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13 Mar 24. US-South Korea defense talks on track, but November not a hard deadline, US official says. U.S.-South Korean talks on sharing the cost of keeping American troops in South Korea are on track and ahead of schedule, but the U.S. side does not necessarily see a hard deadline ahead of the November U.S. election, a senior Biden administration official told Reuters.
The two sides named envoys this month to launch a new early round of talks for a deal to take effect in 2026. South Korean media said the aim was for an agreement before any comeback by Donald Trump, who during his presidency accused Seoul of “free-riding” on U.S. military might.
Trump demanded Seoul pay as much as $5 bn a year for the deployment of some 28,500 American troops as part of efforts to deter nuclear-armed North Korea.
The U.S. official said the talks were “very much on track and ahead of schedule.”
“I can’t say at this moment quite how soon they’ll wrap, but we are not seeing major hurdles. And we’re seeing a lot of political will on both sides,” the official said, speaking on condition of anonymity.
“We’re fairly confident that our incentives are aligned, and that we will get these negotiations done. So we’d like to make quick progress, but … don’t necessarily see November as a hard deadline.”
South Korea began shouldering the costs of U.S. deployments, used to fund local labor, the construction of military installations and other logistics support, in the early 1990s.
The current agreement is set to expire in 2025, with negotiations on a successor pact usually held just before the end of the existing one.
During Trump’s presidency, both sides had struggled for months to make progress, before reaching a deal when Seoul agreed to increase its contribution by 13.9%, the biggest annual rise in nearly two decades.
Trump is set to face off against President Joe Biden in the November election. A senior South Korean presidential official said this week Seoul expects no fundamental shift in relations with the United States even if U.S. voters elect a new president, but hopes to make progress on defense cost-sharing talks and other issues this year. (Source: Reuters)
13 Mar 24. Japan to relax export curbs to allow overseas sales of joint jet fighter. Japan will tweak its military equipment transfer rules to allow exports of the jet fighter it is developing with Britain and Italy, the country’s leader said on Wednesday, removing an obstacle that could have stymied the project.
The joint Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) last year established a joint organisation and industry group led by Britain’s BAE Systems PLC (BAES.L), opens new tab, Japan’s Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (7011.T), opens new tab and Italy’s Leonardo (LDOF.MI), that aims to deploy an advanced fighter by the middle of the next decade.
Without a loosening of Japan’s military export rules, which ban overseas sales of lethal equipment, Tokyo’s partners would have been unable to sell the aircraft abroad, which would cut unit costs by spreading development expenses across more planes.
After months of political wrangling between Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party and its coalition partner Komeito, the government has agreed to allow exports to countries that have defence equipment transfer agreements with Japan and are not embroiled in any conflicts, Kishida told the country’s parliament.
Each export will also require Cabinet approval and the rule change will be limited to the GCAP fighter, he added.
Japan, Britain and Italy may involve other nations as junior partners in GCAP. Saudi Arabia is among the contenders because it would bring money and a lucrative market to a project expected to cost tens of bns of dollars, sources have said.
