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14 Sep 23. Australian government introduces new bill to safeguard national secrets. The federal government is introducing the Safeguarding Australia’s Military Secrets Bill, intended to stop the unwanted transfer of sensitive information to foreign militaries.
The Albanese government has announced that it is introducing the bill to strengthen the Commonwealth’s ability to protect Australia’s national secrets.
It is set to include harsher penalties for anyone found to have disclosed sensitive Defence information.
The bill is also set to include authorisation requirements for certain former members of the Australian Defence Force or public service if they seek employment with foreign militaries or government agencies.
The federal government outlined that authorisation requirements will also extend to any citizen of permanent resident holder who uses military goods and tactics while training for a foreign military.
The new legislations is about keeping Australia’s defence secrets safe, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence Richard Marles said.
“This new legislation will bolster Australia’s national security by ensuring our military secrets remain safe,” DPM Marles explained.
“This sensible reform strengthens the robust laws we have in place by enhancing the government’s ability to prevent the unwanted transfer of sensitive Defence information to foreign militaries.
(Source: Defence Connect)
14 Sep 23. Babcock and HII team in Australia to support goals of AUKUS agenda. Babcock International Group (Babcock) and HII (NYSE: HII) have combined forces in Australia, working together to support critical capability requirements for the once-in-a-generation AUKUS nuclear submarine program. This partnership combines world-leading experience from Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States and builds on the existing agreement between both companies to partner in the UK and USA on nuclear decommissioning, disposal and national security opportunities.
Babcock and HII will collaborate to develop the optimal models for nuclear-powered submarine capability, including infrastructure, sustainment and the necessary skills development, to support the AUKUS endeavour. The parties will engage Australian industry to optimise specific solution sets and provide a true tri-lateral offering.
Babcock CEO David Lockwood said: “Working with HII in Australia to support the critical capabilities required to deliver the AUKUS programme is the next important step in our relationship and significantly strengthens our Australasian business. By harnessing Babcock’s heritage and capabilities to accelerate the development of sovereign capability in Australia, alongside HII’s extensive experience and expertise as America’s largest shipbuilding company, Babcock is strategically positioned to support the Australian Government in the delivery of this critical programme. National security has never been more important and now more than ever, what we do matters.”
Babcock and HII are trusted defence companies with decades of experience supporting the UK and the USA’s submarine fleets.
Babcock currently sustains 100 per cent of the UK’s Royal Navy submarine fleet and owns and operates the UK’s only licensed facility for refitting, refuelling and defueling nuclear submarines.
HII has a proven track record of safely and efficiently building, maintaining and sustaining nuclear submarines for the U.S. Navy and has delivered more than 60 over the last four decades.
14 Sep 23. Philippines-China: Concerns over Chinese covert operations will raise regulatory framework risks. On 13 September, the Philippines’ Defence Secretary Gilberto Teodoro expressed concerns over the potential risk of ‘covert economic and information activities’ posed by Chinese workers in the country. Teodoro noted that the military and security agencies were seeking to further investigate the domestic security threats posed by potential Chinese covert activities, including disinformation campaigns. Such comments highlight Manila’s likely growing scrutiny of Chinese firms and citizens operating in the Philippines. As such, companies closely associated with Chinese entities in the Philippines will potentially be exposed to higher regulatory framework risks over the coming months. Teodoro’s comments followed recent concerns raised by US officials over the operations of a Chinese blacklisted firm working on reclamation projects in Manila Bay, reflecting growing policy co-ordination between the two countries. Beijing is likely to perceive these statements as discriminatory towards Chinese citizens and businesses, raising the likelihood of retaliatory policy targeting Philippine firms, as well as sustaining regional tensions in the South China Sea disputes. (Source: Sibylline)
14 Sep 23. Russia: New US sanctions seek to disrupt energy projects, dual-use equipment procurement. On 14 September, the US State Department announced new sanctions against individuals and entities in response to Russia’s war in Ukraine. The measures targeted 37 entities linked to Russia’s energy production, including companies and individuals involved in developing key energy projects, such as Russia’s Arctic LNG 2 liquified gas project. The project is expected to be launched at the end of 2023 or early 2024, aligning with Moscow’s goal of securing 20% of the global LNG market by 2035. Additionally, the US Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated two Turkish-based entities, Margiana Insaat Dis Ticaret and Demirci Bilisim Ticaret Sanayi, which it claimed are among third-country entities that help Moscow obtain dual-use goods. The latest measures are almost certainly aimed at hindering Russia’s ability to raise revenue from its natural resources in the Arctic, as well as disrupt networks in third countries aiding Moscow in procuring equipment for its war in Ukraine. (Source: Sibylline)
