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27 Sep 23. Brazil Claims $1.1bn Arms Exports So Far This Year.
Exports of Defense Products Total US$ 1.1bn This Year, Exceed Last Year’s Total by Over 60%
During the first nine months of this year, Brazilian exports of defense products totaled US$ 1.1bn, or 63% more than in 2022, when the country recorded US$ 648.5m in export sales of defense products. The accumulated result for 2023 is the third-best result when compared to the figures achieved over the past decade. Among the most exported items in the year are weapons, ammunition, explosives and aircraft (fixed wing and rotary wings).
This month, Embraer sold another five KC-390 aircraft to Austria (Austria says it is buying only four–Ed.) and another five to the Netherlands, reaffirming the growth of the national defense industry, a sector that, in Brazil, represents around 5% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and generates 2.9m direct and indirect jobs. Brazil is the largest exporter of defense products in South America.
“At the beginning of the government, President Lula gave us a mission: to boost the Defense Industrial Base (BID), a sector that is extremely strategic for the country, with a high capacity to generate income and jobs. The results so far show that we are on the right path. With the New PAC, we will have more investments and, consequently, this will help us to further develop the Brazilian defense industry,” highlighted the Minister of Defense, José Mucio Monteiro.
Defense PAC – The resources allocated to Defense through the New PAC total R$53bn and will be used to equip the country with cutting-edge technologies and increase national defense capacity, in addition to strengthening the BID, generating more jobs and income. The PAC’s Defense axis covers strategic projects for the Armed Forces, such as naval, land, air equipment and integrative systems.
The Secretary of Defense Production, Rui Chagas Mesquita, attributes the positive results in exports to the intensification of partnerships and commercial relations. “To reach this level, we work on the commercial promotion of our products, services and defense systems. We participated in fairs and exhibitions in Brazil and abroad, we strengthened dialogue with BNDES, a strategic partner, and there was intense dialogue between the Ministry of Defense and the BID, with parliamentarians and development agencies. It is also important to highlight the high added technological value of our internationally recognized defense products,” he said.
BID – It is the set of state or private companies that participate in research, development, production, distribution and maintenance of strategic defense products (goods and services) that contribute to the objectives related to the country’s security or defense.
The BID has 290 companies registered with the Ministry of Defense. The Brazilian portfolio is made up of 1,365 products, such as aircraft, vessels, cyber solutions for data protection, radars, secure communication systems and weapons, among other high-technology items. (Unofficial translation by Defense-Aerospace.com) (Source: https://www.defense-aerospace.com/ Brazilian Ministry of Defense)
27 Sep 23. Azerbaijan-Iran: Plans to establish Zangezur corridor will drive threat of proxy conflict. On 26 September, the Islamic Republic, an Iranian pro-government newspaper, warned Azerbaijan and Turkey not to exploit Armenia’s weakened position to establish a land bridge in southern Armenia. The warning comes after Azerbaijani and Turkish leaders discussed the establishment of the Zangezur Corridor. Tehran views the corridor as a threat to its interests in the South Caucasus, as it would reinforce Turkey’s regional foothold. Furthermore, Iran remains wary that a strengthened Azerbaijan-Turkey alliance would encourage independence claims from Iran’s Azeri Turkish population and threaten Tehran’s authority in northern areas. Armenia’s refusal to establish the corridor would raise the risks of Azerbaijani military action in the coming weeks. The resumption of a full-scale conflict between Yerevan and Baku would likely prompt greater (indirect) Iranian involvement, with Teheran likely to back Shia extremist groups in Azerbaijan. In the meantime, Iran will most likely reinforce its military presence near the Azerbaijani border. (Source: Sibylline)
28 Sep 23. Why British Pressure on Berlin to Approve Typhoon Sale to Saudi is Doomed to Fail. Despite the official commitment of German Chancelor Olaf Scholz to block exports of Eurofighter Typhoons to Saudi Arabia, made in public on the 13th of July, both the UK Government and BAE Systems continue to push Germany to green light the sale, so far in vain. It should remain so until 2026 at best.
Forcing Berlin to export to Saudi Arabia….
Some sources indicate that the UK Government, pushed by the British defence industry, is currently pressuring Berlin to circumvent the publicly-announced decision by Chancellor Scholz not to export the Typhoon to Saudi Arabia during his mandate. Most recently, The Times reported Sept. 26 that “Sunak urges Germany to approve £5bn Eurofighter sale to Saudis.”
Stakes are high for the UK: the Warton-based plant needs to remain active, Saudi money (and only it) is needed to finance the GCAP mega-program and the French rival of the Typhoon, the Rafale, must be stopped before a serious commercial campaign begins in Riyadh to promote the French fighter.
For the British side, Germany has broken the initial agreements of the Eurofighter project: according to the declaration of intent that the four partners, (United Kingdom, Germany, Italy and Spain) concluded in 1986 to launch the Eurofighter project, “none of the participating countries will prevent the sale or approval of the sale of the program’s products or systems to third parties.”
London also gives this clause a broader meaning: if one of the partners refuses to authorize export, another can itself produce the components developed by the one who vetoed the case.
…Is fully vain, and this is why
Although fully understandable, the British strategy doesn’t have the slightest chance of success.
First, the Chancellery has argued that this (old) clause is inserted exclusively in the declaration of intent and not in the production contract and, therefore, has no binding value. The substitution of German elements in the Eurofighter by British (or Spanish or Italian parts and/or components) cannot be seriously considered, given the length and the costs of this solution.
But above all, the British Government is totally wrong in placing this case into the international ring. For Berlin, the case is exclusively a domestic political issue and has never been considered differently. On the German political stage, all the defence experts have strongly expressed their opposition to any export to KSA.
Besides, Chancellor Scholz has chosen to PUBLICLY veto the export of the Typhoon to Saudi Arabia and nothing has happened since (from either KSA or Germany) to get the chancellor to renege…London should admit one fact that was clear from the beginning of the current coalition in Berlin: the cohesion of the coalition will always prevail over any international and commercial issue.
