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22 Aug 24. North Korea slams US sale of Apache helicopters to South Korea as ‘provocative.’ North Korea’s foreign ministry denounced a U.S. planned sale of Apache helicopters to South Korea, state media KCNA said on Friday, vowing to take additional steps to bolster its self-defence.
The Pentagon said on Monday that the U.S. State Department has approved the potential sale of Apache helicopters and related logistics and support to South Korea for an estimated $3.5bn.
An unnamed senior official in charge of foreign news at North Korea’s foreign ministry issued a press statement on Thursday criticising the sale plan as a move to aggravate tension, alongside ongoing annual military drills by the allies.
“This is a reckless provocative act of deliberately increasing the security instability in the region,” the official said, according to KCNA.
The official accused Washington of escalating military confrontation, “disturbing the military balance and thus increasing the danger of a new conflict” in the region by supplying lethal weapons to its allies and friends.
Pyongyang’s “strategic deterrence will be further strengthened to protect the national security and interests and the regional peace,” the statement said, pledging to steadily conduct military activities to boost self-defence. (Source: Reuters)
21 Aug 24. Iraq-US: Cessation of truce with US will sustain elevated security risks around US bases. On 20 August, Haider al-Lami, a member of the political council of the Iran-backed Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba group, stated that Iraqi armed factions have ended their truce with the US amid the stalling of talks with the Iraqi government over US troop withdrawals. Al-Lami also warned of renewed attacks by his group against US regional bases in the coming days. There is a realistic possibility that al-Nujaba’s announcement is largely designed to exert political pressure on the Iraqi government to make progress in the withdrawal talks. Currently, we assess that a full resumption of attacks against US forces remains unlikely. However, al-Nujaba and other smaller factions are likely to conduct low-level attacks against US bases in Iraq and Syria in the coming weeks to demonstrate their willingness, sustaining elevated security and bystander risks around US bases and assets in the region. (Source: Sibylline)
22 Aug 24. Indonesia: Proposed electoral changes will drive nationwide unrest risks. On 22 August, thousands of protestors gathered outside the House of Representatives (DPR) in the capital Jakarta to demonstrate against a proposal to revise the election law. The protestors believe parliament is attempting to ensure that outgoing President Joko Widodo’s son Kaesang Pangarep will meet age eligibility requirements to run for Jakarta governor during the November elections, while also trying to block Anies Baswedan’s candidacy. The authorities deployed around 3,000 security personnel around the DPR building, the Arjuna Wijaya Statue and the Merdeka Palace in Jakarta. Protestors managed to get through the fence outside the DPR without resistance from the security forces. Protests were also reported in Bandung (West Java province), Makassar (South Sulawesi province) and Yogyakarta special region. The police fired tear gas at protestors trying to break into a local parliament complex in Semarang (Central Java province). Although the security forces initially acted with relative restraint, the authorities have now used water cannons, indicating a realistic possibility of further escalations. We assess that further attempts to revise electoral laws will likely drive increasing unrest. (Source: Sibylline)
22 Aug 24. Iraq: Clashes in Karbala governorate highlight significant security risks amid Arba’in gathering. On 21 August, armed clashes erupted in Karbala (Karbala governorate) at an Arba’in gathering between the Iraqi army and members of the Kata’ib Jund al-Imam Ali group, part of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) injuring three civilians. We assess that the clashes do not indicate a major rift between the army and the PMF; it is likely an isolated incident and unlikely to trigger a rise in mutual hostilities. However, the clashes highlight the significant security risks in Karbala and the main pilgrimage roads connecting to the city ahead of the primary Arba’in celebrations (25-26 August). In the coming days, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and the PMF will adopt an augmented security posture due to the high threat of terrorist attacks, triggering further mobility disruptions. Clashes between the ISF and radical Shia sects remain a realistic possibility, sustaining bystander risks near large gatherings. (Source: Sibylline)
22 Aug 24. Iran: New foreign minister will likely pursue nuclear negotiations, is unlikely to alleviate sanctions. On 21 August, Iran’s parliament approved President Masoud Pezeshkian’s new cabinet, comprising ministers from across the political spectrum. The cabinet includes Iran’s new Minister of Foreign Affairs Abbas Araghchi, who played a key role during the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear deal negotiations with the US. Araghchi will likely pursue re-engagement with the international community on a return to the JCPOA, which the US abandoned in 2018, to lift sanctions and alleviate economic pressure. However, we assess that recently increasing diplomatic tensions between Iran and the West will likely undermine such efforts, sustaining financial and operational risks for businesses in Iran. In addition, expectations of an Iranian retaliation against Israel for the alleged assassination of Hamas’ leader Ismail Haniyeh, particularly if materialised, will further undermine prospects of negotiations and the lifting of sanctions. (Source: Sibylline)
20 Aug 24. Indonesia proposes IDR165trn defence budget for 2025. Indonesia has proposed a 2025 defence budget of IDR165.2trn (USD10.6bn). Budgetary documents issued by the Ministry of Finance on 16 August show that the new budget would amount to a near 6% decline on the expected final defence expenditure in 2024 of IDR175.1trn. However, this final expenditure for 2024 marks a significant increase over the original allocation for that year.