14 Sep 23. Colombia: Persistent clashes between armed groups increase displacement, organised crime risks. As of 14 September, clashes between the ELN and EMC guerrilla groups have displaced over 1,600 indigenous individuals from the Sande reservation (Narino department). The hostilities began on 13 September, resulting in partial evacuations to the municipal centres of Samaniego and Santacruz (Narino). Media reports also indicate injuries among non-combatants, while some families remain trapped in affected villages. This development highlights the longstanding presence of armed groups in Colombia’s remote areas, which are often exposed to clashes for territorial control. A ceasefire between the government and the ELN has been in place since 3 August. Negotiations are also ongoing with the EMC; however, these clashes threaten the government’s peace efforts. Ongoing turf wars raise the likelihood of further violent clashes in the near term, elevating the risk of displacement, especially in conflict-prone regions such as Narino. The heightened risk of organised crime will also persist in the medium term. (Source: Sibylline)
14 Sep 23. Israel-Palestinian Territories: Border crossing closure amid heightened attack risks will cause operational, mobility disruption . On 14 September, Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced the closure of border crossings between Israel, the West Bank and Gaza from 15 September at 0001hrs (local time) until 17 September at 2359hrs. The closure comes ahead of Rosh Hashana holiday (15-17 September), with the IDF likely to announce similar closures ahead of Yom Kippur (24-25 September) and Sukkot (29 September-3 October). In recent weeks the Israeli security forces received more than 70 alerts on intended terror attacks during the September holidays, including kidnaps. Elevated attack risks will persist during September across Israel, particularly in the West Bank, Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. Such attacks will likely be in the form of stabbing, car-ramming, shooting and kidnapping, targeting religious and crowded public spaces. Further closures of border crossings during the month will increase business operational and mobility disruption in the West Bank and Jerusalem while further stoking ethno-religious tensions. (Source: Sibylline)
14 Sep 23. Madagascar: Escalating tensions with opposition elevate unrest risks around November election. On 12 September, ten of the 13 presidential candidates denounced an ‘institutional coup’ after the Constitutional Court ruled that Prime Minister Christian Ntsay would assume the role of interim president during the presidential election period. The allegations come after President Andry Rajoelina resigned on 9 September to run for re-election in the November vote, as per the constitution. The constitution also holds that the president of the Senate should assume the role of interim president, though he has declined to take the position. The move has increased concern that Ntsay, a key ally of President Rajoelina, will undermine the neutrality of the administration during the electoral process, to advance the former president’s candidacy. The developments underscore escalating tensions between the government and the opposition, undermining the credibility of the vote and elevating the risk of protests ahead of and following the November election.
14 Sep 23. Syria: Use of lethal force against protesters will likely further increase unrest, security risks. On 13 September, Syrian security forces fired live ammunition at anti-government protesters in Suweida (As-Suwayda governorate), injuring three individuals. The incident marks the first reported use of lethal force on protesters since the ongoing demonstrations started in mid-August (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 30 August 2023). Activists have accused members of President Bashar Al-Assad’s ruling Baath party of the shooting, which happened outside the party headquarters in the city. Demonstrations have remained largely peaceful, causing limited mobility disruption and material damage. However, there is a realistic possibility of increasing momentum and heightening grievances towards pro-government forces, including Iranian-backed militias, following the incident. Local Druze community leaders have accused these groups of being involved in the crackdown, with rhetoric calling for peaceful actions over the past weeks becoming more confrontational. Tensions will likely remain heightened in the coming weeks, sustaining elevated security and operational risks for staff and assets throughout As-Suwayda governorate (Source: Sibylline)
14 Sep 23. Niger: Resumption of US air missions underscores continued diplomatic engagement amid counter-terrorism interests. On 13 September, US authorities confirmed that counter-terrorism operations in Niger had resumed on an unspecified date in August. The US base in Agadez (Agadez region) is operating at reduced capacity, conducting drone surveillance and crewed aircraft missions as part of US operations in the Sahel. This announcement underscores continued diplomatic engagement between Niger and the US, which is likely driven by the strategic importance of the Agadez base, which despite being operated by the US is owned by Niger. Consequently, the US will likely continue refraining from discussing the military government’s legitimacy to facilitate ongoing counter-terrorism and anti-drug trafficking operations in the region, which underpin the US’s strategic interests in the Sahel. Nevertheless, given increasing international isolation and rising jihadist activity in the Tillabéri region, there is a realistic possibility of the junta seeking a deployment of the Wagner Group, which would almost certainly trigger a drawdown of US operations, substantially undermining Western interests in the region. (Source: Sibylline)
