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27 Aug 23. Three US Marines killed in Osprey aircraft crash on remote island. Three US Marines were killed on Sunday when their Osprey aircraft crashed on a remote Australian island during a training exercise.
US officials said another five crew members were injured and had been flown from the isolated crash site to Royal Darwin Hospital in a “serious condition”.
The US Marine Rotational Force in Darwin said there were a total of 23 personnel on board at the time of the crash.
Australia’s military said only Americans were involved.
Rescue efforts were complicated by the remote location of the crash, on the sparsely populated Melville Island. It is about 37 miles north of the nearest city, Darwin.
The aircraft was taking part in a training exercise called “Predators Run”, a series of drills involving thousands of soldiers from the US and Australia, as well as other militaries, including from Indonesia and the Philippines.
Ospreys are described by the US Air Force as combining the features of both helicopters and turboprop planes.
The hybrid aircraft have two swivelling engines positioned on fixed wingtips that allow them to land and take off vertically. They also travel much faster than a conventional helicopter.
‘Tragic and regrettable’
Anthony Albanese, the Australian prime minister, and Richard Marles, the country’s defence minister, extended their “deepest condolences” to the US military following the crash.
“This incident is a reminder of the significance of the service undertaken by our personnel and those of our partner nations,” they said in a joint statement.
Mr Albanese also described the crash as “tragic” and “regrettable”, and stressed that authorities were still trying to piece together what had happened.
“This is a difficult incident, we are responding fully, and our priority is on providing every assistance possible,” he said. (Source: Daily Telegraph)
25 Aug 23. Burkina Faso-Mali: Rising threat of intervention in Niger increases regional sanctions risk. On 24 August, Niger’s junta leader Abdourahamane Tchiani signed decrees permitting Malian and Burkinabe troops to enter Nigerien territory in case of an attack. The Malian and Burkinabe authorities also reiterated previous statements that a military intervention by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) would be interpreted as a war upon themselves. Significant security challenges within both Mali and Burkina Faso will likely limit both states’ capacity to support prolonged military deployment in Niger. However, the declaration does reflect growing efforts by Niger’s junta to mitigate against the threat of military intervention, likely indicating an expectation that a diplomatic agreement will not be reached with ECOWAS. The persistent threat of military intervention will increase the risk of a broader breakdown in relations between ECOWAS and Mali and Burkina Faso, raising the likelihood of broader sanctions, disrupting supply chains and elevating food security risks. (Source: Sibylline)
25 Aug 23. Colombia: IED attack against military in Cauca reflects sustained security risks linked to militancy . On 24 August, dissidents targeted a military base on the outskirts of Santander de Quilichao (Cauca department) with IEDs, leaving four soldiers injured. The improvised gas cylinder bombs, filled with explosives and shrapnel, were launched into the base, leading to a shootout between army troops and dissidents. The attack was attributed to the Jaime Martinez FARC dissident front, which remains active in northern Cauca. In recent weeks, militant activities targeting military personnel have increased, including the kidnapping of a soldier by the Dagoberto Ramos front on 12 August. The developments highlight growing instability as clashes intensify between the military and armed groups in the region. As Cauca experiences its worst security crisis in decades, further assaults on military facilities and personnel are likely, potentially exacerbating the ongoing internal displacement of local populations. The risk of attacks in Cauca will remain high in the medium term. (Source: Sibylline)
25 Aug 23. Libya: IS commander arrest highlights sustained terror threat amid ongoing intra-regional instability. On 22 August, Libyan forces under the Government of National Unity (GNU) captured an unnamed Islamic State (IS) leader who allegedly planned and sponsored three deadly attacks in the capital Tripoli in 2018 at an undisclosed location. The arrest reflects the continued efforts of Libyan security forces to combat IS cells, which have been prevalent since the fall of General Muammar Gaddafi. The arrest highlights the sustained presence of long-term IS members in Libya, despite maintaining a relatively low profile in recent years. Intra-regional tensions resulting from political instability in the Sahel and armed clashes between Libyan factions and their associated forces will sustain the volatility of Libya’s security environment. Consequently, terrorist threats will persist nationwide over the coming months due to the risk of terrorist cells, particularly IS, exploiting internal instability to conduct opportunistic attacks against security forces. Nevertheless, IS will likely continue its efforts to strengthen its forces in the coming months, particularly in the south-western province of Fezzan. (Source: Sibylline)
24 Aug 23. Argentina and Saudi Arabia among six nations to join BRICS.
The expansion represents a global geopolitical shift, but the dollarisation policy of Argentine presidential hopeful Javier Milei will concern members.
