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13 Jun 24. Burkina Faso takes over from Afghanistan as most terrorism-affected country. Last year Burkina Faso surpassed Afghanistan as the country most impacted by terrorism, with nearly 2 000 deaths as the global terrorism epicentre shifts from the Middle East into the Sahel.
This is according to a new report by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP). Its Global Terrorism Index 2024 recorded 1 907 terrorism-related deaths and 442 injured last year.
Deaths from terrorism have increased successively each year since 2014 when no deaths were recorded. Deaths surged from 1 135 in 2022 to 1 907 in 2023, a 68% increase, despite a nearly 16% decline in the number of attacks last year. This is the second consecutive year that over a thousand people were killed in terrorist attacks in Burkina Faso.
The increase in deaths coincided with an increased frequency of civilians being targeted, with civilians now comprising over half of victims.
Northwestern Burkina Faso, near the country’s borders with Niger and Mali, experienced the most terror attacks, accounting for almost half of all attacks in 2023. Of the country’s 1 907 deaths in 2023, 1 000 occurred along the Niger border in Centre-Nord and Est. Burkina Faso’s deadliest attack of 2023 occurred in this area. In February, at least 71 soldiers were killed in the ambush. Security forces claimed to have killed 160 assailants in the fight, with Islamic State (IS) claiming responsibility for the attack. This was the fifth deadliest attack in the world in 2023, the IEP noted.
Civilians were the most targeted group for the fifth consecutive year, accounting for 1 132 deaths or over 59% of all terror-related deaths in the country. This is an increase of more than 56% when compared to the year prior, when 725 civilians were killed.
Jamaat Nusrat Al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM) continues to be the most prominent terrorist group in Burkina Faso, although attacks remained static over the period, deaths increased almost fivefold, from 134 in 2022 to 616 in 2023. This resulted in a rise in the lethality of their attacks in Burkina Faso, averaging nearly 20 deaths per attack, a significant increase from 3.9 deaths per attack in 2022.
“Islamic State also increased its activity in Burkina Faso, claiming responsibility for seven attacks compared to two in the previous year. Although the overall number of IS attacks in the country remains relatively low, deaths did increase significantly, surpassing 100 for the first time with 174 deaths attributed to the group,” the GTI stated.
The report assessed it is highly likely that the number of deaths both groups were responsible for is significantly higher, as 85% of attacks and 59% of deaths in the country were attributed to unknown jihadist groups. This puts Burkina Faso amongst the countries with the highest rate of unclaimed terrorist attacks and deaths globally.
Burkina Faso’s deterioration in the 2024 GTI mirrors its poor performance in the 2023 Global Peace Index with the country recording the largest deterioration in peacefulness in sub-Saharan Africa. The formation of the Alliance of Sahel States, a collaboration between Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, represents the regions effort to combat terrorism. In January 2024, this alliance withdrew from ECOWAS. The alliance formed after the French and UN troop withdrawals. Given the successive years of escalating violence and the uncertain political situation, Burkina Faso is likely to experience further increases in terrorism, the IEP determined. (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
12 Jun 24. SANDF to remain in austere mode until funding flow improves. SA Army troops deployed to DR Congo as part of a UN peacekeeping mission.
After three ministers of defence and military veterans, the 2012 South African Defence review, renamed in 2015 and approved by the National Assembly (NA), National Council of Provinces (NCOP) and Cabinet, remains a work in progress hamstrung by a lack of funding.
This is made clear in the 2024 Department of Defence (DoD) Annual Performance Plan (APP) for the current calendar year which notes, among others, interventions and deliverables remain dependent on “consistent improvement in the defence baseline funding allocation”. On implementation the APP has it a sustainable defence policy option would need 1.8% of GDP (Gross Domestic Product) in 2014 Rand terms. Today, defence spending accounts for about .8% of GDP.
The revised 2024 Annual Performance Plan maps out five strategic planning milestones it sees as foundations to develop resourced defence capabilities via a DoD “extended long term defence development plan”.
To date only the first milestone – the situation in the DoD as of 2017 – has been reached with number two – arresting the decline in critical capabilities through immediate and direct interventions – remaining dependent on “consistent improvement” in funding ex National Treasury (NT).
As far as Defence Review work packages are concerned one and two are ticked off. They go about organisational and efficiency interventions and “functional strategic intents, strategies and plans”. Work package one also had to explore “possible” additional funding to assist implementation of Defence Review recommendations.
