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21 Sep 23. DRC: Call for accelerated peacekeeper drawdown highlights anti-MONUSCO sentiment; risks to civilians, NGO operations elevated. On 20 September, President Félix Tshisekedi called for the accelerated withdrawal of UN peacekeepers from the DRC to ensure all troops depart by 31 December 2023. Tshisekedi has frequently criticised MONUSCO for its perceived unwillingness to adopt a more offensive mandate to combat insecurity in eastern DRC amid an uptick in M23 rebel activity, driving anti-MONUSCO protests in Goma (North Kivu province) on 31 August. Such an accelerated drawdown will reduce anti-MONUSCO protests over the coming months, mitigating risks to UN assets and staff. Despite the presence of other regional forces, an accelerated MONUSCO drawdown will likely exacerbate insecurity in the eastern DRC. Amid the withdrawal, rebel groups will likely capitalise on reduced international observation to escalate attacks on civilians, including in camps for internally displaced persons, elevating risks to NGO operations, particularly those reliant on MONUSCO for security. (Source: Sibylline)
21 Sep 23. RoK: Parliament will vote on opposition leader’s arrest, possibly driving disruption in Seoul. On 21 September South Korea’s parliament is due to vote on the potential arrest of opposition leader Lee Jae-Myung on corruption charges, following a three-week hunger strike he initiated to protest what he perceives as a decline in democratic values. This event takes place in the broader context of mounting political divisions exacerbated by President Yoon Suk-Yeol’s economic and foreign policies, including those regarding ties with China and the government’s endorsement of Japan’s release of treated wastewater from the Fukushima nuclear power plant. These policies, criticised by Lee and his party, the Democratic Party of Korea, are deepening divisions in public opinion. Due to the contentious nature of the issue, there is a realistic possibility protests and rallies will occur near the time of the vote. Large gatherings around key locations such as the National Assembly will possibly cause transport disruption and blockages of major roads in central areas of the capital Seoul. (Source: Sibylline)
21 Sep 23. Chinese navy seeks graduate students for warplane pilot roles. The Chinese navy wants to hire highly educated graduate students to fly shipborne aircraft, and is raising the age limit to expand its search, as it seeks to improve the qualifications of its air personnel and build a “strong army”.
Besides upgrading its hardware from warships to warplanes, China is also trying to improve the calibre of its recruits, as the military is a career path traditionally favoured by the less educated.
In an advertisement on social media platform WeChat, the People’s Liberation Army Navy said it was seeking graduate students who hold science and engineering master degrees and who are below 26 years old to pilot aircraft from ships, including China’s growing fleet of aircraft carriers.
Just last year, it allowed undergraduates aged 24 or below to apply for the first time. It limited candidates to high school graduates aged below 20 before that.
“The need for high-quality military talent becomes more imperative day by day,” the People’s Liberation Army Navy said in the advert, published on Wednesday.
“The mission and tasks of the navy continue to expand. The speed of the strategic shift of the navy is being accelerated.”
Candidates must be male with a clean “political history” and have no legal or disciplinary history, according to the advertisement.
Training will include three to four years of aviation theory studies and practical flight training. Successfully candidates will have free medical care for themselves and their immediate family, as well as government-provided housing.
China is in the final stages of preparing its third, but first domestically made, aircraft carrier – the Fujian – for sea trials, a key step before the warship goes into operational service.
China is aiming to modernise its military forces by 2035. (Source: Reuters)
20 Sep 23. Armenia-Azerbaijan: Major destabilisation risks in Armenia remain high due to ceasefire uncertainty. Earlier on 20 September, the authorities in Nagorno-Karabakh agreed to cease hostilities from 1300hrs (local time). Azerbaijan also confirmed the end of its military operation. The agreement was reportedly reached through the mediation of Russian peacekeepers and comes after Azerbaijan initiated an ‘anti-terror’ operation on 19 September (see Sibylline Alert – 19 September 2023). The deal reportedly includes the disbandment and complete disarmament of Nagorno-Karabakh’s defence forces, as well as the withdrawal of heavy equipment and weapons from the territory. Issues over reintegrating and ensuring the rights and security of ethnic Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh will reportedly be discussed on 21 September between representatives of the local Armenian population and Azerbaijani authorities. However, it is presently unclear whether this apparent ceasefire will hold (though the military situation is clearly in Baku’s favour). The effective surrender of ethnic-Armenian forces in Nagorno-Karabakh is highly likely to destabilise Armenia; protests and rioting in Yerevan are likely amid growing anti-government discontent. (Source: Sibylline)
20 Sep 23. Haiti: Calls by US president for UN to approve multinational force underscores risk of violent crime. On 19 September, US President Joe Biden called on the UN Security Council to authorise a multinational force to deploy to Haiti amid continued unrest precipitated by armed gang activity. Kenya has offered to lead the proposed mission. However, Russian and Chinese support (which is necessary for the UN Security Council to authorise such a move) remains uncertain. The force was requested by Haiti’s government in 2022 due to the deteriorating security environment. Biden’s public appeal suggests the US assesses the situation is of increasing concern, and his administration will possibly pressure countries to participate. The force’s mandate and composition remain unclear. Given the issues involved in securing approval and the participation of other nations, a near-term deployment is unlikely. As a result, near-to-medium term risks of violent crime and criminal gang activity are likely to further destabilise Haiti. (Source: Sibylline)
20 Sep 23. Israel-Palestinian Territories: Significant escalation is unlikely following deadly Jenin clashes. On 19 September, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) killed four Palestinians and injured 30 others during a raid in Jenin (West Bank). The IDF employed loitering munition drones after encountering heavy fire by Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) fighters. During another IDF raid on the same night near Jericho (West Bank), armed confrontations led to the death of one Palestinian. These back-to-back IDF operations are likely in response to increasing terror attack alerts throughout the September holiday period. While significant cross-border armed escalation is unlikely, there is an increased risk of limited rocket launches from Gaza targeting Israeli cities in the coming weeks. Attack risks will also remain elevated in the next four weeks, including car-rammings, shootings and stabbings, particularly in the West Bank and the broader Jerusalem area. Attacks in other urban centres such as Tel Aviv also remain a realistic possibility. (Source: Sibylline)
19 Sep 23. U.S. Strengthening Deterrence in Taiwan Strait. The Defense Department is working with other government agencies, allies and friends to strengthen deterrence across the Taiwan Strait to ensure peace and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region, Ely Ratner told the House Armed Services Committee today. Ratner, the assistant secretary of defense for Indo-Pacific security affairs, testified about the situation in the Taiwan Strait and moves the United States is making to deter China from bellicose activities toward Taiwan. Ratner told the committee that DOD activities are fully in accordance with long-standing U.S. policy. He said the United States “remains committed to the well-established One China policy … guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the three communiques and the six assurances.”
