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20 Oct 23. North Korea’s Kim vows to ‘faithfully’ fulfil agreements made with Russia’s Putin. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un expressed his resolve to fulfil agreements made at his summit last month with Russian President Vladimir Putin as he met visiting Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, state media KCNA reported on Friday.
Kim took a rare trip to Russia last month during which he invited Putin to Pyongyang and discussed military cooperation, including over North Korea’s satellite programme, and the war in Ukraine.
Kim and Lavrov discussed ways to ramp up cooperation to actively respond to regional and global issues based on “solid political and strategic trust relations,” and Lavrov conveyed Putin’s greetings to Kim, KCNA said.
Kim pledged to “work out a stable, forward-looking, far-reaching plan for the DPRK-Russia relations in the new era by faithfully implementing the agreements … and push forward with the cause of building a powerful state,” KCNA said.
He was referring to North Korea by the initials of its official name, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui and Lavrov signed a plan for exchanges in 2024-25 as they held separate talks to follow up on the summit and explore greater cooperation on the economy, culture and advanced science and technology, KCNA said.
(Source: Reuters)
19 Oct 23. DOD Releases 2023 Report on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China. The Department of Defense today released its annual report on “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China.” The congressionally mandated report serves as an authoritative assessment on military and security developments involving the PRC.
This year’s report provides a baseline assessment of the Department’s top pacing challenge and charts the continued development of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).
The report describes the PRC’s national strategy in the context of an evolving strategic environment, and outlines the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) strategic objectives driving PRC defense policy and military strategy. It also covers key developments of the PLA’s military modernization and reform, and provides insights into the PRC’s regional and global ambitions.
The report finds that in 2022, the PRC increasingly turned to the PLA as an instrument of statecraft. Throughout the year, the PLA adopted more coercive actions in the Indo-Pacific region, while accelerating its development of capabilities, including its nuclear, space, and cyberspace capabilities; deepening military ties with Russia; and strengthening its ability to project power in the Indo-Pacific region and globally. At the same time, the PRC largely denied, cancelled, and ignored recurring bilateral defense engagements, as well as DoD requests for military-to-military communication at multiple levels.
This report illustrates the importance of meeting the pacing challenge presented by the PRC’s increasingly capable military.
The full report can be found here: https://media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF
A Fact Sheet can be found here: https://media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323427/-1/-1/1/2023-CMPR-FACT-SHEET.PDF (Source: U.S. DoD)
19 Oct 23. DOD Report Details Chinese Efforts to Build Military Power.
The People’s Republic of China is continuing its efforts to overturn the international rules-based order and is building an increasingly effective military to further these aims, said a senior defense official speaking on background.
The official gave reporters a preview of the 2023 China Military Power Report that DOD delivered to Congress today. The annual report to Congress is based on the National Defense Strategy’s premise that China is the only competitor with the intent, will and capability to reshape the international order, said the official. “The 2022 National Defense Strategy identifies the PRC as increasingly capable military as the department’s top pacing challenge,” he said.
The report “charts the current course of the PRC’s national economic and military strategies, and offers insight into the strategy, its current capabilities, some of its operational activities, as well as its future modernization goals,” he said.
Communist leaders seek “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” by 2049 – the 100th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party’s takeover of the world’s largest country.
Part of this effort is China is increasing military coercion, the official said. An example of this is the increasing numbers of unsafe intercepts of U.S., allied and partner vessels and aircraft operating in international air and seaways of the Indo-Pacific region. “Between the fall of 2021 and the fall of 2023, the United States documented over 180 instances of coercive and risky air intercepts against U.S. aircraft in the region,” the official said. When allies and partners are included, this jumps to more than 300 instances.
The report also covers China’s intensifying pressure campaign against Taiwan including Chinese ballistic missile overflights of Taiwan, increased flights into Taiwan’s self-declared air defense identification zone and the large-scale simulated joint blockade and simulated joint firepower strike operations done after a visit to the island by a U.S. congressional delegation.
Additionally, China’s deepening security ties with Russia are covered. In fact, as the official was detailing the content of the report, Chinese President Xi Jinping was meeting Russian President Vladimir Putin at a ceremony marking the 10th anniversary of the Belt and Road Initiative in China. The senior defense official said China sees its emergence as a great power as tied to the alliance with Russia.
The report also looks at the continued development of the Chinese military’s nuclear, space and cyberspace capabilities. “We see the PRC continuing to quite rapidly modernize and diversify and expand its nuclear forces,” he said. “They are expanding and investing in their land, sea and air-based nuclear delivery platforms, as well as the infrastructure that’s required to support this.”