Work package three – capital interventions, priority support systems to ensure current operational force levels can be maintained – will not work without funding and work package four – capital interventions for priority capabilities – is in the same boat. The APP has it “the SANDF (SA National Defence Force) will not be able to increase force levels to the required level if the deliverables are not funded”. It gives the border safeguarding tasking Operation Corona as an example, pointing out the number of “landward sub-units” (companies) will not be increased from the current 15 to 22 a year as envisaged.
“Deliverables” to keep South Africa’s defence capabilities properly maintained and in good working order is a necessity for work package five. If it isn’t funded, the APP has it, the SANDF will not be able to maintain the required core conventional capabilities.
More nails in the coffin follow.
One has it due to “RSA fiscal challenges” and declining year-on-year defence baseline allocations, it hasn’t been possible to implement the plan to arrest the decline in and of the SANDF. “Not only has the fiscal allocation not realised, the year-on-year reductions have exacerbated the defence decline resulting in cost-driven and non-cost interventions not being realised and/or compromised”.
“Envisaged implementation of the 2015 Defence Review during the current 2019-2024 MTSF (medium term strategic framework) and 2024/25 medium term expenditure framework (MTEF) remains predominantly unachievable, within the context of marginal progressive allocations to the defence baseline during this period.”
“Hence, during the 2024/25 MTEF, the execution of the resourced defence mandate will be pursued through the execution of prioritised sustainable missions whilst providing value to the people of South Africa as a Developmental State,” the APP stated.
Continentally, President Cyril Ramaphosa’s administration has committed the SANDF to three missions, the newest being SAMIDRC (Southern African Development Community Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo). SA military personnel and equipment are presently in Mozambique, where Operation Vikela is part of SAMIM (Southern African Development Community Mission in Mozambique), due to end in July with the third deployment in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) as part of the United Nations mission MONUSCO due to end in December.
Some good news from the APP is that, “during the period of this Plan, the department, in support of the Executive Authority, and in consultation with identified stakeholders and the National Executive, will consider an evaluation and revision of the SA Defence Review 2015 in the context of current fiscal realities, with a supporting action plan that will inform a sustainable and resourced defence strategic trajectory, force generation guidelines and a defence industry policy and strategy.”
(Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
12 Jun 24. Afghanistan: Al-Qaeda’s call to target Western entities highlights continued militant presence, threat. On 11 June, international news outlets reported that al-Qaeda’s leader in Afghanistan, Saif al-Adl, issued a call for foreign fighters worldwide to move to Afghanistan and join the group. Adl recently released a pamphlet encouraging individuals to undergo training and gain knowledge on how to carry out attacks against ‘Zionists’ and Western targets. This comes as the Taliban government in Afghanistan has been increasing its international engagement, partly to minimise security concerns. It has repeatedly made assurances that it will not allow the country to become a safe haven for terrorist groups. Al-Qaeda’s current capacity is not clear following the death of its former leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, in a US drone strike in the capital Kabul in 2022. The Taliban and al-Qaeda are also assessed to maintain ‘close’ ties according to a UN report earlier this year. We assess that the security threat emanating from Afghanistan, particularly from al-Qaeda and the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) due to their alleged ties to the Taliban, will continue to weaken the Taliban government’s relationships with the West and certain regional countries. This is also likely to hinder the flow of international aid, exacerbating humanitarian risks. (Source: Sibylline)
12 Jun 24. Russian Naval Forces Simulate Missile Strikes in Atlantic During Cuba Transit. Russian warships, including the Admiral Gorshkov frigate and the Kazan nuclear-powered submarine, conducted military exercises in the Atlantic Ocean while en route to Cuba. The Russian Defense Ministry announced on Tuesday that the drills simulated a missile strike on a group of enemy ships using computer simulations, targeting vessels over 600 kilometers away.
The Admiral Gorshkov, equipped with Zircon hypersonic missiles, was a focal point of the exercise. The missiles, lauded by Russian President Vladimir Putin, are capable of reaching speeds nine times faster than sound and have a range exceeding 1,000 kilometers. Putin has promoted the Zircon as a significant advancement capable of penetrating existing missile defenses.
As the Russian vessels head towards Havana, U.S. naval and aerial assets, including the USS Truxtun and USS Donald Cook destroyers, have been observed shadowing the flotilla. Surveillance by aircraft such as the U.S. Navy P-8A Poseidon and Canadian CP-140 Aurora has also been noted.
