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29 Aug 24. New AU mission for Somalia: old problems, fresh solutions? Seventeen years after the first African Union (AU) mission was deployed in Somalia to degrade the violent extremist group al-Shabaab, the country is set to have a third peace support operation starting on 1 January 2025.
This month, the AU Peace and Security Council endorsed a proposal to form the AU Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). It will take over from the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), which replaced the country’s first mission (AMISOM) in April 2022.
The new deployment still requires approval from the United Nations Security Council, which ultimately authorises peace missions based on Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. The council’s Resolution 2748 (2024) indicated the possibility of the new mission, pending a report on its design by 15 November.
Launching AUSSOM raises several questions – mainly how it differs from its predecessors, if it can do better against al-Shabaab, and successfully hand over security responsibility to the Somali Security Forces.
AUSSOM will be deployed in a changed geopolitical environment, marked by escalating tensions between Somalia and Ethiopia, which contributes troops to ATMIS. The two are at loggerheads over the January memorandum of understanding between Ethiopia and Somaliland, a self-declared independent state. The details of the agreement haven’t been made public, but it allegedly grants Ethiopia sea access and a military base in return for political recognition of Somaliland.
Questions about AUSSOM are valid. While the mission may help renew continental and international support for counter-terrorism in Somalia, protecting it from regional tensions will be essential.
Previous missions enabled Somalia to achieve vital security and state-building gains, including consolidating a federal governance system and conducting elections. Somalia became an East African Community member in 2023 and joins the UN Security Council as a non-permanent member for 2025-26.
AMISOM and ATMIS, alongside international partners, also helped launch offensive operations against al-Shabaab and develop the Somali Security Forces’ capacity – as a result, liberating several territories and strategic towns.
The new mission differs from its predecessors in its mandate and operational modalities. Due to Ethiopia-Somalia tensions, Ethiopia probably won’t contribute troops, while Egypt likely will.
Previous missions have struggled with multiple, sometimes conflicting, roles and expectations. Unlike them, AUSSOM will have a more defined supportive role, with more pronounced functions for the Somali Security Forces.
In contrast to ATMIS, AUSSOM should have a more realistic, longer time frame. ATMIS was given under three years to degrade al-Shabaab by supporting offensive military operations and building capacity in the Somali Security Forces. AUSSOM’s priority will be to bolster operations of the Somali Security Forces and carry out capacity building. Unlike earlier missions, it has an explicit mandate to protect civilians under immediate threat of physical violence. AUSSOM will have five years to complete its work (2025-29).
The new mission will follow a backup and urban-based operation approach, with a force strength of 11 146 troops, 85 civilians and 680 police officers. This is less than the maximum strength for AMISOM (about 22 000) and ATMIS (19 626).
Several challenges that constrained both AMISOM and ATMIS will probably also confront AUSSOM. Al-Shabaab remains a regional threat, adapting to counter-terrorism efforts by the AU missions and Somali government. Using asymmetric warfare tactics, it continues its deadly attacks, endangering major supply routes. The group also administers territories, particularly in southern Somalia. Alliances with international terrorist groups, like al-Qaeda, have enhanced al-Shabaab’s capabilities in Somalia and the region.
AMISOM and ATMIS have struggled to subdue al-Shabaab due to limited and unpredictable funding and logistical challenges. One problem with ATMIS has been its phased withdrawal of personnel tied to specific benchmarks. While this process is essential for an orderly exit, the timeline is unrealistic and doesn’t reflect changes in the conflict landscape.
Omar Mahmood, the International Crisis Group’s Eastern Africa Senior Analyst, says, ‘The political ambitions around the transition have consistently not matched ground realities,’ including the security conditions and progress in security force generation. This has resulted in delays across almost all of ATMIS’ phases.
Notably, both AMISOM and ATMIS were military-heavy and not sufficiently able to tackle the socio-political drivers of instability. They also struggled to combine capacity building, governance support, and the international coordination of political and security actors.
Somalia certainly needs a follow-on mission to avoid a security vacuum, and the decision to replace rather than renew ATMIS was based on several issues. AUSSOM addresses ATMIS’ mismatch between mandate and capacity, its unrealistic drawdown, and its flagging international support.
The new mission’s success hinges on several critical factors. The first is an orderly transition of ATMIS to AUSSOM that maintains current gains.