No doubt the case is and will remain deadlocked until 2026 at best. For London, this is not good news in the short term, but in the long term, the German position is extremely worrying for Paris which will be increasingly dependent over the next decade on Germany for two of its future major platforms: the FCAS/NGF and the MGCS. (Source: https://www.defense-aerospace.com/)
28 Sep 23. Burkina Faso: Threats to government stability remain elevated despite allegedly foiling coup. On 27 September, the transitional government in Burkina Faso claimed that security forces had foiled a coup attempt the previous day, arresting four officers with another two on the run. The announcement follows shortly after French-based news magazine Jeune Afrique was suspended for publishing articles over mounting military divisions and after rumours of a coup on social media prompted demonstrations in support of the junta in the capital Ouagadougou. There is a realistic possibility that the alleged disruption of a coup attempt and public demonstrations of support for the junta will temporarily strengthen President Ibrahim Traore’s position. However, this incident is the latest in a series of disputes with the military, with authorities announcing the arrest of three officers on 8 September for plotting attacks on the homes of senior transition figures. As such, continued failure by junta authorities to make gains against jihadist groups will sustain the threat of future coup attempts. (Source: Sibylline)
28 Sep 23. Sudan: Persistent conflict will compound health insecurity, elevating pressure on NGO services. On 27 September, the Sudanese Health Ministry announced an uptick in dengue fever and cholera nationwide. While total case numbers are currently unavailable, Sudan’s health infrastructure has been critically undermined since clashes emerged between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in April. Mortar strikes and looting have damaged critical health infrastructure and heightened safety risks to healthcare personnel, resulting in the closure of most hospitals in conflict zones. Continued clashes between the SAF and RSF will drive further damage to critical infrastructure and widespread water contamination, sustaining the spread of waterborne diseases over the coming months, including dengue and cholera. Additionally, large-scale population movement will likely sustain elevated transmission of diseases, including measles and tuberculosis. Continued health insecurity will likely increase demands for NGO services in healthcare, particularly in the Khartoum and Blue Nile regions, increasing pressure on already strained humanitarian services. (Source: Sibylline)
28 Sep 23. Gabon: Junta plans to hold national dialogue will likely reduce short-term unrest risks. On 27 September, the prime minister of the transitional government, Raymond Ndong Sima, outlined plans for a national dialogue between April and June 2024. Despite statements indicating a determination to return to civilian rule and calling for civil society to engage in the dialogue, the junta has failed to announce a timeframe for its transition to civilian rule. The announcement of plans to hold a national dialogue will likely mitigate the risk of an escalation in domestic opposition towards the junta in the short term, reducing the risk of a spike in domestic unrest over the coming months. However, further indications that the junta is attempting to prolong the transition, such as by continued failure to provide timelines or delays to the national dialogue, will increase scepticism over the junta’s commitment to reform. This will sustain the risk of domestic unrest into 2024, particularly in urban centres, including in the capital Libreville. (Source: Sibylline)
28 Sep 23. Taiwan: Domestic submarine programme underlines growing international collaboration in defence. On 28 September, Taiwan unveiled its first domestically built submarine in a ceremony attended by President Tsai Ing-wen. The diesel-electric powered submarine, named Haikun, will be delivered to the navy in 2024 after undergoing sea trials and tests. The government plans to expand and upgrade its submarine fleet to ten boats, including eight indigenously made models. Although Taiwan’s domestic submarine programme will not upset the overall cross-strait military balance, the fleet will strengthen the self-ruled island’s capability in asymmetric warfare in the event of an armed conflict with China. The new submarine also underscores increasing defence co-operation with foreign partners as it is equipped with components and systems from several Western countries, such as France, Spain and the US, which will likely anger Beijing and sustain regional tensions. However, such co-operation will likely drive fresh opportunities for foreign defence firms. (Source: Sibylline)
28 Sep 23. Armenia-Azerbaijan: Dissolution of de facto Nagorno-Karabakh state will sustain refugee crisis risks, instability in Armenia. On 27 September, Samvel Shahramanyan, the president of the self-declared Republic of Artsakh in Nagorno-Karabakh, signed a decree dissolving all state institutions. The unrecognised republic will cease to exist on 1 January 2024. The decree also refers to an agreement reached with Azerbaijan, by which Baku will allow Karabakh residents to freely leave the region in exchange for the disarmament of troops in the region. On 28 September, Armenian officials reported that 65,000 Karabakh Armenians had already fled the breakaway region. Meanwhile, on 27 September, Azerbaijani authorities arrested Ruben Vardanyan, Nagorno-Karabakh’s previous head of government. It remains unclear if he will be released, but if he and other pro-Russian Karabakh Armenians are able to go to Armenia, growing anger at Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan will drive the risk of unrest. If the government in Yerevan mishandles the influx of refugees and Baku pushes for further concessions on the Zangezur Corridor, the presence of such influential figures will also drive the risk of a Russian-backed coup. (Source: Sibylline)
28 Sep 23. US weaponry becomes incentive for normalised Saudi-Israel ties. Saudi Arabia eyes US support for nuclear weapons program, security guarantees and arms dealings in landmark talks with Israel. Saudi Arabia is pressing Washington for access to more advanced US weaponry and support for its nuclear program amid US-brokered negotiations between Riyadh and Israel.
Tourism Minister Haim Katz on Tuesday (26 September) led the first high-ranking Israeli delegation to Saudi Arabia, hours after a Saudi delegation arrived in the West Bank for the first time since Israel captured the territory from Jordan in 1967, the BBC reported.
Saudi Arabia and Israel have never held normalised relations, with hostilities dating back to the Arab-Israeli war.
A deal between the two powerhouses would mark a significant shift in regional politics – and a consolidation of the US’ diplomatic influence in the Middle East through a rapprochement of its two allies.
Normalised nuclearisation?
For the US to broker such a diplomatic victory, Riyadh expects streamlined access to more advanced military equipment, an array of US defence upgrades and security commitments.
When the United Arab Emirates (UAE) struck a normalisation accord with Israel in 2020, the US made MQ-9 Reaper drones, the F-35 joint strike fighter jet and various precision-guided missiles available to purchase for $23bn. The Biden administration reneged on the Trump-overseen deal after it reportedly discovered the UAE’s construction of a secret Chinese military facility in Abu Dhabi.
Saudi Arabia will expect nothing short of what the UAE was pledged. The kingdom’s push to join the Global Air Combat Programme (GCAP), established by Japan, Italy and the UK, illustrates another recent attempt to strengthen defence ties with militarily active US allies.
Ties with Israel follow the same trend. GlobalData research shows that Jerusalem has been the most active Middle Eastern dealmaker in the defence industry since 2019, with deals surpassing $5bn in value.
More crucial to the Israel-Saudi-US deal is the prospect of other Middle Eastern nations developing nuclear programs.