This policy has helped preserve peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait for more than four decades. “It is why this administration opposes any unilateral changes to the status quo,” he said.
But China is pushing the envelope by waging a campaign of military, diplomatic and economic pressure against Taiwan, he said. “China’s leaders have yet to renounce the use of military force, while they increasingly turn to the as an instrument of coercion in support of their revisionist aims, conducting more dangerous activities in and around the Taiwan Strait,” Ratner said.
China remains the department’s top pacing challenge. Chinese actions also focus U.S. attention on “meeting our commitments consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act — providing Taiwan with self-defense capabilities, as well as maintaining our own capacity to resist any use of force that jeopardizes the security of the people on Taiwan,” he said.
The international rules-based order has kept the peace in the Indo-Pacific since the end of World War II. It has also economically lifted up the nations of the region — including China. Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III has said that “conflict in the Taiwan Strait would be devastating.”
“Taiwan is a thriving democracy that plays a vital role in the world economy with high technology exports like semiconductors,” Ratner said. “The strait itself is an international waterway, where high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight are guaranteed under international law and absolutely essential for global commerce and prosperity.”
A major conflict in the strait would result in thousands of casualties and jeopardize more than $2 trillion dollars in global economic activity, igniting a global economic depression. A conflict would be extremely costly around the world with no one affected more than China itself, Ratner said.
“These risks underscore the extent to which peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait matter for modern life across the Indo-Pacific region, global prosperity around the world, and the economic and national security interests of the American people,” the assistant secretary said. “Military aggression across the strait — whether in the form of an outright invasion, a blockade or other means — would risk human life and global prosperity unimaginable in this century.”
Ensuring peace in the region is not just an U.S. wish. “We have seen a growing number of states in the Indo-Pacific and throughout the international community raise their voices about why peace and stability in and around the Taiwan Strait matters so much to them,” he said. “Maintaining peace, stability and deterrence across the Taiwan Strait is not just a U.S. interest or an interest of the people of Taiwan, it is clearly a matter of international concern.”
U.S. officials do not believe conflict with China is inevitable, Ratner said. Part of this is because deterrence works. “Deterrence across the strait today is real and strong, and we are doing more than ever to keep it that way,” he said. “Our budget request shows that the department is focused on delivering cutting-edge capabilities for our military right now, while investing in the capabilities we need to maintain deterrence well into the future.”
Just as important, the United States is working to advance alliances and partnerships in the region. “Over the past year, we have announced transformative achievements with Japan, Australia and the Philippines, among others, that will make our force posture across the Indo-Pacific increasingly distributed, mobile, resilient and lethal,” Ratner said.
The United States is also providing Taiwan with the systems they need for defense. “Looking ahead, we know that funding to support these authorities would advance our bipartisan, whole-of-government commitment to strengthening Taiwan’s self-defense,” Ratner said. “We are confident that our approach is yielding results.” (Source: U.S. DoD)
19 Sep 23. U.S.-India Relationship Critical to Free, Open Indo-Pacific. A shared vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific bolsters the U.S.-India relationship as the two countries continue to strengthen defense ties, a senior Pentagon official said today.
Siddharth Iyer, the Office of the Secretary of Defense director for South Asia policy, said the defense partnership has experienced an “incredible and unprecedented amount of momentum” as evidenced by Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III twice traveling to India during his tenure and the “warmth and familiarity” between the two countries.
Iyer added that the U.S. and India have reached a “transformative stage in the relationship” as the Biden administration builds upon its progress in the region.
“This relationship is one of the top priorities for the department,” Iyer said. “Our belief is that getting the U.S. and India relationship right is not just necessary, it’s essential to achieving our strategy in the Indo-Pacific.”
“There’s a broad and deep commitment to making that happen,” he said.
During Austin’s most recent visit to India in June, Rajnath Singh, defense minister of India, finalized details on a roadmap to fast-track defense technology cooperation and co-production.
“I think one of the ways in which we think about the roadmap is really a manifestation of Secretary Austin’s commitment to accelerating India’s military modernization, and for him, putting the department on the hook to find targeted opportunities to propose to advance India’s indigenous defense production capabilities,” Iyer said during a discussion on furthering U.S.-India security cooperation hosted by the Hudson Institute in Washington. The Hudson Institute is a public policy think tank focused on defense, international relations, economics, energy, technology, culture, and law.