The report estimates the Chinese had more than 500 operational nuclear warheads as of May 2023. “That is on track to exceed some of our previous predictions,” he said.
China is developing new intercontinental ballistic missiles. These may also be conventionally-armed missiles. “If developed and fielded, such capabilities would allow the PRC to threaten conventional strikes against targets in the continental United States, Hawaii and Alaska,” the official said.
According to the report, Chinese leaders are seeking to modernize People’s Liberation Army capabilities in all domains of warfare.
On the land, the PLA continues to modernize its equipment and focus on combined arms and joint training, the official said. The Chinese military is still a conscript force with two intakes a year. The military is working to field long-range fires and incorporate the capability into their doctrine.
At sea, China has the world’s largest navy with a battle force of more than 370 ships and submarines. The Chinese launched their third aircraft carrier in the past year and commissioned their third amphibious assault ship.
The PLA Air Force “is rapidly catching up to western air forces,” the official said. The air force continues to build up manned and unmanned aircraft and the Chinese announced the fielding of the H-6N – its first nuclear-capable, air-to-air refueled bomber.
The Chinese military has not been involved in a shooting war since 1979 and “this actually is one of the shortcomings that the PRC highlights and a lot of their own self assessments,” the official said. “They tried to address that, I think, by attempting to make their training and their exercises more realistic, to more closely approximate … actual combat type conditions.
“I think they tried to address it as well, by learning whatever lessons they can from other countries’ involvement in military conflicts,” he continued.
Chinese military leaders carefully studied military conflicts involving U.S. forces, Russian forces and others over the years. That is one of the key sources they draw upon to better understand how they need to prepare themselves for future combat operations. “Certainly, they’re watching very closely Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine,” the official said.
The Chinese military is looking for bases overseas and looking to develop the resources needed to be a globally relevant force. They have established an overall logistics command and they are working hand-in-glove with the Belt and Road Initiative to gain access.
Finally, the report also discusses the dearth of contacts between U.S. and Chinese defense officials. “The PLA’s refusal to engage in military-to-military communications with the United States, combined with the PLA’s increasingly coercive and risky operational behavior, raises the risk of an operational incident or miscalculation spiraling into crisis or conflict,” the official said. (Source: U.S. DoD)
19 Oct 23. Sudan: RSF operations to increase control of Khartoum will likely worsen humanitarian crisis. On 18 October, the US called on the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) to cease shelling of civilian neighbourhoods in South Darfur state and Omdurman (Khartoum state). The announcement comes as the RSF consolidates its control of Khartoum state, using long-range artillery to attack the Wadi Sayidna airforce base in Omdurman and shelling nearby civilian infrastructure, including hospitals. On 5 and 6 October, the RSF seized the town of Al-Alifoun (Khartoum), situated around 18 miles (30km) east of Khartoum city, before advancing eastwards and establishing a series of military outposts in Gezira state. The RSF’s presence in Gezira state has allowed them to sever some supply routes used by the army to transport resources to Khartoum State, increasing pressure on military positions in the capital and also likely impeding humanitarian access. To increase control of this route, the RSF is advancing southwards in Gezira state, an internal displacement and humanitarian hub, further elevating threats to civilians and intensifying the humanitarian crisis. (Source: Sibylline)
19 Oct 23. Georgia: Unsuccessful impeachment will sustain intra-governmental tensions, drive polarisation. On 18 October, a motion to impeach Georgian President Salome Zurabishvili over her official visits to EU countries without governmental approval failed. At least 100 votes from 150 lawmakers were required to remove Zurabishvili from her position, though just 86 deputies voted in favour. We previously assessed that the impeachment proceedings initiated by the ruling Georgian Dream party were highly unlikely to pass (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 19 September 2023). On 17 October, Zurabishvilli vetoed amendments to a law that would ban protesters from erecting temporary structures, such as tent camps, during demonstrations, arguing that it was ‘anti-European’. The failed attempt to impeach Zurabishvili, as well as her move to veto the legislation, will highly likely sustain intra-governmental tensions in the coming months. It will also likely deepen polarisation within Georgian society, which could realistically trigger non-violent domestic unrest in the capital Tbilisi, as well as Batumi (Adjara republic). (Source: Sibylline)