14 Sep 23. Philippines-US: Proposed military upgrades near Taiwan underscore long-term security, policy risks. On 13 September, senior US and Philippine military officials inspected the Philippines’ Naval Base Camilo Osias and Lal-lo Airport (both in Cagayan province) as part of plans to upgrade the facilities at both sites. The works, which include repairing an airstrip, building a pier, fuel storage and a command centre, are located at facilities near Taiwan; the development follows recent reports of similar upgrades of military installations on Basco Island. The works are part of the upgraded US-Philippines Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), which seeks to bolster bilateral defence and security co-operation amid sustained threats from China, especially in the South China Sea. The upgrades will likely sustain regional tensions and Chinese military presence near maritime territories contested with the Philippines, as well as raise policy risks. An increase in Chinese military presence near Cagayan province and the Bashi Channel, most likely for surveillance and reconnaissance purposes, is possible in the medium-to-long term, but this will unlikely cause notable operational disruption to maritime and offshore operations.(Source: Sibylline)
14 Sep 23. India: Clashes will prompt stronger security posture in Kashmir, driving bystander, disruption risks. On 13 September, three security officers were killed during a shootout in Anantnag district (Jammu and Kashmir union territory). A team of security officers came under attack during a search operation, prompted by reports of suspected rebels in the forests of Kokernag area of Anantnag district. While the exact affiliation of the militants remains unknown, they are suspected to be associated with The Resistance Front (TRF), a shadow group of Lashkar-e-Taiba. In a separate clash, another army officer and two militants were killed in Rajouri district (Jammu and Kashmir). The incidents underscore the increasing trend of targeted attacks on Indian security forces by militants operating in the contested region. In response, the Indian army has strengthened its presence in the region and launched further search operations in Rajouri district. This will lead to increased security patrols in the region in the coming days, which will possibly restrict or disrupt the movement of people and goods. (Source: Sibylline)
14 Sep 23. Russia-North Korea: US sanction threats are unlikely to deter possible arms transfers. On 13 September, the US State department warned that the US will impose sanctions against Russia and North Korea if they agree to an arms deal. The threats come after North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Russia. It is likely that Pyongyang has agreed to provide weaponry, such as artillery rounds, to aid Moscow’s war efforts in Ukraine. In exchange, Putin said that Russia would assist North Korea in its space programme. Washington DC remains concerned that Moscow would help Pyongyang develop military reconnaissance satellites and missile capabilities. Russia’s assistance would likely violate the UN arms embargo imposed on North Korea. The threats of US sanctions are unlikely to deter the two countries from forging closer ties in defence and security; sanctions have had little impact on actually changing decision-making in the Kremlin to date. However, Moscow likely remains wary of further secondary sanctions which could undermine Russia’s existing sanctions evasion networks.(Source: Sibylline)
13 Sep 23. Iraq: Relocation of Iranian-Kurdish groups points to threat from Iran, sustained security risks. On 12 September, Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein announced that the authorities have started to move Iranian-Kurdish separatist groups to camps further away from the Iranian border. Iran recently threatened to resume cross-border attacks against these Kurdhish groups if they are not removed by 19 September. The developments come ahead of the anniversary of Mahsa Amini’s death and a heightened Iranian security posture in the country’s north-west (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 12 September 2023). In late August, a rocket attack near Sulaymaniyah (Sulaymaniyah governorate) was allegedly linked to Iran. Furthermore, unconfirmed reports on 10 September claimed that Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has been moving weapons to areas bordering the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR). These events underscore the volatile security environment and the sustained security risks along the IKR-Iran border. Regardless of the movement of Kurdish separatist groups, there is a realistic possibility of small-scale cross-border strikes in these areas, particularly around Sulaymaniyah; the security risks facing staff and assets in the coming weeks are therefore elevated. (Source: Sibylline)
13 Sep 23. Mali: Clashes with Tuaregs underscore worsening security environment, elevated risks for staff. On 12 September, the Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad (CMA), a Tuareg rebel coalition, briefly seized a military base in Bourem (Gao region) before withdrawing several hours later. The attack highlights that elevated Tuareg rebel activity and rising tensions between the CMA and the Malian government are further undermining the ceasefire central to the 2015 Algiers peace agreement. Compounded by the ongoing withdrawal of UN peacekeepers from northern Mali and decreasing international supervision, the latest incident has substantially elevated the likelihood of a complete breakdown of the 2015 agreement (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 24 August 2023). Increasing Tuareg rebel activity and clashes with the security forces in Gao, Kidal and Tombouctou regions will almost certainly elevate collateral risks facing staff and assets, particularly those near strategically significant locations, such as military installations. In the coming months, there is a realistic possibility that the CMA will form alliances with jihadist groups active in northern Mali, further elevating risks for staff, including those working for humanitarian outfits in rural areas. (Source: Sibylline)
14 Sep 23. Niger: Concerns over ECOWAS intervention, worsening ties with France will increase detention risks. On 12 September, France’s foreign ministry called for the immediate release of a French official representing French expatriates in Niger. The individual has been detained by the Nigerien security forces since 8 September. The situation comes amid heightened bilateral tensions; Paris is refusing to make concessions in negotiations over the withdrawal of French military assets from Niger, while the military government stripped the French ambassador of his diplomatic immunity on 31 August. Elsewhere, the junta announced plans on 12 September to end a military pact with Benin, accusing its neighbour of authorising the deployment of troops in Niger. Faltering negotiations and heightened tensions with neighbouring states over a possible intervention by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) will drive further unilateral action by the junta authorities. This will substantially raise detention and confiscation risks for staff and assets deemed to be associated with the French foreign mission in Niger. (Source: Sibylline)
