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19 Jun 24. Haiti: Progress on support mission negotiations points to likely deployment in coming months. On 18 June, Haitian National Police (PNH) leaders met with Kenyan police officials ahead of the deployment of the Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission. The deployment continues to face delays due to judicial irregularities in Kenya, poor government stability in Haiti and a lack of funding. However, according to reports on 18 June, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken unlocked USD 109 m in funding blocked by Republican lawmakers. The meetings of the police chiefs and the unlocking of the funding point to gradual progress in the MSS’ deployment. The MSS will face a humanitarian crisis due to gang violence; around 580,000 people in Haiti are internally displaced and almost half the population are facing acute hunger. We assess that the MSS will likely deploy in the coming months. The MSS will likely decrease the risk of attacks and marginally ameliorate the humanitarian situation in the long term, though it is unlikely to reduce overall organised and violent crime rates. (Source: Sibylline)
19 Jun 24. CAR-Sudan: Conflict spillover will sustain instability, drive attack, kidnap, crime risks. On 18 June, the UN Security Council (UNSC) met to deliberate recent developments in the conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The meeting comes after a panel of UN experts published a report on 14 June warning of air raids by the SAF in the Central African Republic (CAR)’s border areas while the RSF uses the country as a ‘supply line’ to recruit from armed groups. The RSF currently controls the Am Dafok border crossing, which is likely to increase the flow of arms between both countries. The crossing also allows armed groups to use Sudanese territory to launch attacks into Vakaga State (CAR). With the conflict in Sudan likely to persist through 2024, this dynamic will likely empower rebel groups in CAR, sustaining instability and reducing the government’s capacity to secure control over border areas. We assess this will elevate the exposure of staff to attacks, kidnap and violent crime, particularly humanitarian staff supporting displaced communities. (Source: Sibylline)
19 Jun 24. Japan and New Zealand agreed Wednesday in principle on an intelligence sharing pact as their leaders shared concerns over the increasingly challenging security environment in the region, including closer ties between Russia and North Korea.
In a joint statement, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and his New Zealand counterpart Christopher Luxon expressed concern about rising tension in the South China Sea, where China has become increasingly assertive in pressing its territorial claims.
Kishida and Luxon “welcomed the agreement in principle of an information security agreement” to facilitate classified information sharing, according to the statement released by Japan’s Foreign Ministry.
The two leaders also agreed to accelerate talks toward signing a pact that would allow the two countries’ forces to share logistical support and supplies during bilateral training and other operations.
Under Japan’s 2022 national security strategy the country has been accelerating military buildup and expanding defense partnerships amid threats from China, North Korea and Russia.
Kishida and Luxon condemned “in the strongest possible terms” the increasing military cooperation between North Korea and Russia, including the North’s shipment to Russia of ballistic missiles used against Ukraine, the joint statement said.
“There is no more important time than right now for our two countries to be engaging together to understand and to respond to the serious regional issues in Japan’s neighborhood,” Luxon told a joint news conference after the talks. He said the two leaders discussed Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Pyongyang and “how North Korea is fueling Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine.”
Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un on Wednesday signed an agreement that pledged mutual aid if either country faces “aggression,” at a summit held at a time both face escalating standoffs from the West.
Putin’s visit was his first in 24 years as the United States and its allies expressed growing concerns over a possible arms arrangement in which Pyongyang provides Moscow with badly needed munitions for its war in Ukraine, in exchange for economic assistance and technology transfers that could enhance the threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile program.
Japan has signed similar intelligence agreements with eight other countries including the United States, Australia, Britain, India and South Korea, as well as with NATO. Japan is also negotiating with Canada over a similar deal and has agreed with Ukraine to start talks.