Other companies involved in the project include European missile maker MBDA, Japanese avionics manufacturer Mitsubishi Electric Corp (6503.T), opens new tab, and engine makers Rolls-Royce PLC (RROYC.UL), IHI Corp (7013.T), opens new tab, and Avio Aero. (Source: Reuters)
11 Mar 24. Haiti: US airlift of non-essential staff points to ongoing safety risks; further violence is highly likely. On 11 March, the US military airlifted non-essential staff from the US embassy in the capital Port-au-Prince (Ouest department). The military has also bolstered the embassy’s security. Violence and further attempts by gangs to seize control of the capital’s Toussaint Louverture International Airport (PAP) continue to impact evacuation efforts. At the time of writing, no inbound or outbound flights are permitted. Reports indicate that some foreign nationals have successfully crossed the four official Haiti-Dominican Republic border crossings. However, the overland journey to cross these points continues to entail high risks given the heavy gang presence and checkpoints along the way. Separately, Guy Philippe – a former Haitian police officer and the orchestrator of Haiti’s 2004 coup plot – has called for the resignation of Prime Minister Ariel Henry. He also signalled that he will seek an amnesty agreement with gang leaders should he come to power. We assess that violence and challenges to evacuation operations are highly likely to persist in the capital in the near term. Food and water security risks will almost certainly increase in the coming days and weeks as the crisis persists. (Source: Sibylline)
11 Mar 24. Sudan: Belligerents remain committed to military solution, sustaining conflict in coming months. On 9 March, a senior representative of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) rejected calls by the UN Security Council for a Ramadan ceasefire unless the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) withdraws from civilian areas. While the RSF officially welcomed a ceasefire, we assess that the group will almost certainly not comply with the SAF’s demands and that it will continue to contest control of the capital Khartoum. In recent weeks the SAF has made various gains in Omdurman, one of three cities that comprises the capital. However, this comes after the RSF advanced into West Kordofan and El Gezira states. As such, there is little to no evidence that either side is close to making definitive military gains against the other; elevated levels of conflict across southern Sudan and around Khartoum are likely to be sustained in the coming months. This will continue to exacerbate the humanitarian crisis, sustaining elevated levels of displacement, stretching the aid capacities of neighbouring countries and driving threats to NGOs. (Source: Sibylline)
11 Mar 24. Philippines prepares to boost defence spending to $6.2bn by 2029. Escalating territorial disputes in the South China Sea drive the Philippines’ military modernisation plan. As tensions escalate in the South China Sea, the Philippines is gearing up for a boost in defence spending, with plans to allocate $6.2bn (343bn pesos) by 2029, according to a forecast by GlobalData on the Philippines defence market.
The “Re-Horizon 3” initiative is crucial, as the country aims to modernise its military amidst growing territorial disputes.
While financial constraints pose challenges, the Philippines remains steadfast in its commitment to enhancing defence capabilities through strategic acquisitions. Focusing on maritime and air defence, the country aims to navigate regional complexities and safeguard its interests in the face of evolving geopolitical dynamics.
In November 2023, the US and Philippines conducted joint military patrols in the South China Sea, near Taiwan, aimed at countering Chinese aggression, particularly in light of recent incidents such as Chinese coastguard vessels ramming a Philippines’ vessel. The patrols involved air and naval forces from both countries.
GlobalData’s latest report, “Philippines Defense Market 2024-2029“, highlights a steady compound annual growth rate (CAGR) in defence acquisition expenditure of 4.9% during 2025-2029, signalling the country’s determination to prioritise defence modernisation despite economic challenges. Over the next decade, the planned initiative underscores the Philippines’ recognition of the need to adapt to emerging threats and strengthen its defence posture.
Rouble Sharma, an aerospace and defence analyst at GlobalData, emphasises the importance of aligning defence objectives with available resources: “The execution of the ‘Re-Horizon 3’ phases hinges on the performance of the Philippine economy.
The funding constraints compelled a review and adjustment of the weapons wish list of the initial Horizon 3 plan, emphasising a practical approach to aligning the objectives with the available resources. Despite these challenges, the revised version maintains its commitment to bolstering the Philippine military, recognising the need to strengthen its defence posture.”
Key aspects of the defence modernisation strategy include acquiring modern weaponry and enhancing naval assets. Ongoing programmes such as procuring offshore patrol vessels, missile corvettes, interdiction boats, and Black Hawk helicopters demonstrate the country’s focus on addressing maritime security concerns and improving reconnaissance capabilities.
Last year, Kongsberg Maritime secured a deal with Hyundai Heavy Industries to provide six sets of controllable pitch propeller systems for the Philippine Navy’s offshore patrol vessels. The first set is scheduled for delivery in August this year. Concurrently, the Philippines entered into an agreement with Lockheed Martin to acquire three C-130J-30 Super Hercules tactical airlifters.
Looking ahead, the Philippines faces the dual challenge of overcoming economic constraints and navigating international alliances to achieve its modernisation goals. With a commitment to strengthening the defence industrial base and maintaining a robust defence stance, the country remains determined to safeguard its interests amidst evolving regional complexities. (Source: naval-technology.com)
13 Mar 24. Integration the key to success, Defence chiefs say.
Australia, the United States, and the United Kingdom must continue to integrate their military capabilities and view security as a whole-of-nation necessity, Chief of Army Lieutenant General Simon Stuart told attendees during a recent presentation.