14 Sep 23. Japan: Bolstered security ties with Taiwan will likely further strain relations with China. On 12 September, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida designated an in-service government official as Japan’s acting defence attaché in Taiwan. Previously, only retired officers held the role to prevent provoking China. The latest appointment coincides with the nomination of a pro-Taiwan parliamentarian, Minoru Kihara, as defence minister in Kishida’s latest cabinet reshuffle. These moves illustrate Tokyo’s intention to build stronger defence ties with Taipei amid concerns over Beijing’s increasing military assertiveness in the region. They will likely further strain Japan’s relations with China, especially after a recent row over Japan’s discharge of treated nuclear wastewater. It is highly likely that Beijing will withhold from high-level bilateral dialogue, while retaliatory measures in the form of trade restrictions and/or military posturing are also possible. (Source: Sibylline)
14 Sep 23. Armenia-Russia: Moscow-orchestrated coup is highly unlikely despite rift in bilateral relations/ On 13 September, Russian foreign ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova refuted allegations that Russian fighters in Armenia are planning to stage a coup. An Armenian Telegram channel claimed on 8 September that the Kremlin sanctioned a coup to oust Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and his government with around 12,000 Wagner Group fighters. No evidence was provided to support these allegations and it is highly unlikely that such a large number of mercenaries would be able to enter Armenia undetected. The channel claimed that Pashinyan’s remarks earlier this month about the mistake of relying solely on Russia to guarantee Armenia’s security prompted the Kremlin to act, adding that joint Armenian-US military exercises were the deciding factor. Although these developments have almost certainly been received negatively by the Kremlin, Moscow still regards Yerevan as a close ally and partner. While a perceived (or actual) distancing from Russia would possibly render Yerevan vulnerable to Russian destabilisation efforts in the coming months, a coup attempt remains highly unlikely. (Source: Sibylline)
14 Sep 23. Russia: Emergency landing points to difficulties sourcing spare aircraft parts due to sanctions. On 12 September, a Russian passenger Airbus A320 plane operated by Ural Airlines made an emergency landing in a field in Siberia. No casualties were reported. The plane was destined for Omsk oblast, but the pilot requested to land at Tolmachevo Airport (OVB) in Novosibirsk oblast after the hydraulic systems failed. However, the pilot was forced to conduct the emergency landing due to a lack of fuel. The aircraft is one of 500 Western planes stranded in Russia and operated under lease after sanctions were issued against the Russian aviation sector. The sanctions led Airbus and Boeing to suspend maintenance services and the provision of spare parts. Ural Airlines denies that a shortage of spare aircraft parts caused the technical issue. In March, a Russian media outlet reported that airlines are facing growing difficulties obtaining spare parts. Ultimately, these difficulties will increase the risks for Russia’s aviation sector, raising the possibility of further emergency landings, aircraft malfunctions and aviation accidents. (Source: Sibylline)
12 Sep 23. Mali: Flight suspension and security restrictions will compound challenges to transit, evacuation. On 11 September, Sky Mali, the last commercial airline flying to Timbuktu (Tombouctou region), cancelled all flights to both Timbuktu Airport (TOM) and Gao International Airport (GAQ; Gao region) through 17 September. The decision was prompted by shelling near TOM amid a broader deterioration in security across central and northern Mali, which on 11 September prompted authorities in both the Tombouctou and Gao regions to increase security restrictions. A 30-day curfew between 2000-0600hrs (local time) has been announced in the Tombouctou region, while authorities in the Gao region have indefinitely banned the movement of unregistered vehicles, land cruisers and those with tinted windows. The measures will further disrupt overland movement through the region, impacting the operations of NGOs, particularly those attempting to reach rural communities. Flight disruption will further compound Timbuktu’s isolation amidst an ongoing jihadist blockade, with further attacks likely to result in additional suspensions, threatening capacity to rapidly evacuate staff, even once flights resume.
12 Sep 23. Senegal: Violence by security forces in labour protests raises reputational risks for firms during disputes. On 11 September, police killed two protesters and injured seven others with live ammunition while dispersing demonstrations over a local labour dispute in the southeastern town of Khossanto (Kedougou region). The protests were staged in opposition to local regulatory changes that allow mining companies to recruit unskilled labour. There is a realistic possibility that furthers protests will be organised in response to the deaths, including in the region’s urban centres. This will sustain a heightened risk of unrest and disruption to local commercial operations. More broadly, the crackdown underscores the tendency of security forces to utilise excessive forces to disperse crowds during protests. Such an approach to resolving industrial disputes with local workforces will threaten to undercut relations between labour and the associated commercial entities, impacting their social license to operate and reputation.