19 Oct 23. Armenia-Russia: Growing tensions with Moscow will increase Russian-led destabilisation risks. On 18 October, an unnamed senior Russian official heavily criticised Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s recent speech at the EU parliament. The Russian official characterised Pashinyan’s address as ‘irresponsible and provocative, especially concerning […] Russian-Armenian relations’. He further implied that the West is trying to turn Armenia into a ‘Ukraine 3.0’ and compared Pashinyan to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. In his speech on 16 October, Pashinyan criticised Moscow, claiming that alliances with Russia failed to guarantee Armenia’s security. On 13 October, Armenia formally ratified the Rome Statute, meaning Yerevan is now required to enforce the International Criminal Court’s (ICC’s) arrest warrant against Russian President Vladimir Putin. Growing antagonism with Moscow will increase the risk of a Russian destabilisation campaign against Armenia, akin to the one staged against Moldova, as well as increase the growing threat of a Russian-backed coup attempt, particularly if Pashinyan grants major concessions to Azerbaijan to prevent another war. (Source: Sibylline)
19 Oct 23. Colombia: Clashes undermine ceasefire in Bolivar; risks of further violence, organised crime remain. On 18 October, social leaders in Santa Rosa del Sur (Bolivar department) accused EMC dissidents of intimidating residents despite a ceasefire announced between the group and government officials on 16 October. The South Bolivar Agro-Mining Federation said dissidents and ELN forces mounted roadblocks on 17 October and had kidnapped three people since 15 October, with one found dead. The incident followed clashes between EMC and Clan del Golfo fighters between 9-14 October, which led to residents’ displacement. The defence minister has ordered operations against armed groups to protect civilians in the area. However, the events underscore concerns over the ceasefire’s durability and effectiveness. Further ceasefire breaches could jeopardise talks. Despite the agreement, the risk of further clashes and organised crime is sustained in the medium term.
(Source: Sibylline)
19 Oct 23. Haiti: Kidnapping of democratic transition council head highlights security crisis. On 18 October, Anthony Virginie Saint-Pierre, the Secretary General of Haiti’s High Transition Council (HCT), was reportedly kidnapped in the capital Port-au-Prince by heavily armed men dressed as police officers. Another HCT official confirmed the abduction, which occurred amid clashes between police and the Kraze Barye gang in nearby Petion-Ville (Port-au-Prince arrondissement). The kidnapping comes amid severe instability plaguing Haiti’s security environment, driven by the influence and control of gangs. In 2022, gang violence resulted in 1,400 deaths and exacerbated the sustained humanitarian crisis. Although the UN Security Council approved a multinational security support mission, the timeframe for deployment is uncertain. In the medium term, there is a continued risk of kidnappings and incidental violence, raising bystander risks. Political assassinations, in relation to the postponed 2023 general election, cannot be ruled out. (Source: Sibylline)
18 Oct 23. Department of Defence performance declining, annual report reveals. Mainly due to funding constraints, South Africa’s Department of Defence (DoD) is missing more of its performance targets.
In a presentation to the Portfolio Committee on Defence and Military Veterans (PCDMV) earlier this month on the latest DoD annual report, for the 2022/23 financial year, the Department revealed that it only achieved 15 of 29 key performance indicators, or 52%.
This represents a notable decline in performance over the years, with a year on year comparison showing the DoD in the 2018/19 financial year achieved 69% of its targets, increasing to 73% the following year before falling to 66% in 2020/21, 67% in 2021/22 and just 52% in 2022/23.
Resource constraints were the main reason the DoD did not reach its targets in 2022/23 (42%), followed by ‘internal factors’ (29%) and ‘external factors’ (29%).
The DoD told the PCDMV that the most prominent challenges experienced during the 2022/23 financial year relate to the baseline funding reduction “which poses serious financial constraints on the ability to rapidly intervene during crises on the continent. The baseline reduction also impacts the contribution to the SDA [Strategic Defence Account], which in turn impacts on arresting the decline, by replacing and maintaining the ageing assets.”
Other challenges include the continuous compensation of employees (CoE) underfunding since the 2017/18 financial year, and legacy information technology Systems “which are not integrated and do not contribute towards good governance and accountability.”
The compensation of employees remains a thorny issue – overspending on salaries resulted in irregular expenditure of R7.398 bn from FY2017/18 to FY2020/21. The Department of Defence said it incurred a further R2.708 bn in irregular expenditure for FY2021/22, bringing the total compensation of employees-related irregular expenditure to R10.105 bn as at the end of FY2021/22.
In order to reduce the wage bill, the DoD implemented human resources cost-saving measures from April 2021. A total of 14 504 vacant posts were deactivated; a force reduction of 2 186 officials materialised through natural attrition; capped allowances resulted in a saving of R30 m; and 1 490 personnel exited by means of the Military Exit Mechanism (MEM), and Employee Initiated Severance Package (EISP) applied to Public Service Act Personnel (PSAP).
