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12 Apr 24. The US is deploying extra military assets near Israel to protect it from a strike by Iran that could come as soon as this weekend.
Officials said they had implemented “force posture changes” and deployed “additional assets” to the region in light of threats by Tehran to strike Israeli territory in retaliation for an air strike on its consulate in Damascus last week.
On Friday, the Pentagon was said to have been expecting an attack in the next 48 hours, which raised the prospect of a direct conflict between Iran and Israel for the first time.
President Joe Biden on Friday said he expected Iran to attack Israel “sooner, rather than later” and warned Tehran not to proceed.
Asked by reporters about his message to Iran, Mr Biden simply said: “Don’t.”
“We are devoted to the defence of Israel. We will support Israel. We will help defend Israel and Iran will not succeed,” he said.
The USS Dwight D Eisenhower, an aircraft carrier, has sailed north through the Red Sea, bringing it closer to Israel, while local media reported Washington was planning to station a missile-equipped vessel close to the Israeli coast.
The Eisenhower is deployed alongside a US Navy cruiser, the USS Philippine Sea, and two destroyers, the USS Gravely and the USS Mason.
An online flight tracker tool showed a cargo plane linked to the aircraft carrier taking off near Yanbu, a Saudi Arabian port city in the northern Red Sea.
The US Navy declined to comment on reports that it had increased its presence in the region amid reports Iran has warned the US not to defend Israel or get involved in the conflict.
John Kirby, the White House’s national security spokesman, told reporters: “I certainly can’t deny that we’ve taken a look at [US deployments] and made some adjustments, but I am not in a position to get into the actual details of what that looks like.”
Separately, the US has increased its presence on existing bases in the Middle East in anticipation of attacks by Iran or its proxy groups, including Hezbollah in Lebanon.
“We are moving additional assets to the region to bolster regional deterrence efforts and increase force protection for US forces,” a defence official said.
The State Department has advised its staff not to travel within Israel until the situation is resolved, while the UK, France, India and Russia have issued travel warnings to their nationals in the region.
There were no visible signs of panic in Israel on Friday as shoppers in Jerusalem went to get groceries and families enjoyed a sunny afternoon on cafe terraces before they closed for the Sabbath.
Israel’s foreign ministry did not comment on reports that some Israeli diplomatic missions had been partially evacuated and security stepped up.
An Iranian attack on Israel in some form has been threatened by the country’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei since the Damascus strike on April 1, which killed a senior Iranian Revolutionary Guards commander, Gen Mohammad Reza Zahedi and six other members of the group.
Israel has not claimed the air strike but is widely believed to have been responsible.
Mr Khamenei said on Wednesday: “When they attacked our consulate area, it was like they attacked our territory. The evil regime must be punished, and it will be punished.”
It is unclear whether Iran’s response would come in the form of missiles from Iranian soil or from its nearby proxies in Lebanon and Syria.
‘We’re taking this seriously’
Western intelligence officials are expecting attacks on military and government buildings in Israel, but do not think civilians will be targeted.
“I can’t speak to what the intelligence picture tells us in terms of the size, scale, scope of what that attack might look like, except to say that we’re taking this seriously,” Mr Kirby said, adding that the threat was “credible”.
“The revenge will come,” wrote Israel’s largest daily newspaper, Yedioth Ahronoth. “For the moment, the premise is that it will be very soon, in the next few days.”
Given its magnitude, a strike on military targets would be challenging for Israel to defend itself against, US officials told CBS News.
The officials said they hoped Iran would opt for a smaller-scale strike. (Source: Daily Telegraph)
12 Apr 24. Region-US: Naval deployment will raise short-term protest risks, regional tensions. On 6 April, the US Southern Command announced that three vessels, including the USS George Washington aircraft carrier, will navigate South America as part of the Southern Seas 2024 deployment. The carrier will be supported by the USS Porter destroyer and a support vessel. As part of the deployment, the vessels will sail near Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Uruguay (with port visits already scheduled for Brazil, Chile and Peru). Joint exercises will also possibly be carried out. The deployment coincides with increased US concerns over rising Chinese economic and political influence in the region, as well as the threat of a Venezuelan military incursion into Guyanese territory. In the medium-to-long term, we assess that regional tensions will likely increase as a result of the naval deployment. During the deployment, there is an elevated risk of protests in response to the US’ military presence. Protests are likely to take place outside US embassies as and when the vessels make port calls. (Source: Sibylline)
12 Apr 24. Cambodia: Plans to construct major canal prompt concerns of Chinese military usage. On 11 April, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet confirmed plans to build a USD 1.7 billion canal connecting the capital Phnom Penh to ports on the Gulf of Thailand. Work on the 112-mile (180km) Funan Techo Canal is planned to start later in 2024 and end in 2028. Hun Manet claimed that the canal would not impact the water flow or fisheries of the Mekong River. The canal would reduce the time, distance and cost of moving cargo across the country. The China Road and Bridge Corporation will reportedly develop the canal under a build-operate-transfer model. This means that the Chinese state-owned company would manage and profit from its operations for 50 years in exchange for funding its construction. Hun has vehemently denied that China, Cambodia’s closest ally, will use the canal for military purposes, though we assess that this is unlikely to assuage US and Vietnamese concerns. (Source: Sibylline)
12 Apr 24. Libya: Armed clashes in Tripoli highlight volatility of security environment, elevated bystander risks. On 11 April, armed clashes involving heavy weapons broke out between the Stability Support Authority (SSA) and the Judicial Police in the capital Tripoli. The clashes erupted after each group detained members of the other. Responding to the clashes, the Tripoli Security Directorate deployed forces at the city’s main road intersections, impacting the road leading to Tripoli International Airport (TIP). As of 12 April, the clashes have subsided following negotiations and the mutual release of detainees. However, the underlying causes of the dispute will persist, as will the fractured nature of Libya’s security environment and the presence of armed competing interests in major cities. This will sustain the risk of sporadic and sudden armed clashes, as well as elevated bystander risks, especially after the detention of individuals affiliated with competing security forces and during disputes over jurisdictions. While the latest clashes are unlikely to resume imminently, we assess that tensions and security risks will remain elevated in the coming days. (Source: Sibylline)
12 Apr 24. Japan-South Korea-US: Trilateral military drills reflect push for deeper security ties in Indo-Pacific. From 10 to 12 April, South Korea, Japan and the US conducted joint naval exercises in the East China Sea. The drills come amid rising concerns over China’s territorial assertiveness and the threat posed by North Korea. They involved a US carrier strike group led by the USS Theodore Roosevelt. The exercises were part of a longstanding plan established after a tri-nation summit last year aimed at bolstering readiness against North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats. The military collaboration featured anti-submarine warfare drills, maritime interdiction exercises to block the transport of illegal weapons and search and rescue operations. Concurrently, South Korean and US defence officials held annual talks in Washington DC, where they reiterated their plans to integrate tabletop simulations of North Korean nuclear attack scenarios into the annual Ulchi Freedom Shield exercise organised jointly in August. This coincided with discussions hosted by US President Joe Biden at the White House on 12 April with the leaders of Japan and the Philippines, where he reaffirmed an ‘ironclad’ US defence commitment to regional allies. These developments reflect ongoing US efforts to strengthen security ties within the Indo-Pacific region in the context of increased regional tensions. (Source: Sibylline)
11 Apr 24. Russia sends military trainers and air-defence system to Niger, says Niger state TV. Military instructors and personnel from Russia’s defence ministry arrived in Niger on Wednesday, Niger state television RTN said, in a further sign the West African country is building closer relations with Moscow like its junta-led neighbours. In a Thursday broadcast, RTN showed footage of a military cargo plane unloading gear as people in fatigues stood by. It said the deployment followed a recent agreement between Niger’s junta and Russian President Vladimir Putin to boost cooperation.
“We are here to train the Nigerien army … (and) to develop military cooperation between Russia and Niger,” said a man in camouflage uniform, who RTN said was one of the instructors.
The man had a neck gaiter pulled up over most of his face while he spoke on camera.
RTN also said Russia had agreed to install an anti-aircraft system in Niger. “Our airspace will now be better protected,” the broadcaster said.
There was no immediate comment from Russia, which has been seeking to boost its influence in Africa, promoting itself as a friendly country without a colonial background on the continent.
The arrival of Russian instructors follows Niger’s decision in mid-March to revoke its military accord with the United States that had allowed Pentagon personnel to operate on its soil out of two bases, including a drone base it built at a cost of more than $100 million.
The Pentagon later said U.S. officials had expressed concerns to Niger about its potential development of ties with Russia before the junta broke off the accord governing roughly 1,000 U.S. military personnel there.
Since 2020, a string of military coups in Niger and neighbouring Mali and Burkina Faso have followed a similar playbook and reshaped international efforts to curb a decade-old fight with Islamist insurgents linked to Al Qaeda and Islamic State.
The three juntas have ended military deals with longstanding allies including France, fostered closer ties with Russia, and formed their own cooperation pact known as the Alliance of Sahel States (AES).
Violence in the region has worsened since the coups. It hit a high in 2023, with conflict fatalities in the central Sahel rising by 38% compared with the previous year, according to U.S.-based crisis-monitoring group ACLED, citing reports of over 8,000 people killed in Burkina Faso alone last year.