The documents said the “strategic outputs” of the 2025 defence budget, which accounts for about 6% of total government expenditure for the year, include military procurement and sustainment, soldier welfare, and strengthening defence facilities particularly along maritime and land borders.
The defence budget for 2025 includes IDR80.4trn for ‘management support’ including operations, IDR10trn for soldier welfare, IDR69trn for military procurement, and IDR1.6trn for defence research, development, and industry.
The documents said defence procurement will be framed by Indonesia’s “fulfilment of the Minimum Essential Force (MEF) programme”. The MEF programme was initiated in 2010 and was originally scheduled to conclude in 2024.
Earlier phases of the programme were focused mainly on tackling the country’s long-running local insurgency. The current phase, which started in 2020, is intended to shift emphasis towards a two-pronged defence posture: continuing to strengthen internal security and bolstering external territorial defence.
However, funding constraints have impacted previous phases of MEF likely reflecting the requirement outlined in the budget documents to continue the project.
Funding constraints have also impacted one of Indonesia’s most high-profile programmes: its engagement with South Korea on developing the KF-21 fighter aircraft. On 16 August South Korea announced that Jakarta had reduced its funding commitment to the programme, from USD1.1bn to USD450m. (Source: Janes)
20 Aug 24. Russia-Ukraine war spills into west Africa: Mali attacks signal dangerous times ahead. Russia suffered significant blows to its reputation in mid-2024. An attack on its territory by Ukraine came as a surprise. In west Africa, the Wagner mercenary group, supported by Russia, suffered one of its heaviest fatalities in Mali.
An alliance of Tuareg rebel groups known as the Permanent Strategic Framework for the Defense of the People of Azawad joined forces in late July with Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, a coalition of four terrorist groups operating in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger.
The rebel-terrorist alliance attacked a Malian army contingent which was supported by Wagner fighters. After three days of heavy fighting, dozens of Malian soldiers and Wagner fighters were either killed or captured.
The attack was significant in many ways. For one thing, it shows the Malian junta is having difficulty in securing the country (its purported reason for taking over, expelling France and turning to Russia).
For another, it highlights the impact of geopolitics in the region. The attack has raised concern that a new proxy war between Russia and Ukraine might be starting in Africa.
This is the second country in Africa where Ukraine is getting involved in local conflicts to attack Russian elements. Ukraine special forces are “active” in Sudan’s civil war, where Russia has interests.
As a scholar of African security and politics, I research conflicts, governance, terrorism and development on the continent. At the start of the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022, I analysed African countries’ position on the war and explained why several chose to be “neutral” and not take sides on the conflict.
I argued that many African countries did not want to get involved in what was seen as a proxy war between the US and Russia. After Russia invaded Ukraine, many countries in Europe as well as the US flooded Ukraine with weapons to defend its territory. The EU for the first time supplied lethal aid to Ukraine.
Although the US and European countries denied it was a proxy war, the director of the CIA under Barack Obama admitted, “It’s a proxy war with Russia whether we say so or not.” This view was shared by several countries in Africa which were determined to remain neutral in order not to be drawn into the conflict.
With the involvement of Ukraine in the war in Sudan and now in Mali, it looks like African countries are in fact getting drawn in, and on their own territory.
A new proxy war will have severe implications for the region and continent more broadly. The security dynamics in Africa are very complicated, with issues such as ethnicity, religion, inequality, topography and poverty adding to the fragility.