The DoD hoped to further cut personnel costs by reducing Reserve Force mandays utilised, but this did not materialise as Reserve Force members were needed to “augment military operations, execute administrative compliance tasks and to continue to effectively secure military installations.”
In the 2022/23 financial year, the SANDF exceeded its reserve force mandays allocation by 142% (2.8 m versus the target of 1.9 m).
During the 2022/23 financial year, the Department of Defence received an appropriation of R51.6 bn, a 5.75% increase on the FY2021/22 appropriation, but it spent R54.6 bn (105.8%), with this extra R2.9 bn, driven mainly by personnel costs, being flagged as unauthorised expenditure. (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
18 Oct 23. Iraq: Thwarted drone attack against US air base reflects elevated security risks. On 18 October, US forces stationed in Iraq intercepted two drones targeting al-Asad air base (Al Anbar governorate) where US troops are deployed. The air base was targeted with ballistic missiles in 2020 by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). While US officials disclosed no details regarding the drones’ origin, the attempt comes amid a heightened threat posed by Iranian-backed forces. These outfits have increased their activity in Iraq due to US support for Israel in its conflict with Hamas. The blast at al-Ahli Arab Hospital in Gaza City (Gaza) on 17 October, which Hamas has since blamed on Israel, is likely to exacerbate regional tensions and the threat of action by Iranian-backed groups. This will further elevate security risks for US assets and staff operating in Iraq in the coming week, including embassy staff. Bouts of domestic unrest are likely following the hospital blast, elevating anti-Western sentiment and security risks facing Western nationals. (Source: Sibylline)
17 Oct 23. Russian parliament makes moves against global nuclear test ban. The lower house of the Russian parliament on Tuesday gave preliminary approval to a bill revoking the ratification of a global nuclear test ban in what Moscow has described as a move to put itself on par with the United States.
The State Duma voted unanimously to rescind the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty known as the CTBT, in the first of three required readings. The final vote is scheduled for later this week.
The vote follows a statement from Russian President Vladimir Putin, who warned earlier this month that Moscow could revoke its 2000 decision to ratify the bill to “mirror” the stand taken by the United States, which has signed but not ratified the nuclear test ban.
Speaking during Tuesday’s session, Duma speaker Vyacheslav Volodin said the Russian move was a response to what he described as the United States’ “boorish attitude to performing its obligations to ensure global security.”
“They thought about themselves as hegemons, proponents of a unilateral world,” Volodin said. “Today’s decision will ring the bell for them.”
The CTBT, adopted in 1996, bans all nuclear explosions anywhere in the world, although it has never fully entered into force. In addition to the U.S., it is yet to be ratified by China, India, Pakistan, North Korea, Israel, Iran and Egypt.
There are widespread concerns that Russia could move to resume nuclear tests to try to discourage the West from continuing to offer military support to Ukraine. Many Russian hawks have spoken in favor of resumption.
Putin has noted that while some experts have talked about the need to conduct nuclear tests, he hasn’t yet formed an opinion on the issue.
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov said last week that Moscow will continue to respect the ban and will only resume nuclear tests if Washington does it first. (Source: Defense News)
17 Oct 23. Department of Defense Releases Declassified Images, Videos of Coercive and Risky PLA Operational Behavior.
The Department of Defense today released a collection of declassified images and videos depicting 15 recent cases of coercive and risky operational behavior by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) against U.S. aircraft operating lawfully in international airspace in the East and South China Sea regions. Ahead of the anticipated release of the congressionally-mandated 2023 Report on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, or “China Military Power Report (CMPR),” the images and videos published by the Department underscore key findings in the forthcoming document about an increasing trend of coercive and risky operational behavior by the PLA since the fall of 2021. Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III and other officials across the Department have previously raised their concerns about this behavior in a range of settings, including during the Secretary’s engagements in 2021 and 2022 with General Wei Fenghe, then-Minister of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), as well as the Secretary’s public remarks at the Shangri-La Dialogue in 2022 and 2023.
The declassified images and videos were captured during lawful U.S. air operations, during which PLA operators engaged in coercive and risky activities, including reckless maneuvers, close approaches at high speeds in the air, releasing objects and projectiles like flares, and other dangerous behavior.
For decades, the United States has flown, sailed, and operated in the region – safely, responsibly, and in accordance with international law. Allies and partners welcome U.S. presence in the Indo-Pacific because it advances a shared regional vision of peace and security. This common vision, which Secretary Austin described at the Shangri-La Dialogue this year, is one of respect for sovereignty; adherence to international law; belief in transparency and openness; freedom of commerce and navigation; equal rights for all states; and the resolution of disputes through peaceful dialogue – not coercion or conquest. By contrast, the PLA’s coercive and risky behavior seeks to intimidate and coerce members of the international community into giving up their rights under international law.