The instability has fuelled a long-running humanitarian crisis in the region bordering the Sahara desert, already one of the world’s poorest. As of March, over 3 million people were displaced there, the International Organization of Migration said on Monday. (Source: Reuters)
11 Apr 24. Joint Press Statement for the 24th Korea-U.S. Integrated Defense Dialogue. The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and the Republic of Korea (ROK) Ministry of National Defense (MND) held the 24th Korea-U.S. Integrated Defense Dialogue (KIDD) on April 11, 2024 in Washington. Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs, Dr. Ely Ratner, and Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for East Asia, Mr. Andrew Winternitz, led the U.S. delegation. Deputy Minister (DEPMIN) for National Defense Policy, Mr. Cho Chang-rae, led the ROK delegation. Key senior U.S. and ROK defense and foreign affairs officials also participated in the dialogue. In a plenary session, both sides had an in-depth discussion focusing on the three key pillars of the ‘Defense Vision of the U.S.-ROK Alliance’ agreed to by the ROK and the United States at the 55th Security Consultative Meeting (SCM): enhancing extended deterrence efforts against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), modernizing Alliance capabilities by evolving into a science and technology alliance, and strengthening solidarity and regional security cooperation with like-minded partners. Both sides agreed the KIDD was the primary forum to review and report on implementation of specific tasks in accordance with the Defense Vision of the U.S.-ROK Alliance to the SCM. They committed to continue assessing ways to synchronize and align U.S.-ROK bilateral defense mechanisms and engagements to effectively and efficiently support discussions on strengthening the U.S.-ROK Alliance and the combined defense posture. First of all, the two sides expressed concerns that the DPRK’s continued provocations and advancing nuclear and missile capabilities are destabilizing the Korean Peninsula and the region, and shared their assessments of the security environment. Both sides committed to demonstrating the strength of the Alliance through close and coordinated bilateral responses to DPRK provocations, threats, and activities that undermine regional peace and stability. In that vein, the U.S. side affirmed its ironclad commitment to extended deterrence through regularly visible U.S. strategic asset deployments, and to support the establishment of the ROK Strategic Command to enhance deterrence against the DPRK nuclear and missile threats. In addition, the U.S. side reaffirmed its enduring and ironclad commitment to the defense of the ROK, leveraging the full range of U.S. military capabilities — including nuclear, conventional, missile defense, and advanced non-nuclear capabilities — and reiterated that any nuclear attack by the DPRK against the United States or its Allies and partners is unacceptable and will result in the end of the Kim regime.
The two delegations discussed the DPRK’s expanding military cooperation with Russia, which violates United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs). Both agreed that expanded DPRK-Russian military cooperation, particularly the transfer of weapons and high-technology, undermined peace and stability in both Europe and the Indo-Pacific region including the Korean Peninsula and pledged to respond in a close coordination with the international community. The two sides also acknowledged the importance of full implementation of UNSCRs by the entire international community, including Russia and other members of the Security Council, and reaffirmed that these efforts supported the denuclearization of the DPRK.
Both sides assessed that the recent FREEDOM SHIELD exercise 24 (FS 24), which applied a new concept of operations, enhanced the Alliance’s crisis management, and strengthened deterrence and defense against advancing DPRK threats. In addition, the two sides affirmed the plan to execute a TTX reflecting a DPRK nuclear use scenario, consistent with the Washington Declaration and as agreed by the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG), and pledged that U.S.-ROK combined exercises would stay responsive to the rapidly changing security environment on the Korean Peninsula. They also agreed that it was imperative for the Alliance to conduct practical combined exercises and trainings, and acknowledged the need to improve realistic training conditions for U.S. and South Korean troops, including through the joint use of ROK facilities and airspace for mutually-agreed training.
The two sides agreed to further modernize Alliance capabilities by leveraging their science and technology to bring cutting-edge technologies to the warfighter, in accordance with the Defense Vision of the U.S.-ROK Alliance. They commended the accomplishments of the Cyber Cooperation Working Group (CCWG) including the U.S.-ROK Cyber Alliance exercise in January 2024. In addition, both sides noted that the ROK’s recently launched military reconnaissance satellite is an important asset and contribution to extending the U.S.-ROK combined capabilities for surveillance and reconnaissance. The two sides pledged to continue cooperation through the Space Cooperation Working Group (SCWG) to strengthen the Alliance’s space capabilities. In addition, both sides urged the working groups to focus on initiatives to enhance mission assurance and resilience against evolving threats. The leaders agreed that science and technology (S&T) cooperation needs to be strengthened in areas such as artificial intelligence, autonomous technology and next-generation communications, and that fields of S&T cooperation should contribute to Alliance policy established by the SCM. In that vein, the two sides discussed the way forward to establish a ROK-U.S. senior-level committee to enable science and technology cooperation and reviewed a ROK proposal to organize a U.S.-ROK joint defense science and technology conference.
The two sides agreed that cooperation to develop advanced technologies also supports shared efforts to enhance the defense industrial base of both the United States and ROK, respectively. The two delegations had an in-depth discussion on the Defense Department’s progress to develop a Regional Sustainment Framework to facilitate logistics in a contested environment as well as cooperation to distribute Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul capabilities in the Indo-Pacific. The U.S. side noted the ROK’s efforts to collaborate on MRO initiatives, and affirmed that such cooperation is in accordance with the direction of enhancing the Alliance’s posture and capabilities. The two leaders also agreed to enhance progress on development of a Reciprocal Defense Procurement Agreement to provide reciprocal market access, which will enhance supply chain resiliency and strengthen defense cooperation between the United States and the ROK.
The two sides reaffirmed the long-standing contribution made by the United Nations Command (UNC) to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, and committed to strengthening UNC. Both sides appreciated that the results of the ROK-UNC Member States Defense Ministerial Meeting held in Seoul in November 2023 demonstrated the commitment and resolve of UNC Member States to implement, manage, and enforce the observation of the Armistice Agreement and to be united upon any renewal of hostilities or armed attack on the Korean Peninsula. The U.S. side expressed its appreciation for ROK’s efforts to continue strengthening cooperation between the ROK, UNC, and UNC Member States by regularizing meetings, and both sides agreed to work closely together.
The KIDD delegations applauded the efforts of the Conditions-based Operational Control (OPCON) Transition Working Group, noting progress towards the transition of wartime OPCON to the Future Combined Forces Command. In particular, the two sides reviewed the progress on this year’s bilateral evaluation on the capabilities and systems, and exchanged views on OPCON issues including the transition of Combined Component Commands to standing component commands. In addition, the two leaders reaffirmed their shared commitment to meeting the three conditions under the bilaterally approved Conditions-based OPCON Transition Plan (COTP) in a systematic and stable manner to strengthen the Alliance combined defense capabilities.
During an Executive Session, ASD Ratner and DEPMIN Cho emphasized the important contribution of the Tailored Deterrence Strategy to deter and respond to advancing DPRK nuclear and missile threats, and welcomed the ongoing efforts of the NCG that contribute to this effect. DEPMIN Cho stressed the importance of ROK-U.S. integrated extended deterrence to the combined posture. The two leaders agreed that the consultation process enabled by the SCM provides the necessary oversight and guidance for combined plans and operations executed in defense of the Alliance.
The two leaders also stressed the importance of trilateral cooperation with Japan, and reviewed the unprecedented progress achieved since the historic Camp David Summit. The U.S. and ROK leaders shared the view that trilateral cooperation with Japan is critical to achieve shared security goals on the Korean Peninsula and in the Indo-Pacific region. Both sides welcomed the successful activation of a three-way data sharing mechanism for early missile warning information against DPRK threats, as well as the regularization of trilateral exercises. The two sides pledged to work through the Defense Trilateral Talks to deepen cooperation in response to the regional security environment, with a focus on operations in various domains.
The U.S. and ROK sides also reviewed the development of the Alliance into a globally comprehensive strategic relationship grounded in shared values and interests. Both sides concurred that it is important to make joint efforts to promote defense and security cooperation in the region. In that vein, reviewing progress from the Regional Cooperation Working Group, the two sides agreed to continue pursuit of security cooperation initiatives that promote regional peace and stability. In addition, both sides concurred on the importance of preserving peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait as reflected in the April 2023 “Joint Statement in Commemoration of the 70th Anniversary of the Alliance between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea.”
ASD Ratner and DEPMIN Cho agreed that the 24th KIDD provided guidance to continue deep and transformative Alliance cooperation in support of our shared values and interests. In particular, both sides assessed that the KIDD laid a foundation for a practical implementation of the Defense Vision of the U.S.-ROK Alliance and emphasized the Alliance’s decisive and overwhelming combined defense posture. The two leaders commended the U.S. and ROK military and civilian personnel that worked to strengthen the bond of the Alliance, and expressed appreciation for their shared commitment and sacrifice. (Source: U.S. DoD)
11 Apr 24. U.S., Japan Military-to-Military Relationship Reaches ‘New Heights.’ Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III met at the White House with President Joe Biden and Prime Minister Fumio Kishida of Japan yesterday to participate in discussions related to strengthening the U.S. and Japan relationship.
“Our defense and security ties with Japan form the core of our alliances and are the cornerstone of regional peace and security in the Indo-Pacific,” Pentagon Press Secretary Air Force Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder said during a briefing today at the Pentagon.
“Recognizing that the alliance has reached new heights, we plan to further bolster our defense and security cooperation to allow for greater coordination and integration, he said.”
As part of the effort to enhance U.S. and Japan security cooperation, both nations agreed to, for instance, an upgrading of alliance command and control. Doing so would enable better integration of operations and capabilities, plus allow for greater interoperability as well as planning between U.S. and Japanese forces in peacetime and during contingencies.
Also discussed were efforts at bolstering regional networked security. Both countries will cooperate on a networked air defense architecture, incorporating future capabilities with Australia. That includes looking at enhanced cooperation in missile defense information sharing.
The U.S. and Japan also agreed to a deepening of defense industry cooperation, where both nations plan to leverage respective industrial bases to establish an alliance defense production capacity to meet the demand for critical capabilities over the long term.
