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03 Feb 24. UK Foreign Secretary reaffirms UK commitment to supporting de-escalation efforts and ongoing support for the Lebanese Armed Forces.
David Cameron reaffirms UK commitment to supporting de-escalation efforts in Lebanon, & ongoing support to the Lebanese Armed Forces reaching £100m since 2009.
UK Foreign Secretary, David Cameron, ended a one-day visit to Lebanon, Thursday 1 February. This was his first official visit to the country as Foreign Secretary, following his previous visit as Prime Minister in September 2015 and his fourth visit to the Middle East as Foreign Secretary.
David Cameron, accompanied by Lord Ahmad, Minister of State for the Middle East, met with Prime Minister Najib Mikati, Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri, Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Commander General Joseph Aoun, and Head of Mission and Force Commander of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, Lieutenant General Aroldo Lázaro Sáenz. In his meetings, David Cameron raised his concerns on the rising tensions along Lebanon’s boundary with Israel and underlined the UK’s commitment to support the de-escalation of violence.
During a visit to the Rayak military airbase in the Bekaa, David Cameron saw first-hand how the UK and Lebanon are working closely together on providing training for the four Land Border Regiments. Cameron reaffirmed the longstanding and proud partnership with the Lebanese Army. The Foreign Secretary announced UK support for the LAF, which has now surpassed £100 million since 2009. To date, the UK has supported the construction of 78 border towers, the provision of 344 Land Rovers, 3450 sets of PPE to soldiers deployed on border operations, 100 Land Rover armoured patrol vehicles trained and mentored over 26,500 LAF personnel in border operations and internal security.
The Foreign Secretary also announced £7.35m of new UK aid funding to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Lebanon Humanitarian Fund, which supports UN agencies and NGOs to provide food, water, shelter and other basic support to vulnerable communities across Lebanon. And a £2.6m contribution to support the education of vulnerable children through a network of community centres for out of school children as part of UNICEF and the Ministry of Education and Higher Education’s (MEHE) Transition and Resilience Education Fund (TREF).
The visit builds on the Foreign Secretary’s regional visits last week and this week. He continues to push for an immediate pause to get aid in and hostages out, and building towards a sustainable, permanent ceasefire.
Foreign Secretary David Cameron said: “The UK is working to help preserve stability in Lebanon and prevent a damaging regional escalation.
“We’re supporting the Lebanon Armed Forces – we’ve trained over 26,500 Lebanese soldiers and are giving further humanitarian aid to help the most vulnerable.
“Thank you PM Najib Mikati and Speaker Berri.”
British Ambassador to Lebanon Hamish Cowell said: “Yesterday’s visit by Foreign Secretary Lord Cameron and Minister for the Middle East Lord Ahmad reaffirms the UK’s long-standing support and commitment to Lebanon’s stability and security.
“The situation across the Blue Line is fragile and an escalation in violence is not in anyone’s interests. In his meetings, the Foreign Secretary stressed the need for a cessation of hostilities and implementation of UNSCR 1701. This is critical if we are to see a long-term solution for peace.