The Russian Defense Ministry stated that the deployment to Cuba reflects “historically friendly relations” between Russia and Cuba. The Cuban Foreign Ministry confirmed that the warships, which also include the fleet oil tanker Pashin and the rescue tug Nikolay Chiker, will be in Havana from Wednesday until June 17. The ministry assured that none of the visiting ships would carry nuclear weapons and emphasized that their presence does not pose a threat to regional stability.
A U.S. State Department spokesperson indicated that the United States expects increased Russian naval and air activity in the region, culminating in a global Russian naval exercise this fall. Despite the increased activity, the Pentagon has stated that these movements pose no direct threat to the United States and are considered routine naval operations.
The presence of Russian warships in the Caribbean, including potential port calls in Cuba and possibly Venezuela, is not unprecedented. Russian naval visits to the region occurred regularly between 2013 and 2020. However, this particular visit comes at a time of heightened geopolitical tensions, following increased NATO support for Ukraine and recent U.S. approvals for Ukraine to use American weapons against targets within Russian borders. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
11 Jun 24. Prepare for more pronounced external threat, Philippine president warns. The Philippine military must begin preparations for “more pronounced external threat”, according to President Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr.
President Marcos made the comments while addressing members of the Philippine Army’s Fifth Infantry Division at Camp Melchor dela Cruz in Gamu, Isabela, on 10 June.
The Philippines must be prepared to face more pronounced external threats as a result of the heightened geopolitical tension in the Indo-Pacific, he said during the speech. In addition, President Marcos said the Philippines’ proximity to Taiwan puts it in China’s area of interest.
“And that is why – the external threat now has become more pronounced, has become more worrisome. And that is why we have to prepare,” President Marcos told the members of the 5th ID.
“So, that is the mission that you have before you. Now, you have two missions, whereas before it was only internal security.”
“We are not trying to take territory. We are not trying to redraw the lines of sovereign territory, the EEZ, the baseline … not even one inch.
The Armed Forces of the Philippines must be supplied with equipment, training and facilities to make it a highly capable force, he said.
Soldiers assigned to the Philippine Army’s 7th Infantry Division and US Army’s 25th Combat Aviation Brigade recently conducted an air assault manoeuvre during Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center-Exportable (JPMRC-X) exercises taking place at Fort Magsaysay, Philippines, from 1 to 10 June.
During the exercise, 25th CAB pilots landed CH-47 Chinook and UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters while 7th ID soldiers exited from the vessels and took defensive positions to secure the perimeter before the helicopters quickly departed.
“This exercise is very crucial to our troops because this is our first time being in this type of exercise. We are glad that our troops have their own experiences on how to conduct air assaults,” said Philippine Army Captain Pedric Lumantis, an OC/T for the Philippine Army.
“We appreciate that the US Army was all over this exercise with all the support the Philippines Army needed. They are always sharing their knowledge with us and this is very important to us.”
The JPMRC-X is a Department of the Army initiative consisting of a deployable package of personnel and equipment designed to support training exercises across the Pacific. This iteration of JPMRC-X marks the first deployment to the Philippines, which will enable and assist the Philippine Army and the Armed Forces of the Philippines in building combat training centre locations within the Philippines.
“JPMRC-X sets us up for success while working alongside allied nations because it allows us to see where our counterparts are to help develop and coach by observing what they do to no change anything but to add to their toolbox,” US Army Sgt. 1st Class Vonnell Diggs, adviser to the Philippine Army OC/Ts, said.
The training executed between the US Army and Philippine Army prepare the troops to respond jointly to potential future crises, contingencies, and natural disasters.
Earlier this year, defence ministers from Australia and the Philippines met at the Philippine-Australia defense ministers formal bilateral meeting during the 21st International Institute for Strategic Studies Shangri-La Dialogue on 3 June.
“Our relations with the Philippines are at their high point. We very much welcome this development,” Deputy Prime Minister Richard Marles said.
(Source: Defence Connect)
11 Jun 24. Global Peace Index reveals highest number of countries engaged in conflict since Second World War. Today marks the launch of the 18th edition of the Global Peace Index (GPI) from international think-tank, the Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP), revealing that the world is at a crossroads. Without concerted effort, there is a risk of a surge in major conflicts.
Key results
- 97 countries deteriorated in peacefulness, more than any year since the inception of the Global Peace Index in 2008.
- Conflicts in Gaza and Ukraine were the primary drivers of the global fall in peacefulness, as battle deaths reached 162,000 in 2023.
