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01 Sep 23. Sierra Leone: Sanctions will likely compound rising threats to government stability. On 31 August, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken announced the imposition of visa restrictions on individuals responsible for manipulating the 24 June election and for intimidating voters, election observers and civil society organisations. The election, which secured a second term for President Julius Maada Bio and a parliamentary majority for his Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP), remains highly disputed. The opposition All People’s Congress (APC) rejected the results and refused to take its seats in parliament. Bio’s proposal to form a committee led by the vice president to review domestic electoral processes has been rejected as inadequate by the opposition. International observers from the EU and the US citing statistical inconsistencies have called for an independent investigation. Sanctions will likely bolster the confidence of the opposition, increasing the risk of domestic unrest and legislative stability unless the government makes concessions. Sanctions will also pose limited compliance challenges for firms working with government officials. (Source: Sibylline)
01 Sep 23. Gabon: Opposition demands indicate rising threat of domestic unrest. On 31 August, the main opposition alliance, Alternance 23, urged the new military junta to continue the electoral process and to finalise the results of the 26 August election. On 30 August, the Gabonese Elections Centre (CGE) announced that President Ali Bongo Ondimba won the election, securing 64.27% of the votes. Alternance 23 rejected the claim and announced an electoral victory. As the military junta legitimised the overthrow of Bongo via appeals to democratic institutions, its refusal to restore what the opposition claims is the rightly elected government would significantly escalate tensions. The African Union (AU) suspended Gabon’s membership on 31 August, increasing the likelihood of further sanctions should the junta fail to agree a quick transition to civilian rule. Failure to hand over power would likely undermine public support for the junta, elevating the risk of unrest, particularly in the capital Libreville. There would also be an elevated likelihood of the military resorting to repression to secure its position, including movement and communication restrictions. (Source: Sibylline)
01 Sep 23. North Korea: Nuclear strike drills pose no direct security threat despite elevated regional tensions . On 31 August, the Korean People’s Army (KPA) conducted simulated ‘scorched-earth’ nuclear strike drills targeting South Korea; they were likely in response to the US-South Korea ‘Ulchi Freedom Shield’ military exercise. The simulation followed Pyongyang’s launch of two short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) into the sea on 30 August to protest the US deployment of B-1B bombers to South Korea, highlighting sustained regional tensions. While Pyongyang regularly conducts such military actions, it has gradually increased its nuclear rhetoric, underscoring its persistent opposition to growing US-South Korea military ties. Such drills do not constitute a direct threat to South Korea, and the risk of war remains low. On 1 September, South Korea and Japan imposed unilateral sanctions on various North Korean individuals and entities for supporting Pyongyang’s missile and nuclear programme. On the same day, the commander of the US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) arrived in Japan to meet top military and government leaders, sustaining the risk of further military drills by Pyongyang. Nonetheless, any such moves are unlikely to cause major business disruption across the region. (Source: Sibylline)
01 Sep 23. Pakistan: Suicide attack in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa underscores elevated risks near security sites. On 31 August, a suicide bomber targeted a military convoy in the north-western district of Bannu (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province), which borders Afghanistan. At least nine soldiers were killed and five others were wounded in the attack; casualty numbers will likely rise. The suicide bomber crashed a motorcycle into a truck that was part of the military convoy. The incident follows a series of targeted attacks by militants against the military and underscores the elevated risk of attacks in the high-risk Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Pakistan has witnessed a surge in violence in the province since the breakdown of a deal between Tehreek-e-Taliban (TTP) and the government last year, along with counter-terrorism (CT) operations against militant groups in regions bordering Afghanistan. With the military’s CT operations against the TTP likely to intensify, heightened security risks will impact bystanders near security sites in the short-to-medium term. (Source: Sibylline)
01 Sep 23. Armenia-Azerbaijan: Further provocations will raise risk of escalation, hinder progress of peace. Armenia’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) reported on 1 September that two of its soldiers were killed and that another was wounded by Azerbaijani shelling near Sotk (situated close to the border with Azerbaijan). The MoD later stated the intensity of Azerbaijani fire towards Armenian combat outposts near the village had decreased. It accused Baku of disseminating false information that Armenian forces are concentrating a large number of weapons, military equipment and personnel in Sotk. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan’s MoD claimed that units of Armenia’s armed forces launched an anti-aircraft missile at Azerbaijani positions in the Kalbajar border region. It stated that two of its servicemen were injured as a result of the alleged strike and that Azerbaijani units were taking ‘decisive counter-measures’. Further clashes between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces in the coming weeks (either alleged or confirmed) will increase the risk of subsequent escalations in fighting; this will hinder the slow progress towards a peace settlement, which remains a remote prospect for the foreseeable future. (Source: Sibylline)
01 Sep 23. Georgia: Impeachment procedure against president will likely elevate risk of unrest. On 1 September, the chairman of the ruling Georgian Dream party, Irakli Kobakhidze, announced that the party is considering initiating an impeachment procedure against Georgian President Salome Zurabishvili. Kobakhidze accused Zurabishvili of violating the constitution after she officially visited Germany despite being denied permission to conduct international visits by the government. Zurabishvili has long been at odds with the government, and the recent announcement marks the latest escalation in the ongoing feud. According to Kobakhidze, the president claims that Georgia is not ready for EU candidate status because of the increasingly authoritarian ruling style of the Georgian Dream-led government. Kobakhidze stated that impeachment is unlikely to succeed since it requires 100 parliamentarian votes; the Georgian Dream-led bloc occupies only 84 seats and Zurabishvili enjoys opposition support. However, despite its low chances of success, initiating an impeachment procedure will likely elevate the risk of anti-government unrest organised by the pro-EU opposition. (Source: Sibylline)
01 Sep 23. Lebanon: UNIFIL extension mandate is unlikely to reduce existing security risks in south. On 31 August, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 2695 to extend the deployment of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) for another year. The vote was initially delayed due to Lebanon’s representative objection to extending UNIFIL’s freedom of movement in southern Lebanon, reflecting the position of the influential Shia Hizballah group. The group holds armed positions in southern Lebanon and has been consistently limiting UNIFIL’s freedom of movement in the area for the past year. In December 2022, an Irish UNIFIL peacekeeper was killed in southern Lebanon; a Lebanese military tribunal later accused Hizballah members of being involved in the killing. One of UNIFIL’s missions is to reduce tensions along the border with Israel. However, the mission’s extension is unlikely to prevent Hizballah from continuing to build and/or reinforce military positions in southern Lebanon (as it has done in the past year). A heightened security environment will be sustained in southern Lebanon in the coming months, as will risks for staff and assets. (Source: Sibylline)
01 Sep 23. US lawmaker says Washington has ‘obligation’ to fulfil military sales backlog to Taiwan. The United States has an “obligation” to fulfil its backlog of arms sales to Taiwan and there is a bipartisan effort to ensure this happens, the vice chairman of the House Armed Services Committee said on Friday during a trip to Taipei.
Taiwan has since last year complained of delays to U.S. weapon deliveries, such as Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, as manufacturers turned supplies to Ukraine as it battles invading Russian forces. The issue has concerned some U.S. lawmakers and officials too.
Meeting Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen at the presidential office in Taipei, Rob Wittman, who also sits on the U.S. House of Representatives’ select committee on China, said Taiwan was making an “incredible effort” for own self-defence, like extending conscription.
“We have an obligation to make sure that we fill the backlog of foreign military sales that exist now between our countries,” he said.
“I can tell you that members of the House on both sides of the aisle are focused on making sure this $19bn backlog in foreign military sales gets fulfilled.”
