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12 Jan 24. Dr Lai Ching-te Wins Taiwan Election: Foreign Secretary’s Statement. Foreign Secretary offers his congratulations to Dr Lai Ching-te following presidential and legislative elections in Taiwan. The elections today are testament to Taiwan’s vibrant democracy. I offer warm congratulations to the people of Taiwan on the smooth conduct of those elections and to Dr Lai Ching-te and his party on his election. I hope that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait will renew efforts to resolve differences peacefully through constructive dialogue, without the threat or use of force or coercion. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)
12 Jan 24. AMD chair resigns. Nombasa Ndhlovu, the Chairperson of the South African Aerospace, Maritime and Defence Industries Association (AMD) has resigned her position, after two years on the job.
In a letter to the AMD Board, Ndhlovu explained her resignation as the Chairperson of AMD: “As discussed on our last Board meeting, I need to attend to personal legal issues that I would not want these issues to bring the association’s name into disrepute. Again, thank you for believing in me and your support.”
Ndhlovu was elected as the Chairperson of AMD in June 2022 after serving as Chairperson of the AMD NCACC Task Team since 2020. There she was instrumental in working with the Directorate Conventional Arms Control (DCAC) and NCACC in unlocking Category A & B exports to the Middle East. (Category A comprises sensitive controlled items such as combat aircraft, explosives, tanks etc. while Category B comprises handheld and portable assault weapons with a calibre under 12.7 mm).
Ndhlovu is the Chief Executive Officer of Umkhombe Marine, and made headlines when she was arrested in October 2020 and released on R80 000 bail for fraud, involving approximately R100 million.
“A tender was awarded by the SANDF [South African National Defence Force] to Umkhombe Marine Pty Ltd (the legal entity belonging to Mrs Ndhlovu) to transport SANDF equipment back to SA from African countries. The contract value was approximately R24 million,” National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) spokesperson Sipho Ngwena said at the time.
Ndhlovu apparently provided false information or documents as part of the tender process, and according to Ngwema thereafter was awarded another contract of R104 million, again to transport SANDF equipment. “But the soldiers were recalled from service [in Sudan] and this led to the cancellation of the second contract.”
Ndhlovu then claimed R30 million expenses from the SANDF, Times Live reported, saying this was what the costs were before the cancellation. “Documents which appear to be false were provided to show the expenses,” Ngwema said.
In 2016, in place of the cancelled contract, Ndhlovu received a transport contract for the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), valued at R79 million.
Ndhlovu’s husband, Major General Noel Ndhlovu, apparently rubber-stamped the mission contracts as he was on the SANDF’s Joint Operations committee. After his wife’s arrest, Noel was placed on special leave and is understood to remain suspended.
The case against Ndhlovu stalled for two years due in part to the Covid-19 pandemic and changes to counsel, but most delays were due to representations by Ndhlovu to the NPA. Speaking to defenceWeb, Ndhlovu said it has taken three years of fighting to get the NPA to hear her side of the story.
She has been waiting for responses from the NPA on her representations, particularly on the fact that she was arrested by Military Police when she was a civilian, and the case is now scheduled to proceed at the end of January.
“I have been put up as a sacrificial lamb,” she said, adding that she is confident investigations on a bigger scale will clarify matters.
(Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
12 Jan 24. Myanmar: China-brokered ceasefire is unlikely to end conflict in Shan state permanently. On 12 January, the junta in Myanmar reportedly agreed to a ceasefire with an alliance of ethnic armed organisations (EAOs). The Three Brotherhood Alliance has been fighting the junta in Shan state near the border with China since it declared an offensive in October 2023. The ceasefire agreement was brokered during Chinese-mediated talks in Kunming (China) on 10-11 January. Beijing has sought to mediate an end to the conflict as it is concerned about its impact on cross-border trade and the safety of Chinese citizens in northern Myanmar. However, the ceasefire is unlikely to end the fighting in the long term. The junta is also engaged in fighting other groups around the country. Last month, Beijing stated that both parties had agreed to a ceasefire, even though fighting continued in much of Shan. The Three Brotherhood Alliance has made significant progress since the launch of its offensive; last week, it took control of Laukkaing, a city on the Chinese border. The agreement will likely give EAOs time to consolidate gains while appeasing China, which has historically supported the ethnic groups.
(Source: Sibylline)
12 Jan 24. Joint statement on DPRK-Russia ballistic missile transfers.
Joint statement issued by Foreign Ministers on the DPRK’s export and Russia’s procurement of ballistic missiles, which have been used against Ukraine.
The following is a statement from the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Albania, Andorra, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Federated States of Micronesia, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, the Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Palau, Paraguay, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, Romania, San Marino, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, the High Representative of the European Union, and the Secretary of State of the United States of America.
We condemn in the strongest possible terms the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) export and Russia’s procurement of DPRK ballistic missiles, as well as Russia’s use of these missiles against Ukraine on December 30, 2023, and January 2, 2024. The transfer of these weapons increases the suffering of the Ukrainian people, supports Russia’s war of aggression, and undermines the global non-proliferation regime. Russia’s use of DPRK ballistic missiles in Ukraine also provides valuable technical and military insights to the DPRK. We are deeply concerned about the security implications that this cooperation has in Europe, on the Korean Peninsula, across the Indo-Pacific region, and around the world.
Our governments stand together in resolute opposition to arms transfers between the DPRK and Russia. The transfer of ballistic missiles, along with any other arms and related materiel, from the DPRK to Russia flagrantly violates multiple United Nations Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs) – namely, resolution 1718 (2006), resolution 1874 (2009), and resolution 2270 (2016) – that Russia itself supported. We are closely monitoring what Russia provides to the DPRK in return for these weapons exports. We call on the DPRK and Russia to abide by relevant UNSCRs and to immediately cease all activities that violate them.
We urge all UN Member States, including all members of the United Nations Security Council, to join us in condemning Russia and the DPRK’s flagrant UNSCR violations. As Russia launches waves of missiles and drones against the Ukrainian people, we will continue to stand together in support of Ukraine. We further call on the DPRK to respond to the numerous and genuine offers to return to diplomacy, the only path to an enduring peace on the Korean Peninsula.
(Source: https://www.gov.uk/)
11 Jan 24. The security situation across the Sahel is deteriorating: UK statement at the UN Security Council.
Statement by Ambassador James Kariuki at the UN Security Council meeting on West Africa.
Thank you, President. I’m grateful to SRSG Simão and Dr Théroux-Bénoni for their briefings this morning. Let me make four points on security, democracy, climate change, and humanitarian need.
First, as we’ve heard, security across the Sahel is deteriorating. The UK is particularly concerned about the situation in Mali, where UNOWAS has a crucial role to play after MINUSMA’s withdrawal. We encourage UNOWAS, through its good offices, to help bring all signatories to the 2015 Algiers Accords back to the negotiating table.
The UK welcomes ECOWAS contributions to regional security and supports the potential of the Accra Initiative. We also stand ready to support the region and the UN for the upcoming Africa Counter Terrorism Summit. We reiterate that the region’s security challenges are only exacerbated by the destabilising chaos of Russian mercenary group Wagner.
Second, democracy is under pressure. Timelines for the restoration of constitutional governments in Mali, Burkina Faso and Guinea continue to slip. We echo ECOWAS’ calls for a return to constitutional order, and we encourage recommitment to transition timetables. We call on Niger to agree a transition timeline with ECOWAS, and urge adherence to an inclusive and transparent transition in Chad.