(Source: Defense News Early Bird/AP)
20 Jun 24. China: Efforts to eradicate corruption within military highlight deficiencies in PLA’s reliability. On 19 June, President Xi Jinping attended a Central Military Commission (CMC) political work conference in Yan’an (Shaanxi province). The conference focused on enforcing loyalty to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and eliminating corruption within the military. The meeting took place ahead of the Third Plenum, a significant CCP conclave set for July. It came amid a widespread anti-corruption drive in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) that has been ongoing since 2023, and which has seen the removal of nine generals and several aerospace defence executives. The former defence minister Li Shangfu was also ousted amid corruption allegations. During the conference, Xi emphasised the need for the PLA to remain loyal to the party and called for efforts to eradicate corruption, ordering senior cadres to oversee this process. He reiterated his commitment to transforming the PLA into a world-class military by 2027. However, the ongoing reforms will possibly impede this modernisation effort, albeit temporarily, as it has brought to light deficiencies in the PLA’s reliability. We assess that these issues will likely diminish the likelihood of China undertaking major military actions in the near future. (Source: Sibylline)
20 Jun 24. Nigeria: Jihadist expansion into northern region points to rising security, regional stability threats. On 19 June, the Netherlands-based Clingendael Institute published a report showing that Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) militants have likely established a presence in Nigeria’s Kainji Lake National Park (Kwara and Niger states). Although JNIM is primarily active in Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali, it also conducts semi-regular cross-border raids into Benin and Togo. JNIM’s presence in the park highlights the elevated likelihood of militant activity diffusing across the Benin-Nigeria border. In the coming months, JNIM will likely leverage this position to expand its regional territorial presence, as well as to conduct training exercises and engage in cross-border drugs and precious metals smuggling, undermining border security. There is also a realistic possibility that JNIM will attempt to bolster its international profile and facilitate local recruitment through increased collaboration with local pastoral armed groups. Despite this presence, we assess that an imminent uptick in JNIM attacks in Nigeria is unlikely, with banditry likely remaining the most significant threat facing business operations and overland movement in northern Nigeria. (Source: Sibylline)
20 Jun 24. South Africa: GNU cabinet appointments represent flashpoints for possible government instability. On 19 June, Cyril Ramaphosa was inaugurated for his second term as president after forming a government of national unity (GNU; see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 18 June 2024). In the coming six weeks, President Ramaphosa will appoint cabinet members and distribute portfolios. The Democratic Alliance (DA) party expects to receive five cabinet posts, though possible dissatisfaction with the distribution of political offices will likely create rifts and elevate inter-party tensions, increasing the risk of early policy stagnation. Additionally, if President Ramaphosa uses constitutional discretion to reappoint former defence and international relations ministers Thandi Modise and Naledi Pandor from outside the National Assembly, we assess that this will likely also elevate tensions. Additionally, if African National Congress (ANC) members believe the DA is being favoured within the cabinet, the risk of an internal rebellion will build, elevating the threats to government stability. (Source: Sibylline)
20 Jun 24. Philippines: Vice president’s resignation from cabinet will drive stability concerns in medium term. On 19 June, Vice President Sara Duterte resigned from her posts of education secretary and head of an anti-insurgency body. She remains vice president but has quit the cabinet of President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. Duterte, stating that this was ‘not because of weakness but because of true concern for teachers and the youth’. In recent months, there has been a growing rift between Marcos and Rodrigo Duterte, including over foreign policy and anti-drug campaigns. Last week, both Sara and Rodrigo criticised Marcos’ government for using excessive force to arrest one of their supporters. Relations between Marcos and Sara Duterte now appear to be completely frayed following her resignation. This dynamic will likely drive moderate stability risks during the 2025 mid-term elections, during which their respective parties are expected to compete against each other. Marcos is ineligible to run for re-election in 2028, with Sara Duterte a possible candidate to succeed him. However, in the immediate term, we assess that policy continuity is likely, as the vice president’s position is largely ceremonial; this includes in foreign policy and defence, where Manila is facing increasing aggression from China in the South China Sea. (Source: Sibylline)
