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01 Apr 24. Philippines to boost diplomacy and defence capability as South China Sea ‘countermeasures.’ Countermeasures by the Philippines to China’s conduct in the South China Sea will entail strengthening its defence capabilities with allies and exhausting all diplomatic measures to resolve disputes, a security official said on Monday.
President Ferdinand Marcos Jr last week said the Philippines would implement unspecified measures against “illegal, coercive, aggressive, and dangerous attacks” by China’s coastguard, upping the stakes in an escalating row in the South China Sea.
“The proportionate, deliberate and reasonable response the president was talking about covered not only the aspect of strengthening military and defence capabilities with other allies …but it also talks about exhausting diplomatic efforts to resolve the issue,” National Security Council spokesperson Jonathan Malaya said on state TV, describing the package as multi-dimensional.
Marcos also ordered his government to strengthen its coordination on maritime security to confront “a range of serious challenges” to territorial integrity and peace, according to a copy of the directive released on Sunday.
China’s foreign ministry on Monday said regardless of what policies the Philippines rolls out, none would affect China’s maritime rights of sovereignty claims.
China claims almost the entire South China Sea as its territory, policed by an armada of coastguard vessels, some more than 1,000 km away from its mainland.
The Philippines and China have had a series run-ins at sea in the past year over disputed maritime features, coinciding with Manila ramping up defence engagements with ally and former colonial power the United States.
The latest flare-up occurred on March 24, when China used water cannon to disrupt a Philippine resupply mission to the Second Thomas Shoal for soldiers guarding a warship intentionally grounded on a reef 25 years ago.
Defence officials traded barbs late last week, with China saying the Philippines was to blame for the breakdown of relations, accusing its neighbor of provocations, misinformation and treachery.
The Philippines responded, accusing China of being patronising and intimidating smaller countries. (Source: Reuters)
31 Mar 24. Korea aerospace industries proposes to sell FA50 light fighters to Royal Thai Air Force.
Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) has presented a proposal to the Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF), offering to sell its FA50 light fighters. The RTAF has earmarked 19 billion baht for the procurement of new fighter jets in the forthcoming fiscal year, as revealed by an insider from the Defence Ministry.
The pitch was made by the CEO of KAI, Kang Goo-young, during the visit of Defence Minister Sutin Klungsang to South Korea, a trip that concluded on Saturday. The Defence Ministry of South Korea invited Sutin, along with defence permanent secretary General Sanitchanok Sangkhachan, to witness the final two Korean-made T-50 advanced trainer jets due for delivery to the RTAF in August. The delegation was transported to KAI’s facility in Sacheon by a helicopter provided by the host.
The RTAF has previously acquired a total of eight T-50 advanced trainer jets and six FA50 light fighters from KAI in 2015. These aircraft have been gradually delivered and commissioned at the Nakhon Sawan-based Wing 4 since 2018.
Kang, in a media interaction, stated that the FA50 is a multi-role fighter that can equal the air combat capabilities of US-made F16 fighter jets but is nearly half as costly and has lower maintenance expenses. He also mentioned that the KF-21, another KAI-developed aircraft, costs merely US$80m (2.9bn baht) with a maintenance cost of US$14,000 per flight hour.
The RTAF is preparing to retire the old F16s from 102 Squadron’s at Wing 1 and substitute them with 12 new fighter jets. For the procurement of the first four aircraft, 19bn baht (US$ 521m) has been allocated for the 2025 fiscal year, as per the Air Force’s White Paper.
The procurement plan for the jets is likely to be presented to the cabinet on April 2, as informed by ACM Punpakdee Pattanakul, the air force commander, last week. The Air Force is currently contemplating between Sweden’s Gripen E/F and the US’s F-16 Block 70 aircraft.
Military hardware
Last week, Saab AB, based in Sweden, stated that its proposal to sell Gripen fighter jets to the RTAF would comply with the government’s offset policy and meet other requirements set forth by the Air Force for national capability development.
Under the offset policy, countries providing new military hardware to Thailand must reciprocate by offering equal economic evaluations in bilateral trade. As per the source, with a spending plan of 19 billion baht, the RTAF can acquire eight FA50 jets. This, combined with the six FA50 jets already ordered, would provide a total of 14 jets, constituting a full squadron.
During his visit, Sutin conferred with his South Korean counterpart Shin Wonsik, on topics about security and the enhancement of military cooperation in areas such as education and the defence industry.