- 92 countries are currently involved in conflicts beyond their borders, more than at any time since the inception of the GPI.
- First of its kind military scoring system suggests that US military capabilities are up to three times higher than China.
- The global economic impact of violence increased to $19.1trn in 2023, representing 13.5% of global GDP. Exposure to conflict poses a significant supply chain risk for governments and businesses.
- Militarisation recorded its largest yearly deterioration since the inception of the GPI, with 108 countries becoming more militarised.
- 110m people are either refugees or internally displaced due to violent conflict, with 16 countries now hosting more than half a m refugees.
- North America saw the largest regional deterioration, driven by increases in violent crime and fear of violence.
There are currently 56 conflicts, the most since World War II. They have become more international with 92 countries involved in conflicts outside their borders, the most since the GPI’s inception. The rising number of minor conflicts increases the likelihood of more major conflicts in the future. For example, in 2019, Ethiopia, Ukraine, and Gaza were all identified as minor conflicts.
Last year recorded 162,000 conflict related deaths. This was the second highest toll in the past 30 years, with the conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza accounting for nearly three-quarters of deaths. Ukraine represented more than half, recording 83,000 conflict deaths, with estimates of at least 33,000 for Palestine up to April 2024. In the first four months of 2024, conflict related deaths globally amounted to 47,000. If the same rate continues for the rest of this year, it would be the highest number of conflict deaths since the Rwandan genocide in 1994.
The global economic impact of violence in 2023 was $19.1 trillion or $2,380 per person. This is an increase of $158 bn, driven largely by a 20% increase in GDP losses from conflict. Expenditure on peacebuilding and peacekeeping totalled $49.6 bn, representing less than 0.6% of total military spending.
Iceland remains the most peaceful country, a position it has held since 2008, followed by Ireland, Austria, New Zealand, and Singapore – a new entrant in the top five. Yemen has replaced Afghanistan as the least peaceful country in the world. It is followed by Sudan, South Sudan, Afghanistan, and Ukraine.
The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) remains the least peaceful region. It is home to four of the ten least peaceful countries in the world and the two least peaceful, Sudan and Yemen. Despite this, the UAE recorded the largest improvement in peacefulness in the region – rising 31 places to 53rd in 2024.
Although most indicators of peacefulness deteriorated over the past 18 years, there was an improvement in the homicide rate which fell in 112 countries, while perceptions of criminality improved in 96 countries.
Steve Killelea, Founder & Executive Chairman of IEP, said: “Over the past decade, peacefulness has declined in nine out of the ten years. We are witnessing a record number of conflicts, a rise in militarisation, and heightened international strategic competition. Conflict negatively affects the global economy, and business risk from conflict has never been higher, compounding the current global economic vulnerabilities.
“It is imperative for governments and businesses worldwide to intensify their efforts to resolve the many minor conflicts before they escalate into larger crises. It’s been 80 years since the end of WWII, and the current crises underscore the urgency for world leaders to commit to investing in resolving these conflicts.”
Changing nature of conflicts
As conflicts become more widespread and more internationalised, increasing complexity reduces the likelihood of achieving lasting solutions. Ukraine and Gaza are examples of ongoing historical grievances or ‘forever wars’ without clear resolutions. The number of conflicts resulting in a decisive victory for either side has fallen from 49% in the 1970s, to less than 9% in the 2010s. Over the same period, the number of conflicts that ended through peace agreements fell from 23% to just over 4%.
Another key factor reshaping conflict is the impact of asymmetric warfare technology, making it much easier for non-state groups, as well as smaller or less powerful states, to compete in conflicts with larger states or governments. The number of states using drones rose from 16 to 40, a 150% increase between 2018 and 2023. Over the same period, the number of non-state groups which committed at least one drone attack rose from 6 to 91, an increase of over 1,400%.
Middle East tensions
Due to the Gaza war, Israel’s ranking fell to an all-time low of 155th, the largest deterioration in peacefulness in the 2024 GPI. However, over the past decade Palestine has witnessed the largest deterioration, slipping to 145th. Highlighting the growing tensions, Israeli media stories with a negative sentiment towards Palestinians increased from just over 30% in 1999 to 92% in early 2023, while stories with negative sentiment by Palestinian media towards Israelis increased from just under 30% in 1999 to 85% in early 2023.
