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19 Apr 24. Philippines-New Zealand: Defence co-operation agreements will drive tensions with China. On 18 April, the Philippines and New Zealand agreed to sign a Mutual Logistics Supporting Arrangement by the end of the year and to conclude a Status of Visiting Forces Agreement. This enhanced defence co-operation comes amid regional tensions in the South China Sea. The announcement was made after a meeting between Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. and New Zealand Prime Minister Christopher Luxon in Manila (Philippines). The agreements aim to bolster mutual support and operational readiness. Both countries want to ensure maritime security and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. The countries’ bilateral ties are set to become a comprehensive partnership by 2026, coinciding with the 60th anniversary of the establishment of their diplomatic relations. These developments reflect Manila’s efforts to diversify its defence partnerships beyond its traditional alliance with the US; they also highlight the increasing dynamic of strategic competition in the region between Western-aligned actors and China. They represent another shift in New Zealand’s historically cautious approach to China, its top trading partner. As such, we assess that the agreements will likely drive regional tensions further. (Source: Sibylline)
19 Apr 24. Ramaphosa extends SANDF deployments. President and Commander-in-Chief Cyril Ramaphosa has authorised extensions of the employment of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and for Operation Copper maritime security patrols in the Mozambique Channel.
Parliament on 18 April in its Announcements, Tablings and Committee Reports document published the two authorisation letters from the President, both dated 15 April.
With regard to the DRC authorisation, this covers the employment of 1 198 members of the SANDF serving with the United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission (MONUSCO) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
“Members of the SANDF employed will continue, under MONUSCO, with the effort to neutralise negative forces and illegal armed groups by restoring peace and security in the DRC under Operation Mistral over the of period 16 April 2024 to 20 December 2024,” Ramaphosa stated.
The expenditure expected to be incurred for this deployment amounts to R805 057 755.
The MONUSCO mission is exiting the DRC this year, with the initial phase of exit seeing the withdrawal of MONUSCO military and police forces from South Kivu by June. In terms of an agreement between DRC President Felix Tshisekedi’s government and the United Nations, the mission will exit the country by December this year when its mandate expires.
In December 2023, MONUSCO’s authorised troop ceiling was 13 500 military personnel, 660 military observers and staff officers, 591 police personnel and 1 410 personnel of formed police units until 30 June 2024. South Africa, with 1 144 military personnel, was number five on the top ten military contributing countries to MONUSCO. It, along with Malawi and Tanzania, make up the mission’s Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), the lone formation in the UN’s various peacekeeping structures to have an offensive clause in its mandate. Number one in troop contributing countries to MONUSCO is India (1 834) followed by Pakistan (1 767), Bangladesh (1 640) and Nepal (1 147) before South Africa in fifth place.
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in the DRC (SAMIDRC) will fill much of the gap left by MONUSCO’s departure. SAMIDRC at present has a 12 month mandate which, according to the South African government, ends on 15 December.
Apart from confirmation of 2 900 South African military personnel being contributed under Operation Thiba (although only around 600 are presently deployed), there is no information from the SADC on Malawian and Tanzanian troop numbers that will contribute to the SAMIDRC force, which is set to be 5 000-strong. The South African deployment will cost R2.37bn.
Earlier this month the SADC said that, “As part of the SAMIDRC, a SADC regional force from Malawi, South Africa and Tanzania and elements of the DRC Armed Forces are working with the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC), in fighting armed groups operating in eastern DRC.”
SAMIDRC troops have already taken casualties, with two South African soldiers killed and three injured in an M23 mortar attack on 14 February, and three Tanzanian soldiers killed by rebel mortar fire on 8 April, with another three injured.
There is concern that SAMIDRC forces will not be able to dominate their environment as they lack troop numbers, vehicles, intelligence, and air support.
Maritime security
Ramaphosa’s second letter covers the continued employment of SANDF members “for service in fulfilment of an international obligation of the Republic of South Africa towards the Southern African Development Community Maritime Security Strategy (SADC MSS).”
Ramaphosa notified the National Assembly that he has extended the employment of 200 SANDF members “in order to counter the threat of piracy and other related illegal maritime activities along the Southern African coast of the Indian Ocean.”
He went on to state that, “members of the SANDF employed will continue with the responsibilities of countering the threat of piracy and other related illegal maritime activities under SADC MSS Operation Copper over the of period 1 April 2024 to 31 March 2025.”
The cost of this deployment amounts to R35 325 852.
The SADC-initiated and approved tasking aims to prevent piracy and crime at sea in the busy shipping lane east of the sub-continent. South Africa is the lead nation providing maritime and limited airborne platforms, with Mozambican military personnel aboard whichever SA Navy platform is on station. Due to a lack of ships, the South African Navy has struggled to undertake Operation Copper patrols in recent years.
According to the most recent Department of Defence annual report, “no Op Copper long-range patrols were conducted during FY2022/23 due to SA Navy prime mission equipment not being operationally available as required.”
(Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
19 Apr 24. Chad Threatens to Expel US Troops as Russian Influence Grows. Chad’s government has signaled a potential pivot in its military alliances by threatening to cancel the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the United States. This agreement currently facilitates the operation of US military personnel in Chad, specifically at a French base in N’Djamena where US Special Operations Task Force is stationed. According to US intelligence sources, the Chadian Chief of Air Staff, Idriss Amine, communicated this threat through a letter not sent via standard diplomatic channels, which some US officials believe could be a negotiating tactic for a more favorable agreement. The letter’s issuance coincides with similar actions by neighboring Niger, which recently terminated its agreement with the US military. This trend underscores a growing regional shift that might allow Russia to expand its influence in Africa, especially in the Sahel. The potential withdrawal of US forces from Chad would follow a pattern of decreasing Western military presence in the region. Adding to the complexity of the situation, a whistleblower complaint from a US airman in Niger has accused US diplomatic officials of downplaying issues to maintain appearances of good bilateral relations. This complaint highlights ongoing challenges faced by US military operations in Africa, including restricted movement due to denied diplomatic clearances, which have led to extended deployments. These developments are occurring against a backdrop of increasing Russian military engagement in the region, including recent deliveries of advanced military equipment to Niger. US Africa Command’s General Michael Langley has expressed concerns over Russia’s strategic maneuvers in Central Africa and the Sahel, indicating a significant geopolitical contest in these regions. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
18 Apr 24. Is the South African National Defence Force up to the challenge? The South African National Defence Force (SANDF) plays a vital role in safeguarding the nation’s security, both domestically and abroad. Enshrined in the Constitution, the mandate of the SANDF encompasses tasks ranging from protecting South Africa’s territorial integrity to contributing to regional stability and participating in international peacekeeping missions. However, recent discussions have surfaced concerns regarding its ability to effectively fulfil its constitutional obligations amidst evolving security challenges.
The South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) Western Cape Branch held a discussion on the mandate of the SANDF on 10 April. One of the speakers was Professor Abel Esterhuyse, who examined whether the SANDF is currently capable of meeting its wide-ranging domestic and international obligations.
Esterhuyse, from the Department of Strategic Studies in the Faculty of Military Science, Stellenbosch University, emphasised that decreased global funding for peacekeeping missions and a shift towards regionalisation of these efforts present challenges for South Africa, which has a history of involvement in continental peacekeeping.
The SANDF now operates within a “post-peacekeeping era”, characterised by a decline in global support for traditional peacekeeping missions. He noted that this transition poses significant challenges for the SANDF, as funding for peacekeeping missions dwindle and regionalisation and diversification of peacekeeping efforts complicate operational dynamics.
Esterhuyse highlighted challenges faced by the SANDF in its peacekeeping endeavours such as regional rivalries, funding constraints and capacity limitations which often impede peackeeping effectiveness. Esterhuyse stressed the importance of clear strategic outcomes and exit strategies in military missions, lamenting the lack thereof in past deployments.
“The challenge is that the military is part of the solution. But the military is not the solution,” he explained, highlighting the need holistic approaches to peacekeeping.
Esterhuyse further delved into the intricacies of proper defence planning, a process often lacking in South Africa, highlighting the critical – but presently lacking – role of civilian expertise in shaping military strategies. He emphasised the need for public debate and broader political consensus in the defence planning process.
“Defence planning is, in essence, finding a balance between the budget and the threat agenda,” he said. This strategy should be informed by a clear understanding of the security threats facing the nation, both internal and external. Budgetary constraints must also be factored into the equation.
Defence planning and policy, Esterhuyse emphasised, is not a bottom up process. “It is not to come from the military bureaucracy, it is a top down process,” he explained, generated through wide consultations. “Of course, the military should offer information and advice.”
As an example, the 2015 Defence Review failed to consider crucial realities, with Esterhuyse arguing it was conducted in a “threat independent and budget independent” manner.
Esterhuyse told his audience that the role of armed forces has evolved from traditional war fighting to a broader mission encompassing defence management, peacekeeping and even elements of conflict prevention. Soldiers today require a broader skillset that includes diplomacy, civil-military collaboration, and the ability to operate in complex environments, and Esterhuyse questioned whether the South African military is adequately preparing soldiers for this new reality.
He argued that an exclusive focus on human security may have led to underinvestment in traditional military capabilities. This could leave South Africa vulnerable to more conventional threats.
Esterhuyse claimed that the disbanding of Commando units and the loss of intelligence gathering capabilities in the 1990s weakened the military’s ability to address internal threats.
He described the current state of the SANDF as “hollowed out,” lacking sufficient intelligence capabilities and reserve forces. The military structure is criticised for being top-heavy, with too many officers stationed in Pretoria and not enough soldiers deployed operationally. This imbalance hinders the SANDF’s ability to effectively respond to a wide range of security challenges.