The United States, Taiwan’s most important arms supplier, in July announced a Taiwan weapons aid package worth up to $345 m.
Last week, the United States also approved a possible $500 m sale to Taiwan of infrared search and track systems for F-16 fighter jets, as well as other equipment.
The United States, like most countries, has no formal relations with Chinese-claimed Taiwan, but is its most important international supporter and arms supplier.
Wittman, who is accompanied by four other Republican lawmakers, reassured on U.S. support.
“President Tsai, know that any, any hostile, unprovoked attack on Taiwan will result in a resolute reaction from the United States,” he said.
While the United States has long followed a policy of “strategic ambiguity” on whether it would intervene militarily to protect Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack, U.S. President Joe Biden has said he would be willing to use force to defend Taiwan.
Tsai told the U.S. delegation that Taiwan looked forward to coordinating with the United States and other democratic partners to jointly defend regional stability and prosperity. (Source: Reuters)
31 Aug 23. Joint Statement on Russia’s continued pursuit of weapons from the DPRK. The United Kingdom, the United States, Japan and the Republic of Korea have issued a joint statement following Russia’s negotiation of potential deals with North Korea for significant quantities and multiple types of munitions, to be used against Ukraine.
Good morning everyone, and thank you very much for being here, I would like to make a statement in my national capacity on behalf of Japan, the Republic of Korea, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
At the top, I would like to note that we are tracking reports that the DPRK has conducted another launch this morning. And as we investigate further, we call on the DPRK to refrain from engaging in provocative behaviour and instead accept one of our numerous offers for dialogue.
We are here today to share new, deeply troubling information: Arms negotiations between Russia and the DPRK are actively advancing. As was highlighted during Friday’s Council meeting, Russian Minister of Defense Sergey Shoigu stood beside Kim Jong Un during the DPRK’s recent military parade – which showcased the DPRK’s Security Council-prohibited ballistic missile advancements. It is shameful that the Russian Federation – a permanent member of the Security Council – participated in a celebration of the DPRK’s continued pursuit of nuclear weapons delivery systems.
The United States is now able to share that Shoigu’s visit was more than just a photo op. Russia used this visit to the DPRK to try to convince Pyongyang to sell artillery ammunition to Russia. Since then, Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Un have exchanged letters pledging to increase their bilateral cooperation. Our information further indicates that, following Shoigu’s visit, another group of Russian officials traveled to the DPRK for follow-up discussions about potential arms deals between the DPRK and Russia.
Russia is negotiating potential deals for significant quantities and multiple types of munitions from the DPRK to be used against Ukraine. These potential deals could also include the provision of raw materials that would assist Russia’s defense industrial base. In its pursuit of these weapons, Russia will violate Security Council resolutions, including resolutions Russia itself voted for. Any such arms deal would be a serious violation of resolutions the Security Council adopted, unanimously, after the DPRK’s past nuclear tests and ballistic missile launches.
Those resolutions prohibited all Member States, including Russia, from procuring any arms from the DPRK. This sends the wrong message to aspiring proliferators: that if you sell Russia arms, Russia will defend – even enable – your pursuit of nuclear weapons. On numerous occasions, the DPRK has publicly said it will not sell arms to Russia. We urge the DPRK to cease its arms negotiations with Russia and abide by the public commitments Pyongyang has made.
This is not the first time Russia has moved to violate Security Council resolutions to pursue its illegal war against Ukraine. There is now incontrovertible evidence that Russia has procured drones from Iran in violation of another resolution it voted for, Security Council Resolution 2231. Russia has since used those drones in punishing attacks against critical infrastructure in Ukraine. And we are very disappointed the UN has not carried out its mandate to investigate and document Russia’s outrageous violations.
Russia’s pattern of behavior – flouting its responsibilities as a member of the Security Council, propping up proliferating regimes – is unacceptable. The United States is therefore taking direct action – by exposing and sanctioning individuals and entities working to facilitate arms deals between Russia and the DPRK. On August 16th, we designated additional entities tied to an already sanctioned evasion network attempting to support illicit DPRK-Russia arms deals.
We cannot – and we will not – stay silent as we receive more information that Russia continues to turn to rogue regimes to try to obtain weapons and equipment in order to support its brutal war of aggression. We will continue to work with allies and partners to identify, expose, and counter Russian attempts to acquire military equipment from the DPRK or any state that is prepared to support Russia’s war in Ukraine. And we will keep strengthening cooperation to address the DPRK’s weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs. This is a pressing matter of international peace and security, and it is one that demands the Council’s attention. Thank you. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)
31 Aug 23. Statement by Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III Marking Two Years Since the End of the Afghanistan War. As we mark two years since the conclusion of the U.S. war in Afghanistan, we salute the valor, patriotism, and selflessness of the American service members and civilians who fought and served there over the course of 20 years.
Throughout America’s longest war, our troops showed great courage and compassion. My thoughts today are with all of the brave Americans who answered the call to duty after al-Qaeda’s terrorists attacked America—including the Pentagon itself—on September 11, 2001. We bow our heads today in memory of the 2,461 U.S. service members who never made it home, including the 13 courageous troops taken from us in the attack at Abbey Gate in the final hours of the war. We also remember the hundreds of service members from allied and partner countries who lost their lives during this 20-year war. And we honor the more than 20,000 Americans who were injured waging war in Afghanistan, including many who still bear wounds that are not visible.
In the war’s final days, the United States, along with our allies and partners, safely evacuated more than 124,000 civilians from Afghanistan, in the midst of the pandemic and in the teeth of danger. In recognition of teams that operated and excelled under these difficult and dangerous conditions, I am proud to announce the approval of the Presidential Unit Citation for the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, the Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force-Crisis Response-Central Command, and Joint Task Force 82 of the 82nd Airborne Division and its supporting units.
We remain deeply committed to supporting the Afghan allies who fought by our sides and to helping those who are now building new lives outside their troubled homeland. We will continue to push to help resettle our Afghan allies, and I am proud that we have welcomed more than 115,000 Afghans who stood by our side to the United States over the past two years.
Today, our hearts and our prayers are with the brave Americans who volunteered to keep our country safe, with the Gold Star families whose loved ones fell in Afghanistan, with the military families who endured so much over those two decades, and with the veterans who still carry the memories and the scars of war. The war in Afghanistan is over, but our gratitude to the Americans who fought it is unending. (Source: U.S. DoD)
30 Aug 23. Readout of the 6th Round of the U.S.-Brazil Strategic Defense Talks. On August 29-30, 2023, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Western Hemisphere Affairs, Mr. Daniel Erikson, co-chaired the 6th Round of the U.S.-Brazil Strategic Defense Talks with the Deputy Chief of International Affairs of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Brazilian Armed Forces, Major General André Luiz Alves Ferreira. The meeting took place at the headquarters of the Brazilian Ministry of Defense in Brasilia, Brazil.
The U.S. delegation included Ms. Karen Riggs, Assistant Deputy Director for Western Hemisphere for Joint Staff J5 Strategy, Plans, and Policy Directorate; Mr. Thomas “Jeff” Hughes, the Deputy at U.S. Southern Command’s J5 Strategy, Plans, and Policy Directorate; Mr. Jeffrey Grover of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment; Colonel Christopher Cronin, Chief of the Joint Staff of the New York National Guard; Colonel Edward Cook, the Director of Operations at the New York National Guard’s J3 Domestic Operations; Colonel Chike H Williams, the Senior Defense Official and Defense Attaché at the U.S. Embassy in Brasilia; and additional representatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, U.S. Southern Command, and the New York National Guard.