Both Saudi Arabia and Israel are keeping a close eye on Iran’s moves towards nuclearisation, which has been an ongoing and crucial facet to US-Iran diplomatic negotiations for decades.
In a rare TV interview with Fox News, Saudi Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman warned that if Iran builds a nuclear weapon, “we have to get one.”
The Palestinian question
In the same interview, bin Salman called for Israeli concessions to Palestine as part of the agreement.
“For us, the Palestinian issue is very important. We need to solve that part,” the Crown Prince said. “And we have a good negotiations strategy until now. We hope that we reach a place that will ease the life of the Palestinians and get Israel as a player in the Middle East.”
The Saudi delegation was headed by Nayef al-Sudairi, already Riyadh’s ambassador to Jordan. Al-Sudairi became Saudi’s first official envoy to Palestine ahead of the two-day trip, which the Palestinian foreign ministry described as “a historic milestone” in relations with Riyadh.
The West Bank and Gaza Strip are two Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967. Human rights organisation Amnesty International say the occupation is “apartheid” and has resulted in the forcible displacement of the five m Palestinians living in the area, which encompasses East Jerusalem. (Source: airforce-technology.com)
27 Sep 23. Austin Pledges Aid to African Partners. “Africa matters” was the message that Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III delivered during a speech in Luanda, Angola, this morning.
Austin pledged that the U.S. military will continue to work with African allies and partners to ensure “that Africa enjoys all the protections of the international rules and norms that advance security and prosperity.”
I am a child of America’s segregated South. I grew up in a time of legalized racist segregation in America. And I stand here in Africa as America’s first Black secretary of defense. I believe with all my soul in the progress that we can make together.”
The United States, unlike other nations, sees African nations as partners in building security, stability and freedom.
This was Austin’s first visit to the continent as defense secretary. He visited Djibouti and Kenya before becoming the first defense secretary to visit Angola.
Africa is a diverse continent with more than 50 nations, hundreds of languages and a mélange of cultures. “The Biden administration believes that the future is being written today in Africa,” the secretary said. “And we want to move forward together, through growing partnerships rooted in mutual cooperation and mutual respect.
“I am here because Africa matters,” he continued. “It matters profoundly to the shape of the 21st-century world. And it matters for our common prosperity and our shared security.”
That there are problems on the continent is no secret. African nations face many of the 21st century’s most urgent shared threats, including pandemics, food insecurity, the climate crisis, terrorism, the plundering of resources and the return of autocracy, Austin said.
Still, there are reasons to hope, and Austin said U.S. Africa Command – the combatant command charged with working with partners on the continent – is positioned to provide aid, he said.
The U.S. strategy on the continent is based on real conversations with African partners. “When we all have a seat at the table, when we work as equals toward shared goals, when we listen and not just lecture, when we invest in our common security — then we have the building blocks for a partnership of principle and progress,” the secretary said.
Frank talk is key to progress on the continent. There are challenges in security, counterterrorism and other 21st century dangers. “Now, our military cooperation with our African partners today is far stronger than it was just a few years ago,” Austin said. We’re working to deepen defense relationships that are rooted in equality and mutual respect. We’re joining hands with new partners and building new coalitions to oppose aggression and uphold sovereignty.”
Africom is working with partners to apply African solutions to local, national and regional problems. “These threats include violent extremism, piracy, cyber vulnerabilities and climate disasters — all too often made worse by weak governance, predatory institutions and persistent poverty,” the secretary said. “We’re determined to work with our valued African partners to develop the capabilities that they need to keep their people safe.”
The support includes professional military education, military capacity-building, counterterrorism, logistics and more.
“Many of our partnerships — including with Angola — focus on our expanding cooperation on maritime security,” Austin said. “African coastal nations must be able to tackle threats at sea, from trafficking and piracy to illegal and unregulated fishing. We’re working with our partners to block illicit activity, to deepen interoperability at sea, to protect local fisheries and to keep the commercial shipping lanes free for everyone.”
Terror groups are also a challenge and groups like al-Shabab in Somalia and the various Islamic State affiliates target civilians and wreak havoc on communities across the continent. “Their cruelty propels waves of suffering and instability that spill across borders,” he said. “African security forces must be able to combat these groups, defend their sovereignty to protect their people. That’s a key focus for Africom.”
Austin cited the re-established U.S. persistent military presence in Somalia as a move in the right direction. The group “has let us do far more to advise, assist and train the forces taking the fight to al-Shabab,” he said. “Under President Hassan Sheikh, Somalia has made important strides towards retaking its territory and disrupting the group’s vicious attacks.”
Across the continent, the United States is deepening counterterrorism cooperation. “The United States is helping our friends in Africa build stronger institutions to tackle the long-term forces that breed extremism,” he said.
Another important aspect is bringing African women into the security and stability process. “Women and girls often suffer disproportionately from war and conflict,” Austin said. “But when women get to lead, when they can participate, and participate fully as negotiators and peacebuilders, the chances of a just and lasting peace go way up.”
Austin assured the audience that the United States is not looking to force African nations to do anything they feel is anathema to their nations, their cultures or their people. “The United States will never take your partnership for granted,” he said. “The people of Africa deserve to chart their own sovereign paths. And we aren’t asking African countries to choose any side other than their own. Africa deserves better than outsiders trying to tighten their grip on this continent. Africa deserves better than autocrats selling cheap guns, pushing mercenary forces like the Wagner Group, or depriving grain from hungry people around the world.”
The United States wants to work toward long-term stability and freedom. “We want our work together to produce lasting security, and not a brittle status quo,” he said. “And we can all see the damage when leaders turn predatory, or institutions grab resources for themselves.”
Local leadership dedicated to democracy is key to progress. “For lasting success, African countries need responsive, transparent and civilian-led institutions that uphold human rights, defend the rule of law and work for all of the people,” the secretary said. “Africa needs civilian leaders who keep faith with their citizens and heed their voices.”
African military leaders must understand that “militaries exist to defend their people, and not to defy them,” Austin said. “Africa needs militaries that serve their citizens — and not the other way around.”
This is key to America’s engagement with African partners. “We will continue to invest in professional, civilian-led militaries,” he said. “We will work together to deepen the norms against toppling democratic governments. And we’ll be candid with our partners when their security institutions fall short of those universal standards. The United States is committed to supporting whole-of-government policies that advance peace, security, and democratic governance together. And those elements are inseparable.”
