NEWS IN BRIEF – REST OF THE WORLD

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08 Oct 23. Statement From Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III on U.S. Force Posture Changes in the Middle East. My thoughts continue to be with the people of Israel and the many families who have lost loved ones as a result of the abhorrent terrorist attack by Hamas. Today, in response to this Hamas attack on Israel, and following detailed discussions with President Biden, I have directed several steps to strengthen Department of Defense posture in the region to bolster regional deterrence efforts.

I have directed the movement of the USS Gerald R. Ford Carrier Strike Group to the Eastern Mediterranean. This includes the U.S. Navy aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78), the Ticonderoga-class guided missile cruiser USS Normandy (CG 60), as well as the Arleigh-Burke-class guided missile destroyers USS Thomas Hudner (DDG 116), USS Ramage (DDG 61), USS Carney (DDG 64), and USS Roosevelt (DDG 80). We have also taken steps to augment U.S. Air Force F-35, F-15, F-16, and A-10 fighter aircraft squadrons in the region. The U.S. maintains ready forces globally to further reinforce this deterrence posture if required.

In addition, the United States government will be rapidly providing the Israel Defense Forces with additional equipment and resources, including munitions. The first security assistance will begin moving today and arriving in the coming days.

Strengthening our joint force posture, in addition to the materiel support that we will rapidly provide to Israel, underscores the United States’ ironclad support for the Israel Defense Forces and the Israeli people. My team and I will continue to be in close contact with our Israeli counterparts to ensure they have what they need to protect their citizens and defend themselves against these heinous terrorist attacks. (Source: US DoD)

 

08 Oct 23. Israel-Palestinian Territories Fighting – Expected IDF Ground Operation. The Israeli government has confirmed that more than 600 Israelis have now been killed since Hamas launched its operation, with a further 100 people kidnapped and 2,000 injured. Meanwhile, the Palestinian Health Ministry has reported that at least 370 people have been killed during Israeli airstrikes in Gaza, with a further 2,200 injured. Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) continue efforts to push back Hamas militants.

SIGNIFICANCE

• The IDF has begun evacuating civilians from towns on the Gaza border, including Alumim, Beeri, Ein Hashlosha, Erez, Gevim, Holit, Ibim, Karmia, Kerem Shalom, Kfar Aza, Kissufim, Magen, Mefalsim, Nahal Oz, Netiv Ha’asara, Nir Am, Nir Oz, Nir Yitzhak, Nirim, Or Haner, Reim, Saad, Sufa, Yad Mordechai and Zikim. At the time of writing, unconfirmed civilian evacuations in the north are taking place in settlements bordering with Lebanon, as well as the deployment of Merkava tanks.
• The Home Front Command has ordered the closure of schools tomorrow, 9 October and 10 October. Workplaces that do not have a shelter room must also remain closed at least through 10 October.
• Israel has denied ongoing media reports that Egypt is negotiating with Hamas with regard to hostages. The government has confirmed that at least 100 Israelis are currently being held captive in Gaza, likely underground to avoid Israeli identification. Due to the heightened sensitivity of the issue, few details are likely to be made public, particularly as the IDF aims at securing areas of Hamas incursions. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has appointed retired general Gal Hirsh as the coordinator for captured and missing individuals.
• The IDF has confirmed that the earlier activation of the Patriot air defence system in northern Israel was a false alarm and there is ‘no threat’ to nearby residents. Nevertheless, the situation along the Lebanese border remains highly volatile, though there have been no further Israeli strikes or reports of cross-border warning shots in recent hours. Developments remain in line with our previous assessment of Lebanese Hizballah involvement.
• German Chancellor Olaf Scholz has confirmed protections for Israeli and Jewish institutions have increased across the country. Similarly, the UK police have stepped up patrols across the capital London following reports that people have been ‘celebrating’ Hamas’ attacks against Israel.

FORECAST

Hamas incursions into Israeli towns in the Gaza envelope are likely to continue, challenging IDF operations to regain control of the area. Infiltrations of Hamas fighters from Gaza are reportedly continuing to take place at the time of writing, with heavy fighting persisting in the villages of Beeri, Holit and Mivtachim, as well as elsewhere.  Incursions are further likely to delay an IDF ground operation in Gaza until the military re-establishes control over the area and evacuations are complete. Confrontations between the IDF and militants will sustain bystander and misidentification risks, which will be particularly high in areas that are currently not being evacuated by Israeli authorities. The Israeli Air Force is likely to continue targeting individuals attempting to leave Gaza through gaps in the Gaza fence, elevating security risks.

High-intensity Israeli air strikes are likely to continue targeting Gaza overnight in preparation for future IDF ground operations. This will sustain the likelihood of overnight retaliatory rocket fire from Gaza. Heightened cross-border attacks will sustain the likelihood of air travel and traffic disruptions. However, despite a substantial reduction in flights to/from Israel today (8 October), a complete halt of flights or airspace closure remains unlikely in the coming hours. The risk of flight cancellations and/or delays remains markedly high, however, with airlines currently still operating flights likely to implement short-notice changes based on on-the-ground developments. The Jordan River and Yitzhak Rabin border crossings remain open, but with heavy congestion, though the Allenby (King Hussein) Bridge crossing in the West Bank remains closed.

Increasing likelihood of cyber attacks on Israeli businesses and infrastructure within and outside of Israel will elevate business operation risks. The pro-Russian hacker group Killnet released statements earlier on 8 October threatening to attack all Israeli government systems. It is likely that in the coming hours additional cyber actors traditionally operating against Israel will release similar statements and increase their operations against Israeli businesses and government assets, both within and without Israel. There is a realistic possibility that several actors will try to launch a simultaneous low-capability denial-of-service (DDoS) attack in the coming days. Cyber retaliation by pro-Israel groups remain a likely scenario, elevating risks for business affiliated with the Palestinian Territories or who are perceived to support Hamas.

Israeli embassies and/or the premises of Israeli businesses across the world are also at growing risk of major protests. Security around diplomatic missions will likely mitigate the risk of an escalation, driving physical risks and the indiscriminate damage of assets during violent protests. However, there is a realistic possibility that pro-Palestinian activist groups in France, Germany and the UK will attempt to target Israeli-affiliated businesses in the near term, despite growing police presences. Increasing numbers of Palestinian casualties triggered by Israeli air strikes in Gaza will sustain the likelihood of anti-Israel and/or pro-Hamas protests across the region, including in Turkey and Jordan, as previously observed.

The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) continued Operation Iron Swords, stepping up airstrikes inside the Gaza Strip and ground operations to push back Hamas militants. Israeli ground forces have retaken the majority of areas Hamas had infiltrated during operations overnight, but fighting continues on the morning of 8 October in Beeri and Sderot, alongside a number of other smaller villages close to the Gaza border.

SIGNIFICANCE

• On the morning of 8 October, the IDF confirmed that there are eight ‘points of engagement’ where fighting continues inside Israel, namely: Beeri, Kfar Aza, Kibbutz Reim, Kissufim, Sderot, Sufa, Yakhini and Zikim. However, at the time of writing on 8 October, there are also reports of isolated firefights away from the Gaza border, including reports of fighting in Ashkelon, seven miles (11 km) north of Gaza near the Rutenberg power station. Over 400 Hamas militants have reportedly been killed during ground fighting, according to the IDF, but hostage situations and Hamas reinforcements from Gaza will continue to slow IDF operations in the short term.
• More Palestinian fighters are reportedly crossing the Gaza border and are entering the town of Magen. Confirmed reports of a major Hamas attack on an Israeli military base in Tseelim, 12 miles (19km) east of Gaza, indicates that Hamas are continuing to expand ground operations, reportedly with the support of parachute and paraglider forces. There are also unconfirmed reports that Israeli citizens in Ofakim are being told to remain indoors given reports of Hamas militants roaming the city.
• The IDF stated that all residents living in towns near the Gaza fence will be evacuated within 24 hours, as Israeli forces likely continue preparations to launch a ground operation into Gaza. Meanwhile, the Israeli Air Force has reported that it has struck various targets across Gaza, including various homes of Hamas leadership, the compound of the head of Hamas intelligence, banks, weapons sites used by Islamic Jihad, and other military targets.
• The Israeli embassy to the US has said that over 100 Israeli soldiers and civilians have been taken hostage by Hamas. Reports suggest they are being or have already been transported back into the Gaza envelope. The al-Qassam Brigades published a statement from military spokesperson Abu Ubaida on Telegram claiming that ‘prisoners are present on all axes in the Gaza Strip’. The diplomatic mission also confirmed that two hostage situations had been ‘resolved’ earlier today.
• There is widespread footage and visual evidence that confirms Israeli civilians have been killed and kidnapped in the areas of Hamas incursions, despite Hamas’ claims they are not targeting civilians. Amnesty International has confirmed numerous civilian deaths at the hands of Hamas militants. Israel’s Embassy in Turkey has estimated at least 300 Israelis have been killed and almost 2,000 injured. Meanwhile, Israeli airstrikes in the Gaza Strip have reportedly left 313 Palestinians dead and nearly 2,000 injured, according to the Palestinian health ministry.
• Israeli authorities have requested that civilians living near the Lebanese border, such as Hanita, Kfar Raosh HaNikra, Moshav Betzet and Shlomi evacuate within 48 hours, underscoring the growing tensions on the border region. The IDF reportedly fired warning shots on the morning of 8 October as Hizballah fighters continue to operate close to border crossing points, claiming to target several Israeli military positions in the Sheba’a Farms area.
• At around 1230hrs (local time) on 8 October, a sole perpetrator opened fire on an Israeli tour group at the Pompey Pillar site in the northern Egyptian city of Alexandria, killing two Israeli nationals and their Egyptian tour guide. The incident underscores the risk of heightened ideological mobilisation amongst pro-Palestinian groups, particularly given the significant presence of Palestinian refugees in Egypt. This will elevate risks of sole perpetrator attacks on Israeli personnel and travelers in major urban cities, including along the Egypt-Israel border.
• Pro-Palestine groups, including those affiliated with the Turkish Islamist political party, organised large-scale anti-Israel protests in cities across Turkey on 7 October, including the capital Ankara, Diyarbakir, Istanbul, Trabzon and Van. In Jordan, protests also took place in cities including the capital Amman, and alongside the Jordan-Israel border. There will almost certainly be further anti-Israel protests in major urban cities in countries including Iraq, Jordan, Egypt and Turkey over the coming days, elevating risks of sole perpetrator and group attacks.
• Diplomatic missions in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem have issued security alerts and advisories cautioning nationals to remain vigilant and take appropriate steps to increase security awareness. US Embassy staff are currently sheltering in place, with the French Embassy also suggesting to nationals to shelter in place if based in the south and areas in proximity to Gaza. General advisories ask citizens to closely follow the ‘Home Front Command’s update (website is only available in Israel). Formally, diplomatic missions have not issued evacuation notices or plans. However, Sibylline is currently tracking a French government Airbus A330-243 likely heading towards Ben Gurion International Airport (TLV). However, it remains unclear if this pre-empts mediation or evacuation efforts.
• As of the time of writing, the following airlines have cancelled flights to Israel: Air Europa, Air France-KLM, Lufthansa Group, Iberia, ITA, Air Baltic, Royal Air Morocco, Air Malta, Air Astana and Air Gulf, Delta Airlines, Korean Air company. Meanwhile, Emirates, Fly Dubai, British Airways, TUS, Cyprus Airways, Turkish Airlines and Pegasus are continuing operations but will to monitor the situation closely and could yet cancel their flights.