Second is AUSSOM’s contributions to implementing the Somalia Security Sector Development Plan adopted last year. The six-year plan, endorsed by international partners, proposes a comprehensive approach to defeating al-Shabaab and achieving sustainable peace and security. The plan includes strengthening security in urban centres, countering terrorism funding and extremist ideology, and enhancing strategic communication. AUSSOM must adopt a comprehensive approach beyond military activities to support the plan.
Third, AUSSOM’s operational capability must be aligned with its mandate. Adequate financing is needed, along with qualified personnel and resources such as attack helicopters. Effective coordination with various partners and stakeholders will also be crucial.
The fourth vital success factor will be managing the region’s geopolitical tensions, especially considering Ethiopia and Somalia’s diplomatic row. While authorising AUSSOM is important, the UN and AU should proactively protect the mission from political repercussions, including by facilitating Ethiopia-Somalia talks.
Written by Meressa K Dessu, Senior Researcher and Training Coordinator, ISS Addis Ababa; Dawit Yohannes, Project Manager and Senior Researcher, ISS Addis Ababa; and Tsion Belay Alene, Researcher, ISS Addis Ababa.
Republished with permission from ISS Africa. (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
28 Aug 24. China-US: Bilateral ties are unlikely to improve significantly, despite high-level meetings. On 27 August, US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan arrived in Beijing (China) for three days of talks with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi. This is the fifth time Sullivan has met with Wang over the past 18 months as both sides seek to stabilise their fraying relationship. Sullivan stated that the US is looking to ‘find ways to work together’, while Wang called for ‘healthy’ ties. The visit comes ahead of the US election in November, in which competition with China will likely be a major issue. A summit between US President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping – potentially in China – is reportedly on the agenda. In the short term, bilateral tensions will remain elevated given that the US has initiated tariffs against imports of Chinese steel, aluminium and electric vehicles (EVs); these will come into effect in the coming month. Despite pushback from industry groups, the US is highly unlikely to reduce tariff barriers in the medium term, sustaining the likelihood of retaliatory measures by China. Should the former US president, Donald Trump, be re-elected, we assess that diplomatic and economic tensions will highly likely deteriorate further in the long term, significantly raising risks to cross-border trade. (Source: Sibylline)
28 Aug 24. Australia-Pacific Islands: Regional policing plan will increase long-term national policing capacities. Earlier on 28 August, Pacific Island leaders endorsed a regional policing plan during the Pacific Islands Forum in Tonga. Australia will fund the plan, which will cost around AUD 400 m (USD 271 m) over five years. The initiative aims to establish four police training centres and to create a multinational crisis response force to address security challenges, including drug trafficking, illegal fishing and organised crime across the region. Papua New Guinea will host the first training centre with Australia’s assistance. A co-ordination hub will be set up in Brisbane (Queensland state, Australia), and will offer Pacific Island police officers access to Australian Federal Police facilities. Several countries, including Vanuatu and other Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) members, have expressed concerns that the plan will simply serve Western strategic interests rather than the needs of Pacific nations. The initiative aims to strengthen the region’s self-reliance on security matters, reducing dependence on external powers like China. In the long term, we assess the initiative will likely improve local policing and security environments. (Source: Sibylline)
29 Aug 24. Taiwan ambitious submarine program a vital deterrence measure against China, says GlobalData. Taiwan is reinforcing its defense posture against China with an $8.8 bn investment in its Indigenous Defense Submarine Program, which aims to induct eight new submarines into its naval fleet over the next decade. These advanced submarines, developed with key support from the US and other allies, will significantly enhance Taiwan’s underwater warfare capabilities amid escalating regional tensions, says GlobalData, a leading data and analytics company. GlobalData’s report, “The Global Submarine Market Forecast 2024-2034,” reveals that Taiwan’s spending on submarine procurement is expected to grow at a CAGR of over 5%. This growth is attributed to the procurement of the eight conventional submarines over the forecast period.
Rithik Rao, Aerospace & Defense Analyst at GlobalData, comments: “Taiwan faced several hinderances while attempting to import new submarines due to diplomatic curbs from China. However, within the last decade, it has been able to gain the required technical expertise and establish the necessary supply chain to facilitate the indigenous construction of modern diesel-electric submarines.”
