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28 Jan 24. Today, three U.S. troops were killed in a drone attack launched by Iran-linked militants. Defense Priorities Policy Director Benjamin H. Friedman issued the following statement in response:
“The soldiers killed and the service members wounded in an outpost on the border of Jordan and Syria should not have been there. The outpost attacked seems to be attached to the U.S. mission in Syria, which is unauthorized, increasingly foolish, and an invitation to war with Iran.
“The militia that killed U.S. forces should be held accountable. But we should ask why U.S. forces in the area were left in range of repeated drone, missile, and rocket attacks. What cause justified this predictable danger? The answer is none. The U.S. government put them in harm’s way in service of a murky and pointless mission.
“The Biden administration claims these forces are there to fight ISIS, but ISIS was thoroughly defeated years ago and remains a target of most local forces, including those attacking our troops. The outposts near the Jordanian-Syrian-Iraqi borders, including the one attacked, are in fact something else, an effort to police the border against Iran-linked forces. But we never hear any larger rationale for that aim which justifies risking American lives. Congress does not perform oversight and the executive branch does not tell us.
“Many U.S. leaders are already calling for war with Iran in response. We should hit the brakes on the march to another war. For one, it is not obvious that Iran was directly involved in this attack. Their links to militias in the area should not be equated with command and control and vary considerably among the different groups they loosely support. Second, launching a massive war in response to this awful attack might feel good, but it would not serve U.S. interests. Remember that the U.S. avoided a war after the 1983 barracks bombing in Beirut, which exposed the futility of their mission. There are better ways to hit back than starting another massive war in the Middle East and signing up for exponentially more death and destruction.” (Source: Defense Priorities )
26 Jan 24. Iran’s Soraya satellite launch: E3 joint statement.
The UK, France and Germany have issued a joint statement in response to Iran’s satellite launch using the Ghaem-100 space launch vehicle on 20 January 2024.
E3 statement on Iranian Soraya satellite launch announcement: “On 20 January Iran announced the launch of the Soraya satellite using the Ghaem-100 Space Launch Vehicle (SLV). We condemn this launch, as this SLV uses technology essential for the development of a long-range ballistic missile system. Iran continues to develop its missile programme despite repeated international calls to halt it, and after years of disregarding UN restrictions. Launches such as these allow Iran to test technology that could be used to further develop its ballistic missile programme, which poses a significant threat to regional and international security. We have longstanding concerns over Iran’s activity related to ballistic missile technologies that are capable of delivering nuclear weapons. These concerns are reinforced by Iran’s continued nuclear escalation beyond all credible civilian justification.
“The governments of France, Germany and the United Kingdom remain committed to taking every diplomatic step to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons and to hold Iran to account for its destabilising activity in the region and internationally.” (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)
27 Jan 24. India, France agree on joint defence production – statement. – India and France have agreed to work together on the joint production of defence equipment including helicopters and submarines for the Indian armed forces and production for friendly countries, New Delhi said.
The deal was reached during a visit by French President Emmanuel Macron, who met Prime Minister Narendra Modi and attended a state banquet hosted by President Draupadi Murmu, the government said in a statement late on Friday.
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Macron and Modi agreed to expand bilateral ties in defence production, nuclear energy, space research and the use of artificial intelligence for public services like climate change, health and agriculture, the statement said.
It did not specify the value of any deals.
After Russia, France is the largest arms supplier to India, which has relied on its fighter jets for four decades.
The leaders welcomed the setting up of maintenance, repair and overhaul services by France’s Safran (SAF.PA), opens new tab for leading-edge aviation propulsion (LEAP) engines in India and adding such services for Rafale engines, and a helicopter partnership.
The bilateral summit during Macron’s 40-hour visit, was the fifth Macron-Modi meeting since May.
India’s Tata Group and France’s Airbus (AIR.PA), opens new tab have signed an agreement to manufacture civilian helicopters together, Indian Foreign Secretary Vinay Kwatra said.
French jet engine maker CFM International also announced an agreement with India’s Akasa Air to buy more than 300 of its LEAP-1B engines to power 150 Boeing (BA.N), opens new tab 737 MAX aircraft.
Akasa Air previously ordered 76 aircraft powered by the engine, of which 22 are in use.
India and France agreed to intensify cooperation in the southwest Indian Ocean, building on joint surveillance missions carried out from the French island territory of La Reunion in 2020 and 2022, the government statement said.