FORECAST

West Bank tensions are likely to remain extremely high, with a realistic possibility of escalation and Palestinian low-capability attacks in the coming hours. However, a third Intifada in the form of large-scale, protracted Palestinian unrest currently remains unlikely (see Sibylline Special Report – 9 March 2023). Hotspots for confrontations will be areas in the northern West Bank, including Jenin and Nablus and further south Hebron and the Shuafat refugee camp (in East Jerusalem), particularly around Israeli checkpoints.

Hizballah will likely continue to test defence Israeli defences along the northern border, elevating security and escalation risks. Hizballah has taken responsibility for a strike on IDF positions along the Israel-Lebanon border, but the group is seemingly currently reluctant to fully commit to the fighting. Similar low-intensity incidents, including grouping at border fence areas, are likely in the coming hours. Miscalculation risks are high on both sides, which could result in either side responding, including against Israeli targets in northern Israel.

Continued IDF bombardments in Gaza are likely throughout the day, delaying ground forces entry into Gaza. The Israeli Air Force is likely to target suspected underground sites with carpet bombing, in preparation for a full-scale ground operation. The close proximity of Hamas military positions to civilian populations will sustain high security risks to civilians and non-combatants. Separate ground operations to retrieve hostages are unlikely at the current moment due to the likely heavy presence of militants, elevating pressure for a full-scale ground forces operation into Gaza to retrieve hostages. However, such an operation will increase the risk of Hizballah’s entry into the conflict, which would increase risks in northern Israel.

Sibylline reported that overnight on 7-8 October, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) continued Operation Iron Swords, stepping up airstrikes inside the Gaza Strip and ground operations to push back Hamas militants. Israeli ground forces have retaken the majority of areas Hamas had infiltrated during operations overnight, but fighting continues on the morning of 8 October in Beeri and Sderot, alongside a number of other smaller villages close to the Gaza border.  (Source: Sibylline)

 

04 Oct 23. Japan enacts new defence industry law. Japanese legislation to strengthen the country’s defence industrial base has come into force, the Ministry of Defense (MoD) in Tokyo has confirmed to Janes.

The MoD said the new law – provisions of which allow the state to take control of ailing defence firms – is part of Japan’s wider efforts to respond to growing regional security threats.

The law, titled the Defense Production Infrastructure Reinforcement Act, came into effect on 1 October and was proposed in June in line with defence policies introduced by the government at the end of 2022. The law replaces the Strategy on Defense Production and Technological Bases, which was introduced in 2014.

A spokesperson from the MoD told Janes, “In order for business operators to stably manufacture and repair defence equipment, we believe that it is important to appropriately implement the law.” (Source: Jane’s)

07 Oct 23. Israel ‘at war’ as Hamas gunmen launch surprise attack from Gaza.

• Summary
• Companies
• Hamas gunmen enter Israel in unprecedented attack
• At least 22 Israelis killed in attack, says ambulance service
• Israel says Hamas declares war, commits ‘grave mistake’
• Barrage of rockets launched into Israel from Gaza
• Reports of gunbattles in towns in southern Israel

Palestinian Islamist group Hamas launched the biggest attack on Israel in years on Saturday, killing more than 20 people and wounding hundreds in a surprise assault that combined gunmen crossing into Israel with a barrage of rockets fired from Gaza.

Israel said the Iran-backed group had declared war as its army confirmed fighting with militants in several Israeli towns and military bases near Gaza and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu vowed to retaliate.

“Our enemy will pay a price the type of which it has never known,” he said. “We are in a war and we will win it.”

At least 22 Israelis were killed in the attack so far, Israel’s ambulance service said. Around 545 Israelis had been wounded, the health ministry said.

The Israeli military said it had responded with air strikes into Gaza, where witnesses reported hearing heavy explosions and multiple dead being carried into hospitals.

The attack marked an unprecedented infiltration into Israel by an unknown number of Hamas gunmen crossing from the Gaza Strip, and the heaviest blow for Israel in the conflict with Palestinians since the suicide bombings of the Second Intifada some two decades ago.

The militant Islamic Jihad group said it had joined the attacks and was holding several Israeli soldiers captive and Hamas social media accounts showed footage of what were said to be Israeli captives being taken alive into Gaza.

The Israeli military has declined to comment on the reports but has not denied them either, saying it would address the reports later.

Israeli broadcaster Reshet 13 TV News said militants were holding Israelis hostage in the town of Ofakim, and that five Palestinian militants had been killed in the town of Sderot and homes had been set on fire.

Israeli media reported gunbattles between bands of Palestinian fighters and security forces in towns in southern Israel. Israel’s police chief said there were “21 active scenes” in southern Israel.

In Gaza, people rushed to buy supplies in anticipation of days of conflict ahead. Some evacuated their homes and headed for shelters.

Hamas military commander Mohammad Deif announced the start of the operation in a broadcast on Hamas media, calling on Palestinians everywhere to fight.

Statement From Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III on the Attacks Against Israel

I am closely monitoring developments in Israel. Our commitment to Israel’s right to defend itself remains unwavering, and I extend my condolences to the families of those who lost their lives in this abhorrent attack on civilians. Over the coming days the Department of Defense will work to ensure that Israel has what it needs to defend itself and protect civilians from indiscriminate violence and terrorism.

“This is the day of the greatest battle to end the last occupation on earth,” he said, adding that 5,000 rockets had been launched.

Israel and Hamas fought a 10-day war in 2021. (Source: Reuters)

 

06 Oct 23. How Australia’s strategic review is changing Army acquisition plans. The Australian Army will now receive less Redback infantry fighting vehicles than planned as the government redirects funding for that effort toward long-range strike systems and littoral maneuver craft.

The government’s recent Defence Strategic Review recommended the Army pivot from a “balanced” structure of equally equipped combined arms brigades to a “focused” force able to meet the changing threat in the Asia-Pacific region. The document places an emphasis on long-range strike and littoral maneuver capabilities while retaining the combined arms philosophy.

“The current Australian Defence Force (ADF) force structure is based on a ‘balanced’ force model that reflects a bygone era. It does not adequately address our new strategic environment,” the report stated. “The ADF needs a much more focused force that can respond to the risks we face. It should be informed by net assessment and able to effect a strategy of denial.”

This refocus includes an enhanced long-range strike capability for multiple domains of warfare; a fully enabled and integrated amphibious combined arms land system; and a mobile, joint expeditionary theater logistics system with the ability to supply a force beyond Australia’s shores for an extended period of time.

“This conceptual approach to force structure planning will lead to a force designed to address the nation’s most significant military risks,” the report read. “The capabilities required to address identified threats will also provide latent capability to deal with lower-level contingencies and crises.”

Change of plans

The Defence Strategic Review specifically recommended the accelerated acquisition of additional M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems as well as local manufacturing of weapons to ensure stocks are maintained.

For the Australian Army, this has meant a significant reduction in the number of AS21 Redback infantry fighting vehicles it had planned to acquire.

The service originally sought 450 Redback vehicles from Hanwha Defense Australia, a local branch of the South Korean company Hanwha, under the government’s multibn-dollar Land 400 Phase 3 program, but the defense review recommended a reduction to 129 units to reflect the new force structure concept.

Australian Defence Minister Richard Marles announced the accelerated purchase of HIMARS on Aug. 19, highlighting the change in focus. The country is already investing AU$1.6 bn (U.S. $1 bn) in a second tranche of HIMARS launchers and weapons, which takes the number on order to 42 units.

An earlier tranche announced in January committed Australia to 20 HIMARS weapons, with deliveries beginning in the first quarter of 2025 and wrapping up by the end of 2026.