Iyer said the agreement has already provided the foundation for measurable progress in talks between the two countries in key areas surrounding defense production and supply chains.
U.S. and Indian officials have also welcomed the establishment of the India-U.S. Defense Acceleration Ecosystem designed to complement government ties by promoting partnerships between U.S. and Indian companies, start-up accelerators and research institutions.
The initiative will focus on accelerating and scaling commercial technologies that have military applications, easing access to capital and removing barriers.
Defense officials have identified India as a critical strategic partner for the coming decades and one that has demonstrated growing willingness to advance a shared vision of free, open and rules-based global order.
“President Biden has described the U.S.-India relationship as being one of the most consequential for the 21st century,” Iyer said.
“The major advances that many of us have observed in the U.S.-India relationship are part of a bigger story about what the United States and the Biden-Harris administration has been doing across the Indo-Pacific to advance our strategic objectives, and to come closer to realizing and reinforcing that vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific,” he said. (Source: U.S. DoD)
19 Sep 23. U.S.-Vietnam Defense Policy Dialogue. Department of Defense spokesperson Lt. Col. Martin Meiners provided the following readout:
Assistant Secretary of Defense Dr. Ely Ratner co-chaired the annual U.S.-Vietnam Defense Policy Dialogue (DPD) with Vietnam Deputy Defense Minister Senior Lieutenant General Hoang Xuan Chien today in Washington, D.C. The DPD is the highest-level forum for advancing bilateral defense cooperation between the United States and Vietnam, and this year’s meeting took place against the backdrop of the tenth-anniversary year for the U.S.-Vietnam Comprehensive Partnership, as well as the beginning of the recently elevated U.S.-Vietnam Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.
The two leaders reaffirmed the importance of the U.S.-Vietnam partnership amid evolving regional dynamics in the Indo-Pacific and exchanged views on regional issues of mutual interest. Assistant Secretary Ratner expressed the United States’ commitment to a strong, prosperous, and independent Vietnam, and highlighted continued U.S. support for ASEAN centrality. Both leaders affirmed their support for the rules-based international order and agreed to work together, along with like-minded partners, to peacefully address and resolve disputes in the region.
Assistant Secretary Ratner and Deputy Defense Minister Chien underscored the value of practical cooperation between the United States and Vietnam and discussed ways to advance bilateral defense cooperation while developing Vietnam’s capabilities across multiple domains. They also emphasized the importance of shared efforts to recover remains of both U.S. and Vietnamese missing persons, and continued work in other important war legacy spaces.
Assistant Secretary Ratner noted the Department’s enduring commitment to dioxin remediation efforts and shared archival documents, collected by Harvard University, to help find missing Vietnamese personnel and received from General Chien two identification cards of missing Americans. Moving forward, the two leaders agreed to enhanced cooperation on defense industry and trade, maritime security, information sharing, cyber security, humanitarian missions, and other areas of shared interest. (Source: U.S. DoD)
18 Sep 23. Somalia-Ethiopia: Substantial al-Shabaab operations underline elevated attack, cross-border threats. On 17 September, al-Shabaab ambushed an Ethiopian military convoy en route to garrisons in Wajid and Hudur (both Bakool region) in south-western Somalia from the Ethiopian-Somali border, with IEDs and small arms. Casualty figures have not yet been confirmed. While Ethiopian officials have acknowledged heavy casualties, they have denied al-Shabaab’s claims to have killed 167 Ethiopian soldiers. The incident underlines the persistent and substantial al-Shabaab presence in southern Somalia, where the Somali government has largely been unable to co-ordinate major offensive action. Continued entrenchment of al-Shabaab positions in southern Somalia will prevent the Somali government from achieving its goal of removing al-Shabaab by early 2024. Persistent and elevated risk of attacks will substantially increase threats to overland movement throughout southern and central Somalia, including when travelling with a heavy security presence. There is also a rising risk of cross-border al-Shabaab attacks into Ethiopia, though this threat is primarily concentrated in border areas of Ethiopia’s Somali region. (Source: Sibylline)
19 Sep 23. Egypt: North Sinai explosion points to possible shortcomings of security forces; security risks remain elevated. On 17 September, an explosion at an air defence base in North Sinai killed eight Egyptian soldiers. The cause has not been determined, though terror groups, particularly the Islamic State Sinai Peninsula, actively target security forces in the Sinai Peninsula. However, attacks this year have been relatively sparse, with an unclaimed attack in southern Sinai in March and a shooting incident after inmates seized weapons during a transfer in northern Sinai in July. Conversely, there is a realistic possibility that the explosion was caused by poor training or maintenance, leading to a weapon system failure. There are increasing reports of issues relating to the training and capabilities of Egyptian security forces, with a training accident on 18 September killed nine officers near 10th of Ramadan city (Sharqia governorate). Nonetheless, the explosion reflects the sustained security and bystander threats in the Sinai Peninsula due to increased military deployment and active terror groups, sustaining the overall high-risk operational environment. (Source: Sibylline)
19 Sep 23. National Treasury confirms SANDF cost-cutting measures. That cost-cutting measures are coming to the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) has been confirmed by a National Treasury letter to Acting Secretary for Defence Dr Thobekile Gamede. The letter, dated 31 August 2023, was sent by Ismail Momoniat, National Treasury Acting Director General, and presented to Parliament this week.