Esterhuyse emphasised the importance of bridging the gap between constitutional mandates and operational realities. “With clear strategic objectives and robust planning processes, the SANDF can effectively meet its constitutional obligations and contribute to regional stability and security,” he concluded. (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
18 Apr 24. Philippines-US: Upcoming joint military drills underscore heightened tensions in South China Sea. On 17 April, the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) announced that six of its vessels would take part in the annual joint military drills with the US from 22 April to 10 May. This will be the first time that the Balikatan or ‘shoulder-to-soldier’ drills will involve the PCG and be carried out beyond Philippine territorial waters. More than 16,700 troops will take part. The drills will reportedly involve a simulation of retaking islands occupied by hostile forces. In recent months, there have been several minor collisions between PCG and Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) vessels in the South China Sea. On 11 April, during a trilateral summit between the US, Japan, and the Philippines, the three countries jointly expressed concerns about China’s ‘aggressive behaviour in the South China Sea’. US President Joe Biden stated that US defence commitments to both countries were ‘ironclad’. Beijing has criticised the Balikatan exercises and this burgeoning trilateral military alliance, alleging that both endanger regional security. We assess that there is likely to be an elevated level of coast guard activity by territorial claimants in the South China Sea over the coming months, driving regional tensions. (Source: Sibylline)
18 Apr 24. Benin: Cross-border attack highlights increasing security risks in northern regions. On 16 April, unidentified gunmen attacked a customs office near Malanville (Alibori department) on the Benin-Niger border, killing three people. The incident comes amid an uptick in cross-border attacks in north-eastern Benin. On 20 March, unidentified militants conducted a shooting and arson attack on a police station in Angaradebou (Alibori). Although no group has claimed responsibility for either attack, they were likely conducted by militants associated with the al-Qaeda-aligned Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) or the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), which has expanded its presence in Niger since the July 2023 coup. Further cross-border militant attacks targeting security forces’ positions are highly likely in the coming weeks and months, elevating bystander risks to staff and assets in north-eastern Benin, particularly around checkpoints. In response to rising militant activity, the Benin Armed Forces (FAB) will likely continue augmenting its posture on the Benin-Niger border, elevating disruption to cross-border movement and driving supply chain delays in Niger. (Source: Sibylline)
18 Apr 24. In a rebel-held Myanmar town, fragile unity pushes junta to the brink. Myawaddy, a critical trading post in Myanmar that rebel forces seized from the ruling junta last week, offers a glimpse of dynamics playing out across the Southeast Asian country as its vaunted military reels from battlefield losses.
At the border town’s outskirts, the site of the most intense fighting, abandoned homes sat next to buildings pockmarked with bullet holes, gas stations damaged by blasts and structures flattened by airstrikes, Reuters reporters saw on a visit this week.
Rebels who fought against junta troops in Myawaddy described a demoralised military that was unwilling to hold its ground.
“We managed to seize three bases and control the area in a very short period of time,” said Saw Kaw, a commander of a rebel unit involved in the battle for Myawaddy. “Then, they fled.”
Guards from ethnic militias until recently loyal to the military administration roamed streets in the town – normally a conduit for over $1bn of annual border trade with nearby Thailand. Those fighters stood aside when forces led by the Karen National Union (KNU) laid siege in early April.
Reuters gained rare access to rebel-held territory on Monday and interviewed seven resistance officials for this story, alongside three Thai officials with detailed knowledge of the conflict and four security analysts.
They provided insight into the delicate diplomacy between armed groups with longstanding rivalries as they seek to hold key population centres and keep the junta they want to topple on the backfoot.
The fall of Myawaddy means that Myanmar’s two most important land border crossings are in resistance hands, after the rebels last year claimed control of Muse, near the Chinese border.
Rebel successes have now cut off the cash-strapped junta from almost all the country’s major land borders, with the economy in free-fall and poverty doubling since 2017, according to U.N. data.
The Thailand-based Institute for Strategy and Policy-Myanmar (ISP) think-tank said in an estimate after Myawaddy’s fall that the junta has been deprived of 60% of land-based customs revenue.
It leaves the junta, which has failed to repel any major rebel offensive since October, in its weakest position since its 2021 coup against Aung San Suu Kyi’s elected civilian government, according to analysts.
Neighbours such as Thailand, who were previously focused on engaging the junta, have started to rethink their stance on the conflict.
Thai Vice Foreign Minister Sihask Phuangketkeow told Reuters on Wednesday that Thai security officials have been in communication with the KNU and other groups and that they were “open to more dialogue,” particularly on humanitarian issues.
“We don’t blindly side with the Myanmar military but because we want peace we have to talk to them,” he said.
A junta spokesperson did not respond to calls from Reuters seeking comment.
Junta chief Gen. Min Aung Hlaing has accused rebel groups of seeking to undermine Myanmar’s unity through armed insurgency and his government has called resistance fighters “terrorists.”
The Democratic Karen Buddhist Army and Karen National Army (KNA), the forces still patrolling parts of Myawaddy and its vicinity even after they abandoned the junta, did not return requests for comment. The groups have not pledged loyalty to the resistance.
PATCHWORK OF FIGHTERS
At the western edge of Myawaddy, Col. Nadah Htoo, a senior commander of Brigade 6 of the KNU’s armed wing, one of Myanmar’s oldest ethnic fighting forces, was thinking about next steps after leading the patchwork of resistance fighters that defeated the army in roughly a week.
Surrounded by armed guards as he chewed betel leaves and peered over his Louis Vuitton sunglasses, Nadah Htoo described ongoing talks with other ethnic armed groups about fighting the junta locally. Reuters has also reported that recent coordination between rebel armies in other parts of Myanmar has taken place at an unprecedented level.
For decades, the country of 55 m has been riven by insurgencies along its borderlands, where some two dozen ethnic armed groups operate. Many of them are part of, or supporting, the resistance.
Nadah Htoo and another resistance official acknowledged the challenges of maintaining cooperation over the course of what both expect will be a difficult war against a better-armed military.
“We have to constantly coordinate so there won’t be any mistake,” the colonel told Reuters. He declined to be photographed or filmed until the operation ended, citing security concerns.
In Myawaddy, Reuters observed at least three armed groups coordinating to maintain control, reflecting recent rare cooperation among rebel forces that share a common enemy in the junta but otherwise have different interests.