The U.S.-Brazil Strategic Defense Talks represent a core component of the bilateral defense relationship and provide a strategic framework to guide security cooperation. Established to incorporate the 13th round of the ministry-level Bilateral Working Group and the 39th round of the Joint Staff Talks, the 6th Round of U.S.-Brazil Strategic Defense Talks serve as a mechanism to discuss strategic-level defense issues and guide future cooperation activities in defense and security.
DASD Erikson and MG André Luiz Alves Ferreira discussed a range of global and regional defense topics, reviewed their national defense priorities, and exchanged views on topics of mutual interest, including their efforts to deepen cooperation on defense procurement, increase interoperability through joint training and educational opportunities, and address emergent transboundary challenges.
The leaders reaffirmed the importance of adhering to the highest standards of professionalism, transparency, and respect for democratic values and human rights in all aspects of the bilateral defense relationship. The U.S. delegation expressed appreciation for Brazil’s contributions to international security, as well as its commitment to peacekeeping operations and humanitarian assistance. Finally, the leaders highlighted the strong bonds of friendship and trust between both countries, as well as the actions undertaken to deepen military and defense cooperation. (Source: U.S. DoD)
31 Aug 23. Kenya and SA to boost military co-operation. Defence relations between Kenya and South Africa are to be strengthened, with at least five areas identified during a visit this week by a South African delegation headed by Acting SA Secretary for Defence (SecDef) Dr Thobekile Gamede. Kenya Defence Principal Secretary (PS) Patrick Mariru is quoted in a Kenya Ministry of Defence (MoD) statement as saying there is a need to strengthen the existing ties created by “a robust defence co-operation agreement”.
The areas named for closer co-operation are security, the blue economy, military medical and health services, the defence industry as well as promoting training of military personnel by way of trainee, instructor and directing staff exchanges.
Mariru welcomed resolutions made by a joint defence committee (JDC) comprising senior officials from both countries adding the defence cooperation agreement (DCA) should develop “cogent practical ideas and resolutions to rationalise the defence agreement to conform to current security needs of the countries”.
The statement has Gamede saying both countries continue to enjoy longstanding diplomatic relations dating back to 1992.
She emphasised the need for Kenya and South Africa to work together to foster regional peace and security, a critical component for socio-economic development and prosperity of the region. Thobekile further urged both countries to address common challenges and bolster the existing DCA “while remaining frank for the formulation of concrete solutions”.
Senior military officers from both countries were present for the meeting at Kenya’s defence headquarters in Nairobi. (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
31 Aug 23. Gabon: Risk of sanctions likely dependent on transition duration following coup. On 30 August, Gabon’s new military junta announced that the transitional government would be led by General Brice Oligui Nguema, the leader of the presidential guard, following the ouster of President Ali Bongo Ondimba (see Sibylline Alert – 30 August 2023). The Committee for the Transition and Restoration of Institutions (CTRI) has also confirmed that a curfew enforced by the former government over election unrest, would remain in effect between 1800-0600hrs (local time), but that restrictions on internet and international media companies have been lifted. The CTRI is yet to provide an outline for the transition period or make announcements on governance over the transition period. The transition outline will likely be instrumental in gauging international response. Unlike in Niger, calls for the restoration of Bongo to the presidency have been very limited, with most governments, including the US and France, simply calling for a return to civilian rule. As such, the risk of sanctions on Gabon and the junta will likely reduce if a limited transition period is proposed. (Source: Sibylline)
31 Aug 23. Mali: Airstrikes on Tuareg positions elevate tensions with government, undermining peace agreement. On 30 August, the Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad (CMA), a Tuareg rebel coalition, accused the Malian forces of conducting airstrikes against its positions in Anéfis (Kidal region). The strikes come amid rising tensions between the Malian government and the CMA, which has repeatedly accused Malian forces of breaching the ceasefire that underpins the 2015 Algiers peace agreement. Concurrently, on 30 August, Russia vetoed several proposals at the UN, terminating all UN sanctions on violators of the 2015 Algiers agreement and the monitoring panel of experts. Compounded by the withdrawal of UN peacekeepers, decreasing international supervision and rising tensions substantially elevate the likelihood of a complete breakdown of the 2015 Algiers agreement, substantially elevating collateral risks to staff and assets in the Kidal and Tombouctou regions. Possible alliances between the CMA and jihadist groups will likely further elevate risks to staff in northern Mali, particularly humanitarians in rural areas. (Source: Sibylline)
31 Aug 23. Democratic Republic of the Congo: Ongoing conflict will likely increase threats of further anti-UN protests in Goma. On 30 August, violent protests against the UN peacekeeping mission MONUSCO killed six protesters and one police officer in Goma (North Kivu province). Perceptions of MONUSCO’s ineffectiveness have repeatedly driven unrest in North Kivu, and are currently spiking in connection to an escalation in activity by the Rwandan-backed M23 rebel group amid the broader failure of the March ceasefire agreement. M23 operations and further escalation in the conflict will likely act as flashpoints for additional protests against MONUSCO, particularly in Goma, but also throughout North Kivu. Protests will likely result in violent clashes with security forces, elevating incidental safety risks to bystanders. As experienced during protests in Butembo (North Kivu), there is a realistic possibility of protesters committing vandalism targeted at UN assets and staff residences, and looting MONUSCO warehouses. As such, protests will significantly elevate direct risks to UN personnel and NGO staff working with the UN. (Source: Sibylline)
31 Aug 23. Philippines-US: Proposed Taiwan-facing port will sustain regional tensions, policy risks with China. On 30 August, Philippine officials revealed the US military was involved in discussions to fund the construction of an ‘alternative port’ on Basco island (Batanes province, Philippines). The island is less than 125 miles (200 km) from Taiwan, underscoring its strategic location near the Taiwan Strait amid elevated tensions with China. The port would reportedly be used for cargo purposes, but possibly also for humanitarian and other military purposes as part of the US-Philippines Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA). An unnamed senior Philippine military official stated that the armed forces of the Philippines were also interested in improving their radar and monitoring capabilities in the area, highlighting a possible enhanced military presence on the island. The governor of Batanes said that a decision on the port could be made in October. An upgraded port on Basco Island with potential military uses would enhance US and Philippine deterrence vis-à-vis China over Taiwan and the South China Sea, driving regional tensions and policy risks involving Beijing in the long term. (Source: Sibylline)
31 Aug 23. India-China: Map row unlikely to trigger fresh tension escalation along disputed border. The Indian government lodged a strong protest with China after Beijing released a map showing disputed territories claimed by New Delhi as China’s. The new official ‘standard map’, published by the Ministry of Natural Resources on 28 August, marks the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh (which Beijing claims as South Tibet) and the disputed Aksai Chin plateau as China’s territory. The row comes following a meeting between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping at the BRICS summit in South Africa, where the two leaders agreed to intensify disengagement and de-escalation efforts along the disputed Line of Actual Control (LAC). China publishes an updated edition of its national map annually, and it typically incorporates all of its territorial claims. Therefore, the move does not necessarily suggest Beijing’s renewed attempts to assert its claims. The map dispute, which will almost certainly be handled through diplomatic channels, is unlikely to trigger fresh tension escalation at the border. (Source: Sibylline)
31 Aug 23. Iraq: Rocket attack near gas field underscores security instability, realistic possibility of Iranian involvement. On 30 August, two Katyusha rockets targeted the Khor Mor gas field in Sulaymaniyah, Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR), causing no casualties. Khor Mor is a key supplier of electricity to Erbil and thus attacks on the field are likely aimed at pressuring the Kurdistan Regional Government. The rockets were launched from Tuz Khurmatu district, an area largely controlled by the Badr Organization, part of the Popular Mobilization Forces, which have close ties with Iran. In recent weeks, Iran has repeated its accusations of Kurdish separatist groups carrying out destabilising activities in its border areas with Iraq and has pressured Baghdad to disarm and evacuate these groups by 19 September. In September 2022, Iran launched military operations in IKR against Iranian-Kurdish opposition, using drones and ballistic missiles. The volatile security environment will likely continue in the coming weeks, sustaining elevated security risks in northern Iraq for staff and assets, particularly close to military and energy infrastructure locations. (Source: Sibylline)
31 Aug 23. Royal Saudi Naval Forces assumes command of Gulf-based IMSC task force. Saudi Arabia has assumed command of Coalition Task Force (CTF) ‘Sentinel’, the operational task force that supports the Gulf-based International Maritime Security Construct (IMSC).