The Defence Technology Institute (DTI) and the Defence Industry and Energy Centre are expected to continue discussions on the development of the defence industry. South Korea’s Defence Ministry also expressed interest in further cooperation, including the establishment of a plant in Thailand and the transfer of technical know-how, reported Bangkok Post.
Sutin and his delegation also met with Paul J LaCamera, chief of the United Nations Command (UNC), who expressed gratitude towards Thailand for its support on UN missions and lauded Thai servicemen for their commitment. (Source: Google/https://thethaiger.com/)
29 Mar 24. Russian Wagner Group and Malian Government Accused of Deadly Civilian Raids in Mali. From December to March, rights groups have documented instances where the Wagner Group, a Russian mercenary organization, collaborated with Malian government forces in central and northern Mali, leading to the deaths of many civilians through raids and drone strikes. Mali has been engaged in a conflict against jihadi insurgents for over a decade, a situation exacerbated by military coups in Mali and neighboring countries.
The presence of Russian mercenaries in Mali, notably after the 2021 coup, has coincided with an increase in violence and deadly operations against civilians. Reports from Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International detail specific incidents, including drone strikes and raids involving Russian mercenaries, resulting in significant civilian casualties. One highlighted event was a raid on a village that led to the execution-style killing of 25 people, including children, who were found blindfolded with gunshot wounds to the head.
Amnesty International noted two drone strikes in northern Mali that killed at least 13 civilians, with victims ranging in age from 2 to 17 years old. Human Rights Watch has pointed out the use of Turkish-supplied drones capable of precise strikes, yet such operations have mistakenly targeted civilian gatherings, including a wedding and a funeral, causing further deaths.
Despite military promises to quell insurgencies, analysts indicate that violence has escalated under their leadership, with jihadist violence stretching the capabilities of their security forces. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
30 Mar 24. Syrian Army Continues Desert Campaign Against ISIS and Faces External Strikes. The Syrian Arab Army (SAA) has continued its operations in the desert regions against the persistent insurgency of ISIS. A notable aspect of these operations is the strategic use of air assets targeting terrorist strongholds. These areas are notably close to the regions controlled by rebel groups affiliated with the United States near Tanf. Concurrently, the situation in Idlib is drawing increased attention, with significant military movements and social media speculation hinting at upcoming operations.
Idlib Operations and Command Leadership: Speculation is rife on social networks regarding the appointment of Suheil Hassan as the commander-in-chief of an impending operation in Idlib. Given his track record and prominence within the Syrian military, his leadership in the upcoming operation seems plausible. Despite this anticipation, the broader international and regional context currently appears to inhibit the initiation of ground operations in Idlib. Nonetheless, it’s clear that the SAA intends to continue its efforts to weaken opposition forces in the northwest through various means, including the employment of vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs).
In the last 48 hours, terrorist factions have escalated their offensive, launching two significant attacks against government positions in the southern and eastern sectors of Greater Idlib. The Syrian Arab Army successfully repelled these assaults, resulting in the death of dozens of militants from Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and associated groups. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
29 Mar 24. Philippines Asserts Stance Against China in South China Sea Dispute. The Philippines has expressed a firm stance against China amidst escalating tensions in the South China Sea, emphasizing its refusal to submit to silence or subservience. In a statement released on March 29, the Philippine defense ministry criticized China for its “illegal and uncivilized activities” in the region and accused it of patronizing and intimidating smaller nations. This assertion follows China’s claim of sovereignty over almost the entire South China Sea, a claim contested by the Philippines and several other Southeast Asian nations.
The discord intensified following an incident involving the use of water cannons by China’s coastguard against Philippine Navy personnel during a confrontation near the Second Thomas Shoal. The area has been a focal point of contention, especially after the Philippines initiated repairs on the BRP Sierra Madre, a naval vessel grounded on the shoal since 1997 to assert Manila’s territorial claim.
Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has pledged to implement countermeasures against what he describes as “illegal, coercive, aggressive, and dangerous attacks” by China’s coastguard and maritime militia, without specifying the actions to be taken. The Philippines has consistently maintained a military presence on the BRP Sierra Madre to emphasize its claim over the disputed area, despite the ship’s dilapidated condition.