Most of the rebels who took Myawaddy were ethnic Karen, though they fought along some ethnic Burman members of the national resistance, said rebel commander Saw Kaw.
“The first thing (is that) we don’t kill each other,” said spokesman Saw Taw Nee of tensions between his KNU and other ethnic Karen groups that were allied to the junta until this month. “And then we start from that.”
MEANING OF MYAWADDY
Last October, three rebel groups, including the powerful Arakan Army (AA), led Operation 1027, a major offensive that saw the resistance take wide swathes of military-controlled areas along the border with China.
“After 1027, we saw the AA in Arakan starting to push. When the AA eased, then we decided to push,” said KNU’s Nadah Htoo, describing how different rebel groups were hitting the military with successive offensives across multiple areas.
The junta “is fighting the war on too many fronts,” said Lalita Hanwong, an assistant professor at Thailand’s Kasetsart University.
“If you look back from the beginning of Operation 1027, the towns that the resistance forces seized have never been regained.”
In the battle for Myawaddy, KNU-led forces encircled the town and pushed the local junta administration to the point of collapse before taking over, said Nadah Htoo.
Reuters couldn’t independently verify the tactics he described. The KNU’s armed wing has previously surrounded junta positions before launching decisive assaults.
Some 200 junta troops remain trapped near a bridge between Myawaddy and Thailand, Nadah Htoo told Reuters, saying they could either surrender to the Thais or the KNU.
The colonel and Bangkok-based security analyst Anthony Davis expect the junta to attempt to retake Myawaddy in the coming weeks to hinder resistance access to an important nearby highway that cuts through the heart of Myanmar.
Some army reinforcements have already been repelled by the KNU en route to the town, and Nadah Htoo said KNU’s political administrator would only take control of Myawaddy after the military operation concluded.
The junta is keen to regain control of Myawaddy, a critical trading centre and its main gateway to Southeast Asia, Davis said.
Around 14% of Myanmar’s total trade via land borders between April 2023 and March 2024 – totalling about $1.15 bn – went through Myawaddy, according to government data.
Bar chart with export and import trade data on the Mywaddy border of Myanwar with Thailand.
Control of territory near the borders can also be lucrative: the U.N., and the British government, have in the last year accused senior KNA leaders of using territory near Myawaddy to run scam centres and illegal casinos.
Reuters could not determine how resistance forces have deployed the customs revenue collected at border points they control. The ISP think-tank said trade at some crossings was suspended.
END GAME
Losses around Myanmar’s frontiers have increasingly pushed the army into Myanmar’s Buddhist-dominated heartland, once fertile army recruiting ground.
The junta is now ensnared there in a low-intensity conflict with hundreds of militia groups known as People’s Defence Forces (PDFs), many of whom are aligned with the KNU and a shadow administration that includes members of the deposed civilian government.
The junta remains a formidable opponent likely to retain control over government and the heartland, unless there was a mutiny or external intervention, Morgan Michaels of the International Institute for Strategic Studies wrote in a March analysis.
However, military setbacks closer to central Myanmar could cut off the junta’s access to key transport arteries and deal a major psychological blow to its army, already bleeding troops, said Davis, adding that it could “accelerate its retreat and potential collapse.”
Either way, KNU officials, rebel fighters and analysts foresee more violence and no easy victory, even as the resistance pushes to coordinate operations and retain momentum.
“In our country (there are) so many groups and so many differences,” said Saw Taw Nee. “We will take time and we will be united.” (Source: Reuters)
17 Apr 24. Missiles, drones and warships the priority as Australia plans $32bn defence boost. Australia will boost defence spending by A$50.3 bn ($32bn) over the next decade and reshuffle its weapons programs to emphasise missiles, drones and warships as it looks to the possibility of a Pacific conflict between China and the U.S.
The bulk of the new spending, part of a A$330bn decade-long budget, will only kick in after five years, and ultimately take defence spending to 2.4% of GDP by 2034 from just over 2% today.
Announced by Defence Minister Richard Marles on Wednesday, the new funding reflects new priorities, such as long-range missiles, that Australia believes are necessary in a world where a potential conflict between China and the United States could upend the region.
“The optimistic assumptions that guided defence planning after the end of the Cold War are long gone,” Marles said in a speech at the national press club. “Our environment is characterised by the uncertainty and tensions of entrenched and increasing strategic competition between the United States and China.”
Just over 40%, or up to A$145bn, is set for the navy, including a beefed-up surface fleet, the AUKUS nuclear-powered submarine program as well as other priorities such as the Ghost Shark undersea drone.
A fifth, or up to A$74 bn, will go toward missile-related programs, whose importance was flagged in a review last year. There will be new longer-range missiles for the air force and army, missile defence programs and domestic manufacturing of guided weapons, the review said.
Military bases across the country’s north, where U.S. Marines are based for months of training and exercises each year, will be allocated up to A$18bn for upgrades. (Source: Reuters)
17 Apr 24. China’s military plans more drills near Myanmar border. China will hold air defence and live-fire drills near its border with Myanmar from Wednesday, state media said, in this month’s second round of such exercises as fighting between Myanmar’s ruling junta and rebel forces intensifies.
The drills follow a significant escalation of the conflict last week, when rebel forces captured the Myanmar town of Myawaddy, a key trading outpost near the Thai border, prompting a stream of refugees into Thailand.
State broadcaster CCTV said this week’s drills, by China’s Southern Theater Command, formed part of an annual training exercise, without referring to the fighting in the neighbouring nation.