The alliance of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) has invited six additional nations during the third and final day of talks at its 2023 summit in Johannesburg.
The invitation, announced by South African President Cyril Ramaphosa on Thursday (August 24), signifies a U-turn by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, who had both previously objected to expanding BRICS.
Initiated by Chinese President Xi Jinping, the expansion will see Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates become BRICS members alongside Argentina and Saudi Arabia. A total of 23 nations from the Global South applied to join the coalition.
Members say it will counter the dominance of the G7 alliance between Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the US. With the latest additions, BRICS will account for half of the world’s population and 30% of global GDP, according to GlobalData figures.
More crucially, the integration of OPEC member states has the capacity to reshape international energy markets. The addition of Saudi Arabia, Iran and the UAE will see BRICS make up 42% of global crude oil output, up from 20%, while Argentina brings its abundant lithium reserves.
But, with many of the BRICS’ agreements revolving around dedollarisation, the increasingly likely election of pro-dollar populist Javier Milei looks set to throw a spanner in the works come Argentina’s elections in October.
Argentina looks east
Buenos Aires stands to gain significantly in terms of trade, deals and geopolitical influence as part of BRICS.
Beijing’s annual trade in Latin America is forecasted to surpass $500bn over the next decade – half of which will go to projects in Argentina, according to GlobalData’s Argentina Defence Market 2023-2028 report.
Chinese investments in Argentina have multiplied in the mining, oil, hydropower, nuclear energy and defence sectors, seen in the agreement to supply 20 FC-1/JF-17 fighter jets produced by the Chengdu Aircraft Corporation and Pakistan Aeronautical Complex.
Argentina also wants in on China’s Belt and Road Initiative, with President Alberto Fernandez signing a memorandum of understanding in Beijing last year. Less than six months later, China invited Argentina to attend the June 2022 BRICS summit in an undisguised attempt to pry the resource-rich South American nation from US’ clutches.
From one BRICS superpower to another. Argentina is Russia’s longest-running business partner in Latin America, and Russian President Vladimir Putin has long supported the country’s claims over the Falkland Islands. Moscow and Buenos Aires also reached an ongoing agreement for the purchase of utility helicopters and the lease of 12 Sukhoi Su-24 Fencer aircraft.
Argentina has had few dealings with India or South Africa but has recently shown interest in India’s indigenously developed TEJAS fighter aircraft. BRICS membership will likely see New Delhi-Buenos Aires ties develop further.
A long-standing neighbourly rivalry with Brazil has impeded neither trade nor strong security links between the two countries in the Southern Cone.
Despite President Lula’s previous stance against BRICS expansion – largely due to concerns of alienating the West and jeopardising Brazil’s non-alignment ‘middle power’ positioning between the US and China – on Tuesday (22 August) he proclaimed: “It is very important for Argentina to be in BRICS.” (Source: army-technology.com)
26 Aug 23. BRICS Shows It’s Little More Than a Meaningless Acronym. The 15th summit of BRICS countries, which just concluded in South Africa, received unprecedented international attention. Some commentators even invoked the Bandung conference of 1955, where leaders of India, China, Indonesia, Egypt, and Yugoslavia launched the non-aligned movement. It seemed as though another generation of leaders, this time from Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, were building an alternative to the US-dominated global order.
As it happened, their doings and sayings ranged from the semi-farcical to the meaningless. According to a leading South African news website, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi refused to leave his aircraft on arrival in South Africa because the host, President Cyril Ramaphosa, wasn’t at the airport to welcome him. China’s Xi Jinping inexplicably failed to deliver a scheduled speech at an opening event where the other leaders spoke, including Russian President Vladimir Putin on video link.
Putin, who didn’t travel due to fear of arrest for war crimes, unsurprisingly blamed the West for his war in Ukraine. Xi’s speech decried acountry, unnamed but recognizable, that is “obsessed with maintaining its hegemony” and obstructing China’s rise. Much agitated talk, notably from President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of Brazil, of de-dollarization and an alternative BRICS currency came to nothing.