“We are proud of our steadfast support to the Lebanese Armed Forces, which will continue to strengthen their ability to manage and respond to security challenges. Our support to the most vulnerable in Lebanon also continues.” (Source: www.joint-forcescom)
02 Feb 24. New Zealand: Prospect of Wellington joining AUKUS military pact will raise regional tensions. On 1 February, New Zealand Defence Minister Judith Collin stated that Wellington is examining ‘opportunities’ to join Pillar Two of the AUKUS security agreement with Australia, the UK and the US. She added at a joint press conference with her Australian counterpart that Canberra will send a team to New Zealand later this year to discuss co-operation in quantum computing and artificial intelligence (AI). Wellington has signalled it will not join Pillar One of the pact, which focuses on Australia’s purchase of nuclear submarine technology from the UK and the US. New Zealand’s centre-right government has prioritised security and defence ties with Australia and the US over economic ties with China since coming to power last year. Earlier on 2 February, the Chinese embassy in Wellington rebuked New Zealand’s decision to consider joining AUKUS and stated the pact will ‘undermine peace and stability’. New Zealand’s accession to AUKUS would likely worsen ties with Beijing and drive regional tensions; we assess that Beijing would possibly consider imposing trade sanctions on New Zealand if the relationship deteriorates. (Source: Sibylline)
02 Feb 24. Tunisia: New prison sentence against opposition leader will likely prompt protests in Tunis next week. On 1 February, a Tunisian court sentenced the opposition leader Rached Ghannouchi to three years in prison for receiving funds from foreign lobby groups. It also fined Ghannouchi’s Ennahda party USD 1.1 million. Ghannouchi was already serving a 15-month sentence on separate charges after he was arrested in April 2023. The development underscores the current crackdown on dissidents as President Kais Saied pushes to consolidate his power further. Several political dissidents and opposition members have been detained in the last two years on a variety of charges. It is highly likely that the recent sentencing against Ghannouchi will prompt protests in the capital Tunis on 2 February and through the coming week at least, elevating the risk of clashes with the security forces in downtown areas. Mobility disruption and bystander risks are highly likely to be heightened around the National Theatre in Tunis, where a planned protest will take place at 1530hrs (local time). (Source: Sibylline)
02 Feb 24. India’s interim defense budget signals focus on modernization to align with evolving geopolitical landscape, says GlobalData.
Following the news that Indian Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman presented the interim budget ahead of the general elections to be held later this year.
Rouble Sharma, Defense Analyst at GlobalData, offers her view:
“India has unveiled an interim budget, which is strategically aimed at sustaining essential operations until a comprehensive budget can be presented. The Indian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has been allocated a substantial budget of $55.4bn (INR 4.6 lakh crore) for the fiscal year 2024-2025, excluding pensions and civilian expenses. This interim defense expenditure, inclusive of pensions, stands at $75.7bn (6.2 lakh crore).
“An allocation of $21bn is earmarked for the acquisition expenditure of new military platforms and upgrades. This signals a strategic focus on enhancing and modernizing the capabilities of the armed forces, aligning with the evolving geopolitical landscape. The recently approved purchase of 31 armed MQ-9B SkyGuardian drones from the US reflects India’s dedication to integrating cutting-edge technologies into its defense infrastructure. The Indian Navy is also advancing its capabilities with the potential acquisition of 26 Rafale Marine aircraft, as France submits a detailed bid.
“Moreover, the announcement of a new scheme to strengthen deep technologies (deep-tech) for defense purposes and expedite ‘atmanirbharta’ (self-reliance) reflects the government’s intent in the interim budget. Such initiatives will help foster innovation, research, and development within the defense sector, aligning with the broader goal of achieving self-reliance in critical defense technologies.
“Notably, programs like the LCA-Mk2 and Future Infantry Combat Vehicle (FICV) to be developed under the ambit of the ‘Make in India’ initiative suggest a forward-looking approach, demonstrating the nation’s commitment to building a robust, self-sufficient defense industry capable of meeting contemporary challenges.