The United States, invoking the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, has reiterated its commitment to defend the Philippines should its forces come under armed attack in the region. In response, China has asserted its determination to protect its territorial sovereignty, dismissing the relevance of the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty to the South China Sea disputes. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
28 Mar 24. Somali Forces Conduct Significant Operations Against Al-Shabab. The Somali government, in collaboration with international allies and local militias, has announced the execution of three military operations against the al-Shabab militant group, resulting in the deaths of about 80 members and injuries to dozens more. These operations took place in the southern and central regions of Somalia, targeting militants allegedly planning significant attacks during Ramadan. Deputy Information Minister Abdirahman Yusuf Adala noted the operations aimed to prevent terrorist activities scheduled for an important date in the Ramadan calendar.
Details on the specific locations and outcomes of these operations were provided, indicating engagements in Galmudug, Hirshabelle, and Southwest regional states. The involvement of the Somali National Army, supported by the United States, Turkey, and African Union members, was crucial to the success of these missions.
The first operation, near Harardhere in the Mudug region, was initiated following intelligence about a potential al-Shabab mobilization for an attack. Harardhere District Commissioner Mohamed Yusuf Kulmiye reported the engagement led to over 40 militant casualties, with the Somali forces suffering 10 fatalities. The second and third operations occurred in Fiqaay forest and areas under Wajid district in the Bakool region, respectively, with additional al-Shabab members killed and military equipment destroyed.
These military actions follow a recent al-Shabab attack on a Somali military base in the Lower Shabelle region, highlighting the ongoing conflict between government forces and the militant group. The reported operations and their outcomes underscore the continued efforts by the Somali government and its partners to counter al-Shabab’s influence and activities in the region. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
28 Mar 24. China Constructs Mock Taiwan Presidential Office for Military Training. Recent satellite imagery has revealed a mock version of Taiwan’s Presidential Office situated within a military training facility in China’s Inner Mongolia region. This construction, first highlighted by a social media post on X (formerly Twitter) and later verified through open-source imagery on the Sinergise’s Sentinel Hub website, illustrates a detailed replication of the area surrounding Taiwan’s Presidential Office in Taipei. The training site, identified in the Alxa League, commenced construction in March 2021 and reached completion by October of the same year.
This move comes amid China’s continued military modernization efforts under the leadership of Xi Jinping, which have raised concerns regarding the potential for an invasion of Taiwan by 2027. China claims Taiwan as part of its territory, a stance that has fueled cross-strait tensions since the Chinese Communist Party’s ascension to power on the mainland in 1949.
The construction of such mock facilities is not a novel strategy for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). In 2015, state media broadcasted a military exercise at the Zhurihe Training Base in Inner Mongolia, showcasing PLA soldiers engaging with a building resembling the Taiwan Presidential Office.
Admiral John Aquilino of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command testified to the U.S. Armed Services Committee highlighting the PLA’s directive to be prepared for potential action against Taiwan by 2027. Despite claims from Chinese leadership expressing a preference for peaceful reunification, the construction of such mock facilities and continued military buildup indicate a readiness to employ force if deemed necessary. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
28 Mar 24. Congress funds Taiwan military support as foreign aid bill stalls. Congress funded cash assistance for Taipei’s military while directing the State Department and Pentagon to “prioritize the delivery of defense articles and services for Taiwan.”
The fiscal 2024 State Department spending bill Congress passed on Saturday includes $300m in Foreign Military Financing, or FMF, for Taiwan. The funding to buy more military equipment comes more than a year after Congress first authorized the cash assistance for Taipei. But the $300m falls far short of the cumulative $4bn in Taiwan military assistance in the foreign aid bill that remains stalled in the House.
“It provides new tools to use to try and contribute to the deterrence effort and get weapons to Taiwan more quickly and in larger quantities,” Bonnie Glaser, the managing director of the German Marshall Fund’s Indo-Pacific program, told Defense News. “Another benefit of it is that it signals to the people of Taiwan that the United States prioritizes their defense and is willing to put our money where our mouth is.”
The $300 m figure represents a halfway point between House appropriators – who sought $500 m in Taiwan FMF – and their Senate counterparts who only wanted $113m.
Taiwan must spend most of that $300 m in FMF grants or loans to procure weapons from U.S. defense contractors but could use $45m of that money to purchase equipment and services on-island – a privilege called offshore procurement that only Israel has enjoyed so far.
Of the 25-plus countries that receive FMF yearly, the largest recipients are Israel with an annual $3.3 bn, Egypt with an annual $1.3bn and Jordan with an annual $425m. The State Department has asked for $100 m in Taiwan FMF as part of its FY25 budget request. It provided Taiwan with $55m in FMF last year from a portion of Egypt aid frozen over human rights concerns.