Ryder said there were dozens of deliverables that came out of the discussions but did not have a specific timeline to share. But he did say that the Defense Department stands ready to do what’s asked of it to help the U.S. strengthen the partnership with its long-time ally in the Pacific.
“We are working hard across all levels of the department to deliver on the agreements made by our national leaders and of course doing so in very close concert with our Japanese allies,” he said. (Source: U.S. DoD)
11 Apr 24. Russia has procured ballistic missiles and artillery shells from North Korea for direct use against Ukraine: UK statement at the UN Security Council.
Statement by Ambassador Barbara Woodward at the UN General Assembly meeting on North Korea’s illegal nuclear and ballistic missile programmes.
On 28 March, Russia vetoed a draft UN Security Council resolution to renew the mandate for the important work of the 1718 committee’s Panel of Experts, which upholds the global non-proliferation regime. This veto completely disregards resolutions Russia has previously voted for; resolutions which protect the non-proliferation regime and international peace and security.
As a result of Russia’s veto, the UN membership will no longer receive reports from the Panel about North Korea’s accelerating nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. It will not receive Panel updates about North Korea’s and Russia’s sanction evasion practices, which now risk going unreported.
This veto was designed to conceal Russia’s partnership with North Korea and make it easier for North Korea to escalate its unlawful weapons programmes. In turn, this enables Russia to breach and evade UN sanctions to get arms and ammunition from North Korea for its illegal invasion of Ukraine.
The Security Council, and this Assembly, know Russia has procured several dozen ballistic missiles and millions of artillery shells from North Korea, for direct use against Ukraine, Ukraine’s people, and civilian infrastructure.
So with this veto, Russia has abused its position as a permanent member of this Council to undermine the global non-proliferation regime and global security.
But let’s be clear to Russia: the UN sanctions regime remains in place. And the UK remains committed to holding North Korea to account for its attempts to evade UN sanctions.
In conclusion, President, I wish to extend our deep gratitude to the 1718 Panel of Experts, and to the United States for their work as penholder in the Security Council. The Panel’s credible, objective, and independent reporting enabled the international community to monitor the implementation of UN sanctions and helped to prevent North Korea’s unlawful and dangerous development of nuclear and ballistic missile programmes.
We will continue to work with all Member States to ensure oversight and implementation of UN sanctions on North Korea in support of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and to uphold international peace and security. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)
09 Apr 24. DRC-Rwanda crisis: what’s needed to prevent a regional war. In the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), South African, Burundian and Tanzanian troops are fighting against the Rwandan army, which has deployed in support of the rebellion by the March 23 Movement, or M23. Soldiers from South Africa, Tanzania, and Burundi, as well as from the United Nations peacekeeping mission, have recently suffered casualties. In the crossfire, civilians have fled: seven m Congolese are now displaced due to this and multiple other crises in the DRC. Diplomats are concerned: the conflict in the eastern DRC was the subject of a special meeting at the United Nations Security Council on 20 February 2024 and a mini-summit on the sidelines of the African Union annual meeting of heads of state on 16 February.
Rwanda, which has denied backing M23, says the Rwandan rebel group – Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) – which includes combatants who participated in the 1994 genocide, has been fully integrated into the Congolese army. It also claims that the Congolese government is engaged in “massive combat operations” aimed at expelling Congolese Tutsi civilians.
The Congolese government has mounted a campaign against Rwanda. In December, while he campaigned for re-election, President Félix Tshisekedi compared his Rwandan counterpart to Adolf Hitler and accused him of expansionist aims.
In January, the Burundian president Évariste Ndayishimiye closed his border with Rwanda and accused the country of backing rebels against him. He stopped just short of calling for Kagame’s ouster.
We have been working on the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo for around 20 years. This wave of violence resembles previous ones, but is also different. At the root of the M23 conflict are countries such as Rwanda and Uganda, intent on projecting power and influence into the eastern DRC, while the Congolese government seems incapable and often unwilling to stabilise its own territory. Donors and United Nations peacekeepers provide humanitarian aid, but do little to transform these dynamics.
Resolving this crisis will require less hypocrisy from foreign donors, the end of Rwandan aggression, and a more accountable Congolese government. But the hopes of a grand bargain are far off, for now. The current peace processes – a “Nairobi process” for domestic negotiations and a “Luanda process” for regional talks – are dead or on life support.
The upcoming elections in Rwanda (July 2024) and the US (November 2024) will likely not help cool heads or focus minds. But it is clear that ending the violence will require a new approach, one that places the lives of innocent Congolese civilians at its centre.
Beginning of regional escalation
During the early days of his presidency, Tshisekedi’s army collaborated intensely with the Rwandan army, allowing troops to conduct operations against the FDLR on Congolese territory in 2019 and 2020. In late 2019, his government even recommended dropping charges against the M23 commanders, then in exile.
Less than three years after winning power, however, Tshisekedi changed his approach, breaking his coalition with his predecessor, Joseph Kabila, and moving to cement his position in power. He declared a state of siege in two eastern provinces, shuffled generals around in the army, and sidelined key securocrats. He also shifted gears in his regional relations.
By mid-2021, Tshisekedi had begun to privilege relations with Uganda, then a bitter rival of Rwanda. Notably, Tshisekedi gave permission to the Ugandan army to deploy somewhere between 2 000 and 4 000 troops to hunt down Allied Democratic Forces rebels, an Islamist Ugandan rebellion based in the eastern DRC. Shortly after that, he did the same for the Burundian army, which had its sights on RED-Tabara, rebels based in the DRC seeking to overthrow the government of Ndayishimiye.
Rwanda suddenly felt isolated, even vulnerable, surrounded by hostile neighbours. According to United Nations investigators, it probably resumed throwing its weight behind the M23 in November 2021. It is above all these regional tensions, coupled with its goal of maintaining influence in the Congo, that pushed it to move.
Since then, the regional fault lines have shifted. Rwanda has patched up relations with Uganda, and the East African Community intervention force – Kenyan, South Sudanese, Burundian and Ugandan troops – that deployed in 2022 to help quell the violence was asked to leave just a year later. This is because their hosts saw them as dragging their feet, if not complicit with the M23. Tshisekedi, who came into office seeing east African countries as allies, has now turned southwards.
Military changes in eastern DRC
Beginning in late 2023, a new force from the Southern African Development Community (SADC) began deploying troops from South Africa, Tanzania and Malawi to take the fight to the M23, alongside the Burundian army.
Already, these forces have begun to take casualties. Two South African soldiers were killed on 14 February by a mortar strike; two others were injured when their helicopter took fire. Some sources indicate that Burundian soldiers have taken heavy losses. Three Tanzanian soldiers were killed on 8 April by an M23 mortar attack.
The rising degree of military sophistication also raises eyebrows. The US government has accused Rwanda of deploying surface-to-air missiles, UN officials have reported armed drones striking their bases, while Tanzania has sent Soviet-era BM-21 Grad rocket launchers. The DRC has bought nine Chinese CH-4 combat drones (three of which have reportedly been shot down already).
Meanwhile, the Congolese army has partnered with private security contractors as well as with an array of local militia, collectively dubbed Wazalendo (patriots), who are poorly trained and disciplined. There are credible reports from late 2023 that, as in the previous year, they are also partnering with the Rwandan FDLR rebels.
And yet, the Congolese government has been unable to make much headway. In early February, M23 forces surrounded the lakeside town of Sake, just 30km west of the provincial capital Goma. This most recent push has displaced another 135,000 people toward Goma; there are around half a m displaced people around the town now.
Mixed signals
Unlike the previous M23 crisis, influential foreign actors have sent mixed signals. At the UN Security Council on 20 February, the US and France called on Rwanda to withdraw their troops from the DRC. The US has gone the furthest of all of Rwanda’s donors, sanctioning a Rwandan general, suspending all military aid, and attempting to broker a ceasefire in December 2023.
And yet, the US remains, by far, the largest donor to Rwanda, which receives the equivalent of around a third of its budget in aid. Other countries have pushed much less or not at all. While the M23 rebellion was going on, the British Commonwealth held its big biannual meeting in Kigali in 2022 and the UK struck a controversial asylum deal with Rwanda.
The EU gave US$22 m to support the deployment of the Rwanda Defence Force in Mozambique. On 19 February, the EU announced a deal to boost mineral exports from Rwanda.
This last piece of news caused an uproar in the DRC, touching on the popular belief that minerals are the root of the crisis. While the causes of the violence are far more complex than that, they have a point: the largest export from Uganda (56% in 2021), Rwanda (23%), and Burundi (29%) in recent years has been gold, almost all of which is smuggled to their countries from the DRC.
In the long term, the DRC government will need to undertake a host of reforms to quell these cycles of conflict. They include reforming the Congolese army, a new demobilisation programme for armed groups, an economic development programme that would allow Congolese to benefit from their resources, a plan for communal reconciliation, and an end to discrimination against Kinyarwanda speakers. But none of that can happen as long as Congo’s neighbours continue to destabilise it.
Written by Jason Stearns, Assistant Professor, School for International Studies, Simon Fraser University, and Joshua Z Walker, Director of Programs, Congo Research Group, Center on International Cooperation, New York University. (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
09 Apr 24. Botswana exits SAMIM as Rwanda grows troop numbers. The withdrawal of the Botswana Defence Force (BDF) contingent to the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) last week is the first troop contributing country (TCC) exit ahead of mission closure in July – three years after it deployed in the east African country.
The BDF contingent, according to SAMIM Public information Operations Officer Captain Tshepiso Mantjane, had been operational in Cabo Delgado since October last year and, along with other TCCs was part of offensive operations to neutralise terrorists as well as engage in quick impact projects. These are mission initiatives to better the lives of local residents returning home after being displaced by terrorist actions.