The summit broke up with BRICS enlarging their membership roster. The group will now include, puzzlingly, crisis-roiled Argentina and Ethiopia as well as oil-rich Saudi Arabia and, until very recently, the latter’s ruthless enemy, Iran. There is still no clarity about what alternative institutions it plans to build. A scheduled news briefing that might have helped clarify this was cancelled on Wednesday in order to give, Ramaphosa claimed, journalists some “rest.”
What then should we make of a group that started life as a casual acronym coined by a British economist at a US securities firm to pitch investments. Rather, how can we avoid exaggerating the importance of BRICS as a counterweight to the decades-old US-led global order?
To be sure, the current rebalancing of the West’s geopolitical and economic power has been overdue for more than a century, ever since Europe plunged into the first of its continental wars. But a generation of Western journalists and commentators are prone to over-interpret this basic historical dynamic.
Two global conflagrations and the destruction of European empires gave the United States its hegemonic position, and Western commentators their basic assumptions about the world. But the West’s strenuous cold war with the Soviet Union, and eventual triumph, distracted them for too long from the much bigger and more consequential event of the 20th century: decolonization.
Once liberated from commodity-extractive and coercive trading relationships with Western nations, Asian, Latin American and African countries were always likely to regain some of their old wealth and power. The dollar was fated to lose some of its global potency — if not as precipitately as the pound sterling did after the two world wars. And large countries with industrious populations such as China, India and Indonesia could no longer be denied certain comparative advantages in the age of globalization.
That said, Pretoria and Johannesburg are no Bandung. Leaders of India, Egypt and China back in the 1950s had freshly emergedfrom world-historical anti-colonial and national-liberation movements. Whatever you think of Yugoslavia’s Josip Broz Tito, he had led the most successful armed uprising against Hitler in Europe and then stood up to Stalin. Moreover, these men, direct victims and witnesses of racist-imperialist occupations and plundering, sincerely wished to build a global system for equitable economic growth. Actual blueprints, such as the New International Economic Order (NIEO), came out of their efforts.
In contrast, the assortment of princelings, autocrats, demagogues, and war criminals holding forth in South Africa this week have neither the prestige nor the foresight possessed by the delegates at Bandung. In fact, they seem to be learning on the job—how to improvise their way through an increasingly precarious global environment.
Indeed, the “vision” that BRICS countries, including its newest members, have in common, amounts to little more than a cynical expediency: to increase their bargaining power in the trade, technology and military deals that they will continue to vigorously pursue with the United States and Europe.
It can’t be otherwise. Take, for example, India: the country needs cheap manufactured goods from its strategic rival China, cut-price oil from Russia, military hardware and technology transfers from the United States and Europe, and investments from the UAE. Accordingly, it cannot but have a foreign policy carefully hedged against binding commitments to this or that country or bloc in the multipolar world.
Nor can it plausibly claim, while banning rice and sugar exports, to lead the Global South. China’s better credentials in this regard are also fading as it scrambles to contain a mounting economic crisis. Perhaps, we won’t have to wait until the bigger summit of BRICS, hosted by Putin in Russia next year, to notice the gaping void of meaning at the heart of an expanding acronym. Analysis by Pankaj Mishra | Bloomberg (Source: Paulo Dominonni via LinkedIn)
24 Aug 23. United States DoD and Indonesia MoD Joint Press Statement. Today, Secretary Austin and Minister Prabowo reaffirmed the strength of the defense pillar of our enduring Strategic Partnership. Together, they resolved to preserve international laws and norms, enhance our mutual security and defense capabilities, and remain guided by our shared democratic principles. They shared their determination to further strengthen our relationship, ensuring that it is robust and capable of seizing future opportunities and tackling emerging challenges in an increasingly complex geopolitical climate.
Shared Vision
Minister Prabowo and Secretary Austin agreed that the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific and the United States’ Indo-Pacific Strategy share fundamental principles, such as a commitment to maintaining peace, security, stability, and prosperity in the region through ASEAN Centrality, and that we should work alongside partners who share these goals and a commitment to an open, inclusive, and rules-based order. They shared the view that the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) expansive maritime claims in the South China Sea are inconsistent with international law as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Secretary Austin and Minister Prabowo jointly condemned violations of national sovereignty, as reflected in United Nations General Assembly Resolution ES-11/1 dated 2 March 2022, as adopted by majority vote, which deplores in the strongest terms the aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine and demands its complete and unconditional withdrawal from the territory of Ukraine.