The United Kingdom congratulates Liberia for its recent peaceful transfer of power, and welcomes the Peacebuilding Commission’s role supporting this process. We urge redoubled efforts on UNOWAS’ regional work to prevent election-related tensions.
Third, the Security Council has recognised the adverse effects of climate change on security and stability in the region. We welcome UNOWAS’ work in the climate-security nexus. The UK is supporting work in the region to build the resilience of those most vulnerable to climate change.
Fourth, the humanitarian situation remains dire. Since 2019, UK aid has supported over 15 m in the Sahel with life-saving assistance, but humanitarian needs are still going unmet. We call on all actors to ensure safe and unimpeded access for humanitarian assistance.
In closing, President, in light of the regional challenges we’ve all set out here today, we should recommit to even closer work with UNOWAS and the regional organisations. We join others in calling for a presidential statement of the Council to reflect this commitment.
I thank you. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)
11 Jan 24. Ramaphosa slammed for SADC DR Congo deployment. This was the blunt reaction of Democratic Alliance (DA) shadow defence and military veterans minister Kobus Marais to South Africa’s commitment to the three-nation SAMIDRC (SADC Mission in DR Congo).
Marais backs his no-holds barred approach to what is seemingly a further SA National Defence Force (SANDF) deployment to the troubled central African country with a call to Commander-in-Chief Cyril Ramaphosa to rescind the decision and recall South African troops when MONUSCO obligations finish.
There has, as yet, been no word from the SADC or the three SAMIDRC countries – Malawi, Tanzania and South Africa – on what the military component of the mission will be. Also not known is, apart from advance elements going to the DRC in December, when the mission will deploy operationally, where it will be based and what forward operating bases (FOBs) it will use and what, if any, aerial assets it will have at its disposal.
Marais sees the potential loss of South African lives as a major risk for the regional bloc deployment, the length of which is also unknown.
He said the reality is the SANDF does not have the capacity to effectively pursue any anti-insurgency campaign against the M23 rebel grouping. The acronym comes from its French title Mouvement du 23 Mars and it comprises largely Tutsi fighters based in the North Kivu province of the DRC. Open source information has it M23 occupies a number of major towns, including Bunagana, Kiwanja, Kitchanga, Rubaya and Ritshuru, as well as controlling “vital roads” to the provincial capital Goma.
Marais echoes the need for proper air cover including transport raised by military experts saying the SADC “brigade” will find it difficult to operate in hostile terrain.
“Perhaps the greatest risk the SANDF faces is their adversary – M23 – has operated in eastern DRC for many years and is familiar with the terrain. Unless the intervention force, apparently led by the SANDF, is well constituted in terms of size and rapid mobility it would be at the mercy of M23 rebels adept at guerrilla tactics.
“This is precisely why MONUSCO and the East African Community Regional Force (EACRF) failed to end the M23 rebellion in eastern DRC.”
According to Thomas Mandrup, an expert in African security governance and South African military and foreign policy, the SANDF will lead the SADC intervention force. However, the SANDF is overstretched and underfunded and has been for a long time.
“There is a discrepancy between what the politicians want it to do and the resources available for this. In addition, the South African government has increasingly used the military for domestic security and policing tasks while also deploying soldiers and equipment in complex international peace missions, including combat missions in the DRC and Mozambique and ad hoc shorter international deployments,” he wrote.
“The South African National Defence Force faces a host of challenges. The politicians are seemingly unwilling to prioritise its tasks. Instead of releasing forces by closing one operation, the force is expected to handle an ever increasing number of tasks and deployments at the same time. Many of these are of a more civilian nature, such as sending out army engineers to stop the pollution of the Vaal River or protecting installations of Eskom, the power utility, without additional funding.
“The defence force has problems keeping its equipment operational and has, for instance, only one operational C-130 transport aircraft. It has only a few helicopters available for all domestic and international missions – five Oryx, out of an initial 39, and three Rooivalk, out of 11.
“Hence it will not be able to provide the much-needed air transport and air cover for offensive operations. The soldiers will have to use road transport in the DRC. But the country has very limited functional roads, making it especially difficult to operate and move around during the rainy season.
“The specialised elements and mobile elements, like the paratroops, the reconnaissance units and the Special Forces, which can be effective against groups like the M23, are overstretched to such an extent that it negatively affects their operational readiness,” Mandrup stated.
“The South African National Defence Force has reached a stage where it can no longer continue to deploy without significant additional funding and intake of recruits. The force will also have to take a critical look at its institutional structure and set-up. It has too many expensive senior officers, and too few young deployable soldiers,” he concluded. (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
10 Jan 24. Germany to resume arms deliveries to Saudi Arabia with IRIS-T missiles. Germany has approved the delivery of 150 IRIS-T air-to-air missiles to Saudi Arabia, a government spokesperson said on Wednesday, resuming arms exports to the kingdom banned since the killing of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi in 2018.
The deal was authorised by Germany’s federal security council in December, according to a document from the economy ministry seen by Reuters, confirming an earlier report by Spiegel news magazine.
The IRIS-T missiles, produced by German arms maker Diehl, are fired by Saudi Arabia’s Eurofighter jets.
The new batch which is yet to be delivered is meant to replenish Saudi stocks depleted over the past years, a security source said, adding the missiles had lately also been used to shoot down drones fired from Houthi-controlled Yemen.
In a major shift of policy, both Chancellor Olaf Scholz and Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock said this week the government in Berlin would no longer stand in the way of British plans to sell additional Eurofighters to Riyadh.
The Eurofighter project is a joint British, German, Italian and Spanish effort.
German Economy Minister Robert Habeck, currently in Saudi Arabia to discuss energy and economic cooperation, said the country had an important role to play regarding stabilisation of the Middle East, including in light of the Israel-Hamas conflict.
“Saudi Arabia is engaging in a such way that there is no escalation there,” Habeck said in comments broadcast by ntv.
“My perception is that Saudi Arabia is self-confident enough to know its role and wants to fulfil it,” he added.
In December, Baerbock strongly condemned attacks on merchant ships in the Red Sea from Houthi-controlled Yemen and thanked Riyadh for helping thwart similar attacks by shooting down drones and missiles.
Germany had banned arms exports to the kingdom following Khashoggi’s killing inside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul in October 2018. (Source: Reuters)
10 Jan 24. Russia’s procurement and use of weapons from the DPRK violates UN Security Council Resolutions: joint statement.
Joint statement by the United Kingdom, France, Japan, Malta, the Republic of Korea, Slovenia, Ukraine, and the United States. On December 30, 2023, January 2, 2024, and January 6, 2024, the Russian Federation launched several waves of devastating aerial attacks against Ukraine, killing dozens of people and injuring hundreds more. These heinous attacks were conducted, in part, using ballistic missiles and ballistic missile launchers procured from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).
The export of these weapons from the DPRK to Russia blatantly violates multiple United Nations Security Council resolutions that prohibit UN Member States from procuring arms or related materiel from the DPRK and prohibit the DPRK from exporting arms or related materiel. UN Security Council resolutions also prohibit the DPRK’s development of ballistic missile programs. These violations lead to further suffering of the Ukrainian people, support Russia’s brutal war of aggression, and undermine the global nonproliferation regime.
Each violation makes the world a much more dangerous place. And a permanent Security Council member that willingly engages in these violations demonstrates a clear exploitation of its position.