SAMIM Acting Head of Mission Mr J Shikongo Shikongo and SAMIM Force Commander Major General Patrick Dube, according to Mantjane, told a farewell parade on 5 April for the Botswana contingent their “commitment, resilience, and determination” coupled with the overall joint efforts of the mission will have “a positive and lasting impact”.
Other troop contributing countries (TCCs) to the multi-prong mandated SADC mission are Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Malawi, South Africa, Tanzania and Zambia.
The SAMIM mandate includes supporting Mozambique to combat terrorism and acts of violent extremism in Cabo Delgado by neutralising the terrorist threat and restoring security to create a secure environment. Other mandate points are strengthening and maintaining peace and security, restoring law and order in affected areas of Cabo Delgado and supporting Mozambique, in collaboration with humanitarian agencies, in providing humanitarian relief to Mozambicans affected by terrorist activities, including internally displaced persons (IDPs).
Mozambique Foreign Minister Veronica Macamo has to date been the only person to provide a reason for the SAMIM shutdown. In late March she was reported as saying SAMIM will depart in July due to a lack of funds.
“SAMIM is facing some financial problems. We also have to take care of our own troops and we would have difficulty paying for SAMIM”, she is reported by local media in the Zambian capital Lusaka as saying. “Our countries are not managing to raise the necessary money”.
Macamo was speaking post a meeting between Mozambican President Filipe Nyusi and his Zambian counterpart Hakainde Hichilema, current SADC body on Co-operation in Politics, Defence and Security chair.
Macamo told media given its budgetary limitations the Southern African regional bloc opted to prioritise its mission in the DRC (SAMIDRC) ahead of SAMIM.
Rwanda, meanwhile, plans to send more troops to Mozambique. Brigadier General Patrick Karuretwa, head of international cooperation in the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF), told journalists in Kigali that additional Rwandan soldiers would help fill the gap left by SAMIM’s departure, News24 reported.
“We shall train Mozambican soldiers to occupy the places where SAMIM used to be stationed. We are also increasing the number of our own forces, and making them more mobile, so that they can cover larger areas,” he said.
The logistics for the new Rwandan contingent will apparently be financed by the European Union. Last week, the European Union said it will disburse roughly 20 m euros to assist the Rwandan mission in Cabo Delgado, under the EU programme for the promotion of world peace
Rwanda some 2 500 troops and police in Mozambique, under a bilateral agreement with Mozambique and outside the SADC arrangement.
Although violence in Cabo Delgado has been declining, there have been recent spikes this year, with attacks in southern Cabo Delgado causing the displacement of thousands of people. Since 2017, conflict has displaced one m people internally and resulted in 5 000 killed.
(Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
11 Apr 24. China sanctions two US defence firms for selling Taiwan weapons. China has banned the senior executives of two U.S. defence companies from entering the country and frozen their property in response to their arms sales to Taiwan, the foreign ministry said on Thursday.
The measures effective from Thursday were against General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, which manufactures unmanned aerial systems, and military vehicle maker General Dynamics Land Systems, a unit of General Dynamics.
China said the arms sales “seriously interferes” in its internal affairs and “damages” China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
“The continued sale of arms by the United States to China’s Taiwan region is a serious violation of the one-China principle and the provisions of the three joint communiqués of the United States and China,” it said.
China said it has frozen the firms’ properties in China and banned their senior executives from entering the country. Both companies did not immediately reply to a request for comment. Last year, China imposed sanctions against U.S. aerospace and defence firms Northrop Grumman and Lockheed Martin, also for providing weapons to Taiwan. Taiwan said its annual war games this year will practice “kill” zones at sea to break a blockade and simulate repelling a Chinese drill around the island that turns into an actual attack. China, which views democratically governed Taiwan as its territory, has been staging regular exercises around the island for the past four years, to pressure Taipei to accept Beijing’s claim of sovereignty, despite Taiwan’s strong objections. The United States is holding a series of security discussions with several countries this week. The U.S., Britain and Australia, under the AUKUS security pact, talked about cooperation with Japan, while U.S. separately said it will change military command posture in Japan to allow better coordination and boost deterrence in the face of Chinese pressure. The U.S. will also hold a trilateral summit with Japan and Philippines on Thursday that will discuss Beijing’s growing pressure in the South China Sea. (Source: Google/Yahoo!/Reuters)
11 Apr 24. US-Philippines-Japan: Military co-operation signals increased US concern over Chinese aggression. On 10 April, lawmakers in the US Senate introduced a bipartisan bill to provide the Philippines with USD 2.5 bn to boost its defences against China. The funds aim to modernise the deterrence capabilities of the US-Philippines alliance. Later on April 11, President Biden is set to meet with President of the Philippines Ferdinand Marcos and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida. This trilateral summit will build on the 10 April meeting between Biden and Kishida, which resulted in a plan to upgrade Japan’s military command and control functions to facilitate closer co-ordination in the Indo-Pacific. In the short term, bipartisan concern over China will likely ensure swift passage of the spending bill. Enhanced military co-operation will likely sustain close US-Japan relations. In the long term, the US will look to enhance its relationship with the Philippines to further mitigate the risk of Chinese aggression in the West Philippine Sea and South China Sea. (Source: Sibylline)
11 Apr 24. Russia: Counter-terrorism mission underscores threat of militant activity in North Caucasus. Russia’s National Antiterrorism Committee (NAK) reported earlier on 11 April that law enforcement killed two armed militants during a counter-terrorism operation in the Muslim-majority North Caucasus Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria. According to the agency, they were members of a gang (that is allegedly part of an unspecified international terrorist organisation) who were planning to commit several acts of sabotage and terrorism in the region. The NAK said the operation took place on the outskirts of the regional capital Nalchik. Local media reported that it is the first time since July 2021 that the authorities have introduced counter-terrorism measures in Kabardino-Balkaria. On 31 March, Russian security forces conducted a counter-terrorism operation in the Republic of Dagestan (also in the North Caucasus and a Muslim-majority region). We assess that the volatile North Caucasus will remain vulnerable to ongoing Islamist militant activity in the long term, despite the security services’ attempt to counter such threats. (Source: Sibylline)
11 Apr 24. Iran-Region: Airline suspension, possible military drills highlight rising regional tensions. On 10 April, German airline Lufthansa announced the continued suspension of flights to Iran until at least 13 April, citing increasing security concerns. The move comes amid significantly elevated regional tensions linked to Israel’s strike on an Iranian consulate building in the Syrian capital Damascus on 1 April, which killed seven Iranian military personnel. There is a realistic possibility of further flight suspensions over the coming days, increasing travel disruption risks, particularly at Tehran’s Imam Khomeini International Airport (IKA). Also, on 10 April, Iran’s Mehr news agency issued and later retracted an announcement indicating the temporary closure of Tehran’s airspace for military drills. The statement highlights increasing risks of Iranian retaliation for the consulate strike over the coming days. Although direct Iranian strikes on Israel remain unlikely, Iran has likely directed its proxies (including Lebanese Hizballah) to escalate attacks on Israel, increasing conflict escalation risks. Intensifying cross-border clashes will likely increase physical security, bystander and operational disruption risks throughout. (Source: Sibylline)
11 Apr 24. Burkina Faso: Security forces will possibly use excessive force to disperse opposition sit-in. On 12 April, the civil society group the Mouvement Servir et Non se Servir (SENS) will hold a sit-in protest in front of the National Security Directorate in the capital Ouagadougou, from 0900-1000hrs (local time). The protest is to demand the release of the SENS national coordinator and human rights lawyer, Guy Hervé Kam, as well as several others. Kam has been detained arbitrarily since 24 January despite an administrative court demanding his release on 7 March. Authorities will almost certainly implement a heightened security presence surrounding the protest, driving risks of localised transportation disruption. There is a realistic possibility that security forces will use excessive dispersal tactics, including tear gas and even gunfire, particularly if the sit-in is highly attended or disruptive. This would also heighten arbitrary arrest risks for attendees. As such, physical risks to bystanders and assets will remain elevated in the vicinity of the protest action. (Source: Sibylline)
11 Apr 24. Mali: Ban on political activity increases risks of demonstrations, security force crackdown. On 10 April, the military government announced a ban on political parties and organised political activity. The ban comes amid a broader crackdown on dissent, with the junta having dissolved four civil society groups since December 2023. These measures highlight increasing junta concerns over rising anti-government sentiment linked to poor socio-economic conditions, the deteriorating security environment and continued delays to elections. Over the coming days, there is a realistic possibility that opposition movements and religious leaders will call for demonstrations in the capital Bamako, elevating domestic unrest risks. Regardless of demonstration size, security forces are highly likely to employ heavy-handed techniques to disperse attendees, including tear gas and live ammunition, increasing bystander risks. The junta’s effective repression of the opposition and continued military support will likely mitigate threats to government stability in the short term. The ban will also increase risks of harassment and detention for individuals associated with the opposition, including activists, journalists and NGO staff. (Source: Sibylline)
11 Apr 24. China-Taiwan: Former president’s visit to China unlikely to herald stronger cross-strait ties. On 10 April, Chinese President Xi Jinping met with Taiwan’s ex-president Ma Ying-jeou in Beijing. The former Kuomintang (KMT) aligned president promoted closer ties with China during his time in office (2008-2016) and the two leaders met for a historic summit in Singapore in 2015. Cross-strait relations have substantially deteriorated under Ma’s successor, the independence-leading President Tsai Ing-wen of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Ma’s visit to China, which he called a ‘journey of peace’, comes after he became the first former Taiwanese president to visit the country in 2023. During their meetings, Xi expressed support for the ‘1992 consensus’ and ‘the peaceful development of cross-strait relations’. Ma stated that he was against Taiwanese independence. Given the KMT does not control the presidency and Ma’s relative lack of influence in Taiwan in the current day, his trip is unlikely to have a tangible positive impact on relations. Nonetheless, Xi’s rhetoric and the positive portrayals of the visit in Chinese state media highlight that dialogue and achieving unification without force remains Beijing’s preferred resolution to cross-strait tensions. (Source: Sibylline)