Libya is an example of how external interference could result in a conflict lasting decades and destabilising the entire region. African leaders must avoid such foreign intervention as that of Libya, which has been labelled a failure.
Foreign dimension of the Mali conflict
Further pointers to a proxy war between the US and Ukraine on the one hand and Russia on the other on African territory were laid bare when a representative of Ukraine’s security service, Andriy Yusov, stated on television that Ukraine “enabled” the attack on the Malian army and Wagner.
The ambassador of Ukraine to Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia, Yurii Pyvovarov, has also been accused by the government of Senegal of providing “unequivocal and unqualified support for the terrorist attack” in Mali.
In response, Mali and Niger have severed diplomatic relationships with Ukraine. Senegal also summoned the Ukrainian ambassador. The west African economic grouping Ecowas declared its “firm disapproval and firm condemnation of any outside interference in the region.”
This is a major setback for Ukraine in the region.
Although Ukraine has denied supporting terrorist groups in the region, its involvement in the death of Malian soldiers has attracted condemnation.
Russia has already seized the attack to label Ukraine an enemy of Africa. Russia accused Ukraine of opening a “second front” in Africa and supporting terrorist groups.
Ukraine’s position
In June 2024, the president of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, organised a summit to gather support for his call on Russia to end its invasion; 92 countries participated, including 57 heads of state or government.
About 80 countries signed a document condemning Russia for the war and declaring Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Only 12 of these countries were from Africa. Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso did not attend. Fewer than 20 African countries sent representatives.
This is another proof that African countries do not want to get involved in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Many have also abstained from previous UN General Assembly votes. This is despite Ukraine trying to get support from the continent.
Narratives about the role of Ukraine in Mali would only weaken its influence in Africa. This is because several countries on the continent are fragile and terrorism is a serious problem.
A Russian propaganda win?
Since the recent coups in the west African region within the last four years, Russia has positioned itself as an alternative to western influence there. It is benefiting from the chaos in the region by quickly filling the gap left by France and its allies in the Sahel.
Shortly after the ambush on Malian and Wagner forces, the foreign minister of Russia, Sergey Lavrov, reiterated Russia’s commitment to helping Mali boost its combat capability, train military personnel and address pressing socioeconomic problems.
For over a decade, Russia has presented itself as an alternative partner in fighting terrorism in the region. For instance, when the US refused to sell weapons to Nigeria because of a damning report by Amnesty International accusing the Nigerian army of human rights abuse, Nigeria turned to Russia for weapons.
With Russia losing allies in the west since its invasion of Ukraine, Africa has been an important region of support. Ukraine is also very keen to get the support of African countries, as seen in its intention to open 10 new embassies on the continent. In a war where both sides are looking for external support, Ukraine’s loss might become Russia’s gain.
A way forward
African leaders must unite to condemn any form of external interference that could further destabilise the region. They should demand accountability from Russia on the activities of the Wagner group on the continent while making it clear to Ukraine that foreign interference will not be tolerated on the continent.
The Tuareg situation must also be addressed. Former president Mahamadou Issoufou of Niger was able to complete two terms in office partly because he accommodated the demands of the Tuaregs in his country and addressed their concerns.
The government in Mali should understand that there is no military solution to the Tuareg dilemma. They should take a cue from Issoufou’s policies which placated the Tuaregs in Niger during his presidential terms.
Written by Olayinka Ajala, Senior lecturer in Politics and International Relations, Leeds Beckett University.