The Defence Strategic Review also axed a planned second regiment of Hanwha Defense Australia-made AS9 Huntsman 155mm self-propelled howitzers as well as AS10 armored ammunition resupply vehicles. That acquisition was part of Phase 2 of the government’s Land 8116 program focused on protected mobile fires.

“We’re currently working through how we will rebalance the Army’s contribution to the integrated force. That system [AS9 and AS10] will still deliver a world-class capability; there will just be less of it,” said Lt. Gen. Simon Stuart, chief of the Army. “I’m focused on the implementation of the direction that we’ve been given, and we’ll continue to deliver the capability that is required by the integrated force within the resource envelope that we have.”

Under Phase 1 of the Land 8116 project, the Army is still set to receive 30 AS9 howitzers and 10 AS10 ammo resupply vehicles beginning in 2025.

Land 400 Phase 3 is a multiyear program that assessed the AS21 and the Germany company Rheinmetall’s KF41 Lynx, with the former declared the contract winner on July 27.

“We will be beginning delivery of these vehicles in early 2027, with the final vehicles to be delivered in late 2028,” Minister for Defence Industry Pat Conroy said. “This is bringing it forward by a number of years.”

That timeline coincides with “the delivery of more landing craft and a very significant investment in long-range strike, both the HIMARS rocket system and land-based maritime strike. So that the Australian Army’s longest-range weapon will go from roughly 40 kilometers to 300 kilometers, then over 500 kilometers,” Conroy added. (That’s about 25 miles to 186 miles, then more than 311 miles.)

Conroy was referring to the initial acquisition of Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems, Army Tactical Missile Systems and, eventually, the U.S. Army’s Precision Strike Missile for HIMARS. Australia jointed the U.S. Army’s Precision Strike Missile development program in August 2021.

The Australian Army’s longest-range weapon is the M777 towed howitzer, Gen. Angus Campbell, chief of the Defence Force, said in May during a Senate estimates hearing, during which lawmakers scrutinize how the government is spending taxpayers’ money.

Coastal defense

Australia is also looking to acquire a long-range maritime strike and coastal artillery system under Project Land 4100 Phase 2.

In response, Kongsberg Defence Australia and Thales Australia have partnered to offer a system based on the utility variant of the Bushmaster protected mobility vehicle, together with Kongsberg’s Naval Strike Missile.

The Australian Army has fielded the Bushmaster for several years now, and the Royal Australian Navy selected the Naval Strike Missile as its deck-launched Harpoon replacement.

The Kongsberg-Thales pitch, dubbed StrikeMaster, is similar to the American Navy/Marine Corps Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System, which uses the Naval Strike Missile with an unmanned variant of the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle dubbed Rogue Fires. However, the StrikeMaster will be a crewed system.

Kongsberg is a Norwegian company, and Thales is based in France.

For its part, the American firm Lockheed Martin is proposing a variant of the M142 HIMARS launcher, integrated with a ground-launched version of the AGM-158C long-range, anti-ship missile. The Australian Army already purchased the former, and the Royal Australian Air Force has ordered the air-launched version of the latter.

Domestic focus

However, underpinning these long-range strike enhancements is a requirement to establish a sovereign supply of weapons — an acknowledgment that global supply chains are inevitably disrupted during a conflict.

In response, the government has committed AU$2.5 bn over the course of four years for the Defence Department’s Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance Enterprise, or GWEO.

“The war in Ukraine has demonstrated the importance of having not just war stocks, but a domestic missile manufacturing industry,” Marles said April 30

GWEO will initially focus on the domestic manufacture of 155mm ammunition, but is also looking to manufacture guided missiles in Australia under the Guided Weapons Production Capability plan.

Speaking at the Senate estimate hearing in May, the head of GWEO, Air Marshal Leon Phillips, said an Australian team recently visited the United States to meet with missile manufacturers and federal lawmakers.

“GMLRS [the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System] is a credible option that we are looking to accelerate, and I expect we’ll return to [the Australian] government before quarter two of 2024 with options to make a start on that, to meet what we believe is a credible timeline for a level of missile production in this country in 2025,” Phillips said.

When asked by senators if plans were set for eventually manufacturing the U.S. Army’s Precision Strike Missile, Phillips replied: “Not at this stage. I think GMLRS is a logical start point, and then we might work our way up in terms of our industrial base, our certification, our competencies, and our releasability and ITAR issues with the U.S. government.”

ITAR, or International Traffic in Arms Regulations, is a U.S. government regime that controls the export of defense equipment and other sensitive technology.

Landing craft

The Defence Strategic Review also recommends the government accelerate its multiphase landing craft program Land 8710.

Phase 1 of the program is in an open-tender stage, which should lead to the purchase of medium littoral maneuver vessels to replace the Army’s LCM-8 landing craft, as well as the acquisition of an amphibious vehicle to replace the Vietnam-era LARC vehicles.

Phase 2 is for the acquisition of heavy landing craft to replace the Balikpapan-class vessels retired more than a decade ago.

Phase 3 will seek a fast assault craft.

“We are investing in the capabilities our Defence Force needs to hold our adversaries at risk further from our shores, and keep Australians safe in the complex and uncertain world in which we live today,” Marles said Aug. 21. (Source: Defense News)

 

07 Oct 23. The White House and pro-Ukraine lawmakers are growing increasingly alarmed about the future of US funding for Kyiv in the wake of Kevin McCarthy’s ousting as speaker of the House of Representatives, which has left military aid in limbo. The risk of a lapse in American aid to Ukraine within a few months — a worst-case scenario for the Biden administration which has until now seemed unlikely — has risen in the past few days as chaos has enveloped the Republican party in Congress. It has also triggered soul-searching in Washington over the impact of US political dysfunction on the administration’s foreign policy goals, as it tries to forge global alliances to counter Russian aggression and rising threats from China. “Will we appease Putin and cut off aid to the Ukrainians? If we do, it will be our problem,” said Jack Reed, a Rhode Island Democrat and the chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee, in a speech on the Senate floor this week. “It just breaks the heart to see that we cannot put the national security of the country itself above the partisanship here in Washington,” said Heather Conley, president of the German Marshall Fund in the US.

Concerns have been compounded by the fact that Jim Jordan — one of the two leading candidates to replace McCarthy as speaker, who is backed by former president Donald Trump — has been openly sceptical of Ukraine aid, if not hostile towards it. Steve Scalise, the other top contender for the speaker job, has backed Ukraine funding in the past. But if he prevails it is unclear whether he would defy the right flank of the party with a vote to bolster aid to Kyiv. “Jim Jordan is a real candidate to take over the House speakership and he voted against Ukraine funding. So I would be worried if I were [Volodymyr] Zelenskyy and his team watching US domestic politics unfold from afar,” said Rachel Rizzo, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center, referring to the Ukrainian president. Worries about the future of Ukraine funding mounted when it was omitted from legislation last Saturday to avert a government shutdown, at least until mid-November. President Joe Biden has tried to reassure American supporters of Ukraine and allies around the world that it would ultimately be approved. Once McCarthy was removed from his post by a small group of Republican rebels and all Democrats in the House, though, it was harder for the White House to remain upbeat. Recommended The Big Read The ungovernable Republicans: ‘Their goal is chaos’ “Time is not our friend. We have enough funding authorities to meet Ukraine’s battlefield needs for a bit longer, but we need Congress to act to ensure that there is no disruption in our support,” John Kirby, co-ordinator for strategic communications at the National Security Council, told reporters. Biden has noted that a majority of members of the House and Senate in both parties say they back continued funding for Ukraine. But he conceded that he needs to make a more concerted defence of US support to the American public. “I’m going to be announcing very shortly a major speech I’m going to make on this issue and why it’s critically important for the United States and our allies that we keep our commitment,” he said.

The US president then convened a meeting of his top national security team to discuss Ukraine. Biden is facing mounting pressure, particularly from Republicans in Congress who support aid to Ukraine, to deliver a much more definitive explanation of the US strategy in the war to help sustain public support. “Your administration has failed to articulate a strategy outlining how US assistance to Ukraine will help them achieve victory over Russia, while also prioritising and advancing American interests,” Jim Risch, the top Republican on the Senate foreign relations committee, and Michael McCaul, the chair of the House foreign affairs committee, wrote in a letter to Biden on Friday.  “A pledge to support Ukraine ‘for as long as it takes’ is not a strategy,” they added. “The administration has not provided a strong consistent message to Congress or the American people. Now aid to Ukraine has become a lightning rod issue in Congress,” added Heather Nauert, a former state department spokesperson under Trump now at BGR, a lobbying group in Washington. The ramifications for Ukraine’s war effort of a possible reduction or lapse in funding are serious. “It could not come at a more difficult time, because Ukraine’s counteroffensive is at its most difficult moment. This is exactly when we need to give Ukraine all the means necessary to accomplish this as quickly as possible,” said Conley. Raphael Cohen of the Rand Corporation said this could be a watershed moment in the historical debate about whether the US did or did not “play this war correctly,” and whether it should have delivered more aid more rapidly than it did. “There will be an argument if aid peters out that [the US strategy] contributed to slower battlefield results” and failed to take into account “a diminishing window of public support”, Cohen said. (Source: FT.com)

 

06 Oct 23. Sweden pledges more military aid to Ukraine, considers fighter jets. Sweden will send Ukraine a new military support package worth 2.2bn crowns ($199m) – consisting mainly of artillery ammunition – and is looking into sending fighter jets, Defence Minister Pal Jonson said.

Jonson told a news conference the armed forces were due to report by Nov. 6 on the potential for sending Jas Gripen jets to Ukraine after the government asked them to assess the issue.

But he reiterated that Sweden would for domestic security reasons need to become member of NATO before it would be able to potentially spare any fighter jets.

