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16 Feb 24. Russian opposition activist Alexei Navalny has died in an Arctic penal colony, according to the country’s prison service, triggering condemnation from western leaders who blamed President Vladimir Putin for his demise. Putin’s most prominent opponent, Navalny fell ill after a walk in the prison’s yard and “lost consciousness almost immediately”, the Russian prison service said on Friday, adding that attempts to resuscitate the 47-year-old failed and “the reasons for his death are being clarified”. US President Joe Biden was among the western leaders who were quick to suggest Navalny’s death was caused by the Russian government. “Make no mistake: Putin is responsible for Navalny’s death,” Biden said. “Putin is responsible. What has happened to Navalny is more proof of Putin’s brutality.” Emmanuel Macron, president of France, said: “In today’s Russia, free spirits are sent to the gulag and condemned to death. Anger and indignation . . . My thoughts go out to his family, loved ones and to the Russian people.” A charismatic anti-corruption activist, Navalny was jailed just over three years ago after returning to Russia from Germany following treatment for a nerve agent poisoning that he blamed on Putin. The Kremlin then steadily moved to isolate him from the outside world by holding him under increasingly restrictive conditions in notoriously harsh and remote prison colonies. In December, he was relocated to a jail in the Yamalo-Nenets region of Russia, above the Arctic Circle, after disappearing from public view and falling out of contact with his legal team for several weeks. Navalny’s exiled team of supporters on Friday said it had “no confirmation” of the activist’s death, adding that a lawyer for Navalny was travelling to the prison. Navalny’s wife Yulia Navalnaya gave an unannounced speech at the Munich Security Conference, saying: “If this is true, I want Putin and all of his entourage, Putin’s friends and his government to know they will be held accountable for what they have done to our country, to my family and to my husband. And that day will come very soon.” In Moscow, Russians lined up in the snow to lay flowers in honour of Navalny at a memorial to victims of Soviet prison camps, according to videos posted on social media. They laid flowers in several other cities despite recent harsh crackdowns on displays of dissent against Putin. Police pressed them to leave the area after doing so, said Olga, 31, a financial analyst who attended the Moscow memorial close to the headquarters of the FSB intelligence agency. “When I was walking away, I saw quite a few people with flowers on their way to the monument, which I guess is the most important thing in all of it really — seeing others share your shock and resentment,” she said. More than 100 people were detained at Navalny memorials in eight cities, according to rights monitor OVD-Info. (Source: FT.com)
16 Feb 24. Turkey and Pakistan forge ahead in air-to-air missile advancements. Turkey‘s second Chief of General Staff, General Irfan Yossert, accompanied by his delegation, visited the Pakistan Air Force Command. The visit highlighted a certain technological partnership between the two nations, particularly in the area of air-to-air missiles.
During this respectful visit, General Irfan Yossert, along with his delegation, met with Pakistan Air Force’s Chief Marshal, Zahir Ahmed Baber Sidhu. They engaged in a substantial dialogue centered on enhancing military cooperation between their respective countries.
The discussion led to a mutual agreement to augment the existing partnership. This included development through collaborative groups focused on technological advancement, as well as, the exchange of principal capabilities.
Missile technology exchange program
The Pakistan Air Force has shed light on the ongoing discussions regarding the continuation of the air-to-air missile technology exchange program. This initiative aims to bring maximum benefits to the air forces of both involved nations.
The enhancement of existing collaborative efforts has been mutually agreed upon. They have decided to strengthen their cooperation on various levels – nation to nation, corporation to corporation, and military authorities to the Air Force.
Turkey and Pakistan consistently focus on expanding their defense industry cooperation. Currently, with Asphat A.Şr serving as the primary contractor, construction activities for the four Milgem Corvettes, allocated for the Pakistan Navy, are in full swing. The maiden ship, christened as PNS Babur, was recently handed over.
Project Goktug
On December 14, 2012, a watershed moment occurred when the Ministry of National Defense for Research and Development and Tubitak Sage signed a pivotal agreement concerning the Goktug project. The signed deal focused specifically on the air-to-air missile requirements of the Turkish Air Force. In November 2016, the project was subsequently handed over to the SSB.
The current Goktug project contract stipulates a plan for leading the design and development of the missile. This endeavor aims to realize two distinct configurations for F-16 PO-I aircraft: In-Visibility and Beyond-Visibility. Following this, the path then leads to the missile’s qualification. Post qualification, the first batches of ammunition for testing would be delivered, thereby marking the completion of the project’s lifecycle.
Bozdogan WVRAAM
The Bozdogan is a cutting-edge In-Sight air-to-air missile, designed to rival the American AIM-9X. It boasts a high-resolution infrared [IIR] seeker head, assuring a wide field of view, and has a robust defense against electronic warfare systems.
Capable of covering a distance of approximately 25 kilometers, the streamlined Bozdogan can achieve a remarkable speed of Mach 3, three times the speed of sound. Its advanced features include high maneuverability, thanks to its vector control, and an IIR warhead for potential engagement with even cruise missiles.
Photo credit: YouTube
The development of the Bozdogan involved rigorous flutter tests beginning in April 2019. This was a joint effort between Tubitak Sage and the 401st Fleet Test Command. An impressive success was recorded in November 2019 when a test missile, fired from a grounded F-16, annihilated a high-speed unmanned aerial vehicle hovering 4 kilometers above. The end goal? The Turkish Air Force Command plans to replace its AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles with the superior Bozdogan.
Gokdogan BVRAAM
Have you ever wondered about the equivalent of the US-made AIM-120 AMRAAM? Meet the Gokdogan, a highly advanced air-to-air missile. Built with solid-state construction and an active radar [AR] seeker, the Gokdogan offers capabilities that are a step beyond typical. It possesses the power to lock onto multiple targets, initiate firings from any direction, and even forget about locked-on targets after initiating the firing sequence.
What makes this missile even more remarkable? It’s designed to withstand radio-electronic warfare. The Gokdogan ensures the source of interference becomes your target. Additionally, with an impressive range of approximately 65 kilometers, it’s important to note that it can update targets, thanks to a functional data link. (Source: Google/https://bulgarianmilitary.com/)
09 Feb 24. Babcock CEO pitches Arrowhead frigate ahead of upcoming Australian surface fleet review. Affordability, flexibility and reduced staff requirements are central to Babcock Australasia CEO Andrew Cridland’s pitch for the Arrowhead frigate ahead of the surface fleet review.