Republished with permission from The Conversation. The original article can be found herehttps://theconversation.com/russia-ukraine-war-spills-into-west-africa-mali-attacks-signal-dangerous-times-ahead-236646
(Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
19 Aug 24. China-Philippines: Collision near Sabina Shoal highlights continued tensions, risk of escalation. Earlier on 19 August, Chinese and Philippine coast guard vessels collided in the South China Sea near the Sabina Shoal. The incident involved the Philippine coast guard vessels Cape Engano and Bagacay, which were on a mission to resupply personnel stationed on Flat/Patag and Lawak/Nanshan islands. The Philippines accused China of unlawful and aggressive manoeuvres and of causing structural damage to its vessels. The confrontation is part of a broader territorial dispute over the Spratly Islands, which are claimed by China, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam. It follows a recent air encounter wherein Chinese jets fired flares in the path of a Philippine patrol aircraft near the Scarborough Shoal. The latest collision took place despite apparent efforts by both countries to manage tensions in the South China Sea, including via a provisional agreement reportedly reached in late July to avoid clashes at the Second Thomas Shoal. We assess that tensions are highly likely to persist despite these efforts, driving the likelihood of further collisions near disputed features and sustaining the risk of wider escalation. (Source: Sibylline)
20 Aug 24. Australia-Indonesia: Security pact will boost defence interoperability, security co-operation. Earlier on 20 August, Australia and Indonesia announced a new security pact during a visit from Indonesia’s Defence Minister and President-elect Prabowo Subianto to Australia. Prabowo stated that the deal achieved ‘great progress’ in strengthening bilateral defence ties. Australia’s Defence Minister Richard Marles claimed that it would ‘provide for much greater interoperability’ and ‘more exercises’ between their militaries and allow them ‘to operate from each other’s countries’. The pact is set to be signed during Marles’ upcoming visit to Indonesia this week. Australia has struck several defence agreements in recent years, such as the AUKUS military alliance with the US and the UK (which was condemned by China). On 20 August, Prabowo reaffirmed his commitment to Indonesia’s policy of non-alignment, which involves maintaining ties with both the US and China. This approach will likely limit the scope of its military co-operation with Australia over the coming years. We therefore assess that the agreement is unlikely to significantly elevate regional tensions. (Source: Sibylline)
19 Aug 24. Moldova: Secession of pro-Russia autonomous region is highly unlikely. Reports emerged on 16 August outlining that politicians in Moldova’s pro-Russia autonomous Gagauzia region will possibly make statements in the coming hours advocating for the territory breaking away from Moldova. Sergey Chernev, a former parliamentarian of Gagauzia’s People’s Assembly, claimed that fugitive Moldovan oligarch Ilan Șor is pushing politicians in Gagauzia to make secessionist statements. Șor is a key figure in Moscow’s efforts to destabilise the pro-West Moldovan government ahead of a presidential election and referendum on joining the EU on 20 October. However, Chernev claims that politicians are likely reluctant to call openly for Gagauzia’s secession because of the legal consequences (such as imprisonment). The self-proclaimed Gagauz Republic was declared on 19 August 1990, though the central government in Chișinău deemed it unconstitutional and only granted the region autonomous status years later. Any possible separatist sentiment from Gagauzia is almost certainly aimed at subverting Chișinău’s pro-West trajectory and weakening the stability of the central Moldovan government ahead of these votes. However, we assess that Gagauzia is highly unlikely to secede successfully from Moldova in the foreseeable future. (Source: Sibylline)
18 Aug 24. China ‘dramatically’ alarmed by US missile deployment: Philippines. China expressed its “very dramatic” alarm over a mid-range missile system that the U.S. military recently deployed to the Philippines, and warned it could destabilize the region. But Manila’s top diplomat said Friday he reassured his Chinese counterpart that the weaponry was only in the country temporarily.
Philippine Foreign Secretary Enrique Manalo said his Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi, expressed China’s concern over the U.S. mid-range missile deployment to the Philippines during their talks last month in Laos on the sidelines of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations meetings with Asian and Western countries.
“We discussed it and, well, they made it very dramatic,” Manalo said in response to questions during a news conference with foreign correspondents in Manila. “I said you shouldn’t be worried.”
Pressed to specify what China’s specific concerns were, Manalo said Wang warned the presence of the U.S. missile system could be “destabilizing,” but the Philippine foreign affairs chief said he disagreed.
“They’re not destabilizing” and the missile system was only in the Philippines temporarily, Manalo said he told Wang.
The U.S. Army said in April it transported the mid-range missile system, a land-based weapon that can fire the Standard Missile-6 and the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile, from the U.S. to the northern Philippines as part of combat exercises with Philippine troops.
The missile system, however, was not fired during the joint combat exercises of the longtime treaty allies and the Philippine military has said the missile system may be transported out of the country next month.
China has strongly opposed increased U.S. military deployments to the region, including to the Philippines, and warned these could endanger regional stability and peace.