12 Sep 23. Sudan: SAF airstrike underscores threats to staff, assets in Khartoum; further attacks almost certain. On 10 September, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) killed at least 43 civilians in an airstrike on Gouro Market (Khartoum). The strike comes amid a renewed SAF offensive to reclaim territory south of the capital Khartoum after the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) breached the perimeter of the SAF’s second-largest weapons depositary on 25 August. Since clashes erupted on 15 April, the SAF has relied on heavy artillery and airstrikes while lightly armed RSF fighters have entrenched themselves in residential districts. Further SAF strikes on civilian installations are almost certain, sustaining significant bystander risks to staff and assets throughout Khartoum. Moreover, since 29 August, the chief of the SAF, General Abdel Fattah Al Burhan, has visited several key allied governments, including Eritrea and Qatar, to corral support for the SAF. Consequently, there is a realistic possibility of international partners providing increased military equipment to the SAF in the coming months. This will likely intensify clashes in Khartoum, compounding risks to staff and assets. (Source: Sibylline)
12 Sep 23. China: Intelligence agency propagates Beijing’s tit-for-tat espionage claims against the West. On 11 September, the Ministry of State Security (MSS; China’s principal intelligence agency) posted the details of an espionage case on social media. The case centres on Hong Kong permanent resident and US citizen John Shing-wan Leung, who was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment in May for spying for the US. The MSS post claims that Leung had worked for an unnamed US intelligence agency for over three decades and was decorated for his service. The novel use of social media by the MSS to disclose case details indicates that the agency is increasingly proactive in propagating the Chinese government’s espionage accusations against the West. The post also serves the purpose of showcasing and warning the domestic population about China’s counter-espionage capabilities amid an ongoing crackdown. The revelation underlines heightened data security and politicised harassment risks for Western businesses operating in China. (Source: Sibylline)
12 Sep 23. Russia: Visit by North Korean leader likely to forge closer defence ties, increase sanctions risks. On 12 September, North Korea’s Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un arrived in Russia following reports of a potential meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Kremlin Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov said the meeting would be held in Russia’s Far East but did not specify the location. Unnamed sources close to the Russian authorities claimed the talks could take place either in Vladivostok (Primorsky krai) on 12 September, or at the Vostochny Cosmodrome in Amur oblast on 13 September. Peskov disclosed that negotiations between the two delegations will take place, as well as a one-on-one meeting between Putin and Kim. The North Korean delegation reportedly includes diplomats, senior military commanders and arms industry officials, which suggests that defence co-operation will likely be a significant focus for the talks. There is a realistic possibility that the two sides will secure an agreement for North Korea to provide weaponry, such as artillery rounds, for Russia to use in Ukraine, with additional Western sanctions against Moscow and Pyongyang likely to follow. (Source: Sibylline)
12 Sep 23. Lebanon: Likelihood of renewed Ain el-Hilweh clashes will sustain domestic unrest risks in the south. Since the afternoon of 11 September, fighting has subsided in the Ain el-Hilweh Palestinian refugee camp in southern Lebanon following the announcement of a ceasefire. This marks the second such agreement in two months, sustaining concerns that additional fighting will occur in the near term. The clashes, which began on 7 September, have resulted in 11 deaths, with more than 100 injured. Armed confrontations have also triggered short-term closures, including of public administration and schools in the Sidon area (South governorate), due to bystander risks. Protracted clashes between Palestinian and Islamist factions underscore the growing frictions in Ain al-Hilweh, particularly as an uptick in arrivals of refugees from Syria has led to the emergence of additional rival groups. Beyond sustaining security volatility, renewed rounds of fighting in the near term will exacerbate public frustrations heightening the likelihood of bouts of domestic unrest and anti-Syrian sentiment in Sidon, particularly in urban centres in close proximity to the camp. (Source: Sibylline)
11 Sep 23. Niger: French refusal to compromise on military presence points to risk of ECOWAS intervention. On 10 September, Niger’s military government accused France of deploying troops to several neighbouring states in preparation for a co-ordinated intervention alongside the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). France has not responded directly to the statement, though French officials reiterated that Paris does not recognise the junta’s authority, and that it will not comply with directives to withdraw its military presence. It will also support any ECOWAS action to re-instate civilian rule. The latest statement follows earlier reports of negotiations over the withdrawal of several French military assets. France’s refusal to make concessions underlines the sustained possibility that ECOWAS will deploy its standby force to Niger in the coming weeks. The junta will almost certainly resist any intervention, elevating collateral risks to staff and assets in Niger, particularly in the capital Niamey. Anti-French protests will likely continue in the coming weeks, elevating risks to entities associated with the French government, including humanitarian outfits. (Source: Sibylline)
11 Sep 23. Russia: Ruling party’s lead in regional votes likely reflects an attempt to shore up domestic stability. According to preliminary results early on 11 September, candidates from the ruling United Russia party won in gubernatorial elections in 13 regions. An independent Russian election watchdog reported widespread voting irregularities on 8 September, including threats of violence, vote buying and people being barred from voting. Voters in the capital Moscow, the wider Moscow oblast and Siberia’s republic of Khakassia reported the highest number of violations. Russian state media reported that United Russia received between 75% and 83% of the vote in the Russian-annexed Ukrainian oblasts of Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia. Ultimately, it is highly likely that United Russia’s lead was orchestrated to portray the party as the most viable guarantor of domestic stability in preparation for the presidential election in 2024.(Source: Sibylline)
14 Sep 23. Austin Welcomes Increased Cooperation With Bahrain. Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III welcomed increased security ties with Bahrain today in a meeting with the country’s Crown Prince Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa.
The two leaders met at the Pentagon one day after the U.S. and Bahrain signed the Comprehensive Security Integration Agreement to enhance cooperation on issues ranging from defense and security to emerging technologies and trade.
“This important bilateral agreement will deepen our already strong relationship and underscores America’s commitment not only to Bahrain but to the entire region,” Austin said. “It gives us a framework for cooperation in areas from security and trade to technology and information sharing. And together we will demonstrate that integration and inclusion are the paths to security, stability and prosperity.”