He noted that across the continent, autocrats have undermined free and fair elections and are blocking peaceful transitions of power. “I had a brief, 41-year career in a U.S. Army uniform, and every day of those 41 years taught me the importance of civilian control of the military,” he said. “So let me be blunt. When generals overturn the will of the people and put their own ambitions above the rule of law, security suffers — and democracy dies.”
Austin noted that Angola’s first contact with America was as a result of the slave trade. “Today, the ocean that once carried desperate, enslaved people from Angola to America has become a basin of peaceful cooperation,” he said. “We know that the walk to freedom can be long. And no one gets it right all the time.”
Democracy is not perfect and when a democracy fails, the whole world sees it, Austin said. “The genius of a democracy is not that it is perfect,” he said. “The genius of a democracy is that it can always open up space to let its citizens strive to live the universal values of freedom, self-government and human rights. And the genius of a democracy is that it is always a work in progress.”
This is personal for Austin. “I am a child of America’s segregated South,” he said. “I grew up in a time of legalized racist segregation in America. And I stand here in Africa as America’s first Black secretary of defense. I believe with all my soul in the progress that we can make together.”
“I’ve seen institutions move from discrimination to democracy,” he continued. “I’ve seen leaders learn powerful lessons from the tragic past. And I’ve seen democracy become a mighty engine for its own renewal. My story is not your story. And my country’s journey is not your country’s journey. But I believe to my core that our dreams are shared, and our futures are linked.” (Source: U.S. DoD)
26 Sep 23. Readout of U.S.-India 2+2 Intersessional Dialogue. Department of Defense spokesperson John Supple provided the following readout: Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Dr. Ely Ratner co-chaired the seventh U.S.-India 2+2 Intersessional Dialogue today in Washington, D.C., alongside Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Donald Lu, Additional Secretary Vani Rao of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, and Joint Secretary Vishwesh Negi of the Indian Ministry of Defense.
The 2+2 Intersessional Dialogue advanced a wide range of ambitious initiatives across the breadth of the U.S.-India partnership, including defense and security, emerging technologies, people-to-people ties, clean energy, and supply chain resilience. On the defense side, Assistant Secretary Ratner and his counterparts reviewed the progress the two countries have made on implementing the Roadmap for U.S.-India Defense Industrial Cooperation; they welcomed progress on new co-production initiatives and committed to expeditiously conclude negotiations on Security of Supply Arrangement and Reciprocal Defense Procurement agreements. They also discussed opportunities to further strengthen interoperability and logistics cooperation, including through combined maritime engagements in the Indian Ocean region, as well as expanded cooperation in the space and cyber domains. The officials also discussed regional security developments and strategic priorities across the Indo-Pacific region.
The officials underscored the transformative momentum in U.S.-India relations and reaffirmed that a strong U.S.-India partnership is essential to upholding security and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region. Assistant Secretary Ratner reaffirmed the Department’s commitment to working with India to advance our shared vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific. (Source: U.S. DoD)
26 Sep 23. Mali: Election delay raises threat of sanctions, domestic unrest. On 25 September, the military junta announced an indefinite postponement of the 4 February 2024 general election. The junta blamed technical factors, including a dispute with a French-based tech company IDEMIA, which allegedly has denied Mali access to its civil identification database since March 2023, preventing the registration of newly eligible voters, over unpaid bills. This is despite Mali holding a constitutional referendum in June 2023. Regardless, the postponement will likely be interpreted by many of Mali’s political class and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) as evidence of junta efforts to delay the transition to civilian rule. ECOWAS has not yet issued a formal response, but in the context of increasing tensions over Niger, there is a realistic possibility the bloc will impose sanctions, potentially disrupting supply chains, cross border operations and increasing compliance challenges. The decision will likely also prompt criticism by political parties, raising the threat of protests in the capital Bamako. (Source: Sibylline)
26 Sep 23. Afghanistan: Taliban’s mass surveillance system reflects heightened security risks for civil society members. On 25 September, international news outlets reported that the Taliban administration was in the process of establishing a large-scale camera surveillance network for major Afghan cities to prevent attacks by international militant groups and clamp down on the Islamic State (IS) presence in the country. The network will utilise and repurpose the surveillance infrastructure created by the US prior to its withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021. It will also complement the existing network of thousands of cameras across the capital Kabul. The Taliban administration has also consulted the Chinese telecom equipment maker, Huawei, to implement the surveillance system. While the exact details of how the Taliban intend to deploy and expand the surveillance system have not been made clear, there is a realistic possibility that enhanced surveillance will be used to target protestors and activists. As the crackdown against journalists intensifies, and restrictions on women increase, heightened security risks will likely persist for civil society members. (Source: Sibylline)
26 Sep 23. Egypt: Presidential elections in December will likely elevate human rights concerns, risks for NGO staff. On 25 September, Egypt’s election authority scheduled the next presidential election for 10-12 December. The candidate list will be finalised by 9 November, and the campaign period will run through to 29 November. While incumbent Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi has yet to announce his candidacy, his participation is almost certain. Despite Egypt facing one of its worst economic crises, affecting living conditions and the value of the Egyptian currency, Sisi is still likely to win the elections due to long-standing systematic repression of opposition and the support of the military leadership. As such, it is likely that Egyptian authorities will continue pressuring opposition figures and perceived critics ahead of polls due to heightened sensitivities over anti-government sentiment, elevating human rights and detention risks. There is a realistic possibility these risks will also impact human rights NGOs and their staff, limiting in-country access and operations in the coming months. (Source: Sibylline)
26 Sep 23. Yemen-Saudi Arabia: Drone attack threatens ongoing peace talks but unlikely to signal major cross-border escalation. On 25 September, Bahrain stated that a drone attack by the Iran-backed Houthis killed two Bahraini army personnel and wounded several others in an undisclosed location on Saudi Arabia’s southern border with Yemen. The Saudi-led military coalition, as well as the Houthi spokesperson, have condemned the incident, which comes just after the latest round of Saudi-Houthi peace talks ended in Riyadh last week. It further marks a notable escalation after a prolonged period of relative cross-border calm, despite continued fighting and attacks within Yemen. The attack has a realistic possibility of stalling talks between Saudi and Houthi officials, which has been subject to limited progress over recent months and vocal criticism from Houthi leadership in mid-August. Tensions among Houthis over the limited diplomatic progress will increase the likelihood of attacks targeting Saudi-affiliated military assets in the near term. However, a substantial cross-border escalation, targeting critical infrastructure in Saudi Arabia, remains unlikely in the near term. (Source: Sibylline)