“While the final budgetary picture will emerge with the passing of the full budget in June-July this year, this interim allocation offers a glimpse into India’s current defense priorities. Balancing between personnel costs, efficient modernization, and emerging technology adoption will be the main challenges that the government will have to navigate.” (Source: GlobalData)
01 Feb 24. Congo (DRC): Persistent intercommunal violence will drive mobility disruption, attack risks. On 30 January, at least ten members of the Mobondo (a militia associated with the Yaka community) and one soldier were killed in intercommunal violence involving the Teke and Yaka communities in Mai-Ndombe province. Violence involving the two communities has been elevated since 2022. It spread from Mai-Ndombe to surrounding provinces in 2023, including Kinshasa province. Around 150,000 people are currently displaced. Further movement restrictions remain possible in the coming weeks, with the authorities having already prohibited passenger and freight transport along the NR-17 route connecting the capital Kinshasa with Bandundu (Kwilu province). The government will likely maintain a heightened security presence in Mai-Ndombe; checkpoints will raise movement disruption and expose local staff and logistics firms to bribery. However, such measures are unlikely to resolve the conflict; further attacks will raise threats to staff in rural areas. Militias are known to rob commercial assets to fund armaments. (Source: Sibylline)
01 Feb 24. Sudan: Imminent ceasefire agreement is unlikely; talks will reduce risk of national division. On 31 January, it was announced that senior officials from the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) met three times in Manama (Bahrain) throughout January. Both sides tentatively agreed on a declaration of principles, including maintaining the unity of Sudan. With the RSF continuing to push into West Kordofan and El Gezira states and the SAF renewing its efforts to regain control of the capital Khartoum, the prospects for a ceasefire in the coming weeks remain limited. Both sides will continue efforts to militarily bolster their positions in future negotiations and to secure concessions on influence and immunity in a post-conflict settlement. However, we assess that pressure from foreign countries will likely ensure the continuation of talks in some capacity. This will reduce the prospects of Sudan being divided between the warring parties. (Source: Sibylline)
01 Feb 24. Kuwait: Augmented security posture is highly likely in coming weeks after detention of IS members. On 29 January, a court ordered the continued pretrial detention of two Kuwaiti citizens and three Tunisians who are suspected to be members of the extremist Islamic State (IS) group. The five suspects were apprehended last week for planning attacks against Shia mosques. The authorities claim that the suspects were trained to make explosives and communicated with IS commanders in Syria and Iraq. The details of the case are consistent with the 2015 suicide bombing against the al-Sadiq mosque (Kuwait). Since then, the authorities have constantly monitored Shia mosques and neighbourhoods. It is highly likely that an augmented security posture in the capital Kuwait City will continue in the coming weeks and will intensify further through Ramadan (starting 9 March), when mosques are usually filled for evening prayers. We assess that this posture will likely include the establishment of checkpoints along major roads, as well as stop and search operations in Shia neighbourhoods, driving limited operational disruption. (Source: Sibylline)
31 Jan 24. Taiwan air force shows off its sub hunting, early warning prowess. Taiwan’s air force showed off its armed-to-the-teeth submarine hunters and early warning and control aircraft on Tuesday, demonstrating how it keeps watch on the skies and waters around the Chinese-claimed island. China, which views Taiwan as its own territory, has over the past four years regularly sent warplanes and warships into the skies and waters around the island as it seeks to assert sovereignty claims that the government in Taipei rejects. Taiwan’s air force, dwarfed by China’s but well-armed with mostly U.S. equipment, has been at the front lines of responding to these missions and regularly scrambles to shadow and warn away Chinese aircraft and ships.
On a defence ministry-organised media visit to the Pingtung air base in southern Taiwan, the air force displayed its Lockheed Martin (LMT.N), opens new tab P-3C Orion anti-submarine aircraft and Northrop Grumman-built (NOC.N), opens new tab E-2K Hawkeye early warning and control aircraft.
Crews demonstrated attaching missiles under the wing of an Orion, which can be armed with torpedoes, depth charges and U.S.-made Maverick air-to-ground missiles and Harpoon anti-ship missiles.
“We uphold the concept of integrating training for war under the guidance of the defence ministry. We are doing very solid training, which is enough to cope with various situations,” said training officer Tsai Tsung-yu.
Taiwan operates 12 Orions, which the U.S. government approved the sale of in 2007 for almost $2bn. The first aircraft, surplus U.S. Navy stock, entered service with Taiwan in 2013 and can stay airborne for up to 12 hours.
The air force also conducted flybys with one of their E-2K Hawkeye aircraft. Taiwan has six of the planes, but one was damaged in 2022 during a landing accident and is still being repaired.
They have long-range detection abilities, allowing them to direct intercepts from the air and track low-altitude targets flying below the range of ground-based radars.
Their Pingtung base gives the aircraft easy access not only to the Taiwan Strait but also to the Bashi Channel.
That strategic waterway separates Taiwan from the Philippines and connects the South China Sea with the Pacific. Taiwan has reported Chinese warships and warplanes frequently passing through the Bashi Channel. (Source: Reuters)
31 Jan 24. Britain set to deploy aircraft carrier to Red Sea. Royal Navy ready to send either HMS Queen Elizabeth or HMS Prince of Wales into the Gulf amid Houthi attacks on shipping. Britain is poised to send an aircraft carrier to the Red Sea to counter drone and missile attacks from Houthi rebels.