The conflict has also thrown the entire Middle East region into crisis, involving Syria, Iran, Lebanon and Yemen, with the economic consequences mounting and a high risk of open warfare. A further broadening of the conflict would severely impact the global economy, potentially triggering a worldwide recession. Highlighting the point, Syria’s economy shrunk by more than 85% after the start of the civil war in 2011, and the Ukrainian economy shrunk by 29% in the year after the onset of the conflict in 2022.
Global military capability
Since the start of the Ukraine war, militarisation has increased in 91 countries, reversing the trend of the prior 15 years. Given the forward commitments of many countries to military spending, it is unlikely to improve in the coming years.
Changes in the dynamics of warfare have seen troop numbers decrease while technological sophistication has increased. Over the last decade, 100 countries reduced their armed forces personnel, while global military capability increased by over 10%.
First of its kind research by IEP calculates the military capability of countries by combining military sophistication, technology, and combat readiness. It reveals that the US has substantially higher military capability than China, which is closely followed by Russia. Traditional approaches to measuring military capability generally count the number of military assets only.
Regional highlights
- Europe remains the most peaceful region, however, it recorded its largest year on year increase in military expenditure since the GPI’s inception.
- North America recorded the largest regional deterioration in peacefulness with a drop of just under 5%. Both the US and Canada saw significant falls, primarily driven by increases in violent crime and fear of violence.
- Sub-Saharan Africa is now the second least peaceful region behind MENA as it faces several security crises – most notably increasing political unrest and terrorism in the Central Sahel.
- Asia-Pacific remains the second most peaceful region with a slight decline in peacefulness. Papua New Guinea recorded the worst deterioration in the region, caused by intensified tribal violence from disputes over territory and land ownership.
- Central America and the Caribbean experienced a minor decline in peacefulness, as countries like Haiti battled high levels of organised crime and civil unrest. Despite this, El Salvador recorded the world’s most significant peace improvement.
- South America experienced the second largest fall in peacefulness with a deterioration of 3.6%. The largest changes occurred for the Homicide Rate, Political Terror Scale, and Intensity of Internal Conflict indicators. (Source: PR Newswire)
11 Jun 24. Somalia: Intercommunal violence is likely to persist, weakening efforts to combat al-Shabaab. On 10 June, local officials confirmed that clashes between the Dir and Marihan clans killed at least 55 people and injured another 155 between 8 and 9 June in the towns of Abudwaq and Herale (Galmudug state) over grazing land and watering points. The two clans had previously cooperated alongside government troops in successful operations which reduced al-Shabaab territorial control in central Somalia. However, the government has not followed this military success with sufficient economic support, driving tensions between clans still recovering from five consecutive failed rains between 2020 and 2022, driving intercommunal competition for resources. Limited government capacity to address these economic challenges will sustain the risk of sporadic violence in rural areas, elevating bystander risks to staff in central and southern Somalia. These tensions will also create opportunities for al-Shabaab expansion, undermining government efforts to secure decisive gains before African Union troops withdraw at the end of 2024, sustaining attack and kidnap risks, including in the capital Mogadishu. (Source: Sibylline)
11 Jun 24. Korean Peninsula: Armed conflict is unlikely in short term, despite warning shots. Earlier on 11 June, South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) announced that a group of North Korean troops working in the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) crossed the border into South Korea on 9 June. It stated that South Korea’s military ‘issued warning broadcasts and warning shots’, prompting the North Koreans to retreat. The JCS added that the intrusion was probably accidental since ‘border markers are hidden’ due to overgrown vegetation. Nonetheless, inter-Korean relations have worsened since South Korea formally abandoned peaceful unification as a goal in 2023. In recent weeks, North Korea launched several hundred balloons filled with rubbish and manure into South Korea. On 4 June, South Korea suspended a 2018 military agreement with North Korea, allowing it to conduct ‘drills along the military demarcation line’. On 10 June, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un’s sister, Kim Yo-jong, threatened ‘countermeasures’ if South Korea resumed loudspeaker propaganda broadcasts at the border. These latest events demonstrate a credible risk of an accidental escalation between the two countries, though we assess an armed conflict is unlikely in the short term. (Source: Sibylline)
10 Jun 24. Third Meeting of Nuclear Consultative Group Enhances U.S., South Korea Alliance, Deterrence. U.S. and South Korean officials today convened the third meeting of the Nuclear Consultative Group, where among other things, participants planned greater cooperation between the two nations and enhanced nuclear deterrence on the Korean Peninsula.