10 Apr 24. Japan Enhances Military Capabilities with Upgraded Aircraft Carrier. Japan has successfully completed the first phase of upgrading the JS Kaga, transitioning the vessel from a helicopter to an aircraft carrier, a move that reintroduces aircraft carrier capabilities to the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) for the first time since World War II. The Kaga, which has been serving as a multi-purpose operation destroyer, underwent modifications to host the F-35B Lightning II, a vertical take-off variant of the stealth fighter jet. The upgrade involves significant changes to the Kaga’s deck and the application of a heat-resistant coating to accommodate the F-35B’s jet engines. This development is part of Japan’s strategic response to rising regional tensions, particularly concerning maritime security. The transformation of the Kaga is a clear indication of Japan’s intent to bolster its military capabilities, albeit within the confines of its pacifist constitution, which renounces war as a means of settling international disputes. Despite the enhancement of Japan’s military assets, analysts maintain that the Kaga’s upgrade, by itself, is unlikely to shift the balance of power in the region dramatically. The strategic significance of this upgrade lies in its contribution to Japan’s overall defense strategy rather than serving as a standalone solution to regional challenges. The JMSDF plans to similarly upgrade the JS Izumo, Kaga’s sister ship, reflecting a broader move towards enhancing Japan’s maritime self-defense and collective security efforts. This initiative does not signify a departure from Japan’s defensive posture but rather an adaptation to the changing security landscape in the Pacific. The introduction of the upgraded Kaga and the planned modification of the Izumo come as Japan seeks to navigate the complexities of regional geopolitics and assert its role as a formidable maritime force. While Japan continues to adhere to its constitution’s pacifist principles, the reinterpretation of Article 9 under former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has provided a legal framework for more proactive defense measures, including the right to collective self-defense. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
10 Apr 24. Armenia-Azerbaijan: Ceding villages is unlikely to mitigate conflict risks fully in longer term. Earlier on 10 April, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan stated that Yerevan is open to initiating border delineation in Armenia’s north-eastern Tavush province, as well as discussions over the return of four disputed villages to Azerbaijan. Pashinyan stated that while border delimitation in Tavush does not guarantee Armenian security, refusing to resolve the issue ensures the continuation of threats against Armenia and ‘absolutely’ guarantees a new attack by Azerbaijan. The remarks come amid an uptick in reports by both sides of border provocations in recent days. Azerbaijani Deputy Prime Minister Shahin Mustafayev insisted on the immediate return of the settlements on 9 March. Pashinyan subsequently warned that Azerbaijan will possibly start a new war in the near term if Armenia does not cede the villages. We assess that ceding the villages would likely lower regional tensions and the risk of a resumption of hostilities in the short term. However, Azerbaijan would possibly push for further territorial concessions, sustaining conflict risks. Concessions would also be extremely unpopular domestically in Armenia, likely triggering anti-government unrest in the capital Yerevan. (Source: Sibylline)
10 Apr 24. Iran: Increasing militant activity will likely drive augmented security posture, tensions with Pakistan. On 9 April, Jaish al-Adl militants killed six police officers during an ambush on a convoy travelling between Mehrestan and Soran (both Sistan and Baluchistan province). The attack follows a series of Jaish al-Adl attacks on 3-4 April in Sistan and Baluchistan, in which 11 Iranian security officers were killed. These incidents highlight increasing militant Sunni separatist activity in south-western Iran. Over the coming days, Iran’s security forces are highly likely to augment their posture in Sistan and Baluchistan by setting up additional checkpoints and conducting stop-and-search operations. This will elevate the risk of transport disruption. These operations will also increase the risk of arbitrary detention, aggravating ethno-religious tensions in the Sunni-majority province and driving the likelihood of protests following Friday Prayers on 12 April. The attack will likely further increase regional tensions with Pakistan, which Iran accuses of failing to contain Jaish al-Adl militant activity. Although unlikely, Iranian strikes will possibly target Jaish al-Adl positions in south-eastern Pakistan in the coming days. (Source: Sibylline)
10 Apr 24. Sudan: Drone strike in el-Gadarif will raise risk of supply chain disruption, further clashes in east. On 9 April, three drone strikes damaged a Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) position and injured three civilians in el-Gadarif (al-Qadarif state). The strikes were almost certainly conducted by the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and mark the first incident in el-Gadarif since hostilities between the SAF and RSF broke out in April 2023. In recent months, clashes have intensified in eastern Sudan, with the RSF capturing numerous locations in neighbouring el-Gezira state. Hostilities in al-Qadarif will likely intensify in the coming weeks, further impeding aid operations and increasing incidental risks facing staff. Clashes in eastern Sudan will elevate risks of supply chain disruption along transit routes between the capital Khartoum and Ethiopia, particularly for aid organisations. We assess that intensifying violence will likely trigger further displacement and undermine agricultural production in the state, exacerbating food security risks. As such, organised and opportunistic violence targeting aid depots and convoys will also likely increase. (Source: Sibylline)
10 Apr 24. UK Minister reaffirms commitment to ‘free and open’ Indo-Pacific. Lord (Tariq) Ahmad of Wimbledon visited India to reaffirm UK commitment to a “free and open” Indo-Pacific at foreign policy conference Raisina Dialogue.
- UK’s Minister of State, Lord (Tariq) Ahmad of Wimbledon in Delhi to reaffirm UK commitment to a “free and open” Indo-Pacific at flagship foreign policy conference
- Against backdrop of increasing global instability, he will say prosperity and security of the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific are inseparable
- He will also mark the second anniversary of Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, which has underlined the link between the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific security
Lord (Tariq) Ahmad, Minister of State for the Middle East, South Asia, UN and the Prime Minister’s Special Representative on Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict arrives in India today (21 February) to lead the UK delegation to the Raisina Dialogue where he will reaffirm the UK’s commitment to a “free and open” Indo-Pacific, a region of critical importance to our future security and the Prime Minister’s priority of growing the UK’s economy.
Against a backdrop of an increasingly volatile world, he will say the prosperity and security of the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific are inseparable, and that the UK is committed to working with partners to play a constructive leadership role in tackling the long-term drivers of conflict. The UK and our allies are also clear that we will always stand up for freedom of navigation and the free flow of trade.
The UK delegation at this year’s Raisina Dialogue includes First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Sir Ben Key. In addition to his participation at the flagship foreign policy conference, Admiral Key will join a series of high-level meetings with the senior leadership of the Indian Armed Forces to review progress on various aspects of the UK-India defence partnership and exchange views on global security challenges.
During the visit, Lord Ahmad will also mark the second anniversary of Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, which has underlined the link between the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific through its impact on global energy and food costs. As Russia’s war enters its third year, the UK’s support for Ukraine is unwavering.
Following a plenary with the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII), the Minister will meet key counterparts from the Government of India, including Foreign Secretary Vinay Mohan Kwatra and Home Secretary Ajay Kumar Bhalla to highlight the strong UK-India trade partnership and embrace new opportunities to collaborate, including on energy. They will also discuss progress towards an ambitious trade deal, for which there is strong political will on both sides.
Strengthening the UK-India relationship is a key pillar of the UK’s long-term foreign policy, as part of its enduring engagement in the Indo-Pacific set out in the Integrated Review Refresh.
Lord Ahmad Minister of State for the Middle East, South Asia, UN, and the Prime Minister’s Special Representative on Preventing Sexual Violence said:
Against a backdrop of rising conflict and instability, the UK’s commitment to a ‘free and open’ Indo-Pacific is enduring.
The UK-India relationship is at the heart of that commitment, which is not just about rhetoric or slogans; it is happening now and is set to improve lives across the UK and the region for years to come.
On the margins of the Raisina Dialogue, he will discuss how to ease the desperate humanitarian situation in Gaza with key figures in the Middle East. This follows his travel to the region last week to push for an immediate stop in fighting to allow humanitarian aid in and hostages out and act as a pathway to a sustainable and permanent ceasefire. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)
10 Apr 24. “No turning back” for SADC DRC mission – Heitman. Respected South African defence analyst Helmoed Heitman maintains that early setbacks aside for the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo (SAMIDRC), there’s no turning back because “if we retreat we will look stupid and we will have showed how toothless we have become”.
His comments formed part of a report in Johannesburg-based daily, The Citizen, in the wake of four more deaths in the mission now approaching its fourth month of deployment in the eastern DRC.
Earlier this week three Tanzanian soldiers died following a mortar attack with another three injured. The SADC further reported the death of a South African soldier with “challenges experienced while receiving health treatment”.
The first SAMIDRC casualties of the deployment came in March, again from a mortar attack, which killed two South African soldiers and wounded three.
Heitman is reported as saying the task set for SAMIDRC is “too great for any one African country to handle”.
“The area is too large and the number of armed groups too many, with diverse aims. Strategically and economically, the mission would be justified if the force was adequate.”
The mission, according to him, has no chance of a lasting effect. “The force is too small – lacking air support in a region of difficult terrain, as well as few and poor roads.
“A total of 5 000 troops are not going to achieve what 15 000 could not. I would fully support a deployment in the DRC if we and the SADC were serious about it – and if South Africa still had the military capability to do the job properly.