All UN Member States have the responsibility to uphold the UN Charter and to abide by Security Council resolutions. France, Japan, Malta, the Republic of Korea, Slovenia, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the United States strongly condemn the DPRK’s and Russia’s Security Council resolution violations and call upon the DPRK and Russia to immediately cease any unlawful arms transfers and faithfully implement these resolutions. We encourage all Council Members to join us in this call during the Security Council meeting today. We also urge the DPRK to abandon its unlawful nuclear and ballistic programs in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner, and to engage instead in dialogue.
Our governments have signed a joint statement condemning in the strongest possible terms these arms transfers, as well as Russia’s use of these arms against Ukraine, and we will continue to work with allies and partners to identify, expose, and counter any such arms transfers in defense of international peace and security. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)
10 Jan 24. An overarching SA defence industry strategy is desperately needed for 2024 and beyond. As South Africa enters 2024, the state of its defence industry is taking centre stage, urging the need for a comprehensive strategy to propel it forward. The nation finds itself perched on the precipice of opportunity, with four potential arms supply segments capable of generating over $1bn in revenue each.
2023 ended with two interesting references on defenceWeb. The first was on the SIPRI Top 100 defence businesses and the second that caught my eye was the parliamentary debate on the Portfolio Committee on Defence and Military Veterans and Joint Standing Committee on Defence Joint Study Tour to Germany. One of the Joint Study Tour’s focusses was studying the management of a defence industry as well as efforts to boost the defence industry’s economic contribution and potential for employment creation. The Tour was earmarked for Egypt, Türkiye and Germany. Only Germany was visited. I would have suggested South Korea from the defence industry and conscription perspectives. It is positive to note that the Committees observed the importance of a vibrant domestic defence industry, its potential economic contributions and strategic value to the state’s defence readiness.
Germany has four entities in the SIPRI Top 100 defence companies (Rheinmetall, ThyssenKrupp, Hensoldt and Diehl). Important to note is that the German government only has shareholding in Hensoldt, out of the big four local arms manufacturers. The German defence industry supports local and European defence capabilities while offering Germany the potential of full strategic independence. The German defence industry promotes innovation across multiple related dual use industries.
The SIPRI study of defence businesses provides an interesting input on newer countries with defence solution supply aspirations. Total worldwide arms related revenue was $597bn for 2022. I examined South Korea and Türkiye, which both have four companies represented on the list. South African defence industry (SADI) structure and timelines are relatively close to these countries.
The four biggest South Korean companies are all listed entities (Hanwha Aerospace, LIG Nex 1, Korea Aerospace Industries and Hyundia Rotem). The seed of most of the entities was via state support, but driven by entrepreneurial entities. Their goal is to achieve the potential of strategic independence if required, while still interacting with global partners.
Türkiye has a structure where the Turkish Armed Forces Foundation (think something similar to Denel) has a majority shareholding in Aselsan, Turkish Aerospace Industries and Roketsan. This provides the government the opportunity for guiding industry to achieve potential strategic independence, while projecting Turkish industry capabilities to gain influence. Baykar, now the largest revenue entity of the Turkish big four, is a private defence company, but has benefitted from government contractual support to prove products.
Key to both South Korea and Türkiye is that the government has realised the economic potential and strategic value of a vibrant defence industry. The figures support each of the country’s focus on Arms supply.
As recently as 2010/11, South Africa was sitting at around 0.5% of world arms production. The table above shows that the SADI has regressed in arm manufacturer status. This can be attributed to lack of implementation of a defence industry strategy. This is decreasing the SADI’s potential to guarantee strategic independence.
The upside is that the SADI has an established core capability across a wide range of arms segments. Critically, building blocks still remain in the sector. The SADI’s long term target (20-30 years) should be at least 1% of world arms supply, with a focus of being strategically independent across the majority of the modern force main equipment. South Africa needs to decide on its stance for the SADI’s investment – and quickly as it seems as though Nigeria is being courted by China and the USA for arms industry establishment on the continent. Egypt has a well established support environment that could quite easily be expanded for growth into production and design capability.
What is needed is a consolidated strategy or plan of action designed to achieve a long-term goal or overall aim. The Aerospace & Defence Masterplan is a start as it aims to uplift the country through the SADI as an apex industry. The problem is that the document is aerospace, not arms focused. The Ministry of Defence needs to take control of this plan, not Public Enterprises, for this implementation to become reality with the benefit of aligning to true strategic independence through a self-sustainable capability that is made viable through business principles.
The SADI’s goal/aim should be to see if there is a chance to: a) Provide a secure and satisfying environment for companies and employees now as well as in the future (based on the SADI, SA National Defence Force and employee passion), b) Provide satisfaction to the market now as well as in the future (provide a best in world solution that also provides element of country strategic independence), and then c) Make money now as well as in the future (understand aerospace and defence as an economic engine that can provide company as well as country benefits of employment, innovation and contribution to the tax base).
Can we find the one big thing that the SA defence industry, with inputs from the SA National Defence Force, can focus on and do better than any other entity in the world?
My input: Meeting Sub-Saharan Africa special operations forces needs. If we could crack this challenge, other developing world countries could apply these less technologically sophisticated solutions that are able to be scaled up for faster production in response to demand surges.
There has been increasing global tensions over the last fifteen years due to the unprecedentedly rapid redistribution of power from the old West to the rising Global South. There is an increasing chance of a “big war”, also the current movement of countries towards nationalism presents an interesting environment that each wants to protect sovereignty own their own. Here is an environment ripe for the supply of defence equipment.
South Africa would stand to benefit through the application of internal technical knowledge and look to product solutions that can unlock maximum semi-skilled job opportunities. This in turn stimulates nascent industries that also use these skills. Importantly, the SADI is unlocking export business, bringing much needed positive balance of payments for our own defence capability. The output could be better integration of SADI products on the continent.
The SADI, and the state, need to understand and reflect on its position in the market. The South African defence industry needs to examine the following four dimensions:
1) What is the structure of the industry? Identify the distinct segments and ask how structurally attractive are the segments. Non-commercial sovereign/strategic elements needed to be integrated with viable capability elements with the understanding that these funding needs are 100% local.
2) Analyse customer value. This means understanding the underlying needs and desired outcomes of customers, as well as the end-user (SA National Defence Force, SA Police Service, Border Management Authority, Correctional Services and Department of Forestry, Fisheries and the Environment). The government need to force through maximum commonality of main equipment across internal security elements.
3) Analyse the relative position of the SADI relative to competition. How do SADI capabilities and SADI costs compare with the competitors? Is there a mechanism for local support to cover premium element for market viability?
These first three dimensions provide input into:
4) Competitive Analysis. The competitive analysis provides a range of predictions of how the SADI thinks competitors will react to a selected “where to play” and “how to win” strategy. The SADI needs to make a country-level strategic choice based on the competitive analysis.
Here is an example of an output of the above process, using special operations forces needs that align with the other government security department requirements:
1) C5I/Electronics/Sensors/Precision Guided Munitions/Space Payloads;
2) Wheeled Armour Vehicles (manned & unmanned)/Artillery/Ammunition/Light Weapons;
3) Close Air Support (manned & unmanned)/Avionics/Utility Class Air Lift (manned & unmanned); and
4) Combat Patrol Vessels & smaller, including Unmanned Surface Vessels/Support Vessels.