This is the first time that a regional navy – namely, the Royal Saudi Naval Forces (RSNF) – has taken command of CTF ‘Sentinel’, a task force that plays a key role in regional security.
“This change of command ushered in the turnover of CTF ‘Sentinel’s’ leadership to regional partners,” the US Naval Forces Central Command’s public affairs office said, in a statement published on 27 August.
IMSC was established originally in 2019, to provide maritime patrol activity to reassure commercial shipping and deter threats to such shipping following a spate of attacks on merchant vessels sailing through and anchored around the Straits of Hormuz. IMSC’s area of operations stretches from the Gulf, down through the Straits of Hormuz and Gulf of Oman, across the Gulf of Aden, and back up through the Bab al-Mandab Strait into the southern part of the Red Sea.
The current list of IMSC members numbers 11 countries: Albania, Bahrain, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Saudi Arabia, the Seychelles, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Originally, the US Navy (USN) took command, before handing over to the UK Royal Navy (RN) in January 2020. The RN has since maintained command of both IMSC headquarters and CTF ‘Sentinel’, until the RSNF took command of ‘Sentinel’ on 27 August.
Underlining the multinational collaboration that underpins IMSC outputs, the RN retains command of IMSC at a headquarters level.
In a handover ceremony at IMSC headquarters in Manama, Bahrain, Commodore Peter Laughton – the RN officer commanding IMSC – said “It is entirely right that the task force transitions to regional leadership …. CTF ‘Sentinel’ exemplifies the collective power of IMSC’s multinational partnerships.”
On taking operational command, the RSNF’s Commodore Saleh Aloufi said “I look forward to working with our multinational team to ensure that the free flow of commerce is protected throughout the region.” (Source: Armada)
31 Aug 23. Japan makes record defence spending request amid tension with China. Japan’s defence ministry made a record spending request on Thursday of 7.7trn yen ($52.67bn), for fiscal 2024, the latest step of a plan to boost defence spending by 43trn yen over five years.
The request is for the second year of Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s plan to double defence spending to 2% of gross domestic product by 2027 as it faces up to an increasingly assertive China and unpredictable North Korea. The request comes as Japan’s relations with China have deteriorated sharply with Japan last week beginning to dump treated radioactive water from its wrecked Fukushima nuclear plant into the sea. China has condemned the release and banned Japanese seafood imports. The fiscal 2024 request, submitted to the Ministry of Finance, adds almost a trillion yen to the previous year’s budget of 6.8trn yen. If approved, the budget will have increased spending by about a trillion yen from the previous year for an unprecedented two consecutive years.
The defence ministry plans to set aside more than 900bn yen to secure ammunition and weapons, including new ship-to-air missiles, according to the budget request.
Some 600bn yen will be used to strengthen logistics capabilities to deploy weapons and resources towards southwest island chains in the event of an emergency.
The budget includes funding for three new landing ships, for a total of 17bn yen, 17 transport helicopters, for more than 300bn yen, and a new specialised transport team to improve deployment capabilities, the defence ministry said in its request.
Japan will also put 75 bn yen towards jointly developing interceptor missile to counter hypersonic warheads with the United States, and 64 bn yen to creating next-generation fighter jets with Britain and Italy.
The record defence spending by the staunch U.S. ally comes after decades of pacifist policies. The United States in 1947 imposed a constitution on Japan that renounces war.
But concerns over China’s maritime ambitions and military assertiveness, especially over Taiwan, and a belligerent and increasingly well armed North Korea have shifted thinking, as has Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Japanese aggression before and during World War Two is still a cause of tension in relations with some countries in Asia and Japan has given assurances its growing military strength will not be used to threaten others. Japan has said it will still prioritise diplomatic efforts and dialogue to avert misunderstandings. (Source: Reuters)
31 Aug 23. Vision 2030 to propel Saudi Arabia’s defense budget at 4.5% CAGR by 2028, says GlobalData. Saudi Arabia has one of the highest defense expenditures relative to its gross domestic product (GDP), driven by a combination of regional security challenges, economic diversification goals, and the desire to assert itself as a major player on the global stage. The country introduced Vision 2030 in 2016, with an aim to develop a self-sustaining domestic defense industry, foster technological innovations, and build strategic partnerships that could collectively enhance its defense capabilities. As a result, Saudi Arabia’s defense expenditure is set to experience a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 4.5% over 2024–28, reaching $86.4bn in 2028, forecasts GlobalData, a leading data and analytics company.
GlobalData’s latest report “Saudi Arabia Defense Market Size and Trends, Budget Allocation, Regulations, Key Acquisitions, Competitive Landscape and Forecast, 2023-28,” reveals that Saudi Arabia’s defense budget recorded a 5.7% increase to $69.1bn in 2023. The increase in the defense budget is attributed to the continued investment in strategic procurement programs, including military fixed-wing aircraft, missiles and missile defense systems, and naval vessels.
Rouble, Aerospace & Defense Analyst at GlobalData, comments: “Saudi Arabia is located in a volatile region marked by territorial conflicts and terrorism, which necessitates a robust defense expenditure to safeguard its sovereignty and protect vital assets such as oil infrastructure. By aligning defense modernization with strategic interests, the country aims to fortify its position as a key player in the Middle East’s security landscape. Its defense expenditure as a percentage of GDP averaged 7.9% over 2019–23.”
Saudi Arabia’s determination to enhance its defense capabilities is evident from the series of procurement programs for military platforms undertaken in recent years. The procurement of advanced platforms such as the Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft, the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missile system, and the modernization of the F-15SA fleet underscore the country’s commitment to enhance air superiority and missile defense capabilities.
Rouble adds: “Saudi Arabia is heavily modernizing its aerial capabilities with a specific emphasis on strike platforms. The country plans to integrate a number of advanced sensors and radars into its in-service F–15 fighters and Eurofighter Typhoons over the coming years. The integration of these advanced capabilities into its multi-role fighter aircraft would significantly enhance the country’s air defense and military prowess. With modern avionics, radar systems, and versatile weaponry, the fighter jets would bolster Saudi Arabia’s ability to respond to a range of threats and undertake various missions, from air superiority to ground attack.”
Additionally, the Saudi Arabian Navy is expected to induct an array of advanced equipment to enable it to transition from a Brown Water Navy to a Green Water Navy. The country is modernizing its eastern naval fleet under the Saudi Naval Expansion Program II (SNEP II) program, which aims to procure a fleet of corvettes, littoral combat ships, and offshore patrol vessels to guard its vital shipping routes and maritime resources.