Appropriators initially were wary of allocating large FMF sums for Taiwan given pressures on the State Department budget and the relative wealth of the island, whose GDP came in at an estimated $800 bn in FY23.
Glaser noted that Taiwan has increased its defense spending consecutively over the past several years and now spends 2.6% of its GDP on defense, “which is still not enough given the nature of the threat they face.”
The U.S. hopes that rushing an influx of weapons into Taiwan will help deter a potential Chinese invasion. China considers Taiwan to be a rogue province and has threatened to take it by force if necessary. President Xi Jinping has set 2027 – the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Liberation Army – as the date he hopes the Chinese military will have the capabilities to take Taiwan.
“Yes, it’s our taxpayer money and they should be paying for more themselves, but there’s also some value in signaling that this is a priority for the United States,” said Glaser. “It does help to boost the determination of the Taiwanese to defend themselves because they know that the United States cares about their defense.”
Another $4bn
The Taiwan FMF in the FY24 State Department spending bill pales in comparison to the $3.9bn in additional military assistance for Taipei that the Senate’s foreign aid bill. The Senate in February passed the bipartisan bill, which primarily provides $60bn in economic and security aid to Ukraine and another $14bn in military aid to Israel, in a 70-29 vote.
House Speaker Mike Johnson, R-La., has so far refused to put it on the floor amid opposition to the Ukraine aid from former President Donald Trump, the presumptive Republican presidential nominee, and the right-flank of his caucus. Meanwhile, some progressive Democrats oppose the additional Israel aid in the bill amid the humanitarian crisis in Gaza.
Johnson has told Republican defense hawks the House will hold foreign aid votes in April after it returns from its two-week recess, though it will not necessarily take up the bipartisan Senate bill, which hews closely to President Joe Biden’s request.
The Senate bill includes an additional $2bn in Taiwan FMF and another $1.9 bn that would allow the Defense Department to rush weapons to Taipei from U.S. stockpiles and replenish it.
Using Presidential Drawdown Authority from U.S. stockpiles would allow the U.S. to move materiel into Taiwan faster than through FMF-funded arms sales. The Biden administration has primarily armed Ukraine through drawdowns of U.S. stockpiles since Russia’s 2022 invasion.
“That makes it easier to deliver something if we already have it in our own stockpiles, and we can just give it to Taiwan,” said Glaser. “That seems to cut through quite a bit of the red tape that might be involved in using other methods.”
Lawmakers estimate that there is a roughly $19bn backlog in U.S. arms sales to Taiwan due to a confluence of issues, including industrial base constraints, a sometimes slow pace of contracting and acquisition and a medley of lengthy technology and security reviews in the Foreign Military Sales process. (Source: C4ISR & Networks)
29 Mar 24. Russian veto points to ‘grim future’ for North Korea sanctions enforcement. Russia’s move to effectively disband the panel of experts monitoring longstanding United Nations sanctions against North Korea points to a “grim future” for the sanctions enforcement, three former members of the panel told Reuters.
Russia vetoed the annual renewal of the multinational panel of experts on Thursday, which has spent the last 15 years monitoring U.N. sanctions against North Korea over its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs.
China, North Korea’s only military ally and its largest trading partner, abstained. Beijing and Moscow have denied breaking sanctions but have blocked new measures at the UN Security Council and advocated lifting some existing sanctions on North Korea, blaming the West and its allies for exacerbating tensions.
Diplomats said it appeared unlikely there would be another vote to try to renew the mandate before it expires on April 30.
The veto highlights a rare diplomatic dividend for Pyongyang and underlines its deepening ties with Moscow, which have included
the war in Ukraine as well as possible fuel supplies for North Korea, according to U.S. and South Korean officials and independent analysts.
Both Moscow and Pyongyang have denied arms deals, but have vowed to deepen military relations and Russia’s spy chief visited North Korea this week to vow a united front against “attempts to increase pressure from external forces.”
The vote was significant and represents a major turning point in the international sanctions regime against North Korea, said Aaron Arnold, a former member of the panel who now works as a sanctions expert at Britain’s Royal United Services Institute (RUSI).
