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30 May 24. SAMIM withdrawal from Cabo Delgado: uncomfortable truths. Why is the region turning away from an international terrorist organisation on its doorstep that is growing in influence?
On 16 May, Islamic State (IS) declared victory over the Southern African Development Community Mission in Mozambique’s (SAMIM) forces in Cabo Delgado. After its 10 May attack on the Macomia district headquarters, IS claimed in Al-Naba: ‘The surprise attack redrew the map of the war in the next phase and practically confirmed the failure of the “core mission” [SAMIM] in Mozambique and the escalation of jihad.’
The Al-Naba weekly publication is a well-known IS marketing and indoctrination tool. But was the article simply propaganda? That conclusion might overlook the evolution and momentum of the insurgency, which over the past five months has been at its most active since the 2021 Palma attack.
Since the insurgency started in 2017, IS has claimed credit for 296 incidents. Since January 2024, 57 claims have been logged compared to 51 for the whole of 2023. These claims have become a relatively credible reference, exposing the paucity of official reporting from Mozambique’s government, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and Rwanda, which also has troops in Cabo Delgado.
SAMIM’s withdrawal (to be completed by mid-July) has allowed the insurgency to regain momentum and some territorial dominance and operational presence in parts of the Macomia and Quissanga districts. This provides a springboard for attacks further afield, especially in the central and southern districts.
The remaining several hundred SAMIM forces who provided little more than a reduced static security role have now pulled back to the provincial capital, Pemba. Central to countering the renewed attacks is the deployment of a reported 2 000 more Rwandan soldiers and police. Al-Naba’s editorial highlights an inconvenient truth. The SAMIM drawdown provides IS not only with operational space, but also a major propaganda opportunity. The situation signifies the greatest level of instability in Cabo Delgado since Rwandan troops and SAMIM were first deployed in 2021.
So why are regional governments turning away from a global terrorist group on their doorstep that is increasing in influence? Financial constraints play a significant role. Although SADC members (especially South Africa, Tanzania, Botswana and Lesotho) covered SAMIM’s core costs over the 36-month deployment, the mission was never properly resourced. As South African National Defence Force Head General Rudzani Maphwanya told media in 2022: ‘You don’t get a single-malt service from a Coca-Cola budget.’
Assessed contributions from member states stretch only so far, and the cost of sending SADC forces to eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo in December 2023 means the region can’t service two deployments simultaneously.
But other factors are also in play. At a diplomatic level, Mozambique has resisted regional involvement; SADC was kept at bay for most of 2020 despite rapidly deteriorating security conditions in Cabo Delgado. The government only endorsed an intervention after the Palma attack and huge regional pressure.
Without consulting SADC, Maputo also fast-tracked a bilateral deal for Rwanda to send troops. Rwanda was responsible for security in the Palma and Mocímboa da Praia districts where the multibn-dollar natural gas investments are located. SAMIM was deployed to Nangade, Mueda, Muidumbe and Macomia districts.
Although SAMIM and Rwanda’s troops were both mandated to support Mozambican security forces and launch counter-offensives only after getting Mozambican government approval, operational modalities apparently weren’t uniformly employed in practice. Consequently, responses to attacks were sometimes delayed or had minimal impact, fuelling criticism of SAMIM.
Mozambican authorities also gave preference to bilateral agreements between Rwanda and Tanzania, fuelling a breakdown in trust between SAMIM, Rwanda and Mozambique’s security forces. Relations were already strained by weak intelligence sharing and a lack of joint operations, which limited SAMIM’s ability to conduct offensive operations. Challenges on the ground were compounded by political and diplomatic rivalries, which appear to have taken precedence over security objectives.
Furthermore, SAMIM’s offensive fighting capacity was hampered by a lack of logistical support, particularly air support and combat-ready forces. Resupply lines over thousands of kilometres were also problematic. At times, SAMIM forces either had insufficient intelligence or couldn’t act on the intelligence available. And as the first SADC standby deployment, SAMIM’s command and control was tested in the field. Multilateral forces always face myriad challenges, from multiple chains of command to inter-service dynamics and doctrinal reciprocity.