Macron also said France would create conditions to attract up to 30,000 Indian students a year for higher education. (Source: Reuters)
26 Jan 24. Burkina Faso: Russian Africa Corps deployment unlikely to boost security, will drive sanctions risk. On 24 January, the first 100 Russian service personnel of a 300-troop deployment landed in the capital Ouagadougou. These are allegedly members of the recently formed Russian Ministry of Defence-backed African Corps, designed to replace the Russian private military company Wagner Group in Africa. The Africa Corps will allegedly provide training to the Burkinabe military and patrol in high-risk regions, but will likely primarily act as a bodyguard for interim president Ibrahim Traore following repeated alleged coup attempts. The deployment is unlikely to significantly improve Burkina Faso’s capacity to combat jihadist groups across the country, sustaining elevated attack risks. An increased Russian presence will also increase the risk of Western sanctions targeting Burkina Faso as Western states continue to pursue efforts to clamp down on Russian sanctions evasion. (Source: Sibylline)
26 Jan 24. Mali: Termination of peace agreement will likely prolong conflict with Tuareg rebels in northern Mali. On 25 January, the junta ended the 2015 Algiers Accord with Tuareg separatist rebels. Authorities cited the signatories’ lack of commitment to the deal, as well as alleged hostile acts by Algeria, the mediator of the agreement, possibly in response to Algeria sheltering Tuareg militants that fled recent military operations. The statement largely formalises a process that has been ongoing since the passage of the draft constitution in June 2023, which directly contradicted the decentralisation clauses of the 2015 Algiers Accord. Since then, fighting between Malian armed forces and Tuareg rebels has escalated in northern Mali. The statement significantly reduces prospects of a negotiated settlement in the coming months, prolonging the conflict in northern Mali and increasing risks to staff and assets around key cities such as Kidal (Kidal region). This will also elevate the likelihood of alliances between Tuaregs and the al-Qaeda-aligned Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin. (Source: Sibylline)
26 Jan 24. Iraq: Increased security posture on main roads in Diyala, Saladin, Kirkuk will likely continue. On 24 January, Prime Minister Muhammad al-Sudani warned of possible retaliatory attacks by Islamic State (IS) in the coming weeks in response to the ongoing crackdown on the organisation’s sleeper cells. Since 20 January, Iraqi security forces have launched intensive operations targeting IS members and affiliates in Diyala, Saladin and Kirkuk governorates. It is highly likely that security forces will maintain a heightened posture in major cities and/or towns in the aforementioned governorates. Checkpoints and widespread stop and search operations will likely elevate mobility risks on major roads/highways, especially the Diyala-Kirkuk road, in the coming weeks. There is also a realistic possibility that the current operation will expand to include Nineveh and Anbar governorates. (Source: Sibylline)
28 Jan 24. Today, three U.S. troops were killed in a drone attack launched by Iran-linked militants. Defense Priorities Policy Director Benjamin H. Friedman issued the following statement in response:
“The soldiers killed and the service members wounded in an outpost on the border of Jordan and Syria should not have been there. The outpost attacked seems to be attached to the U.S. mission in Syria, which is unauthorized, increasingly foolish, and an invitation to war with Iran.
“The militia that killed U.S. forces should be held accountable. But we should ask why U.S. forces in the area were left in range of repeated drone, missile, and rocket attacks. What cause justified this predictable danger? The answer is none. The U.S. government put them in harm’s way in service of a murky and pointless mission.
“The Biden administration claims these forces are there to fight ISIS, but ISIS was thoroughly defeated years ago and remains a target of most local forces, including those attacking our troops. The outposts near the Jordanian-Syrian-Iraqi borders, including the one attacked, are in fact something else, an effort to police the border against Iran-linked forces. But we never hear any larger rationale for that aim which justifies risking American lives. Congress does not perform oversight and the executive branch does not tell us.
“Many U.S. leaders are already calling for war with Iran in response. We should hit the brakes on the march to another war. For one, it is not obvious that Iran was directly involved in this attack. Their links to militias in the area should not be equated with command and control and vary considerably among the different groups they loosely support. Second, launching a massive war in response to this awful attack might feel good, but it would not serve U.S. interests. Remember that the U.S. avoided a war after the 1983 barracks bombing in Beirut, which exposed the futility of their mission. There are better ways to hit back than starting another massive war in the Middle East and signing up for exponentially more death and destruction.” (Source: Defense Priorities )
26 Jan 24. Iran’s Soraya satellite launch: E3 joint statement. The UK, France and Germany have issued a joint statement in response to Iran’s satellite launch using the Ghaem-100 space launch vehicle on 20 January 2024. E3 statement on Iranian Soraya satellite launch announcement: “On 20 January Iran announced the launch of the Soraya satellite using the Ghaem-100 Space Launch Vehicle (SLV). We condemn this launch, as this SLV uses technology essential for the development of a long-range ballistic missile system. Iran continues to develop its missile programme despite repeated international calls to halt it, and after years of disregarding UN restrictions. Launches such as these allow Iran to test technology that could be used to further develop its ballistic missile programme, which poses a significant threat to regional and international security. We have longstanding concerns over Iran’s activity related to ballistic missile technologies that are capable of delivering nuclear weapons. These concerns are reinforced by Iran’s continued nuclear escalation beyond all credible civilian justification.