China’s troops are always prepared to respond to emergencies and will “resolutely safeguard national sovereignty, border stability and the safety of people’s lives and property”, it added.
Myanmar’s military-run government has battled insurgencies on several fronts since overthrowing an elected government in 2021, but defeats in frontier areas since last October have lost it control of tracts bordering Bangladesh, China and India.
Concerned about trade disruptions and an influx of refugees,
China has acted as a mediator in the conflict, which has sent hundreds of thousands fleeing across the border.
But Myanmar’s northern border with China had been relatively calm since ceasefire talks that Beijing brokered in January.
This month’s earlier land and air drills at the Myanmar border also featured no mention of direct links to the conflict in the neighbour’s north.
The world’s biggest election kicks off in India this month,00:0002:51
In January, China called for an immediate ceasefire when five people were hurt in its southwestern province of Yunnan after an artillery shell crossed from Myanmar.
At the time of a live-fire exercise last November, China’s military said armed conflicts in Myanmar had led to casualties and complicated the security situation, adding that it had a responsibility to protect lives and property in border areas.
“It is the responsibility of the (People’s Liberation Army) to safeguard border security,” it added on its website at the time of the drill, which did not involve air force units.
Security warnings by the Chinese embassy in November and December urged citizens to evacuate the key commercial town of Laukkai in Myanmar’s long-restive Kokang region in Shan state.
In 2015, shells from the area landed across the border in Yunnan amid battles between Myanmar government troops and rebels, some just 500 m (540 yards) from the border. (Source: Reuters)
17 Apr 24. Australian National Defence Strategy, Integrated Investment Program to reprioritise funding towards quick capability. Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Richard Marles has formally launched the Albanese government’s National Defence Strategy and a new Integrated Investment Program, with some surprises for the future of the Australian Defence Force.
Defence Connect can reveal the findings of the 2024 National Defence Strategy, one of the principle outcomes of the Albanese government’s 2023 Defence Strategic Review.
The government states that the 2024 National Defence Strategy (NDS), alongside a new look and “rebuilt” Integrated Investment Program (IIP), outlines the government’s strategic framework to guide the significant and urgent changes required to address Australia’s challenging strategic circumstances and deliver an ambitious transformation of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) to an integrated, focused force capable of safeguarding Australia’s security for decades to come.
Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Marles said, “The inaugural National Defence Strategy sets out a clear and priority-driven approach to protecting against threats to Australia and our interests. The National Defence Strategy outlines how we are transforming the ADF and equipping it to survive in a much less-certain world.
The central doctrine of the National Defence Strategy is founded on the concept of “National Defence”, a shift in the nation’s approach to defence, in a doctrine that “harnesses all arms of Australia’s national power to achieve an integrated approach to our security”.
At the cornerstone of Australia’s future defence planning is a “Strategy of Denial” across all domains, land, maritime, air, space and cyber.
The adoption of National Defence also means the ADF will shift to an integrated, focused force designed to address Australia’s most significant strategic risks. This will ensure the ADF has the capacity to:
- Defend Australia and our immediate region.
- Deter through denial any potential adversary’s attempt to project power against Australia through our northern approaches.
- Protect Australia’s economic connection to the region and the world.
- Contribute with our partners to the collective security of the Indo-Pacific.
- Contribute with our partners to the maintenance of the global rules-based order.
In order to deliver these capabilities, the government announced an expansion of the nation’s Defence spending, with the Albanese government investing an additional $5.7bn over the next four years and $50.3 bn over the next decade in Defence funding, above the previous trajectory over that period.
This increase in annual funding will see the Defence budget grow to more than $100bn by 2033–34 – an historic investment, critical to giving effect to the National Defence Strategy.
The Deputy Prime Minister said, “These transformational reforms are designed to ensure that peace, security, and prosperity are maintained in our region. The Albanese government is making an historic investment in Defence and has taken tough decisions to reshape the ADF to meet our strategic circumstances and to keep Australians safe.”
As part of this funding, the 2024 National Defence Strategy is supported by a new Integrated Investment Program, forecasting the nation’s defence spending and capability acquisition objectives over the next decade in order to deliver the “Focused Force”.
The Albanese government has allocated $330bn for the Integrated Investment Program over the decade to 2033–34. This is a significant lift compared to the $270bn allocated for the 10-year period to 2029–30 as part of the 2020 Defence Strategic Update and 2020 Force Structure Plan.
As a result of this funding increase, the Australian Defence Force will undergo a fundamental restructuring, with each of the respective branches set to receive increased funding to deliver the planned capabilities.
This will see the decade-long funding program expending $76bn for undersea warfare, including nuclear submarines and underwater drones, supported by up to $69 bn for new surface ships.
In addition to this, Australia’s guided weapons and explosive ordnance enterprise will see $21bn worth of investment for guided weapons, alongside an investment of $18bn for integrated air and missile defence.
Finally, the plan includes up to $44 bn to transform the Army into an amphibious force modelled on the United States Marine Corps, with the Royal Australian Air Force set to receive $33bn over the next decade.
These investments include an additional $11.1bn over the next decade to deliver the government’s response to the independent analysis of Navy’s surface combatant fleet and an additional $1 bn over the next four years to support targeting, long-range fires, theatre logistics, fuel resilience, and robotic and autonomous systems.