“Across the board, we’re making progress in the Nuclear Consultative Group,” said Richard C. Johnson, deputy assistant secretary of defense for nuclear and countering weapons of mass destruction policy. “Just the establishment of that group, I think, was very important to demonstrate how we are elevating the discussion that we’re having on nuclear deterrence issues, but the work that we’re doing is really key. Whether that’s from information sharing to joint planning and execution.”
Johnson spoke today at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.
At this meeting of the NCG, Johnson said, a “big outcome” was the signing out of a set of shared guidelines for the U.S. and South Korean alliance.
“These guidelines really serve as kind of the principles and procedures upon which the alliance will serve to really look at nuclear deterrence issues in terms of policy and posture,” Johnson said. “This will really be the foundation upon which we move forward in the NCG on U.S./ cooperation.”
According to a statement released today by the NCG, the guidelines provide principles and procedures for the U.S./South Korea alliance to maintain and strengthen a credible and effective nuclear deterrence policy and posture.
A key focus of this most recent meeting of the NCG, Johnson said, was planning and execution related to conventional nuclear integration, or CNI.
The NCG is interested in ensuring that, in the event of a nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula, U.S nuclear capabilities are effectively integrated with Korea’s own conventional capabilities. ” … is really advancing its conventional capabilities,” he said. “And I think we’re making real progress there.”
The NCG statement today said participants in the meeting discussed the planning and execution of U.S/South Korea CNI options on the Korean Peninsula. The group reaffirmed that integration of South Korea’s conventional capabilities with U.S. nuclear operations “substantively strengthens the allied deterrence and response capabilities against the nuclear and missile threat.”
Also on the agenda, Johnson said, was a focus on increased tabletop exercises so that the U.S. and South Korea can practice the integration and deterrence the NCG seeks.
“The best way to understand how to operate in this … world is to practice,” he said. “We are doing more and more of what we call tabletop exercises, or TTXs. And we have at least, I believe, three coming up over the course of the next year, including a military-to-military exercise.”
During today’s meeting, NCG participants agreed to an interagency simulation, an NCG-led TTX and a military-to-military TTX.
A big part of deterrence efforts, Johnson said, also includes enhanced visibility of U.S. commitment to the alliance through the visibility of American strategic deterrent assets. In July 2023, for instance, the USS Kentucky, a nuclear ballistic missile submarine, visited the South Korean port of Busan. It was the first time in over 40 years such a visit occurred.
“I think we’re in a very good place,” Johnson said. “I don’t think we’ve ever had this high of a level of collaboration, commitment and trust on extended deterrence than we’ve ever had with the United States and the Republic of Korea.”
The NCG was created to implement what was agreed to in the April 2023 Washington Agreement. In that agreement, the U.S. reaffirmed its commitment to South Korea and the Korean people and also agreed that any nuclear attack by North Korea against South Korea “will be met with a swift, overwhelming and decisive response.” (Source: U.S. DoD)
10 Jun 24. Congo (DRC): M23 conflict will continue to absorb military resources, driving Islamist attack risks. On 7 June, the IS-aligned Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) killed 41 people in attacks on the villages of Mahini, Mapasana and Masala in Beni territory (North Kivu province). Since 4 June, the ADF has killed 82 civilians in a series of attacks in the north of the North Kivu region in a spike in actions likely facilitated in part by a minimal local security presence. Despite ADF aggression, the Congolese armed forces are currently focused on combatting the M23 rebel group, active around the provincial capital Goma (North Kivu). Further attacks on communities around Beni and in the bordering Ituri province are likely in the coming weeks. This will drive attack threats to NGO staff engaged in local rural development projects and drive displacement, increasing pressure on aid resources in Beni and other regional urban centres. This trend will likely persist as long as Congolese military resources remain focused on the M23, sustaining threats through the coming months. (Source: Sibylline)
10 Jun 24. Iraq: Attacks Against Western Businesses Will Persist.
Key points
- Current anti-West sentiment in Iraq stems partly from the ongoing Israel-Hamas war. However, recent attacks against Western assets along Palestine Road in the capital Baghdad were likely conducted due to ongoing tensions between Kata’ib Hizballah (KH, a prominent Iranian-backed Shia proxy) and the Iraqi government. This dynamic will sustain the likelihood of future attacks, even in the event of a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas; an escalation in the conflict will also exacerbate hostility to Western assets.