SAMIM’s outreach efforts were hamstrung by the lack of coordinated community engagement between military stakeholders and non-governmental organisations. SAMIM’s mandate included supporting humanitarian aid provision and re-establishing law and order. But it had limited impact in these areas. The pilot peacebuilding programme SAMIM introduced in 2022 ends when it withdraws. Mozambique hasn’t called for its continuation, reflecting the extent to which it seems locked into a securitised response that, at best, contains the conflict in current circumstances.
After the Macomia attack, it’s even more evident that SAMIM’s withdrawal is premature. But a fighting force won’t be retained. The April announcement that South Africa’s troop deployment will be extended until year-end is probably to facilitate the exfiltration of remaining hardware and other assets.
A detailed and public assessment of SAMIM’s impact is unlikely. The official position is that the mission’s mandate to stabilise security conditions and erode terrorist capacities has been achieved. SAMIM’s territorial dominance did inhibit insurgent attacks, enabling over 600 000 internally displaced people to return home by February 2024. But this year’s upsurge in incidents indicates that the threat is far from over.
In April, some sources recorded the highest number of incidents (both violent and non-violent) since the conflict began in October 2017. The uptick in IS claims and the choreography of their messaging convey a central point: the terrorist group is biding its time, waiting for the inevitable withdrawal of SAMIM.
SADC is withdrawing in a context where IS is clearly pushing the local insurgency. While the degree of external IS authority remains contested, its growing influence is undeniable. Al-Naba’s SAMIM editorial refers to instructions from IS’ central leadership to attack more densely populated urban centres. This raises critical questions about the insurgency’s next phase, given the overwhelming reliance on Rwandan forces.
SAMIM’s withdrawal reflects a political and diplomatic failure for the region. Beyond IS’ propaganda claim of defeating the SADC mission, some truths must be acknowledged. SAMIM didn’t achieve a battlefield victory. Instead, it stabilised vital parts of the province by displacing rather than neutralising insurgents. In the absence of a comprehensive counter-insurgency strategy and with time on their side, IS has manoeuvred to fight another day in Mozambique.
Written by Jasmine Opperman, Independent analyst, and Piers Pigou, Head, Southern Africa Programme, ISS.
Republished with permission from ISS Africa. The original article can be found here: https://issafrica.org/iss-today/samim-withdrawal-from-cabo-delgado-uncomfortable-truths (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
30 May 24. The 11th edition of the IISS Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment (APRSA) has highlighted the growth in competition within the Asia-Pacific region, as both the United States and China vie for influence.
Key Points:
KKA draining decade has seen the United States engage seriously with China, amid a range of issues competing for attention
AAChina’s willingness to assert itself has been uneasily felt by many of its neighbours, but they still feel their economic prosperity is inextricably linked to it
CCCompetition between the two is now no longer linked to security, with polarised networks forming around both the US and China, but broader policy alignment beyond defence matters should not be assumed
CCCrisis management “is too important to only be left to Washington and Beijing”, with Australia, Japan, India and South Korea now appealing for strategic partners and alternatives
CCEmerging technology is now a domain contested by the major powers, with the US limiting China’s access to advanced chip-making, while the regional balance of military power may tilt towards China
The 11th edition of the IISS Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment (APRSA) has highlighted the growth in competition within the Asia-Pacific region, as both the United States and China vie for influence.
While the US continues to show a serious interest in dealing with China, the pressures of conflict elsewhere in Europe and the Middle East have drawn away focus from policy makers in Washington, although being “strong on China” is now a leitmotif across the partisan divide there. In the meantime, China’s coercion on economic, military and security matters leaves its neighbours uneasy while still relying on Beijing’s economic performance for prosperity.