Rouble concludes: “Vision 2030 will act as a power push to boost Saudi Arabia’s domestic defense manufacturing base as the country plans to localize more than half of its defense equipment needs and develop its own defense industrial complex. To achieve self-sufficiency in defense manufacturing, the country has been promoting its domestic companies to engage in joint ventures, strategic partnerships, and collaborations with international manufacturers, which will in turn assist in acquiring foreign technology and propel local production.” (Source: GlobalData)
30 Aug 23. Gabon: Ongoing coup will likely cause significant operational disruption. On 30 August, representatives of the presidential guard, military and police calling themselves the Committee for Transition and the Restoration of Institution (CTRI) announced the dissolution of the country’s institutions and the deposition of President Ali Bongo Ondimba. The announcement was made on national television from the Presidential Palace shortly after the electoral commission announced that President Bongo had secured his re-election in the 26 August polls with 64.7% of the vote. While there were reports of heavy gunfire in the capital Libreville earlier on 30 August, the CTRI has now restored internet access and the situation in Libreville is relatively calm, likely indicating the CTRI has successfully secured control. A heightened security presence is likely across Libreville through the coming days, disrupting city-wide movement. The CTRI has also closed Gabon’s borders, impeding cross-border movement and elevating risks of supply chain disruption in the immediate term. Opposition to Bongo’s government will likely drive some support for the coup in the short term, though unrest will likely increase if a prolonged transition period is announced. (Source: Sibylline)
30 Aug 23. Ethiopia: Ongoing clashes will sustain heightened risks for operations in Amhara, staff nationwide. On 29 August, the United Nations Human Rights Office announced that at least 183 people were killed in clashes between the Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF) and the Fano militia, an Amhara ethno-nationalist group. The clashes began in early August due to rising tensions over negotiations with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), prompting the authorities to declare a state of emergency in Amhara region. Reports of high numbers of casualties in Amhara will exacerbate rising concerns about Amharan marginalisation, sustaining elevated levels of unrest in the region. This will sustain the threat of clashes, including Ethiopian airstrikes, as well as likely disruption to the movement of goods between the capital Addis Ababa and regional hubs, including Bahir Dar. Collateral risks to staff and assets will also be elevated across Amhara. TPLF negotiations will likely continue to act as flashpoint for conflict and unrest, as will the arbitrary arrests of perceived Amharan dissidents. (Source: Sibylline)
30 Aug 23. Zimbabwe: Opposition demands will sustain protests, though repression will mitigate risk of unrest. On 29 August, the opposition Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC) party demanded an election re-run under the supervision of neighbouring countries. The opposition alleges that the 23 August poll, in which incumbent President Emmerson Mnangagwa secured 52.6% of the vote, was fraudulent. While international observers, including those from the Southern African Development Community (SADC), have stated that the election did not meet international democratic standards, they are highly unlikely to endorse calls for an election re-run. While the CCC has stated it will employ all necessary measures to ensure a fair election, the ruling ZANU-PF’s control of the courts and the military will mitigate the risk of any institutional pressure on the government to re-run. As such, the CCC’s only recourse is public action, though the prospects for protests are diminishing amid heightened fear of government repression. Any protests which do materialise in the capital Harare and Bulawayo will likely be rapidly and violently dispersed. (Source: Sibylline)
30 Aug 23. Serbia: Government will continue balancing act on EU membership bid, affirming status quo. On 29 August, Prime Minister Ana Brnabic stated that Serbia’s membership in the EU is unlikely before 2030 due to the bloc changing its membership criteria. The statement followed a call by European Council (EC) President Charles Michel that the EU was ready for enlargement in 2030. Serbia has opened 22 of the necessary 35 chapters for accession thus far, though it has made little progress since 2021. The 2022 EU country report cites concerns over reforms, Serbia’s stance on Russia, minority rights and corruption. Despite less than 50% of its population supporting EU accession, Serbia benefits greatly from its EU candidacy status, particularly from the associated free trade agreement (approximately 80% of its trade is done with the bloc). The Serbian government has therefore been trying to balance maintaining EU candidacy benefits without having to undertake moves unpopular with both its population and anti-EU allies like Russia. Serbia will almost certainly continue this balancing policy for the foreseeable future. (Source: Sibylline)
30 Aug 23. Russia: Kremlin’s management of presidential candidates will likely ensure incumbent’s re-election. On 28 August, the independent news outlet Meduza reported that the Kremlin’s domestic policy team had mostly finalised the list of who will run against incumbent Russian President Vladimir Putin in the 2024 election. Two of the outlet’s sources, allegedly Kremlin insiders, said politicians below the age of 50 were deliberately excluded from the selection process. The selected candidates are from three of Russia’s ‘systemic opposition’ parliamentary parties: the Communist Party (KPRF), the far-right Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) and the centre-right New People (NL) party. On 6 August, the Kremlin press secretary, Dmitry Peskov, described Russia’s presidential election as a ‘costly bureaucracy’. He assessed that Putin will be re-elected with over 90% of the vote. While the veracity of the report cannot be confirmed, it demonstrates the Kremlin’s efforts to manage the upcoming vote by selecting candidates who will not pose a threat to Putin’s re-election.
30 Aug 23. Armenia-Azerbaijan: Incidents in Nagorno-Karabakh will likely sustain unrest risks in Stepanakert. On 29 August, the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) reported a violation of the 2020 ceasefire agreement by Azerbaijani armed forces in Nagorno Karabakh’s Shusha district. The Russian peacekeeping force, along with the Armenian and Azerbaijani military authorities, are reportedly investigating the incident. No casualties were reported. Despite previous ceasefire violations, this is the first reported violation Russian peacekeepers have attributed to either side since November 2022, underscoring Nagorno-Karabakh’s volatile security environment. On 28 August, Azerbaijani border guards also arrested three ethnic Armenians in the Lachin corridor. The individuals were arrested for allegedly desecrating Azerbaijan’s flag in 2021. Although the charges were dropped, the arrest triggered protests in Nagorno-Karabakh’s capital Stepanakert. Demonstrators protested the deteriorating humanitarian situation in the enclave, with some calling for Nagorno-Karabakh’s president, Arayik Harutyunyan, to resign. Given the currently volatile security environment, further incidents will likely trigger protests in Stepanakert. (Source: Sibylline)
30 Aug 23. US B-1B bomber deployed for joint military drills with South Korea. A U.S. B-1B bomber joined military drills by the United States and South Korea on Wednesday, the 10th such flight by an American bomber this year as the allies have stepped up responses to threats from North Korea. The bomber flew alongside South Korean FA-50 jets and U.S. Air Force F-16 fighters as part of ongoing Ulchi Freedom Shield exercises, South Korea’s defence ministry said.
North Korea routinely denounces the annual military drills as a rehearsal for war. The allies have stressed the exercises are defensive in nature.
The bomber flight came days after North Korea attempted a satellite launch that ended in failure.
The two countries began Ulchi Freedom Shield last week – a joint large-scale military exercise designed to enhance their response to Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile threats, with the second part kicking off on Monday.
Wednesday’s exercise was a demonstration of what the allies have called “extended deterrence” in the face of North Korea’s recent space launch vehicle flights and a show of “strong united defence posture”, South Korea’s defence ministry said in a statement.
On Tuesday in a speech marking Navy Day, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un accused the United States and its allies of increasing the risk of nuclear war, referring to an Aug. 18 summit at Camp David between the United States, South Korea and Japan.
“Owing to the reckless confrontational moves of the U.S. and other hostile forces, the waters off the Korean Peninsula have been reduced to the world’s biggest war hardware concentration spot, the most unstable waters with the danger of a nuclear war,” Kim was quoted as saying by state media KCNA. (Source: Reuters)
30 Aug 23. Gabonese military officers announce they have seized power. A group of senior Gabonese military officers appeared on national television in the early hours of Wednesday and said they had taken power, minutes after the state election body announced President Ali Bongo had won a third term. Appearing on television channel Gabon 24, the officers said they represented all security and defence forces in the Central African nation. They said the election results were cancelled, all borders closed until further notice and state institutions dissolved.