As a result of this increased commitment, Defence funding, as a proportion of gross domestic product, is projected to rise to around 2.4 per cent by 2033–34 – up to 0.3 per cent higher than the spending trajectory set by the former government.
The Deputy Prime Minister added, “To deliver impactful projection, we are making an historic investment in Defence funding – including $330 bn for the Integrated Investment Program over the decade, a significant lift from previous planning.”
Defence Industry Minister Pat Conroy added, “This is a record investment in defence capability and an investment in a future made in Australia, which will not only make the country safer, but also deliver dividends for industry and jobs for hard-working Australians.
“This fully funded plan ensures a continuous pipeline of investment that underscores the Albanese government’s unwavering commitment to developing Australia’s sovereign defence industry,” Minister Conroy added.
The Integrated Investment Program will be revised biennially, in line with the National Defence Strategy cycle, to ensure the government’s investment plans remain aligned with the nation’s strategic settings. (Source: Defence Connect)
16 Apr 24. Austin Meets Virtually With Chinese Defense Minister for First Time. Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III held his first engagement with Adm. Dong Jun, defense minister of China, today via video teleconference at the Pentagon.
The two leaders covered an assortment of topics during their discussion, including defense relations between the U.S. and China, as well as both regional and global security issues.
” … underscored the importance of respect for high seas freedom of navigation guaranteed under international law — especially in the South China Sea — and reiterated that the United States will continue to fly, sail and operate safely and responsibly, wherever international law allows,” Pentagon Press Secretary Air Force Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder said during a briefing.
The secretary reiterated that the U.S. remains committed to its One China Policy, which is guided by the Three Joint Communiques, the Taiwan Relations Act and the Six Assurances.
Austin also discussed Russia’s unprovoked invasion and subsequent war in Ukraine, as well as concerns about recent provocations from North Korea, Ryder said.
The discussion, wherein Austin stressed the importance of keeping military-to-military communication lines between the U.S. and China open, followed a series of other U.S.-China talks dating back to December of last year.
On Dec. 21, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Air Force Gen. CQ Brown, Jr., met virtually with his Chinese military counterpart, People’s Liberation Army Gen. Liu Zhenli. In January, senior U.S. and Chinese defense officials gathered for two days at the Pentagon to discuss defense relations between the two countries. And earlier this month U.S. and Chinese officials met for working-level talks aimed at ensuring professional and safe interactions between the two countries’ air and naval forces.
“The department will continue to engage in active discussions with PRC counterparts about future engagements between defense and military officials at multiple levels, as agreed by President Biden and PRC President Xi Jinping in November 2023,” Ryder said. (Source: U.S. DoD)
15 Apr 24. Pentagon Arctic Policy Official Underscores Critical Role of Alliances in Evolving Region.
Partnerships are critical to the United States’ strategy for ensuring a stable and secure Arctic region, a senior defense official said today.
Esther McClure, the Defense Department’s director of Arctic and oceans policy, said the U.S. and its allies face global competitors that seek to rewrite rules that underpin global security as the Arctic quickly becomes a leading region of great power competition.
“We are facing risks from an increasingly assertive, and even aggressive action by Russia and the People’s Republic of China,” McClure said during a panel discussion on security in the High North hosted by the Atlantic Council, a public policy think tank, in Washington.
“That is the most likely and most dangerous risk at the same time,” she said in surveying the challenges in the Arctic, noting a lack of clarity about Russia and China’s intentions in the region.
The U.S. has long recognized the Arctic as a linchpin to homeland defense. During the Cold War, the Arctic served as an avenue of approach for Soviet bombers and missiles in the event of an attack on the U.S.
Competition in the Arctic has grown exponentially in recent decades, due in part to the thawing of once ice-choked sea lanes brought on by a warming climate, further opening avenues of approach.
The warmer waters also provide access to rich energy and mineral deposits and create potential for disputes about fishing rights as migration patterns shift.
Russia, which accounts for a broad swath of Arctic Ocean coastline has increasingly sought to extend its influence in the region.
China too, has increasingly sought to extend its influence in the region, declaring itself to be a “near-Arctic” nation despite having no Arctic coastline.
The U.S. revealed its National Strategy for the Arctic Region in 2013. That strategy articulated the link between the events in the region and U.S. national interests, and it outlined efforts to safeguard peace and security.
The Defense Department has aligned its blueprint for the Arctic with the whole-of-government strategy for the region. The 2019 DOD Arctic Strategy outlines a desired end-state where “the Arctic is a secure and stable region in which U.S. national security interests are safeguarded, the U.S. homeland is defended and nations work cooperatively to address shared challenges.”
A 2022 update of the National Arctic Strategy noted increasing strategic competition in the region that has been further exacerbated by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
The updated strategy calls for advancing U.S. interests in the Arctic across four pillars including security, environmental protections, sustainable economic development and international cooperation and governance.
DOD will release its updated Arctic Strategy in the coming months, McClure said.
“I think you will see that our end-state, our strategic end-state, has changed much,” she said previewing the updated DOD roadmap. “We still want to preserve the Arctic as a secure and stable region where the homeland is defended, and our vital interests are safeguarded.”
But, she said, DOD does have “real concern” about the erosion of guardrails by competitors in the Arctic as elsewhere.
“We need to shore them up,” she said. “We also need to invest in frameworks for communication to reduce the risk of miscalculation.”
Alliances remain key, McClure said, in accomplishing that strategy.