The chief executive made the pitch as the government readies to release the independent analysis into the Royal Australian Navy’s surface fleet. The analysis is expected to provide detail into the optimal mix of Tier 1 and Tier 2 combatants as recommended in the 2023 Defence Strategic Review.
Babcock’s Arrowhead 140 frigate, pitched as a solution to the possible Tier 2 combatant acquisition, is a multi-mission warship able to conduct anti-air, anti-submarine and amphibious warfare taskings, mine countermeasures and land strike.
The Royal Navy is currently building 5 Arrowhead Type 31 designs, an adaptation of the Arrowhead 140, for the Royal Navy at Rosyth in Scotland.
The global shipbuilder was first awarded the Type 31 contract by the Royal Navy in 2019. The company then developed their Arrowhead shipyard and commenced construction on the ship during the COVID-pandemic. Steel was cut on the first Arrowhead Type 31 – the HMS Venturer – in 2021. The Arrowhead 140 has also been selected as the base design for the Indonesian and Polish frigate programs.
Babcock’s readily deployable digital shipyard combined with the modular design of the Arrowhead will enable the company to rapidly begin construction for the Royal Australian Navy, Cridland explained.
“Babcock’s proven and trusted international shipbuilding experience allows us to build Arrowhead frigates in Australian shipyards, developing a truly sovereign capability.
“Backed by Babcock’s established history of designing, building and sustaining warships, the frigate build can be delivered using our Arrowyard concept, which can be deployed anywhere in the world, delivering naval build infrastructure, an industry-ready workforce and an enduring support capability.”
The capability also reduces staffing requirements, amid the Royal Australian Navy’s ongoing recruitment concerns, as highlighted in the Defence Strategic Review.
“Capable of operating with a core crew of just over 100 people, our platform allows the Royal Australian Navy to deploy more capability, with a significantly smaller workforce,” Cridland detailed.
Speaking to Defence Connect, Sir Nick Hine, Babcock’s managing director AUKUS and international, and former United Kingdom Second Sea Lord explained that the modular design of the Arrowhead underpins the competitive advantages of the ship: affordability, speedier build and reduced crewing requirements.
“At the risk of sounding a bit trite, modularity should be like Lego. You should be able to put bits of things on things that you want.
“I used to be in Baghdad, we used to have a Phalanx anti-missile system, literally bolted onto the top of a container. And in the container was all the relevant associated space, both power and the ammunition
“I know this will be heresy to naval architects and designers and procurement specialists and the rest of it, but why would I just not take one of those and put it on my ship if I have the relevant space and the relevant weight attribution and the relevant power?
“Why would I integrate it?”
During the upcoming review, the Commonwealth is expected to acquire a set of Tier 2 surface combatants to support the Tier 1 Hunter Class, under the Australia’s emerging maritime strategy of acquiring a larger number of smaller surface vessels.
(Source: Defence Connect)
16 Feb 24. Ratner Describes Strategy Driven Changes in Indo-Pacific. In only two years, U.S. officials have made many positive inroads with allies and partners throughout the Indo-Pacific.
Ely Ratner, the assistant secretary of defense for Indo-Pacific security affairs, shared his thoughts on the second anniversary of the Indo-Pacific strategy during a presentation at the U.S. Institute of Peace in Washington, yesterday. He spoke alongside representatives from the White House and State Department, illustrating the whole-of-government approach of the strategy.
The Indo-Pacific Strategy is an outgrowth of President Joe Biden’s National Security Strategy, which spawned the National Defense Strategy. That strategy says China is America’s pacing challenge and recognizes that China is the only nation with the will and, increasingly, the capabilities to overturn the rules-based international order that has kept peace between great powers since the end of World War II.
Ratner said the strategy is all about “a shared vision that we have with our allies and partners. I think the degree of strategic alignment between the United States and our major allies and partners … throughout the Indo-Pacific is unprecedented.”
In two short years, the Defense portion of the strategy has meant a more capable force, being more forward positioned and working more closely with allies and partners, Ratner said.
Ratner pointed to the Quad partnership among Australia, India, Japan and the United States as an example of the ways nations are working together. He specifically mentioned the Quad is delivering greater maritime domain awareness.
He also spoke of the growth in partnership with India. Both nations have accelerated integration in the defense industrial sector. “We’ve been working very intensely with the Indian government on their efforts to deepen their indigenous, defense industrial base through some really exciting co-production, co-development opportunities in areas such as jet fighter engines and armored vehicles,” he said.
Ratner also spoke of the Australia, United Kingdom and United States trilateral agreement, known as AUKUS, and what it will mean with Australia developing conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarine capability. The agreement will also mean the three nations will work on other cutting-edge military capabilities.
On the practical side, the United States is bringing more capability and capacity to the region with our allies and partners, and American forces are positioned forward and are more mobile and distributed, Ratner said. “2023 stood as the most transformative year in our regional force posture in a generation,” he said. “And there’s more to come in the years ahead.”
DOD officials are reaching out to allies and partners in the region, working to build capabilities, and conducting exercises with nations. This builds ties between like-minded nations.
More must be done, Ratner said. The most immediate is to secure Compact of Free Association funds from Congress. These are compacts between the United States and the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the Republic of Palau. State Department officials have negotiated an agreement with these nations that will go through 2043. Total U.S. funding for the agreements is $7.1 billion. “Securing COFA funding is one of the most important things that the administration can do this year in terms of our Indo-Pacific strategy,” Ratner said.
The island states are strategic territory giving the U.S. “assured access” in the region, the assistant secretary said.
A large number of islanders serve in the U.S. military. “It’s something where there is strong bipartisan support,” he said. “This is an opportunity for Congress the administration to work together this year. And we just have to get it done.”
The U.S. military in the region is working in many new ways with allies and partners, Ratner said. “We’re going to have to deliver on AUKUS in 2024,” he said. “We’re going to have to keep delivering on the force posture front again. We’ve got lots of successes to talk about, but we’ve got to roll up our sleeves and keep at it this year.” (Source: U.S. DoD)
15 Feb 24. Australian defense industry concern grows over export controls. The U.S. is gearing up to give Australia and Britain a broad exemption to Washington’s export control regime in hopes of enabling a key pillar of the AUKUS agreement focused on facilitating joint development of advanced defense technologies.