Sweden hopes to join the NATO defence alliance soon although its accession has been held up by member states Turkey and Hungary.

The new military aid package will be Sweden’s 14th to Ukraine since Russia’s invasion, taking the total value of the Nordic country’s such aid to just over 22bn crowns.

“We need to design our support so that it’s long term and sustainable,” Jonson said. “It is now important that more countries step up to support Ukraine.”

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy on Thursday warned European leaders at an informal meeting in Granada, Spain that Russia could attack other countries within five years if Europe were to waver in its support.

He also said he remained confident of continued U.S. and European financial aid, however. ($1 = 11.0307 Swedish crowns) (Source: Reuters)

 

06 Oct 23. Wagner group reportedly bought Chinese satellites for use in war in Ukraine.

Contract suggests company sanctioned by United States sold mercenaries two high-resolution observation units

The Wagner mercenary group reportedly bought satellites from China to use in the war against Ukraine.

Beijing Yunze Technology sold two high-resolution observation satellites for $30 m (£24.5 m) last year to a company owned by the group’s founder, Yevgeny Prigozhin, according to a contract.

Wagner also acquired the right to bid for other satellite images from a network held by the Chinese operator CGST, which owns about 100 satellites.

The contract, which is still active, was reportedly signed by Ivan Mechetin, the director of a subsidiary company that was part of Prigozhin’s business empire.

Wagner apparently took pictures mapping the route for its fighters between Ukraine and Moscow in the weeks before its abortive coup, a European security source said, having bought them in November last year.

The contract makes no reference to ordering images of Russian territory and their use could not be confirmed by the AFP news agency.

Images were apparently taken of a Russian military base in Rostov-on-Don, which was later seized by the paramilitary group, towns on the road to Moscow, and Grozny, the stronghold of Ramzan Kadyrov, the pro-Kremlin Chechen leader.

Satellites used from Ukraine to Mali

An expert who asked not to be named said that it was “obvious” that Chinese authorities would have been kept abreast of Wagner’s actions.

The group is said to have used the satellites to take pictures of other areas where its mercenaries were active, including Ukraine, Libya, Sudan, the Central African Republic and Mali.

The supply of satellite data also seems to have been known by Washington, which announced sanctions on Beijing Yunze Technology in February this year.

Two months later, the US State Department issued sanctions against Head Aerospace Technology, describing it as a “satellite image reseller that supplied satellite imagery of locations in Ukraine to entities affiliated with PMC Wagner and Yevgeny Prigozhin”.

Wagner left Ukraine in June to launch its abortive coup against Russia’s military leadership, having seized the eastern city of Bakhmut a month earlier.

Although its rebellion was called off within 24 hours, the paramilitary group came within 150 miles of Moscow, downing a Russian Ka-52 attack helicopter on the way.

In the weeks following the abortive coup, Wagner moved en masse to Belarus following a truce negotiated by Alexander Lukashenko, the country’s leader.

Prigozhin was killed in a mysterious plane crash in August that Vladimir Putin, the Russian president, suggested on Thursday could have been caused by intoxicated mercenaries setting off hand grenades.

(Source: Daily Telegraph)

 

06 Oct 23. SA President launches country’s newest armed service in Musina. The newest component of the South African government’s security sector – the Border Management Authority (BMA) – was launched in Musina yesterday (Thursday, 5 October) by President Cyril Ramaphosa well over a year after its first “cohort” of border guards was deployed.

Confirmation of the status conferred on Chief Executive Michael Masiapato’s organisation was provided by the South African President in his address at the Musina showgrounds launch function.

“The BMA is now the third armed service in South Africa after the SA National Defence Force (SANDF) and the SA Police Service (SAPS),” his prepared remarks read with an addition that leaves no doubt about the continued involvement of particularly the SA Army as the landward service in the wider border protection sector.

“While the border guard will be conducting border law enforcement functions, including access control, the SANDF remains responsible for border protection and safeguarding.”

Regular and Reserve Force SA Army units are the backbone of Operation Corona’s current 15 company-strong deployment along South Africa’s 4 860 plus kilometres of land borders with six countries.

Ramaphosa told the launch function the BMA is mandated to perform border management functions “within ports of entry as well as the law enforcement area” adding it was “established through an incremental approach”.

On why the establishment of the BMA, the South African President’s prepared remarks have it “since 1994 the country’s border management has been exercised by different government departments and state agencies, often implementing their respective mandates in isolation”.

A “lack of co-ordination and inadequate information sharing between various management and enforcement authorities rendered our borders vulnerable,” which Ramaphosa sees changing with the BMA providing “a sustainable solution to the structural challenges of border security, control and co-ordination”.

“It will be a new model of integration of functions, roles and responsibilities in the broader law enforcement environment.”

The BMA is expected to tackle the challenges of congestion, procedural delays, long transit times, lack of predictability and high logistics costs experienced at any number of ports of entry, including high volume ones such as Beitbridge (with Zimbabwe) and Lebombo (with Mozambique). (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)

 

06 Oct 23. US-Mexico: Congressional tensions, increased border security are likely due to wall’s construction. On 5 October, the Biden administration announced that it would resume construction of the US-Mexico border wall in the Rio Grande Valley (Texas). The structure will cover 20 miles (32km). It will cut through a wildlife refuge and require the re-location of multiple private properties. In a comprehensive policy shift, the Department of Homeland Security waived 26 federal laws and appropriated 2019 fiscal year funds previously raised during the Trump administration to re-commence construction. The decision is in response to increasing migratory pressures; more than 245,000 crossings took place in the Rio Grande Valley area alone this year. The dramatic policy reversal underscores that migration will likely dominate budget negotiations in Congress ahead of the 15 November deadline to pass a long-term funding bill. Migration issues will also likely shape the 2024 presidential election campaigns. The wall’s construction also signals increasing securitisation at the border and the possibility of increasing regulatory scrutiny. (Source: Sibylline)

 

06 Oct 23. Azerbaijan-EU: Resolution unlikely to result in sanctions or change in energy partnership with Baku. On 5 October, the European Parliament adopted a resolution condemning Azerbaijan for its military operation in Nagorno-Karabakh last month and demanded a review of EU-Baku relations. The parliament urged the EU to reduce its dependency on gas supplies from Azerbaijan and, in the event of military aggression or significant hybrid attacks against Armenia, to stop the import of Azerbaijani oil and gas. The resolution also called for sanctions against Azerbaijani officials deemed to be responsible for ceasefire violations and human rights abuses in Nagorno-Karabakh. French President Emmanuel Macron stated on 5 October that it would be premature for the EU to impose sanctions against Baku, claiming this would be counterproductive. It is therefore unlikely that the resolution will lead to the bloc halting its energy partnership or imposing sanctions against Baku in the near term. Such actions would be more likely if Azerbaijan threatens Armenia militarily in the coming months. (Source: Sibylline)

 

05 Oct 23. After U.S. Downs Turkish Drone in Syria, Focus Remains on Defeat ISIS Mission. An American F-16 fighter aircraft shot down a Turkish unmanned aerial vehicle that had been observed conducting airstrikes in a U.S.-restricted operating zone about a kilometer from U.S. forces in Syria today.

During a phone call between Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III and Turkish Defense Minister Yasar Guler, the two leaders discussed the incident and agreed that while it is regrettable, the focus must remain on the important mission to defeat ISIS in Syria, said Pentagon Press Secretary Air Force Brig. Gen. Pat Ryder during a media briefing today.

“The secretary reaffirmed that the United States remains in Syria exclusively in support of the campaign to defeat ISIS,” Ryder said. “The secretary also acknowledged Turkey’s legitimate security concerns and underscored the importance of close coordination between the United States and Turkey to prevent any risk to U.S. forces or the global coalition’s defeat-ISIS mission.”

I called Turkish Minister of National Defense Yasar Guler (@tcsavunma) today to discuss national security and defense-related matters of mutual interest. I reiterated U.S. commitment to continue working together to defeat ISIS and ensure security and stability in the region.… — Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III (@SecDef) October 5, 2023

At around 7:30 a.m. local time, U.S. forces observed UAVs conducting airstrikes in the vicinity of Hasakah, Syria, Ryder said. Some of the strikes were inside a declared U.S.-restricted operating zone.

“At approximately 11:30 local time, a Turkish UAV reentered the ROZ on a heading toward where U.S. forces were located,” Ryder said. “U.S. commanders assessed that the UAV, which was now less than a half a kilometer from U.S. forces, to be a potential threat, and U.S. F-16 fighters subsequently shot down the UAV in self-defense at approximately 11:40 local time.”

No U.S. forces were injured, Ryder said, also adding there is no indication that Turkey had intentionally been targeting U.S. forces.

“It’s a regrettable incident, but U.S. commanders on the ground did assess that there was a potential threat and so they took prudent action in this scenario,” Ryder said. “But again, the secretary has talked to his counterpart. They had the opportunity to have a fruitful conversation and … commit to one another that the U.S. and Turkey will continue to closely communicate and coordinate. And as I mentioned, Turkey does remain a very important and valuable NATO ally and partner to the United States.”