Australia’s Chief of Army reflected on the changing battlefield alongside his counterparts, British Army Chief of the General Staff General Sir Patrick Sanders and US Army Chief of Staff General Randy George, during a presentation for the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Key to success was the integration of military capabilities, information sharing, expediting delivery of systems, and appreciating the changes of the modern battlefield, according to reports from the US Department of Defense.
“In an era of great power competition, defence and security is once again, a whole-of-nation endeavour,” LTGEN Stuart told attendees.
“But even more so, it requires us to work even more closely and in a more integrated fashion with allies and partners. As military professionals, our greatest challenge is balancing the enduring human nature of warfare with its ever-changing character.”
Enhanced integration between the three nations includes expediting the speed in which data is transferred between Australian, American and British forces. This is especially true in the Indo-Pacific, which will rely on freedom of manoeuvre across all domains, the Army Chief explained.
“You need to get the right data in the right place at the right classification,” he said.
“If we were to look at what some of the central priorities are, I think what we would previously have called the network is really at the heart of the digital age warfare in all domains, but particularly in the land domain.
“I think that there’s no such thing as a maritime theatre, for example, I think these are joint theatres,” he told attendees.
“It’s going to take everybody’s capability. It’s going to have to be a joint team.”
During the presentation, the chief reflected on the lessons learned during the war in Ukraine, including how uncrewed aerial vehicles are creating intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance threats for militaries. Meanwhile, militaries must make greater preparations for littoral and urban combat, requiring capabilities that are fit for purpose in built-up environments. (Source: Defence Connect)
14 Mar 24. Philippines-China: Manila’s rejection of Beijing’s South China Sea proposition will sustain tensions. On 12 March, the Philippines’ Department of Foreign Affairs claimed that it had received several maritime proposals from China on the South China Sea that were contrary to its interests. Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr separately stated that it was ‘difficult to see a way forward’. Also on 12 March, China confirmed that it had sent proposals, without specifying what they were, and accused the Philippines of ‘infringement’ and ‘provocation’. This latest dispute comes amid a significant escalation in maritime tensions in disputed waters in the South China Sea in recent months. On 5 March, four Filipino crew members were injured in a collision involving Chinese and Philippine coast guard vessels near the Second Thomas Shoal. In 2023, physical encounters between vessels of the two countries were reportedly more frequent and intense than in previous years, driving regional tensions. However, we assess that the risk of armed conflict remains low, not least because the US-Philippines Mutual Defence Treaty extends to armed attacks against vessels in the South China Sea, which will deter further escalation. (Source: Sibylline)
11 Mar 24. Russian arms exports plummet amid war, sanctions: think tank. Russian weapons exports have dropped dramatically under the shadow of Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the global sanctions that followed, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.
The sale of Russian weapons to other countries fell by 53% between the five-year periods of 2014-18 and 2019-23, according to the latest report by the think tank, dated March 11.
While Moscow exported major arms to 31 countries in 2019, this number plummeted to only 12 last year, with Western sanctions against the Kremlin representing one of the key reasons some governments are interested to buy elsewhere.
The report noted that the three largest receivers of Russian-made weapons between 2019-23 were India, China, and Egypt. However, the amount of equipment that those governments acquired underwent a steep decrease.
“Between the two periods, Russian arms exports to India decreased by 34%, while exports to China decreased by 39% and to Egypt by 54%. Algeria and Vietnam, which were Russia’s third- and fourth-largest recipients in 2014-18, saw their exports drop by 83% and 91%,” respectively, SIPRI analysts wrote.
The newest figure, combined with the overall low number of pending Russian arms deliveries, suggest that the country’s exports in the defense sector are likely to remain low, as the draw of made-in-Russia military equipment is waning, according to the analysts.
One trend relates to the continents of Asia and Oceania. The regions, which accounted for 68% of overall Russian weapons exports in 2018-2023, are now seeing the rise or the United States as their largest arms supplier.
Several Asian countries have hinted in the last year at their intention to decrease their arms dependency on Russia, rather looking to diversify their supplier channels or build up their domestic industries.
Another important shift in arms transfers between the two time periods analyzed was the move of France ahead of Russia in the ranking of arms-exporting nations. Paris is now the world’s second-largest weapons exporter, recording a 47% increase in sales.
With European nations scrambling for weapons to fill their own stocks or to support Ukraine, the continent logged a significant increase in arms imports, which were 94% higher in the past five-year window than in 2014-18. Purchases from the United States accounted for 55% of the uptick.