The Royal Navy is preparing to step in to replace USS Dwight D Eisenhower when it returns to America, as the Houthis warned of a “long-term confrontation” in one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes.
James Heappey, the armed forces minister, said on Tuesday that the UK may “co-operate with the Americans” and step in to “plug a gap” in the Red Sea.
The UK has two aircraft carriers designed to carry F-35 fighter jets. One is HMS Prince of Wales, which would face its first combat operation if it were deployed. The other is HMS Queen Elizabeth, which has been sent into combat once before.
On Tuesday, Mohamed al-Atifi, the commander of the Iran-backed Houthi forces, said the group was prepared for a long conflict over the Red Sea, where it has launched dozens of drone and missile attacks against commercial and naval ships since November.
The attacks have caused major delays for global shipping, as tankers and container ships are re-rerouted around Africa to avoid the narrow Bab al-Mandab strait, the entry point to the Red Sea between Yemen and Djibouti.
Britain and the US have launched two rounds of joint air strikes on Houthi drone and missile sites, using American F/A-18 Super Hornet jets from USS Eisenhower, and the RAF’s Typhoons launched from a base in southern Cyprus. (Source: Daily Telegraph)
31 Jan 24. No immediate requirement for UK carrier deployment to Red Sea. A combination of the nuclear-powered endurance of US Navy carriers and an immediate lack of a UK solid stores support vessel for any UK flattop deployment indicate no near-term requirement.
It is unlikely that the UK would be required to send one of its Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers to the Red Sea in support of security operations in the near term, with the US Navy’s USS Dwight D Eisenhower having only arriving in the region in November last year.
Recent reports following an interview given by James Heappey, Minister for the Armed Forces, to an in-house UK parliamentary magazine indicated that the Royal Navy could be tasked to fill any capability gap created when the USS Dwight D Eisenhower departs from its current station.
The only publicly-known deployment of a UK Queen Elizabeth class this year is to participate in Exercise Steadfast Defender, a wide-ranging Nato effort to showcase and improve military readiness in the European theatre in light of Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine. A UK carrier not scheduled to transit through the Suez Canal and into Red Sea and wider Indian Ocean until 2025, with the deployment of a Queen Elizabeth class to the Asia-Pacific region.
An MoD spokesperson said: “As the Minister set out, any decision as to whether to deploy the carriers will be made in conjunction with our allies and based on operational need.”
When contacted, US Central Command said that it would not comment as to how or when the USS Dwight D Eisenhower would be replaced when it eventually leaves its position.
See Also:
- UK establishes ‘DMEx’ – a £42.5m advanced materials research partnership
- UK establishes ‘DMEx’ – a £42.5m ADMs research partnership
The UK, US, and other allies are currently engaged in an ongoing maritime security campaign in the Red Sea, protecting merchant shipping from missile and drone attacks launched by the Houthi faction in Yemen. The Houthis are known to be supplied and supported by Iran through the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Al Quds unit, which maintains a network of proxy forces and allies in the Middle East. (Source: naval-technology.com)
01 Feb 24. Pakistan: Attacks highlight elevated threat of militant activity in Balochistan in lead-up to polls. On 29 January, militants belonging to the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) launched a series of co-ordinated attacks against military and security installations in the city of Mach (Balochistan province). They used firearms and rockets to target a military camp, as well as Mach’s police and railway stations. The ensuing operation resulted in the deaths of at least nine militants and four security officials. In a separate incident on 30 January, an explosion occurred during an election rally organised by the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party in Sibi (Balochistan). While no group has claimed responsibility for the explosion, at least four people were killed and six others were wounded. These attacks come amid a sharp uptick in militant activity in the restive provinces of Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, just days before the upcoming general election on 8 February (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 22 January 2024). Given the elevated threat of further militant attacks in the coming days, heightened security risks will persist for bystanders near security sites and political rallies. (Source: Sibylline)