Loud sounds of gunfire could be heard in the capital Libreville, a Reuters reporter said, after the television appearance.
There was no immediate comment from the government of the OPEC-member nation. There were no immediate reports on the whereabouts of Bongo, who was last seen in public when he cast his vote in the election on Saturday.
“In the name of the Gabonese people … we have decided to defend the peace by putting an end to the current regime,” the officers said in a statement.
As one officer read the joint statement, around a dozen others stood silently behind him in military fatigues and berets.
The servicemen introduced themselves as members of The Committee of Transition and the Restoration of Institutions. The state institutions they declared dissolved included the government, the senate, the national assembly, the constitutional court and the election body.
If successful, the coup would represent the eighth in West and Central Africa since 2020. Coups in Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Chad and Niger have undermined democratic progress in recent years.
Last month, the military snatched power in Niger, sending shockwaves across the Sahel and sucking in global powers with strategic interests at stake.
Tensions were running high in Gabon amid fears of unrest after Saturday’s presidential, parliamentary, and legislative vote, which saw Bongo seeking to extend his family’s 56-year grip on power while the opposition pushed for change in the oil and cocoa-rich but poverty-stricken nation.
A lack of international observers, the suspension of some foreign broadcasts, and the authorities’ decision to cut internet service and impose a night-time curfew nationwide after the poll had raised concerns about the transparency of the electoral process.
Gabon foiled an attempted military coup in January 2019 after soldiers briefly seized the state radio station and broadcast a message saying Bongo, who had suffered a stroke months earlier, was no longer fit for office.
The situation was restored hours later after two of the suspected coup plotters were killed and others arrested.
IN POWER SINCE 2009
The Gabonese Election Centre said earlier on Wednesday Bongo won the election with 64.27% of the vote and that his main challenger, Albert Ondo Ossa, had come in second place with 30.77%.
Bongo, 64, who succeeded his father Omar as president in 2009, had contested against 18 challengers, six of whom backed Ondo Ossa in an effort to narrow the race.
The government has said the web blackout and curfew are necessary to prevent the spread of fake news and to protect public safety. Bongo’s disputed 2016 election win provoked violent protests that saw the parliament building torched.
His team have rejected allegations of fraud by Ondo Ossa and his opposition alliance after a vote marred by numerous polling stations opening several hours late.
The alliance Alternance 2023 also reported other alleged irregularities including that ballot slips for its candidates had not been deployed correctly in some areas. Reuters could not independently verify the claim.
The European Union was not invited to observe this election. EU monitors previously questioned the validity of Bongo’s narrow victory in the 2016 presidential vote.
On Monday, media watchdog Reporters without Borders (RSF) voiced concern about the internet block and Gabon’s temporary suspension of broadcasts by French international news outlets RFI, France 24, and TV5 Monde.
“RSF denounces a series of attacks on press freedom and information pluralism, facts likely to compromise (the) general election’s transparency,” it said in an online post.
The opposition has disputed both of Bongo’s previous electoral victories, citing fraud. He first came to power in a 2009 vote following the death of his father Omar Bongo before being re-elected in 2016.
(Source: Reuters)
29 Aug 23. Australian MINDEF announces review of Defence Trade Controls Act.
Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Richard Marles has announced a review of the Defence Trade Controls Act 2012 to be led by Peter Tesch and Professor Graeme Samuel AC.
The Defence Trade Controls Act 2012, which regulates the supply of military and dual-use technology overseas and the brokering of defence goods and technology, requires a review every five years to ensure Australia’s export control regime remains fit for purpose, balancing appropriate safeguards with a rapidly evolving strategic environment.
The review will examine the act alongside existing policies and regulations surrounding the protection of sensitive and critical technology and consider whether current safeguards for technology transfers complement these frameworks. This review will also extend to evaluate the act in the context of other reforms the government is considering to defence trade.
Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister, the Hon Richard Marles MP said, “The Albanese government is committed to ensuring the Australian export control regime remains fit for purpose in a rapidly evolving strategic environment.”
Tesch served in the Australian public service for more than 35 years, having held diplomatic roles including as Australia’s ambassador to Russia and Germany, and most recently, as Deputy Secretary of Strategy, Policy, and Industry Group in Defence.
“Peter Tesch and Professor Graeme Samuel bring a wealth of experience and expertise and I can’t think of two more qualified people to lead this review,” the Deputy Prime Minister said.
Professor Samuel AC is a former chairman of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, associate member of the Australian Communications and Media Authority, and president of the National Competition Council. He brings a wealth of public administration and regulatory experience. As part of the review, Tesch and Professor Samuel AC will undertake public consultation and engage with key stakeholders across government, academia, and industry. (Source: Defence Connect)
29 Aug 23. Fortifying Nigeria’s security: defence and procurement strategies unveiled. An examination of Nigeria’s defence readiness and market dynamics reveals a complex interplay between economic growth and security threats. To tackle escalating security threats, Nigeria’s armed forces are amping up preparedness while navigating a complex web of procurement policies and market intricacies. GlobalData’s comprehensive analysis, encompassing defence forces and procurement strategies, unveils a nation determined to safeguard its interests and enhance capabilities across its navy, air force, and army sectors.
Nigeria stands at a critical juncture, grappling with mounting security challenges that demand robust responses. With a burgeoning defence budget of $2.8bn in 2023 and a staggering CAGR of 9.6%, Nigeria’s armed forces are adopting a multi-faceted approach to address terrorism, illegal activities, and geopolitical partnerships.
GlobalData’s “Nigeria’s Defense Market 2023-2028” report outlines the West African country’s collective defence strategies across its military branches.
Cracking down on terrorism and illicit activities
The threat of terrorism looms large, with groups like Boko Haram, ISWA, and Ansaru posing persistent challenges. The recent spate of attacks underscores the urgency to bolster security. Nigeria’s military expenditure reflects its commitment to combat these threats, making counterterrorism initiatives a cornerstone of its defence policy.
From arms smuggling to oil theft, the African nation faces a dual battle on illegal activities that fuel insecurity and economic losses. As a response, Nigeria has engaged in international partnerships and stringent measures to curb arms smuggling and mitigate oil theft. These efforts illustrate the nation’s resolve to stem the tide of these illicit activities.
Global peacekeeping and navigating budgetary avenues
Nigeria’s defence forces extend their influence far beyond national borders. By actively participating in UN peacekeeping missions, Nigeria demonstrates its commitment to fostering international stability. Strategic collaborations with countries like Iran, Brazil, and the US further bolster their global standing, underscoring its role in shaping geopolitical dynamics.
Nigeria’s defence strategies have a global footprint. Active participation in the African Union strengthens regional security cooperation, while bilateral relationships with countries like Turkey and the US reflect the geopolitical manoeuvring of Nigeria. By engaging in military cooperation and trade forums, the country positions itself as an influential player.
Allocating resources to defence is a strategic priority. With a defence budget of 0.5% of GDP in 2023 and projections of reaching 0.6% by 2028 (CAGR of 4.4%), Nigeria aligns its financial commitments with its evolving security needs. This reflects a per capita expenditure growth from $9.5 in 2019 to an estimated $14.9 by 2028.
An all-encompassing defence doctrine
Nigeria’s security doctrine encapsulates diverse elements, from diplomacy to military capabilities. This holistic approach safeguards territorial integrity and national interests and contributes to global peacekeeping efforts. Nigeria’s engagement in UN missions underscores its commitment to international security and its strategic stance on the world stage.