Weapons high on countries’ wish lists currently are both combat aircraft and helicopters, with 800 on order globally, as well as air defense systems and a greater interest in long-range missiles.
“In the past two years, we have seen a much greater demand for air defense systems in Europe, spurred on by Russia’s missile campaign against Ukraine,” Pieter Wezeman, senior researcher at SIPRI’s arms transfer program said. (Source: Defense News Early Bird/Defense News)
14 Mar 24. Haiti: Suspension of MSS deployment points to continued attack, government stability risks. On 12 March, a Kenyan official announced that plans to deploy a Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission to Haiti have been put on hold due to a ‘complete breakdown of law and order’ in Haiti. The MSS mission will now only be deployed once a new Haitian government is established. The deployment had been agreed by Kenyan President William Ruto and Haiti’s former prime minister, Ariel Henry, on 1 March. Following Henry’s resignation on 11 March, gangs have retained substantial territorial control. Despite Henry’s resignation and the appointment of a transitional council, the risk of further attacks remains high; gang leader Jimmy Chérizier threatened to attack hotels in which politicians are residing. It also remains possible that the tenuous alliance of various gang factions will deteriorate; we assess that this would result in inter-gang conflict for territorial control. This risk will be exacerbated if gang leaders are excluded from the transitional government. (Source: Sibylline)
12 Mar 24. Haiti: Prime minister’s resignation is unlikely to quell short-term security risks. On 11 March, Prime Minister Ariel Henry officially announced his resignation following weeks of calls for him to step down. Henry’s resignation will be effective once a presidential transition council is implemented. The council will reportedly be drawn from Haiti’s business sector and political parties. It will exercise presidential powers via a majority vote. The council will also establish a provisional electoral council that will organise Haiti’s first general election since 2016. The transition council will only be implemented once the security situation has improved. According to US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, Washington DC will provide USD 100 m to support the pending deployment of the Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission led by Kenya. Despite Henry’s resignation, we assess that violence will likely be sustained in the near term as gangs continue to seek to capitalise on the political and security vacuum. Airports and ports will likely remain paralysed as gangs continue to block key supply chain arteries. For further information on Haiti’s security situation, please see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – Haiti – 5 March 2024. We ultimately assess that the security situation is unlikely to improve significantly until the MSS deployment. (Source: Sibylline)
12 Mar 24. Rwanda-Congo (DRC): Mediation to end conflict with M23 rebels remains highly unlikely. On 11 March, Rwandan President Paul Kagame announced that he is open to meeting with Congolese President Felix Tshisekedi to discuss the ongoing conflict in eastern Congo (DRC). President Tshisekedi agreed to meet with President Kagame in February. Any such meeting would mark the latest round of negotiations between the DRC and Rwanda over the M23; Rwanda is already party to the largely unsuccessful 2022 Luanda and Nairobi processes. As such, it is unlikely that fresh negotiations would overcome the systemic drivers of conflict that resulted in the violation of the Luanda agreement. Rwanda’s determination to maintain its influence over mineral assets in the DRC and its capacity to target groups it deems a threat to its national security will likely sustain the threat of conflict in the coming months. This includes around North Kivu. (Source: Sibylline)
12 Mar 24. U.S., Australian, British Land Chiefs Address Security Agreement’s Progress. AUKUS, the trilateral security agreement among Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States, is already bringing the three allies closer together, and concrete progress will be measured over the next few years, the chiefs of the countries’ land forces said yesterday at a Center for Security and International Studies presentation.
AUKUS, signed in September 2021, is primarily known as a program that will enable the three countries to work together to provide a nuclear-powered, conventionally armed submarine force to Australia in the 2040s. This is the “Pillar 1” portion of the program, but leaders from all domains are already working on Pillar 2 of the agreement. Army leaders speaking at CSIS said they can see the benefits of the close partnership happening much more quickly.
Pillar 2 looks at technologies — including hypersonic weapons, cyber and computer technology and more — and land forces have expertise in these capabilities.
Australian Chief of Army Lt. Gen. Simon Stuart, British Army Chief of the General Staff Gen. Sir Patrick Sanders, and U.S. Army Chief of Staff Gen. Randy A. George have worked closely together to examine the ramifications of the partnership and ways to make it closer and more interoperable.