“Russia’s vote, along with its blatant violation of sanctions by buying conventional arms from North Korea, years long history of ignoring their obligations, and at least tacit support from China suggest that the future is grim for the DPRK sanctions regime,” he said, using the initials of North Korea’s official name, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
PUZZLE PIECES
Russia’s U.N. Ambassador Vassily Nebenzia criticized the experts’ work, saying before the vote that its reports had been reduced to “playing into the hands of Western approaches, reprinting biased information and analysing newspaper headlines and poor quality photos.”
Even the panel’s backers acknowledge that its work was increasingly constrained, but blamed it on Chinese and Russian members blocking or obfuscating unfavourable findings.
“The latest report is very interesting, because although it goes into some useful detail on finance and on overseas workers, China is barely mentioned,” said one former senior member who asked not to be named because of diplomatic sensitivities. “If you’re talking about breaching the sanctions, and not mentioning China, that’s not really a terribly accurate reflection of what is really going on.”
While the panel reports looked like a comprehensive summary, they were more like a small part of a larger puzzle, often with some of the most important pieces left out, the former member said.
The end of the panel could lead to more trilateral cooperation among Washington, Seoul and Tokyo, and more evidence of sanctions violations could be released to the public since the restraining influence Russia and China had over headline-generating reports will be gone with the UN panel of experts, said Leif-Eric Easley, a professor at Ewha University in Seoul.
Because global banks and insurance companies have come to rely on independent reports to freeze and close accounts associated with North Korean overseas sanctions evasion networks, continued reporting mechanisms will be found, said Hugh Griffiths, former head of the panel and now a sanctions consultant.
DEEPER RUSSIA-NORTH KOREA TIES
Griffiths said the veto suggests Russia does not want its illegal procurement of North Korean ballistic missiles and conventional artillery munitions to be reported by a UN Security Council body.
“Russia’s veto indicates that Putin will intensify his ballistic missile and embargo-busting cooperation with North Korea,” he said.
The vote illustrates how strong the ties between Russia-North Korea have become, said Jenny Town of 38 North, a Washington-based North Korea monitoring programme.
“It underscores that no new sanctions at the UN Security Council level should be expected in the current geopolitical environment, and the bigger burden on states now to handle sanctions monitoring efforts,” she said.
The United States and South Korea launched a new task force this week aimed at preventing North Korea from procuring illicit oil, particularly from Russia.
The two countries also imposed unilateral sanctions on individuals and entities based in Russia, China and the United Arab Emirates, accusing them of channelling funds to Pyongyang’s weapons programs.
South Korea’s Unification Ministry, which handles relations with the North, called the vote “extremely regrettable.”
Most visible sanctions enforcement has already been headed by the United States and its partners, sometimes in conflict with China or Russia.
Canada accused Chinese jets of “recklessly” harassing its surveillance planes taking part in an U.N. operation to enforce sanctions against North Korea. Beijing called the Canadian flights “provocative.” (Source: Reuters)
28 Mar 24. Gabon: Concerns over military government’s extension will raise unrest risks over national dialogue. Between 2 and 30 April, the government’s ‘Inclusive National Dialogue’ will take place in both the capital Libreville and Akanda (Estuaire province). They aim to determine the duration of the transition and the start of the process to create a new constitution. Unlike previous dialogues, all civil societies and each of Gabon’s 104 political parties will send representatives; Gabonese political refugees and figures living in exile are also expected to take part. However, some opposition figures claim that most of the dialogue’s 600 delegates are supporters of the interim president, General Brice Oligui Nguema. Furthermore, the government is paying attendees to make Nguema appear popular. As such, there are concerns that the dialogue is being manipulated to give Nguema grounds for extending his tenure beyond August 2025 (when he previously promised to restore civilian rule). During the dialogue, we assess that a heightened security posture is likely to drive mobility disruption in Libreville and Akanda. If the dialogue calls for the transition to be extended, the risk of opposition calls for protests will increase. (Source: Sibylline)
27 Mar 24. South African Department of Defence faces critical audit findings; urgent reform needed. The Department of Defence (DoD) received stark warnings from its audit committee chair during a presentation to the Portfolio Committee on Defence and Military Veterans (PCDMV) last week.
DoD Chairperson: Audit Committee Luyanda Mangquku highlighted four areas of grave concern, including performance, discipline, consequence management, and accountability.
These areas of concern, according to his presentation, require urgent improvement and attention if the DoD “is to turn around its fortunes, avoid regressing in its audit outcomes, improve its service delivery capabilities and ultimately maintain its current mandate”.