The upcoming submarines, christened Hai Kun-class, will feature several sophisticated sensors and weapon systems supplied by the US, such as the combat management system, electro-optical masts, sonars, MK-48 Mod6 torpedoes, and UGM-84 Harpoon missiles. This would augment Taiwan’s anti-surface and anti-submarine capabilities, hence boosting the country’s endeavors to safeguard its territorial interests.
Despite its significance, the Indigenous Defense Submarine Program has been criticized within the country on various issues, including its high cost, relatively slow progress, and hasty plans for additional units prior to the sea trials of the first submarine of the class, which was launched last year.
Rao concludes: “While much of the program’s details have not been publicly revealed, the relevance of a modern submarine in the naval fleet is well understood by Taiwanese policymakers, given the asymmetric advantage a submarine provides in naval warfare. It is likely to come off as a valuable investment in the country’s efforts to maintain its sovereignty.” (Source: GlobalData)
29 Aug 24. Iraq-Turkey: Uptick in Turkish operations in northern Iraq will elevate security, bystander risks. Earlier on 29 August, intense armed clashes erupted between the Turkish army and fighters from the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) near the village of Koherzi in the Metin mountain range (Duhok governorate, Iraqi Kurdistan). The clashes come days after a Turkish drone killed two Kurdish journalists near Sulaymaniyah (Sulaymaniyah governorate, Iraqi Kurdistan). Turkish officials claimed that the journalists had ties with the PKK and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). We assess that the recent uptick in Turkish operations and targeted airstrikes inside Iraqi Kurdistan will likely continue in the coming weeks, elevating security and bystander risks along Iraq’s northern border, particularly in the Metina and Gara mountain areas. Mobility disruption along roads leading to Duhok city is likely in the coming days due to the ongoing mass migration of residents from northern Kurdish villages fleeing to the city. (Source: Sibylline)
29 Aug 24. Armenia-Azerbaijan: Cross-border shelling claims will likely moderately elevate regional tensions. On 28 August, Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) claimed that Armenian forces fired at positions in Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan exclave. Armenia’s MoD denied these accusations, stating that they were fabricated by Baku. The Armenian MoD also noted that Baku has not replied to Yerevan’s proposal to establish a joint mechanism for investigating ceasefire violations and cross-border incidents. Meanwhile, Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov met with his Turkish counterpart, Hakan Fidan, in Turkey on 27 August. During the visit, Bayramov stated that the main obstacle to a peace agreement with Armenia is the Armenian constitution’s provisions, which include territorial claims against Azerbaijan and Turkey. Bayramov further stated that Yerevan’s ongoing efforts to procure military equipment from its allies threaten regional stability. Yerevan rejected Bayramov’s statements, asserting that changing the constitution is a domestic affair and that it does not include any territorial claims against any country. We assess that Bayramov’s statements and Baku’s claims of cross-border shelling are likely to elevate regional tensions moderately, further delaying the conclusion of a peace deal. (Source: Sibylline)
27 Aug 24. Japan-China: Chinese military aircraft enters Japan’s airspace for first time, driving regional tensions. On 26 August, Japan’s Ministry of Defense alleged that a Chinese military Y-9 surveillance plane violated the territorial airspace’ of the Danjo Islands (Nagasaki prefecture) for around two minutes from 1129hrs (local time). Japan issued ‘notifications and warnings’ to the aircraft and deployed four fighter jets to the area. This was reportedly the first time the Japanese Self Defense Forces had ever detected a Chinese plane in Japanese airspace. Tokyo has lodged an ‘extremely serious protest’ with Beijing. China and Japan have a territorial dispute over the Japan-administered Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea; tensions have escalated in recent years. In July, a Japanese navy destroyer entered China’s territorial waters near Taiwan, prompting an official complaint by Beijing. It is unclear whether China’s aircraft incursion was a deliberate provocation and retaliation for this incident or if the plane had merely briefly strayed off course. We assess that an increase in Chinese military activity in the East China Sea is likely over the coming years as Japan’s military ties with the US and South Korea grow. The risk of armed conflict remains low as both countries possess formidable militaries and China is seemingly prioritising power projection towards Taiwan over Japan. (Source: Sibylline)