With the subject ‘Cost containment measures to assist national departments, public entities and provinces to close fiscal gap,’ the letter reminded Gamede that at its 15 August 2023 meeting, Cabinet noted the economic growth outlook for South Africa has worsened significantly relative to expectations, “given the impact of more intense loadshedding and freight and port logistical constraints, amongst other factors. In addition, the fiscal outlook-was negatively affected by the higher-than anticipated [public sector] wage settlement.”
Since the tabling of the 2023 budget, low economic growth has resulted in deteriorating revenue collection and funding conditions, and tax revenue under-collection has worsened, “already resulting in a lower projection of the revenue estimate for 2023/24,” the letter stated. “Funding performance through the debt markets has also been poorer than anticipated over the past few months. As a result, we face unprecedented challenges for the current 2023/24 financial year, even as we hope conditions will improve over the medium-term, once the underlying factors like loadshedding and logistical constraints are addressed.”
Due to the reduced funding collected, National Treasury said it is identifying immediate measures to reduce the level of government spending. “Heads of national departments should implement the following cost containment measures,” Momoniat wrote to Gamede, and these include:
Freeze the hiring of new employees
Freeze the process of advertising new procurement contracts for all infrastructure projects, unless approved otherwise by the National Treasury Drastically reduce spending on travel by freezing all non-essential travel Freeze spending on catering, conferences, workshops and other related goods and services that have not yet been contracted.
Momoniat warned that “these measures alone will not by themselves fully restore fiscal sustainability. The National Treasury will work with all national departments and public entities, as part of the coming adjustments budget process, to identify further measures to consolidate budgets.”
Furthermore, “National Treasury would also like to clarify that no additional funds have been identified for the 2023 Public Service Co-ordinating Bargaining Council wage settlement,” meaning that “departments and public entities that receive transfers from the National Revenue Fund must absorb the cost of the 2023 wage agreement within departmental baselines. We appreciate that these measures will be especially challenging for personnel-intensive departments and will engage with such departments and provinces.”
The Department of Defence will have to find R2.4bn for these salary increases in 2023/24, according to a draft presentation seen by defenceWeb on the impact of National Treasury budget cuts affecting the Department of Defence.
Momoniat told Gamede that these austerity measures “can be relaxed as soon as economic and fiscal conditions improve. However, given the fiscal conditions, we have little choice but to request all affected institutions to implement these measures from 15 September 2023.”
Parliament’s Portfolio Committee on Defence and Military Veterans (PCDMV) on 6 September was told by Chief of Human Resources, Vice Admiral Asiel Kubu, the Department of Defence (DoD) is facing a potential shortfall of R6.712 bn during the 2023/24 financial year. This includes the R2.8bn salary shortfall carried over from 2022/23; a R2.4bn incremental increase (for salaries) that National Treasury will not be providing to the DoD; and a “R1.4bn shortfall” this year.
According to the draft presentation seen by defenceWeb, the defence budget for 2023/24 is also expected to be cut by around R1.9bn.
The Department of Defence is battling to deal with these cuts, especially as it uses more Reserve Force mandays than expected in order to fulfil its obligations, including military operations and to secure military installations. Some money has been saved on shrinking personnel numbers, but this has not been enough, and the SANDF has overspent on salaries to the tune of R12 bn over the last seven years.
African Defence Review Director Darren Olivier, speaking to eNCA about South Africa’s defence spending, this week said “we’re past the point of crisis. Essentially at this point we are going to lose certain capabilities and they cannot be recovered unless there’s an unreasonable level of funding. It’s really important for us to be realistic about this now.” (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
18 Sep 23. Taiwan: Heightened Chinese military activity will perpetuate regional tensions. On 18 September, Taiwan’s defence ministry confirmed it tracked 103 Chinese military aircraft around the island in the 24 hours from 0600hrs (local time) on 17 September; 40 sorties crossed the median line of the Taiwan Strait or entered Taiwan’s air defence identification zone. The record-high daily incursion tally follows heightened activity by China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) around Taiwan in the past week, which is possibly linked to the deep-sea drills involving a group of PLA warships led by aircraft carrier Shandong. July to September is typically the most active period for Chinese military exercises. Increased PLA activity near Taiwan is also likely a response to recent US-led drills in the region, underscoring the volatile geopolitical tensions. While the PLA is set to maintain a robust posture in the lead-up to Taiwan’s presidential election in January 2024, the risk of armed conflict remains in the medium-to-long term. Mass air and naval incursions pose limited operational risks to commercial aviation and shipping. (Source: Sibylline)
18 Sep 23. Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan: Persistent border disputes will drive regional tensions, sustain moderate risk of cross-border clashes. On 15 September, Kyrgyzstan’s chairman of the State Committee for National Security, Kamchybek Tashiev, asked Tajikistan to abandon its territorial claims against Kyrgyzstan. He further threatened that Bishkek has enough ‘strength and capabilities’ to make the request in an effective ultimatum. The statements were issued on the anniversary of the Kyrgyz-Tajik border clashes in September 2022, which resulted in hundreds of casualties. Tashiev made such comments despite recent efforts to solve border disputes. On 3 August, Kyrgyz and Tajik authorities agreed to re-open their shared border for vendors and residents living near the frontier, with Bishkek reportedly willing to fully re-open the border, closed since April 2021, after its delimitation and demarcation are completed. However, competing territorial claims and ongoing tensions over the access and use of natural resources have been persistent causes of border conflicts between the two countries. Territorial claims during the delimitation and demarcation talks will drive regional tensions, with cross-border clashes a realistic possibility. (Source: Sibylline)