Bahrain, a major non-NATO ally that hosts the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet, remains as one of the United States’ longest-standing partners in the Middle East.
Austin extended his appreciation for Bahrain’s support of U.S. service members and their families stationed abroad and praised the country for its active participation in coalition operations.
The newly signed agreement further strengthens coordination between the two countries’ armed forces and intelligence capacities.
The agreement also advances scientific and technical cooperation between the two countries through information sharing and exchanges and promotes the deployment of trusted technologies with the aim of protecting critical systems and privacy.
“The United States remains committed to Bahrain and the region,” Austin said. “And we will continue to work with you to push back against all threats to regional stability both from states and non-state actors.”
In addition to highlighting the new agreement, Austin u expressed appreciation for the Bahraini foreign minister’s visit to Ukraine earlier this year. The crown prince, who also serves as Bahrain’s prime minister, praised the close ties between Bahrain and the United States and extended his gratitude for U.S. service members’ work alongside Bahraini armed forces to secure the region.
“Only by working together can nation states both very large and small, each in their own realm of responsibility, provide for a more stable and productive world,” he said.
11 Sep 23. New Chinese Exports Controls on Gallium and Germanium: Crisis or Opportunity? China recently introduced new controls on the export – to be enforced from 1 August – of gallium and germanium, two minerals used in the development and production of many electronic equipment.
The new regulations stipulate that any proposed export that potentially affects national security must obtain approval from China’s State Council. Chinese exporters will therefore have to disclose detailed information on each proposed including details about the intended end-users to obtain clearance from the Ministry of Commerce.
China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said the export controls “do not target any specific country”. Nonetheless, China’s announcement sends a clear message that it intends to respond to the years of export restrictions imposed by the United States and Western allies on advanced technologies, including sophisticated chips meant to power AI systems lately.
Why are these minerals vital for the defense industry?
Gallium and germanium are two chemical elements often found in conjunction with other well-known minerals. Gallium is typically obtained as a byproduct of zinc and alumina mining, while germanium is extracted during zinc mining or isolated from brown coal.
Gallium notably finds application in the production of T/R modules for radio communication equipment, mobile devices, satellite communications, and LED displays. On the other hand, germanium is extensively utilized in fiber optics, infrared optics, and solar cells.
Moreover, these applications also make them critical components in modern weapons as some electronic warfare systems and advanced radar systems installed on warplanes, warships, missiles and ground installations.
By utilizing gallium nitride (GaN) semiconductors, radar developers can achieve equivalent or superior performance in fire control radars while consuming less power and producing less heat. Additionally, GaN has the potential to extend the range of an existing radar by 50 percent, enhance its target discrimination capabilities, increase its search volume by a factor of five, or allow form directed energy beams for electronic attack. Furthermore, GaN can contribute to enhancing the reliability of these intricate systems.
Gallium arsenide (GaAs) and gallium nitride is very important in the production of transmit-receive modules used in active electronic scanning array (AESA) radars. As a result, LIG’s ESR-500A and Raytheon’s Phantom Strike are advertised as air-cooled AESAs. Prominent US defense companies as well as other international manufacturers like Leonardo, Thales, Indra, Elbit and Saab are reportedly developing new AESA radar systems based on GaN, which offer superior performance compared to the previously utilized GaAs. In particular, it is planned that GaaS-based radar (AN/APG-81) of the F-35 stealth fighter jet might switch to a GaN-based AESA (AN/APG-85)
Moreover, gallium compounds are key inputs to some advanced U.S. defense systems and, by extension, the United States Department of Defense supply chain. Gallium nitride is used in the U.S. Navy’s AN/SPY-6 radar and the U.S. Marine Corps’ AN/TPS-80 G/ATOR radar. Various other products, such as Raytheon’s LTAMDS, SPY-6, “Ghost-Eye”, Next Generation Jammer, Northrop Grumman’s TPY-5, Lockheed Martin’s Q-53, also incorporate gallium nitride chips.
Germanium, recognized as a vital advanced electronic material, finds extensive usage in various critical applications. It is employed in night-vision devices, satellite imaging, semiconductor devices, fiber optic systems, and infrared sensors for ships, aircraft, missiles, tanks, and anti-tank units. Acknowledging its significance in these domains, germanium was included in the US National Defense Stockpile during the early 1980s.
As core elements of electronic warfare weapons, these minerals supply bottlenecks will directly affect the capacity of NATO countries to conduct operations, potentially creating vulnerabilities in conflict situations.
Military analysts have pointed out that the implementation of Chinese export controls has the potential to significantly impact the US defense industry. This comes at a time when the United States is actively seeking to curtail China’s military development. Gallium and germanium are “chess pieces in a geopolitical game of enormous proportions,” said Christopher Ecclestone, a mining strategist at the financial advisory firm Hallgarten & Company. “They’re pretty key playing pieces.”
Understanding China’s Dominance in the Global Market
China produces the majority of the world’s gallium and germanium. In 2021 it accounted for around 98% of the world’s production of low-grade primary gallium, the core feed-stock for the gallium supply chain, according to the United States Geological Survey (USGS). China’s primary gallium capacity largely is a by-product of the country’s aluminum industry. But the country is not the only producer.