In addition to the phone call between Austin and Guler, newly sworn-in chairman of the joint chiefs of staff Gen. CQ Brown, Jr., also discussed the incident with his counterpart, Chief of the General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces Gen. Metin Gurak. Those two leaders discussed the U.S. and Turkey’s shared objective of defeating ISIS and the importance of following common deconfliction protocols. (Source: U.S. DoD)

 

06 Oct 23. Cameroon: Armed separatists’ public execution underscores rising risk to NGO local staff. On 4 October, armed separatists publicly executed two civilians accused of spying for the government in the village of Guzang (Northwest region). The prominent separatist armed group, the Ambazonia Defence Forces (ADF), claimed responsibility for the execution after kidnapping the two civilians last month. Despite peace process efforts in January, the conflict between the Cameroonian government and several Anglophone groups from Cameroon’s English-speaking Northwest and Southwest regions persists, with the ADF continuing to reject negotiation efforts. The incident represents the ADF’s first public execution of civilians deemed to be affiliated with the government and comes after the ADF threatened to target anyone working with Yaoundé in July. As such, the incident underscores rising threats to the safety of civilians (particularly NGO local staff with perceived ties to local and national Cameroonian government bodies) in Northwest and Southwest regions.

 

06 Oct 23. Kenya-China: Prospects for additional Chinese loan, debt repayment extension are limited. On 6 October, Kenyan officials stated that President William Ruto will ask China to extend the debt repayment period for existing loans and to provide another USD 1 bn to complete stalled road construction projects during a visit to Beijing later this month. Ruto previously criticised his predecessor for accruing considerable Chinese debt and several Chinese-funded projects. Amid ongoing austerity measures, the proposals will likely help stabilise Kenya’s debt burden while providing capital for development projects, helping to drive growth. However, prospects of a Chinese agreement to the request are limited, at least in the short term. Since the 2021 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, China has cut direct investment in Africa, favouring increased trade volumes. Additionally, China has been reluctant to restructure debt; it only reached an agreement with Zambia after 28 months. There is a realistic possibility that its refusal will further undermine relations, increasing state pressure on Chinese projects in Kenya. (Source: Sibylline)

 

06 Oct 23. Somalia: Al-Shabaab clash points to raised attack risks; delays to counter-offensive are highly likely. On 5 October, clashes between government forces and al-Shabaab militants in the Shabelow forest (Galmudug state) killed at least 30 pro-government fighters and dozens of al-Shabaab militants. The clashes come amid the ongoing Somali National Army (SNA) offensive, which aims to remove al-Shabaab from its strongholds by early 2024. On 30 September, the Somali government asked the UN to pause the planned drawdown of around 3,000 African Union (AU) peacekeepers; this was likely driven by concerns that the SNA would be unable to defend vacated peacekeeping positions. Continued clashes between the SNA, allied clan militias and al-Shabaab will sustain the persistent risk of attacks, underscoring threats to staff and assets in central and southern Somalia, particularly during overland movement (even when travelling with a heavy security presence). The continued entrenchment of al-Shabaab positions in southern Somalia will likely further delay the ongoing SNA offensive, sustaining heightened operational risks for staff and assets nationwide well into 2024.(Source: Sibylline)

 

05 Oct 23. Iraq: Halt to USD withdrawals, transactions will sustain unrest risks ahead of December polls. On 5 October, a top official at the Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) confirmed plans to halt USD cash withdrawals and transactions by 1 January 2024. The move aims to curb the use of Iraq’s foreign currency reserves for illicit activities and reduce the volatility of the Iraqi Dinar (IQD). The measure will likely increase the demand for hard currencies, increasing the USD black market exchange rate. This will sustain national currency volatility and consumer pressures in the near term, compounding the risk of socio-economically driven domestic unrest. While the CBI has clarified that restrictions will only affect USD transfers from abroad, this will likely raise business costs for foreign firms relying on Iraq-based staff. The status of the IQD will represent a polarising factor ahead of December’s provincial council elections; this will possibly lead to heightened anti-US sentiment in the coming months.

 

06 Oct 23. Syria: Drone strike reflects heightened risk of attacks; resultant robust state security posture is likely. On 5 October, a drone attack against a Syrian military academy graduation ceremony near Homs killed at least 100 people, including 20 civilians. While no terror organisation took responsibility, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which controls areas in the neighbouring Idlib governorate, has previously used similar munitions against government forces. The attack reflects the current heightened terror threat and volatile security environment in Syria due to weeks of infighting between non-state military actors. Bystander risks will remain elevated in the coming weeks, particularly near government and military bases. A heightened state security posture and retaliatory operations targeting terrorist- and rebel-held areas, such as parts of Idlib, is highly likely; the indiscriminate use of force will also likely elevate collateral and incidental risks for civilians. (Source: Sibylline)

 

05 Oct 23. DOD Remains Focused on Deterring Conflict in Indo-Pacific. The U.S. remains fully committed to its strategy of integrated deterrence in the Indo-Pacific while keeping a close eye on China’s provocations in the region, a senior Pentagon official said today.

Ely S. Ratner, assistant secretary of defense for Indo-Pacific security affairs, said conflict with China is not inevitable despite indications that Beijing is increasingly leveraging its military to spread its malign influence abroad.

Previewing the forthcoming 2023 China Military Power Report, Ratner said DOD assesses that the Chinese Communist Party is increasingly turning to its military as “an instrument of coercion in support of their revisionist aims” with an eye toward restructuring the international order and undermining global peace and stability.

That assessment, he said, is evidenced by China’s rapid expansion of its nuclear forces and increasing provocations by its air and naval forces against U.S. allies and partners operating in the region under accordance with international law.

Ratner also noted China’s lack of interest in maintaining open lines of communication with U.S. defense officials, noting that Beijing has declined multiple invitations to communicate directly with Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III and other senior Pentagon policymakers.

“The bottom line is this: We are clear eyed about the challenges posed by the PLA’s growing capabilities and by how it is choosing to use these capabilities in threatening and destabilizing ways,” Ratner said.

“But at the same time, we know this: Conflict in the Indo-Pacific region is neither imminent nor inevitable because deterrence is real and strong today,” he said. “And we’re doing more than ever—together with our allies and partners—to keep it that way by advancing a common vision for regional peace and stability.”

Ratner noted DOD’s investment in critical capabilities to maintain deterrence in the region throughout the next decade and beyond.

Those investments, he said, will “strengthen our warfighting advantages, exploit adversary vulnerabilities and address critical challenges in the Indo-Pacific” with the aim of strengthening the United States’ combat credible deterrent and assuring that the U.S. will prevail in conflict.

Ratner also underscored the department’s work with regional allies and partners “to deliver a U.S. force posture in the region that is more mobile, distributed, resilient and lethal.”

He noted key partnerships with Australia, Japan and the Philippines project U.S. capability and usher in a new era of enhanced cooperation in the region.

He also highlighted Austin’s recent trip to Papua New Guinea – the first ever visit to the country by a U.S. defense secretary. In May, the U.S. and Papua New Guinea committed to cooperate on security.

Ratner said the U.S. will continue to work relentlessly to counter Chinese aggression and ensure a free and open Indo-Pacific.

“Of course, the PLA’s power matters,” he said. “But so does our power, and so does the collective power of our allies and partners. Continuing to deliver in the Indo-Pacific will require considerable attention, resources and prioritization by the U.S. government, and we are focused on doing what it takes.” (Source: US DoD)

 

05 Oct 23. U.S.-Australia-Canada-New Zealand-UK Release Joint Guidance on Countering Russia Evasion. As a follow-up to the establishment of the “Export Enforcement Five” or “E5” partnership to coordinate export control enforcement issues in June 2023, the governments of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States have issued joint guidance to industry and academia identifying high priority items critical to Russian weapons systems and urging specific actions to prevent diversion of these items to Russia through third countries. On June 28, 2023, the governments of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States established the E5 partnership to significantly enhance the effectiveness of each country’s export control regimes, minimize gaps in enforcement, and foster joint investigations and coordinated enforcement actions. The E5 also agreed to strengthen enforcement partnerships with industry to further counter Russian diversion efforts. The quint-seal guidance released today provides industry and academia with the list of 45 prioritized Harmonized System (HS) codes containing items Russia needs for its weapons systems, of which nine (9) codes are the highest priority. The guidance then identifies anomalous patterns associated with importers in countries outside of the Global Export Control Coalition (GECC), which is the 39-member global coalition that has implemented substantially similar controls in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, that may raise diversion concerns, due diligence tips for screening such parties, and red flag indicators that may be relevant to exporters to assist in determining whether an activity may be connected to export control and/or sanctions evasion. The full guidance is available online here: 2023 09 26 Export Enforcement Five Guidance for Industry and Academia Priority HS Codes (doc.gov) (Source: glstrade.com)

 

04 Oct 23. US General Says Middle East is a Theater for Strategic Competition. Although deterring Iran and defeating extremist groups in the Middle East are priorities for U.S. Central Command, the region is also “fertile ground for strategic competition with China and Russia,” said Lt. Gen. Alexus Grynkewich, the commander of Air Forces Central, and Combined Forces Air Component Commander, U.S. Central Command.

The Middle East is important to China, the general told the Defense Writers’ Group today. The rising power gets about 50 percent of its oil and about a third of its natural gas from the Persian Gulf region. The Gulf hydrocarbons are fueling China’s rise.

China is trying to “displace” U.S. influence in the Middle East, he said. Right now, the Chinese are primarily working to supplant the United States through economic means and through the Belt and Road Initiative – the Chinese program to finance infrastructure projects that often come with hidden costs to debtor nations.

“What I think is a reasonable assertion, though, is that where economic interests start, military interests will follow to protect those economic interests,” Grynkewich said. “Over time, … there is a risk of Chinese expansion into the region militarily.”

Growing Chinese influence would have effects on U.S. access, basing and overflight in the region. “That could be critical, not just for things that happen in the Middle East, but things that would happen in the Indo-Pacific in the future,” he said.