January 11, 2022: Images newly released by the Department capture a PLA fighter jet in the course of conducting a coercive and risky intercept against a lawfully operating U.S. asset in the South China Sea. The PLA fighter crossed in front of the U.S. aircraft at a distance of 100 yards, forcing the U.S. aircraft to fly through the PLA plane’s wake turbulence.
April 29, 2022: Images and video newly released by the Department capture a PLA fighter jet in the course of conducting a coercive and risky intercept against a lawfully operating U.S. asset in the East China Sea. Over the course of five hours, four PLA aircraft conducted this intercept, at one point reaching a distance of just 75 feet from the U.S. plane.
May 24, 2022: Images and video newly released by the Department capture a PLA fighter jet in the course of conducting a coercive and risky intercept against a lawfully operating U.S. asset in the East China Sea. The PLA fighter jet first sped toward the U.S. asset and crossed under the plane’s nose, causing the U.S. aircraft to lose visual contact of the PLA fighter. After the U.S. pilot opened some distance between the two planes, the PLA pilot re-approached at a distance of just 15 feet laterally and 10 feet below the U.S. plane.
June 8, 2022: Images newly released by the Department capture a PLA fighter jet in the course of conducting a coercive and risky intercept against a lawfully operating U.S. asset in the East China Sea. Over the course of five hours, four PLA aircraft conducted this intercept, including by approaching a distance of just 40 feet and taking pictures of the U.S. plane.
June 23, 2022: Images and video newly released by the Department capture a PLA fighter jet in the course of conducting a coercive and risky intercept against a lawfully operating U.S. asset in the South China Sea, including by approaching a distance of just 40 feet before repeatedly flying above and below the U.S. aircraft and flashing its weapons. After the U.S. operator radioed the PLA fighter jet, the PLA pilot responded using explicit language, including an expletive.
December 21, 2022: A video released by USINDOPACOM in December 2022 captures a PLA fighter jet performing an unsafe maneuver against a lawfully operating U.S. asset in the South China Sea. The PLA operator flew in front of and within 20 feet of the nose of the U.S. plane, forcing the U.S. aircraft to take evasive maneuvers to avoid a collision.
January 11, 2023: A video newly released by the Department captures a PLA fighter jet in the course of conducting a coercive and risky intercept against a lawfully operating U.S. asset in the South China Sea, including by approaching a distance of just 30 feet from the U.S. plane.
February 7, 2023: A video newly released by the Department captures a PLA fighter jet conducting a coercive and risky intercept against a lawfully operating U.S. asset in the South China Sea, including by approaching a distance of just 20 feet from the U.S. plane.
February 15, 2023: An image and video newly released by the Department capture a PLA fighter jet conducting a coercive and risky intercept against a lawfully operating U.S. asset in the South China Sea, including by approaching a distance of just 70 feet from the U.S. plane.
March 2, 2023: A video newly released by the Department captures a PLA fighter jet conducting a coercive and risky intercept against a lawfully operating U.S. asset in the East China Sea, including by approaching a distance of just 50 feet from the U.S. plane.
May 25, 2023: A video released by USINDOPACOM in May 2023 captures a PLA fighter jet conducting a coercive and risky intercept against a lawfully operating U.S. asset in the South China Sea. The PLA operator flew in front of the nose of the U.S. plane, forcing the U.S. aircraft to fly through the PLA plane’s wake turbulence.
June 11, 2023: A video newly released by the Department captures a PLA fighter jet conducting a coercive and risky intercept against a lawfully operating U.S. asset in the East China Sea, including by approaching a distance of just 25 feet from the U.S. plane.
July 12, 2023: A video newly released by the Department captures a PLA fighter jet conducting a coercive and risky intercept against a lawfully operating U.S. asset in the East China Sea, including by deploying eight flares at a distance of 900 feet from the U.S. plane.
August 10, 2023: Images newly released by the Department capture a PLA fighter jet performing a coercive and risky maneuver by closing in at a high speed to a distance of just 50 feet underneath the wing of a U.S. aircraft. The PLA operator then conducted a barrel roll around and below the U.S. aircraft, causing the U.S. pilot to perform defensive procedures to prevent a collision.
September 21, 2023: A video newly released by the Department captures a PLA fighter jet conducting a coercive and risky intercept against a lawfully operating U.S. asset in the South China Sea, including by approaching a distance of just 50 feet from the U.S. plane.