“We fortunately have an alliance that is stronger and more unified than I have ever seen in my many decades of — first when I was in uniform in the Navy steaming with NATO allies and Partnership for Peace participants and then working in the Europe and the NATO office — I’ve never seen such cohesion,” she said.
“That is our center of gravity,” she added. “But alliances, like gardens, do need tending. Alliance management is an entire line of effort all its own at the Pentagon as we seek to understand the different national perspectives each ally brings to the table and work to coordinate our actions.” (Source: U.S. DoD)
16 Apr 24. Readout of Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III’s Call With People’s Republic of China (PRC) Minister of National Defense Admiral Dong Jun. Pentagon Press Secretary Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder provided the following readout: Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III and Admiral Dong Jun, Minister of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), spoke today via video teleconference. The two officials discussed U.S.-PRC defense relations and regional and global security issues. Secretary Austin emphasized the importance of continuing to open lines of military-to-military communication between the United States and the PRC, following the 17th U.S.-PRC Defense Policy Coordination Talks (DPCTs) in January 2024 and a round of working-level Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) talks in early April 2024. He reaffirmed the announcement by President Biden and PRC President Xi Jinping in November 2023 that both sides will resume telephone conversations between theater commanders. The Secretary also reiterated that the United States will continue to fly, sail, and operate – safely and responsibly – wherever international law allows. Secretary Austin underscored the importance of respect for high seas freedom of navigation guaranteed under international law, especially in the South China Sea. He also discussed Russia’s unprovoked war against Ukraine and expressed concerns about recent provocations from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). The Secretary also reiterated that the United States remains committed to our longstanding one China policy, which is guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the Three U.S.-China Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances, and he reaffirmed the importance of peace and stability across the Strait.
Today’s call follows President Biden’s November 15, 2023 meeting with PRC President Xi Jinping, as well as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. CQ Brown, Jr.’s call via video teleconference with his People’s Liberation Army counterpart on December 21, 2023. The Department will continue to engage in active discussions with PRC counterparts about future engagements between defense and military officials at multiple levels. (Source: U.S. DoD)
15 Apr 24. Austin Notes Success of Territorial Defeat of ISIS in Iraq. This year marks 10 years of the global coalition to defeat ISIS, Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III said today while hosting a meeting and an enhanced honor cordon, to welcome Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani to the Pentagon.
“In 2019, thanks to the courage and sacrifices of the Iraqi security forces and our partners in Operation Inherent Resolve, together, we achieved the territorial defeat of Daesh. But Daesh remains a threat to your citizens and to ours,” Austin said, referring to another name for ISIS.
The U.S. agrees on the need to transition to an enduring bilateral security relationship between the United States and Iraq, he said.
As a part of this transition, an agreement was reached at the inaugural U.S.-Iraq Joint Security Corporation Dialogue in Washington last August to launch the higher military commission, he said.
In that commission, military leaders are conducting joint assessments of key factors to help inform discussions on the upcoming transition, the secretary said.
“These are deep and respectful discussions between partners, which reflect the deep U.S. commitment to regional stability and Iraqi sovereignty. And they show how the U.S.-Iraq relationship is evolving,” Austin said.
Austin noted that on Saturday, Iraq’s minister of defense signed a letter of request for the pricing and availability of counter-unmanned aerial systems from the United States. “That reflects many months of work, and the signing came at an extremely important moment.”
The Iraqi prime minister said this meeting shows the resolve of the Iraqi government to promote its relations with the United States.
“The Iraqi people really appreciate the efforts of the international community to support them to fight ISIS and militarism on its territory,” he said.
Earlier today, President Joe Biden met with al-Sudani in the White House. Biden told the prime minister: “The partnership between Iraq and the United States is critical. We’ve seen over the last decade as our troops have served side by side to help defeat ISIS, and we’ve seen this in our Strategic Framework Agreement as well.” (Source: U.S. DoD)
15 Apr 24. Joint Statement From Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III and Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani.
Today at the Pentagon, Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III welcomed Iraqi Prime Minister Mohamed Shia al-Sudani during his first visit to Washington, D.C. as Prime Minister. The Secretary and the Prime Minister affirmed the two nations’ commitment to an enduring U.S.-Iraq bilateral defense relationship and to a strong Iraq, capable of self-defense in support of a more stable and peaceful region. The Prime Minister of the Republic of Iraq and the Secretary of Defense discussed ongoing U.S.-Iraqi security cooperation, joint efforts to address persistent security threats to the United States and Iraq, and the future of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS mission in Iraq.
The visit occurred one week after the Principals Meeting on April 8 of the U.S.-Iraq Higher Military Commission (HMC), a professional military-to-military dialogue between Iraqi and U.S. military leaders and professionals to determine how and when to end the international coalition and how the D-ISIS Coalition will evolve based on the level of threat from ISIS, the Iraqi Security Forces’ (ISF) capabilities, and other operational and environmental factors.
Secretary Austin thanked Prime Minister Sudani for Iraq’s role in supporting operations by the Global Coalition to ensure ISIS can never reconstitute in Iraq and Syria. The Secretary paid tribute to the immense sacrifices of the Iraqi people and security forces in the fight to liberate ms from ISIS’s genocidal and barbaric rule.