26 Sep 23. Burkina Faso: Rising tensions within armed forces increase threats to government stability. On 25 September, the military junta suspended the French-based news magazine Jeune Afrique for reporting on discontent within the armed forces. Jeune Afrique reported heightened tensions in several military camps on 20 September, as well as reports of gunfire at Camp Guillaume Ouédraogo in the capital Ouagadougou on 24 September. Allegedly, the junta’s decision to send troops to Niger to face a possible intervention by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) amid poor conditions and high casualty rates in the ongoing conflict with jihadist groups have been a key drivers of recent discontent. While the extent of unrest within the armed forces is unknown, as with the previous military administration, continued deterioration of the security environment will exacerbate tensions. As such, further high casualty attacks by jihadist forces in Burkina Faso will likely act as flashpoints for escalation, raising threats to the junta’s stability. The junta will likely continue to crack down on reports of dissent within the Burkinabe army. (Source: Sibylline)
26 Sep 23. Armenia-Azerbaijan: Pressure to establish Zangezur corridor will drive risk of further military action. On 25 September, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan met with his Azerbaijani counterpart Ilham Aliyev in Azerbaijan, where they discussed the establishment of the Zangezur land corridor connecting both countries via Armenia. The corridor would give Azerbaijan unimpeded access to its landlocked Nakhchivan exclave. On 6 September, Azerbaijan’s foreign minister Jeyhun Bayramov stated Baku had a ‘Plan B’ to realise the Zangezur corridor without Armenia’s involvement, implying that it is considering military action to create the corridor. The meeting comes days after Azerbaijan took control of Nagorno-Karabakh after a 24-hour military operation. While Yerevan has consistently refused to establish the Zangezur corridor, growing tensions with Moscow have weakened Armenia’s regional position. As such, Baku will increasingly pressure Yerevan into making further concessions, driving the risk of further military action if Yerevan does not agree. However, if Yerevan does agree to establish the corridor, it will drive the risk of major domestic unrest and instability in Armenia. (Source: Sibylline)
25 Sep 23. China-Philippines: Bilateral tensions in South China Sea will raise maritime operational, security risks. On 25 September, officials confirmed that the Philippines will dismantle floating barriers obstructing Filipino fishing vessels from accessing Scarborough Shoal’s south-eastern waters. The barriers were constructed over the weekend by China’s Coast Guard, and have intensified already heightened tensions between Manila and Beijing. Last week, the Philippines accused Chinese fishing boats of damaging coral reefs near Palawan. Manila is also reportedly exploring the possibility of filing a legal case before the Permanent Court of Arbitration. This follows Beijing’s publication earlier this month of a new ‘standard map’ that claims Chinese sovereignty over almost 90% of the South China Sea. These claims overlap with the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of numerous countries, including the Philippines. It is likely that tensions will continue to rise in the coming weeks, increasing the risk of protests targeting Chinese interests in the Philippines and posing operational and security risks for fishing and hydrocarbon activities in and near disputed waters. (Source: Sibylline)
25 Sep 23. Philippines: Officials’ claim of militants’ surrender points to possible threat decrease in coming year. On 22 September, the police and army stated that they expect at least 100 members of the extremist Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) and Dawlah Islamiya to surrender in the next 12 months. Both groups are based in the restive Mindanao region and are linked to the Islamic State (IS). The commander of the Philippines Armed Forces 6th Infantry Division claims to have received indications from local government units involved in the reconciliation programme that militants will surrender. In all, 417 militants have reportedly surrendered since 2021. However, while the latest statement points to a shrinking threat in the medium-to-long term, the short-term likelihood of further militant attacks in the region will remain, as evidenced by an armed attack in Datu Salibo (Maguindanao del Sur province) in August which left three police officers injured. (Source: Sibylline)
25 Sep 23. Armenia: Exodus of ethnic Armenians, shift away from Russia will sustain major destabilisation risks. On 24 August, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan indicated that Armenia’s membership of a Russian-led alliance has failed to ensure Armenia’s external security. Pashinyan added that Yerevan must seek the support of other international actors. He has advocated for Armenia to join the International Criminal Court (ICC), which has issued an arrest wanted against Russian President Vladimir Putin. Pashinyan’s statements come days after Azerbaijan took full control of Nagorno-Karabakh after a 24-hour military operation. On 24 August, the Armenian authorities reported that more than 1,000 ethnic-Armenians from the breakaway region have arrived in Armenia through the Lachin Corridor. Baku’s reluctance to provide ethnic Armenians with special status, as well as the uncertainty over the amnesty of ethnic-Armenian fighters, will likely prompt a mass exodus to Armenia; this will stretch the country’s limited resources. Russia will possibly exploit the situation in response to Yerevan’s increasingly anti-Russian posture; growing anti-government protests in Armenia will increase the risk of a government collapse therein. (Source: Sibylline)
25 Sep 23. Bolivia: Former president’s 2025 election bid will sustain government stability, domestic unrest risks. On 24 September, the former president, Evo Morales, announced his bid to run for office in Bolivia’s 2025 election. Morales governed for nearly 14 years before resigning in November 2019 following disputed elections and national protests. Morales stated that grassroots activism motivated his decision to run. However, the move will undermine President Luis Arce’s leadership of the ruling Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) party, with which Morales is aligned. Considering Morales’ divisive legacy, his re-election campaign will likely deepen political polarisation. Domestic unrest and claims of electoral fraud are likely in the long term. While the implications of a Morales victory remain uncertain, the former president’s renewed bid will likely raise government stability risks through the 2025 vote. (Source: Sibylline)
25 Sep 23. Colombia: Prison riot in Buenaventura highlights sustained risk of organised crime, violent clashes. On 24 September, a riot broke out between rival gangs at the Marte detention centre in Buenaventura (Valle del Cauca department) leaving one person dead and 19 others injured. The clashes involved two local criminal groups, Shottas and Espartanos. Buenaventura has recently experienced an increase in gang-related killings as groups vie for control of drug routes. Given that the Marte prison operates at 200% capacity, further deadly riots are highly likely in the near-to-medium term. Despite peace talks held by the government, efforts to curb surging organised crime levels and related violence are unlikely to mitigate further clashes between local criminal groups. The risk of organised crime will be sustained in Buenaventura in the medium term. (Source: Sibylline)