27 Aug 24. Burkina Faso: Jihadist attack will elevate junta anxieties over unrest, stability risks. On 24 August, jihadists attacked the town of Barsalogho (Centre-Nord region), killing at least 200 people, including civilians and soldiers, while they were digging defensive trenches around the town. The al-Qaeda-aligned Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) has claimed responsibility for the attack. The attack will likely further undermine confidence in the military’s ability to ensure security. Moreover, Barsalogho is located around 28 miles (45km) from the strategic town of Kaya (Centre-Nord region), which hosts the primary military base between JNIM territory and the capital Ouagadougou. Whilst the attack does not indicate an increased risk of attacks in Ouagadougou, it will likely compound concerns over JNIM’s expansion and the junta’s perceived ineffectiveness in resolving the security crisis. We assess that this will likely heighten the junta’s anxieties over unrest risks in Ouagadougou, prompting it to implement a heightened security posture in the city. This will likely include increasing checkpoints and crackdowns on activists, driving risks of movement disruption and arbitrary detention of local staff. (Source: Sibylline)
27 Aug 24. Pakistan: Multiple attacks highlight persistent militant threat in Balochistan province. On 25 and 26 August, more than 70 people were killed in co-ordinated attacks targeting police stations, railway lines and vehicles on highways across Balochistan province. At least 14 military and police personnel, along with 21 militants, were killed in clashes after militants attacked a major highway in Lasbela district. In a separate attack in Musakhail district, 35 vehicles were set ablaze and 23 people were killed after they were identified as Punjabi migrant workers. In Kalat (Balochistan province), 10 people were killed after a police station and a highway were attacked. The Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) has claimed responsibility for the attack. The attacks come against the backdrop of growing disenfranchisement among the ethnic-Baloch population and increasing ethnic tensions against the Punjabi community (who are perceived as partly responsible for their socio-economic grievances). The attacks, which underscore the persistent militant threat in the province, will likely further undermine investor confidence and heighten China’s concerns about the deteriorating security environment and safety of its assets and workers. We assess that separatist activity will likely continue to be focused on Balochistan, however, attacks on the security forces or Chinese targets in Karachi (Sindh province) are also a possibility. (Source: Sibylline)
27 Aug 24. US quietly reopens talks with Chad amid challenges in Africa posture. The U.S. has restarted talks over the future of its armed forces in Chad — the latest African country to express doubt over its relationship with the American military.
In the last month, senior leaders from the State and Defense departments have visited the capital of N’Djamena, where they met with members of the Chadian government and armed forces to discuss their security ties.
They arrived at a sensitive moment for the American military’s work in the country and on the continent more broadly. Earlier this year, the government in N’Djamena said it wanted to renegotiate its agreement that allows the U.S. military access to its territory, leading the U.S. to withdraw a unit of 75 or so special operations forces operating from a disputed base near the capital.
That request came as its neighbor, Niger, was in the process of ordering the American military out — a departure that all but ended in earlier this month, when the U.S. handed control of a $100 m base to Niger’s ruling junta.
Niger was once a top partner in the fight against terrorism in the Sahel — a much more mature relationship than America has with Chad. Still, the U.S. had around 100 special operations personnel there before April, and the country has been a valuable companion in the fight against terrorism in the region.
“We don’t expect to return in the exact same footprint that we had before,” a senior U.S. defense official said in an interview late last month July.
Instead, the official said America would do better to start from the ground up: sharing its own goals for the region, listening to Chad’s and then deciding what kind of presence made sense in the country.
“What we’re hearing from a lot of African partners is they want to lead and they’re interested in our facilitation,” the official said. “That’s different than a handful of years ago, where the U.S. was conducting operations.”
Going forward, the new presence may not include the personnel withdrawn in April, the official said, a choice a Pentagon spokesperson labeled at the time a “temporary step.”
The Defense Department’s head of special operations and low-intensity conflict was more hopeful on their return.
“This is fundamentally what we’re talking about to the Chadians,” Assistant Secretary of Defense Chris Maier told reporters during an event hosted by the Defense Writers Group in Washington. “There was probably some rationale on their removal that had to do with their presidential election that now is over, and so may give us an opportunity to have more, if you will, effective talks with them again.”
‘No West Africa policy’
To that end, the State Department announced a late-July visit to Chad by John Bass, its acting head of political affairs, holding a short press conference afterward. The Defense Department did not follow suit until a little over a week later, sending Maj. Gen. Kenneth Ekman, America’s top military officer for West Africa, according to a brief write-up of the encounter on the website of the Chadian Air Force.
Ekman’s host was Chad’s air chief, who first called for the ouster of the American personnel in April.