But before the U.S. issues that exemption, it wants Australia to adopt export control laws similar to its own. And several Australian defense companies are unhappy about legislation pending in Australia’s parliament that would replicate a U.S.-style export control regime.
They say importing the stringent U.S. export control laws could hinder their ability to effectively collaborate and do business with non-AUKUS countries.
Australia and Britain have long sought a carveout within Washington’s International Traffic in Arms Regulation, or ITAR, export control regime. Defense companies in all three countries have argued ITAR’s rigorous restrictions on sensitive defense exports stymies a key AUKUS goal of jointly developing disruptive technology such as quantum computing, artificial intelligence and hypersonic weapons.
The U.S. Congress passed legislation in December to give Australia and Britain an ITAR exemption for AUKUS, on the condition that both countries implement similarly tough export control laws. Canada is currently the only country to enjoy a special ITAR exemption.
Before Australia and Britain receive their exemptions, Secretary of State Antony Blinken must certify they have each implemented comparable export control regimes.
Michael Biercuk, the chief executive of Q-CTRL, an Australian firm specializing in quantum technology that has offices in Sydney, Los Angeles and London, said the company is “supportive of the idea of making a control-free zone, if you will, between Australia, the U.S. and the U.K. in support of AUKUS.
However, “we don’t think the right way to do it is to bring in the totality of the system that everybody in the world says doesn’t work,” he added, noting the policy would “fundamentally limit exports outside of that AUKUS bubble, and this is not something that is helpful to the local community of vendors who are heavily reliant on export markets.”
Andreas Schwer, the chief executive of EOS, an Australian company specializing in high-tech remote weapons stations, directed energy and counter-unmanned aircraft systems, told Defense News stricter, more ITAR-like regulations in the country “will make life extremely difficult for us to export into any non-AUKUS country.” He said it can sometimes take six months to a year to get simple upgrades formally approved for NATO allies under ITAR.
“This is something which is hated by most of the western European procurement agencies,” said Schwer. “That’s the reason why they always prefer non-ITAR offers. I expect that the same will happen with Australian products. As soon as we have similar regulations in place, they will also say we don’t want to have Australian ITAR components.”
But proponents of ITAR argue it’s a crucial tool for keeping U.S. technology out of the hands of rivals such as China and Russia. Mike Burgess, director general of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, warned last year of an uptick in online espionage attempts aimed at the country’s defense industry since AUKUS was announced in September 2021.
U.S. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control Bonnie Jenkins told lawmakers this week the U.S. must “make sure that we protect our intellectual property.
“We know there’s countries like China who want to steal information,” she added.
Jenkins noted Britain updated its espionage laws in July 2023 as part of the National Security Act and pointed to Australia’s proposed export control overhaul pending a review in parliament.
Biercuk said the Australian proposal was “rushed” and called it “a catastrophically bad piece of legislation.”
Still, NIOA Group chief executive Rob Nioa, noted “really what the U.S. wants to do is protect U.S. [intellectual property. “If it was technology that originated in America, it was always subject to those controls,” Nioa told Defense News. “Our concern will be if that captures Australian uniquely produced intellectual property and prohibits it from going to other places.”
NIOA Group is an Australian munitions company which also owns U.S.-headquartered Barrett Firearms and has a joint venture company with Rheinmetall.
Yet, he added, a comparable Australian export control regime “might streamline” some export approval processes by allowing Canberra to administer them “instead of having to go back to the U.S. for approval.”
“Until we see how it’s implemented, I’m not going to automatically panic,” he said. “People are nervous about it though in Australia because people are nervous about the unknown.”
(Source: Defense News Early Bird/Defense News)
16 Feb 24. Russia: Digital Authoritarianism Will Increase Censorship, Cyber Espionage Risks.
Key points
• The Russian authorities are unlikely to achieve effective digital isolation from the wider global internet in the short term, despite recent efforts to test Russia’s ‘sovereign internet’ concept.
• The Kremlin’s internet control measures will likely reinforce already high censorship, though the effectiveness of efforts to rein in VPNs and messenger apps will remain varied.
• We assess that foreign businesses, NGOs and opposition activists will remain increasingly exposed to cyber espionage risks within Russia, including via state surveillance.
Context
Reports from 5 February indicate that the Russian authorities are considering a ban on the services of major virtual private networks (VPNs) from as early as March and ahead of the presidential election. While unconfirmed, the latest reports underscore the Kremlin’s efforts to reinforce censorship during the electoral period and, more broadly, to pursue its long-standing goal of isolating Russia from the World Wide Web by implementing its ‘sovereign internet’ concept. This concept was coined by a series of laws established in 2019 that provide the authorities with the legal basis to reinforce authoritarian control over Russian cyber space. While the Kremlin’s efforts to establish effective digital authoritarianism remain constrained by various technological obstacles, they have nevertheless significantly enhanced the security services’ internet surveillance capabilities, increasing the risks facing NGO operations, opposition activists and foreign firms.
The death of opposition leader Alexei Navalny on 16 February is highly likely to exacerbate these already heightened risks in the coming days. We assess that the Kremlin will almost certainly pre-empt pro-Navalny protests and meet such calls with extreme repression – including in the cyber space. Temporary blackouts of VPNs and messaging services will likely aim to reduce citizens’ access to sites co-ordinating protests in major cities; if protests do materialise, knock-on internet outages and GPS jamming will likely occur nearby.
Forecast
The Kremlin’s efforts to replicate Chinese-style ‘digital sovereignty’ will be a protracted endeavour, increasing the risks of internet outages in the interim
In May 2019, Russian President Vladimir Putin enacted the so-called ‘Sovereign Internet Law’. The law tasked the Russian telecommunications watchdog Roskomnadzor with creating the technical infrastructure to provide the Kremlin with a ‘kill switch’ to disconnect Russia from the World Wide Web. To that end, Roskomnadzor created a Russian national domain name system (NDNS). It became compulsory as of January 2021 for internet service providers (ISPs) to re-direct their traffic to this NDNS. Additionally, ISPs are required to install deep packet inspection (DPI) filters, allowing Roskomnadzor to filter and reroute traffic without the ISPs participation, thus enhancing central control over the internet.