“The governments of France, Germany and the United Kingdom remain committed to taking every diplomatic step to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons and to hold Iran to account for its destabilising activity in the region and internationally.” (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)
25 Jan 24. Myanmar: Anti-junta group’s seizure of town in Rakhine state elevates armed conflict risk. On 24 January, the Arakan Army (AA), an ethnic armed organisation (EAO), stated it ‘completely controlled’ Pauktaw, a port town in western Rakhine state. In November 2023, the AA briefly seized the town before the junta retook it days later. The AA also stated that it is engaged in ‘intense’ clashes in Kyauktaw, Minbya, Mrauk-U, and Rathedaung towns in Rakhine. The AA has been fighting in Rakhine since November 2023 following a breakdown in the tense ceasefire in the state; the AA has simultaneously taken part in Operation 1027, which was launched in October 2023 with two other EAOs as part of the Brotherhood Alliance. This has made significant progress in northern Shan state (though a ceasefire is currently in place). The junta is now likely to focus on maintaining control over Sittwe, the Rakhine state capital 16 miles (25km) away from Pauktaw. It will also likely carry out airstrikes and artillery strikes against the AA to stem its progress. (Source: Sibylline)
25 Jan 24. Chad-Russia: Possible expansion of Russian influence will raise risk of sanctions. On 24 January, Chad’s interim president Mahamat Idriss Deby met with Russian President Vladimir Putin at the Kremlin in Russia’s capital Moscow. Details from the meeting are limited but a transcript published by the Kremlin stated Putin wished to develop their bilateral ties. In recent years, Russia has substantially increased its influence across the Sahel. It has successfully exploited rifts between military governments in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger with France – their former primary Western partner – to secure military and economic agreements. By contrast, Idriss Deby has maintained close ties to France, which was also a key ally of his father, the late president Idriss Deby Itno. However, ahead of elections later this year, where Deby will likely face substantial domestic opposition to his attempt to extend and legitimise his rule, there is a realistic possibility Chad will shift towards Russia if France is critical of state repression around the polls. Development of these ties will raise sanctions risks. (Source: Sibylline)
25 Jan 24. Change in ISIS Threat Means Evolution in Long-Term U.S.-Iraq Relationship.
The Pentagon today underscored the mutual commitment by the United States and Iraq to strengthening the evolving security relationship between the two nations.
Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh said today that the two nations have, for a decade now, enjoyed a productive security relationship aimed at the shared goal of defeating the threat posed by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria terrorist group.
The U.S. and Iraq will, in the coming days, begin discussions as part of the U.S.-Iraq Higher Military Commission, or HMC, to plan how the existing security relationship between the two partner nations is expected to evolve going forward.
Discussions taking place as part of the HMC are expected to shape the role of U.S. forces in Iraq and the defeat-ISIS mission. How the U.S. role in that mission will change depends on three key factors, Singh said. Those three factors include the current nature of the threat from ISIS, operational and environmental requirements and Iraqi security forces capability levels.
“Expert working groups of military and defense professionals will examine these three factors and advise the HMC on the most effective evolution of the D-ISIS coalition mission, ensuring that ISIS can never resurge, in consultation with coalition partners at all stages of the process,” Singh said.
The groundwork for the HMC discussions was laid last summer during the U.S.-Iraq Joint Security Cooperation Dialogue in Washington, D.C., Singh said.
“During that August 2023 meeting, the U.S. and Iraq committed to start the HMC to discuss the coalition’s mission to defeat ISIS,” she said.
The U.S. currently has a military presence in Iraq as part of Combined Joint Task Force Operation Inherent Resolve. The CJTF OIR mission is to advise, assist and enable partnered forces in the defeat of ISIS within designated areas of Iraq and Syria. Inside Iraq, the U.S. works in partnership with both the Iraqi security forces and the Kurdish security forces to carry out that mission.
Discussions on how that mission may evolve, Singh said, are relevant now because after 10 years the threat posed by ISIS may also be different. That’s something the HMC will investigate as part of its discussions she said.
“We want to make sure that the threat that we saw 10 years ago is not the same threat that we face today, which is why we have entered into this HMC working group to address what the future, what the partnership, what the bilateral relationship looks like,” she said. “This is about the future and making sure that Iraq is set up for success in defending its own national security and sovereignty, and how the U.S. can support Iraq in doing that.”
One thing Singh said the HMC meetings will not involve is U.S. “withdrawal” from Iraq.
“Let me be clear, the HMC meeting is not a negotiation about the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq,” Singh said. “The United States and the coalition are in Iraq at the invitation of the Iraqi government to fight ISIS. Our Iraqi partners have assured us of their commitment towards working together to shape this future on U.S. military presence and the enduring defeat of ISIS. The HMC will enable the transition to an enduring bilateral security partnership between the U.S. and Iraq, building on the successes of the D-ISIS campaign in partnership with the Combined Joint Task Force Operation Inherent Resolve.”