World primary low-purity gallium production capacity in 2021 was estimated to be 774.000 kilograms per year. The remaining primary low-purity gallium producers outside of China are Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Russia.
The high-purity refined gallium production capacity, 325.000 kilograms per year; and secondary high-purity gallium production capacity, 273.000 kilograms per year. The main countries responsible for this production were China, Japan, Slovakia, and the United States.
Moreover, Canada, Germany, Japan, Slovakia, and the U.S. recycle gallium from new scrap and Germany announced that it would restart primary gallium production by the end of 2021.
China was a leading global producer (67% of the world’s production) and exporter of germanium in 2021. Nearly all exports were sent to Russia, Germany, Hong Kong, Belgium, Japan, and the United States, in descending order of quantity.
China’s control of the germanium (Ge) supply chain is looser but still significant at around 60% of the global market, according to European industry association Critical Raw Materials Alliance (CRMA). About 75% of Ge comes from zinc production and the balance from coal fly ash.
The United States Geological Survey (USGS) reported in 2021 that refinery production was 140.000 kilograms with China having 95.000 kilograms, Russia 5.000, and the rest of the world 40.000 kilograms, which includes Canada, Belgium, Germany, Japan, and Ukraine. The US is one of the alternative suppliers, with deposits in Alaska and Tennessee and additional refining capacity in Canada. But as it stands, the US is still over 50% reliant on imported germanium. The USGS estimates the USA consumption is around 30.000 kilograms or 75% of the rest of the world’s output.
The full impact of China’s new export regime depends on a number of factors, including the severity of the controls in practice, and the response of western governments and companies. As it stands, the controls look likely to lead to higher prices for gallium and germanium, as well as longer delivery times.
A report released by brokerage Sinolink Securities noted that, in the short term, foreign suppliers may struggle to secure sufficient quantities of gallium materials given the limited alternatives outside China. However, Dak Hardwick, vice president of international affairs at the Aerospace Industries Association, said the export restrictions will likely have little short-term impact for defense companies, which tend to buy materials for critical systems far in advance.
In the long run, it is unclear whether export restrictions will be beneficial to China. As there are potential new sources of germanium and gallium, both primary and secondary, which could be activated to compensate for any Chinese ban. However, it is crucial for NATO countries to come together and collaborate on strategic initiatives aimed at diversifying their sources of supply.
Some Western countries, including the US, Canada, Germany, and Japan, also produce these materials, but ramping up production could be difficult. They must accelerate innovation to accelerate refining processes. Otherwise, they may be tempted to relax the environmental regulations that constrain traditional separation and purification techniques. The mining process causes significant pollution, which was one of the reasons production was conveniently offshored to China in the beginning.
At the US, the Defense Department is proactively taking steps using Defense Production Act Title III authorities to increase domestic mining and processing of critical materials, including gallium and germanium. For example, the Department took earlier this week the decision to resume, after a 30-year lapse – domestic graphite mining under a plan to establish a domestic supply chain to produce the critical mineral for large-capacity batteries that power unmanned systems and other military equipment.
Some experts think the gallium and germanium control exports are just the beginning of news sanctions regarding critical minerals. Indeed, over the past couple of years, China had used its dominance over certain materials as leverage in trade disputes.
“This for me shows that the Chinese put their boxing gloves on,” said Nicola Beer, a liberal Renew lawmaker who’s the rapporteur on key EU legislation to secure the supply of critical raw materials. “So, it’s clear that we need our own extraction, processing, recycling capacities” as well as “more reliable trade with other countries.”
NATO countries should view these new sanctions as a golden opportunity to develop critical minerals industries within their own borders, and increase self-reliance and sovereignty. This also provides an excellent chance for markets to reassess the value of mining activities in different regions. (Source: https://www.defense-aerospace.com/)
15 Sep 23. Taiwan outlines requirement for enhanced asymmetric warfare capability. Taiwan’s National Defense Report 2023 has highlighted how the country is trying to learn lessons from the Ukraine-Russia war in ramping up its own multidomain and asymmetric military capabilities in preparing for any conflict with China.
The biennial policy paper – published by the Ministry of National Defense (MND) in Taipei on 12 September – also confirms short-term investment in funding for military capabilities that will enhance the sea and air combat resilience of the Republic of China (RoC) Armed Forces.
“[China] is progressively enhancing its capabilities to invade Taiwan,” the report said. “Facing this situation, the RoC Armed Forces have to absorb the lessons learned from the example of asymmetric warfare as shown in the Russia-Ukraine war, exploit geographic advantages in the form of island defence, seek suitable force buildup initiatives, and maintain combat readiness.” (Source: Janes)
16 Sep 23. Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group. Building on the May 2022 summit statement by President Yoon Suk Yeol and President Joseph R. Biden to reactivate the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the United States Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group (EDSCG), the foreign affairs and defense agencies of the two countries held the 4th annual high-level EDSCG meeting at the Vice Minister/Under Secretary level on September 15, 2023, in Seoul, the first EDSCG meeting held in the Republic of Korea. ROK First Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Chang Hojin and ROK Vice Minister of National Defense Shin Beomchul led the ROK delegation. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs Bonnie Jenkins and Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Sasha Baker headed the U.S. delegation.