Going further he warned unless the DoD “adopts a full ethics management approach alongside committing to a zero tolerance to fraud and corruption, driven by leadership commitment and capable forensic and investigative capabilities, this department will continue to be consumed by rampant acts of fraud and corruption”.
Democratic Alliance (DA) shadow defence and military veterans minister Kobus Marais – taking one example from Mangquku’s presentation of “only” R800 recovered from a fruitless and wasteful expenditure bill of R438.7m – maintains the DoD is dysfunctional and should be placed under administration.
“Failure to act now will lead to a summary collapse in government’s ability to provide a working administrative service for our defence force,” he warns.
Due to the underfunding of the wage bill (compensation of employees), the DoD has recorded R2.6bn in unauthorised expenditure this year alone, set to top R5.6bn by the end of the 2023/24 financial year.
The total irregular expenditure figure stands at R15.98bn, arising from the compensation of employees bill reaching a total of R10.1bn and R4.9bn coming from within the procurement environment and logistics division.
With regard to irregular expenditure, the Audit Committee observed that, “management has failed to prevent or clear irregular, fruitless and wasteful expenditure balances, with failing investigations, and ineffective consequence management.”
On fruitless and wasteful expenditure the audit committee chair informed the PCDMV it “reduced marginally” by R3.1m to R438.7m, adding R431m of this was “reported prescribed”. “This may result in a material irregularity as it is due to department’s inefficient investigation and recovery processes,” the presentation has it.
On why the situation has reached its current nadir, the presentation notes an audit action plan “remains in draft”; management does not respond to calls for re-establishing the accountability management forum (AMF) and that services and divisions are not providing responses for the audit action plan.
Human Resources are “concerning” with, high levels of occupational health and safety issues, among others seeing 95 officials dying in six months – 71 of medical causes. There are and 893 grievances outstanding from longer than the prescribed 90 days. There are also leave applications pending since 2021.
Another red light warning area is the DoD Inspector General where “extremely delayed investigations” undermine consequence management and improvements to internal controls. Additionally “critical shortages” of capacity, “insufficient tools of trade”, fuel shortages, delays in obtaining security clearances for auditors and delayed management responses on audit requests compromise audit execution audits.
Critical findings were made during a weapons and ammunition audit at one (unnamed) ammunition depot with the audit committee also calling for a review of the “Reserve Force process management” and nine material irregularities. They range from inventory and asset management to lease payments for unoccupied office buildings; unfair fuel supply award; personal protective equipment (PPE) not procured in a cost effective manner; unregistered drugs imported without approval; non-usage of medical equipment at 1, 2 and 3 Military Hospitals; payment of “inflated invoices for emergency ambulance services” and two unnamed Defence Intelligence (DI) material irregularities.
Other Audit Committee observations included a lack of ambulances for the SA Military Health Service (SAMHS) alongside paying inflated prices for ambulance services resulting in irregular expenditure of R17m; and high medical costs incurred by SAMHS due to expensive outsourcing of healthcare services.
R225m has been allocated by National Treasury for border safeguarding technology but this has not been spent accordingly. “The additional allocation of R500m in 2024/25 and R200m in 2025/26 will be monitored.”
In closing, the audit committee informed the PCDMV Minister Modise’s department needs “a revised defence strategy which reconciles to the shrinking budget appropriation to address what is quickly appearing to be a systematic defunding of the defence force, to the detriment of our sovereignty and national security”.
The risk of the SA National Defence Force (SANDF) not meeting its mandate, performance objectives and outcomes has never been this elevated, the presentation stresses, demanding immediate redress through deliberate measures by all stakeholders, especially Parliament and National Treasury.
The Audit Committee added that another Defence Review is necessary to assist the department address some of its critical challenges, including archaic ICT infrastructure, growing cyber security threats, and underfunded mandates that undermine the department and “its ability to fill critical vacancies, procure its critical prime mission equipment and to implement its vital maintenance programme.” (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
26 Mar 24. Germany extends maritime patrol surveillance over Libya. The German Navy will continue its maritime air surveillance over Libya as part of the EU-led operation Irini to monitor the UN arms embargo.
The German Navy will continue to monitor Libya after the German Government agreed to extend its participation in the EU-led operation Irini to monitor the UN arms embargo against the North African nation.
In a discussion in the German Parliament, it was found that “this oepration is and remains necessary in order to enable more stability in Libya in the long term.”