ISIS threatens international security, and Iraq, as a well-positioned and equipped partner, represents a linchpin in the campaign to defeat ISIS by hosting Coalition forces. The Secretary also noted Iraq’s leadership in repatriating more than 4,100 Iraqi nationals from displacement camps and detention facilities in northeastern Syria last year. Prime Minister Sudani affirmed the importance of accelerating such repatriations of Iraqi nationals and facilitating their safe reintegration or, if needed, to hold them accountable for crimes they may have committed through appropriate judicial processes.
Addressing the strategic nature of the U.S.-Iraq bilateral defense relationship and Iraq’s role as leader in ensuring regional security, the Secretary and Prime Minister discussed efforts to modernize the ISF, including Kurdish Peshmerga forces, and build their capabilities. Iraq’s partnership with the United States features Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and a broad range of train and equip activities supporting the security forces funded with the Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund (CTEF). DoD also implements Foreign Military Financing (FMF)-funded defense articles and services and International Military Education and Training (IMET)-professional military education courses on behalf of the Department of State.
The Prime Minister of the Republic of Iraq and the Secretary of Defense hailed the signing of a joint work protocol recognizing the intended FMS purchase by Iraq worth nearly $550M using the new Credit Assured Payment Schedule (CAPS) flexible payment mechanism. Iraq will be the first nation to use the CAPS financing opportunity, for which terms of sale allow Iraq to make payments towards the FMS case over time rather than all up front — a sign of the strength of our partnership now and into the future. The Secretary and Prime Minister also highlighted ongoing efforts between the Department of Defense and Ministry of Defense to secure key sites across Iraq, including the Iraqi Kurdistan Region, from aerial threats.
The Prime Minister of the Republic of Iraq and the Secretary of Defense look forward to Iraq and the United States convening strategic discussions on the future of the U.S.-Iraq security relationship — pursuant to the 2008 U.S.-Iraqi Strategic Framework Agreement — at the second Joint Security Cooperation Dialogue later this year. Both leaders reaffirmed their commitment to an orderly transition to enduring bilateral security partnerships between Iraq and the United States and other countries of the Coalition in accordance with the Iraqi constitution and the strategic framework agreement. (Source: U.S. DoD)
15 Apr 24. Op Vikela is over, SA troops flown back from Mozambique. South Africa’s contribution to the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) is over as per a Presidential authorisation stating it ends today (15 April). Ahead of the end date, SAMIM Public Information Operations Officer Captain Tshepiso Mantjane last week reported on a 7 April farewell parade for the South Africans – one of eight SADC countries providing equipment and troops to the mission in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province. The first contingent to withdraw was Botswana with the now remaining six – Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia – set to exit the east African country by July. That will leave only a contingent from the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF), known as the Rwanda Security Force (RSF), in Mozambique assisting the Mozambique Defence Armed Forces (FADM – Forças Armadas de Defesa de Moçambique) in ongoing efforts to curb attacks by ASWJ (Ansar al-Sunna Wa Jamma) also known as ISIS-M. The SA National Defence Force (SANDF) deployment in support of the regional bloc mission went by the code name Operation Vikela. It saw up to 1 495 personnel, the majority from units in the SA Army Infantry Formation, supported by engineering and logistics personnel as well as SA Air Force (SAAF) and SA Military Health Service (SAMHS), on active duty at any one time for the three-year lifespan of the deployment. Ahead of boarding an aircraft bound for South Africa last week, SAMIM Acting Head J Shikongo Shikongo bid the South African soldiers farewell “at the end of a distinguished tour of duty” where dedication, professionalism and courage was shown in support of Mozambican security forces. As the remaining SADC troop contributing countries (TCCs) move into exit mode the RDF is increasing community policing and civil/military co-operation in Cabo Delgado. This follows reports of Rwanda adding more boots on the ground to its Mozambican commitment. News24 reported RDF International Co-operation Head, Brigadier General Patrick Karuretwa as saying Rwanda would increase the number of its soldiers and make them “more mobile so they can cover larger areas”. The Rwandans will, he said, train Mozambican soldiers “to occupy the places where SAMIM used to be stationed”. The sole indication to date for wrapping up of the regional bloc mission and force in Mozambique came from the country’s foreign minister who said in late March SAMIM would depart in July due to a lack of funds.
Speaking after a meeting between Mozambican President Filipe Nyusi and his Zambian counterpart Hakainde Hichilema, current SADC body on Co-operation in Politics, Defence and Security chair, Veronica Macamo said the regional bloc was “facing some financial problems”.
“We also have to take care of our own troops and we would have difficulty paying for SAMIM”, she was reported by local media in the Zambian capital Lusaka as saying. (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
15 Apr 24. Argentina: President’s affirmation of support for Israel underscores increased security, unrest risks. On 14 April, President Javier Milei led an emergency cabinet meeting to assess national security risks following Iran’s attack on Israel. The meeting led to increased security measures being implemented in the Tri-Border Area (TBA) between Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay. A new intelligence assessment emphasised that the area is vulnerable due to its porous nature. Immediately following the attack, Milei affirmed Argentina’s ‘unwavering commitment’ to Israel. On 12 April, Argentina’s highest court ruled that the 1994 terrorist attack against the Argentina Israelite Mutual Association (AMIA) was ordered by Iran. Bilateral tensions between Argentina and Iran are likely to remain heightened in the short-to-medium term, increasing ethno-religious tensions in the former. Despite enhanced security measures to safeguard Jewish cultural and religious sites in Argentina, we assess that the risk of attacks and anti-Israel protests will remain elevated in the coming days and weeks. (Source: Sibylline)
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