While these networks of influence no longer surround just military matters, they are becoming increasingly polarised and their value endures.
As the Editor’s Introduction suggests, friction as seen in the South China Sea continues to build and that “crisis management in the Asia-Pacific is too important to be only left to Washington and Beijing.”
While ASEAN continues to struggle to make a regional impact, the debate over how dialogue should be conducted does not concern which multilateral network should be replaced, but which platforms regional leaders will commit to. A number of domains are now contested by the major powers and not in purely military matters, with emerging technology increasingly of importance.
The APRSA looks at key intersecting themes across the region, but also focuses on a number of additional, specific issues which are of growing importance:
- Its special topic-chapter looks at Combined Military Exercises in the Asia-Pacific. With the US staging more than 1,100 exercises with over a dozen Asia-Pacific countries since 2003, China has executed nearly 130. But while US exercises have been more complex and better tested, China has been catching up in recent years and working with partners to develop skills in new areas. Such exercises serve a broader strategic purpose and why and how regional countries develop and implement them can affect their ability to respond to a wide range of security challenges and shape regional stability.
- APRSA also looks at broader Crisis Management in the Asia-Pacific. Regional countries are concerned about the lack of communication between the United States and China, two nuclear-armed powers, at a time of heightened tension and increased interaction between their militaries. The US and China have different perceptions of what crisis management and communication means, while other regional mechanisms only partially include both countries. Numerous mechanisms exist between China and regional countries already. Regional crisis-management mechanisms that include China are numerous but so far have not brought stability to the Asia-Pacific.
- The defence diplomatic role of India in the Asia-Pacific is also examined in detail by APRSA. For India, being a ‘preferred security partner’ through defence partnerships, from combined exercises to arms transfer, increases its regional presence, which in turn enhances its influence with Asia-Pacific countries while countering Beijing’s regional influence. India’s defence engagement is and will continue to be focused on the Indian Ocean region, although it is working to increase its presence in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Ocean. India’s expanding defence role and partnerships will likely further contribute to the increasingly competitive nature of India–China relations.
- APRSA looks at how diplomats have handled the crisis within Myanmar, finding four distinct approaches over a strategically important location between China, India and the Indian Ocean: AAWestern powers have sought to reverse the coup, while otherwise deferring to ASEAN to manage the crisis.
- In turn, ASEAN has downgraded Myanmar’s representation at key meetings in response to its failure to implement the group’s ‘Five Point Consensus’ but has struggled to find ways to de-escalate the conflict and foster dialogue.
- Myanmar’s neighbours, led by Thailand, have sought to create a diplomatic channel outside of ASEAN that is more sympathetic to engagement with the junta.
- However, China now has the greatest influence within Myanmar, not only within negotiations but also on the battlefield.
- The role of disinformation campaigns in the Asia-Pacific is also examined. While China has used disinformation campaigns to deter Taiwanese voters who seek de jure independence, it has also pushed a positive role for itself in the Philippines, casting doubt on US leadership there at the same time. Governments must take active measures to tackle this and build national digital literacy at all levels. The importance of the information domain is only expected to grow given the geopolitical tensions in the region and wider conflicts being waged in Ukraine and the Middle East.
APRSA also examines the air-to-air balance of military power in the Asia-Pacific, where the PLAAF has used sustained investment to develop tactical-combat aircraft of yet more credibility. This is also backed up by advanced air-to-air missiles which are at least equivalent to their potential adversaries including the United States and its allies. Should there be a peer-on-peer war, the PLAAF would make the air domain a strongly contested environment.
Editor of the APRSA, Dr Evan A. Laksmana, commented: “Over the last decade, the Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment has sought to reflect upon and deepen our understanding of the challenges in the Asia-Pacific. In that time, the competing impulses of great-power strategic competition and the often elusive quest for a stable regional order have become sharper and the stakes increasingly higher.”