01 Feb 24. Iraq: Kataib Hezbollah’s suspension of hostilities is unlikely to prevent US retaliatory strikes. On 30 January, the Iraqi militant group Kataib Hezbollah (KH) announced the suspension of its military operations against US troops in the region. The Iran-backed Shia group also called on its members to carry out ‘passive defence’ temporarily in the event of any hostile US action. The group is one of the main factions comprising the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI), which claimed direct responsibility for the attack on the Tower 22 base in Jordan earlier this week. It is likely that KH’s announcement reflects Iranian pressure to reduce tensions with the US and to take a more defensive posture to protect assets. However, KH’s announcement is unlikely to prevent US strikes targeting several Iranian proxies in Iraq and Syria. Targets will likely include the Popular Mobilisation Forces’ (PMF) and IRI’s headquarters and bases, some of which are jointly operated by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). However, we assess that direct retaliatory US strikes inside Iran remain highly unlikely. (Source: Sibylline)
01 Feb 24. South Korea: Pyongyang will likely attempt to disrupt April vote following president’s warning. Earlier on 31 January, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol warned that North Korea will seek to interfere in South Korea’s legislative elections on 10 April. He stated that Seoul expects Pyongyang to carry out ‘border area provocations, drone infiltrations, fake news [and] cyberattacks’. Yoon has adopted a hawkish approach to North Korea since he came to office in 2022. His People Power Party (PPP) currently holds 113 of 298 seats in the National Assembly and is seeking to win a majority. Pyongyang typically carries out military and cyber provocations ahead of South Korean elections as part of its strategy to cause disruption and undermine parties it considers to be hostile. North Korea recently stated that South Korea is the ‘principal enemy’ and has launched several rounds of cruise missiles into the Sea of Japan. We assess there is a realistic possibility that North Korea will attempt to carry out a disruptive cyber attack against election-related infrastructure ahead of the polls. While further missile tests, drone incursions and disinformation campaigns are possible, we continue to assess that a military conflict ahead of the polls is unlikely. (Source: Sibylline)
30 Jan 24. Readout of Senior DoD Officials’ Meeting with Dr. Keith Rowley, Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago. Department of Defense Spokesman Lieutenant Colonel Devin T. Robinson provided the following readout: Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Western Hemisphere Affairs, Mr. Daniel Erikson, hosted the Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago, Dr. Keith Rowley at the Pentagon on January 29. The delegation from Trinidad and Tobago also included Mr. Stuart Young, Minister of Energy and Energy Industries; Dr. Amery Browne, Minister of Foreign and CARICOM Affairs; Ambassador Anthony Phillips-Spencer, Ambassador to the United States; and Air Vice Marshall Darryl Daniel, Chief of Defence Staff. Ms. Mieke Eoyang, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber Policy; Ambassador Candace Bond, Ambassador to Trinidad and Tobago; COL Robert Creason, Americas Division Chief, Western Hemisphere, Joint Staff J5 Strategy, Plans, and Policy Directorate; and Major General Michael Berry, Adjutant General of Delaware, also attended for the United States. Performing the Duties of Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Ms. Melissa Dalton, joined the meeting to emphasize the Department’s strong support of the U.S. defense partnership with Trinidad and Tobago. The DoD leaders expressed appreciation for Trinidad and Tobago’s leadership in the Caribbean Community and in co-hosting the Caribbean Nations Security Conference alongside U.S. Southern Command in November 2024. They further commended the robust partnership between the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force and Delaware National Guard, which celebrates its 20th anniversary this year through the State Partnership Program. The senior officials exchanged views on illicit trafficking and maritime security, defense force modernization and training, cybersecurity, and frameworks to facilitate expanded bilateral security cooperation. The meeting reaffirmed the United States’ and Department of Defense’s commitment to partnership with Trinidad and Tobago and to working together to improve Caribbean regional security and resilience. (Source: U.S. DoD)
29 Jan 24. SA Navy in intensive care – Lobese. First port of call for Deputy Defence and Military Veterans Minister Thabang Makwetla in 2024 was SA Navy (SAN) Headquarters, continuing a schedule of visits to SA National Defence Force (SANDF) services and divisions started last year. On arrival at the Visagie Street building formerly known as SAS Immortelle and now Navy Headquarters on the southern side of the Pretoria central business district (CBD) on 25 January, Makwetla was met by SA Navy (SAN) Chief, Vice Admiral Monde Lobese. The country’s senior sailor is reported by SAN Public Relations as telling the deputy minister the maritime service is “in intensive care” and unable to provide combat-ready vessels at the capability level required “for the republic’s defence or to meet its international duties and commitments”. Lobese further emphasised the negative impact “annual underfunding” has had on the Navy’s ability to sustain and regenerate since at least 1988. Makwetla heard from Rear Admiral (JG) Piet Masimala, Director Maritime Plans, on the current state of the SAN. He addressed a range of “significant concerns underlying the organisation’s challenges” with budget constraints topping the list.