Stronger Partnership
As the United States and Indonesia move into the 75th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations, Minister Prabowo and Secretary Austin reaffirmed that our defense partnership is stronger than ever. They highlighted that the United States and Indonesia hold more than 220 defense engagements annually, from subject-matter expert exchanges to multilateral exercises with thousands of troops, all demonstrating the breadth of our interoperability. They discussed how, in recent years, we have expanded Exercise GARUDA SHIELD from a bilateral army-to-army exercise to a joint, multinational exercise with over nineteen countries represented, and they committed to seek further opportunities for expansion. Together, Secretary Austin and Minister Prabowo reaffirmed the importance of Indonesia’s military modernization and discussed both countries’ mutual intention to deepen interoperability through defense capabilities like fighter aircraft upgrades, new multi-role fighter aircraft, and additional fixed and rotary wing transport aircraft.
Shared Values
Secretary Austin and Minister Prabowo also discussed the commitment by the United States and Indonesia, as two of the world’s largest democracies, to the rule of law and the professionalization of our armed forces. They highlighted that for the first time this year, there were Indonesian cadets in the Army, Air Force, and Naval service academies. Minister Prabowo expressed his appreciation for the education of more than 7,000 Indonesian military personnel and civilians in the United States, as well as training and education funds that have been provided to Indonesian students by the United States, totaling more than $130 million since 1970. Going forward, as part of our professionalization efforts, Minister Prabowo and Secretary Austin pledged to work together to promote civilian harm mitigation best practices. They also discussed how our efforts to mitigate and respond to civilian harm directly reflect our values and directly contribute to mission success and public confidence in the armed forces. (Source: U.S. DoD)
24 Aug 23. Armenia-Azerbaijan: Further dialogue needed to facilitate eventual agreement despite new peace proposal. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said on 24 August that Yerevan has relayed new peace proposals to Baku. However, Pashinyan did not provide further details about what these proposals contain; it is unknown whether these are terms that Baku could compromise on. The prime minister claimed that Yerevan had received ‘credible information’ that Azerbaijan is planning to re-open the Lachin Corridor, the sole road connecting Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia, to allow outbound transit from the disputed territory. Pashinyan stated that about 400 tonnes of humanitarian cargo destined for Nagorno-Karabakh are still waiting at the entrance of the Lachin Corridor. As such, re-opening travel only for exiting the region is unlikely to markedly improve the tense humanitarian situation in Nagorno-Karabakh. While Yerevan’s latest peace proposal will moderately raise the prospect for continued dialogue, the blocking of the Lachin Corridor will remain an obstacle to the signing of a peace settlement in the coming months. (Source: Sibylline)
24 Aug 23. Türkiye, S. Arabia, Pakistan Convene First Defense Committee Meeting. The Trilateral Defense Committee of Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan held its inaugural meeting in Riyadh, the capital of Saudi Arabia, according to the written statement made by the Ministry of Defense of Saudi Arabia, Anadolu Agency (AA) reported Thursday.
According to the statement, Deputy Defense Minister Celal Sami Tüfekci, Deputy Minister of Defense of Saudi Arabia Talal Bin Abdullah Bin Turki Al-Otaibi and Lieutenant General Muhammed Said from the Pakistan Armed Forces attended the meeting, which was held to improve cooperation in the field of defense. After the meeting, the officials attended special bilateral working groups. At the Saudi Arabia-Türkiye working group meeting, the roadmap for cooperation in the defense industry, technology transfer and nationalization, and the development of scientific research were discussed. Alongside Al-Otaibi and Tüfekci, the head of the Presidency of Defense Industries (SSB) Haluk Görgün also attended the meeting, according to AA reports. (Source: https://www.defense-aerospace.com/ Daily Sabah)
23 Aug 23. US approves potential $500m sale of military equipment to Taiwan. The United States government has approved a potential $500m sale of military equipment to Taiwan, a move likely to stir simmering tensions with China. Nevertheless, in a statement (PDF) on Wednesday, the US Department of State sought to quell concerns about the proposed sale, which would include infrared search-and-track systems, munitions support and equipment for F-16 fighter jet programme.
“The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not alter the basic military balance in the region,” the State Department said in its news release.
The sale is set to be negotiated with the defence and aerospace company Lockheed Martin. A final deal has not yet been signed.
Hours before the announcement, Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen visited a memorial on Kinmen Island, where Taiwan and Chinese forces fought in August 1958 during the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis.
To mark the anniversary of the crisis, Tsai reiterated her plans to bolster Taiwan’s defences.