Singh said the U.S. and Iraq have for a decade now worked together in a productive and successful partnership that has put U.S. military and coalition forces alongside ISF and KSF in a mutual effort to eliminate the destructive influence of ISIS. While that partnership is expected to evolve going forward, neither nation wants to see it come to an end.
“The start of the HMC process reflects the evolving U.S.-Iraq bilateral relationship, and it underscores our commitment to deepen our security cooperation to advance stability within Iraq and the region,” Singh said. (Source: U.S. DoD)
25 Jan 24. U.S., Iraqi Officials to Hold Talks. A commission made up of officials from the U.S. and Iraq will begin holding high-level talks in the coming days designed to advance the nations’ shared goal of building an enduring security partnership, Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III announced today.
The U.S.-Iraq Higher Military Commission aims to build upon joint commitments to regional security and Iraqi sovereignty outlined during the U.S.-Iraq Joint Security Cooperation Dialogue held last year in Washington.
Previous discussions have focused on transitioning the U.S.-led mission by Combined Joint Task Force Operation Inherent Resolve to defeat the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria to a timeline that reflects the threat posed by the terrorist group, operational requirements and the Iraqi security forces’ capabilities, Austin said.
During the upcoming meetings, military and defense experts will focus on the evolution of Iraq’s campaign to defeat ISIS.
“The United States and Iraq have enjoyed a deep and productive partnership on security matters in the 10 years since the Iraqi government invited the United States and the coalition to fight ISIS, including the seven years since the territorial defeat of ISIS in Iraq,” Austin said in a statement announcing the commencement of the forum.
The U.S. and Iraq will start U.S.-Iraq Higher Military Commission working group meetings in the coming days, building upon the U.S.-Iraq Joint Security Cooperation Dialogue and reflecting our commitment to deepen security cooperation to advance stability in Iraq & the region.…
— Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III (@SecDef) January 25, 2024
He added that the discussions reflect the evolving U.S.-Iraq relationship outlined in the 2008 Strategic Framework Agreement between the two nations and “underscores our commitment to deepen our security cooperation to advance stability within Iraq and the region.”
The secretary said the upcoming discussions are guided by a shared commitment to determine the most effective evolution of the mission to defeat ISIS, while ensuring that ISIS can never resurge.
In previewing the upcoming discussions, senior officials with the Defense and State departments further underscored the strength of the U.S.-Iraq relationship and the key role it has played in the mission to defeat ISIS.
“The partnership between CJTF OIR and the has been a decisive factor in the defeat of ISIS,” a senior defense official said. “The Iraqi Security Forces, the ISF, have been in the lead during the last several years of the campaign to defeat ISIS with CJTF OIR in support to advise, assist and enable our partner forces.”
The officials said over the past decade, ISIS, which once attracted tens of thousands of fighters across the region, has been significantly reduced in terms of size and capability.
“The ISF have made tremendous progress through cooperation with CJTF OIR,” the official added. “Ten years after the Iraqi government invited the United States and the rest of the coalition to defeat ISIS, and seven years after our collective territorial defeat of ISIS in Iraq, we see a need to transition to a normal bilateral security cooperation relationship.”
The official emphasized that the discussions are not a negotiation about the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq.
“The United States and the coalition are in Iraq at the invitation of their of the Iraqi government to fight ISIS,” the official said. “Our Iraqi partners have assured us of their commitment toward working together to shape this future US military presence and ensure the enduring defeat of ISIS.
“Both nations remain committed to security cooperation, and our shared interest in regional stability,” the official added. “The United States and Iraq will continue to work together to shape future US military presence and ensure an Iraqi lead enduring defeat of ISIS.” (Source: U.S. DoD)
25 Jan 24. Statement by Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III on the Start of Working Group Meetings of the U.S.-Iraq Higher Military Commission.
The United States and the Government of Iraq will start working group meetings of the U.S.-Iraq Higher Military Commission (HMC) in the coming days, initiating a process the two sides committed to during the U.S.-Iraq Joint Security Cooperation Dialogue (JSCD) in Washington, D.C., on August 7-8, 2023. The commencement of the HMC process reflects the deep U.S. commitment to regional stability and Iraqi sovereignty.
The HMC will enable the transition to an enduring bilateral security partnership between the United States and Iraq, building on the successes of Iraq’s Defeat-Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (D-ISIS) campaign in partnership with the Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve as part of the Global Coalition to D-ISIS.
The HMC builds upon the inaugural U.S.-Iraq JSCD, held on August 7-8, 2023. During that meeting, the United States and Iraq committed to start the HMC to discuss how the Coalition’s mission to defeat ISIS will transition on a timeline that considers three key factors: the threat from ISIS, operational and environmental requirements, and the Iraqi security forces’ capability levels.