U.S. Africa Command usually notes when its senior leaders visit different countries in the region. The decision not to, another American defense official said, is a sign of internal government pressure to be discreet when discussing security ties at a moment of such uncertainty — and as different parts of the administration trade blame for the withdrawal from Niger.
“There is no West Africa policy from the White House,” said the official, allowed to speak anonymously to be candid.
U.S. Africa Command said that there was a “small contingent” of American personnel in Chad supporting a counterterrorism mission. It also confirmed that Ekman visited the country in August “to engage with military and civilian leaders on a whole-of-government approach to the shared security challenges in the region.”
Africa Command deferred to the State Department on the status of that security relationship. And State wouldn’t offer more specifics, instead saying the U.S. “is committed to working closely alongside our partners across the region to advance our mutual security interests and bolster peace and stability in the Sahel and Lake Chad Region.”
Those shared interests started to fray this April. Chad’s air chief abruptly sent a letter to the U.S. embassy telling it to halt operations at a base near the capital and saying it wanted to review the two countries’ military agreement. Soon after, the American military complied.
The Pentagon agreed to start negotiations after Chad’s elections in May.
Meanwhile, the threat of terrorist groups continues to grow in the Sahel, a belt of countries across northern Africa where coups have recently become more common. The region’s share of global terrorist-related deaths rose from 1% in 2007 to 43% in 2022, according to the Global Terrorism Index.
That said, Maier cautioned that the threat may be contained to the region.
“I don’t think we’ve see an external operations threat emerge from there,” he said, while still arguing that U.S. officials and embassies in the Sahel could be at risk.
The senior defense official argued that the countries calling for a different relationship with the U.S. all have different motives and shouldn’t be seen as a pattern. Still, both that official and Maier acknowledged that U.S. posture would need to change, likely becoming smaller and more spread out.
Cameron Hudson, who studies African security issues at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, argued those may be the wrong lessons. Rather than evaluating what kind of posture the U.S. should have there, he said, the U.S. should consider whether it’s necessary at all.
“Do we really need this footprint in this region?” Hudson said. “The jihadist threat [there] is not a threat to the U.S. homeland.”
(Source: Defense News Early Bird/Defense News)
26 Aug 24. Australia to command Combined Task Force in Red Sea.
Naval. Australia is set to assume command of the Combined Maritime Force’s Combined Task Force (CTF) 153 for the first time later this year.
The six-month appointment, from October, is designed to demonstrate Australia’s ongoing commitment to maritime security and international rules and norms.
CTF 153 was established in April 2022 and focuses on international maritime security and capacity-building efforts in the Red Sea, Bab al-Mandeb, and Gulf of Aden.
Australia has been conducting maritime security operations in the Middle East under Operation Manitou since 1990 and has previously commanded CTFs 150 and 152.
“Australian Defence Force command of CTF 153 is a significant milestone in our commitment to maritime safety and security,” Chief of Joint Operations Vice Admiral Justin Jones said.
“We proudly work alongside 44 other member nations in the Combined Maritime Force to support freedom of navigation and free, fair and open trade, and the international rules‑based order.
“This role demonstrates Australia’s commitment to international rules and complements our separate deployment under Operation Hydranth.”
Assuming the leadership of CTF 153 will see Australia maintain its current contribution to the CMF, which was bolstered in December 2023 in response to Houthi attacks on shipping and maritime traffic in the Red Sea.
Operation Manitou and Australia’s command of CTF 153 is separate to the support Australia is providing to international efforts to target and degrade Houthi capabilities in Yemen under Operation Hydranth.
The Australian government has previously drawn criticism for declining to send any warships to the Red Sea as part of international efforts to prevent attacks against commercial shipping by Iranian-backed Houthi rebels.
Shadow minister for defence, defence industry and defence personnel, Andrew Hastie described the refusal as another “no-show” on defence.
“This latest no-show from Labor proves they are weak on defence and can’t be trusted to back our allies on the international stage,” he said in a public address last month.
“This is a pattern of weakness in defence from the Albanese government.
“Back in December 2023, the Albanese government declined to send a warship to protect maritime trade in the Red Sea. Our Navy had a warship ready, but they weren’t ordered to go.