The Chinese influence could take many forms. One the general is looking at is “smart cities” projects put together by Chinese technology giant Huawei. “If that kind of infrastructure comes in and it starts to touch networks, you start to see a risk to U.S. forces and U.S. technical capabilities because of the collection capabilities that might come with that,” he said. “We do watch that closely.”

The general is forthright when discussing the threat with allies and partners in the region. “They all understand that, and I think they are making individual decisions about how to pursue their economic interest with China,” he said.

U.S. officials, including Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III, have repeatedly said the United States is not forcing nations to choose between China and the U.S. However, they think nations should understand all the baggage that comes with having economic ties to China.

Grynkewich said there is no Chinese military footprint in the U.S. Central Command’s area of operations, though there is a Chinese base in neighboring Djibouti at the southern entrance to the Red Sea. “We watch that closely,” he said.

Chinese navy ships have participated in the counter piracy mission in the region for years, “but, I would tell you, to the extent that there are ‘mil-to-mil’ relationships with China in the region, they are very transactional,” Grynkewich said. “What I emphasize to our partners is when you work with the Chinese, you are getting a transaction.”

U.S. forces work with allies and partners because of the deep strategic partnerships based on shared interests. Many of the nations of the Persian Gulf are major non-NATO allies, and U.S. forces have worked alongside them for generations.

For example, Grynkewich said the Chinese have had a maritime presence in the region for a long time. “When was the last time the Chinese used their military presence to do something like intercept lethal aid going to the Houthis,” he asked. “They’ve never done it. They’ve never done something like that.”

Some nations in the region have conducted military exercises with the Chinese. “They do one exercise with China,” he said. “We do 15 or 20.” (Source: US DoD)

 

05 Oct 23. Austin Says U.S. Committed to Defending Japan, Including Senkaku Islands. Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty states the United States’ “ironclad” commitment to defend all of Japan, including the Senkaku Islands and other territories, said Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III.

The Senkaku Islands, claimed by China, are in the East China Sea, about 43 miles northeast of Taiwan.

Austin provided remarks today, hosting an enhanced honor cordon and meeting, welcoming Japanese Defense Minister Minoru Kihara to the Pentagon.

“This is a time of historic momentum in the U.S.-Japan alliance. We support your government’s bold decisions to invest in advanced capabilities including counterstrike, and to increase defense spending to 2% of Japan’s gross domestic product by 2027,” Austin said.

Japan and the U.S. face major challenges including China’s coercive behavior, North Korea’s dangerous provocations and Russia’s reckless war of choice against Ukraine, he said.

The U.S. and Japan share a vision for a free, open, peaceful and prosperous Indo-Pacific region, Austin said.

“Our force posture is becoming more versatile, more mobile and more resilient. And we’re also investing in stronger ties with our friends across the region,” he said, including South Korea.

Japan, South Korea and the U.S. are dedicated to mutual defense, including exercising combined forces under a multiyear, trilateral framework, sharing real-time missile warning data and strengthening secure lines of communication, Austin said.

The United States is also encouraged to see Japan working more closely with allies like Australia, he said, noting that in exercises last month, F-35A fighter jets from Australia operated in Japan within days of F-35s from Japan flying over Australia.

Austin congratulated Kihara on his appointment to defense minister last month.

Kihara said he looks forward to strengthening Japan’s defense capabilities to deter aggression in the region.

Japan appreciates America’s ironclad commitment to defend Japan and will work in close cooperation on strengthening the alliance, Kihara said.

(Source: Defense-Aerospace.com/US DoD)

 

05 Oct 23. Egypt: US military aid block unlikely to reduce elevated human rights, domestic unrest risks. On 3 October, Ben Cardin, the newly-appointed chairman of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, announced that the US will block military finance aid for Egypt worth USD 235m. The block is reportedly due to human rights concerns. Cardin called for major reforms in pre-detention practices and more space for political opposition and independent media. The announcement comes ahead of the Egyptian presidential election on 10-12 December. The block is unlikely to pressure the government to reduce its repression of opposition candidates and government critics ahead of the polls. Heightened international scrutiny over human rights is likely to elevate anti-government sentiment and domestic unrest risks ahead of the election. The sum of USD 235m marks only part of the USD 1.2 bn approved for Egypt on 14 September. As such, the block is unlikely to harm the Egyptian security forces’ capabilities significantly in the coming months. (Source: Sibylline)

 

05 Oct 23. Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan: Protocol signing will raise prospects of border settlement in coming months.  On 2 October, top security officials from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan signed a protocol in Bishkek regarding disputed border areas. While the officials did not disclose the details of the protocol, they claimed it outlines a blueprint to resolve border disputes and to sign a border agreement in the ‘shortest possible time’. Border disputes, especially over enclaves in the restive Fergana Valley, have been a source of regional insecurity for years. In September 2022, border tensions escalated into deadly clashes, killing over 100 people. Disputes over access to natural resources in the region have compounded cross-border tensions. However, Bishkek and Dushanbe have since agreed to re-open the border fully after completing demarcation and delimitation works. Therefore, the protocol signing raises the prospects of a border settlement in the coming months, which will decrease regional security risks and the likelihood of a major border conflict. (Source: Sibylline)

 

05 Oct 23. Indonesia must be prudent with military spending, president says. Indonesian President Joko Widodo on Thursday emphasised the importance of military hardware modernisation but warned any spending should be done wisely as the state budget was limited.

The archipelago nation of 270m people, Southeast Asia’s biggest economy, is seeking to modernise its military but has lagged its regional peers in recent years.

“Spending for military hardware must be done wisely, in terms of the amount or allocation,” Jokowi, as the president is known, said during an armed forces parade.

Defence Minister Prabowo Subianto, a likely presidential candidate seeking to replace the outgoing Jokowi next year, has led a series of procurements of late, including 42 Dassault Rafale fighter jets for $8.1 bn, 12 new drones from Turkish Aerospace worth $300 m, and 12 Mirage 2000-5 fighter jets valued at $800 m.

Jokowi in July also warned his cabinet to maintain a “healthy” budget as he highlighted outsised spending by the security agencies, including the defence ministry.

For the past decade, Indonesia’s defence spending per capita and as a percentage of gross domestic product has been the lowest among Southeast Asia’s six emerging market economies, according to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) think tank. (Source: Defense News Early Bird/Reuters)

 

05 Oct 23. Mali: Call for demonstration increases risks of clashes, threatens government stability. On 4 October, opposition leader Mahmoud Dicko, called for a peaceful protest in the capital Bamako on 13 October to demand an expedited transition to civilian rule after the military government announced an indefinite postponement of the 2024 presidential election. As one of Mali’s most significant political and religious leaders, Dicko previously led a series of mass demonstrations in 2020, which contributed to the overthrow of then-president Ibrahim Boubacar Keita. Large-scale demonstrations will almost certainly prompt an elevated security presence throughout Bamako, likely disrupting movement and increasing the risk of clashes with protesters, elevating incidental risks to staff and assets. Since August, there has been a significant escalation in clashes between Tuareg rebels and Malian security forces, while multiple jihadist groups remain active, targeting civilian and military installations in Mali’s central and northern regions. Consequently, popular mobilisation, particularly in Bamako, will likely further compromise the junta’s authority, undermining government stability over the coming weeks. (Source: Sibylline)

 

05 Oct 23. Armenia-Azerbaijan: Baku’s non-participation in talks will elevate risk of clashes, delay peace agreement. On 4 October, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev opted out of attending an EU-mediated summit scheduled for today (5 October) with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. The summit had aimed to prevent further escalation and restore contact between the two sides following Baku’s military operation into Nagorno-Karabakh last month. According to Azerbaijani state media, Baku wants its ally Turkey to participate in negotiations, though France and Germany objected, and believes an ‘anti-Azerbaijani atmosphere’ had formed. Baku could reportedly participate in tripartite talks with Brussels and Yerevan, indicating that Azerbaijan has not yet abandoned holding negotiations. Pashinyan announced that the Armenian delegation would still travel to Granada and hold meetings, emphasising that a peace agreement could nevertheless be signed. While Baku’s non-participation in talks will raise the risk of cross-border clashes, it is most likely a delaying tactic aimed at increasing Turkish involvement and pressuring Yerevan to cede ground on the Zangezur Corridor – which remains the key trigger issue that could see fighting resume in the coming weeks. (Source: Sibylline)

 

04 Oct 23. Israel has quietly helped fuel Azerbaijan’s campaign to recapture Nagorno-Karabakh, supplying powerful weapons to Azerbaijan ahead of its lightening offensive last month that brought the ethnic Armenian enclave back under its control, officials and experts say.

Just weeks before Azerbaijan launched its 24-hour assault on Sept. 19, Azerbaijani military cargo planes repeatedly flew between a southern Israeli airbase and an airfield near Nagorno-Karabakh, according to flight tracking data and Armenian diplomats, even as Western governments were urging peace talks.

The flights rattled Armenian officials in Yerevan, long wary of the strategic alliance between Israel and Azerbaijan, and shined a light on Israel’s national interests in the restive region south of the Caucasus Mountains.