30 May 24. Iraq: Kurdish parliamentary elections will likely be postponed, elevating risk of political uncertainty. On 29 May, Iraq’s Federal Election Commission formally requested the semi-autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to set a new date for the upcoming parliamentary elections (originally scheduled for 10 June). The development comes after months of political controversary and tensions between Erbil and Baghdad following Iraq’s Supreme Court ruling that the minority quota in the KRG’s election act was unconstitutional. This prompted several parties to boycott the elections, including the ruling Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP). We assess that Kurdistan’s President Nechirvan Barzani will formally announce the postponement of the elections next week; there is a realistic possibility that no new date has been selected yet, elevating the risks of political uncertainty and unrest in the coming weeks. However, we assess that the postponement will likely prompt Baghdad and Erbil to settle their discrepancies in the coming months and to agree on an election timeline that encourages greater participation (particularly with regard to the KDP) and reduces the risk of domestic unrest. (Source: Sibylline)
29 May 24. North Korea sends balloons carrying excrement to the south as a ‘gift.’
- Summary
- North Korea sends balloons carrying trash, excrement to the south
- Ruling party official calls the balloons ‘gifts of sincerity’
- South Korea says the act was base and dangerous
- Both sides use balloons to float propaganda campaigns
North Korea sent hundreds of balloons carrying trash and excrement across the heavily fortified border to South Korea on Wednesday, calling them “gifts of sincerity”, prompting an angry response from Seoul, which said the act was base and dangerous.
Photographs released by the South Korean military showed inflated balloons with plastic bags tied to them. Other images appeared to show trash strewn around collapsed balloons, with the word “excrement” written on a bag in one photograph.
By Wednesday afternoon, more than 260 balloons had been detected, and most of them have landed on the ground, carrying animal faeces and rubbish, the South Korean military said in a statement, calling the act “base and dangerous”.
North Korea said the balloons were in retaliation for an ongoing propaganda campaign by North Korean defectors and activists in South Korea, who regularly send inflatables containing anti-Pyongyang leaflets, alongside food, medicine, money and USB sticks loaded with K-pop music videos and dramas across the border.
Kim Yo Jong, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s sister and a powerful ruling party official, issued a statement in state media KCNA, slamming Seoul as “shameful, brazen” for criticising the balloons while defending its citizens’ own freedom of expression.
The North’s balloons were “gifts of sincerity” for South Koreans who “cry for freedom of expression”, she said, pledging to send dozens of times the number she said South Korea had sent into its territory.
An official at Seoul’s presidential office said the North might want to “test” the South’s reaction but vowed to respond calmly.
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE
“By putting rubbish and miscellaneous objects into balloons, they seem to want to test how our people would react and whether our government is indeed disrupted, and apart from direct provocations, how psychological warfare and small-scale complex threats would play out in our country,” the official told reporters.
The South Korean military’s explosives ordnance unit and chemical and biological warfare response team were deployed to inspect and collect the objects, and an alert was issued warning residents to keep away and report any sightings to authorities.
On Sunday, North Korea’s vice defence minister denounced balloons sent by South Korean activists, calling them “dirty things” and a “dangerous provocation,” and warned that “mounds of waste-paper and filth” would be sent to the South in response.
North Korea also attempted to jam GPS signals in South Korea on early Wednesday morning, although no damage was reported, the Donga Ilbo newspaper said, citing multiple unnamed government sources.
Seoul’s defence ministry said it had no immediate comment on the report.
A previous South Korean government sought to block such campaigns, especially after a 2014 incident when the North tried to shoot down balloons, which triggered complaints from residents near the border.
A ban on balloon launches introduced in 2021 was later ruled unconstitutional by a top court, which said it violated freedom of speech.
The two Koreas’ large militaries face off across the military border and North Korea routinely threatens to annihilate its neighbour.
Peter Ward, a research fellow at the Sejong Institute, said sending balloons was a far less risky than taking overt military action.