The images and videos released today depict what the Department’s forthcoming report to Congress will describe as “unsafe, unprofessional, and other behaviors that seek to impinge upon the ability of the United States and other nations to safely conduct operations where international law allows.” Additionally, the 2023 CMPR will find that “the goal of the PLA’s behavior is to pressure the United States and other nations to reduce or cease lawful operations near areas where Beijing claims territorial sovereignty.”
The United States will continue to fly, sail, and operate – safely and responsibly – wherever international law allows, and the Department continues to believe in the importance of open lines of military-to-military communication with the PLA at multiple levels, including the senior-most levels. (Source: U.S. DoD)
18 Oct 23. Militaries of RoK, Japan and US to hold first joint aerial drill. South Korea, the United States and Japan will hold a joint aerial exercise near the Korean peninsula, which would be the first time the three countries are conducting such a drill, media reports said on Wednesday. The three countries are likely to conduct the exercise on Sunday and are coordinating the locations, South Korea’s Dong-a Ilbo newspaper reported, citing a government source.
Yonhap news agency also said the drill will likely be on Sunday and involve the U.S. B-52 strategic bomber as well as fighter jets of the three countries.
A South Korean defence ministry official declined to confirm or comment on the details of the aerial exercise.
But the three countries are “expanding” three-way joint military exercises on the basis of an agreement by their leaders in August at the Camp David summit to bolster cooperation against North Korea’s threats, the official said.
The reported exercise would be the latest in a series of moves by the three countries to strengthen ties at a time of growing tensions with North Korea and China’s influence in the region.
General Kim Seung-kyum, who chairs the South’s Joint Chiefs of Staff, said at a parliamentary hearing last week that the three countries were planning to stage joint aerial drills, local media reported.
The U.S. nuclear-capable B-52 bomber, which is currently deployed in South Korea, made a rare flyover at a South Korean defence exhibition on Tuesday.
In a further sign of growing trilateral security cooperation, South Korea, the United States and Japan have completed work on a three-way communications hotline, Yonhap news agency reported on Tuesday, citing a senior Seoul official. (Source: Reuters)
17 Oct 23. US envoy calls alleged North Korea, Russia weapons delivery dangerous. Relations between North Korea and Russia were “very worrying,” the U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Sung Kim said on Tuesday, after the White House said last week Pyongyang recently provided Russia a shipment of weapons.
The weapons deliveries between the two countries were “dangerous” and “destabilising,” Kim told reporters after meeting his South Korean and Japanese counterparts in Jakarta, and reaffirmed U.S. commitment to protecting its allies.
“At the same time we will continue our work to counter the DPRK’s unlawful WMD (weapons of mass destruction) and ballistic missiles,” Kim told a briefing, referring to North Korea by the acronym for its official name, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
The meeting took place days after the United States said the North provided Russia with a large shipment of weapons, which it said raised concerns and indicated an expanded military relationship between the two countries.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un made a rare trip to Russia to meet President Vladimir Putin last month, fanning concerns they could shore up Russia’s military in Ukraine while North Korea obtained missile technology banned under U.N. resolutions.
Russia’s foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, will visit North Korea this week, according to North Korea’s state media KCNA and Russia’s foreign ministry.
“Kim Jong Un is continuing with his nuclear obsession by sacrificing people’s livelihood and violating their human rights,” Kim Gunn, South Korea’s nuclear envoy, said, condemning the alleged military cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang as a “blatant” violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions.
In a further sign of a growing trilateral security cooperation, South Korea, the United States and Japan have completed work on a three-way communications hotline, Yonhap news agency reported on Tuesday citing a senior Seoul official.
South Korea’s foreign ministry did not immediately confirm the report about the hotline being ready.
On Tuesday, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol pledged to boost the defence industry as he addressed the opening of the country’s largest-ever defence exhibition, which included a rare flyover by a U.S. nuclear-capable B-52 strategic bomber.
Pyongyang has repeatedly criticised the United States over the deployment of strategic assets in the region, including the recent arrival of a U.S. aircraft carrier, calling it a provocation. (Source: Reuters)
17 Oct 23. North Korea accuses US of stoking tension with ‘nuclear supremacy.’ North Korea’s nuclear programme is a self-defensive move to head off a nuclear war in the face of the U.S. pursuit of “nuclear supremacy,” state media KCNA said on Tuesday.
Kim Kwang Myong, whom KCNA described as a researcher at the Foreign Ministry’s Institute for Disarmament and Peace, accused the U.S. of stoking regional tension with its nuclear programme and blamed it for strategic instability destroying world peace.
The comments come as nuclear-armed North Korea has raised alarm in the region with regular launches of missiles, including intercontinental ballistic missiles that can strike the continental United States.