The U.S. and the Philippines have repeatedly condemned China’s increasingly assertive actions to fortify its territorial claims in the South China Sea, where hostilities have particularly flared since last year between Chinese and Philippine coast guard forces and accompanying vessels. In addition to China and the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan also have overlapping claims in the busy waterways, a key global and security route. (Source: C4ISR & Networks)
16 Aug 24. China: New export restrictions on antimony highlight aim to control strategic minerals. On 15 August, China announced export restrictions on antimony and superhard material processing equipment, effective from 15 September, citing national security concerns. These restrictions cover six types of antimony-related products, including antimony ore, metals and oxide, as well as gold-antimony smelting and separation technologies. Exporters of these items will now need to meet unspecified requirements to obtain export licences for dual-use material and technologies. As China is the world’s leading antimony supplier (accounting for 48% of global antimony production in 2023), it is likely that the move is driven by strategic competition with the US. These new restrictions are likely to tighten supplies for Western militaries, which depend on antimony for weapons and other uses, such as photovoltaic glass. Businesses in the electronics and chemical sectors reliant on antimony will also likely face heightened supply chain disruption risks. We assess this decision is part of China’s broader strategy to control critical minerals; it follows previous restrictions related to rare earth magnets, graphite, gallium and germanium. (Source: Sibylline)
16 Aug 24. Thailand: Long-term instability risks will persist despite new prime minister. Earlier on 16 August, the leader of the Pheu Thai Party, Paetongtarn Shinawatra, was comfortably elected as prime minister by the House of Representatives, securing 319 votes against 145 (with 27 abstentions). She was elected just two days after fellow Pheu Thai member, Srettha Thavisin, was removed from the role by the Constitutional Court. The same coalition that made up Srettha’s government agreed to back Paetongtarn the previous day. The quick appointment of a replacement prime minister has helped to avoid a sustained period of uncertainty undermining the government. Maintaining the same government make-up also indicates relative policy continuity. However, Srettha’s flagship, but fiscally risky, ‘Digital Wallet’ cash handout scheme will possibly be scrapped. Yet despite the inclusion of key pro-military parties in the ruling coalition, we assess that tensions between the military-royalist establishment and the populist Pheu Thai Party will continue to threaten the sustainability of the government. This is currently heightened by the fact that Paetongtarn’s father, Thaksin Shinawatra, remains a highly divisive figure. (Source: Sibylline)
16 Aug 24. Iraq-US: Postponement of troop withdrawal will likely drive domestic unrest, elevate operational risks. On 15 August, the Iraqi foreign ministry postponed the announcement of an end date for the US-led coalition mission in the country and the withdrawal of international forces due to unspecified developments. The announcement comes against the backdrop of a recent increase in attacks against US assets in Iraq and elevated regional tensions. Further delays in the withdrawal will likely exacerbate domestic tensions in the country, elevating the risk of unrest and subsequently driving bystander risks. The sustained deployment of international forces will likely intensify anti-Western sentiment, elevating the risk of further attacks against coalition forces and driving collateral risks for staff and assets in the vicinity of military facilities. A resumption of attacks against Western-affiliated businesses, particularly in the capital Baghdad, remains a realistic possibility, driving operational disruption and safety risks for staff. However, we assess that any such attacks are likely to be sporadic. (Source: Sibylline)
16 Aug 24. Nigeria moves to establish ammunition production factory, expand local defence industry. In a significant step towards enhancing Nigeria’s defence capabilities and achieving self-reliance in military hardware production, the National Agency for Science and Engineering Infrastructure (NASENI), has signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Federal Ministry of Defence and its manufacturing enterprise, the Defence Industries Corporation of Nigeria (DICON) for the establishment of an ammunition production factory.
This partnership is a unique opportunity for Nigeria to strengthen its defence infrastructure through indigenous innovation and technological advancement, NASENI Director of Information, Olusegun Ayeoyenikan, explained after the signing of the MoU in Abuja on 13 August.
Speaking at the ceremony, Minister of State for Defence, Bello Matawalle, said the Armed Forces of Nigeria requires two hundred m rounds of ammunition annually for its operations.
The minister, while blaming past governments for the nation’s failure to achieve self-sufficiency in the production of military hardware, assured Nigerians that DICON would, in the next three years, export its military capabilities through local manufacturing of military hardware.
Also speaking at the ceremony, the Executive Vice Chairman of NASENI, Khalil Suleiman Halilu, highlighted the importance of the Military Industrial Complex (MIC), as not just a strategic initiative but a national imperative.
“Today, we are embarking on a journey that will redefine Nigeria’s defence landscape and secure our nation’s future,” said the NASENI Executive Vice Chairman. “This partnership between NASENI and the Ministry of Defence is a testament to our commitment to harness Nigeria’s scientific and engineering expertise in the service of national defence,” he said.