“We’re missing again. Labor can’t be trusted on defence and national security.” (Source: Defence Connect)
23 Aug 24. Libya: Central Bank crisis will elevate risk of armed conflict in Tripoli. On 23 August, the newly appointed head of the Central Bank of Libya (CBL), Mohamed al-Shukri, announced that he would only accept his appointment with a joint agreement from the High State Council (HSC, affiliated with the Tripoli-based government) and the House of Representatives (HoR, affiliated with the rival Benghazi-based government). Al-Shukri is likely trying to alleviate the mounting tensions following the Presidential Council’s (PC) decision to sack his predecessor, Al-Siddiq al-Kabir, on 18 August. The HoR, HSC and al-Kabir all oppose this decision. However, tensions remain heightened, particularly those between militias supporting al-Kabir and those affiliated with the PC. The risk of armed confrontations in the capital Tripoli will therefore increase in the coming days, particularly around the CBL headquarters. Amid the ongoing negotiations, we assess that al-Kabir will likely remain in his position in the coming days, though the risk of operational disruption in the banking sector in Tripoli and other major cities in western Libya will remain elevated. (Source: Sibylline)
23 Aug 24. Taiwan: Opposition will possibly leverage defence spending amid growing Chinese military threat. On 22 August, Taiwan’s Executive Yuan approved an NTD 3.33trn (USD 104.2bn) central government budget for 2025. This includes a 480% year-on-year rise in anti-fraud funding and a 40.4% increase in water control spending in light of recent flooding). The budget allocates NTD 647 bn (USD 20.24bn) in defence spending, a 7.7% rise compared to 2024. The budget still needs to be passed by the Legislative Yuan (unicameral parliament), in which President Lai Ching-te’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) lost its majority in January’s general election. Despite the Kuomintang (KMT) having historically obstructed defence spending bills while in opposition, there appears to be growing cross-party consensus on the need to strengthen Taiwan’s military deterrence in response to rising tensions with China. However, we assess that opposition parties will possibly leverage defence spending as a bargaining chip to obtain concessions on other agenda items, such as domestic economic issues and/or nuclear energy. (Source: Sibylline)
25 Aug 24. Australia’s $45bn Indo-Pacific investment fuelled by submarines. GlobalData’s report unveils Australia’s defence expansion, focusing on submarines, frigates, and advanced aircraft.
In response to escalating geopolitical tensions in the Indo-Pacific, Australia will provide investment of more than $45bn in defence from 2024 to 2029, focusing on submarines.
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GlobalData’s recent “Australia Defense Market 2024-29” report highlights acquisitions, including nuclear-powered submarines under the AUKUS agreement, next-generation frigates, and military aircraft.
The AUKUS pact and Australia’s $21.6bn submarine investment
According to GlobalData’s “Australia Defense Market 2024-2029” report, this surge in defence spending is driven by the need to counter growing security threats in the Indo-Pacific region, where geopolitical tensions are intensifying.
Australia’s commitment to the AUKUS alliance is central to this defence strategy, a trilateral security pact with the United States and the United Kingdom. The report highlights that under AUKUS, Australia will invest $21.6bn in developing nuclear-powered submarines. These submarines, part of the SSN-AUKUS project, will enhance Australia’s ability to conduct prolonged underwater operations, an asset in the contested waters of the Indo-Pacific.
Since signing the AUKUS pact in September 2021, Australia has made progress toward acquiring a nuclear-powered submarine fleet under Pillar I of the agreement. The AUKUS framework includes hosting UK Astute-class and US Virginia-class submarines starting in 2027 and planning for the domestic production of at least three Virginia-class SSNs, with deliveries expected by 2032.
On July 30, 2024, the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) celebrated a milestone as its first sailors graduated with distinction from the US Navy’s Basic Enlisted Submarine School (BESS) in Groton, Connecticut. This achievement under the AUKUS trilateral security pact is a step toward preparing for Australia’s acquisition of Virginia-class submarines by 2030.
According to GlobalData’s intelligence on the global submarine market, Australia has 41% of the market for submarines in the Asia-Pacific region.
Enhancing Air Force’s capabilities
Beyond submarines, Australia also focuses on modernising its naval fleet by acquiring new general-purpose frigates. The report reveals that the country has earmarked $6bn for constructing 11 frigates to replace the ageing Anzac-class vessels. These new frigates will be equipped with technologies for enhanced maritime strike capabilities, air defence, and escort missions, ensuring that the Royal Australian Navy remains a force in the region.