“In an era of great power competition, defense and security is once again, a whole of nation endeavor,” Stuart said. “But even more so, it requires us to work even more closely and in a more integrated fashion with allies and partners. As military professionals, our greatest challenge is balancing the enduring human nature of warfare with its ever-changing character.”
The three men have been meeting for a week and observed exercises at Camp Pendleton, California. The other two land force chiefs echoed Stuart’s statements.
The leaders see Russia’s war on Ukraine and conflict in the Middle East and see lessons for their own militaries and the need for closer cooperation among the militaries. In the past, George said, the military would see a promising technology or system and examine it and, perhaps, get it on line in four or five years. “We have to be quicker than that,” he said. “What we talk about in the U.S. Army is continuous transformation.”
He used lessons from unmanned aerial vehicles in Ukraine as an example. “You really can’t hide anymore with all the sensors that you have out there,” he said. “That has implications for … how we’re going to have to transform.”
He noted that commercial companies are moving much quicker than the military in many areas, and the three leaders had conversations about the process.
Other aspects they spoke about were that more people are moving to cities and combat is moving to cities, as well. “That will have implications on … what your capabilities are and how you’re going to do those things,” he said.
The meeting of the land forces chiefs is timely, as the world situation is volatile, Sanders said. “We can see threats proliferating, at a scale, a pace and a vector that we probably haven’t seen for 80 years or more,” the British chief said. “It’s not beyond the realms of possibility that these threats begin to metastasize together.”
The meetings are also key as time is “surely the most critical strategic resource that we have in the face of these threats,” he continued.
Sanders said he sees the discussions as a chance to speak about deterrence, which includes maintaining and increasing capabilities – what he calls “magazine depth.”
AUKUS, he said, is about maintaining the warfighting competitive edge. “It’s about partners” being able to seamlessly work together.
To that point, Stuart said that the chiefs spent a lot of time discussing the need for U.S., Australian and British forces to share data at machine speed. “You need to get the right data in the right place at the right classification,” he said. “If we were to look at what some of the central priorities are, I think what we would previously have called the network is really at the heart of the of digital age warfare in all domains, but particularly in the land domain.”
Data is the key, Sanders said. Data ultimately generates effects, and that requires “being able to freely flow data from sensors through to deciders through to effectors across all domains,” he said. ” is the single most important enabler to allow us to co-develop, co-produce and co-sustain the sort of capabilities that were, that we’re talking about.”
There is a lot of blue in any map of the Indo-Pacific, and many believe AUKUS is a maritime strategy. George said people must think larger than that. “You’re not going to win a war from the sea,” he said. “I don’t think you’re going to win a war from the air. I’m certainly not saying that you would win just from the land.
Spotlight: Project Convergence Capstone 4
“I think that there’s no such thing as a maritime theater, for example, I think these are joint theaters,” he continued. “It’s going to take everybody’s capability. It’s going to have to be a joint team.” (Source: U.S. DoD)
09 Mar 24. US Evaluates Sending Marine FAST Unit to Haiti Amid Escalating Gang Violence. The United States is currently evaluating the option to deploy a specialized Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team (FAST) of Marines to Haiti, prompted by a severe deterioration in the security environment due to rampant gang violence. This move, prompted by a request from the State Department, aims to enhance the security of the U.S. Embassy in Port-au-Prince in the wake of chaos that led to the shutdown of the nation’s primary international airport and the release of over 4,000 prisoners from jails.
Haiti’s Prime Minister Ariel Henry is facing increasing difficulty in governing, further complicated by restrictions on his movement, including airspace closures by neighboring countries. The security turmoil in Haiti has led to more than 8,400 people being killed, injured, or kidnapped in 2023, doubling the figures from the previous year and exacerbating a humanitarian crisis that affects nearly half of the country’s population.
On Wednesday, the U.S. Embassy in Haiti advised American residents to leave the country at their earliest convenience due to safety concerns, announcing that it would operate on a limited basis starting Thursday. The embassy issued a security warning, highlighting the possibility of disruptions to its operations throughout the week due to violence from gangs and its impact on transportation and infrastructure.