Expert working groups of military and defense professionals will examine these three factors and advise the HMC on the most effective evolution of the D-ISIS Coalition mission, ensuring that ISIS can never resurge, in consultation with Coalition partners at all stages of the process.
U.S. military personnel are in Iraq at the invitation of the Iraqi government, as part of Operation Inherent Resolve’s mission to advise, assist, and enable the Iraqi security forces in their ongoing fight against ISIS. The United States remains committed to a secure, stable, and sovereign Iraq.
The United States and Iraq have enjoyed a deep and productive partnership on security matters in the 10 years since the Iraqi government invited the United States and the Coalition to fight ISIS, including the seven years since the territorial defeat of ISIS in Iraq. The start of the HMC process reflects the evolving U.S.-Iraq bilateral relationship under the Strategic Framework Agreement, and it underscores our commitment to deepen our security cooperation to advance stability within Iraq and the region. (Source: U.S. DoD)
17 Jan 24. North Korea set for modest increase in defence spending.
North Korea said on 16 January that it expects to spend 15.9% of total government expenditure in 2024 on defence. The state-run Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) did not provide a monetary figure, but the proportion is the same as in recent years.
In 2023 Janes tracked North Korea’s defence budget at about USD1.47 bn. Janes estimates that the new allocation represents a small increase but spending power in the isolated country remains limited due to challenging economic constraints including inflation.
KCNA said the national budget for 2024 was presented to the 10th Session of the 14th Supreme People’s Assembly in Pyongyang. Citing a speech by North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, KCNA said the proposed defence budget will support Pyongyang’s five-year plan to develop ‘defence science and weapon systems’.
This plan – announced in January 2021 – focuses on progressing military capabilities including intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), solid fuel ballistic missiles, warheads for hypersonic missiles, nuclear submarines, and reconnaissance satellites. (Source: Janes)
24 Jan 24. U.S. Conducts First Drone Strike of 2024 in Somalia, Killing Three Al-Shabaab Members. The United States initiated its first drone strike of 2024 in Somalia on January 21, targeting the al-Shabaab terrorist group. This operation, confirmed by both U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) and Somali officials, occurred in the Lower Juba region, approximately 35 kilometers northeast of Kismayo. The strike resulted in the deaths of three al-Shabaab members, with no civilian casualties reported. This action was conducted at the request of the Federal Government of Somalia, and it is described as a collective self-defense airstrike.
This recent strike is part of a broader U.S. military engagement in Somalia, which has been increasingly active since President Biden’s tenure began in January 2021. Throughout 2023, AFRICOM conducted at least 18 airstrikes in Somalia, along with a special operations raid in February, marking a significant year for U.S. military operations in the region. The total number of U.S. strikes in Somalia since 2007 is at least 262, reportedly eliminating over 1,200 al-Shabaab militants. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
24 Jan 24. Abu Dhabi drone fair offers rare look at Belarusian weapons. An unusual sight at the UMEX drone fair organized here from Jan. 23-25 was the large booth of the Republic of Belarus.
The autocratic regime is not in the habit of attending Western trade shows, having been sanctioned by many Western nations and blocs, including the European Union, for its role in Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.
But here, while unlisted in the event’s official lineup exhibitors, a handful of Belarusian companies attended the show, showing more equipment than Russian manufacturers.
Among them was the Minsk-based, state-owned firm Belspetsvneshtechnika (BSVT), displaying the latest variant of its Sapphire grenade launching system.
Mounted on a tracked chassis the size of a shopping cart – the U.S. big-box store kind – a mock-up shown here appeared to be armed with 12 anti-tank rockets.
A company representative, who wished not to be named, told Defense News that the company began testing the system in Belarus in November. The plan is to have it serially produced by the end of 2024, after which it is expected to enter into the service of the Belarusian military.
When asked whether the company had plans to eventually supply it to Russia, the representative said that this was not being considered.
The Sapphire is available in anti-personnel, anti-tank, and multi-strike, cluster-attack configurations, among others. At the show, BSVT was marketing the weapon as a “game-changer in the modern battlefield” as well as effective for urban warfare.
The carrier vehicle is remote-controlled, and it is programmed to return to the operator autonomously if the connection is lost, according to the manufacturer.
The development of the new launcher was said to have started approximately two years ago, although it is unclear whether the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 prompted or affected its evolution.
The Sapphire was last shown at the International Exhibition of Arms and Military Machinery dubbed MILEX organized in Minsk last May, where delegates from Russia, China and Iran showed an interest, according to the vendor representative.
Belarus has backed Russia in its war against Ukraine. According to Ukrainian analysts, Moscow has used Belarusian airspace for drone and missile attacks against Kyiv and other cities.