20 Jun 24. Armenia-Azerbaijan: New constitution proposal will likely lower regional tensions, drive unrest. On 19 June, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan reportedly instructed the government to draft a new constitution to facilitate its approval by the Constitutional Council by 30 December 2026. In January, Pashinyan expressed his willingness to adopt a new constitution which removes constitutional provisions that implicitly support the unification of Armenia with Nagorno-Karabakh, which is now under Azerbaijani control. The announcement proposal comes in the context of Azerbaijani pressure on Armenia to remove such provisions as a condition for a peace deal. The move underscores Pashinyan’s efforts to reach a peace deal and lower regional tensions. There is a realistic possibility that the new draft of the constitution will also remove provisions that denounce Turkey’s role in what many believe amounted to an Armenian genocide in 1915. As such, the move will likely facilitate ongoing peace talks with Azerbaijan and mitigate regional tensions. However, we assess that these steps will highly likely exacerbate anti-government sentiment and nationalist unrest risks, which are already significant.(Source: Sibylline)
20 Jun 24. Georgia: Impasse on EU membership aspirations will likely sustain domestic unrest risks. On 19 June, the EU’s ambassador to Georgia, Paweł Herczyńsky, stated that the country’s adoption of controversial foreign agent legislation has effectively ‘frozen’ Georgia’s bid to join the bloc. Herczyńsky disclosed that the EU will discuss the consequences of the law next week. According to the ambassador, any decision to open accession talks with Georgia hinges on the approval of EU member states, some of which previously asserted that they would not support Georgia’s EU membership bid if the government enacts the foreign agent law. Georgia’s parliament overruled a presidential veto and adopted the law on 28 May amid domestic and international backlash (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 13 May 2024). Strong pro-EU sentiment among the Georgian population will likely sustain domestic unrest risks in the coming weeks. The start of EU accession talks with Moldova and Ukraine (most likely on 25 June) will possibly represent a flashpoint for protest activity in Georgia, including in the capital Tbilisi and other major urban centres.(Source: Sibylline)
20 Jun 24. Bangladesh-India: Prime minister’s visit to New Delhi will likely strengthen defence, economic ties. Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina will visit New Delhi (India) on 21-22 June, where she will meet Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and take part in delegation-level talks. Her visit is likely to focus on issues such as cross-border connectivity and defence, as well as trade and energy security. Given Bangladesh’s dwindling foreign exchange reserves, Dhaka is also likely to seek a loan from New Delhi as part of a new framework, as it is struggling to adhere to existing loan conditions. India’s investment in the Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project will also likely be discussed. China previously expressed interest in the development of the project, which involves setting up reservoirs and constructing townships along the river. India is also likely to show interest in managing Mongla Port, as it aligns with its broader strategy of countering increasing Chinese influence in the region. We assess that successful discussions and signed agreements on these projects will strengthen bilateral ties between the two countries. However, they will likely complicate Bangladesh’s efforts in navigating geostrategic competition between India and China. (Source: Sibylline)
21 Jun 24. Philippines-US: Washington DC reaffirms support for Manila amid rising tensions in South China Sea. On 20 June, the Philippines’ Secretary of Foreign Affairs Enrique Manalo and his US counterpart Antony Blinken discussed the latest developments in the South China Sea. Blinken emphasised Washington DC’s ‘ironclad commitments to the Philippines under our Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT)’. On 17 June, China Coast Guard (CCG) vessels disrupted a Philippine re-supply mission to the grounded BRP Sierra Madre in the disputed Second Thomas Shoal; the CCG vessels rammed Philippine inflatable boats, while bladed weapons were used to strike the boats. One Filipino soldier reportedly lost a thumb. The MDT, signed in 1951, posits that either side will come to the aid of the other if it is attacked. In April, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. claimed that if any Filipino serviceperson were killed in an attack by a foreign power, Manila would invoke the MDT. In light of the recent developments, we assess that joint exercises between the US and the Philippines will likely increase (security co-operation has already ramped up significantly under Marcos Jr). (Source: Sibylline)