18 Sep 23. Colombia: Deadly clashes with FARC dissidents will undermine peace talks, sustain risk of attacks. On 15 September, four Colombian soldiers were killed in clashes with FARC dissidents in Cumbitara (Narino department). The incident occurred on the eve of negotiations between the government and FARC dissident group Estado Mayor Central (EMC) to formalise a ceasefire agreement. The government announced a unilateral ceasefire on 31 December 2022. However, violence continues in conflict-affected regions (such as Antioquia, Cauca, Choco and Norte Santander) as armed groups fight for control of lucrative drug trafficking routes. The fragmented nature of dissident groups, including continued recruitment, will complicate the enforcement of ceasefires. Ongoing turf wars raise the risk of further clashes between armed groups, sustaining a high level of instability. In particular, entrenched criminal dynamics in historically volatile areas such as Narino will undermine any ceasefire deals. The risk of attacks, especially the targeting of military personnel, will persist in the medium term. (Source: Sibylline)
18 Sep 23. Guatemala: Mass protests amid contested election outcome will drive unrest risks in coming months. On 16 September, Guatemalan President-elect Bernardo Arevalo announced plans to mobilise nationwide protests on 19 September against alleged efforts to derail his incoming administration. The call for protests follows a probe by the prosecutor’s office into the registration and electoral victory of Arevalo’s party, Semilla, which have been deemed unconstitutional by local administrative authorities. The country’s polarised political climate and the entrenched interests of governing institutions increase the risk of further tensions. Arevalo’s efforts to mobilise mass protests significantly elevate the risk of domestic unrest in the near term. Large-scale protests and legal challenges over the election outcome will induce a high level of instability throughout the power transition period in the lead-up to Arevalo’s scheduled inauguration in January 2024. (Source: Sibylline)
18 Sep 23. Iran-US: Prisoner swap deal unlikely to reduce arbitrary detention risks amid crackdown on protests. On 18 September, Iranian authorities stated that a prisoner swap involving five Iranians and five Americans would be taking place today, in parallel to the release of frozen Iranian funds. Part of a long-negotiated process, the deal was initially made public on 10 August. While the developments do not mark a fundamental shift in the relations between Tehran and Washington DC, the successful implementation of the deal will likely remove an element of friction. Nonetheless, arbitrary detention risks for foreign and dual nationals in Iran will remain heightened by the current domestic unrest outlook. Earlier on 16 September, during the first anniversary of Mahsa Amini’s death, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps arrested a dual national suspected of organising ‘unrest and sabotage’ in the city of Karaj, west of the capital Tehran. Likely ongoing anti-government protests throughout the month and an expected government crackdown after the anniversary-related protests will sustain detention risks in the near term. (Source: Sibylline)
18 Sep 23. Peru: Investigations into protester deaths, abuse of authority will sustain government stability risks. On 17 September, the office of the prosecutor summoned senior officials, including President Dina Boluarte and Prime Minister Alberto Otárola Peñaranda, to testify amid investigations into alleged offences during the anti-government protests from December 2022 to March 2023. The probe indicates heightened scrutiny of the state’s response to a wave of unrest that resulted in dozens of deaths. Boluarte faces a preliminary investigation on charges of genocide and abuse of authority. Charges against other senior figures are increasingly likely. The investigations will possibly further undermine the legitimacy of the incumbent government, which is already contested amid continued instability. However, should judicial authorities fail to hold officials accountable amid heightened scrutiny, it will likely trigger further protests. The public would also likely demand Boluarte’s removal from office, driving government stability risks in the short-to-medium term. (Source: Sibylline)
18 Sep 23. Mali: Defence pact unlikely to mitigate rising Tuareg attack threat; risks to staff, assets increasing. On 17 September, the Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad (CMA), a Tuareg rebel coalition, seized two military bases in Léré (Tombouctou region). The seizure follows a similar attack on a military base in Bourem (Gao region) on 12 September, and likely signals a complete breakdown of the 2015 Algiers agreement between the CMA and the Malian government. Compounded by the ongoing withdrawal of UN peacekeepers from Mali, further attacks are highly likely, elevating collateral risks to staff and assets throughout northern Mali. Reflecting increasing instability throughout the Sahel, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger’s military governments signed a collective defence agreement on 16 September, codifying reciprocal military support in cases of domestic rebellion and external aggression. While the agreement will likely facilitate improved cross-border military co-operation, all three signatories lack the capacity to effectively counter ongoing domestic insurgencies. As such, the alliance is unlikely to mitigate threats from transnational jihadist and Tuareg rebel groups. (Source: Sibylline)
18 Sep 23. China’s military hierarchy under spotlight after defence minister disappears. The disappearance of Chinese Defence Minister Li Shangfu highlights the opaque and complex nature of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), diplomats and analysts say.
Reuters reported on Friday that Li is under investigation over the corrupt procurement of military equipment during his previous role. Eight other senior officials are also being investigated. His fate has not been officially explained.
HOW POWERFUL WAS LI SHANGFU WITHIN THE PLA SYSTEM?
In the Chinese system, the Minister of National Defence is seen as significantly less powerful than the U.S. defence secretary and many international equivalents.
The position is essentially a diplomatic and ceremonial role without a direct command function.
Even so, Li is among the six military officials under Commander-in-Chief and President Xi Jinping on the core Central Military Commission (CMC) and is one of five State Councillors, a post outranking a regular cabinet minister.
An aerospace engineer who worked in China’s satellite program, Li was seen as technocrat who helped implement Xi’s modernisation vision for the PLA, military attaches and analysts say.
HOW DOES THE CHINESE MILITARY SYSTEM OPERATE?