In October 2022, the country’s president, Aleksandr Lukashenko, announced the deployment of Russian troops alongside military equipment to Belarus in response to what he called NATO provocations on the border.
Earlier this month, the defense minister of Belarus said the government would formalize new military doctrine for the use of nuclear weapons.
(Source: Defense News)
25 Jan 24. Taiwan begins extended one-year conscription in response to China threat. The first batch of new recruits began serving their one-year compulsory military service in Taiwan on Thursday after the conscription period was extended from four months due to government concerns about China’s rising military threat.
President Tsai Ing-wen announced the extension in late 2022.
China has ramped up military, diplomatic and economic pressure on Taiwan to assert its sovereignty claims, including almost daily Chinese air force missions near the island over the past four years.
At a recruitment centre in central Taiwan’s Taichung, a group of young men gathered in the morning cold to be inducted, as dogs checked their bags for drugs and barbers shaved their heads before changing into army fatigues.
“It is our shared responsibility to adjust the structure of the military and improve combat power. It is also a foundation for us to strengthen our military power,” officer Lien Chih-wei told reporters.
Taiwan’s army said in a statement that it expected a total of 670 conscripts to join in the first batch under the newly extended scheme.
“In the face of a complex international environment, it is our first priority to build the strong will to resist the enemy,” it said.
“The extension of compulsory service to one year will not only enhance immediate combat effectiveness, but will also improve the quality of reserve personnel, strengthen mobilisation energy, and enhance the overall combat effectiveness of national defence.”
Tsai has described the previous military system, including training reservists, as inefficient and insufficient to cope with China’s rising military threat, especially if it launched a rapid attack on the island.
Conscripts will undergo more intense training, including shooting exercises, combat instruction used by U.S. forces, and operating more powerful weapons including Stinger anti-aircraft missiles and anti-tank missiles, according to previously announced plans.
Yin Hsin-shih, 18, said he was a “little bit excited” to be joining up.
“For the country, it will provide the needed defence power given that our neighbouring country is a great threat to our nation,” he said, referring to China.
The United States, Taiwan’s most important international backer and arms seller despite the lack of formal diplomatic ties, has welcomed the conscription reform as part of Taiwan’s efforts to boost its ability to defend itself.
However, the period of service in Taiwan is still shorter than the 18 months mandated in South Korea, which faces a hostile and nuclear-armed North Korea.
After Taiwan announced the extension in 2022, China criticised Taiwan for seeking to use the Taiwanese people as “cannon fodder”.
Taiwan’s government rejects Beijing’s sovereignty claims and says only the Taiwanese people can decide their future. (Source: Reuters)
23 Jan 24. U.S.-Vietnam Cooperation Growing, Maturing, DOD Official Says. Defense cooperation between the United States and Vietnam is growing, but it is only one aspect of the growing relationship between the two countries, said Lindsey W. Ford, the deputy assistant secretary of defense for South and Southeast Asia.
Ford spoke at the 2024 U.S.-Vietnam Conference sponsored by the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
Ford said this is “a really fascinating time” to be working on this partnership, noting the upgrade of the relationship to a comprehensive strategic partnership. The past year “was unlike anything I’ve seen, and I think, from our perspective at the Defense Department, it provides us a really interesting opportunity to continue to grow on what has been very promising cooperation that we’ve been doing for decades,” she said.
While Ford is a defense expert, she noted the relationship between the two nations encompasses many different fields. She also said that while the view of Vietnam is affected by the competition with China it is more than simply that.
The United States and Vietnam share strategic interests, particularly on the economic side, that are truly important, she said. She noted the U.S. trade with Vietnam topped $130 bn in 2022. The trade provides large export markets in both directions. She also noted there are tight people-to-people ties between the nations. “There’s an awful lot more to this relationship than just what we’re doing on defense,” she said. “I think that that really bears mentioning because when you look at what we are doing, and what we are building our security partnership toward much of what it is centered around … allowing the United States and Vietnam to think together about how we can provide for the public good.”
This covers the gamut of exercises between the two countries from maritime security to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. This impacts all of Southeast Asia, she said.
Ford credited the foundational work of U.S. veterans of the Vietnam War who forged “the legacy of war cooperation that we have together … is very unique about the U.S. Vietnam relationship.”
She said the veterans felt that it was really important to turn this relationship into a friendship and a partnership.
On the defense side, the relationship began with recovery of those missing in action and has grown through the years. U.S. experts are working with Vietnamese officials to locate and identify their war dead.
Overall, U.S.-Vietnamese defense ties have grown. Ford specifically spoke about the U.S. helping Vietnam train and equip for its U.N. mission supporting peace in South Sudan. Vietnam is exporting peace not only in the Indo-Pacific but globally, she said.
Spotlight: Focus on Indo-PacificOther aspects include cooperation on disaster preparedness and recovery, responding to climate change disasters, establishing and running disaster management coordination centers, and most recently, building military medicine ties, which has been a growing area of cooperation.