The Marine Corps’ Fleet Antiterrorism Security Teams (FAST), known for their global deployments for short-term missions to protect or reclaim U.S. interests, are highly trained for various security tasks. These tasks include operations for evacuating noncombatants, engaging in close-quarters combat, conducting urban and convoy operations, securing ships, and other specialized security activities. This training information is detailed on the Defense Visual Information Distribution Service’s website. FAST units, stationed in Yorktown, Virginia as part of the Marine Corps Security Force Regiment, have been actively involved in key missions. For example, in 2019, FAST Marines were assigned to secure a U.S. merchant vessel navigating through the Strait of Hormuz, which lies between Oman and Iran.
However, the U.S. government has indicated a preference for focusing on diplomatic and humanitarian support rather than deploying military forces for stabilization purposes, highlighted by the recent endorsement of a Kenyan police mission to Haiti. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
04 Mar 24. OPINION: The Defence Industry Development Strategy (DIDS).
So, Defence has published two long-awaited (and long overdue) documents – the Defence Industry Development Strategy (DIDS) and its response to the Hilarides review of the RAN’s surface combatant fleet, Enhanced Lethality Surface Combatant Fleet.
You should read them together. Not surprisingly, the latter cites Defence’s Continuous Naval Shipbuilding program as one of the justifications for the decisions it recommends; the former names it as one of seven Sovereign Defence Industrial Priorities (SDIPs):
- Maintenance, repair, overhaul and upgrade of Australian Defence Force aircraft
- Continuous naval shipbuilding and sustainment
- Sustainment and enhancement of the combined arms land system
- Domestic manufacture of guided weapons, explosive ordnance and munitions
- Development and integration of autonomous systems
- Integration and enhancement of battlespace awareness and management systems
- Test and evaluation, certification and systems assurance
A few things stand out here. Firstly, we now have a list of Defence’s industry priorities and a proper definition of each of them – this list subsumes the previous much longer list of Strategic Industry Capability Priorities (SICPs) which weren’t all defined in any case.
Secondly, the DIDS talks of two timeframes, or ‘epochs’ for the SDIPs: Epoch 1 runs from 2023 to 2025 while Epoch 2 runs from 2026 to 2030. Defence has acknowledged it needs to differentiate between short-term and medium-term goals and will handle capability and industry development differently for those two epochs as a result.
Thirdly, although Defence doesn’t say so explicitly, the DIDS is tantamount to an acknowledgement that it hasn’t been a good customer. It does admit it hasn’t been easy to deal with. The majority of the DIDS focusses on reforms to the Defence organisation, to acquisition and to capability development.
As Mr Ewen Levick, Publisher of Australian Defence Magazine, pointed out in his opening speech to February’s ADM Congress in Canberra, “The greatest risk to industry in this country is government. And as industry ultimately deliver capability to the ADF, government has become its own greatest capability risk.”
To be fair, Defence has tended to operate on a peace time basis and its processes are designed to protect the public purse and ensure taxpayers’ money is spent wisely. But risk-aversion, at the level to which Defence and the Commonwealth take it, has simply become yet another cause of risk, delay and waste. The DIDS is meant to streamline and simplify Defence’s glacial and over-opaque processes and deliver warfighting capability much quicker, to both the Australian Defence Force (ADF) and, through an invigorated exports program, to Australia’s allies.
It remains to be seen how effective Defence’s reform program is, but this one gets off to a good start: it devotes an entire chapter to Communication, something that Defence is abysmally poor at but which a strong, resilient industry sector needs. It lists four target outcomes in communicating with the defence industry, along with methods for achieving them and the types of content required. Again, it remains to be seen how effective this part of the DIDS program will be – Defence is notoriously secretive and the culture change necessary to alter this is massive. But at least Defence and CASG have finally acknowledged Communication is an issue.
Fourthly, there’s a focus on Innovation and speed to capability, and this is reflected in the SDIPs: a platform might have a service life of 30 years, but its combat effectiveness will likely depend on regular, even frequent, technology refreshes. Refreshing the technology properly will require ongoing R&D (possibly in collaboration with a foreign ally) and the ability to commercialise the resulting Intellectual Property (IP) quickly (and again potentially collaboratively). Hence the focus on Defence being a good customer: unless it is spending money to acquire the right stuff quickly there is absolutely no incentive for the Australian defence industry to conduct research and to manufacture things.