“These kinds of grey zone tactics are more difficult to counter and hold less risk of uncontrollable military escalation, even if they’re horrid for the civilians who are ultimately targeted,” he said. (Source: Reuters)
28 May 24. U.S., Angolan Defense Leaders Discuss Deepening Cooperation. Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III welcomed Angolan Defense Minister Joao Ernesto dos Santos to the Pentagon today to continue talks begun when Austin visited the African nation in September.
Austin said Angola is a U.S. strategic partner and a regional leader. He said the ties between the two nations are growing deeper and have tremendous potential.
The outreach to African nations follows the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit, which was hosted by President Joe Biden in 2022. At the summit, the president said, “Africa’s success is the world’s success.”
Since that meeting, the United States has continued high-level dialogue with African partners to advance the goals the leaders agreed upon.
Austin became the first defense secretary to visit Angola. “I traveled to Angola because of the importance of our defense partnership,” he said at the meeting. “I’m proud of all that we’ve done together to deepen our partnership, from maritime security to peacekeeping to defense policy and more.”
The military-to-military relationship between the two nations has the potential to grow, Austin said, and he specifically talked about strengthening cooperation in cybersecurity, as well as Angola’s potential participation in the Defense Department’s National Guard’s State Partnership Program.
“We’re eager to work together to seize this historic opportunity to promote peace, security and responsible rules-based governance,” Austin said. “And the Department of Defense looks forward to continue the cooperation with Angola as you restructure and modernize your armed forces.”
Angola is a leader among the nations of the continent. “The geostrategic and the geopolitical space in which Angola is inserted requires special attention due to the deep historical, geographical, economic and cultural complexities of the community,” dos Santos told the secretary through a translator. “The Republic of Angola is … focused on an agenda of conflict prevention and resolution by peaceful means in interstate dialogue.” (Source: U.S. DoD)
28 May 24. China’s drone carrier will aid South China Sea A2/AD bubble.
Beijing sees the PLAN as being its key element in its ability to control the entire South and East China Seas, with carriers crucial for power projection.
China appears to have stolen another march on US naval development as details emerge of a small aircraft carrier-shaped warship that looks to have been designed from the ground up as a drone flattop, as the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) seeks to dominate the Western Pacific.
In imagery widely circulated across social media in recent days, the purported drone aircraft carrier appears too short to host and operate larger, crewed fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft, presenting the possibility that it could be developing an entirely new class of warship.
According to GlobalData’s “The Global Naval Vessels and Surface Combatants Market Forecast 2024-2034” report, China will be spending about $46.2bn on procuring various naval vessels over the next ten years. Of this, 8.5% will be directed towards the procurement of amphibious vessels and aircraft carriers, which includes the apparent drone carrier.
This development underscores the PLAN’s intent to augment the application of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) to undertake various types of maritime operations, GlobalData analysts stated.
“The growing US assistance to Taiwan and escalating territorial disputes with its neighbors in the South China Sea have long been an irritant for Chinese policymakers. In response, China is advancing its naval capabilities with the introduction of dedicated drone carriers, following the deployment of fixed-wing aircraft [carriers] and helicopter [carriers] in recent years,” said Harsh Deshmukh, aerospace and defence analyst at GlobalData, referencing platforms such as the Fujian and Type 075 respectively.
As the role of UAVs in naval warfare grows, China’s drone carrier, which is approximately one-third the size of the recently launched Type-003/Fujian aircraft carrier, could prove to be an important asset in terms of conducting long-range surveillance missions far away from the Chinese mainland, GlobalData analysts state.
Deshmukh added that the PLAN drone carrier would also improve China’s ability to conduct anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) operations, making it “more challenging” for rivals to operate freely in disputed areas of the South China Sea.
“As China continues to enhance its blue water capabilities, the launch of this drone carrier before the fourth aircraft carrier (Type-004) shows China’s plan on diversifying its naval forces by inducting more UAVs into its naval fleet,” Deshmukh detailed.
“This rapid militarisation by China could become a cause of concern for many countries in the vicinity and could plunge the region into a new arms race.”