25 Sep 23. Costa Rica: Surge in homicides highlights increasing risk of organised crime, incidental violence. Official data released on 23 September indicates that Costa Rica has suffered over 650 homicides this year, surpassing the prior annual record set in 2021. An official statement linked the upswing in violence to the growing presence of Mexican cartels and an increase in the trafficking of Colombian cocaine via Costa Rica. Notably, Costa Rican criminal groups have adopted similar tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) to major regional and transnational criminal organisations like Mexico’s Sinaloa Cartel; this has resulted in turf conflicts in densely populated areas. The national homicide rate will possibly soon exceed 16 per 100,000 residents, up from 12.6 per 100,000 in 2022. Costa Rica’s rising homicide rate reflects growing criminal capabilities and an increasing disregard for the authorities. Underlying conditions (including geography) are likely to enable further drug trafficking and incidental violence. These factors will continue to jeopardise Costa Rica’s security environment in the medium-to-long term, unless the government adopts a major shift in strategy. (Source: Sibylline)
25 Sep 23. Iran: Foiled IS terror plot highlights sustained instability concerns, government crackdown. On 24 September, an Iranian news agency reported that the authorities destroyed 30 bombs allegedly planted by Islamic State (IS) to target busy areas in the capital Tehran on the anniversary of last year’s nationwide protests. They also arrested 28 individuals across Alborz, Tehran and West Azerbaijan provinces. Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence added that several of the individuals are affiliated with groups in Afghanistan, Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), Pakistan and Syria. The developments will sustain the heightened terror threat environment. IS claimed an attack against a shrine in Shiraz (Fars province) in October 2022. However, there is also a realistic possibility that the government wants to exaggerate the threat posed by foreign Sunni extremists to justify bolstered security measures and its crackdown on anti-government protest activity. This will heighten the likelihood of unrest and clashes in cities with sizeable Sunni populations in the near term, sustaining bystander risks for staff and assets. (Source: Sibylline)
25 Sep 23. Iraq: Court dissolution of Kurdish provincial councils will elevate policy, government stability risks. On 24 September, Iraq’s Federal Supreme Court dissolved the Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG) provincial councils, ruling their extension in 2019 as unconstitutional. The dissolution will likely elevate government stability and policy risks ahead of scheduled elections in February 2024. It raises further questions about the validity of council decisions and actions since 2019. Governance uncertainty is likely to elevate compliance risks for local and international companies operating within the KRG in the coming month. The KRG plans to hold both parliamentary and council elections simultaneously; this will elevate business disruption risks in the run-up to polling day. Political instability and domestic unrest risks are also likely to increase ahead of and after the polls. In addition, the volatile policy, political and social environment will likely elevate risks for business continuity and exacerbate regional socio-economic growth deficiencies in the coming months. (Source: Sibylline)
25 Sep 23. Malaysia’s defence landscape: A thriving triad in land, air, and sea domains. Malaysia’s robust budgets and strategic acquisitions are starting to reshape Malaysia’s military. Malaysia is making strides in bolstering its national defence capabilities, focusing strategically on land, air, and naval domains.
Malaysia’s rising budgets drive defence growth
Malaysia’s dedication to fortifying its defence capabilities is apparent in the allocation of $4bn to the defence budget in 2023. Reflecting a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 5.5% from 2019 to 2023. The budget is poised for further expansion, with projections indicating a CAGR of 8.4%, reaching $6.2bn by 2028.
Noteworthy is the surge in acquisition budget, from $1.4bn in 2023 to $2.1bn in 2028, driven by procurement programmes focused on aircraft, corvettes, and armoured vehicles.
Strategic initiatives across domains
Malaysia’s pursuit of military modernisation is evident in land, air, and naval initiatives. The Royal Malaysian Air Force has signed a contract with Korea Aerospace Industries for 18 FA-50 light combat aircraft.
The Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) has acquired four Batch-I Littoral Mission Ship (LMS) vessels, a move to reduce the number of ship classes in the RMN under its “15 to 5 Transformation Programme.”
Malaysia’s maritime dominance and technological leaps
Naval vessels and surface combatants are projected to be the largest market sector in Malaysia, accounting for $1.96bn in spending from 2023 to 2028, with a CAGR of 15.4%, according to GlobalData’s ‘Malaysia Defense Market 2023-2028′ report. The market for light combat vessels within this sector is anticipated to be $1.15m.
The Maharaja Lela-class frigates, constructed by Boustead Heavy Industries Corporation in collaboration with Naval Group, had an estimated contract allocation of $1.31m over the forecast period.
Promising growth avenues and geopolitical considerations
Malaysia’s defence market has high-growth opportunities, with military fixed-wing aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, and missile defence systems leading the pack, boasting CAGRs of 39.7%, 35.3%, and 16.1%, respectively.
Territorial disputes with neighbouring nations continue to shape Malaysia’s defence posture. These disputes necessitate investments in border security and defence capabilities. The nation’s participation in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping initiatives underscores its commitment to global harmony.
Malaysia’s defence strategy combines self-reliance, counter-terrorism measures, and support for UN-sponsored peacekeeping efforts. Additionally, the nation participates in the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA), a multilateral defence cooperation pact involving the UK, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, and Singapore.
Balancing security and socioeconomic priorities
As defence spending grows, Malaysia grapples with economic challenges, including income inequality and regional disparities. Balancing defence expenditure with broader financial priorities remains crucial, ensuring the nation’s security while fostering economic development.
The nation’s defence modernisation initiatives across land, air, and naval domains, coupled with its geopolitical engagements, position Malaysia as a key player in the evolving security landscape of Southeast Asia. Balancing these defence investments with broader economic considerations will be pivotal in achieving long-term security and prosperity. (Source: army-technology.com)
25 Sep 23. The U.S. and Kenya signed a defense agreement Monday that will see the East African nation get resources and support for security deployments as it is poised to lead a multi-national peacekeeping mission to Haiti to combat gang violence.
U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and Kenya’s Defense Minister Aden Duale signed the accord at a meeting in the Kenyan capital, Nairobi. The agreement guides the countries’ defense relations for the next five years as the war in East Africa against the al-Qaeda linked al-Shabab extremist group intensifies.
Austin thanked Kenya for volunteering to take the leadership of the Haiti multi-national force and reiterated that the U.S government would work with Congress to secure the $100 m in funding that it pledged on the sidelines of the U.N General Assembly.