“But we cannot even patrol our borders and waters or police our air space. SANDF soldiers who are part of SADC mission could not muster an effective force for Cabo Delgado in Mozambique – something showing more direct problems and risks.”
A withdrawal from Cabo Delgado and neglecting South African border security “to deploy into the DRC with an entirely inadequate force is reckless,” the man who was part of Roelf Meyer’s Defence Review 2012 team said.
“Without adequate air power to support, reinforce or, if needs be, withdraw the force under pressure – we are placing troops at risk and doing so to no purpose.
“The sad part is that it is the soldiers who will be blamed when, in fact, they will have done the best they could with what they had.”
(Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
09 Apr 24. U.S./Iraq Higher Military Commission Principals Meeting Statement. The Chief of the General Staff of the Iraqi Armed Forces, Gen. Abdel Emir Rashid Yarallah and the Commander of U.S. Central Command, Gen. Michael Erik Kurilla co-chaired the inaugural U.S.-lraq Higher Military Commission Principals Meeting on April 8, 2024. Both leaders reaffirmed their commitment to a process toward an orderly transition from the mission of the international Coalition for the Defeat of ISIS in Iraq to enduring bilateral security partnerships between Iraq and the United States and other countries of the Coalition. The principals also committed to building broader security cooperation between the United States and Iraq, which will contribute to the region’s stability and security.
The Higher Military Commission is a military-to-military dialogue between Iraqi and U.S. defense leaders and professionals. Since its launch in January 2024, the three subcommittees established by the Higher Military Commission have conducted meetings in Baghdad supported by Coalition members, to discuss the threat of ISIS, the operational environment, and the capabilities of the Iraqi Security Forces.
Principals reflected on the historic achievements and sacrifices made in the fight to defeat ISIS; the enduring efforts to prevent ISIS resurgence; and the support to Iraqi sovereignty, stability, and unity. Both sides committed to providing assessments through the Higher Military Commission process that will inform decisions by national leaders of both countries on the timeline for transition of Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve to an enduring bilateral security partnership.
The successful completion of this inaugural Principals Meeting underscores the two nations’ commitment and progress toward an enduring U.S.-lraq bilateral defense relationship. (Source: U.S. DoD)
09 Apr 24. AUKUS Countries Set Measured Pace for Security Partnership.
The U.S., U.K. and Australia are focused on a deliberate, conditions-based approach to ensuring successful implementation of the AUKUS security partnership, the U.S. Navy’s top submarine warfare officer said yesterday.
The partnership, which was agreed to in September 2021, is aimed at fostering technology exchanges between the three countries and building Australia’s nuclear-powered submarine force.
Under “Pillar 1” of the plan, Australia will purchase three Virginia-class, conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines in time to replace its current fleet of diesel electric subs in the 2030s.
The three countries will also develop a state-of-the-art platform designed to combine and leverage their shared submarine technology. The “SSN-AUKUS” as the future platform is known, is slated to be fielded by the U.K. in the 2030s and by Australia in the 2040s.
Navy Vice Adm. Robert M. Gaucher, commander of U.S. Naval Submarine Forces, said that key to a successful rollout of the first pillar is taking measured steps to develop Australia’s nuclear submarine forces side-by-side with the U.S.
“They can take advantage of our training resources, and then they can go out and ride along on our submarines while they’re building up their knowledge and experience in the entire spectrum on maintenance training operations to be ready,” he said during a panel discussion at Sea-Air-Space 2024, an exposition hosted by the Navy League at National Harbor, Maryland.
The U.S. will begin operating Virginia-class submarines out of Australia as part of Submarine Rotational Force – West, slated as early as 2027. As part of that endeavor, Australian forces will begin learning and operating on U.S. submarines as they continue to develop their forces.
Gaucher said once Australia receives its first Virginia-class submarine, its operators will already have ample experience operating on the platform.
“It’s a very deliberate pace, very steady,” he said. “If there’s a problem they can phone home, we can help solve it along the way. And then as they build up their experience operating on nuclear submarines, then we get to the point where the first AUKUS submarine comes online.”
He noted that by the time the Australia is slated to field the AUKUS-class submarines, its forces will have a decade of experience operating the nuclear-powered Virginia-class submarine.
“Along the way, if we slip a year or if we accelerate a year, we have those options, depending on what’s going on,” he said. “But the key there is conditions-based, so that when the conditions are right, we’ll move to the next phase.”
Gaucher was joined during the panel discussion by Vice Adm. Martin Connell, the U.K. Royal Navy’s second sea lord, and Pat Conroy, Australian minister for defense industry, in underscoring the mutual strategic benefits for each country enabled by the AUKUS agreement.
“I look at interoperability between the United Kingdom, Australia and United States as seamless and ever changing,” Gaucher said.
He said AUKUS builds upon the that interoperability — forged by decades of alliance — by expanding the three countries’ combined operational footprint, expanding maintenance capacity between the three countries and bolstering their industrial bases.
“It’s a win-win situation for the United States, Australia and the United Kingdom,” he said. (Source: U.S. DoD)
08 Apr 24. UAE’s military modernisation escalates amidst regional unrest.
The Emirati Armed Forces strengthen their Army, Air Force, and Navy to counter emerging threats. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is witnessing a surge in defence expenditure, signalling a comprehensive modernisation drive aimed at fortifying its military capabilities amidst escalating regional tensions.
According to insights from GlobalData’s “The UAE Defense Market 2024-2029” report, the UAE’s defence budget is projected to reach $30.7bn (Dh112.6bn) by 2029, reflecting a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 4.1%. This increase shows the country’s strategic imperative to bolster its Armed Forces and adapt to evolving security challenges in the Middle East.
Army, Air Force, and Navy modernisation initiatives
The UAE’s Armed Forces are undergoing a modernisation effort spanning its Army, Air Force, and Navy. In response to evolving threats, the Emirati Navy is shifting its focus towards expeditionary warfare capabilities, with plans for fleet expansion and the acquisition of advanced naval vessels such as Gowind-class corvettes and Falaj-class patrol vessels armed with missile systems.
Simultaneously, the Emirati Army is enhancing its expeditionary warfare capabilities through the adoption of specialised platforms like the Jobaria Multiple Cradle Launcher, which maximises battlefield firepower. Additionally, investments in modernising the armoured vehicle fleet and intensifying training regimes reveal the UAE’s readiness for overseas operations.
In the domain of air defence, the UAE is bolstering its capabilities to counter ballistic missile threats, particularly from Iran. Acquisitions such as the Patriot air defence missile systems and KM-SAM from South Korea highlight the country’s commitment to safeguarding its airspace against emerging threats.
According to GlobalData’s “The UAE Defense Market 2024-2029” report, the UAE’s defence expenditures recorded a CAGR of 6% between 2020 and 2024, reaching $25bn in 2024. Per capita defence expenditures are projected to increase from $2,592 in 2024 to $3,062 in 2028.
Geopolitical imperatives and defence strategy
The UAE’s heightened defence spending is motivated by regional dynamics, including territorial disputes with Iran and the threat posed by Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen.
Moreover, the normalisation of ties with Israel under the Abraham Accords has reshaped the country’s defence posture, allowing it to redirect resources towards countering Iranian influence in the region.
As tensions escalate in the Middle East, the UAE’s defence budget shows its commitment to national security and regional stability. Through investments in its Army, Air Force, and Navy, the UAE aims to navigate complex security challenges while solidifying its position as a key player in the region’s defence landscape. (Source: army-technology.com)
08 Apr 24. Canada to boost military spending by nearly $6bn but falls short on NATO goal. The new defence policy paper does not offer a timeline for the country to meet the 2 percent GDP target but it argues a move to double military spending between 2016-2017 to 2026-2027 is “on track.”
Canada has pledged to increase national military spending by $5.9bn over the next five years but that spending still will fail to meet the NATO target of contributing 2 percent GDP on defense funding until after 2030, at the earliest.
The multiyear commitment was announced by Prime Minister Justin Trudeau today as part of a new national defense policy paper — “Our North, Strong and Free” [PDF] — that also includes acquisition of new airborne early warning aircraft (AWACs), long-range army missiles and “tactical” helicopters, either crewed or uncrewed.
Additionally, Ottawa declared that it will spend $54bn over the next 20 years to build out a “ready, resilient and relevant Canadian Armed Forces.”
The Trudeau government has long been accused by other NATO members of not contributing enough to the alliance, but in the face of such pressure today’s plan will reach just 1.76 percent GDP by the end of the decade.
“This is a significant increase in defence spending and is a major step forward in our effort to reach 2 [percent] of GDP, as agreed by NATO members at the Vilnius Summit in 2023,” states the new defense policy document.
It does not offer a timeline for the country to meet the 2 percent GDP target but it argues a move to double military spending between 2016-2017 to 2026-2027 is “on track.”
In 2023, Canada spent 1.38 percent GDP on defense, according to NATO figures [PDF], a lowly figure that ranks just ahead of Slovenia, Turkey, Spain and Belgium, the most meagre of alliance spenders, outside of Luxembourg.
Foreign Actors And ‘Our Arctic’
Detailing national military strategic priorities, Bill Blair, Canada’s defense minister, writes in the defense strategy of a need to “confront the reality of climate change” and warns “Our Arctic” is warming four times faster than the world average.
Canada, he adds, has also witnessed “greater Russian activity” in the air domain and “a growing number of Chinese vessels and surveillance platforms” across the Arctic Ocean, as the adversaries continue to map and collect data about the region.
Those issues are compounded by “states” building up military capabilities including “submarines, long-range aircraft and hypersonic missiles,” which are judged to “move faster and are harder to detect.”