“For us, it is a major concern that Israeli weapons have been firing at our people,” Arman Akopian, Armenia’s ambassador to Israel, told The Associated Press. In a flurry of diplomatic exchanges, Akopian said he expressed alarm to Israeli politicians and lawmakers in recent weeks over Israeli weapons shipments. (Source: Defense News Early Bird/AP)

 

05 Oct 23. Moldova: Efforts to curtail pro-Russian participation in elections will drive unrest risks, constitutional wrangling. On 4 October, President Maia Sandu signed a law banning members of the pro-Russian Șor party from participating in elections. The move comes ahead of local elections on 5 November, where the ruling pro-EU Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) is fighting growing support for opposition and pro-Russian parties. Chişinău has been trying to curtail Șor’s ability to participate in elections given concerns of Russian interference and destabilisation ahead of key votes, including next year’s presidential election. However, on 3 October the Constitutional Court overturned Sandu’s previous ban. This the led to Sandu pushing through the latest legislation on 4 October under a state of emergency, which will prevent 70 Șor candidates from standing in elections. The back-and-forth between the parliament and the Constitutional Court reflects enduring polarisation, and led the opposition communist and socialist bloc to register a motion of no confidence against the government on 5 October, which is unlikely to succeed. In the meantime, Șor will likely try to rally supporters, driving short-term unrest risks. (Source: Sibylline)

 

03 Oct 23. Niger: Attacks elevate threats to military support for junta, raising government stability risks. On 2 October, suspected Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) militants killed at least 29 soldiers in an ambush utilising both IEDs and vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIEDs) near the Malian border in the Tahoua region. Subsequently, the Nigerien junta has declared a three-day national mourning period, during which a heightened security presence is likely in the capital Niamey. The incident marks the highest casualty attack against Nigerien forces since the deposition of President Mohamed Bazoum in July, following which the rate of attacks against Nigerien forces has increased significantly. Such losses will likely undermine military support for junta leader Abdourahamane Tchiani, threatening government stability amid heightened economic pressure driven by Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) sanctions. Moreover, competing claims and denial that the Nigerien junta had accepted mediation offers from Algeria, likely also reflect instability within the government, sustaining tensions over the issue of Niger’s transition process. (Source: Sibylline)

 

03 Oct 23. Syria-Israel: Deir ez-Zor airstrike reflects volatile security environment, elevated attack risks. On 2 October, an alleged Israeli airstrike hit military positions of pro-Iranian militants in Deir ez-Zor governorate in eastern Syria near the border area with Iraq, injuring two soldiers. Israeli strikes in the area, an axis route of smuggling from Iraq, are relatively rare, with the last strike taking place in November 2022, during a peak period of tit-for-tat activity between Israel and Iran. The strike indicates a strategic target was likely in the area, reflecting Iranian attempts to exploit the weakened security presence of Syrian Democratic Forces in the area following recent clashes with Arab tribes. There are sustained risks of further Israeli strikes, elevating bystander risks near military and militant positions in the coming weeks due to the heightened security volatility in the area. Furthermore, there is a realistic possibility of Iranian cross-border retaliation against Israeli targets, particularly in the form of cyber attacks, elevating risks of tit-for-tat attacks in the coming month. (Source: Sibylline)

 

03 Oct 23. Haiti: Approval of foreign security mission faces sustained risk of armed conflict. On 2 October, the UN Security Council authorised a multinational force to combat Haiti’s powerful gangs. Kenya made a commitment to lead a mission and provide 1,000 police personnel. The Bahamas followed suit with a commitment of 150 individuals, while Jamaica and Antigua and Barbuda have also expressed their willingness to offer assistance. However, the deployment timeline remains uncertain, given the limited commitments so far. Past interventions in Haiti have a dubious legacy, making the local population wary of foreign troops. In August, the leader of the G9 gang, Jimmy Cherizier, threatened armed resistance against any foreign force. Operationalising the mission will likely require extensive planning and resources that Kenya has yet to secure. Elections are also scheduled to take place this year on an undetermined date after having been postponed due to instability and violence. The risk of armed conflict and unrest persists amid continued volatility despite the potential deployment of a multinational force. (Source: Sibylline)

 

03 Oct 23. US Exploring Options to Help Philippines, SE Asia States Boost Maritime Defense. The United States is identifying ways to help boost the maritime security capabilities of Southeast Asian states, including the Philippines, in the South China Sea, the US Department of Defense (DOD) said Friday.

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Lindsey Ford made the statement at a US congressional hearing as she took note of China’s “broader efforts” to expand its military footprint in the South China Sea.

“While our allies and partners have taken great steps to stand up for our shared vision, the DOD is taking an increasingly proactive approach to counter PRC (People’s Republic of China) coercion,” she said.

“We are laser-focused on identifying new and cost-effective emerging technologies that will bring greater capability to our allies and partners more quickly.”

Ford said since 2016, the DOD has allocated more than USD475 m in capabilities to allow its partners in Southeast Asia “to sense, share, and contribute to regional maritime security” in the region.

She said the DOD is exploring the possibility of providing its allies with unmanned surface and subsurface systems for situational awareness, mesh networks for at-sea communications, undersea sensing, and expeditionary logistics capabilities, such as 3D printing and modular at-sea resupply.

Delivery of these systems, she said, will also be complemented with system-specific training, tactics, techniques, and procedures for creative employment options.

In her submitted statement to the US House of Representative Committee on Foreign Affairs hearing, “Lasers and Water Cannons: Exposing China’s Harassment in the South China,” Ford argued that China’s actions over the contested region are not isolated incidents.

“These actions demonstrate a pattern of increasingly risky and coercive behavior, a manifestation of PRC’s growing willingness to use its military instrument of power to achieve its foreign policy objectives,” she said.

Ford pointed out that China, over the past decades, added “more than 3,200 acres of land to its seven occupied outposts” in the Spratlys, which now feature airfields, berthing areas, and resupply facilities.

Since 2018, she said, China has “steadily equipped its Spratly Island outposts, including Mischief Reef, Subi Reef, and Fiery Cross, with an increasing array of military capabilities.”

Ford said China uses these outposts “to support People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) vessels, People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) deployments, and China Coast Guard (CCG) operations in the South China Sea, including routine harassment of Southeast Asian nations’ vessels and assets, undermining these nations’ sovereign rights under international law.”

“We’ve witnessed a sharp uptick in coercive and risky operational behavior by the PRC, threatening the safety not only of US forces but of allied and partner forces operating in the South China Sea,” she said.

Rep. Young Kim of California’s 40th congressional district, chair of the House Subcommittee on Indo-Pacific, said she has witnessed the situation over the disputed waters and agrees that the US must support the small littoral states in the region.

Kim last month led a bipartisan congressional delegation to the Philippines and flew on a mission with the US Navy over the South China Sea.

“(What) we saw is congestion. Instead of open water, we saw civilian fishing fleets from South Asian countries, patrols from the Philippine Coast Guard, and vessels from PLA Navy and Chinese Coast Guard – by far the largest and the most common vessels in the sea, all vying for the same waters and islets,” she said.

She added that when they flew near the BRP Sierra Madre in the Ayungin, the Chinese Navy radioed their aircraft and demanded that their plane turn around while claiming they were flying over “Chinese territorial waters.”

“This was clearly a bullying tactic, intimidation tactic. Our partners in the region need our help, and our allies are questioning if the US will be there to help if CCP (Chinese Communist Party) escalates aggression in the South China Sea,” she said.

“Congress must take the CCP’s aggression in the South China Sea seriously and ensure that our allied nations are getting the assurances that they need. This starts with ensuring our military is supporting these countries’ maritime domain awareness missions.”

Kim said the US must also strengthen its economic relations with Southeast Asian states, adding that the Biden administration’s rhetoric about trade in the region has been positive “but has not been met with deliverable.”

On Thursday, Executive Secretary Lucas Bersamin said the Philippines is “seriously” studying the case buildup against China in the wake of its installation of floating barriers at the Scarborough Shoal, also known as Bajo de Masinloc.

The barriers have been removed as ordered by President Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr.

“We have always conducted our relations, (our) foreign policy on a strictly diplomatic tact. Wala tayong (We do not have) aggressiveness or aggression or what,” Bersamin said in an interview. “But whether or not we will file another case against China is one of the options, and I think our lawyers are seriously giving this a study.”

In a media interview on the sidelines of rice distribution in Siargao Island, Surigao del Norte on Friday, Marcos said he would always assert the country’s rights over Philippine waters, but clarified that he is not picking a fight with China.

“Hindi tayo naghahanap ng gulo. Basta gagawin natin, patuloy nating ipagtatanggol ang Pilipinas, ang maritime territory ng Pilipinas, ang mga karapatan ng mga fishermen natin na mangisda doon sa mga areas kung saan sila nangingisda daang-daang taon na (We are not looking for trouble. What we will do is continue defending the Philippines, the maritime territory of the Philippines, the rights of our fishermen who have been fishing there for hundreds of years),” he said.

He added that he would not allow foreign entities to put up a barrier “that is within the Philippines.”