The 2019 Sovereign Internet Law underscores the Kremlin’s efforts to replicate China’s Great Firewall, with which the Chinese authorities have successfully insulated their country from the wider internet. The effectiveness of the Chinese model is the result of Beijing’s early efforts to establish state control over internet infrastructure, when the number of external internet exchange points (IXs) was minimal. By contrast, the Russian internet remained free during the 1990s; around 40 IXs were established before the Kremlin started to implement internet control measures. Moscow also currently lacks the technological and infrastructural capacity to replicate China’s autarkic internet model. Nevertheless, reports indicate that as of late 2021, Roskomnadzor controlled 100% of mobile communications and 73% of internet traffic in Russia.
Since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Kremlin has become increasingly concerned about suppressing potential dissent and countering the intensification of pro-Ukraine cyber operations. As such, Moscow has ramped up its efforts to establish internet services which are completely separate from the wider global internet. Amid efforts to experiment with decoupling the Russian internet from the World Wide Web, service outages have increased over the last year. For example, during outages in late January, pro-Kremlin hacktivists took to Telegram to assure users that the disruption to Russian internet services was not caused by Ukrainian cyber attacks, but rather by the process involved in migrating towards a sovereign internet. Ultimately, we assess that the establishment of a Chinese-style sovereign internet will be a long-term project that will result in further service outages and more frequent disruption to cyber security operations. (Source: Sibylline)
16 Feb 24. Russia: Attacks against security forces underscore persistent volatility in Chechnya. On 14 February, a group of individuals opened fire on the security forces in the village of Stary Achkhoy (Achkhoy-Martan district) in Russia’s Chechen Republic. The shoot-out reportedly started when the local security forces asked the group of assailants to surrender the weapons they were carrying in their car. In all, three assailants were killed, and two assailants were reportedly arrested. The head of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov, stated on Telegram that the individuals were planning to carry out other attacks against security force personnel, though without disclosing any details on the identity of the group. Reports indicate that a similar attack took place in Chechnya’s capital, Grozny, on 4 February, in which law enforcement personnel were also targeted. Such attacks underscore the persistent volatility in the Chechen Republic, where an Islamist and Chechen nationalist insurgency persisted until 2017. However, the extreme brutality of Kadyrov’s regime will largely prevent the resumption of major insurgent operations; we ultimately assess that attacks similar to the Stary Achkhoy incident are unlikely to destabilise the government. (Source: Sibylline)
15 Feb 24. Ecuador-US: Ratification of military co-operation agreements will likely bolster government stability. On 15 February, President Daniel Noboa ratified two agreements by presidential decree on military co-operation with the US. The agreements, which were initially put together by the former president, Guillermo Lasso, will facilitate joint operations between the US and Ecuadorian militaries. The agreements encompass collaboration on naval operations and combatting drug trafficking, weapons trafficking, human trafficking and illegal fishing. They come amid a wave of gang violence that has gripped Ecuador since January and a subsequent ‘state of exception’ which remains in effect. The agreements signal a continuation of Noboa’s ‘mano dura’ (hard hand) stance against gang activity in Ecuador. US support is likely to bolster Noboa’s position and legitimacy, thereby decreasing government stability risks. However, we assess that there is a realistic possibility that the agreement will raise the risk of reprisal attacks against government security forces, in turn elevating bystander safety risks. (Source: Sibylline)
16 Feb 24. Indian Defence Acquisition Council clears heavy weight torpedoes, mid-air refuelling aircraft among major deals.
Deals for heavy weight torpedoes, flight refueller aircraft and towed array sonars have been repeatedly delayed and the process now begins again
The Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) on Friday accorded Acceptance of Necessity (AoN), the first step in the procurement process, for proposals worth ₹84,560 crore. The proposals include some long-pending deals such as for heavy weight torpedoes (HWT) for the Navy’s Scorpene-class submarines and flight refueller aircraft (FRA) for the Indian Air Force (IAF).
Other major deals include medium range maritime reconnaissance and multi-mission maritime aircraft for the Navy and the Coast Guard, new generation anti-tank mines, air defence tactical control radar, and software defined radios.
“Further, to keep the Indian naval ships one step ahead of the threats posed by the adversaries, the AoN under Buy (Indian) category has been accorded for procurement of active towed array Sonar having capabilities to operate at low frequencies and various depths for long-range detections of adversary submarines. The AoN has also been accorded for procurement of HWT for enhancing the attacking capabilities of Kalvari class submarines,” the Ministry said. “The DAC accorded AoN for procurement of FRA for enhancing the operational capabilities and the reach of the IAF.”
Deals for HWTs, flight refueller aircraft and towed array sonars have been repeatedly delayed and the process now begins again. The delays were due to allegations of corruption and in the interim, the existing older generation torpedoes have been customised to fire from the Scorpenes. With delays in their procurement, the IAF has been looking to lease aircraft for training purposes and keep the existing six IL-78 aircraft for operational tasks.
The AoN for procurement of medium range maritime reconnaissance and multi-mission maritime aircraft, through the Buy and Make category, has been granted by the DAC for strengthening the surveillance and interception capabilities of the Navy and the Coast Guard over the country’s vast maritime area. These are likely to be developed by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) based on the Airbus C-295 transport aircraft.
The procurement of new generation of anti-tank mines having seismic sensors and the provision of remote deactivation with additional safety features has been approved under Buy (Indigenously Designed, Developed and Manufactured (IDDM) category of Defence Acquisition Procedure (DAP) 2020. “In order to enhance the operational efficiency and domination in the tactical battle area for engaging targets that are beyond visual line of sight by the mechanised forces, the AoN under Buy (Indian-IDDM) category has been accorded for procurement of canister launched anti-armour loiter munition system,” the statement said.
To strengthen air defence capabilities, especially the capabilities to detect slow, small and low-flying targets as well as surveillance, detection and tracking of different targets, the AoN has been accorded for procurement of air defence tactical control radar. The AoN for procurement of software defined radios for the Coast Guard will fulfill its requirement of having a “high-speed communication with secure networking capability for seamless information exchange between the ICG and the Indian Navy units.”