There are other niche sovereign capability solutions, but these four groupings are +$1 bn segments if well-coordinated as per points 2-4 above. The SADI already has core capabilities in these areas. There are cost competitive ways of competing while offering the country strategic independence in the modern brigade main equipment elements that align with special operations forces needs.
The “how to win” element of a SADI overarching strategy is where major innovation is needed. The funding model (acquisition & operation support) is what most will highlight as a challenge. Funding at an industry level is a current SADI Achilles Heel. In order to compete, production costs may need to be amortised over longer periods. Independent security department main equipment acquisition budgets need to be grouped. Countries with the capability for direct acquisition have started establishing local capabilities, or are looking at such endeavours.
I understand that government would like the state to be the leader in this and can reference Türkiye. The South African state does not have the financial muscle (or desire) to drive the SADI to reach its full potential. The German and South Korean limited ownership model provides a more viable option.
Private Funding Mechanisms may be available if the state and SADI can agree on a coherent policy solution. The return of the Strategic Defence Account is needed for long term prime mission equipment solutions, but expanded to also cover main equipment for other security departments (SA Police Service, Border Management Authority, Correctional Services and Department of Forestry, Fisheries and the Environment).
If the state indicated that a long term capability contract was available, there is a possibility that the total contract value for 20-30 years can be secured with a diversified funding solution. An option could be for four strategic segment funds being established. The state would not be the owner of the fund. I would suggest the state provides minor investment through entities like the Industrial Development Corporation and Development Bank of Southern Africa in order to generate returns in addition to tax windfall. The funding could be a blend of local pension funds and international funding entities (an example could be the BRICS Bank). The local contract is then delivered, but total contract values can be used to fund export production to grow the SADI as a whole. The country wins.
SADI members that agree to be part of the sector elements could then tap into the fund for National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC) approved foreign contracts manufacturing component funds. The rules could be for local build at least 50%, and then the supply contract needs to include a capability support contract for the first use period (suggest 15 years up to mid life upgrade).
The above shows why the Defence Industry Lekgotla should be concluded before the publication of the Revised Level of Defence Ambition. I fear that the Revised Level of Defence Ambition document is going to present defence industry business solutions by people that really do not understand “playing to win”. Keep in mind that Armscor and Denel have not been shining lights as to what makes a profitable business.
As a final point, the output document cannot be another over 100 page document. Business Executives really cannot afford to wade through such an output. The output document should be the agreed solution only, maximum 40 pages.
Written by James Kerr, Orion Consulting CC, which provides Market Entry Strategy and Bid & Proposal services to the Aerospace & Defence related industry and assists international SME mission system product suppliers to gain traction in South Africa. (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
10 Jan 24. Russia to Focus on Provisioning of Troops. Russia maintains strategic initiative in Ukraine and will focus on all-round provisioning of its forces, Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu said at a conference call with top military brass. He stressed Russia would keep its nuclear triad at a high combat readiness level, develop drone production, introduce new weapons and increase the capabilities of the satellite grouping.
Ukraine operation
In 2023, Ukraine lost over 215,000 troops and 28,000 pieces of equipment. The Kiev regime follows US instructions and does not spare its men on the battlefield. “Despite the exhaustion of the human resource and the absence of results on the battlefield, the US cold-bloodedly tries to implement its ambitions for global leadership at the expense of Ukrainian lives. Upon the instructions of western sponsors, the Kiev regime continues to send its soldiers to slaughter and looks for every possibility to replenish the Ukrainian army. Naturally, it will not change the situation on the line of contact, but will only drag the military conflict,” the minister said.
We retain the strategic initiative along the entire line of contact. We will continue to consistently achieve the goals of the special military operation,” Shoigu said.
New weapons
A key 2024 task is to maintain the nuclear triad at the highest combat readiness level, the minister said.
“We will also focus our efforts on the comprehensive provisioning of troops participating in the special military operation. We will continue to equip the Army and the Navy with the latest cutting-edge weapons, including those based on artificial intelligence technologies and new physical principles,” he said.
“In particular, we will launch the serial production of unmanned aerial vehicles, from ultra-small drones to heavy attack ones,” he specified.
“Our immediate plans include improving communications systems, raising the efficiency of the use of the latest means of reconnaissance, target acquisition and counter-battery warfare and boosting the capabilities of our air defense systems and fleet of satellites,” Shoigu said.
Training
The Russian military continues studying Ukrainian combat experience and engaging instructors with a combat record. “We shall keep streamlining the forms and methods of the engagement of forces, updating the provisions of combat documents, charters and instructions,” Shoigu said.
Social guarantees
All participants in the special military operation and their family members should enjoy equal social guarantees. “It refers to the status of a war veteran, the payment of envisaged bonuses, housing acquisition and medical services, including rehabilitation and spa treatment,” the minister said. (Source: https://www.defense-aerospace.com/TASS)
10 Jan 24. Sub-Saharan Africa most conflict-affected region globally – IISS. Sub-Saharan Africa was the most conflict-affected region globally in 2023, with over half a dozen conflict regions, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ 2023 Armed Conflict Survey.
The region continued this unfortunate status with conflict concentrated in four adjacent theatres – the Sahel, the Lake Chad Basin, the Great Lakes Region and East Africa, the respected think tank reported. Other conflict areas are the Central African Republic (CAR) and Mozambique. “Most conflicts, the survey has it, “have internal, regional and international elements” contributing to “their intractability”.
What IISS terms “notable developments” last year were reported from six countries. They are Sudan, Ethiopia, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Mali and the Sahel. These include the breakout of conflict in Sudan between the Sudan Armed Forces and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in April 2023, which engulfed Khartoum, other urban centres and peripheral regions, with critical regional implications; the end of the two-year civil war in Ethiopia with the signing of a peace agreement between the Ethiopian government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front in November 2022; the re-ignition of inter-state tensions between the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda; the end of France’s Operation Barkhane and its pull-out from Mali and Burkina Faso; and the announced withdrawal of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali, amid a wider drift towards military authoritarianism across the Sahel (with Niger being the latest country experiencing a military coup).
Overall levels of violence in sub-Saharan Africa were “broadly unchanged” with jihadist violence “markedly increased, especially in Somalia and the Sahel”.
“Jihadist groups in the region have been evolving, becoming much more localised and intertwined with community and ethnic conflicts. Their international ties to the Islamic State (ISIS) and al-Qaeda have weakened and connections between insurgent groups now appear to be limited to intra-regional collaborations,” according to the survey.
As for North Africa, the IISS found the conflict in Libya remained at a stalemate, with the country divided between competing governments, while Egypt saw a decrease in fighting.
The spike in food prices has compounded the region’s extreme climate-change vulnerability to create a major food-insecurity crisis, especially for import-dependent countries, notably in North Africa. The region’s ability to tackle these multiple crises will have important implications for regional security dynamics as well as global energy security, the IISS warned.
Global conflict intensity on the rise
Globally, the IISS Armed Conflict Survey 2023 found the intensity of armed conflicts is on the rise, marked by a 28% rise in violent events and a 14% increase in related fatalities.
These trends are reinforced by the growing clout of non-state armed groups (NSAGs) as conflict parties and political actors against a backdrop of declining state legitimacy and reach. According to ICRC estimates, 200 m people live in areas controlled to different degrees by these actors across the world. NSAGs are also becoming more globalised amid international support from third party states and other NSAGs, and increasingly regional and/or global presence, networks, and operations.