21 Jun 24. Burkina Faso: Increasing jihadist activity points to elevated insecurity, government instability risks. On 20 June, interim President Ibrahim Traore denied claims of a mutiny within the armed forces in a televised address. The denial comes after the al-Qaeda-aligned Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) attacked an army base in Mansila (Sahel region) on 11 June and killed over 100 Burkinabe soldiers. Local media outlets subsequently reported instances of gunfire and shelling near the presidential palace and state-run media offices in the capital Ouagadougou on 12 June, elevating concerns over a possible attempted mutiny within the armed forces. On 18 June, the junta suspended the French news outlet TV5’s operations in Burkina Faso for publishing ‘disinformation’, including reporting on the attack. These incidents highlight the military government’s increasing anxieties over threats to its stability amid the worsening security environment. Over the coming weeks, media outlets and staff will likely face elevated risks of harassment and detention as the junta attempts to limit coverage of potential threats to its stability. (Source: Sibylline)
21 Jun 24. China-Japan: New sanctions on entities supporting Russia’s war reflect elevated regional tensions. Earlier on 21 June, Japan announced new trade sanctions targeting 11 entities in China, India, Kazakhstan, the UAE and Uzbekistan for their support of Russia’s war in Ukraine. These measures mark the first instance of Japan imposing sanctions on Chinese companies due to their connections with the conflict, a significant policy shift. The sanctions include asset freezes and a prohibition on Japanese exports to certain companies. These include Hong Kong-based Asia Pacific Links Ltd and Yilufa Electronics Limited in Shenzhen (China), which have been involved in supplying semiconductors for Russian drones. This action follows sanctions imposed last month by Japan and South Korea against North Korean entities supplying weapons to Russia. Japan has adopted a notably firmer stance against Russia under Fumio Kishida compared to his predecessor Shinzo Abe’s more conciliatory approach. We assess there is a risk that Beijing will respond to the sanctions in a reciprocal manner. (Source: Sibylline)
21 Jun 24. Armenia-Palestinian Territories: Recognition of Palestine will moderately elevate regional tensions. Earlier on 21 June, the Armenian Foreign Ministry (MFA) released a statement announcing its recognition of Palestinian statehood. The MFA noted that Yerevan categorically rejects the targeting of civilian infrastructure, violence against civilians and the taking civilians hostage during armed conflict and called for their unconditional release. According to the ministry, Armenia supports a ‘two-state’ solution to the Israel-Palestine issue, underscoring that it believes this is the only way to ensure that both populations can ‘fulfil their legitimate aspirations’. Neighbouring Azerbaijan, with whom Armenia is attempting to broker its own peace deal, enjoys close ties with Israel and has attempted to adopt a balanced approach to the ongoing Israel-Hamas war. Notably, Azerbaijan supplies Israel approximately 40% of its oil demands, while Baku receives almost 70% of its weapons from Israel. Such military assistance has highly likely strained Armenian-Israeli ties. We assess that Yerevan’s decision to recognise Palestine as a state will likely moderately raise regional tensions with Azerbaijan and Israel in the coming months and possibly deepen Armenian-Iranian ties, though major pro- or anti-Israeli unrest is less likely. (Source: Sibylline)
21 Jun 24. Colombia: Government stability, unrest risks will likely remain elevated despite debt ceiling increase. On 20 June, lawmakers approved a request from President Gustavo Petro to increase Colombia’s debt ceiling to USD 17.6 bn. This will allow Colombia to comply with its debt payments and finance new development plans. However, according to Finance Minister Ricardo Bonilla, the debt ceiling increase will raise the annual budget deficit to USD 1.37 bn in FY2024. In May, Petro asserted that Colombia would enter a fiscal crisis if the debt ceiling was not raised. Following the announcement of the new fiscal cap, financial analysts have indicated that Colombia remains unlikely to meet its fiscal rule due to ambitious reforms that will increase government expenditure on healthcare and pensions. In the short-to-medium term, we assess that inflationary and tax pressures are likely to increase in response to Colombia’s growing deficit. As socio-economic pressures increase, domestic unrest and government stability risks are likely to remain elevated in the long term. (Source: Sibylline)
21 Jun 24. U.S. and China hold first informal nuclear talks in 5 years, eyeing Taiwan. The United States and China resumed semi-official nuclear arms talks in March for the first time in five years, with Beijing’s representatives telling U.S. counterparts that they would not resort to atomic threats over Taiwan, according to two American delegates who attended.
The Chinese representatives offered reassurances after their U.S. interlocutors raised concerns that China might use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons if it faced defeat in a conflict over Taiwan. Beijing views the democratically governed island as its territory, a claim rejected by the government in Taipei.