Austin said the rest of the world ought to follow Kenya’s commitment to global security and “step up and provide more personnel, equipment, support, training and funding.”
Kenya has pledged to send 1,000 security officers to Haiti to combat gang violence in a mission that is pending the U.N Security Council’s formal approval but has received support from the U.N. and U.S.
Duale said his country is ready to deploy to Haiti and cited Kenya’s “very long history of global peacekeeping” in Kosovo, neighboring Somalia and Congo.
Human rights activists, meanwhile, have expressed concerns over the deployment, citing a history of human rights abuses during security operations in the country.
Some security analysts have expressed concerns that there will be a language barrier between the deployment from Kenya, an English- and Swahili-speaking country, and the people of Haiti, where the official languages are French and Creole.
On the regional fight against al-Shabab, Austin said he had met with Somalia’s president and that both agreed that the country had made “significant progress in the last year against al-Shabab.” But Austin also said that “progress is not always a straight line so we may see things improve significantly on one day and maybe we’ll see challenges on the next day.”
Somalia last week asked the U.N. to pause for three months the withdrawal of 3,000 troops in the second phase of drawdown to allow the country’s forces to regroup. Somalia is expected to take up its full security responsibilities by end of 2024. (Source: Defense News Early Bird/AP)
25 Sep 23. US military captures key Islamic State militant during helicopter raid. The U.S. military said Monday it had captured an operator for the Islamic State extremist group during a helicopter raid in northern Syria. The operator, Abu Halil al-Fad’ani, “was assessed to have relationships throughout the ISIS network in the region,” U.S. Central Command said in a statement.
His capture on Saturday increases the chance that U.S. counterterrorism operations there will be able to target additional members of the group, command spokesman Lt. Col. Troy Garlock said.
The U.S. has approximately 900 troops in Syria focused on countering the remnants of the Islamic State group, which had held a wide swath of Syria until 2019.
News of the capture came as U.S.-backed Kurdish-led forces imposed a curfew after continued skirmishes with rival Arab militiamen. According to reports from Syrian media and activists, the Syrian Democratic Forces imposed the curfew Monday in several towns in Deir el-Zour province, including in Ziban, close to the Iraqi border where the Americans are based. Hundreds of U.S. troops have been there since 2015. The oil-rich province has Syria’s largest oil fields.
Syria remains in a bloody 12-year civil war that has killed a half-m people. The Syrian government of President Bashar Assad in Damascus sees the Kurdish-led forces as secessionist fighters and has denounced their alliance with the United States in the war against the Islamic State militants and their self-ruled enclave in eastern Syria. (Source: Defense News Early Bird/Military Times)
25 Sep 23. Japan looks to maintain interoperability with US and NATO countries, says GlobalData. Japan has been investing significantly in the modernization of its defense capabilities over the past few years, owing to its perceived threats from North Korea and China. The country’s government also allocated an additional supplementary budget in 2023 to prioritize its defense modernization programs to integrate advanced technologies and weapons into the existing fleet of military platforms through acquisition programs with the US. With these programs, Japan aims to strengthen its defense capabilities while maintaining its interoperability with the US and NATO countries to enhance its operational readiness to respond effectively to evolving threats, says GlobalData, a leading data analytics company.
In addition to the modernization programs, Japan has also been focusing on the acquisition of next-generation equipment from the US to meet the requirements for engaging in modern warfare. Some of the major ongoing acquisition programs include F-35A/B, E-2D AEW&Cs, KC-46A, and RQ-4B Global Hawk, among others.
Sai Kiran, Aerospace and Defense Analyst at GlobalData, comments: “Procurement of F-35s not only enhances Japan’s aerial combat capabilities but also emphasizes its interoperability with the US and other NATO allies, which operate a huge fleet of F-35s across the globe. Japan’s focus on enhancing defense capabilities is attributed to its efforts to maintain its relevance as a key player in the Indo-Pacific region amid growing dominance of China in the region.”
GlobalData’s latest “Fleet Size Dashboard”, reveals that approximately 50% of Japan’s military fleet, consisting of land vehicles, artillery systems, fixed-wing aircraft, rotorcraft, naval vessels, submarines, and missile defense systems, boasts an average service age of less than 30 years. With ongoing acquisition programs, it is expected that some of the older platforms will be decommissioned over the coming years, and the average age of the fleet will reduce further by the end of this decade.
The Fleet Size Dashboard also reveals that more than 93% of Japan’s fleet is developed indigenously, highlighting the country’s ability to cater to the majority of its domestic defense requirements independently. About 6% of Japan’s fleet consists of military platforms that were acquired from its long-term defense partner, the US.
25 Sep 23. Niger: French withdrawal will raise regional insecurity risks, lower likelihood of ECOWAS intervention. On 24 September, French President Emmanuel Macron announced that France will withdraw its troops from Niger in the coming weeks. Paris will reportedly complete the withdrawal before January 2024. The French ambassador and several diplomats will be removed in the coming hours. The announcement comes shortly after the junta banned all French aircraft from its airspace, a measure which remains in effect, but which is unlikely to be enforced for the withdrawal of French assets. France has not yet confirmed where it will send its roughly 1,500 troops based in Niger. Their possible relocation to Chad will likely be perceived as French support for N’djamena’s military government, elevating the threat of anti-French protests by pro-democracy elements in the country. The withdrawal of French troops will further exacerbate the threat of jihadist expansion in the Sahel and increase the threat of attacks in Niger’s Tillabèri region. The withdrawal will also lower the likelihood of an intervention by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). (Source: Sibylline)
23 Sep 23. US, South Korea, Japan raise concerns over Russia-North Korea military cooperation. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and South Korean, Japanese counterparts expressed “serious concern” over the discussion of military cooperation between Russia and North Korea, including possible arms trade, South Korea’s Foreign Ministry said on Saturday.
Blinken, South Korea’s Foreign Minister Park Jin and Japan’s Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa agreed to respond firmly to any acts that threaten regional security in violation of U.N. Security Council resolution in a brief meeting on Friday, the ministry said in a statement.
North Korea’s leader Kim Jong Un made a weeklong visit to Russia last week and discussed military cooperation with Russian President Vladimir Putin.
U.S. and South Korean officials have expressed concern that the summit was aimed at allowing Russia to acquire ammunition from the North to supplement its dwindling stocks for its war in Ukraine.