As Nigeria confronts various security challenges, its armed forces are embracing comprehensive approaches to fortify its defences. Against the backdrop of dynamic market dynamics, stringent procurement policies, and evolving security paradigms, Nigeria’s navy, air force, and army are collectively poised to safeguard national interests.
Nigeria lays the groundwork for a secure and stable future through robust investments, strategic alliances, and concerted efforts. (Source: naval-technology.com)
29 Aug 23. RoK Seeks 4.5 Pct Rise in Defense Budget for 2024. South Korea’s defense ministry on Tuesday requested a 4.5 percent on-year increase in its budget for next year, with a focus on reinforcing capabilities to counter North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats.
The defense ministry is seeking a budget of 59.59trn won (US$45bn) for next year, compared with this year’s 57trn won. The government plans to submit the proposal to the National Assembly on Friday for approval.
Of the total, the ministry seeks to spend 17.8trn won for weapons acquisitions and other projects to bolster defense capabilities — a 5.2 percent rise from the previous year — while earmarking 41.79trn won for running military forces, up 4.2 percent on-year.
The proposed budget includes 7.16trn won to bolster the country’s “three-axis” system that consists of the Kill Chain preemptive strike platform; the Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation program; and the Korea Air and Missile Defense system (KAMD).
It features a plan to spend 3.3trn won on 24 Kill Chain projects, which includes efforts to acquire KSS-III Batch-II submarines and more F-35A stealth fighter jets.
The ministry also seeks a budget of 1.57trn won for 11 KAMD projects, such as performance upgrades to its Patriot missile defense system, as well as 1.54trn won in support assets for the three-pronged system, including the country’s project to acquire military reconnaissance satellites.
The overall proposal also includes a scheme to raise monthly wages for enlisted troops. Under the scheme, the monthly pay for a sergeant, which currently stands at 1m won, is set to increase to 1.25m won next year.
“In order to prepare our military against security uncertainties and asymmetric threats, such as North Korean nuclear and missile (weapons) … (we) will actively consult with the National Assembly and other relevant agencies,” the ministry said in a release. (Source: https://www.defense-aerospace.com/ Yonhap News Agency)
29 Aug 23. PH-Australia Joint Patrols Now in the Works – AFP Chief. Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) chief Gen. Romeo Brawner Jr. on Sunday said joint patrols with Australia on the South China Sea (West Philippine Sea) are now in the offing. In an interview with DZRH, Brawner said the planning on the measure is ongoing after this has been approved by President Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr. and the Australian government.
“We are now planning but in essence the President and the Australian leadership have already approved it, and this will be done to so that we can maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific, this is part of our efforts to promote rules-based international order,” he added.
In a joint statement on the sidelines of the Philippines and Australia’s amphibious assault drills on Aug. 25, part of the ongoing “Exercise Alon”, Department of National Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr. and Australia Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defense Richard Marles said they have “discussed the importance of all countries in the region exercising their agency in support of an Indo-Pacific region that is based on sovereignty, international law, and ASEAN Centrality.”
“Under the Enhanced Defence Cooperation Program, we are working to broaden the scope of our cooperation and the complexity of our activities,” the joint statement said, adding that this intent is epitomized by the Indo-Pacific Endeavour 2023.
“We agreed on the importance of all states operating safely and professionally, while respecting and adhering to international law, particularly the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and we reaffirmed our strong support of the 2016 South China Sea Arbitral Tribunal Award,” the statement further read.
In line with this, the Philippines and Australia have “recommitted to planning bilateral joint patrols in the South China Sea/ West Philippine Sea and other areas of mutual interest.”
Some 1,760 Filipino and Australian troops participated in “Exercise Alon” which will end on Aug. 31.
Participants include 560 members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and 1,200 personnel from the Australian Defense Force with 120 supporting personnel coming from the United States Marine Corps.
Participating military assets include the helicopter landing dock, HMAS Canberra, frigate HMAS Anzac, with the landing dock BRP Davao Del Sur. Close-air support was provided by the Royal Australian Air Force F-35A “Lightning II” aircraft; Australian Army M-1A1 “Abrams” tank and two PMC amphibious assault vehicles, with airlift support by Darwin-based USMC MV-22B. (Source: https://www.defense-aerospace.com/ Philippine News Agency)
29 Aug 23. Australia Welcomes Japan’s First International F-35A Deployment. The Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) has welcomed a visit by Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) F-35A Lightning II aircraft and personnel to Australia, marking the first time Japan has deployed these aircraft overseas. Two F-35As and a contingent of 55 personnel from the JASDF are being hosted at RAAF Base Tindal from 26 to 29 August after making the 6,400-kilometre trip to Australia’s top end.
Vice Minister of Defense for International Affairs Serizawa Kiyoshi and Ambassador for Japan, His Excellency Suzuki Kazuhiro, visited JASDF personnel at RAAF Base Tindal today as guests of Chief of Air Force, Air Marshal Robert Chipman.
The visit by the F-35As follows the entry into force of the Australia–Japan Reciprocal Access Agreement, which facilitates deeper and more sophisticated practical cooperation between the Australian Defence Force and the Japan Self-Defense Forces.
Secretary of the Department of Defence, Greg Moriarty, said: “Australia is honoured to be chosen as the destination for Japan’s first international deployment of its F-35As. This is a significant milestone in the relationship between our two countries, and is the first activity to be held under the Reciprocal Access Agreement.
“In September, we will reciprocate this visit with six RAAF F-35As deploying to Japan for Exercise Bushido Guardian 2023. Our special strategic partnership with Japan is critical to supporting an open, secure and prosperous Indo-Pacific.”
Chief of Air Force, Air Marshal Rob Chipman AM, CSC, said: “This visit to Australia will build closer working-level relationships between our respective air forces, and enhance our mutual ability to cooperate in the Indo-Pacific region. It’s our pleasure to host the Japan Air Self-Defense Force for this visit, and we look forward to seeing them return for future exercises here in Australia.