China’s MND says carriers are “defensive”
Following media coverage of the sea trials of the Type 003-class aircraft carrier Fujian recently, China’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) in mid-May stated that the ongoing workup of the vessel “did not target a specific objective, region, or country”, according to an MND spokesperson at the time.
“China remains steadfast in pursuing the path of peaceful development and a defence policy that is defensive in nature,” the spokesperson said.
The sea trials took place at the same time as a joint US-Philippine exercise aimed at asserting free and open use of the South China Sea, which China claims in virtual entirety through its infamous ‘nine-dash line’.
Aircraft carriers are traditionally offensive in nature and used to project power into areas where operating countries do not have land bases and are ideally placed to be used to create A2AD bubbles in the South China Sea to deter other regional or US warships.
Similarly, a country does not develop crewed and uncrewed platforms capable of hosting and operating fixed-wing aircraft without a specific objective in mind.
China has long sought to assert its claims over the South and East China Seas as deter regional rivals such as Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines, as well prevent continued US access to what Beijing considers its territorial waters.
A recently published guide to China’s surface naval development of the IUS Office for Naval Intelligence revealed the scope of Beijing’s maritime spending, detailing a PLAN surface force that already far exceeds the US Navy in numerical terms. (Source: naval-technology.com)
28 May 24. Burkina Faso: Term-extension decision will likely elevate risk of unrest in Ouagadougou. On 25 May, Burkina Faso’s military leader, Ibrahim Traore, signed a new charter extending the country’s transition period by 60 months, granting him the positions of president and ‘supreme leader of the armed forces’ and allowing him to contest elections as and when they are organised. The charter was agreed following what was initially scheduled to be a two-day dialogue among mostly pro-junta groups which began earlier that day. The charter will take effect from 2 July. It is likely that pro-junta demonstrations will be held on or around 2 July in the capital Ouagadougou near government buildings and the Koulouba Palace, driving localised transit disruption. We assess there is also a realistic possibility that the announcement will prompt demonstrations by pro-democracy activists in Ouagadougou in the coming weeks. The security forces are likely to target any such demonstrations; pro-junta counter-protesters will possibly do the same, elevating the likelihood of clashes and driving safety risks for bystanders, as well as the risk of exposure to arbitrary arrest. (Source: Sibylline)
28 May 24. Sudan: Artillery fire, airstrikes will continue to drive heightened risks for NGO staff in El Fasher. On 26 May, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) announced that clashes between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have killed at least 134 people in North Darfur’s capital El Fasher since 10 May. On 25 May, RSF artillery shelling killed an MSF worker near the city’s central main market. The SAF has expelled the RSF from the eastern outskirts of El Fasher, seizing control of positions used to shell residential areas and health facilities. However, shelling and airstrikes will likely continue to drive risks for civilian areas, hospitals and displacement camps, sustaining heightened physical security risks for NGO staff and assets. In addition, the RSF is currently attempting to prevent the movement of humanitarian aid along routes controlled by the SAF, driving threats to logistics staff and restricting the flow of aid. El Fasher’s Southern Hospital reportedly only has ten days’ worth of supplies. We assess that a mass exodus of over 20,000 people from El Fasher will almost certainly increase pressure on humanitarian resources in surrounding areas and exacerbate the risks of violence targeting NGO workers. (Source: Sibylline)
28 May 24. China-Japan-South Korea: Existing security issues retain potential to derail trilateral co-operation. On 27 May, Chinese Premier Li Qiang, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol held a trilateral summit in Seoul (South Korea). This was the ninth trilateral summit between the three countries since 2008, though the first in more than four years. The summit demonstrated the intent of Beijing, Tokyo and Seoul to boost trade and economic co-operation and to stabilise the trilateral relationship. On 27 May, they issued a joint statement pledging to hold regular inter-ministerial meetings and to keep holding ‘discussions for speeding up negotiations’ for a ‘mutually beneficial’ agreement. The three sides reiterated their positions on ‘regional peace’ and the ‘denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula’ without reaching a consensus on these issues. On 27 May, Yoon and Kishida called on North Korea to scrap a planned military spy satellite launch (the satellite exploded shortly after launch on 28 May), while Li merely called for ‘easing tensions’. We assess that regional security issues such as Taiwan and the South and East China seas – which were not mentioned in the joint statement – have the potential to derail trilateral co-operation and any further talks. (Source: Sibylline)