South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol said on Wednesday that if Russia helped North Korea enhance its weapons programs in return for assistance for its war in Ukraine, it would be “a direct provocation” and Seoul and its allies would not stand idly by. (Source: Reuters)
22 Sep 23. Russia plans to increase spending by more than 25% next year Kremlin cites boosting ‘defence potential’ and integrating new regions for raising draft budget to Rbs383bn Vladimir Putin claimed this week that Russia had overcome western sanctions after emerging from a recession last year © Mikhail Metzel/Sputnik/Kremlin Pool/EPA-EFE-Shutterstock Russia plans to increase spending by more than 25% next year on x (opens in a new window) Russia plans to increase spending by more than 25% next year on facebook (opens in a new window) Russia plans to increase spending by more than 25% next year on linkedin (opens in a new window) Share Save current progress 100% Anastasia Stognei and Max Seddon in Riga YESTERDAY 68 Print this page Russia plans to increase state spending in 2024 by more than 25 per cent compared with this year amid expectations the Kremlin will drastically raise cash for president Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. The draft Rbs36.6tn ($383bn) budget, presented by prime minister Mikhail Mishustin on Friday, lists “strengthening the country’s defence potential” as a key priority alongside “integrating the new regions” partially annexed from Ukraine last year. The plans also highlight “social support for the most vulnerable” — a sign that the Kremlin intends to boost spending on pensions and welfare ahead of next March’s presidential election, where Putin, who has ruled as either president or prime minister for 24 years, is expected to coast to victory, extending his rule until at least 2030. Though officials did not say how much of the budget will go on military spending, which is classified, the increase showed “there hasn’t been such huge defence spending in the whole modern history of Russia”, according to Alexandra Prokopenko, a former Russian central bank official. “This shows that the Kremlin has set out its priorities — and the main priority is the war, followed by social spending and internal security,” added Prokopenko, a non-resident fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center. “Putin is betting on an eternal war — the war has become critical for the regime and the economy.” Bloomberg reported on Friday that Russia planned to raise defence spending to nearly 6 per cent of gross domestic product, an increase from 3.9 per cent this year and 2.7 per cent in 2021, the year before Putin ordered the invasion. Russia’s finance ministry did not respond to a request for comment. In presenting the budget legislation, various government officials emphasised the additional spending that could be attributed to Putin’s plans for social expenditure, some of which were related to the war. For example, the budget will support a foundation for those involved in Russia’s “special military operation” and their families, as well as covering classified payouts to injured soldiers and relatives of those killed in battle. The budget also reflects the grim economic future Russia faces after western sanctions cut it off from global markets and limited its ability to sell energy exports overseas. Though Putin claimed this week that Russia had overcome western sanctions after emerging from a recession last year, his cabinet’s low expectations for the weak rouble and vague descriptions of how it would raise funds for the huge increases in spending illustrated a bleak future for Russia’s economy more than a year and a half into the war.
Russia’s economy ministry said it was basing its plans on the rouble hovering around Rbs90-Rbs92 to the dollar from 2024 to 2026, as opposed to a prewar average of slightly more than Rbs70. The draft budget expects Russia to run a deficit of Rbs1.6tn in 2024, while the cabinet acknowledged that it did not expect a surplus in the coming years and forecast a deficit through to 2026. Recommended Russian economy Russia raises interest rates to halt collapse in rouble It also projects budget revenues of Rbs35tn, an increase of nearly 15 per cent from the current budget for 2024, which was approved last year. “We tried to keep the deficit down as much as possible and foresaw that it will mostly be covered through borrowing,” Mishustin said. The prime minister claimed that Russia’s revenues from oil and gas, which have in recent years accounted for as much as half of the entire budget, would amount to a third of next year’s total. But former central bank officials cast doubt on how exactly Russia would fund the spending as western sanctions continue to bite at energy exports. “The rise in expenses suggested by the law draft isn’t the real surprise; it’s the nearly identical increase in income that catches the eye,” said Sofia Donets, a former central bank official and chief economist at Renaissance Capital. “It’s hard to explain this uptick in income solely by what’s already been disclosed,” she added. (Source: FT.com)
22 Sep 23. Syria: Continued NDF-Syrian Army fighting underscores volatile security environment, risk of attacks. On 20 September, fighting broke out between the pro-government National Defence Forces (NDF) and the Syrian Army in al-Hasakah (al-Hasakah governorate) in north-east Syria. This follows the local NDF commander’s announcement that they have split from the Syrian government. As of 22 September, armed clashes have killed one soldier, injured four policemen and five civilians, as the Syrian Army surrounded the NDF headquarters and deployed tanks in the streets. Elevated mobility disruption in the area is likely due to road closures and the enforcement of the city’s security zone by the Internal Security Forces (Asayish); the measures seek to prevent the escape of NDF members. Armed clashes in al-Hasakah are likely to continue in the coming days, elevating bystander risks. These will be highest in the security zone area, near the NDF headquarters and in proximity to military positions. Security volatility in the area is also likely to elevate the risk of attacks by terrorist groups, particularly the Islamic State, which will possibly target military positions and detention facilities. (Source: Sibylline)
22 Sep 23. Austin Lauds Mozambique’s Leadership on Regional Security. Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III today thanked Mozambique President Filipe Nyusi for his leadership in promoting the role of women in security during an enhanced honor cordon and meeting at the Pentagon. Austin also thanked him for signing the Maputo Accord for Peace and National Reconciliation in 2019, that facilitated ending years of conflict in his nation. The secretary also congratulated Nyusi on signing another compact with the Millennium Challenge Corporation and his leadership at the U.N. Security Council on a range of issues, including climate change. The Defense Department also shares Mozambique’s determination to prevent illegal fishing and trafficking in the region and supports the two nations’ partnership on strengthening maritime security and promoting regional stability, Austin said.
“We’re aligning diplomacy, development and defense to get after the forces that fuel instability and insecurity,” Austin said.
Austin noted that the U.S. and Mozambique have both suffered from terrorism.
“We’re deeply grateful for your partnership to counter violent extremist groups in northern Mozambique and your cooperation with the Southern Africa Development Community, the European Union and others,” Austin said, adding that he hopes to deepen military training between the two nations.
Nyusi thanked Austin, President Joe Biden and Congress for their support in areas ranging from the economy, health and security.
He said Mozambique will continue its efforts to counter terrorism and improve maritime domain awareness. The nation also welcomes military-to-military training with the U.S. and invites U.S. Navy vessels to make port visits to Mozambique, Nyusi said. (Source: US DoD)
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