According to Halilu, “NASENI’s track record in research, development, and manufacturing positions the agency as a key player in the establishment of the MIC. The new Military Industrial Complex will serve as a hub for the development, production, and maintenance of military equipment, ranging from small arms to advanced defence systems.”
He also explained that the aim of the project was to create a robust ecosystem that supports the needs of the Nigerian Armed Forces while fostering the growth of local industries, thereby reducing reliance on foreign imports.
“‘This MoU represents the beginning of a long-term collaboration aimed at enhancing our defence capabilities through innovation and indigenous production,” he continued.
“Our goal is to ensure that our military is equipped with the best tools to defend our nation, and through this partnership, we will lay the foundation for a self-reliant defence industry that will also contribute to Nigeria’s economic growth,” he added.
Other stakeholders present to witness the signing of the landmark agreement included the Minister of Steel Development, Prince Shuaibu Abubakar Audu; Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defence, Dr Ibrahim Abubakar Kana and; and senior officers of the Nigerian Armed Forces.
NASENI was established by the Nigerian Government in 1992 to promote and develop science, technology and engineering infrastructure in the country. It was also set up to address various challenges and needs in Nigeria’s scientific and technological development.
The agency has a network of 12 Development Institutes spread across Nigeria – each with its own focus area and mandate.
The agreement with NASENI came at the same time as the Presidency pledged to make significant investments in DICON to ensure it achieves its mandates before 2030.
This is according to Secretary to Government of the Federation, Senator George Akume, representing President Bola Tinubu at the 60th anniversary celebration of DICON and the maiden African Defence Industries Conference held in Abuja this week.
On Wednesday 14 August, He said that with the signing of the DICON Act 2023, a new era for DICON has been marked, positioning it as the arrowhead of the nation’s Military Industrial Complex.
“It is also providing a robust framework to drive our strategic objectives in defence manufacturing and technology and supporting the modernisation of our Armed Forces to address national and subregional security challenges.
“The DICON Evolution Strategy and Road Map 2030, based on the DICON Act 2023 that we launch today, aims to bridge performance gaps in our Military Industrial Complex and reposition DICON as a global player, as was long envisaged by our founding fathers.
“To this end, my administration will invest substantially in DICON to ensure it delivers on its mandate efficiently within the 2030 roadmap timeframe,” he said.
“I am happy to see the progress towards establishing our first uncrewed or unmanned aerial and land vehicle automated production lines. These lofty steps would indeed bring us closer to the rest of the world, and no doubt significantly impact our current efforts to defeat terrorism, banditry, kidnapping, and other violent crimes in our country.
“Introducing the BAT A-1 Specialised Assault Rifle and its production line will address small arms proliferation issues while equipping our security operatives with modern fighting capabilities.
“The proposed state-of-the-art micro motherboard processing facility will be the backbone of robotics and artificial intelligence innovations, leveraging resources from our newly inaugurated lithium development plant in Nasarawa State,” he said.
In February, DICON Director-General, Major General Aniedi Edet, said DICON had resumed the production of ammunition and delivered four m rounds to the Nigerian Army in January as it embarks on an ambitious expansion drive.
In November 2023, Tinubu signed the new DICON bill (The Defence Industries Corporation of Nigeria Act, 2023), which empowered DICON to operate, maintain, and control subsidiaries and ordnance factories to manufacture, store, and dispose of ordnance and ancillary stores and material.
The new act also established the Defence Industry Technology, Research, and Development Institute (DITRDI) to “create a scientific and research-based technological foundation for Nigeria’s defence industry through the leveraging of combined, multi-disciplinary research from multiple military research institutes for application that leads to commercialization and the development of new military technology and capacity in Nigeria.”
In September 2023, Nigeria approved a $1bn partnership agreement with the Indian government to help DICON attain 40% self-sufficiency in local manufacturing and production of defence equipment in three years.