Fifthly, the DIDS examines the characteristics of the Australian defence industrial base. It divides the industry into three Tiers: Tier 1 consists of the primes, almost all of whom are foreign-owned, though most have a significant footprint in Australia; Tier 1 companies deliver major capability at scale – the F-35, ANZAC-class frigates, Redback IFVs, and so on. Tier 2 it defines as ‘businesses delivering major equipment, systems, assemblies and services realising specific function’. It notes that Tier 2 doesn’t include many Australian companies and states that ‘Strengthening the industrial base’s resilience and capacity to innovate requires increasing [Australian] businesses in this segment.’
Most Australian defence companies are Small-Medium Enterprises (SMEs) and they operate at Tier 3, notes the DIDS. They are defined as ‘businesses providing the parts, consumables and services needed to enable the initial assembly, upgrade or ongoing operation of systems’. The DIDS aims to help Tier 3 companies grow and transition to Tier 2 and, eventually, to prime contractor status, but it will take a while and a change of Defence mindset.
Tier 3 companies are often more agile and innovative than larger companies, but barriers to growth can include cash flow, access to finance and access to skilled staff. Within the defence context specifically, they also face the challenges of increasing security requirements, lack of information about Defence’s needs and priorities and, of course, long lead times before contract signature. The DIDS is intended to overcome these barriers.
The DIDS aims to help grow Australia’s defence industry into something that can be a pillar of a stronger national economy. In 2022-23 Defence spent some $38bn on acquisition and sustainment; 57% of acquisition expenditure and 80% of sustainment expenditure went to Australian firms. The DIDS is intended to help all of those figures to grow.
Interestingly, the DIDS also explicitly acknowledges the importance of private investment in the development of the industry. As private capital – venture capitalists, banks, institutional investors, etc – typically requires a reasonable financial return in a sensible timeframe before it will invest then, again, Defence’s capability development, acquisition and decision-making processes come under the spotlight.
An interesting feature of the fallout from the release of the DIDS has been the response from AIDN, the Australian Industry Defence Network, which is usually quick to spot and criticise inconsistencies, contradictions and deliberate obfuscation in official documents.
“This is a comprehensive document and the interrelationship between all sections and annexes needs to be read and understood in detail,” says AIDN CEO Brent Clark. “AIDN is now calling for the release of the Integrated Investment Plan (IIP). The IIP is a vital element for industry to fully plan, with confidence, and to move forward.
“The Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence and Minister for Defence Industry have previously advised that the IIP will be fully funded and budgeted accordingly. Industry must have this assurance to have the confidence to move forward.”
The Defence Industry Development Statement acknowledges some simple and often hard truths: Defence isn’t always a good customer while industry itself has sometimes followed what it sees as its own best interests, even if they don’t align with Defence needs.
The DIDS is designed to modify the behaviours of both parties. It has been welcomed by most and hasn’t attracted lots of criticism – that alone makes it unusual. But until we see the IIP and the National Defence Strategy we shan’t know the full context for the DIDS.
(Source: https://www.ex2.com.au/news/)
10 Mar 24. Adapting to the New Frontier: Enhancing US Special Operations Forces for Strategic Global Competition. The Atlantic Council has released a report emphasizing the critical shift needed for US Special Operations Forces (USSOF) in the face of strategic competition, primarily against China and Russia. Highlighting the multifaceted nature of modern security threats, the report advocates for a broader application of USSOF’s unique skills beyond traditional combat roles. It calls for an integration of cyber, information, economic, and diplomatic strategies to enhance US strategic objectives globally.
Executive Summary:
The evolving landscape of global security necessitates a reevaluation of USSOF’s role in maintaining US strategic interests. With adversaries leveraging unconventional warfare tactics, USSOF’s adaptability and expertise across domains present an underutilized asset in the strategic competition.
Key Recommendations:
- Transition USSOF’s focus from primarily counterterrorism activities to encompass broader strategic competition roles.
- Enhance USSOF’s capabilities in cyber, information warfare, and economic engagements to counter near-peer adversaries effectively.
- Foster deeper integration and coordination of USSOF efforts across geographic combatant commands to address global challenges comprehensively.
- Encourage innovation within USSOF by adopting cutting-edge technologies and fostering partnerships with the defense industry and tech sectors.
- Establish clear metrics for success to evaluate USSOF’s contributions to strategic competition and guide resource allocation and strategic planning. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
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