The DAC, headed by Defence Minister Rajnath Singh, also approved amendments in DAP 2020 to promote the procurement of advanced technologies from start-ups and micro, small and medium enterprises (MSME), a Defence Ministry statement said. The DAC has approved amendments in the DAP 2020 with respect to benchmarking and cost computation, payment schedule and procurement quantity.
The DAC also cleared the AoN for sustainment support through follow on support and repair replenishment for the 24 MH-60R multi-role helicopters procured by the Navy from the U.S. under the foreign military sale route.
(Source: News Now/https://www.thehindu.com/)
15 Feb 24. SADC DR Congo mission will come up against high-tech weaponry. UN footage of a WZ551 SAM system that targeted a UN Falco UAV in the DRC.
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) will, reports have it, face an M23 rebel grouping with high-tech armament at its disposal.
M23 is an abbreviation of the March 23 Movement (Mouvement du 23 mars in French) also known as the Congolese Revolutionary Army and comprising mostly Tutsis. It is based in the eastern DRC and operates mainly in North Kivu province.
United Kingdom based defence and security information provider Jane’s earlier this month reported “sophisticated guided mortar rounds” were being used against government FARDC (Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo) forces in North Kivu.
At the same time, Agence France-Presse (AFP) reports that the rebel group has “sophisticated weapons” including surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). One, suspected to be ex-Rwandan Defence Force (RDF), was fired at a UN (United Nations) “observation drone”, but did not hit it, the publication quotes a “confidential report” as stating. The unmanned aerial vehicle in question was a UN Falco EVO aircraft, which managed to capture footage of the missile launcher.
“External military intelligence from France supports assessment that the suspected WZ551 6×6 IFV mobile SAM system is Rwandan,” according to the report seen by AFP.
Two images attached to the report show a six-wheeled armoured vehicle with a roof-mounted radar and missile launcher system, indicating a Type 92 Yitian version of the WZ551 armoured personnel carrier.
The photos were taken by the targeted UAV about 70 km north of Goma, provincial capital of North Kivu in rebel-held Rutshuru territory.
The UN MONUSCO peacekeeping mission said in the document it had “no past reporting of known armed groups possessing the training, capital or resources to operate and maintain a mobile SAM system”. Use of the suspected WZ551 mobile SAM system, the report notes, “indicates an escalation of conventional force conflict in eastern DRC”.
M23 and “the Rwanda army”, according to the quoted document, have used “numerous weapons against aircraft and also have in their armoury anti-aircraft guns and MANPAD mobile air defence systems”.
Reporting on the “sophisticated guided mortar rounds,” Janes has it a DRC UN group of experts photographed “a previously undocumented 120 mm guide mortar round” found in Murambi last June.
“While the group of experts did not identify the mortar round, saying it was working to trace its origin, the report included a marketing image for the 120 mm Stylet round made by Israel’s Elbit Systems to illustrate what the munition would have looked like when undamaged.
“Elbit says the Stylet is a global positioning system (GPS) guided munition that can be launched from an unmodified mortar and hit targets with an accuracy of 10 circular error probable (CEP) out to a range of 9 km.
“The group of experts’ report included two other photographs showing the tail from a similar mortar round recovered after an attack on a FARDC camp in Kanyamahoro on 24 October 2023,” as per the Janes report.
The increasingly sophisticated array of weapons being used by rebel forces in the DRC pose a major threat to MONUSCO peacekeepers, who are to withdraw by year-end, and the new SADC Mission in the DRC (SAMIDRC), which will have about 5 000 troops from South Africa, Tanzania, and Malawi. South Africa has committed 2 900 troops to SAMIDRC, who will be deployed until 15 December 2024 at a cost of R2 bn. MONUSCO, by contrast, had some 15 000 troops at its disposal.
The report of the use of SAMs in the DRC comes weeks after a SAAF Oryx on a MONUSCO medical evacuation mission was hit 43 times by small arms fire, on 2 February, injuring the aircraft commander and a medic in the cabin. (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
14 Feb 24. Indonesia: Early indications suggest that defence minister is set to become new president. On 14 February, voters in Indonesia took part in elections to decide the next president and vice president, as well as the make-up of the national and local legislatures. The elections passed off peacefully, with no reports of significant unrest (though heavy rains in various parts of the country led to some disruption). Regarding the presidency, three candidates are contesting to replace the incumbent Joko ‘Jokowi’ Widodo (see Sibylline Special Report – 6 February 2024). Uncompleted and unofficial ‘quick counts’, which involve independent pollsters counting sample ballots, indicate that Defence Minister Prabowo Subianto will almost certainly receive the most votes. We assess that he is likely to win without needing a second-round run-off. Official results can take days and even weeks to be confirmed, though they typically do not differ significantly from quick counts. If Prabowo is victorious, he will be inaugurated on 20 October. His victory would represent a largely status quo result. There has been some controversy related to Jokowi’s tacit support for Prabowo, including accusations that he misused state resources to favour Prabowo. We assess that this will likely drive the risk of protests in the short term. (Source: Sibylline)
14 Feb 24. Pakistan: Likely weak coalition will sustain political stability, socio-economic health risks. On 13 February, the Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PML-N) and the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) agreed to form a coalition government (along with other parties) following the general election on 8 February. The election resulted in a split mandate, with no single party securing a clear majority in the National Assembly (NA). Although Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI)-backed independents emerged with the most seats and are expected to join the minority Majlis-e-Wahdat-Muslimeen (MWM) party in an attempt to form a federal government, PTI has faced a sustained crackdown from the military establishment which has severely dimmed its prospects. It is likely that the PML-N-led coalition will ultimately form the government, with Shehbaz Sharif likely to return as prime minister. Nonetheless, we assess that the fractured coalition and questionable mandate will highly likely sustain government stability and socio-economic health risks, especially given the widespread accusations of election rigging and impending external debt obligations (around USD 25bn) starting in July. (Source: Sibylline)
13 Feb 24. Strengthening ties with defence counterparts in India. The UK-India defence partnership continues with educational visits and Joint Staff talks. Following the announcement of plans to deploy our Carrier Strike Group to the Indian Ocean Region in 2025, Strategic Command continues to support the developing relationship between the UK and India. Major General James Roddis, Director Strategy at Strategic Command, met with participants from the Higher Defence Management Course (HDMC) of India.