These factors have led to a rise in the intensity of global armed conflicts, making conflicts such as the one in Ukraine more protracted in nature. The intractability trend is mirrored in an increasing length of conflicts, presently estimated at around 30 years on average as compared to under 20 in early 1990s, according to the IISS.
The influence of non-Western powers, including Russia, China, Iran, the Gulf countries and Turkey, add to an ongoing trend of democratic backsliding tied to diminishing Western clout, and drive geopolitical fragmentation in the Global South.
The increasing number of conflicts have strained international funding and resources to address the mounting humanitarian crises and development issues, the IISS reported.
Looking forward, the IISS noted that the diplomatic deadlock and military stalemate in Ukraine point to a potentially protracted conflict. “The feasibility and sustainability of the country’s reconstruction will be inextricably linked to Kyiv obtaining security guarantees that ensure Ukraine’s future territorial integrity against external aggression.”
The ongoing war between Israel and Hamas in Gaza, triggered by Hamas’ attacks on 7 October 2023, “represents one of the most acute phases of the Israel/Palestinian Territories since its inception,” according to the IISS. “Tensions and fighting had already intensified in the period under review, notably in the West Bank, against a backdrop of iron-fist policies in the Territories and following a controversial judicial reform by Israel’s extreme right government which has stoked increased social and political polarization.” (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
10 Jan 24. UK plans to deploy Spearhead Carrier Strike Group to Indian Ocean Region in 2025. The UK and India have today vowed to continue strengthening ties during the first visit of an Indian Defence Minister to the UK in more than 20 years.
Secretary of State, Grant Shapps and the Honourable Raksha Mantri Shri Rajnath Singh.
- Plans to send UK’s high-readiness Littoral Response Group to Indian ocean region in 2024 and the Carrier Strike Group in 2025 for joint training. Both will visit and operate with Indian forces.
- Deployment of the UK’s most advanced naval capabilities mark a decisive step in bolstering UK-India security ties.
- Partnership stepped up as Indian Defence Minister makes his first visit to the UK.
The UK and India have today [Wednesday 10 January] vowed to continue strengthening ties during the first visit of an Indian Defence Minister to the UK in more than 20 years.
In a move that signals the growing importance of the strategic relationship between the UK and India, Defence Secretary Grant Shapps welcomed the Honourable Raksha Mantri Shri Rajnath Singh to the UK to agree unprecedented levels of UK-India defence cooperation.
The Defence Secretary announced the UK’s plans to send its Littoral Response Group to Indian Ocean Region later this year, with plans for the Carrier Strike Group to visit in 2025. Both will operate and train with Indian forces.
The two nations also discussed future cooperation in defence from joint exercises to knowledge sharing and instructor exchanges. These steps build on the comprehensive strategic partnership envisaged in the 2030 India-UK roadmap, announced in 2021.
In the coming years, the UK and India will also embark on more complex exercises between their respective militaries, building up to a landmark joint exercise to be conducted before the end of 2030, supporting shared goals of protecting critical trade routes and upholding the international rules-based system.
Defence Secretary, Grant Shapps, said: “There is absolutely no question that the world is becoming increasingly contested, so it’s vital that we continue to build on our strategic relationships with key partners like India. Together we share the same security challenges and are steadfast on our commitment to maintaining a free and prosperous Indo-Pacific. It is clear that this relationship is going from strength-to-strength, but we must continue to work hand-in-hand to uphold global security in light of threats and challenges that seek to destabilise and damage us. Collaboration with industry is also key in the strategic defence partnership between the UK and India, with the two nations working together on electric propulsion systems that will power our future fleets and cooperating on the development of complex weapons.”
Building on the existing strategic partnership, during the visit the UK and India also confirmed several new joint initiatives. These include:
- Launching Defence Partnership-India – a bespoke office designed to further defence collaboration between the two countries.
- A commitment to several instructor exchanges between our world-leading Officer Training Colleges and specialist schools, alongside signing of a Youth Exchange MOU to solidify the already strong relationship between our cadet organisations.
- Signing a Letter of Arrangement that will enable further emphasis to be placed on research and development between our two nations, focused on next-generation capabilities.
- Solidifying an agreement on logistics exchange, allowing for the provision of logistic support, supplies and services between the United Kingdom and Indian Armed Forces, for joint training, joint exercises, authorised port visits and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) operations. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)
09 Jan 24. Timing of China’s sanctions for US-Taiwan defence sales “absolutely significant.”
China said US arms sales to Taiwan were in “blatant violation of the one-China principle” ahead of Taiwan’s crucial Saturday elections.
China has announced sanctions on five defence firms over weapons sales to Taiwan, as Beijing ramps up efforts to disrupt US influence over the island ahead of Taiwan’s elections on 13 January.
Weapons sales from Washington to Taipei are a frequent source of tension between the US and China, which views self-governed Taiwan as its own territory.
The Chinese Foreign Ministry’s statement warned the US to “stop arming Taiwan and stop targeting China with illegal unilateral sanctions”, an unequivocal escalation of the US-China trade war.
It also claimed US weapons sales were in “blatant violation of the one-China principle”.
The five companies named were BAE Systems Land and Armament, Alliant Techsystems Operation, AeroVironment, ViaSat and Data Link Solutions.
“A choice between peace or war”
These latest sanctions, which follow the US State Department’s approval of a $300m sale for tactical information equipment to Taiwan in December, aim to bolster China’s Taiwan reunification strategy.
Announced less than a week before Taiwan’s upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections, the timing of China’s sanctions is “absolutely significant”, according to Wilson Jones, Defence Analyst at GlobalData.
“Observers in Taiwan, China and the rest of the world see this election as essential, as the winner will significantly affect cross-strait politics,” Jones told Army Technology.
Military drills have become increasingly commonplace across the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea in the past few months.
With former President Ma Ying-jeou describing the upcoming elections as a “choice between peace or war”, Chinese reunification is the leading issue for many Taiwanese voters heading to the polls this weekend.
Party politics
Ying-jeou was leader of the centre-right Kuomintang (KMT) party which ruled Taiwan as a dictatorial one-party state until the 1990s and negotiated the one-China policy.
Meanwhile, the incumbent centre-left Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has rejected the one-China principle throughout President Tsai Ing-wen’s eight-year rule.
Ing-wen remained relatively moderate on the China question, but will not stand in the 2024 elections, having completed her second term.
While the KMT and DPP are the two largest parties, the newly formed Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) will also appear on the ballot.
“The DPP promotes Taiwan’s distinct identity from China, but has a mixed position on independence, with some members fully calling for it and some opposing”, Jones added. “The TPP, which wants to break this two-party system, strongly favours independence”.
Whether the current economic warfare being waged by the US and China escalates in the aftermath of Taiwan’s elections remains to be seen.
Strong words have been exchanged in recent weeks. Chinese President Xi Jinping reiterated his belief that Taiwan will “surely be reunified” with China in his annual New Year’s Eve address.
Three days later, Taiwanese Foreign Minister Joseph Wu claimed it is an “established fact that Taiwan is a test ground for China’s ambitions to exert its malign influence abroad” in a column for The Economist.
All eyes now turn to Taiwan. Saturday’s elections may involve a population of just 23.5m people, but the outsized ramifications look set to make waves from the South China Sea across the Pacific. (Source: army-technology.com)
09 Jan 24. Kenya faces defence investment challenges amid spending crunch. With military expenditure at low levels, Kenya is likely to struggle to attract foreign defence investment, according to GlobalData analysis.