This ease of access to the Arctic by “foreign actors” demands “our military has the tools to assert our sovereignty and protect Canada’s interests,” according to Blair.
Canda plans on significantly bolstering Arctic defenses through “greater presence, reach, mobility and responsiveness” that will be delivered by developing a “network of northern operational support hubs, a fleet of airborne early warning aircraft, deployable sensors on our coasts and underwater, a satellite ground station in the High Arctic, enhanced foreign intelligence capabilities, and new tactical helicopters,” according to the defense policy document.
Detailing the rotorcraft acquisition further, it adds a “mix of crewed and uncrewed aircraft” could be procured and to “ensure Canada has modern aircraft to contribute to international operations with allies, including
against threats from militaries with advanced capabilities.”
Only a brief reference is made to the acquisition of new Canadian Army long-range missiles, which “will be deployed to enable our forces to shoot at greater ranges than our adversaries in combat.”
The new acquisitions are in addition to big ticket items like Lockheed Martin F-35 fifth generation fighter jets and Boeing P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft already under order.
Elsewhere the strategy explicitly condemns Russia’s war in Ukraine and violation of international law, noting, “Russia has demonstrated that it is a reckless and hostile adversary willing to undermine peace and stability in pursuit of its goals, which is a reminder that Canadians cannot take global security for granted.”
More generally, Canada says that its “investments” will mainly focus on partnerships relating to the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions, “two regions that are fundamental to safeguarding … security and prosperity.”
Regarding North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) collaboration with the US, the defense strategy also commits Ottawa to “further explore” national integrated air and missile defense capabilities, designed to achieve “significant benefits across all theatres” and strengthen “collective security.”
Cyber capabilities will also be enhanced through the establishment of the Canadian Armed Forces Cyber Command. (Source: Google/Breaking Defense.com)
08 Apr 24. AUKUS partnership to consult with other nations including Japan on military capability collaboration. Consultations between AUKUS partners and other nations to begin this year. Collaboration could include working together in areas such as quantum technologies, undersea capabilities, artificial intelligence (AI) and autonomy, cyber, hypersonic and counter-hypersonic capabilities, and electronic warfare capabilities.
- Australia, UK and US already have close bilateral relationships with Japan and consultation will begin with them.
AUKUS is a trilateral security and defence partnership between Australia, the UK and the US, first announced in September 2021. It sees the three nations work together on a range of capabilities to support a free and open Indo-Pacific, including a conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarine capability for the UK and Australia – SSN-AUKUS – under Pillar One of the partnership.
Consultation with other countries, including Japan, as potential collaborators on some advanced military capabilities under Pillar Two of the partnership will begin this year.
Australia, the UK and US are considering Japan’s potential involvement in some elements of the Pillar Two programme. Pillar Two includes quantum technologies, undersea capabilities, artificial intelligence (AI) and autonomy, cyber, hypersonic and counter-hypersonic capabilities, and electronic warfare capabilities, supported by innovation and information sharing.
Partners have always been clear on the intent to engage additional nations in Pillar Two projects as the work progresses. The potential collaborations will complement and build on the close bilateral relationships that all three AUKUS nations have with other countries.
The submarine capability is Pillar One of the AUKUS programme and will always remain a trilateral endeavour. Work is progressing at pace on the submarine programme, with Australia appointing UK company BAE Systems last month to build its SSN-AUKUS submarines in partnership with ASC during a visit by Deputy Prime Minister Marles and Defence Secretary Grant Shapps to Osborne shipyard in Adelaide.
Defence Secretary, Grant Shapps said: “In a more dangerous world, relationships and partnerships like AUKUS are more important than ever.
We have always said we would engage additional nations in our Pillar Two work as it progresses, and collaborating with like-minded countries will strengthen the partnership further. I am committed to a peaceful, prosperous and open Indo-Pacific and to working with partners to grow our capabilities and uphold international rules and order.”
AUKUS nations will assess whether involving like-minded nations like Japan would strengthen the development of capabilities. Consultations will begin this year on where potential partners, including Japan, can contribute to and benefit from Pillar Two work.
Japan’s potential involvement was announced by UK Defence Secretary Grant Shapps, Australia Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Richard Marles and US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin today in a joint statement.
Japan and the UK are already working together with Italy on our sixth-generation fighter jet programme, GCAP, where they have proved effective partners. Last year the UK and Japan agreed a landmark new strategic partnership – the Hiroshima accord.
The joint statement comes two weeks after Defence Secretary Grant Shapps and Foreign Secretary David Cameron visited Australia for meetings with their counterparts, and a year after Prime Minister Rishi Sunak, Australian Prime Minister Albanese and US President Biden met in San Diego.
The AUKUS partnership is a demonstration of the commitment of Australia, the UK, and the US to support peace, stability, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. Engaging like-minded nations in the work of Pillar Two will only strengthen this pursuit.
08 Apr 24. AUKUS Defense Ministers’ Joint Statement. The Honourable Richard Marles MP, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence, Australia; the Right Honourable Grant Shapps, Secretary of State for Defence, United Kingdom; and the Honorable Lloyd J. Austin III, Secretary of Defense, United States.
Just over a year ago, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States announced the Optimal Pathway to deliver conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs) to Australia — the first major initiative of AUKUS. Today, we take stock of the progress our nations have made, both to deliver this capability and to deepen our work on other advanced capabilities.
Our three countries seek to maximize the strategic benefits of the AUKUS partnership to support security and stability in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond. Australia’s acquisition of a conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarine capability is a necessary response to the rapidly evolving strategic environment. Strengthening our trilateral defense capabilities and our industrial capacity will enable AUKUS partners to deter coercion or aggression in the region more effectively.
The Deputy Prime Minister and Secretaries remain strongly committed to continued implementation of the ambitious plan set out in the Optimal Pathway for Australia’s acquisition of conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines. Maintaining steady delivery of this plan will enhance the collective ability of AUKUS partners to promote stability and security in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond.
All AUKUS nations have reaffirmed their commitment to take full advantage of the technological opportunities of AUKUS by combining national strengths to deepen collaboration and deliver game-changing capabilities at pace. The AUKUS nations have bolstered efforts to break down barriers to collaboration, spur a more integrated defense industrial base and private sector partnership, and identify new opportunities for trilateral capability development.
The Deputy Prime Minister and Secretaries endorse the following announcements and initiatives across Pillar I and Pillar II.
PILLAR I – CONVENTIONALLY ARMED, NUCLEAR-POWERED SUBMARINES
Significant, tangible steps to implement the Optimal Pathway have occurred in all three nations in the past year. AUKUS partners remain committed to progressing Australia’s acquisition of conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines in a way that sets the highest non-proliferation standards.
Leveraging the power of defense industry
AUKUS partners note the significant milestone for trilateral submarine cooperation provided by the important industry announcements of March 22, 2024, including Australia’s selection of ASC Pty Ltd and BAE Systems to build its SSN-AUKUS submarines, and its selection of ASC as Australia’s nuclear-powered submarine sustainment partner. These strategic partnerships with industry will leverage respective knowledge, skills, and capabilities across AUKUS nations and will form the foundation for Australia’s new nuclear-powered submarine production and maintenance activities.
Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States are making significant investments in their respective submarine industrial bases, which will ensure the supply chains of all three nations are more resilient, integrated, and productive. This will generate economic growth in defense and national security sectors in all three countries. These partnerships will pave the way for further opportunities for industry to expand and strengthen trilateral supply chains, supporting a sovereign sustainment and build capability in Australia.
Establishing Submarine Rotational Force-West
Building on the success of earlier SSN visits to Australia since the Optimal Pathway announcement, AUKUS partners welcomed a visit by USS Annapolis to HMAS Stirling in March 2024. This latest visit is part of a trilateral commitment to more frequent SSN visits to HMAS Stirling under the Optimal Pathway. This, and future such visits from UK and U.S. SSNs, will contribute to building Australia’s capacity to support a rotational presence of UK and U.S. SSNs under Submarine Rotational Force-West (SRF-West) from as early as 2027, and Australia’s future sovereign SSN capability.
The most significant maintenance activity to be conducted on an SSN in Australia, to date, is scheduled to occur in the second half of 2024. The maintenance activity, supported by a Submarine Tender, will be critical to building Australia’s ability to safely and securely sustain U.S. SSNs in preparation for the establishment of SRF-West. In anticipation of this forthcoming activity, 37 Royal Australian Navy sailors reported to the USS Emory S. Land in Guam in late January 2024, to begin training and to gain the necessary skills and qualifications. Australian industry personnel will also be involved in supporting this activity to continue to grow the submarine sustainment workforce and supply chain. UK Royal Navy officers will observe the activity to enable integration of UK maintenance requirements for future UK SSN port visits and future UK rotational presence as part of SRF-West. This will be the first time that Australian personnel will actively participate in the maintenance of a U.S. SSN in Australia, enabled by the provisions in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024.
Important steps have been taken towards delivering a sovereign conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarine training capability for Australia. In December 2023, the United States and Australia finalised a Foreign Military Sales (FMS) case to procure submarine training devices to support the establishment of SRF-West. As part of the FMS case, the first contracts were awarded this month by the United States for submarine training simulators. These will be used to train Royal Australian Navy personnel on the Virginia class platform in advance of Australia operating its own sovereign Virginia class SSNs, and supporting visiting and rotational U.S. Virginia class SSNs through SRF-West. The FMS case will also enable the training of Australian Defence and industry personnel in the United States. In March 2024, a cohort of 20 Australian industry personnel completed a successful three-month placement at Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance Facility.