The Defence Industries Corporation of Nigeria was established in 1964. It operates an Ordnance Factory in Kaduna, where it makes small arms and ammunition, including assault rifles, machine guns and sub-machine guns (in 2018 it secured an agreement with Poland’s PGZ to manufacture Beryl assault rifles locally). Its Special Vehicle Plant is carrying out the refurbishment and upgrade of armoured vehicles, and has manufactured locally developed Ezugwu mine-resistant, ambush protected (MRAP) vehicles for the Nigerian Army. (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
16 Aug 24. Still a way to go before Public Procurement Act is fully enforceable. The glass-fronted Armscor head office building in Pretoria East. State-owned defence and security acquisition and project management company Armscor currently has nine tenders out in the wake of South African President Cyril Ramaphosa signing the Public Procurement Act (PPA) into law late in July. As with other government agencies, authorities and departments, Armscor has to comply with the new legislation aimed at eliminating so-called “tenderpreneurs” and clamping down on corruption and fraud. But there’s a silver lining of sorts for them – all provisions in the Act are not yet in force.
This means unscrupulous tenderers wanting to put bids in on defence related equipment ranging from berets for the SA Army and to what is labelled “life inflatable support” and “survival aid support” for the SA Air Force (SAAF) as well as “cushion-soled” socks for the SA Military Health Service (SAMHS) still have to comply with the onerous needs set out in Armscor tender documentation. Among others, these include broad-based black economic empowerment (BBBEE), financial status as well as diagrammatic representations of the items sought – along with measurements – and materials, where applicable. In one instance – for the acquisition of 1 194 dixie sets, 2 000 cutlery kits (knife, fork and spoon) and a similar number of plastic two litre water bottles for the landward force – the tender document and its requirements ran to 140 A4 pages.
This publication has previously been supplied with tender details on request to spread the net of potential suppliers wider. However, a single sentence response from Armscor Supply Chain Management (SCM) effectively put paid to this type of reporting. It stated: “Please note that Armscor bids documents are only shared with prospective suppliers and not with media houses, therefore it will not be forwarded to you”.
A National Treasury advisory dated 13 August has it Public Procurement Act provisions will become operational on different dates using a phased approach. This will see different categories of “procuring institutions such as national and provincial departments, national and provincial public entities and municipalities and municipal entities” having own dates set for implementation.
Existing procurement legislation including the Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA) and the PPPFA (Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act) remain in place until the relevant provisions of the PPA accompanying regulations take effect, Finance Minister Enoch Godongwana’s National Treasury has it.
The PPA legislation aims to create a single framework that regulates public procurement, including preferential procurement, by all organs of state, with the necessary efficiency, cost-effectiveness and integrity.
As enacted by the President, the Public Procurement Act is aimed at addressing weaknesses in the procurement of goods and services by organs of State that have in the past enabled various degrees of corruption, including State capture.
The new legislation bolsters the October 2022 government response to the Zondo commission’s extensive recommendations. The commission, chaired by Chief Justice Raymond Zondo from 2018 to 2022, found that interference from members of the Executive in government’s procurement function was one of the ways that allowed state capture to thrive.
Law expert Prof Geo Quinot told Corruption Watch that, “I think the promulgation of the Public Procurement Act is itself a momentous occasion in South African procurement law despite the fact that there are still a number of outstanding questions that must be resolved, and a lot of work still to be done before the act can be fully implemented, not the least of which is the creation of extensive regulations to give content to the system.”
A priority must be the drafting of regulations, said Quinot, which will help to arrive at more specific operational details such as permissible procurement methods or thresholds. “Those are important practical aspects that I hope we will get some sight of very soon, because for many procuring institutions, the changes that those detailed operational rules will bring about are going to be very important in terms of their own planning, operational systems, and standard operating procedures.”
There are other issues that must be clarified with urgency, he said, such as the constitutionality of the PPA, which is also the subject of a Western Cape challenge.
Western Cape premier Alan Winde last month said the Public Procurement Act is unconstitutional, and urged that consultations take place to address his concerns, particularly the preferential procurement provisions such as set-asides for the historically disadvantaged, mandatory subcontracting and local procurement in designated sectors if feasible.
“We firmly believe that the act in its current form does not pass constitutional muster as it usurps the autonomy of provinces and municipalities in adopting their own preferential procurement policies,” Winde said in a statement.
“The act will impose significant costs on the procurement process as well add to the administrative burden involved in procurement — it will be a handbrake on all systems and processes. This in turn will affect service delivery at a time when we as the provincial government are doing everything, we canto improve services for our residents,” Winde said.
- TAGS
- Armscor
- National Treasury
- Public Procurement Act
- South Africa
(Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
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