This fourth meeting of the EDSCG advanced U.S. and ROK comprehensive discussions on strategy and policy issues to strengthen Alliance deterrence on the Korean Peninsula and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. Both sides shared their assessments and concerns about the DPRK’s threatening and irresponsible rhetoric and behavior, including its ongoing missile launches and continued pursuit of destabilizing and illicit WMD and ballistic missile programs. Participants reaffirmed the commitment of both nations to use all available levers—including diplomatic, informational, military, and economic tools—to strengthen deterrence and reinforce the U.S. security commitment to the ROK.
Participants examined the recent progress the United States and the ROK have made to strengthen extended deterrence, including through the April 2023 Washington Declaration and successful establishment of the ROK-U.S. Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) in July. The United States and the Republic of Korea reviewed their on-going bilateral cooperation to deter DPRK nuclear and non-nuclear aggression and thus to enhance security on the Korean Peninsula and in the region, and discussed various measures to further strengthen the Alliance’s deterrence and defense posture. Both sides reaffirmed their commitment to the complete denuclearization of the DPRK in accordance with the relevant United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions. They emphasized that the DPRK’s unprecedented number of ballistic missile launches, including multiple intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), and space launches using ballistic missile technology seriously undermine regional and global security. The two sides agreed to further enhance coordination to address DPRK sanctions evasion and illicit cyber activities, using diplomatic, informational, military, and economic tools. The United States reiterated its strong support for the goals of the ROK’s Audacious Initiative. Both sides recognized the importance of the strategic use of information for enhancing deterrence. The United States and ROK expressed their strongest concern about DPRK-Russia cooperation inconsistent with UNSC resolutions, and discussed its implications for DPRK’s attempts to advance its illicit nuclear and ballistic missile programs, as well as the threat posed by DPRK assistance to Russia’s war effort in Ukraine. Both sides agreed on the importance of upholding and fully implementing all relevant UNSC resolutions.
In the context of mounting DPRK threats to regional stability, in part facilitated by third parties’ shielding of the DPRK from consequences for its brazen UNSCR violations, the United States underlined its ironclad and unwavering security commitment to the Republic of Korea, using the full range of U.S. defense capabilities, including nuclear, conventional, missile defense, and other advanced non-nuclear capabilities, to provide extended deterrence for the ROK. Both sides reaffirmed that any nuclear attack by the DPRK against the ROK will be met with a swift, overwhelming, and decisive response. The U.S. side also reiterated that any nuclear attack by the DPRK against the United States or its allies is unacceptable and will result in the end of the Kim regime.
As bilateral cooperation on extended deterrence is advancing rapidly, the participants affirmed the importance of high-level policy and strategic coordination. The EDSCG, mutually complementary with other alliance bodies, will facilitate a strategic whole-of-government approach to strengthen U.S. and ROK extended deterrence cooperation and thus to enhance security on the Korean Peninsula and promote regional peace and stability. The next high-level EDSCG engagement will be held in 2024. (Source: US DoD)
11 Sep 23. SA arms exports up in first half of 2023. If current trends continue, South Africa is set to export far more military hardware and munitions this year than last, as exports in the first half of 2023 are already close to that of the whole of 2022.
In the first half of 2023, the National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC) approved R3.8 bn worth of munitions exports, compared with R1.4 bn for the first half of 2022.
Ultimately, for the 2022 calendar year, South Africa exported R4.679 bn worth of military hardware and munitions, up from R3.353 bn the year before.
On 7 September, Advocate Ezra Jele, NCACC Secretariat Head, briefed Parliament’s Joint Standing Committee on Defence (JSCD) on first and second quarter imports and exports. His figures revealed that for the first quarter of 2023, the NCACC approved 128 munitions export permits to 34 countries, valued at R957 m, and 28 dual use goods permits to 14 countries valued at R108 m.
For the second quarter of 2023, the NCACC approved 136 munitions exports permits to 17 countries valued at R2.8 bn, and 39 dual use technology exports to 14 countries worth R229 m.
Regarding imports, in 2023’s first quarter, the NCACC approved 49 import permits worth R5 m from 14 countries, and in the second quarter authorised 69 import permits from 25 countries worth R400 000.
While Jele did not give a breakdown of what the 2023 export permits covered, it is likely that ammunition made up a large component, along with electronic systems. This would be in line with 2022 calendar year exports, which were dominated by ammunition (R1.6 bn), bombs and rockets (R946 m), and electronic equipment (R1.3 bn).
The strong export sales in the first two quarters of 2023 are most likely a result of the general world increase in military expenditure that accelerated following Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) reported that global military expenditure continued to increase last year, remaining well over the $2 trillion mark, to reach a new high of $2 240 bn.
“The continuous rise in global military expenditure in recent years is a sign that we are living in an increasingly insecure world,” said Dr Nan Tian, Senior Researcher with SIPRI’s Military Expenditure and Arms Production Programme. “States are bolstering military strength in response to a deteriorating security environment, which they do not foresee improving in the near future.” (Source: DefenceWeb)
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