“Difficulties included maintenance, repairs, improvements and, in certain cases, replacement of the current deteriorating fleet.”
During the presentation to the Deputy Minister, proposals on how to make the SA Navy “more viable” in terms of assets, force design, and footprint were presented.
Apart from the January call on the SAN, Makwetla has to date been to the SA Air Force (SAAF), SA Army, the Joint Operations Division and the SA Military Health Service (SAMHS). (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
29 Jan 24. US-Jordan: Attack on US troops in Jordan unlikely to prompt direct retaliatory strikes against Iran. On 28 January, the Iran-backed Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI) killed three US soldiers and injured at least 34 others in an Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) attack against Tower 22 base in Al Rukban (Mafraq governorate) near the Syrian border. The IRI attack was co-ordinated with other attacks against the Al Tanf (Homs governorate) and Al Shaddadi (Hasakah governorate) US bases in Syria. Notably, a new militant group named Popular Arab Resistance (PAR) also claimed responsibility, suggesting it is operating under the IRI group. It is highly likely that the US will retaliate with widespread strikes against Iran proxies in Iraq and Syria, particularly the Popular Mobilisation Forces’ (PMF) headquarters and bases, some of which are jointly operated by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Targeted assassinations of high-level PMF figures in Iraq are also a realistic possibility, which would likely prompt protests focused on the US embassy in the capital Baghdad. However, direct retaliatory US strikes inside Iran remain unlikely. (Source: Sibylline)
29 Jan 24. Burkina Faso: Russian Africa Corps deployment unlikely to boost security, will drive sanctions risk. On 24 January, the first 100 Russian service personnel of a 300-troop deployment landed in the capital Ouagadougou. These are allegedly members of the recently formed Russian Ministry of Defence-backed African Corps, designed to replace the Russian private military company Wagner Group in Africa. The Africa Corps will allegedly provide training to the Burkinabe military and patrol in high-risk regions, but will likely primarily act as a bodyguard for interim president Ibrahim Traore following repeated alleged coup attempts. The deployment is unlikely to significantly improve Burkina Faso’s capacity to combat jihadist groups across the country, sustaining elevated attack risks. An increased Russian presence will also increase the risk of Western sanctions targeting Burkina Faso as Western states continue to pursue efforts to clamp down on Russian sanctions evasion. (Source: Sibylline)
29 Jan 24. Mali: Termination of peace agreement will likely prolong conflict with Tuareg rebels in northern Mali. On 25 January, the junta ended the 2015 Algiers Accord with Tuareg separatist rebels. Authorities cited the signatories’ lack of commitment to the deal, as well as alleged hostile acts by Algeria, the mediator of the agreement, possibly in response to Algeria sheltering Tuareg militants that fled recent military operations. The statement largely formalises a process that has been ongoing since the passage of the draft constitution in June 2023, which directly contradicted the decentralisation clauses of the 2015 Algiers Accord. Since then, fighting between Malian armed forces and Tuareg rebels has escalated in northern Mali. The statement significantly reduces prospects of a negotiated settlement in the coming months, prolonging the conflict in northern Mali and increasing risks to staff and assets around key cities such as Kidal (Kidal region). This will also elevate the likelihood of alliances between Tuaregs and the al-Qaeda-aligned Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin.(Source: Sibylline)