The PLA is the armed wing of the ruling Communist Party and, according the Pentagon’s annual report on China’s military, “does not directly serve the state but is rather under the direct control of the party”.
As Li rose through his career to this point, he would have been vetted to ensure he was absolutely loyal to the party and to Xi.
The PLA still operates an active cadre of political commissars who flank the command chain, tasked with ensuring loyalty, unity and morale. The commissar system does not have clear equivalents outside traditional Communist militaries.
The CMC, meanwhile, is the party’s highest-level decision-making body on military matters.
“Since becoming CMC Chairman, Xi Jinping has implemented multiple reforms reducing PLA autonomy and greatly strengthening Party control over the military,” notes the Pentagon report, which was released in November 2022.
That adds an extra layer of opacity beyond routine military secrecy, according to foreign defence attaches who scrutinise the PLA.
DO THE SYSTEMIC DIFFERENCES MATTER?
For sure. The PLA is already the world’s largest fighting force and growing more capable and modernised. As it absorbs new weapons, its system is changing too, with the creation in recent years of new unified regional commands and a Strategic Support Force to cover its space and cyber warfare capabilities – a body Li was deputy commander of in 2016.
As the PLA’s power and reach expands, foreign militaries are eager to learn more about how it functions and the strategic intentions of its leadership – efforts that underpin military-to-military to diplomacy.
The disappearance of Li has raised concerns among some diplomats and analysts that Chinese military outreach is being trumped by an internal security clampdown.
U.S. defence chiefs are eager to restore routine communications with their Chinese counterparts amid regional tensions.
Li, who was sanctioned by the U.S. in 2018 over the purchase of Russian weapons, shunned formal discussions with U.S. Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin in Singapore in June.
After weekend talks between White House national security adviser Jake Sullivan and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Malta, U.S. officials said they noted “limited” signs that the communications chill could ease.
Even if China announces a new defence minister and allows them to meet Austin, some analysts say a more senior figure, such as CMC vice-chairman and close Xi ally Zhang Youxia, would be a figure on a more equal footing.
Given the upheaval, an international security conference Li was due to host in October is now being closely watched.
WHAT’S THE NEXT THING TO WATCH FOR?
If Li does not appear at the upcoming Xiangshan Forum, Beijing’s biggest defence diplomacy outreach event, it could mean that he is still being held for investigation.
Diplomats say China is set to hold the forum in the latter half of next month, but has not sent invitations – late by China’s standards.
Billed as Beijing’s version of the Shangri La Dialogue, the Xiangshan Forum is a high-level conference through which China tries to shape global discussions on defence and security issues.
When the forum was last held in-person in 2019, more than 530 defence and military officials and scholars attended, including defence ministers from 23 countries. The Chinese defence minister would typically give the keynote speech at the forum and meet with delegations. (Source: Reuters)
18 Sep 23. Taiwan Eyes New Chinese Aircraft Carrier as Major Threat. A new Taiwanese military assessment highlights the threat posed to the self-governing island by China’s third and most advanced aircraft carrier, the Fujian, which is expected to enter service after completing sea trials sometime next year.
The assessment, laid out in Taiwan’s National Defense Report 2023, also calls for developing a decentralized command platform across military services based on lessons learned from observing Russia’s war on Ukraine.
The report, released this week, says the Chinese-designed Fujian incorporates major technological advances over the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s two existing carriers, both based on a Russian design.
Most significantly, aircraft taking off from the ship will be boosted into flight with three electromagnetic catapult devices, which are more effective than the steam catapult devices used on other carriers. To date, electromagnetic catapults are used only by the United States on its most advanced Gerald R. Ford-class carriers.
The added power of the catapults allows for heavier aircraft and shorter runways, which combined with other design improvements will allow the Fujian to carry as many as 40 jet fighters, according to Taiwan’s report. China’s two previous carriers can handle 18 and 32 fighters respectively.
“This is a major maritime threat that we must actively deal with in the future,” said Major General Huang Wen-Chi, the assistant deputy chief with the General Staff for Intelligence of Taiwan’s Defense Ministry, in releasing the report this week.
The report says the Fujian will enhance China’s ability to seal off the Taiwan Strait, potentially delaying or preventing the U.S. military from entering the theater to help defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack.
While Taiwan’s military sees the vessel as a major threat, independent analysts point out that much of the technology is new to China and so far untested. Even the U.S. Navy encountered many surprises when it began using electromagnetic catapults, said Kitsch Liao, assistant director of the Global China Hub at the Atlantic Council.
“A problem that [the U.S. military] often encounters is that the catapult is too accurate,” Liao told VOA. “Every time it is ejected, it will cause a lot of structural stress on the aircraft, which may damage the aircraft very quickly. The U.S. military has its own way of solving this problem, and I am not sure whether the PLA has a way to solve it.”
China also lags far behind the United States in training its pilots to fly off a carrier like the Fujian, according to Richard Chen Yeong Kang, a former Taiwanese Navy admiral and currently an adviser to the Taiwan Center for Security Studies.
He told VOA that compared with U.S. Navy pilots — who perform missions at sea for many years — PLA Navy pilots perform missions from carriers only two to three times a year. He estimated the combat effectiveness of the Chinese pilots at only one-third that of their American counterparts and said it may reach only one-half after five years.
Liao estimated it will take two years of training for the Fujian to achieve real ocean-going combat capabilities.
The National Defense Report also recommended that Taiwan improve its ability to survive an attack by developing a “common operating picture” allowing better communication and coordination across the territory’s military services and with its allies.