29 May 24. Thailand: Former prime minister will face inditement, highlighting political stability risks. Earlier on 29 May, Thailand’s government announced that the Attorney-General will indict former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra on charges of ‘insulting the monarchy’ and violating the Computer Crime Act. Thaksin will be required to appear in court on 18 June. Since 2020, there have reportedly been more than 270 prosecutions in Thailand under the strict lèse-majesté law, which forbids criticism of the monarchy and carries a maximum jail term of 15 years. The charges relate to an interview Thaksin gave in 2015. Parts of the military establishment believe that Thaksin retains significant influence over the governing Pheu Thai party, despite not holding an official position. Following the 2023 general election, the Pheu Thai party formed a coalition government with military-backed parties, with Srettha Thavisin becoming prime minister. As part of the arrangement, Thaksin returned to Thailand after 15 years of self-imposed exile and was taken into custody for corruption; he was then released early in February. The latest charges highlight the divisions between the military-royalist establishment and the Pheu Thai party. Separately, the Constitutional Court of Thailand is due to make a final ruling over the potential dismissal of Thavisin over ethical breaches. The upcoming court trials will likely elevate policy and government stability risks in the medium term. (Source: Sibylline)
28 May 24. Georgia: Proposed referendum is highly unlikely to overturn controversial foreign agent law. On 28 May, Georgian President Salome Zurabishvili proposed a referendum to determine the country’s trajectory after the parliament overrode her veto on controversial foreign agent legislation. The bill has triggered large-scale domestic unrest in recent weeks. Zurabishvili urged opponents of the law to start gathering signatures to initiate a referendum, which she said will determine whether the Georgian population wants a European future or ‘Russian slavery’. The Georgian constitution stipulates that the president has the power to call a referendum under certain circumstances, including if 200,000 signatures are collected. However, a referendum cannot in and of itself adopt or repeal a law. Although obtaining 200,000 signatures is likely possible given strong pro-EU sentiment among Georgians, it is highly unlikely that a referendum could overturn the foreign agent law given the government’s commitment to the bill. Ultimately, calls for a plebiscite are almost certainly intended to sustain further pressure on the Georgian Dream-led government in the coming weeks. (Source: Sibylline)
30 May 24. Moldova: Increasing co-operation with West will likely deepen polarisation, drive unrest risks. On 29 May, a pro-Russia party associated with the fugitive oligarch Ilan Șor staged a protest outside the US embassy in response to US Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s visit to the capital Chișinău. The Revival party stated that the demonstration was in opposition to actions by the US and NATO that it claimed are aimed at destabilising Moldova. Meanwhile, the Moldovan authorities reported that Șor supporters (most of whom hail from the pro-Russia autonomous Gagauzia region) blocked Dacia Boulevard, one of the main avenues in the capital, before Blinken’s arrival. The Moldovan government has accelerated its pivot to the West following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022; Chișinău has also warned of Moscow’s efforts to destabilise the country since early 2023. Although pro-West Moldovan officials continue to distance Chișinău from Moscow, Russia-friendly sentiment remains across parts of Moldovan society. We assess that closer Western (particularly US) co-operation will likely sustain polarisation within Moldova; further visits by US officials will increase the likelihood of low-level domestic unrest in the medium-to-long term. (Source: Sibylline)
28 May 24. China accelerates naval modernization amid rising regional tensions, says GlobalData. China has unveiled its inaugural drone carrier in response to heightened tensions and evolving geopolitical dynamics in the Asia-Pacific region. This marks a significant stride in its ambitious military modernization efforts, reflecting its commitment to bolstering naval prowess. With a focus on enhancing maritime surveillance capabilities and asserting dominance in contested areas like the South China Sea, this strategic move aims to safeguard China’s regional interests, according to GlobalData, a leading data and analytics company.