The participants were briefed on the role of Strategic Command, and the role of Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) in supporting operations, as part of an International Strategic Management Tour.
The HDMC aims to develop enlightened leadership by imparting knowledge, skills, and competencies for effective decision-making in higher defence management in the Indian Armed Forces.
The tour also saw attendees visit the Defence Academy in Shrivenham, meeting Commandant Major General Andrew Roe and touring the Tech Hub.
The Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre welcomed the HDMC, provided updates on the development on the 7th edition of Global Strategic Trends, and discussed the importance of global partnerships in achieving shared goals.
The HDMC members also met representatives from the RAF, Royal Navy and Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office.
Discussions focused on recent developments to UK Defence including the Integrated Review Refresh and the release of the latest Defence Command Paper. Potential joint opportunities in the cyber and electromagnetic domain were explored as well as the ethical use of AI in Defence.
Sharing knowledge is a key aspect of the strategic partnership between both nations and contributes to the vision set out in the 2030 India-UK roadmap. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)
13 Feb 24. Congo (DRC): South African deployment is unlikely to decrease insecurity in eastern provinces. On 12 February, President Cyril Ramaphosa announced the deployment of around 2,900 South African soldiers to the east of the country as part of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) peacekeeping mission. The announcement comes after a UN investigation into an attempted surface-to-air missile (SAM) strike on an observation drone in North Kivu province determined that it was likely fired by the Rwandan army (elements of which are suspected of supporting the M23 rebel group). The deployment will likely temper risks of a direct military confrontation between the DRC and Rwanda; we also assess that a conflict between Rwanda and SADC would threaten to disrupt Rwandan interests in Mozambique, where the two forces are supporting counter-insurgency operations. However, we assess that Rwanda will likely continue to support the M23 rebel group covertly, substantially challenging Congolese and SADC offensive efforts to contain the group; this will sustain the risk of conflict around Goma and disrupt supply chains feeding the city. (Source: Sibylline)
13 Feb 24. Armenia-Azerbaijan: Fatal shoot-out underscores border volatility, efforts to acquire concessions. Armenia’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) reported that on 12 February, four Armenian soldiers were killed in a shoot-out along the border with Azerbaijan in Syunik province (Armenia). The Azerbaijani MoD reported that one of its soldiers was injured, and accused Armenian soldiers of initiating the shoot-out. Yerevan made similar accusations against Azerbaijan. Such border incidents have become less common since Baku’s successful take-over of the disrupted territory of Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023. The incident occurred amid ongoing peace negotiations and shortly after both countries held talks on border delimitations on 31 January. It underscores the persistent volatility of the border region amid growing revanchist rhetoric from Azerbaijan. Further border incursions and clashes are likely in the coming months as Baku pressures Yerevan to grant further territorial concessions. If border clashes increase in intensity, the risk of a resumption of armed conflict will increase, though we assess that this remains unlikely in the short term. (Source: Sibylline)
13 Feb 24. Bahrain: Protests are likely in Shia towns outside Manama amid anniversary of 2011 uprising. On 12 February, Bahraini Shia activists held limited anti-government protests in the run-up to the 13th anniversary of the 14 February 2011 Shia uprising. While social media accounts did not specify the locations of the night protests for safety reasons, they were likely held in Shia areas outside the capital Manama. Further protests are likely on the evenings of 13 and 14 February in Shia towns/areas such as Al-Dair (Muharraq governorate), Abu Saiba and Al-Markh (both Northern governorate), among others. We assess that it remains unlikely that Shia protests will occur in downtown Manama. However, an augmented security posture in the city (particularly around major mosques and squares in Shia neighbourhoods) will likely prompt mobility and traffic disruption. Clashes between the security forces and protesters remain a realistic possibility; these would drive bystander safety and physical damage risks for nearby assets. (Source: Sibylline)
12 Feb 24. Azerbaijan’s defence modernisation. As Azerbaijan ramps its defence budget, a blend of indigenous production and strategic partnerships reshapes procurement dynamics amidst regional conflicts.
Amidst heightened tensions and regional rivalries, Azerbaijan charts a course towards self-reliance in defence by enhancing domestic production capabilities and fostering strategic alliances to navigate complex geopolitical landscapes.
Azerbaijan’s commitment to bolstering its defence capabilities amidst escalating tensions is evident in its defence budget, projected to reach $4bn (6.8bn manat) by 2028, as highlighted in GlobalData’s “Azerbaijan Defense Market 2023-2038” report. The nation’s strategic focus on modernisation aims to fortify its military strength while reducing dependence on imports, particularly crucial in light of ongoing territorial disputes, notably with Armenia.
The recent resurgence of conflict in the Nagorno-Karabakh region underscores the Asian nations determination to maintain a decisive edge over its adversaries. This drive for military superiority extends beyond mere procurement, with Azerbaijan actively investing in domestic defence production capabilities. By nurturing indigenous and newly established production facilities, the country aims to enhance its self-reliance and strategic autonomy in defence matters.
Moreover, Azerbaijan’s defence strategy is characterised by a multifaceted approach to regional cooperation and bilateral relations. Strategic partnerships with neighbouring states like Georgia and Turkey contribute to regional stability and security, while alliances with global powers like Israel and the United States bolster Azerbaijan’s defence capabilities and counter potential threats.
Last year, the country partnered with Turkey’s “TUSAS” company to modernise its Su-25 aircraft, signing a contract to integrate Turkish-made smart bombs, missiles, and avionics upgrades.
Azerbaijan’s commitment to modernisation transcends its land forces and extends to its air force and navy. With a strategic responsibility for safeguarding the Caspian Sea, the Azerbaijan navy plays a role in securing maritime interests and combating transnational threats like drug trafficking. Investments in naval vessels and technologies underscore Azerbaijan’s resolve to protect its maritime borders.
Procuring defence systems, including the Hurkus training and light attack aircraft, Aster 30 SAMP/T missile defence systems, and JF-17 Block-3 variants, exemplifies Azerbaijan’s strategic approach to enhancing its military capabilities through diversified acquisitions.