Despite being one of East Africa’s economic leaders, Kenya’s military expenditure remains persistently low, with the country’s defence budget witnessing a negative compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 0.5% from 2019 to 2023, according to GlobalData analysis.
Kenya’s defence spending amounted to $1.14bn in 2019, which decreased to $1.12bn by 2023, despite the country’s military requirements appearing to point towards a need to increase expenditure to meet the challenges posed by the Al Shabaab movement in neighbouring Somalia and other internal threats, as well as participation in internal peacekeeping missions.
Defence spending was forecast to increase slightly from 2023-2028, rising at a CAGR of 1.4% to reach $1.19bn.
According to GlobalData, Kenya’s small defence budget “will act as an obstacle to foreign investors” and with the budget not forecast to increase significantly in the coming years, defence companies are likely to persist with such sentiments in the near term.
Earning potential of UN peacekeeping participation
Kenya earns considerable sums from its military’s participation in UN peacekeeping missions, first joining the UN Iran–Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) from 1988-1990.
According to Kenya’s Ministry of Defence, since then the country’s military has deployed troop contingents to the UN Transition Assistant Group in Namibia, the UN Protection Force in Croatia, the two UN missions in Liberia (UNOMIL and UNMIL), the UN Mission in Sierra Leone, the UN Interim Force in Lebanon, the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the UN–African Union Mission in Darfur, and the UN Mission in South Sudan.
United Nations figures from 2019 indicate that countries volunteering uniformed personnel to peacekeeping operations are reimbursed by the UN at a standard rate, approved by the General Assembly, of $1,428 per soldier per month. (Source: army-technology.com)
08 Jan 24. China Sanctions Five US Defense Companies. China announced sanctions Sunday on five American defense-related companies in response to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and U.S sanctions on Chinese companies and individuals.
The sanctions will freeze any property the companies have in China and prohibit organizations and individuals in China from doing business with them, the Foreign Ministry said in a statement posted online.
It was unclear what impact, if any, the sanctions would have on the companies, BAE Systems Land and Armaments, Alliant Techsystems Operations, AeroVironment, ViaSat and Data Link Solutions. Such sanctions are often mostly symbolic as American defense contractors generally don’t sell to China.
The Foreign Ministry said the U.S. moves harmed China’s sovereignty and security interests, undermined peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and violated the rights and interests of Chinese companies and individuals.
“The Chinese government remains unwavering in our resolve to safeguard national sovereignty, security and territorial integrity and protect the lawful rights and interests of Chinese companies and citizens,” the ministry statement said.
The announcement was made less than a week ahead of a presidential election in Taiwan that is being contested in large part over how the government should manage its relationship with China, which claims the self-governing island as its territory and says it must come under its rule.
The Chinese Foreign Ministry did not specify which arms deal or which U.S. sanctions China was responding to, though spokesperson Wang Wenbin had warned three weeks ago that China would take countermeasures following the U.S. government’s approval of a $300m military package for Taiwan in December.
The deal includes equipment, training and equipment repair to maintain Taiwan’s command, control and military communications capabilities.
The U.S. said the sale would support the modernization of Taiwan’s armed forces and the maintenance of a credible defense. “The proposed sale will improve the recipient’s capability to meet current and future threats by enhancing operational readiness,” a news release from the Pentagon’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency said.
Taiwan is a major flashpoint in U.S.-China relations that analysts worry could explode into military conflict between the two powers. China says that U.S. arms sales to Taiwan are interference in its domestic affairs.
The Chinese military regularly sends fighter planes and ships into and over the waters around Taiwan, in part to deter the island’s government from declaring formal independence. An invasion doesn’t appear imminent, but the constant military activity serves as a reminder that the threat is ever-present.
The U.S. switched diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China in 1979, but it is bound by its own laws to ensure that Taiwan has the ability to defend itself. America and its allies sail warships through the Taiwan Strait, a 160-kilometer-wide waterway that separates the island from China. (Source: https://www.defense-aerospace.com/ Voice of America News;)
08 Jan 24. Agaléga, India’s semi-secret Indian Ocean naval base.
India has been quietly turning an Indian Ocean tropical island into a strategic naval outpost.
The Indian Ocean island is one of two Agaléga islands that fall under the sovereignty of Mauritius. Without fanfare India has been building a naval base in order to better extend its influence over the western side of the ocean that bears its name.
It follows an approach India made to the Seychelles some years back, which fell through leaving India exposed in the face of a growing Chinese presence in the region. China has established a naval base at the port of Djibouti in the Gulf of Aden (GoA), giving it a meaningful influence over the Red Sea and Gulfs of Aden and Oman.
China also maintains constant naval patrols in the north-west Indian Ocean and GoA. This it says is to safeguard Chinese merchant shipping in a potentially dangerous region.
India, meanwhile, has developed strong relationships with Mauritius, which lies further to the south and straddling another of the major shipping lanes.
The Agaléga islands, in between these two regions, are sparsely populated, not visited by tourists or industry and leaving the 300 or so permanent inhabitants largely dependent on coconut farming and fishing.
Before the arrival of the Indian Navy, the islands possessed a jetty for fishing boats and a small airfield more for emergency purposes than anything else. In 2021 the Indians arrived and began building a 3 000-metre runway and airfield capable of taking large military aircraft, including the Boeing P-8I surveillance and other anti-submarine warfare aircraft of the Indian Armed Forces.
Roughly 50 Indian military personnel were initially stationed on the island, which is taking on the appearance of a permanent forward base with satellite evidence showing the construction of two jetties extending from the island.
India, which sees the Indian Ocean as its own backyard, has long had concerns with any Chinese incursion into the area. India placed considerable pressure on Sri Lanka when its close neighbour allowed China to firstly develop a new deepwater seaport facility at Hambantota, and then leased it to that country for 99 years.
One of the stipulations placed by India on Sri Lanka was that no Chinese naval vessel should be allowed to use the new port. When the Chinese surveillance vessel Yang Wang 5 docked in Hambantota in August 2022, alarm bells rang in both India and the US and protests were made to Sri Lankan officials.
Sri Lanka lost control of the new port through indebtedness, with a Chinese company taking over the port in lieu of debt. Sri Lanka’s situation is not unique, other nations on the surrounds of the Indian Ocean and, for that matter, those facing the South Atlantic, face similar challenges arising from China’s Belt and Road Initiative which inevitably results in heavy debts owed to China.
India, no doubt, remains strongly conscious of this and the increasing likelihood of additional Chinese presence in both oceans. The South Atlantic may not be its concern, but the Indian Ocean certainly is.
Why should China be interested in developing additional naval presences on either side of sub-Saharan Africa? From where else can it so easily to project power and influence towards both Europe, the Middle East and the Americas!
Though the Indian presence on Agaléga in no way resembles that of the well-established US military presence on Diego Garcia further east (the Chagos Archipelago, an area claimed by Mauritius, it should be remembered), it is early days and facilities at the Agaléga island may well develop further in the coming few years.
India’s Foreign Minister, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, hinted at this when he addressed the Council on Foreign Relations, an American think tank. “From an Indian point of view, I would say it’s very reasonable for us to try and prepare for greater Chinese presence than we have seen before,” he mentioned.