“Developing our mutual understanding, especially in how we each operate the F-35A, is essential to how Australia and Japan contribute to the collective security of the Indo-Pacific.” (Source: https://www.defense-aerospace.com/)
29 Aug 23. Somalia: Military offensive drives retaliatory attacks, raising threats to hotels, government buildings in Mogadishu. On 28 August, Somali armed forces withdrew from the villages and towns of Budbud, El Dheer, Gal’ad and Masagaway following a high casualty al-Shabaab counter-attack on the recently captured village of Cowsweyne (all Galmudug state) on 26 August. Exact casualty figures have not yet been released though a former government official in the capital Mogadishu has claimed around 130 soldiers were killed. In recent days, military operations in central Somalia have escalated as part of an effort to resecure territory captured in 2022, and force al-Shabaab into southern Somalia before launching offensive operations in that region. To counteract this effort, al-Shabaab will likely conduct further counter-attacks in central Somalia in the coming days and weeks, including retaliatory bombing attacks targeting government officials involved in co-ordinating offensive operations. This will elevate the threat of attacks against hotels and government buildings in Mogadishu, as well as cities across central and southern Somalia. (Source: Sibylline)
29 Aug 23. Niger: Heightened diplomatic tensions will sustain risks to French assets, personnel in coming weeks. On 28 August, French President Emmanuel Macron announced that France’s ambassador to Niger would remain in his post, defying a 48-hour junta deadline for his removal set on 25 August. Following the passing of the deadline, the junta announced it would block the provision of electricity, water and food to the embassy. Pro-junta demonstrators gathered outside the French military base and embassy in the capital Niamey on 27-28 August. French authorities have repeatedly denied the junta’s legitimacy to demand the withdrawal of troops and diplomatic personnel. Ongoing discord over France’s presence in Niger will sustain the likelihood of further anti-French protests over the coming weeks. There is a realistic possibility of incidents of isolated and opportunistic violence, elevating risks to assets and personnel associated with the French government, and those close to France’s embassy and military base. While the embassy likely has an auxiliary power supply, it is possible that disruption to other supplies will force the embassy to relocate to the military base, further fuelling tensions. (Source: Sibylline)
29 Aug 23. Zimbabwe: Opposition’s rejection of electoral results increases likelihood of protests. On 27 August, the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) announced that President Emmerson Mnangagwa had secured re-election with 52.6% of votes. However, the opposition Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC) party has rejected the results, citing vote rigging and voter suppression, bolstered by queries over the results’ credibility raised by international observers, including South Africa, the EU and the US. While Mnangagwa has encouraged the CCC to appeal the results in court, the ruling ZANU-PF-controlled judiciary is likely to reject the opposition’s appeal. The CCC will likely call for protests in the coming days, particularly in Bulawayo and Harare, with Nelson Mandela Avenue, the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission and Africa Unity Square being potential hotspots (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 3 August 2023). There is a realistic possibility that repression will reduce turnout but the security forces will almost certainly utilise excessive dispersal methods against any demonstration that materialises, sustaining elevated bystander risks. (Source: Sibylline)
29 Aug 23. Taiwan: Possible new presidential candidate will likely boost prospects of ruling party’s candidate. On 28 August, the billionnaire founder of electronics manufacturer Foxconn, Terry Gou announced that he plans to contest next January’s presidential election as an independent candidate. Gou attempted to run as the main opposition Kuomintang’s (KMT) candidate earlier in the year, but the party selected former New Taipei mayor Hou Yu-ih instead. Gou cited his business credentials during the announcement, while criticising the ruling Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) cross-strait policy for increasing the risk of war. Gou will need to obtain 290,000 signatures in 45 days to be eligible, which has only been managed by a few previous independent candidates, although Gou’s high-profile standing boosts his chances. If Gou successfully becomes an independent candidate, this would likely split the votes of the ‘pan-Blue’ camp (voters who favour closer and more stable relations with Beijing). Given that the DPP’s candidate, Vice President Lai Ching-te, already has a comfortable lead in polling, his chances of winning the race would likely be further boosted in such a scenario. (Source: Sibylline)
29 Aug 23. Guatemala: Temporary suspension of president-elect’s party fuels government instability, protest risks. On 28 August, Guatemalan prosecutors ordered a temporary suspension of the centre-left Semilla party, with which president-elect Bernardo Arevalo is affiliated. The order questions the party’s legal registration, casting uncertainty on the election’s legitimacy. However, the officials granted Semilla a three-day window to initiate legal proceedings against the suspension order. The suspension by prosecutors coincided with the Supreme Electoral Tribunal’s (the highest electoral authority in the country) ratification of Arevalo’s victory. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) has also warned of death threats against Arevalo. Given the uncertainty over the legitimacy of Arevalo’s victory and the standing of the Semilla party, further destabilisation is likely until the presidential inauguration, scheduled for January 2024. This is likely to sustain short-to-medium-term government instability risks in Guatemala, and the possibility of mass protests and unrest.
29 Aug 23. Haiti: Attack against protest near capital underlines sustained security risks linked to organised crime. On 26 August, at least ten people were killed during a protest led by a local Christian leader in Canaan, a suburb to the north of the capital Port-au-Prince. The death toll will possibly rise, as some protesters were reportedly kidnapped. The gang responsible for the attack, ‘5 Seconds’, controls territory in Canaan (see Sibylline Alert – 24 August 2023). Its members opened fire on demonstrators who were marching as part of a growing civilian resistance movement advocating for armed self-defence groups, known as ‘Bwa Kale’. The movement has raised fears that gangs will retaliate against civilians, sparking further violence. There are elevated risks of armed conflict and organised crime in and around Port-au-Prince, and along Route Nationale 1 leading to the Artibonite department. Continued unrest is likely as gang violence persists amid increasing civilian mobilisations. (Source: Sibylline)
29 Aug 23. Syria: Clashes between US-backed forces will elevate security risks in eastern Syria. Since 28 August, armed clashes have been ongoing in the eastern Deir ez-Zor province between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and its former ally, the Deir ez-Zor Military Council (DMC). Both are financially supported by the US and are fighting Islamic State (IS) cells in eastern Syria. Three individuals have been killed in the fighting, erupted after the arrest of a DMC commander by the SDF on 27 August. Iranian-backed Iraqi militants have also reportedly been deployed to the area to conduct sabotage attacks and take advantage of the instability. Sustained clashes in the near term, in addition to the realistic possibility of Iran-directed destabilising actions, are likely to weaken counter-IS security operations and increase terrorism risks in eastern Syria. An uptick in the volatility of the security and operational environment in Deir ez-Zor will also compound elevated security risks, particularly for US military assets and around militant bases, with contingent physical risks for staff and assets based in close proximity. (Source: Sibylline)
28 Aug 23. Pakistan defense budget to reach $10bn by 2028 growing at 2.5% CAGR, says GlobalData. Pakistan’s efforts to secure its borders and maintain stability within the country have been the primary factors shaping its defense investments over the years. Historically, challenges including Pakistan’s volatile relationship with its neighbours and regional separatist movements, have played a major role in influencing the country’s defense policy making. These factors are expected to continue to drive Pakistan’s defense budget to an estimated $10 bn by 2028, with a compounded annual growth rate (CAGR) of 2.5%, according to GlobalData, a leading data and analytics company.
GlobalData’s latest report, “Pakistan’s Defense Market Size and Trends, Budget Allocation, Regulations, Key Acquisitions, Competitive Landscape and Forecast, 2023-28,” reveals that the country’s defense budget witnessed a sharp decline of 14% annual growth rate in 2022. However, it grew from $7.8bn in 2022 to $8.3bn in 2023, enabling it to maintain a positive CAGR of 0.5% over the period 2019-23.
Akash Pratim Debbarma, Aerospace & Defense Analyst at GlobalData, comments: “Despite facing a severe economic crisis, Pakistan did not cutback its defense budget in 2023, which indicates the country’s emphasis on strengthening its defense capabilities and signifies its desire to ensure stability and security within its borders and fostering tranquillity in the region. The projected growth in the defense budget showcases its intent to responsibly allocate resources to meet the needs of its armed forces.”
As Pakistan charts its path towards modernization, a significant emphasis lies on bolstering its military fixed-wing aircraft capabilities. As per GlobalData estimates, the country is expected to cumulatively allocate $3.6bn between 2023 and 2033 for procuring various categories of military fixed-wing aircraft. The ongoing and planned procurement programs, such as the acquisition of FC-31, J-10C, PAC PF-X, and JF-17 Block-3 multi-role aircraft, are set to play a pivotal role in shaping the future of Pakistan’s aerial prowess.
Debbarma concludes: “Through a strategic partnership with China, Pakistan was able to source advanced weaponry and technologies while nurturing its indigenous defense manufacturing capabilities. Despite its challenges, the country is trying to mix external collaboration and internal innovation to develop a robust domestic defense industry landscape. Pakistan is also organizing events like IDEAS 2024, slated to be held in Karachi in 2024, to promote local defense companies and provide opportunities to showcase their defense products to the international markets.” (Source: GlobalData)
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