expanded further, including artificial intelligence, autonomous technology, crewed-uncrewed teaming, and next-generation communications. In that vein, both sides consulted on a ROK proposal to hold a joint ROK-U.S. Defense Science and Technology Conference from the year 2025.
The two sides also pledged to continue expanding cooperative measures to enhance the defense industrial base and interoperability of both the United States and the ROK. The delegations agreed that cooperative efforts for a Regional Sustainment Framework being developed by the Defense Department would strengthen posture and capabilities of the Alliance. As such, they highly appreciated a ROK’s participation in the Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul (MRO) pilot project, in an area of Air Force’s aviation maintenance, and pledged to continue discussions for expanding cooperation into the Army aviation and naval vessels. The two sides also welcomed the recent U.S. Navy contract with ROK shipyards for the conduct of MRO for U.S. vessels. In addition, both sides recognized the need to provide reciprocal market access to deepen defense cooperation and enhance supply chain resiliency, and pledged to advance progress on a Reciprocal Defense Procurement Agreement (RDP-A).
Both sides commended the work of the Space Cooperation Working Group (SCWG), including ROK’s participation in the Joint Commercial Operations (JCO) led by the U.S. Space Force. They emphasized that such cooperation contributes to enhancing interoperability and information sharing for space domain awareness of the Alliance and strengthens joint response capabilities against increasing space threats. Furthermore, the two sides welcomed the work of the Cyber Cooperation Working Group (CCWG), including the Cyber Alliance and Cyber Flag exercise.
The two sides reviewed the progress on the Conditions-based OPCON Transition Plan (COTP) agreed upon by the ROK and the United States through Conditions-based OPCON Transition Working Group (COTWG). They exchanged views on this year’s bilateral evaluation on the capabilities and systems required for OPCON transition, pledged to pursue OPCON transition in a systematic and stable manner, and reaffirmed the two nations’ commitment to strengthening combined defense posture of the Alliance.
DEPMIN Cho and DASD Lee also reviewed the regional and global security environments and pledged to deepen cooperation with like-minded countries to achieve shared security goals. They acknowledged that the 2nd ROK-UNC Member States Defense Ministerial Meeting, which was held in Seoul in early September reaffirmed the commitment and resolve of the UNC Member States to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. They reviewed the work of the Regional Cooperation Working Group (RCWG) aimed at enhancing peace and stability in the region, and pledged to strengthen cooperative efforts based on the respective Indo-Pacific strategy of both countries. In that vein, they closely discussed measures for regional cooperation to pursue expanded cooperation with the ASEAN members and Pacific Islands Countries, and agreed to report the outcomes of the discussions at the 56th SCM.
In addition, both sides concurred that ROK-U.S.-Japan security cooperation should continue to be strengthened to achieve shared security goals on the Korean Peninsula and in the Indo-Pacific region. They pledged to intensify cooperation to respond to regional security landscape based on the Trilateral Security Cooperation Framework (TSCF), including high-level policy consultations, information sharing, and trilateral multi-domain exercises. To this end, the two sides resolved to continue efforts for the implementation of cooperative tasks agreed through the Defense Trilateral Talks (DTT) held in early September.
DEPMIN Cho and DASD Lee agreed that the 25th KIDD reaffirmed a robust solidarity of the ROK-U.S. Alliance and provided guidance to strengthen the Alliance’s cooperation in accordance with the Defense Vision of the U.S.-ROK Alliance. Based on these outcomes of the Alliance’s cooperation, the two sides pledged to continue efforts to achieve meaningful progress at the 56th SCM, to be hosted in late 2024.
On the occasion of this meeting, both sides visited a General Outpost along the central front, reviewing increasing DPRK military activities in the vicinity of the border region and assessing our response. They expressed appreciation to service members of the ROK and the U.S. for maintaining an overwhelming combined defense posture to respond to any DPRK provocations. (Source: U.S. DoD)
23 Sept 24. Myanmar: Statement highlights China’s influence over ethnic armed organisations. On 18 September, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) issued a statement declaring it would not work with the civilian shadow National Unity Government (NUG). The MNDAA is an ethnic armed organisation (EAO) that has taken significant territory from the military junta in northern Shan state since late 2023. The MNDAA also stated that it would not expand its offensive to Taunggyi city (Shan state) or Mandalay city (Mandalay region). In addition, the group pledged that it would not co-operate with groups opposing China. On 19 September, a joint statement between several EAOs reaffirming their commitment to establishing a federal democratic union did not include the MNDAA. While it is likely that the MDNAA will continue to work with NUG-linked civilian militias, known as People’s Defence Forces (PDFs), despite the statement, the announcement highlights the pressure and influence that Beijing has on the group. Beijing likely does not desire for the junta to be completely removed from power and will be concerned over excessive levels of instability at its borders. We assess that, without the support from key EAOs, efforts to take control over major urban areas such as Mandalay city will likely be unsuccessful. (Source: Sibylline)
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