(Source: Google/army-technology.com)
12 Feb 24. Pakistan: Nationwide protests against election rigging will raise government stability, unrest risks. On 11 February, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) supporters held demonstrations in various cities to protest against the alleged rigging of the general election on 8 February (see Sibylline Alert – 9 February 2024). PTI supporters blocked the Peshawar-Islamabad motorway (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province), causing significant traffic disruption until midnight. In Punjab province, while some protests were called off due to fears of ‘false flag’ operations, gatherings still took place in Lahore, where protesters faced baton charges; several others were arrested. In Karachi (Sindh province), both the PTI and Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) staged sit-ins across the city. Despite PTI-backed independent candidates winning 95 of 264 seats according to the final results issued by the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP), it is highly likely that the PTI will challenge the results of at least 20 other seats in court. We assess that there is a realistic possibility of further protests across major cities in the coming days, elevating the risks of arbitrary arrests and clashes with the security forces. The authorities are also likely to curb internet access during major PTI protests. Meanwhile, the Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PML-N) and Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) are reportedly in talks to form a coalition government, though such a government would face questions of legitimacy given the rigging allegations. (Source: Sibylline)
12 Feb 24. The IISS Military Balance 2024 highlights the extent to which the world has entered a more dangerous period in the last twelve months, examining how increased tensions and conflict have reshaped the global defence-industrial landscape.
Our new data shows how countries are reshaping their equipment and spending plans and how their regional ties are changing in accordance with geopolitical reality.
KEY FINDINGS:
•Russia has lost around as many tanks as it had in its active inventory when it launched the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022
•While Moscow has traded quality for quantity in its replenishment efforts, Ukraine, so far, has been able to offset equipment losses through Western donations, upgrading quality in the process
•Global defence spending grew by 9% to reach a record USD2.2 trillion, driven, in part by NATO member states boosting budgets in response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. Non-US NATO members now spend 32% more on defence since Russia’s 2014 invasion of Crimea
•Iran’s expanding influence on conflict areas manifested itself by the Houthis’ use of Iranian-supplied anti-ship missiles and Russia’s continued employment of Iranian-supplied UAVs
•China has demonstrated increased power-projection capacity, driving increased cooperation among Western and Asian militaries as a counterbalance
•Monitoring undersea critical national infrastructure is becoming a driver of maritime domain awareness efforts within national security establishments
The IISS Military Balance, now in its 65th year, shows the deteriorating security environment which is exemplified by a mounting number of conflicts, such as the Hamas–Israel war, Russia’s continued aggression against Ukraine, Azerbaijan’s takeover of the Nagorno-Karabakh region, coups in Niger and Gabon, as well as China’s more assertive manoeuvres around Taiwan, in the South China Sea and elsewhere.
In Ukraine, Russian equipment losses continue on a large scale. Our analysts assess that its full-scale invasion has cost Russia more than 3,000 main battle tanks, roughly as many as the Kremlin had in its active inventory before February 2022. Russia has been drawing on stored equipment to replenish losses.
Ukraine, meanwhile, has relied heavily on Western equipment to maintain its inventory levels and help underpin its deep battle to strike targets beyond the frontlines. But Kyiv also continued to demonstrate its ingenuity in other ways, using Western and indigenously developed systems to put Russia’s Black Sea Fleet on the back foot. It has also shown the utility of uninhabited maritime vehicles (UMV), giving the technology that other navies have been exploring a boost. The newest edition of The IISS Military Balance includes data on UMVs in country listings for the first time.
The combination of Russia’s war on Ukraine and rising tensions between with China and Western countries have been principal drivers of military spending. Global defence spending is up 9% from the previous year and poised to rise further in 2024, based on already announced spending commitments.
This era of insecurity is also resetting the global defence-industrial landscape. The US and Europe are ramping up production of missiles and ammunition and while progress has been slow, those efforts promise to soon deliver a greater defence production capacity after decades of underinvestment. Russia’s focus on equipping its armed forces is causing some long-term buyers of arms from Moscow to look elsewhere.
We reveal that non-US NATO countries now spend a combined 32% more than they did when Russia invaded Crimea in 2014, showing how Moscow’s actions have driven a response in the West. But that spending is only fixing long-standing issues and there are suggestions that inflation remains a concern, with costs for some types of ammunition more than doubling. The West’s basic inability to keep up with demand is being addressed, but gaps remain glaring.
While the West ramps up spending, so are China and Russia, which now dedicates more than 30% of government outlays to total military expenditure. The past year has also shown how some armed forces are reviving interest in equipment that had been neglected, such as artillery and air defence, while also embracing new technology, such as hypersonic glide vehicles and cruise missiles, or direct attack munitions. Nuclear weapons are also very much back on the agenda, with China adding missile silos and the United States modernising warheads and delivery systems.
Bastian Giegerich, Director-General and Chief Executive of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, said, “The IISS Military Balance is published at an important time when the rules-based order is being increasingly questioned. While Western defence spending is rising and plans to revamp equipment are ongoing, we reflect on the challenges including those set by Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine, China’s military modernization and events in the Middle East. The IISS Military Balance remains an indispensable guide to defence capabilities and military data.”
12 Feb 24. Congo (DRC): Rebel activity will likely drive further protests; threats to UN staff, assets will increase. On 10 February, protesters attacked staff and torched vehicles belonging to the DRC’s UN peacekeeping mission (MONUSCO) in the capital Kinshasa’s Gombe district. Protesters also vandalised vehicles belonging to other international organisations and embassies. The unrest was likely driven by the M23 rebel group’s progress towards Goma (North Kivu province); perceptions of MONUSCO’s ineffectiveness have repeatedly driven unrest in Kinshasa and cities in North Kivu. Further advances will almost certainly drive additional protests, particularly in Goma and Kinshasa. During all such protests, we assess that there is a realistic possibility of vandals targeting UN assets and staff residences; the looting of MONUSCO warehouses and the targeting of associated international aid agencies are also possible. As such, protests will significantly elevate the direct risks facing UN and NGO staff. This will in turn increase the likelihood of an accelerated MONUSCO withdrawal, almost certainly exacerbating insecurity in the east of the country. (Source: Sibylline)
12 Feb 24. Myanmar: Enforcement of military conscription law highlights challenges facing junta. On 10 February, Myanmar’s junta announced that it would enforce a 2010 law that allows it to call up men aged between 18 and 35, and women aged between 18 and 27, to serve in the military for at least two years. The age ranges are extended for individuals considered to be ‘experts’ in a ‘professional occupation’. The People’s Military Service Law also states that in a period of national emergency, service lengths can be extended to five years, and that individuals avoiding military service can be imprisoned. The announcement stated that the authorities would release the necessary ‘procedures’ and ‘instructions’, though no further details as to how the law would be enforced have been announced at this time. The development highlights the struggles the junta faces in quashing resistance, particularly since a re-energised offensive against the military government began in October 2023. However, we assess that the draft is a risky initiative for the junta given its already low levels of popularity; unconfirmed reports suggest that the announcement has increased interest in joining anti-junta civilian militias. (Source: Sibylline)
09 Feb 24. SADC’s second military intervention in eastern DRC in a decade raises many questions. The long-simmering conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is starting to boil over again. On 2 February, a South African Airforce Oryx helicopter participating in MONUSCO, the UN peacekeeping mission in DRC, was seriously damaged by ground fire and some of its crew and a medical officer were injured.