Kim singled out the recent findings by the U.S. Strategic Posture Commission calling for enhancing the country’s nuclear weapons modernisation programme in preparation for potential simultaneous wars with Russia and China, as yet another “extremely risky” sign and a “hegemonic move”.
“The U.S., the world’s biggest nuclear weapons state and the world’s first nuclear user which adopted the preemptive nuclear attack on other countries as its national policy, is talking about ‘nuclear threat’ from someone. This is a sophism,” Kim said.
Kim said Washington was seeking to improve its preemptive nuclear strike capability against North Korea by building a missile defence system, while sending strategic assets to the region and “ultra-modern military hardware” to its allies.
“The reality urgently requires the DPRK, which is standing in confrontation with the U.S. imperialism, the most aggressive nuclear war criminal force, to bolster up its self-defensive military capabilities for deterring a nuclear war,” Kim said.
DPRK, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, is North Korea’s official name.
In another KCNA article, Kim Tong Myong, a researcher of the Society for International Politics Study, criticised NATO’s annual nuclear exercises, called “Steadfast Noon”, which kicked off on Monday to practise the use of U.S. bombs based in Europe.
“The reality goes to prove once again that the dark clouds of a dreadful thermonuclear war can never be wiped out as long as the U.S., a heinous nuclear war killer which regards nukes as the key for its hegemonic foreign policy, exists,” Kim said. (Source: Reuters)
17 Oct 23. Colombia: EMC agree to ceasefire; risk of attacks by dissident groups remains high. On 16 October, the Colombian government and the ex-FARC dissident group Estado Mayor Central (EMC) signed a three-month ceasefire and formally began peace talks in Tibu (Norte de Santander department). The agreement supports President Gustavo Petro’s total peace strategy, which includes negotiations with armed groups ahead of the regional elections on 29 October. Under the deal, attacks on civilians will cease and monitors will verify compliance, possibly undertaken by UN personnel. The EMC, which includes an estimated 3,500 members, is Colombia’s third-largest armed group after rejecting the 2016 FARC peace accord. Verification zones were designated in Narino, Cauca, Guaviare, Bolívar and Norte de Santander departments. However, the EMC’s decentralised structure raises concerns over the durability of the truce. The ceasefire signifies initial progress in quelling violence. However, the risk of organised and violent crime will continue in Colombia in the medium term, particularly if EMC members or dissident units violate the ceasefire agreement. (Source: Sibylline)
17 Oct 23. Mali: Attempts to secure MINUSMA camps will elevate attack threats, risks for NGOs in northern Mali. On 16 October, the UN mission in Mali (MINUSMA) confirmed it has begun to withdraw from two military camps, Tessalit and Aguelhok, in the northern Kidal region. The Kidal region is largely under the control of the Tuareg separatist group ‘Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad’ (CMA). The CMA has repeatedly contested efforts by the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) to occupy MINUSMA bases in northern Mali. On 2 October, FAMa launched a large convoy towards the Kidal region in preparation for MINUSMA’s withdrawal. However, under heavy pressure from CMA, progress has been limited. This has forced FAMa to rely on airlifting its forces to Tessalit. The deployment remains vulnerable to encirclement. This will increase the risk of an escalation in the coming weeks, as FAMa attempts to secure supply lines and the MINUSMA base in Kidal city. Perceived local support for the CMA will significantly elevate the threat of violence against civilian communities, increasing bystander risks for NGO staff in northern Mali. (Source: Sibylline)
17 Oct 23. Fiji-Australia: Growing security co-operation points to competing influence in South Pacific region. On 17 October, Fjian Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka stated that Fiji and Australia should co-operate further in intelligence sharing and cyber security, as well as security and law enforcement operations, in a meeting with the Australian defence minister in Canberra. In 2022, Fiji signed a Status of Forces agreement with Australia, which allows for the presence of Australia’s military in Fiji, and vice versa. Rabuka, who was elected in December 2022, also confirmed that a controversial policing agreement with China remains ‘on hold’ due to differences in their systems. The developments signal Australia’s continued efforts to sustain influence in the strategically important South Pacific region amid challenges from China. Increased co-operation will possibly also help to mitigate the issue of transnational crime organisations using the South Pacific, including Fiji, as a transshipment location and a hub for drug trafficking. (Source: Sibylline)