“But in terms of taking down the barrier, I don’t see what else we could do dahil talaga ‘yung mga fishermen, noong pinutol ‘yong tali, ‘yung mga nakapasok na fishermen noong araw na ‘yun, nakahuli sila ng 164 tons na isda. So, sa isang araw pa lang ‘yun (because when the barrier was removed, the fishermen who entered that day caught 164 tons of fish. So, that was just in one day),” Marcos said. (Source: https://www.defense-aerospace.com/ Philippine News Agency)

 

03 Oct 23. Georgia: Persistent destabilisation allegations will sustain anti-government unrest risks, government pressure on NGOs. On 2 October, the Centre for Applied Nonviolent Actions and Strategies (CANVAS), a Serbian-based NGO, denied destabilisation allegations made by Georgia’s Security Services (SSSG). The SSSG accused CANVAS of teaching Georgian activists how to stage violent protests and accused USAID of funding subversive activities. On 18 September, the SSSG published a report alleging that opposition forces are planning to prompt large-scale unrest between October and December to overthrow the government. These allegations are consistent with the ruling Georgian Dream party’s anti-western rhetoric and are likely part of a strategy to deflect responsibility for their likely failure to achieve EU candidacy status, ahead of the anticipated October decision. The SSSG’s accusations will drive tensions with the US and raise international and activist scrutiny, as well as further increase government pressure on US and other foreign NGO operations. Destabilisation allegations will further exacerbate political polarisation and sustain anti-government unrest risks(Source: Sibylline)

 

03 Oct 23. Mali: Military redeployment increases likelihood of clashes in Kidal, elevating risks to staff. On 2 October, the Malian armed forces redeployed hundreds of soldiers and over 100 vehicles from Goa (Gao region) to Kidal (Kidal region) amid increasing Tuareg rebel activity. The redeployment almost certainly represents renewed efforts to re-establish the military’s presence in Kidal, which is controlled by the Tuareg rebel coalition, the Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad (CMA). Since August, increasingly frequent clashes between the CMA and the Malian army have further exacerbated insecurity in northern Mali, with the CMA targeting numerous military bases (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 24 August 2023). The army’s renewed focus on Kidal will almost certainly trigger further clashes with the CMA, elevating collateral risks to staff operating in the region, while elevated risks of ambush at checkpoints will likely disrupt overland movement between Aguelhok, Kidal and Tessalit. Further clashes in Kidal will also incentivise enhanced coordination between Tuareg rebel networks in Mali and Niger, elevating the risks of cross-border attacks. (Source: Sibylline)

 

02 Oct 23. Burkina Faso: July 2024 elections will likely be delayed, raising government stability, unrest risks. On 29 September, junta leader President Ibrahim Traore stated that no election would take place until voting can be held across the country. As over 40% of the national territory is outside the direct control of the authorities due to sustained and widespread conflict with jihadist groups, the announcement is essentially an indefinite postponement of polls scheduled for July 2024. Traore also referenced the need for a new constitution, though he did not specify the key sections in need of reform; again, this is likely a pretext to delay the election. While it is possible that the announcement will prompt sanctions from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), given that no formal postponement has been announced, inaction is also possible. While anti-government protests are currently unlikely, the risk of opposition-led criticism and associated protests will increase as long as elections are delayed, driving government instability risks, as well as state repression and threats to local staff. (Source: Sibylline)

 

02 Oct 23. Mali: Growing insecurity in northern regions will elevate risks to government stability. On 1 October, the Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad (CMA), a Tuareg rebel coalition, claimed to have taken control of the town of Bamba (Gao region) after seizing the town’s military base and reportedly killing around 80 Malian soldiers. Since August, clashes between the CMA and the Malian military have increased in frequency and intensity, with the CMA briefly occupying several military bases in the Gao, Mopti and Tombouctou regions (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 24 August 2023). In the coming weeks, the CMA will almost certainly continue targeting military bases in northern Mali; attacks around cities such as Timbuktu and Gao will threaten supply chains and drive collateral risks facing staff and assets. Further significant victories will likely undermine Colonel Assimi Goita’s presidency and elevate risks to government stability. Additionally, a CMA alliance with the al-Qaeda-aligned Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) is possible, elevating the risk of further attacks targeting civilian installations. (Source: Sibylline)

 

02 Oct 23. Nigeria: Government proposals are unlikely to appease unions, sustaining strike risks. On 1 October, the government announced a temporary wage increase for government workers and a three-month income subsidy for low-income households. The government also announced a pause in value-added taxes on diesel. The announcement comes ahead of indefinite nationwide strike action by the Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC) and Trade Union Nigeria (TUN) from 3 October. However, the government’s proposed wage increase to NGN 25,000 (USD 31.99) is significantly less than the union demands of an increase of NGN 200,000 (USD 255.95). Additionally, in line with government objectives to cut costs, far fewer people will benefit from the three-month low-income subsidy than the broader petrol subsidy. The unions are likely to discuss the government’s proposals later on 2 October. While neither union has yet commented on the proposals, the significant undercutting of union demands will likely sustain the heightened risk of strike action. (Source: Sibylline)

 

02 Oct 23. Armenia: Mass Karabakh exodus will raise humanitarian risks, sustain socio-economic health risks. On 1 October, a UN-led mission reportedly arrived in Nagorno-Karabakh to assess the humanitarian situation. On 29 September, Filippo Grandi, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, reported that around 100,000 Karabakh Armenians have entered Armenia from the territory. Grandi explained that the humanitarian situation remains critical and that refugees need immediate assistance. The mass exodus comes after Azerbaijan took control of the breakaway region in a 24-hour military operation. In co-ordination with Yerevan, the UN has taken measures to address the immediate needs of the refugees. Such measures include medical services, psychological assistance and food. However, a humanitarian crisis remains likely, given the scale of the population move. Furthermore, given that the refugees are unlikely to return to Nagorno-Karabakh for the foreseeable future, the refugee crisis will strain Armenia’s limited resources, driving long-term socio-economic health risks, as well as anti-government sentiment and unrest. (Source: Sibylline)

 

02 Oct 23. Haiti: Planned UN vote on foreign forces deployment raises risk of armed conflict. Later on 2 October, the UN Security Council will vote on whether to deploy an international police force to Haiti to combat criminal gangs. On 16 August, gang leader Jimmy Cherizier recently threatened to push back on the presence of any foreign troops. Civil society groups have also rejected the prospect of intervention, citing the failure of such operations in the past. An intervention would possibly escalate conflict risks, as heavily armed gangs have recently sought to consolidate their positions. However, further state collapse is likely without international support. Nonetheless, a deployment would likely face opposition from local inhabitants, further challenging its efficacy. The risk of armed conflict and unrest will persist in the long term. (Source: Sibylline)

 

02 Oct 23. Lebanon: Possible loss of US funding will likely impact security forces, driving risks in border regions. On 30 September, Lebanese media quoted a US embassy source warning that financial aid to the army and Internal Security Forces (ISF) personnel will not be renewed past its expiration in November. The reports highlight the growing impatience and dissatisfaction of international allies with the longstanding political deadlock preventing the election of a president and approval of reforms. Similarly, an IMF delegation to Lebanon published its findings on 15 September, warning of an unstable outlook and the need for comprehensive policies and urgent action by the government and parliament. The non-renewal of the support plan by the US, regardless of plans to divert other funds to Lebanon, will likely degrade the army’s capabilities in the coming months. This will likely contribute to elevated security volatility in Lebanon’s border regions, affecting operations relating to irregular migration and smuggling as well as terror activity, particularly along the Lebanon-Israel border. (Source: Sibylline)

 

01 Oct 23. UK Minister for the Armed Forces meets defence leaders and military chiefs in Central Asia and Mongolia. James Heappey meets counterparts in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Mongolia with talks focusing on cooperation on regional security.

The Minister for the Armed Forces James Heappey visited Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Mongolia this week to meet with defence leaders and military chiefs, for talks to deepen security and defence cooperation.

In Kazakhstan on Tuesday, he met with officials including Deputy Foreign Minister Roman Vassilenko, Deputy Defence Minister Lieutenant General Sultan Burkutbayevich Kamaletdinov and members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security of the Mazhilis of Parliament, to discuss future cooperation on peacekeeping missions. The Minister also welcomed Kazakhstan’s support for the sanctions regime against Russia in response to the war against Ukraine.

For over 20 years, the UK has assisted Kazakhstan in building the capability of the Peace Operations Centre (KAZCENT), helping to enable Kazakh deployments on peace support operations such as the UN missions in Côte d’Ivoire, Lebanon and Western Sahara. These efforts have been underpinned by military English language training delivered by the UK.

The minister then travelled to Uzbekistan on Wednesday, where he held regional security talks with the Minister of Defence, Lieutenant General Bakhodir Kurbanov, as well as the Commander of the National Guard, General Rustam Jo’rayev, and Special Representative of the President of Uzbekistan for Afghanistan Ismatulla Irgashev. He also laid a wreath at the Victory Park in Tashkent to pay tribute to Uzbek soldiers who lost their lives in World War Two.

His visit concluded in Mongolia, where he became the first British defence minister to visit the country. He met Defence Minister Gürsediin Saikhanbayar and discussed cooperation on peacekeeping missions. The UK and Mongolia have an especially close relationship: our soldiers have served together in Afghanistan and as peacekeepers in South Sudan, and 2023 marks the 60th anniversary of the UK becoming the first Western country to forge diplomatic relations with Mongolia.

Minister for the Armed Forces, Rt Hon James Heappey MP, said: “My visits this week form part of the approach outlined in the recent Defence Command Paper as we build our strategic international partnerships across Asia, in the interests of security and prosperity for everyone. I’ve held productive discussions with defence ministers and military leaders in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Mongolia, laying the groundwork for future cooperation, especially on peacekeeping operations. As set out in the Integrated Review Refresh 2023, the UK is committed to strengthening engagement with Central Asia and Mongolia to boost their prosperity, security and resistance to Russian interference.” (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)

 

29 Sep 23. Maldives: Presidential run-off vote will shape future relations with China, India. On 30 September, the presidential run-off election will be held in the Maldives; voters will decide between the incumbent Ibrahim Mohamed Solih and the former mayor of the capital Malé, Mohamed Muizzu. The first round of voting took place peacefully. However, security will be high for the run-off, and the possibility of localised unrest remains. Defying some expectations, Muizzu secured the most votes in the first round (46%) and is now favoured in the polls. Local issues, such as housing and the economy, will be decisive for most voters. However, foreign policy has also been a prominent factor in the contest. The opposition has criticised Solih’s ‘India First’ policy, under which the Maldives has fostered closer relations with New Dehli, sparking concerns about the impact on the country’s sovereignty. If Muizzu is elected, he will highly likely seek closer ties with Beijing and much greater Chinese investment, although India is likely to remain an important partner. (Source: Sibylline)

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