The United States worked closely with Vietnam during the COVID-19 pandemic sending vaccines and equipment to the country.
In terms of emerging areas of cooperation, she noted the work between the two nations on maritime security. The situation in the Indo-Pacific is challenging. “We are doing a lot and want to continue helping Vietnam build its own maritime domain awareness capabilities, train its sailors to help address some of the harassment, but also illegal fishing and other kinds of problems that we’re facing in the maritime domain,” she said.
The United States and Vietnam are working together on cybersecurity programs. Both countries see this as a vulnerability and both work together to close those defenses. (Source: U.S. DoD)
24 Jan 24. Nigeria-US: Efforts to enhance regional influence will likely drive competition with Russia. On 23 January, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken met with Nigerian President Bola Tinubu and issued pledges to remain a strong security partner to Nigeria. This was Blinken’s third country in a four-country tour he has been conducting between 21-26 January, during which he also pledged another USD 45 m to combat instability in West Africa. The visits underline US efforts to reinforce their influence in the region, particularly in the context of growing Russian influence in the Sahel. Niger, which hosts a US drone base, agreed earlier this month to develop military ties with Russia. This ongoing competition for regional influence reduces the likelihood that the US will reduce support to Nigeria over allegations that US-supplied aircraft have been used in airstrikes, causing civilian casualties. Increased competition for regional influence will also likely drive Russian online sentiment manipulation campaigns in the region to elevate anti-US sentiment, though a spike in harassment of US individuals or entities remains unlikely. (Source: Sibylline)
24 Jan 24. Tuvalu-Taiwan: Tuvalu will likely switch recognition from Taiwan to China following general election. According to reports on 23 January, Tuvalu will review its diplomatic ties with Taiwan following a general election set for 26 January. Tuvalu is one of only 12 countries that recognise Taiwan as the sole legitimate government of China. Since 2019, Taiwan’s allies in the Pacific Island region have halved from six to three, amid intensive Chinese (PRC) diplomatic lobbying and promises of development funding to switch recognition. Following the presidential election in Taiwan on 13 January, Nauru cut ties with Taiwan and re-established relations with China. There are no political parties in Tuvalu and the parliament is made up of 16 independent MPs. In a nod to Beijing, this week, the finance minister stated that voters need more international financial support for development and to combat climate change. This indicates that Tuvalu will likely switch recognition to China, further increasing diplomatic pressure on the new Taiwanese government. However, stronger unofficial ties with more significant states, such as the US and Japan, have become more important for Taiwan, moderating the impact of this pressure. (Source: Sibylline)
24 Jan 24. Korean Peninsular: Cruise missile launches highlight elevated regional tensions. Earlier on 24 January, North Korea launched multiple cruise missiles off its west coast into the Yellow Sea. The missile launches are part of North Korea’s efforts to demonstrate its arsenal of tactical weapons, including recent tests of a solid-fuel hypersonic ballistic missile and a nuclear-capable underwater attack drone. These actions follow North Korea’s criticism of recent joint naval drills by Japan, South Korea and the US. Despite UN sanctions targeting North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme, cruise missile tests are not prohibited. However, they raise concerns due to their capability to evade radar detection, posing potential threats to South Korea and Japan. The missile launch occurred during the South Korean Navy’s special warfare unit training exercises near the North Korean border, which aim to bolster operational readiness in response to North Korea’s military activities. These developments highlight the heightened tensions on the Korean Peninsula as North Korean leader Kim Jong Un intensifies weapons development. (Source: Sibylline)
24 Jan 24. Pakistan: Military deployment will help mitigate security, unrest risks ahead of general election. On 23 January, the caretaker federal cabinet approved the deployment of military and paramilitary forces to ensure the peaceful conduct of the upcoming general election on 8 February. The security personnel will be stationed in ‘sensitive constituencies’ and will serve as a rapid response force. The decision comes amid a sharp uptick in violence and targeted attacks against political figures, particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan provinces, where two independent candidates were killed and a Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PML-N) candidate was wounded in a recent attack. To ensure poll security, security personnel will likely be present at key public squares, gathering venues and major thoroughfares. This is likely to partially mitigate the risk of major militant activity and widespread violent unrest (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 22 January 2024). However, with approximately 17,500 polling stations marked as ‘sensitive’, security risks will nonetheless persist in restive constituencies of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Balochistan and Punjab ahead of the polls. (Source: Sibylline)
22 Jan 24. Pakistan-Iran: Resumption of diplomatic ties reduces risk of further escalation. On 19 January, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Jalil Abbas Jilani spoke with his Iranian counterpart and agreed to de-escalate bilateral tensions and resume diplomatic ties. They also agreed to strengthen co-ordination on counter-terrorism efforts and discussed the possibility of the return of ambassadors of the two countries to their respective capitals. This development follows tit-for-tat military strikes by both Pakistan and Iran inside each other’s borders, resulting in several casualties and significantly elevating regional tensions. Both Tehran and Islamabad will likely prioritise diplomatic channels to address security concerns in the near term. However, it remains possible that militant groups on both sides of the border, including the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), will exploit the recent hostilities and escalate their cross-border activities. As such, there is a sustained risk of attacks in districts in the Pakistan-Iran border region. (Source: Sibylline)