29 Jan 24. Papua New Guinea: Potential security pact with China would likely elevate regional tensions. On 29 January, Papua New Guinea’s Foreign Minister Justin Tkachenko stated that Papua New Guinea is in talks with China over a security and policing agreement. He added that in September 2023, China offered to provide its police force with training and surveillance equipment, which Papua New Guinea had not yet accepted. On 10 January, rioting in the capital Port Moresby led to several dozen casualties, and the government imposed a state of emergency. Beijing called for Port Moresby to ‘penalise perpetrators severely’ after reports of looting of Chinese-owned properties, though there is limited evidence to suggest Chinese entities were targeted in this case. China’s involvement in Papua New Guinea has hitherto primarily been economic, but security talks between the two countries come amid growing competition for influence by regional powers in the largest Pacific Island country. In 2023, Papua New Guinea signed policing deals with Australia and the US. A security deal with China would likely intensify regional tensions and potentially the risk of domestic unrest. Chinese citizens and businesses could act as a potential target for protests and riots if anti-Chinese sentiment spiked due to any deal. (Source: Sibylline)
29 Jan 24. Armenia-Azerbaijan: Non-aggression pact unlikely to be agreed in short term. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan announced on 28 January that he had proposed the signing of a non-aggression pact with Azerbaijan. Pashinyan stated that Yerevan has also offered Baku border demilitarisation and a mutual arms control mechanism if the two sides take longer than expected to reach a peace settlement. He emphasised that Yerevan is ready to give lasting and irreversible guarantees that Armenia does not (and will not) make territorial claims outside of its sovereign territory on the condition that the assurances are reciprocated. Pashinyan’s offer highly likely seeks to offset increasing revanchist rhetoric from Azerbaijan and, in the absence of a peace settlement, mitigate the risk of renewed armed conflict. However, Baku could yet realistically demand further concessions from Yerevan before agreeing to any such agreement, or refuse the proposal outright, particularly ahead of Azerbaijan’s presidential election on 7 February. (Source: Sibylline)
29 Jan 24. Russia: Violent repression of protesters will mitigate escalation risks; small-scale protests possible. On 26 January, a protester who was detained on 19 January died in custody in Russia’s Bashkortostan region, with another detained protester reportedly hospitalised. Both cases were likely caused by police brutality after local law enforcement arrested both individuals for participating in protests denouncing the imprisonment of local activist Fail Alsynov. The protests occurred between 17 and 19 January, involving up to 5,000 demonstrators and escalating into clashes with the police in the Bashkir city of Baymak and the regional capital, Ufa. Although Kremlin spokesperson Dimitriy Peskov toned down the extent of the protests, denying they were mass riots, the harsh repression likely highlights the Kremlin’s fears that such protests could catalyse anti-Moscow and ethnic separatist sentiment in non-Slavic majority Bashkortostan. Further protester deaths will represent a moderate trigger for small-scale spontaneous demonstrations, though harsh crackdowns will mitigate any escalation risks. (Source: Sibylline)
29 Jan 24. Haiti: Kenyan court blocks UN-backed deployment plan, sustaining risk of attacks in Port-au-Prince. On 26 January, a court in Kenya blocked the country’s planned deployment of a UN-backed force to Haiti. Kenya had previously agreed to lead the force to support Haitian police in tackling the country’s escalating gang violence. According to the court ruling, Kenya’s National Security Council does not have the authority to deploy regular police outside of the country since there is ‘no reciprocal arrangement’ between Kenya and Haiti. The blocked deployment has triggered further concern across the island amid escalating rates of criminal violence. Reportedly, gangs now control at least 80% of Haiti’s capital Port-au-Prince. While the Kenyan government is likely to appeal the court ruling, it remains unclear whether a smaller, multinational mission will be deployed in the near term. Sustained organised crime and attack risks remain high in the near term. There is a realistic possibility that gangs will further expand their control of Port-au-Prince, elevating government stability and socio-economic health risks. (Source: Sibylline
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