Taiwan confirmed in May that, with American assistance, it will obtain the NATO Link-22 radio system to connect with the U.S. to form a common operating picture. According to the Financial Times in June, the U.S. is expected to begin delivering four MQ-9B drones to Taiwan in 2025.
By then, Taiwan’s Defense Ministry has said, the island expects to begin sharing real-time intelligence with the United States and Japan and building a common operating picture with those two countries.
Lin Ying-yu, assistant professor at the Graduate Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies at Tamkang University and a member of an advisory committee to the National Defense Report, said that in the early stages of a war, the PLA would likely give priority to attacking Taiwan’s main military command center and early warning radars in Taipei.
That makes it imperative for Taiwan to switch to a decentralized command and control system, he said, although that will require improved personnel training and upgraded equipment.
“It is already difficult for Taiwan to conduct joint operations,” Lin told VOA. “What’s more, how do you conduct good command when all branches of the military are under attack and in a chaotic situation?
“In addition to technology, it is important for personnel to be able to communicate across branches,” he said. (Source: https://www.defense-aerospace.com/ Voice of America News)
18 Sep 23. Joint Press Statement for the 23rd Korea-U.S. Integrated Defense Dialogue. The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and the Republic of Korea (ROK) Ministry of National Defense (MND) held the 23rd Korea-U.S. Integrated Defense Dialogue (KIDD) on September 18, 2023 in Seoul.
Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for East Asia, Cara Allison Marshall, led the U.S. delegation and Deputy Minister for National Defense Policy (DEPMIN), Dr. Taekeun Heo, led the ROK delegation. Key senior U.S. and ROK defense and foreign affairs officials also participated in the dialogue.
During the Security Policy Initiative session, both sides reaffirmed the shared U.S. and ROK goal of the complete denuclearization of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). They pledged to continue strengthening combined defense posture and capabilities to defend the ROK as well as deter conflict on the Peninsula.
The two sides shared their assessments of continued DPRK provocations and its efforts to diversify its delivery systems and advance its nuclear systems. The leaders committed to respond to DPRK provocations that undermine regional peace and stability through close and coordinated bilateral responses that demonstrate the strength of the Alliance. Both sides also reaffirmed the importance of full implementation of all United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolutions by the international community, particularly in light of the DPRK’s failed space launch vehicle (SLV) launches in May and August.
Furthermore, the U.S. side reaffirmed its ironclad commitment to the defense of the ROK, leveraging the full range of U.S. military capabilities—including nuclear, conventional, and missile defense capabilities as well as advanced non-nuclear capabilities—and reiterated that any nuclear attack by the DPRK against the United States or its Allies will result in the end of the Kim regime.
To this effect, the two sides assessed that the Ulchi Freedom Shield 23 (UFS23) exercise significantly improved the Alliance’s crisis management and all-out war execution capabilities. The exercise was conducted in August of this year under a realistic operational environment that reflected the DPRK’s advancing nuclear and missile threats as well as the possibility of a rapid transition to wartime. They also assessed that UFS23, in conjunction with over 30 intensive Warrior Shield field training exercises, enhanced combined operation execution capabilities. Based on these outcomes, the two sides pledged to further strengthen combined exercises and training to stay responsive to the rapidly changing security environment on the Korean Peninsula.
In commemorating the 70th anniversary of the U.S.-ROK Alliance and Armistice Agreement, the two sides agreed to co-host the ROK-UNC Member States Defense Ministerial Meeting in conjunction with the 55th Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) in November. The leaders acknowledged that the meeting would strengthen U.S and ROK solidarity with the UNC Member States who share core values of promoting peace and security on the Korean Peninsula.
On defense science and technology cooperation, both sides recognized the need to modernize the Alliance and expeditiously deliver game-changing technologies to the warfighter. To this end, the two sides pledged to continue strengthening cooperation based on shared strategic interests and enhance collaboration on joint research and development. The leaders underscored the importance of bolstering supply chain resiliency and strengthening the connection between U.S. and ROK defense industrial bases to enhance interoperability and interchangeability within the Alliance defense architecture.
Both sides acknowledged progress of the revision of the Tailored Deterrence Strategy (TDS) based on guidance from U.S. and ROK strategic documents to effectively deter and respond to advancing DPRK nuclear and missile threats. The leaders shared a common understanding that the document, in conjunction with the progress achieved through the newly established Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG), will contribute to consultations and joint planning to this effect.
The leaders reviewed progress on the Program Analysis Working Group (PAWG), which aims to counter the DPRK’s evolving missile threat and pledged to continue close collaboration. Both sides also agreed to initiate a joint study through the Counter-Missile Working Group (CMWG) to further develop the Alliance’s comprehensive counter-missile strategy.
The two sides commended the outcomes of the May 2023 Cyber Cooperation Working Group (CCWG) meeting, which included discussions on plans to participate in a bilateral cyber exercise early next year. The leaders also acknowledged that the ROK-U.S. Space Cooperation table-top exercise (TTX) will highlight ways the two sides can work together to build a unified understanding of deterrence and threats in the space domain. The U.S. and ROK also pledged to continue close consultations on various space cooperation measures, through the Space Cooperation Working Group (SCWG).
During the Conditions-based Operational Control (OPCON) Transition Working Group (COTWG), both sides reviewed the progress in meeting the three conditions under the bilaterally approved Conditions-based OPCON Transition Plan (COTP) and reaffirmed a mutual commitment to strengthening the combined defense posture of the Alliance. In particular, the leaders noted the progress made in pursuing the transition of wartime OPCON this year, including the bilateral evaluation of COTP capabilities and systems, the transition of Combined Component Commands to standing component commands, and the assessment of the regional security environment. The two sides pledged to comprehensively review the results of the bilateral evaluation to pursue the F-CFC Full Operational Capability (FOC) certification and other subsequent tasks in a systematic and stable manner.