Germany’s Armed Forces have been involved in the misison since 2020, and the upper personnel limit of 300 soldiers will remain unchanged. The mandate is due to extend until 30 April 2025.
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The Bundeswehr is currently fulfilling its mission through airborne reconnaissance. The Bundeswehr’s contribution to Irini will continue to include staff at the operation’s mission headquarters as well as regular airborne maritime surveillance missions. There is also the fundamental possibility of the Bundeswehr participating with a ship.
The operation is intended to prevent the illegal export of petroleum, including crude oil and refined petroleum products, from Libya. It is also intended to help combat the business model of smuggling and human trafficking networks. Irini gains relevant information from this.
According to GlobalData intelligence, the German Air Force currently operates eight P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft acquired in 2006. Although, the Orion has been operating in the US Air Force from as early as 1962.
More than 400 aircraft are operational with 21 operators in 17 countries including Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Germany, Greece, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, Spain, Taiwan, Thailand and the US.
The sensor suite includes an ASQ-81 magnetic anomaly detector and an ASA-65 magnetic compensator. Sonobuoys are launched from within the main cabin and from the external hardpoints.
The airborne electronic surveillance receiver, ALQ-78(V) is carried on a pylon under the wing fairing. The system is supplied by Lockheed Martin and has also been manufactured under licence by Mitsubishi in Japan. (Source: naval-technology.com)
26 Mar 24. 2015 South African Defence Review action plan envisaged by October. Nine years since the most recent SA Defence Review saw the light of day, Defence and Military Veterans Minister Thandi Modise wants, as “a foremost priority”, to conclude evaluating it and “formulate an actionable plan”.
These are her words in the foreword to the 2024 Department of Defence (DoD) annual performance plan (APP) for the current year. She envisages the “actionable plan” to be ready for consultation with “the National Executive” by the end of October this year.
The 2012 Defence Review was the brainchild of then Defence Minister Lindiwe Sisulu, but when Sisulu left her portfolio in 2012, it took her successor Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula another three years for it to see the light of day, and it was renamed the 2015 Defence Review. It was, however, approved without an accompanying funding model, meaning its objectives have been all but impossible to reach.
The APP was tabled at last week’s Portfolio Committee on Defence and Military Veterans (PCDMV) meeting. The Minister, via her foreword, listed a number of priorities. These include four desired “end states” of future defence; organisational renewal; efficiency, effectiveness and economy; and Armscor and the South African defence industry (SADI).
Future defence, the first end state, according to her foreword, goes about a revised level of defence ambition and a Cabinet approved revised defence strategic trajectory, sustainably funded from the “national fiscus” over multiple medium term strategic framework periods. This will be “implemented pragmatically in the strategic management processes of the department [of Defence]”.
End state two would see a “DoD business case report” consulted on and signed off between the ministers of Public Service and Administration and Defence and Military Veterans.
On end state three – the three Es of Efficiency, Effectiveness and Economy – Modise writes her department is on “a deliberate and clear trajectory to comply with budget and allocation ceilings as set by government”.
Her deliberate and clear trajectory also comes into play for Armscor, the State-owned defence and security acquisition and project management company in her portfolio, and the South African Defence Industry (SADI). The trajectory she sets out is “to retain a domestic industrial and technology base”.
Maintenance of main operating systems and prime mission equipment as well as support for national cyber resilience and leveraging defence capabilities in support of the national developmental agenda are, according to Modise “crucial aspects of our commitment to socio-economic upliftment and safeguarding South Africa’s security and sovereignty”.