22 Jan 24. Senegal: Endorsement of alternative opposition candidate slightly reduces unrest risks. On 20 January, the Constitutional Council released the final list of 20 candidates for Senegal’s presidential election, rejecting the final appeal of opposition leader Ousmane Sonko. However, following the announcement, Sonko and officials within his Patriots of Senegal (PASTEF) party reiterated their support for his chosen alternative Bassirou Diomaye Faye (who is also in prison on charges of defamation but has not yet been convicted). This position has largely mitigated the risk of opposition protests over Sonko’s candidacy. However, PASTEF spokespersons have criticised Diomaye Faye’s continued imprisonment as this prevents a free and fair presidential contest. This will raise the likelihood of protests calling for his release or that opposition supporters reject the election results as illegitimate. In turn, this will sustain the risk of unrest in the weeks following the election. (Source: Sibylline)
23 Jan 24. Sudan: Further sanctions are likely as conflict persists, increasing compliance risks for businesses. On 22 January, the European Council imposed sanctions against six entities for their involvement in financing and arming the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The entities are subject to asset freezes and funding prohibitions designed to cut off financial flows to both sides. Since the fighting broke out in April 2023, the UK and US have imposed sanctions on firms associated with the military groups. However, these have largely failed to prompt serious negotiations, as both sides have access to illicit financial and armaments streams through regional partners, money laundering and trafficking. As such, the European Council’s sanctions are unlikely to reduce conflict, sustaining the elevated risk of further sanctions in the coming months. Such sanctions will likely target a wide range of Sudanese businesses, including those operating from neighbouring states, elevating compliance risks and due diligence needs for businesses with ties to the Sudanese and regional market. (Source: Sibylline)
22 Jan 24. Armenia: Proposed new constitution likely underlines push to lower regional tensions. On 19 January, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan called for the adoption of a new constitution. Pashinyan indicated that the new constitution would not change the parliamentary system of government. He said its adoption would make ‘Armenia more competitive and viable in the new geopolitical and regional environment’ without providing further details. Previously, Pashinyan has opposed constitutional provisions that implicitly support the unification of Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia while denouncing Turkey’s role in the 1915 Armenian genocide. Pashinyan’s latest call followed a statement by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in early December calling for Armenia to reject any form of revanchism regarding Nagorno-Karabakh. The proposal to change the constitution will likely be aimed at facilitating the ongoing peace negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, thereby decreasing regional tensions (including with Turkey). However, any constitutional changes are highly likely to exacerbate domestic political polarisation in Armenia. (Source: Sibylline)
22 Jan 24. Russia: Increased surveillance of Russian nationals, foreign visitors likely to raise risk of harassment. Reports on 19 January indicated that the Russian government plans to introduce mandatory consular registration for Russian citizens living abroad and create a ‘digital profile’ for foreigners entering the country. The policy seeks to establish a means of accounting for Russian citizens who permanently reside abroad, as well as the legal status of such individuals by 20 June 2025. However, it is uncertain how the Russian authorities intend to enforce compliance with mandatory consular registration. Estimates suggest that up to 920,000 Russians have left the country following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Meanwhile, the digital profiling of foreign visitors to Russia will include passport information and biometric data. Reports indicate that airports serving the capital Moscow will collect DNA samples of arriving foreign citizens and record their voices as an experiment. The increased surveillance of Russian nationals living abroad, as well as visiting foreign nationals, will further increase physical security risks while the remote possibility of harassment and arbitrary detention is likely to persist. (Source: Sibylline)
22 Jan 24. Egypt-Ethiopia: Somaliland port deal will likely undermine prospective infrastructure negotiations. On 21 January, Egyptian President Abdel Fatah El Sisi stated that his country will not allow ‘any threat’ to Somalia, following the Memorandum of Understanding between Ethiopia and Somaliland (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 12 January 2024). Sisi’s statement is the latest in the diplomatic standoff between Egypt and Ethiopia, which has intensified after the recent failure of talks over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). The Somali development is highly likely to exacerbate tensions between the two countries, while undermining prospects for new GERD talks in the short term. This will also sustain threats to water and food security in Egypt, further undermining domestic stability through 2024. However, the risk of an escalation to military engagement remains low. There is also a realistic possibility that other BRICS members (such as China or Russia) will seek to mediate. (Source: Sibylline)
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