In addition to bolstering its naval capabilities, Australia is enhancing its airlift capacity with a $6.4bn investment in 24 C-130J-30 Super Hercules aircraft. These next-generation aircraft will upgrade the Royal Australian Air Force’s ability to conduct various military and humanitarian missions.
In other Royal Australia Air Force developments, on August 7, 2024, the Institute for Public Affairs (IPA) recommended that Australia acquire the US B-21 Raider stealth bomber. The IPA suggests the B-21 as a “Plan B” to supplement the AUKUS initiative, providing a non-nuclear long-range deterrent ahead of the AUKUS nuclear-powered submarines, which are not expected until the early 2040s. This acquisition would offer Australia an immediate boost in strike capability while awaiting the delivery of submarines. (Source: naval-technology.com)
23 Aug 24. Austin Lauds U.S.-India Ties in Meeting With Counterpart.
Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III praised the momentum behind the U.S.-India relationship today as he met with Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh at the Pentagon.
Austin noted the countries’ increased cooperation on a range of defense issues, including efforts to strengthen critical supply chains and interoperability between their militaries.
“We share a vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific, and our defense cooperation continues to grow stronger and stronger,” Austin said. “We’re expanding our defense industrial ties and working to coproduce more capabilities and strengthen supply chain resilience.”
He added that the countries have increased operational cooperation across all domains and highlighted India’s participation in this summer’s Rim of the Pacific, a large-scale exercise led by the U.S. Navy in Hawaii that brought together 29 partner nations.
“The Indian navy remains an important security provider in the Indian Ocean,” Austin said. “Indian sailors have helped mariners in distress and defended global commerce. So, we are committed to deepening naval cooperation, to doing more together with unmanned technology, and to strengthening undersea domain awareness.”
Singh said the growing cooperation covers “all areas of human endeavor.”
The defense minister noted the robust people-to-people ties, shared democratic values, and the convergence of interests between the U.S. and India on a range of issues.
Austin and Singh’s meeting came a day after the countries finalized an agreement aimed at mitigating unanticipated supply chain issues to meet national security needs.
Under the nonbinding “security of supply” arrangement, the United States and India have agreed to provide priority support for goods and services that promote national defense.
“This security of supply arrangement represents a pivotal moment in the U.S.-India major defense partner relationship and will be a key factor in strengthening the U.S.-India Defense Technology and Trade Initiative,” Vic Ramdass, principal secretary of defense of industrial base policy, said in a statement.
“I look forward to hosting the next meeting this fall to deepen cooperation between our respective defense industrial bases and pursue bilateral co-development, co-production and co-sustainment initiatives,” Ramdass said. (Source: U.S. DoD)
28 Aug 24. Denel to become a Motshekga responsibility. The dissolution of the Department of Public Enterprises (DPE) has seen “shareholder responsibility” for State-owned enterprises (SOEs) moved to “line function ministries”.
This is the gist of a proclamation signed by President Cyril Ramaphosa this week and sees Denel added to the workload of Defence and Military Veterans Minister Angie Motshekga, in addition to her overseeing the SA National Defence Force (SANDF) and Department of Military Veterans (DMV).
The Presidential proclamation transfers the “administration, powers and functions entrusted by specific legislation” from the now defunct DPE to, in the case of Denel, Motshekga’s ministry.
She is also the shareholder (government) representative for defence and security acquisition and project management company, Armscor, as well as the Castle Control Board. Additionally, she is responsible for the Military Ombud, the Reserve Force Council (RFC) and the Defence Force Service Council (DFSC).
As is generally the case with Presidential and other government edicts, words come head of action and Ramaphosa’s Minister in the Presidency, Khumbudzo Ntshavheni, is taking on DPE authority until financial and human resources are “appropriately transferred”.
She is also the President’s point person for the National State Enterprise Bill. When on the Statute Book the Bill will set out SOE shareholder responsibility to be transferred “in a phased manner into the envisaged national enterprise holding company”.
In addition to Denel, six other SOEs now find themselves reporting to ministers other than Pravin Gordhan, democratic South Africa’s last public enterprises minister. They are Alexkor (Minister of Mineral and Petroleum Resources), Eskom (Minister of Electricity and Energy), Safcol (SA Forestry Company – Minister of Forestry, Fisheries and the Environment), SAA (South African Airways – Minister of Transport), SA Express (Minister of Transport) and Transnet (Minister of Transport).
(Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)27 Aug 24.
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