- There is a realistic possibility that increasing public hostility towards Western businesses will discourage the Iraqi government from providing or extending licenses to all such outfits operating street-level assets; this ultimately underscores that policy risk is growing.
- A significant rise in attacks against Western nationals as part of a systemic and co-ordinated campaign remains highly unlikely; any escalation is more likely to focus on physical ‘brick-and-mortar’ assets.
Context
On 5 June, unknown assailants threw a stun grenade at the Cambridge British English teaching school in Qadisiyah governorate. Since 25 May, we have noted an uptick in attacks targeting Western-linked businesses in Iraq (at least nine such incidents were confirmed between 25 May and 5 June). These attacks have primarily targeted branches of US restaurant franchises, though two British English teaching schools and one branch of a US heavy equipment manufacturer were also attacked. Additionally, while most attacks have taken place in Baghdad, the 5 June incident points to growing spillover and security risks across the country. Methods of attack include low-yield IEDs, small arms, grenades and vandalism. Notably, none of the recent attacks resulted in casualties. While these incidents reflect growing anti-West sentiment among the local population amid the ongoing Israel-Hamas war, a new and small-scale militant group called the Rebel Youth of Jerusalem claimed responsibility for the attacks targeting the US restaurant branches. This not only underscores that some attacks are being carried out with a degree of co-ordination, but also that they are not necessarily tied solely to the war; it is possible that local political tensions are also to blame.
Forecast
Sporadic attacks against Western brands in Federal Iraq (not including Kurdistan Region, KR) will likely persist throughout H2 2024, elevating business disruption risks and impacting domestic sales
Iraqi officials claim that the Rebel Youth of Jerusalem is highly likely affiliated with KH. This underscores that a degree of co-ordination exists between the attack planners, whose motives are likely consistent with Iran’s objectives (namely the reduction of the US’ regional influence). The latest attacks were likely an extension of ongoing tensions between the Iraqi government and KH, with the latter seeking to pressure the government by threatening Western investments and assets in key locations. The government is reportedly planning a security overhaul of the area around Palestine Road in Baghdad (where many US restaurant franchises are located). At the same time, KH wants to cement its control over the area. Additionally, KH is opposed to the continued presence of US troops in Iraq. These objectives and conditions will sustain the likelihood of attacks targeting Western businesses, even in the event that an Israel-Hamas ceasefire is reached.
We assess that KH will continue to conduct small-scale sporadic attacks in major Iraqi cities throughout H2 2024 to exert more pressure on the government to comply with its demands. KH will also continue to exploit the Israel-Hamas war to gain popularity and political support for all such attacks. US restaurant franchises in major Iraqi cities (including Baghdad) remain particularly vulnerable to physical damage risks. Together, these factors will drive operational disruption, as well as duty of care risks and an overall reduction in sales over the next six months. There is also a realistic possibility that these risks will expand to other Western-themed / -aligned businesses due to the increasing misinformation disseminated by KH’s social media campaigns.
There is a moderate risk that these attacks will increase in frequency and scope if the Iraqi government decides to confront KH directly. In this scenario, attacks against Western brands will likely turn more violent; assailants will likely also carry them out in a more systematic manner. However, due to the current political and security dynamics and the strategic relationship between Iranian-backed proxies and the government, a major direct confrontation between the Iraqi government and KH remains unlikely.
Given the heightened anti-West sentiment in Iraq and the increasing popularity of boycotts against US brands, we assess that attempted copycat attacks against Western businesses by other clandestine groups (not affiliated with KH) remain a realistic possibility in the coming months. The primary triggers for an escalation in attacks and protests against Western brands by such groups likely include a significant deterioration of the humanitarian conditions in Gaza (Palestinian Territories) and/or an Israeli ground operation in Lebanon in H2 2024. These conditions are highly likely to prompt more widespread boycott campaigns and more aggressive pro-Palestine protest calls from politicians and religious leaders, such as the Shia Cleric Muqtada al-Sadr.
Such protests are known to attract tens of thousands of participants, particularly after Friday prayers around major mosques. In these scenarios, the attack risks facing Western franchises are significantly elevated. Another trigger that is likely to exacerbate these risks is the resumption of direct hostilities between Iranian-backed proxies in Iraq and US forces in the region. However, we assess that this scenario remains unlikely in the short term, as a de facto fragile truce still stands.