“They told the U.S. side that they were absolutely convinced that they are able to prevail in a conventional fight over Taiwan without using nuclear weapons,” said scholar David Santoro, the U.S. organiser of the Track Two talks, the details of which are being reported by Reuters for the first time.
Participants in Track Two talks are generally former officials and academics who can speak with authority on their government’s position, even if they are not directly involved with setting it. Government-to-government negotiations are known as Track One.
Washington was represented by about half a dozen delegates, including former officials and scholars at the two-day discussions, which took place in a Shanghai hotel conference room.
Beijing sent a delegation of scholars and analysts, which included several former People’s Liberation Army officers.
A State Department spokesperson said in response to Reuters’ questions that Track Two talks could be “beneficial”. The department did not participate in the March meeting though it was aware of it, the spokesperson said.
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Such discussions cannot replace formal negotiations “that require participants to speak authoritatively on issues that are often highly compartmentalized within (Chinese) government circles,” the spokesperson said.
Members of the Chinese delegation and Beijing’s defence ministry did not respond to requests for comment.
The informal discussions between the nuclear-armed powers took place with the U.S. and China at odds over major economic and geopolitical issues, with leaders in Washington and Beijing accusing each other of dealing in bad faith.
The two countries briefly resumed Track One talks over nuclear arms in November but those negotiations have since stalled, with a top U.S. official publicly expressing frustration at China’s responsiveness.
The Pentagon, which estimates that Beijing’s nuclear arsenal increased by more than 20% between 2021 and 2023, said in October that China “would also consider nuclear use to restore deterrence if a conventional military defeat in Taiwan” threatened CCP rule.
China has never renounced the use of force to bring Taiwan under its control and has over the past four years stepped up military activity around the island.
The Track Two talks are part of a two-decade nuclear weapons and posture dialogue that stalled after the Trump administration pulled funding in 2019.
After the COVID-19 pandemic, semi-official discussions resumed on broader security and energy issues, but only the Shanghai meeting dealt in detail with nuclear weapons and posture.
Santoro, who runs the Hawaii-based Pacific Forum think-tank, described “frustrations” on both sides during the latest discussions but said the two delegations saw reason to continue talking. More discussions were being planned in 2025, he said.
Nuclear policy analyst William Alberque of the Henry Stimson Centre think-tank, who was not involved in the March discussions, said the Track Two negotiations were useful at a time of glacial U.S.-Chinese relations.
“It’s important to continue talking with China with absolutely no expectations,” he said, when nuclear arms are at issue.
NO FIRST-USE?
The U.S. Department of Defense estimated last year that Beijing has 500 operational nuclear warheads and will probably field more than 1,000 by 2030.
That compares to 1,770 and 1,710 operational warheads deployed by the U.S. and Russia respectively. The Pentagon said that by 2030, much of Beijing’s weapons will likely be held at higher readiness levels.
Since 2020, China has also modernised its arsenal, starting production of its next-generation ballistic missile submarine, testing hypersonic glide vehicle warheads and conducting regular nuclear-armed sea patrols.
Weapons on land, in the air and at sea give China the “nuclear triad” – a hallmark of a major nuclear power.
A key point the U.S. side wanted to discuss, according to Santoro, was whether China still stood by its no-first-use and minimal deterrence policies, which date from the creation of its first nuclear bomb in the early 1960s.
Minimal deterrence refers to having just enough atomic weapons to dissuade adversaries.
China is also one of two nuclear powers – the other being India – to have pledged not to initiate a nuclear exchange. Chinese military analysts have speculated that the no-first-use policy is conditional – and that nuclear arms could be used against Taiwan’s allies – but it remains Beijing’s stated stance.
Santoro said the Chinese delegates told U.S. representatives that Beijing maintained these policies and that “‘we are not interested in reaching nuclear parity with you, let alone superiority.'”
“‘Nothing has changed, business as usual, you guys are exaggerating’,” Santoro said in summarising Beijing’s position.
His description of the discussions was corroborated by fellow U.S. delegate Lyle Morris, a security scholar at the Asia Society Policy Institute.
A report on the discussions is being prepared for U.S. government but would not be made public, Santoro said. (Source: Reuters)
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