In closing she notes the strategic priorities “underscore our dedication to ensuring the defence of our nation while upholding accountability, transparency and efficiency in our operations. Together, we will navigate the challenges ahead and strive towards a safer and more prosperous South Africa”. (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
25 Mar 24. Russia: Highly likely IS attack indicates urban centres will remain vulnerable to terror plots. On 24 March, four suspects made court appearances in the capital Moscow following a terror attack against the Crocus City concert hall in Krasnogorsk (Moscow oblast). The 22 March attack, in which at least 137 people were killed, was the worst such attack in Russia in two decades (see Sibylline Alert – 22 March 2024). Islamic State (IS) later claimed responsibility for the attack. However, Russian President Vladimir Putin did not mention IS explicitly in an address to the nation on 23 March. Rather, he stated that the perpetrators tried to escape in the direction of Ukraine. Kyiv has categorically denied any involvement in the attack. We assess Ukraine’s involvement to be highly unlikely. Rather, we assess that IS, specifically its Islamic State Khorasan (IS-K) offshoot, is highly likely to be the perpetrator. The attack points to an intelligence failure among Russia’s security agencies. As such, urban centres will likely remain vulnerable to Islamist terror plots in the coming weeks and months. (Source: Sibylline)
25 Mar 24. Japan-US: Reports of upgraded defence co-operation point to ambitions to combat regional threats. On 24 March, international media reported that US President Joe Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida will announce their intention to upgrade security co-operation significantly. The announcement will reportedly come during Kishida’s planned visit to the White House for a state dinner on 10 April. Neither government has confirmed these reports, though we assess that they are likely to be credible. On 25 March, Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshimasa Hayashi stated that Japan is considering how its ‘planned joint command can strengthen co-operation with the US’. In 2022, Japan pledged to spend 2% of its GDP on defence; it also recently agreed to buy US Tomahawk cruise missiles. According to reports, the plans centre around restructuring the US’ military command in Japan and streamlining co-operation. While details of the plan are reportedly being discussed, the proposals further demonstrate that both countries are committed to working closer together to combat regional threats, particularly as China has increased its military posture in recent years. We continue to assess that ongoing militarisation in the Asia-Pacific is likely to drive regional tensions in the coming years. (Source: Sibylline)
26 Mar 24. Japan: Shift in defence equipment transfer policy will heighten tensions, drive limited risk of protests. On 26 March, Japan’s cabinet approved a plan to sell future next-generation combat aircraft to external countries; this marks a further shift from Tokyo’s post-World War II pacifist principles. This decision aims to support Japan’s involvement in a collaborative project with Italy and the UK to develop a new stealth fighter jet with supersonic capabilities. The updated rules allow Japan to export these jets (which it wants to be ready for deployment by 2035) to nations which have defence equipment and technology transfer agreements with Japan. There are currently 15 such countries, including the US. Tokyo also claimed that sales will not be made for use in active wars. This move, part of a broader strategy to enhance Japan’s security ties and support domestic industries, marks the country’s first joint defence equipment development project with countries other than the US. It comes against the backdrop of rising concerns over China’s military expansion and actions in the East and South China Seas. Japan’s push for military expansion has sparked division within the country. Furthermore, while we assess that public opinion is shifting towards supporting a stronger Self-Defence Forces, Japan’s re-militarisation and enhancement of security ties with foreign actors will likely drive tensions with China. (Source: Sibylline)
26 Mar 24. Russia-Central Asia: Terror attack will likely drive ethno-religious tensions, xenophobic acts . On 25 March, Sergei Mironov, a lawmaker, stated that Russia must abolish its visa-free scheme with Central Asian states to strengthen its national security. On 22 March, Russia experienced its worst terror attack in two decades, in which at least 139 people were killed (see Sibylline Alert – 22 March 2023). Several of the suspects are believed to be from Central Asia (principally Tajikistan). Separately, Russian-state media reported on 25 March (citing an unspecified insider in its foreign ministry) that the attack will possibly accelerate the government’s efforts to tighten migration. According to the International Organization for Migration, Central Asian citizens comprised around 40% of Russia’s migrant force in 2020, underscoring that Central Asian migrants provide a key labour source within Russia. We assess that certain Russian officials will highly likely continue to call for stricter migration controls in the coming weeks; this will possibly increase the risk of xenophobic attacks against individuals from (or suspected of coming from) Central Asia. (Source: Sibylline)
25 Mar 24. The Royal Thai Air Force Unveils Strategic Procurement Plans. According to the white paper, which was made public at the recent RTAF Symposium 2024 seminar, the Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF) aims to utilize next year’s budget to purchase 12 fighter jets, middle-range air defense systems, and anti-drone technologies. Additionally, plans are underway to acquire more helicopters, along with training aircraft. Several air security projects are currently in the pipeline.
The purchase of a new fleet of fighter jets is intended to replace the aging F-16 jets, which are due to be decommissioned in 2028. The acquisition scheme will be divided into three phases, with the first phase commencing in the 2025 fiscal year, starting in October. The first phase of procurement, involving four jet fighters estimated to cost 19 bn baht, has been submitted to the Defense Ministry and will be forwarded to the cabinet.
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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need. A CNIM Group Company
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