There is a realistic possibility that domestic pressure will prompt the Iraqi government to delay new licenses this year for some US franchises, elevating policy risks in the coming months
Due to the increasing popularity of boycotts and protest calls, as well as the political pressure from Shia parliamentary blocs, there is a realistic possibility that the government will delay approving first-time licenses for some US and Western franchises/brands seeking to set up branches in Iraq. Among such outfits, US restaurant franchises will likely be the most impacted by the elevated policy risks in the coming months. These measures will possibly include pausing extensions to existing franchises in Federal Iraq (such as the opening of new branches in Baghdad or other major cities). While such measures would possibly mitigate against the risk of public anger and domestic unrest in the short term, they would also likely discourage broader new foreign direct investment (FDI), further undermining Iraq’s fragile economy.
Systematic sponsored attacks against Western expats are highly unlikely in the short term
Despite the latest sporadic attacks against Western brands, as well as boycott calls and protests, we assess that systematic attacks against Western expats in Federal Iraq by Iranian proxies are highly unlikely in the second half of 2024. Such a strategy would violate the Iraqi government’s de facto red lines regarding these paramilitaries. These boundaries are designed to manage Iraq’s fragile security ecosystem while also mitigating against the risks facing new foreign investments. Several Iranian proxies (such as the Popular Mobilisation Forces, PMF) are crucial partners to the internal security forces and are unlikely to risk their strategic position and associated benefits by approving attacks against Western persons for limited apparent strategic gains.
Even if tensions between KH and the Iraqi government ramp up significantly, the Iranian-backed paramilitary group will likely focus its escalation against US franchises (but not directly against their staff). However, there is a realistic possibility that various clandestine groups (loosely affiliated with these proxies) will identify Western expats as targets for kidnap and/or opportunistic violence. Nevertheless, we assess that this is largely consistent with the existing security environment; it does not constitute a major increase in risk.
(Source: Sibylline)
10 Jun 24. Putin to visit North Korea, Vietnam in coming weeks, Vedomosti newspaper says. Russian President Vladimir Putin will visit North Korea and Vietnam in the coming weeks, the Vedomosti newspaper reported on Monday, citing a diplomatic source.
Russian ambassador to North Korea Alexander Matsegora confirmed to Vedomosti that the president’s visit to Pyongyang will happen and is being “actively prepared”.
The newspaper said Putin could visit Vietnam as early as June and most likely immediately after his visit to North Korea.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un visited Russia last September for talks with Putin. He toured Russia’s Vostochny space launch centre in the far east, and Putin promised to help North Korea build satellites.
The Kremlin has said Russia wants to build a partnership with North Korea “in all areas” but has yet to confirm the date of the visit.
Russia has stepped up ties with North Korea and other countries hostile to the United States such as Iran since the start of the war with Ukraine – relations that are a source of concern to the West.
The United States and Ukraine in January accused Russia of firing North Korean-supplied short-range ballistic missiles at Ukraine, something Russia declined to confirm or deny.
Vedomosti said Putin and Kim may discuss whether Russia will bring in migrant workers from North Korea. Russia is suffering acute labour shortages because of the Ukraine war; many hundreds of thousands of men have either gone to fight or fled abroad to avoid being mobilised.
Putin’s only previous trip to North Korea was in 2000, the first year of his presidency.
Vedomosti quoted Russia’s trade representative in Vietnam as saying last month that the most pressing trade issue between the two countries was banking support for settling payments. (Source: Reuters)
07 Jun 24. China-Philippines: Recent incidents in contested waters reflect South China Sea tensions. Earlier on 7 June, the Philippine Navy claimed that an inflatable China Coast Guard (CCG) boat intentionally rammed a Philippine Coast Guard boat transporting a sick sailor from the grounded BRP Sierra Madre Second Thomas (Ayungin) Shoal on 19 May. It released a video of the alleged incident, which occurred during a medical evacuation operation. CCG vessels obstructed this evacuation despite being informed of its humanitarian nature, according to Philippine officials. The announcement comes amid other reports of recent incidents, raising tensions in the region. On 4 June, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) denied claims by Chinese state media that Filipino soldiers aboard the BRP Sierra Madre pointed guns at CCG personnel. The AFP stated that its personnel were ‘on guard’ due to the CCG venturing dangerously close to the vessel. The situation in the South China Sea is likely to remain volatile, as China claimed it will enforce the Administrative Law Enforcement Procedures for Coast Guard Institutions from 15 June to arrest foreign nationals in its claimed waters. We assess that this will raise the potential for escalation. (Source: Sibylline
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