During the Executive Session, acting DASD Allison Marshall and DEPMIN Heo led discussions on the increasingly complex regional and global security environment. As such, the two leaders reaffirmed the importance of upholding the the rules-based international order and adhering to international law. They pledged to work closely together to promote peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region, including in the South China Sea and beyond.
Both delegations noted efforts to expand cooperation with Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) nations and Pacific Island countries through the Regional Cooperation Working Group (RCWG) as part of efforts to implement the ROK Strategy for a Free, Peaceful, and Prosperous Indo-Pacific Region and the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy.
The two sides also underscored the significance of the outcomes of the Trilateral Leaders’ Summit at Camp David in August, which marked the beginning of a “new era of ROK-U.S.-Japan cooperation.” The U.S. and ROK discussed ways to evolve defense trilateral cooperation into a comprehensive and multi-layered partnership that contributes to peace and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula and in the Indo-Pacific region. Along with Japan, the U.S. and ROK discussed ongoing trilateral efforts to operationalize a real-time missile warning data sharing mechanism against DPRK threats by the end of 2023 and to institutionalize a multi-year trilateral military exercise plan.
During the meeting, both pledged that the U.S. Strategic Command and United States Forces Korea will closely collaborate with the ROK Strategic Command, which will be newly established, so that it can secure its role and status as a strategic unit. Both sides also agreed that U.S. and ROK forces will enhance the combined defense architecture of the Alliance by jointly developing planning and execution of Conventional-Nuclear Integration (CNI) efforts through the NCG.
In conclusion, ROK and U.S. leaders assessed that the 23rd KIDD significantly contributed to reaffirming the strong cohesion of the Alliance, bolstering Alliance coordination, and strengthening the ROK-U.S. combined defense posture. Both delegations agreed that the KIDD has been a key mechanism in developing the Alliance into one of the most dynamic and premier alliances in the world over the last 70 years. Based on these outcomes, the two sides pledged to continue progress leading up to the 55th SCM and the ROK-UNC Member States Defense Ministerial Meeting, scheduled in November 2023. (Source: U.S. DoD)
18 Sep 23. Rifle, fur hat, drones: North Korea’s Kim returns with gifts from Russia. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un is heading home on Monday, most likely with gifts from his Russian hosts including a rifle, a cosmonaut’s glove, and military drones – which on their own are a violation of U.N. sanctions. Following are some of the items he is bringing back to the “friendship” museum, where gifts received by the North’s three generations of leaders are kept.
GIFTS FROM RUSSIA
After his summit with Russian President Putin, Kim received a Russian-made rifle “of the highest quality,” according to Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov. Kim reciprocated with a rifle for Putin “made by North Korean craftsmen”.
Putin also presented a glove from a spacesuit worn in space, Russia’s TASS news agency said.
Oleg Kozhemyako, the governor of the Primorsky region, presented Kim with a set of modern, lightweight body armour designed for assault operations that protects the chest, shoulders, throat and groin, Russia media said.
Kim was also presented with five one-way attack drones and a Geranium-25 reconnaissance drone, which is widely used in the war in Ukraine, TASS said.
That violates at least two U.N. Security Council resolutions against the North – which Moscow voted to approve – imposed for its banned missile and nuclear activities.
Kim received a fur hat from Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu in Vladivostok, where he inspected Russian nuclear bombers, fighter jets equipped with hypersonic missiles and a warship.
There had been a scramble to determine the right size of the hat, Russia’s RIA news agency reported. Russia’s ambassador to Pyongyang, Alexander Matsegora, suggested a size slightly smaller than his own “very large head”, which turned out to be just right.
“It’s also important that this is a gift from the heart. And Comrade Kim Jong Un liked it,” Matsegora said.
Kim began his visit with a stop in Russia’s border town of Khasan, where he was presented with a photo of Yuri Gagarin, the cosmonaut who was the first human to orbit the Earth.
‘COMPARABLE TO THE LOUVRE’
North Korea has put much effort into showcasing the gifts that Kim, as well as his father, Kim Jong-il, and grandfather and state founder Kim Il Sung, received from foreign dignitaries, dedicating a special museum for them.
Nestled in the hills of the Myohyangsan mountain 160 km (99 miles) from Pyongyang, the International Friendship Exhibition is two imposing concrete structures built in the traditional architectural style with blue tiled roofs.
Opened in 1978, the museum comprises more than 100 showrooms with more than 115,000 items from more than 200 countries, according to the North’s state media.
The scale and importance of the collection make it comparable to the Louvre in Paris, North Korea’s state media have said.
WHO ELSE SENT GIFTS?
The collection includes crystalware sent from former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, tea cup set from French President Francois Mitterrand, a basketball signed by Michael Jordan given by former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright on her visit in 2000 and a rifle given by the late Cuban leader Fidel Castro.
Propaganda plays heavily into how gifts from South Koreans are displayed, with the large-screen television set from former President Kim Dae-jung, who engaged Pyongyang with peace policies, receiving prominent showing.
The Dynasty sedan, which was Hyundai Motor’s flagship, was gifted to Kim Jong Il by the North Korean-born founder of the Hyundai Group, Chung Ju-yung, who spearheaded invest (Source: Reuters)
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