Jaishankar added that concerns were not only confined to China. “If you look at maritime threats, piracy, smuggling or terrorism, if there is no authority, no monitoring, no force out there to actually enforce the rule of the law, it’s a problem,” he said.
The strategic position of the Agaléga base is important for this dual role. North Agaléga lies close to the main sea lane for ships using the Suez Canal/Red Sea route to the Far East.
India is understood to have commenced aerial patrols not only over the wider region but also over the Mozambique Channel, in company with naval patrols by elements of the Indian Navy.
Apart from France, India appears to be the only other country to have an interest in patrolling the channel between Africa and Madagascar. Due to a lack of available ships, the South African Navy has shown itself inadequate for this task.
North Agaléga Island is small, with a length of just 12 kilometres and width of 1.5 kilometres. The few people living there occupy a little village known as Vingt Cinq, which in French means Twenty Five. This is believed to refer to 25 lashes, the regular number suffered as punishment by the former slaves marooned on the island.
At present, there appears to be no intent by the Indians or Mauritius to relocate the original inhabitants, as took place with those on the Chagos Archipelago.
Until recently, Agaléga was virtually cut off from the world, with a rudimentary jetty for the occasional fishing vessel and a small grass airfield barely fit for small aircraft. Now two new jetties extend into the sea towards deep water, suggesting that soon larger naval ships will be able to call.
As the power dynamics evolve in the Indian Ocean, the isolated island that few had ever heard of is taking on an increasing importance.
Written by Terry Hutson and republished with permission from Africa Ports. The original article can be found here. (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
08 Jan 24. Bangladesh: Domestic unrest risks are highly likely to persist following Hasina’s election victory. On 7 January, the incumbent Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina secured a fourth-consecutive term in office after a controversial general election. Preliminary results indicate that her ruling Awami League (AL) won at least 222 out of the 300 parliamentary seats, with independent candidates aligned with the AL winning an additional 63 seats. Although Hasina’s re-election was widely predicted, the result remains contentious, as the main opposition boycotted the election (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 5 January 2024). Amid widespread reports of election day irregularities, including accusations of ‘ballot stuffing’, at least two people were killed and three others were injured in clashes between government and opposition supporters. Amid renewed calls for anti-government campaigns by the opposition, the security forces are highly likely to suppress dissent with violence in the coming weeks, thereby elevating human rights and domestic unrest risks. In the short-to-medium term, Hasina is also likely to implement domestically unpopular economic reforms in line with an IMF agreement; these reforms will exacerbate the cost-of-living crisis, further sustaining unrest risks. (Source: Sibylline)
08 Jan 24. Russia: Approved candidates in presidential race are highly unlikely to threaten incumbent’s chances. Russia’s Central Election Commission registered two candidates, Leonid Slutsky and Vladislav Davankov, on 5 January to run in the presidential election on 15-17 March. Slutsky is the leader of Russia’s far-right Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR), while Davankov serves as the first deputy head of the centre-right New People (NL) party. In August, independent Russian media reported that the Kremlin had mostly finalised who would run against President Vladimir Putin, noting that the candidates were from three of Russia’s ‘systemic opposition’ parliamentary parties (including LDPR and NL). Although the parties are nominally independent, they are often largely supportive of the Kremlin’s major policy decisions. The Russian authorities barred independent anti-war presidential hopeful Yekaterina Duntsova from participating in the election in December 2023. As such, Davankov and Slutsky are highly unlikely to threaten the re-election of Putin or to disrupt the status quo; they were almost certainly approved for this reason. (Source: Sibylline)
08 Jan 24. Iraq: Decision to end presence of US-led coalition is unlikely to be implemented in short term. Earlier on 8 January, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudan announced that the government is setting a date for the launch of a bilateral committee to establish arrangements for the permanent end of the US-led international coalition’s deployment in Iraq. While the statement echoes similar announcements issued in previous years, the coalition’s withdrawal will highly likely be a key topic of discussion within government and parliament in the coming months, especially due to currently elevated levels of domestic pressure. However, while there is near bipartisan support from Sunni and Shia factions for ending the international coalition’s deployment, it is unlikely that there will be a complete withdrawal of US-led forces from the country in the short term. Subsequently, the political infighting and domestic unrest over this particular issue will likely persist in the coming months; we assess that future US attacks against pro-Iran paramilitary groups will act as key flashpoints. (Source: Sibylline)
09 Jan 24. Nearly R1bn worth of defence exports in third quarter of 2023. The South African defence industry exported R900m worth of military equipment, including dual-use items, in the third quarter of 2023, up slightly from the same period last year.
This is according to the National Conventional Arms Control Committee’s (NCACC’s) third quarter report, covering the period July to September. The report was presented to Parliament’s Joint Standing Committee on Defence on 23 November by NCACC Secretariat Head, Advocate Ezra Jele.
NCACC figures show that 162 export permits worth R853m were authorised to 31 countries in the third quarter. In addition, 23 permits to 11 countries worth R33m were authorised for dual use goods and technology.
This compares to 152 export permits to 41 countries authorised for munitions in the third quarter of 2022, totalling R818m. During that period, 43 export permits to 16 countries were authorised for dual-use items, totalling R137m.
Jele noted a large increase in imports for the third quarter of this year compared to last: for Q3 of 2023, the NCACC lists R3.4bn worth of import permits authorised, from 24 countries. This is up substantially from the R25m in imports from 17 countries in the same period last year.
For the first half of 2023, the NCACC approved just over R4bn worth of munitions and dual use exports, putting the total for all three quarters of the year at R4.9bn. This already exceeds 2022’s total of R4.679bn.
Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine and a consequent rise in global defence spending, South African defence exports have been steadily rising, according to NCACC figures, up from R3.353bn in 2022.
While Jele did not give a breakdown of what the 2023 export permits covered, it is likely that ammunition made up a large component, along with electronic systems. This would be in line with 2022 calendar year exports, which were dominated by ammunition (R1.6bn), bombs and rockets (R946m), and electronic equipment (R1.3bn).