This week, missile, mortar and artillery fire were exchanged in the Goma area between the armed forces of the DRC and its allies, and the M23 rebel group, according to unconfirmed reports from both sides. One report said the DRC’s military successfully repelled an M23 offensive against the strategic town of Sake, 20 km from Goma, North Kivu’s provincial capital, on 7 February.
M23’s advance on Goma prompted the recently arrived troops of the Southern African Development Community Mission in the DRC (SAMIDRC) to formally deploy to Sake and surrounding areas, some analysts say. This would be its first known battlefield deployment – comprising South African, Tanzanian and Malawian troops – since it began arriving in the DRC in December.
Some observers believe M23 has more or less surrounded Goma, and intends to capture it, as it did in 2012. That incident precipitated the international furore that led to the creation and deployment of the UN Force Intervention Brigade (FIB).
M23 this week denied that it intended taking Goma, but vowed to deal with the sources of ‘artillery and air attacks targeting our forces and/or indiscriminate shelling of civilian populations.’
It also said it remained committed to a peaceful solution and would withdraw from forward positions if a monitored ceasefire and credible verification mechanisms were put in place. M23 said it sought a solution through political dialogue and called on regional and international leaders to support this effort.
The recent surge in fighting is a warning to SAMIDRC about the difficulty it faces in meeting its mandate – to defeat the Rwanda-based M23. Assessing its performance is hard because SADC has been frugal with information about the deployment.
But DRC expert Stephanie Wolters of the South African Institute of International Affairs recently warned in Daily Maverick that M23, which the FIB routed in 2013, was today a far more formidable force. She also said it seemed the US and Rwanda’s other Western allies weren’t putting the same pressure on President Paul Kagame to withdraw support from M23 as they did in 2013. This is despite successive UN Group of Experts reports on the DRC that said Rwanda is still backing M23.
And SAMIDRC seems under-planned. One military expert said, “I do not think there is really clarity on this deployment as it seems to be rushed and maybe not that well planned due to operational pressures.”
Military experts also suggest the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) – the hard core of SAMIDRC – is technically ill-equipped for the mission because of years of underfunding. One said the Oryx helicopter was hit because it lacked the support of Rooivalk attack helicopters, which played a decisive role in the FIB’s 2013 defeat of M23.
There is a suspicion that SAMIM, SADC’s other ongoing mission – in Mozambique – is being curtailed prematurely to avoid overstretching the regional bloc’s military resources. SAMIM deployed in July 2021, just after Rwandan troops were also dispatched, to help Mozambique defeat Islamic State-linked insurgents who had been terrorising the northern Cabo Delgado province since 2017.
SAMIM has also been a rather opaque exercise. In August 2023, SADC extended its mandate for a year – which at the time seemed routine, as the mission had been extended before. SADC only recently disclosed that that was the final extension and the force would withdraw by July 2024, assuming its mission has been accomplished. But many observers say the insurgents are still active and strong.
Conversely, it seems that Mozambique never wanted SAMIM in the first place, and sidelined it, leaving the real task of fighting the insurgents to Rwanda. It’s somewhat ironic then that in the DRC, SADC may now, directly or indirectly, be taking on Rwanda, its former ally in Mozambique.
Viewed more positively, SAMIM’s imminent termination and the scheduled withdrawal of MONUSCO by the end of 2024, may free SADC, and especially South African, military resources to be channelled into SAMIDRC.
Though one might have imagined that more UN involvement rather than less is needed in the DRC right now – especially after the UN Security Council decided in December last year to allow UN financial support to African Union (AU) and regional peace missions.
If SAMIDRC’s military readiness is uncertain, its political justification is also obscure. Towards the end of 2022, the Nairobi peace process demanded an immediate ceasefire in eastern DRC and the repatriation of foreign militaries.
The parallel Luanda process – focused on the DRC-Rwanda political dimensions of the conflict – endorsed the Nairobi decisions, demanding an end to hostilities, the withdrawal of M23 and other armed movements, and deployment of an East African regional force. The process also insisted on ending foreign support to rebels. But public SADC documents suggest that SAMIDRC’s mandate is simply to defeat M23, as the FIB did in 2013.
Arguably SADC may be observing the AU Peace and Security Council meeting resolution of 17 February 2023, which called for the ‘revitalisation’ of the 2013 Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the DRC and the Great Lakes Region. That document called for a ceasefire in eastern DRC and for all foreign forces to withdraw.
Perhaps that is the justification for SAMIDRC but if so, it hasn’t been invoked by SADC, at least not publicly. The fact that SADC is re-entering the eastern DRC a decade after its first intervention to fight the same enemy should surely send the message that a different approach is needed.
It would seem that SADC responded impulsively to a cry for help from DRC President Félix Tshisekedi. He was unhappy that the East African Community Regional Force, which began deploying in east DRC in 2022, would not take on M23. So Tshisekedi demanded in November last year that it withdraw, which it started doing a month later. He hoped SAMIDRC would take the fight to M23.
Tshisekedi’s call for aggressive action against M23, and by inference against Rwanda, was originally interpreted by some as mere vote-catching rhetoric before the December presidential elections. But he didn’t let up after being re-elected, and so what seemed like rhetoric is now becoming a rather more ominous reality. (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
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