Enabling legislative and policy change
AUKUS partners welcomed the passage of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 by the U.S. Congress in December 2023. This was essential for implementation of the Optimal Pathway, including through the U.S. Congress’ AUKUS Submarine Transfer Authorization Act regarding the sale of Virginia class SSNs to Australia, and enabling critical workforce development activities. A further legislative milestone was achieved through the introduction of nuclear safety legislation – the Australian Naval Nuclear Power Safety Bill 2023 and Australian Naval Nuclear Power Safety (Transitional Provisions) Bill 2023 – to the Australian Parliament in November 2023. Once passed by the Australian Parliament, this legislation will establish the nuclear safety framework for Australia’s nuclear-powered submarine enterprise.
Accelerating workforce growth
Progress has been made to implement the education and training initiatives announced by AUKUS Defense Ministers in December 2023, supporting workforce development for Australia’s nuclear-powered submarine enterprise. Australians are undertaking placements in the United Kingdom and United States throughout 2024 to build Australia’s industrial workforce. These placements will be undertaken in accordance with AUKUS partners’ respective obligations and commitments under international and domestic law, including with respect to nuclear non-proliferation. Later this year, ASC employees will commence placements at Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard to develop the skills necessary to sustain Virginia class SSNs. They will be the first Australian civilian industry personnel to train in the United States following the passage of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024.
More than 20 Royal Australian Navy sailors and officers are currently in the U.S. Navy Submarine Training system. The first three Royal Australian Navy submarine officers completed the U.S. naval nuclear power training pipeline and are on track to graduate from the Submarine Officer Basic Course in Groton, Connecticut later this month. They will report to Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, in June to serve on U.S. Virginia class SSNs while completing further qualifications. Over the next 12 months, these numbers will increase to more than 100 Royal Australian Navy personnel in training across the United States, including serving at sea on U.S. Virginia class SSNs. These training opportunities are critical to ensure Australia is ready to operate its sovereign Virginia class SSNs from the early 2030s. In the United Kingdom, three Royal Australian Navy officers have completed initial nuclear power training at HMS Sultan. They will undertake further engineering courses and are on track to graduate from the UK Nuclear Reactor course in July this year, before commencing practical qualification within the Royal Navy Submarine Arm. These officers will be deployed on a UK Astute class SSN.
Australia and the United Kingdom, and Australia and the United States, have signed bilateral Memoranda of Understanding for personnel exchanges to help accelerate growth of Australia’s sovereign workforce.
PILLAR II – ADVANCED CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT
Advancing commitments from December 2023, AUKUS partners highlighted efforts under Pillar II to bolster industry and innovation sector collaboration. Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States are pooling the talents of our defense sectors to catalyze, at an unprecedented pace, the delivery of advanced capabilities. Partners are working with investors, private capital, and traditional and non-traditional industry to translate disruptive technology into asymmetric capability for our three defense forces.
Progress on the AUKUS Defense Ministers’ commitments into the AUKUS Advanced Capabilities endeavour is continuing. Although much of this activity remains classified, AUKUS partners are making strides towards jointly realizing greater maritime awareness through networked autonomy, decision advantage, and enhanced strike.
Private sector financing
AUKUS partners welcomed the first meeting of the Defense Investors Network on February 28, 2024. Pillar II is embracing innovative finance and investment as key enablers for advanced capability development. Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States look forward to engaging with the Defense Investors Network and similarly focused groups on opportunities under Pillar II.
Aligning our systems
AUKUS partners are continuing to update laws and policies to enable effective implementation of AUKUS Pillar II. Partners are working through our respective National Armaments Directors towards better harmonization of our capability development and acquisition systems to support more seamless and agile cooperation. A National Armaments Directors’ tabletop exercise in March tested our respective national processes in three scenarios against co-development, co-production, and co-sustainment.
Securing licence-free defense trade
AUKUS partners are making progress in aligning exports and trade regulations to drive deeper defense trade. Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States are taking significant and tangible steps to meet their commitment to streamline trade among and between the AUKUS partners. In December 2023, the U.S. Congress included in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 a pathway to a historic export control exemption to streamline the flow of defense trade for Australia and the United Kingdom. To complement this, on March 27, 2024, Australia passed the Defence Trade Controls Amendment Act 2024 that provides the reciprocal national exemption for the United States and the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom is progressing reform to its Open General Export License Program to provide reciprocal exemption for Australia and the United States. These collective mechanisms will enable most defense items to transfer or re-transfer between the three countries without needing further authorization. This environment will set the conditions for unparalleled levels of defense cooperation between AUKUS partners and enable the integration of our industrial bases to accelerate our technological advantage.
Strengthening links across our industrial bases
Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States acknowledged the launch of the AUKUS Advanced Capabilities Industry Forum, which will hold its first meeting on April 9, 2024. The Forum is the key interface between AUKUS governments and industrial bases, via our trade associations. It will focus on trilateral requirements, capability planning, development, and delivery of AUKUS Advanced Capabilities. The Industry Forum provides an opportunity for government and industry representatives to come together to exchange ideas and deepen industrial collaboration on advanced capabilities.
Innovation driven capability
AUKUS partners launched the inaugural Pillar II Innovation Challenge on electronic warfare on March 26, 2024, as a collaborative initiative between respective innovation accelerator units. This will be the first in a series of AUKUS innovation challenges that will identify opportunities to harness commercial technologies from all three nations to support advanced capability development under AUKUS.
Responding to operational demand
Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States welcomed the Land Commanders Statement of Intent to develop a land contribution to AUKUS Pillar II, the AUKUS Army Armaments Cooperation Forum, and the Combined Multi-Domain Task Force. All three countries affirmed their support for Land Commanders to pursue opportunities in Long Range Fires under AUKUS Pillar II in 2024.
Engaging close partners and allies
Since the inception of AUKUS, our nations have been clear in our intent to engage others in Pillar II projects as our work progresses. Over the past two and a half years, we have built a strong, trilateral foundation for delivering advanced military capabilities at speed and scale. AUKUS partners have developed principles and models for additional partner engagement in individual Pillar II projects and will undertake consultations in 2024 with prospective partners regarding areas where they can contribute to, and benefit from, this historic work.
In identifying collaboration opportunities, we will take into account factors such as technological innovation, financing, industrial strengths, ability to adequately protect sensitive data and information, and impact on promoting peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. Our objective remains to further the delivery of advanced military capabilities to our respective defense forces in support of regional stability and security; we are confident that engaging like-minded partners in the work of Pillar II will only strengthen this pursuit. Recognizing Japan’s strengths and its close bilateral defense partnerships with all three countries, we are considering cooperation with Japan on AUKUS Pillar II advanced capability projects.
Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States are committed to continued openness and transparency with international partners on AUKUS. We look forward to continuing close collaboration to advance the generational potential of AUKUS. Through the activities of both Pillars, all three countries affirm their commitment to work jointly and together with the region to ensure a stable, peaceful, and prosperous Indo-Pacific region, complementing the existing regional architecture. (Source: U.S. DoD)
08 Apr 24. China-US: High-level meetings signal willingness to maintain communication despite tensions. On 6 April, US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen and Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng held formal discussions in Guangzhou (Guangdong province, China). The meeting aimed to ease tensions stemming from China’s alleged state-supported industrial overcapacity, particularly concerning the overproduction and exportation of green-energy products such as electric vehicles and solar panels and the perceived unfair treatment of foreign companies. The discussions touched upon US apprehensions regarding China’s support for Russia’s military industries and led to an agreement on a joint initiative to counter money laundering. Additionally, earlier on 8 April, US Treasury officials announced that the US and China will conduct two simulations focusing on financial stability and shock resilience. This follows a recent exercise on large bank failure as part of an effort to deepen co-operation between the two countries’ financial regulatory bodies. These high-level interactions signal a concerted effort by both sides to maintain communication amid ongoing tensions and persistent trade disputes. That said, we assess that the two sides are unlikely to resolve their core differences regarding these issues in the short-to-medium term. (Source: Sibylline)
08 Apr 24. Colombia: Bystander risks will increase amid threat of renewed violence by FARC militias. On 7 April, dissident members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) announced that they will renew attacks against government, security and military entities. In a statement published on 7 April, they claimed that they will now target battalions, patrols and police stations in response to what they characterised as a violent escalation by the Colombian armed forces. These threats follow a government decree announced on 17 March which stated that the military would suspend its ceasefire with FARC dissidents, including the Estado Mayor Central (EMC). In the short-to-medium term, we assess that attacks and violence between FARC dissident groups and the security forces will elevate bystander safety risks substantially in Cauca, Nariño and Valle del Cauca departments, where the ceasefire has been suspended. While there is a realistic possibility that a ceasefire will be reintroduced in the long term, further hostilities will almost certainly undermine President Gustavo Petro’s efforts to establish peace with Colombia’s militia groups. (Source: Sibylline)
09 Apr 24. Russia-China: Proposed presidential summit will seek to reinforce economic ties. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov disclosed earlier on 9 April that Russia and China agreed to discuss methods to deepen security co-operation across Eurasia during Lavrov’s official visit to Beijing (China). Lavrov added that Moscow and Beijing have decided to consult other ‘like-minded’ partners on the matter without offering further details. Lavrov’s visit to Beijing comes ahead of a slated meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, in May. Such a meeting would mark Putin’s first international trip of his new presidential term. Lavrov’s visit therefore likely intends to pave the way for a potential upcoming Putin-Xi summit, during which the two sides will seek to expand their countries’ close ties and possibly forge new agreements for co-operation. With new intelligence indicating that China has provided Russia with satellite imagery for military purposes, as well as micro-electronics and machine tools for tanks, we assess that there is scope for further military co-operation, despite the ongoing threat of secondary Westen sanctions. (Source: Sibylline)
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