GlobalData’s “The Global Naval Vessels and Surface Combatants Market Forecast 2024-2034” report reveals that China will be spending about $46.2 bn on procuring various naval vessels over the next 10 years. Out of which, 8.5% will be directed towards the procurement of amphibious vessels, which includes the drone carrier. This development underscores the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) intent to augment the application of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) to undertake various types of maritime operations.
Harsh Deshmukh, Aerospace & Defense Analyst at GlobalData, comments: The growing US assistance to Taiwan and escalating territorial disputes with its neighbors in the South China Sea have long been an irritant for Chinese policymakers. In response, China is advancing its naval capabilities with the introduction of dedicated drone carriers, following the deployment of fixed-wing aircraft as well as helicopters in recent years.”
As the role of UAVs in naval warfare grows, China’s drone carrier, which is approximately one-third the size of the recently launched Type-003 aircraft carrier (Fujian), might prove to be an important asset in terms of conducting long-range surveillance missions far away from the Chinese mainland. This will also help PLA save the lives of its personnel by avoiding the sending of manned missions into highly contested airspace.
Deshmukh concludes: “The vessel will also enhance China’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, making it more challenging for its rivals to operate freely in disputed areas like the South China Sea. As China continues to enhance its blue water capabilities, the launch of this drone carrier before the fourth aircraft carrier (Type-004) shows China’s plan on diversifying its naval forces by inducting more UAVs into its naval fleet. This rapid militarization by China could become a cause of concern for many countries in the vicinity and could plunge the region into a new arms race.” (Source: GlobalData)
24 May 24. Kenya-US: Pledges of partnerships, debt relief likely underscore efforts to deter relations with China. On 23 May, US President Joe Biden agreed to new security partnerships and investments with Kenyan President William Ruto during the first state visit by an African leader to the US in 15 years. The US has committed to a new USD 7 m partnership to modernise Kenya’s National Police Service and to designate Kenya as its first key sub-Saharan African non-NATO ally. The presidents also launched the Nairobi-Washington Vision, which calls on the international community to support countries in managing debt while investing in economic growth. The pledges underscore heightened competition for regional influence and are likely intended to counter increasing ties with China, to whom Kenya currently owes around 64% of its total external debt. Such efforts will likely drive further US partnerships with sub-Saharan African countries to develop key industries and security capabilities over the medium to long term, with a particular focus on digital inclusion and the technology sector. (Source: Sibylline)
24 May 24. Japan-South Korea: New sanctions are unlikely to stem arms trade between Russia, North Korea. Earlier on 24 May, Japan and South Korea separately announced sanctions on individuals and entities implicated in the alleged arms trade between North Korea and Russia. Japan targeted 11 organisations and one individual, while South Korea imposed sanctions on seven North Korean individuals and two Russian vessels. These sanctions align with similar measures taken by the US and Australia aimed at halting military cooperation that supports Russia’s agenda in the war in Ukraine. These sanctions are also part of broader international efforts to enforce UN Security Council resolutions that prohibit the transfer of weapons to and from North Korea. Historically, North Korea has used illicit arms exports as a major source of revenue to support its nuclear program and sustain its regime while facing severe international sanctions. In recent months, Moscow has reportedly acquired artillery, ammunition and other military supplies from North Korea to support its war in Ukraine. We assess that the new measures are unlikely to effectively halt North Korea and Russia’s military collaboration. This is due to the opacity of North Korea’s procurement networks and its ability to circumvent sanctions through money laundering and front operations. (Source: Sibylline)
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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.
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