Global military expenditure continued to increase last year, remaining well over the $2trn mark, to reach a new high of $2 240bn, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), indicating that South Africa’s defence exports are likely to continue growing after a period of stagnation, compounded by difficulties in securing export permits to countries in the Middle East. (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
09 Jan 24. Taiwan: Nationwide air raid alert following Chinese satellite launch points to rising regional tensions. Earlier on 9 January, mobile phone users across Taiwan received an air raid alert from the Ministry of National Defence (MND) to ‘pay attention to your safety’. The alert stated that a satellite had flown over the southern part of the island; however, the accompanying English text erroneously stated that it was a ‘missile flyover’, sparking some confusion and an apology from the MND. Taiwan’s foreign minister stated the alert was issued due to the risk of possible debris. This is the first time the authorities have issued an island-wide alert of this nature, with the opposition Kuomingtang (KMT) questioning why it was issued, given previous satellite launches had not prompted such alerts. The incident comes ahead of elections on 13 January. In recent weeks, Beijing has sought to influence the elections in favour of the KMT party through ‘grey zone’ tactics, such as flying balloons across the Taiwan Strait and launching carrier rockets in space over south-western Taiwan. There is a realistic possibility that China will deploy further aircraft, ships and satellites across the median line in the Taiwan Strait in the coming days. (Source: Sibylline)
10 Jan 24. Ecuador: Security, regional supply chain risks will escalate in coming hours amid state of emergency. On 10 January, Ecuadorian President Daniel Noboa announced a nationwide state of ‘internal armed conflict’. He also ordered the armed forces to ‘neutralise’ key criminal organisations. The announcement follows an attack against Ecuador’s TC Television station in Guayaquil (Guayas province), where hooded gunmen interrupted a live television broadcast. The attack comes amid a broader uptick in violence across Ecuador following the 7 January jailbreak of Adolfo Macias, the leader of the Los Choneros gang (one of the most powerful drug gangs in Ecuador). Noboa also announced a nationwide state of emergency, which includes a daily curfew between 2300hrs and 0500hrs (local time). The ‘internal armed conflict’ will almost certainly escalate in the next 24-48 hours; there is also an acute risk of violence during the overnight curfew. Organised and common crime risks will remain elevated, as will the risk of attacks and terrorism. Peru has also declared an emergency (including a curfew) in northern areas bordering Ecuador, elevating supply chain and regional trade risks. (Source: Sibylline)
10 Jan 24. China-US: Military talks signal intent to expand co-operation, dialogue. On 9 January, the US government stated that Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Michael Chase met with Chinese Major General Song Yanchao (the deputy director of the Central Military Commission Office) for defence policy co-ordination talks on 8-9 January. This comes after top US and Chinese military officers met at a virtual meeting in December 2023. Both sides are seeking to expand military-to-military communication after US President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping agreed to resume defence talks in November 2023. Separately, a senior Chinese government minister stated during a visit to the US on 9 January that China seeks ‘mutually beneficial’ co-operation. This points to a growing desire in Beijing to boost dialogue and co-operation with the US amid severe domestic economic issues in China. While improved dialogue is likely to reduce (slightly) the risk of unintended military escalation, there remains significant geopolitical and diplomatic tensions between the two sides. There is also a realistic possibility that a diplomatic spat, akin to the balloon incident in early 2023, will lead to either side suspending the resumed military talks. (Source: Sibylline)
11 Jan 24. Ecuador: Support for presidential decree, US aid will bolster security forces as conflict escalates. On 10 January, the National Assembly of Ecuador voted unanimously in favour of President Daniel Noboa’s Executive Decree 111, declaring a state of ‘internal armed conflict’. Furthermore, the US indicated that it will send an assistance package to Ecuador in the coming days. Meanwhile, the UN and the Organization of American States (OAS) human rights body stated that they are actively monitoring the situation. Since the imposition of the ‘State of Exception’ on 8 January (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 10 January 2024), seven police officers and 149 prison workers have been held hostage. In addition, 14 people have been killed and at least 329 others have been arrested. As a result of the deteriorating public order, various hotels, offices and businesses have closed; several neighbouring countries have also fortified their borders (Colombia has placed 200 troops at its border with Ecuador). Violence between government security forces and gangs will almost certainly continue in the short term. Transport and border crossing disruption remains highly likely. The violence will continue to pose significant operational disruption and elevated risks to bystander safety. (Source: Sibylline)
11 Jan 24. Comoros: Crackdown will mitigate risk of significant unrest amid incumbent’s likely re-election. The 14 January presidential election will likely result in the re-election of incumbent President Azali Assouman for a third consecutive term (and fourth overall). For many in the opposition, the election underlines the erosion of Comorian democratic norms; this will drive calls for a boycott. The highly contentious 2018 constitutional referendum removed the requirement for the presidency to rotate between the Comoros’ three main islands every five years; Assoumani was also permitted to remain in office until 2029. While this prompted months of unrest, it also allowed Assoumani to be re-elected in a 2019 poll which regional observers claimed lacked credibility. Assoumani has since cracked down heavily on the opposition. As such, while Assoumani’s election will likely be widely viewed as illegitimate and although there is a realistic possibility that it will act as a flashpoint for protests, prolonged and/or large-scale demonstrations are unlikely. (Source: Sibylline)
11 Jan 24. North Korea-Russia: Military co-operation will likely continue as regional tensions remain high. In an interview on 10 January with local media, South Korea’s defence minister, Shin Won-sik, claimed that North Korea will possibly provide Russia with a new type of close-range ballistic missile (CRBM) to use in the war in Ukraine. US intelligence claims that North Korea has already provided Russia with KN-23 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), which have allegedly been used to target several Ukrainian cities in recent weeks; Russia denied these allegations at a UN Security Council (UNSC) meeting on 10 January. Shin stated that Moscow is suspected of providing technological assistance to Pyongyang in return for the missiles. As part of this assistance, Russia is reportedly helping to develop North Korea’s spy satellite programme. Amid rising tensions on the Korean peninsula, further provocative North Korean weapons tests are highly likely in the coming weeks and months; Shin claims that Pyongyang will possibly seek to elevate tensions ahead of elections in both South Korea (April) and the US (November). (Source: Sibylline)
11 Jan 24. Malaysia-Singapore: Political instability in Malaysia will possibly hamper special economic zone. Earlier on 11 January, Malaysia and Singapore signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) to develop a Johor-Singapore special economic zone (SEZ) straddling the countries’ shared border. Under the MoU, Malaysia and Singapore have agreed to develop a passport-flow system, as well as a digitalised process for cargo clearance at land checkpoints and other initiatives to ease the cross-border flow of people and goods. Better connectivity between the two countries would likely boost their economic growth and trade. Malaysia and Singapore are each other’s second largest trading partners; Singapore accounted for 70% of total FDI in the manufacturing sector in Johor state (Malaysia) from January to June 2022. However, we assess that underlying political volatility in Malaysia will possibly undermine the sustainability of the SEZ (and other long-term cross-border investment initiatives in the country). While Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s unity government has a majority in parliament, we assess that its durability is fragile. (Source: Sibylline)
11 Jan 24. Venezuela-Guyana: US support to Guyana underscores sustained regional tensions. On 9 January, talks between Guyanese and US officials concluded with Guyana allowing the US to support its defence capabilities. This comes amid concerns about escalating regional tensions with Venezuela and the territorial dispute over the oil-rich Essequibo region. It was announced that the US will assist Guyana in creating a more organised and better-equipped military in the coming months. Specialised training teams will also continue to visit Guyana throughout 2024. Broadly, the Guyanese security forces will seek to modernise their defence capabilities and to bolster their cyber security efforts. The latest talks follow an agreement made in December 2023 which stipulated that neither Guyana nor Venezuela is to use military force against the other. However, disputes over Essequibo were not resolved; they remain a salient point of tension. Regional tensions will be sustained in the near term. The risk of border incursions remains moderate, though the risk of a full-scale military conflict remains low. (Source: Sibylline)
11 Jan 24. Iran: Attack against military base in Rask will likely elevate mobility disruption, arbitrary arrest risks. On 10 January, the salafist militant group Jaish ul-Adl killed one police officer in an attack against the Jangal military base near Rask (Sistan and Baluchestan province). During the three-hour clash, the militant group blocked surrounding routes leading to the base before then retreating. This is the third attack by Jaish ul-Adl against the police in the province in the last 30 days. The security forces have maintained a heightened posture in the area since mass domestic unrest in 2022. It is highly likely that they will augment their presence along major roads and squares in the coming days (particularly on 12 January during and after Friday prayers) to prevent gatherings. This will likely elevate mobility risks across the province, along with arbitrary stop-and-search and arrest risks, primarily in Rask and its outskirts. (Source: Sibylline)
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