17 Oct 23. Moldova-EU: Phased EU accession is unlikely in medium term due to territorial dispute. On 16 October, Moldovan President Maia Sandu stated that she believes there will be a ‘geopolitical’ opportunity to resolve the frozen conflict with the Russia-backed breakaway Transnistria region in the coming years. Sandu announced that while Moldovan officials would prefer that the country becomes an EU member, its phased accession into the bloc should be considered. The Moldovan president proposed that the territory controlled by the central government in Chișinău could be admitted before the Russian-backed Transnistrian breakaway region. On 1 June, the EU’s foreign policy chief Josep Borrell signalled that Moldova’s path towards membership is not impeded by Transnistria. Borrell noted that Cyprus joined the EU despite having a ‘territorial dispute’ with Turkey, claiming that Moldova can do the same. However, the bloc will likely face significant internal opposition to admit Moldovan territory in phases as this would possibly set a precedent for other countries, namely Georgia and Ukraine, and provide pro-Russia separatists leverage within EU decision making bodies. (Source: Sibylline)
17 Oct 23. Colombia: EMC agree to ceasefire; risk of attacks by dissident groups remains high. On 16 October, the Colombian government and the ex-FARC dissident group Estado Mayor Central (EMC) signed a three-month ceasefire and formally began peace talks in Tibu (Norte de Santander department). The agreement supports President Gustavo Petro’s total peace strategy, which includes negotiations with armed groups ahead of the regional elections on 29 October. Under the deal, attacks on civilians will cease and monitors will verify compliance, possibly undertaken by UN personnel. The EMC, which includes an estimated 3,500 members, is Colombia’s third-largest armed group after rejecting the 2016 FARC peace accord. Verification zones were designated in Narino, Cauca, Guaviare, Bolívar and Norte de Santander departments. However, the EMC’s decentralised structure raises concerns over the durability of the truce. The ceasefire signifies initial progress in quelling violence. However, the risk of organised and violent crime will continue in Colombia in the medium term, particularly if EMC members or dissident units violate the ceasefire agreement. (Source: Sibylline)
17 Oct 23. Syria: Elevated tensions between IRGC affiliates, US-led coalition will increase security risks. On 16 October, militias affiliated with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) withdrew from Al-Bokamal (Deir ez-Zor governorate, Syria) due to alleged indications of an upcoming attack by US-affiliated forces. This comes after the IRGC reportedly met with leaders of local Arab tribes to plan strikes against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the wider US-led coalition fighting Islamic State (IS) militants in the area, including at the Al-Omar oil field. Iranian plans to target US-affiliated/-led forces in Syria underscore the sustained spill-over risks of the Israel-Hamas conflict. Increasing tensions and likely tit-for-tat confrontations between US- and Iran-affiliated forces in Deir ez-Zor will likely continue in the coming weeks, elevating security risks in the area. Iran will also likely attempt to divert the attention of US forces away from Israel and exert pressure to prevent a US intervention in the ongoing Israel-Hamas conflict. As such, a significant intensification in the Israel-Hamas conflict will likely also result in an uptick in attacks targeting US-affiliated sites in Syria. (Source: Sibylline)
16 Oct 23. Armenia-Azerbaijan: Forced implementation of land corridor will drive conflict risk in coming months. Politico reported on 13 October that US Secretary of State Antony Blinken warned a small group of lawmakers that Azerbaijan will possibly invade southern Armenia in the coming weeks. This likely refers to the Zangezur Corridor that aims to connect the Azerbaijani Nakhchivan exclave to Azerbaijan through Armenian territory. However, US State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller has denied the report. Also on 13 October, Russian President Vladimir Putin said a peace deal between Baku and Yerevan is achievable if both sides show ‘goodwill’. As Azerbaijan has previously implied that it could realise the Zangezur Corridor using force, this remains a realistic possibility in the coming months (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 6 October 2023). While negotiations are set to continue, it remains unclear if Baku will opt to open up the corridor via military force or whether Yerevan will concede, sustaining the risk of a resumption of fighting in the coming months. (Source: Sibylline)
16 Oct 23. Philippines: Heightened security posture amid Israel conflict does not point to elevated threat. On 13 October, Gilbert Teodoro, the secretary of national defense, claimed that the security forces have been placed on high alert due to the potential threat from ‘ISIS spinoffs’ in the wake of the Israel-Hamas conflict. However, Teodoro did not state whether there had been any specific intelligence warning of militant activity from ISIS-affiliated groups. Meanwhile, the authorities are also working to designate Hamas as a terrorist organisation, highlighting Manila’s friendly relations with Israel. Islamist militant groups, such as Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) or Dawlah Islamiyah, are predominantly based in the southern Mindanao region and typically target the security forces, as well as Christian religious sites. However, their capacity has been reduced by sustained pressure from the security forces in recent years, leading to a significant number of surrenders. Consequently, their ability to carry out sophisticated attacks against urban populations, particularly outside Mindanao, remains limited. (Source: Sibylline)
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