“In order to keep the peace, we need to strengthen ourselves,” she said. “As such, we need to continue to reform the national defence, push for self-reliance, strengthen our defence capabilities and resilience.”
Those defence ambitions, however, clash with China’s stance towards Taiwan. It considers the self-governing island part of its territory and has hinted it may use force to bring Taiwan under its control.
The US, meanwhile, has not had formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan since 1979, when it chose to instead recognise Beijing as the government of China.
That recognition came with an acknowledgement of Beijing’s “One China” policy, which asserts China’s claim over Taiwan.
But Washington has not taken an official position on Taiwan’s sovereignty, and it continues to have informal relations with the island, including through military aid and sales.
Just last month, the US approved $345m in military aid for Taiwan. It marked the first time US President Joe Biden used his presidential drawdown authority to transfer military supplies from the Pentagon to Taiwan, similar to what has been done for Ukraine.
Biden has indicated several times that the US would defend Taiwan in the event of an “unprecedented attack”.
Tensions between his administration and that of Chinese President Xi Jinping have soared in recent months, particularly as prominent Taiwan officials passed through the US.
China has denounced these “transit” stops as opportunities for Taiwan officials to meet with their US counterparts. But the US has dismissed the transits as routine layovers, warning China against “overreacting“.
President Tsai herself stopped in the US as she travelled to Belize and Guatemala earlier this year, meeting US House Speaker Kevin McCarthy in California on her way home.
And Taiwan’s Vice President William Lai passed through the US earlier this month, during a trip to attend the inauguration of Paraguay’s new president.
Those visits prompted China to put its military on “high alert”. It responded to Lai’s recent stops in New York City and San Francisco by organising war games around Taiwan, as a “stern warning” to the island’s separatist forces. (Source: Google/https://www.aljazeera.com/)
23 Aug 23. China’s naval plans propel $1.4trn PLA modernisation over 2024-2028. Rising geopolitical tensions drive China’s ambitious defence spending amid territorial disputes and alliances.
GlobalData’s latest report unveils China’s strategic plan to allocate $1.4trn for modernising the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) over 2024-2028, with a robust 6.6% CAGR.
The escalating concerns over growing US assistance to Taiwan, territorial disputes in the South China Sea, and regional security alliances have prompted China to focus on bolstering its military capabilities. The planned expenditure reflects the calculated investment in innovation and readiness, aimed at aligning its rising influence on the global stage.
China’s strategic emphasis on naval modernisation
China’s strategic emphasis on building a formidable blue water navy and establishing a credible nuclear deterrent is evident through its ongoing procurement programmes.
These programmes include the acquisition of a fourth aircraft carrier, the Tang-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), Type 054A frigates, and Renhai-class (Type 055) Destroyers. Once completed, these significant initiatives are expected to reshape regional and global security dynamics.
Debbarma highlights the nations naval evolution as indicative of its strategic foresight, transforming its Navy from a coastal defence force into a potent blue water fighting unit. “China’s naval evolution stands as a testament to its strategic foresight and determination to enforce its interests in key regions like the East China Sea, the South China Sea and the Yellow Sea.
A noteworthy transformation is underway as the Chinese Navy shifts from its traditional coastal defence role to a formidable blue-water fighting force. This metamorphosis, driven by a vision of comprehensive maritime prowess, underscores China’s intent to reinforce itself as a major stakeholder in calling shots and determining global orders.”
The modernisation strategy takes centre stage
In a recent report titled “China’s Defense Market Size and Trends, Budget Allocation, Regulations, Key Acquisitions, Competitive Landscape and Forecast, 2023-28,” GlobalData, a leading data and analytics company, reveals that the defence budget is set to experience substantial growth.
The forecast indicates a robust compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 6.6%, culminating in a cumulative expenditure of $1.4trn from 2024-2028.
China’s defence budget has surged from $172.2bn in 2019 to $230.3bn in 2023, driven by a series of ongoing and planned procurement programmes designed to modernise its defence capabilities.
Akash Pratim Debbarma, aerospace & defence Analyst at GlobalData, underscores the significance of the South East Asian country’s financial commitment, stating: “The estimated significant financial commitment of $1.4trn is a clear indication of China’s strategic vision. This modernisation initiative isn’t just about numbers. It is about a calculated investment in innovation, readiness, and a global role that aligns with China’s rising influence.”
A self-reliant defence manufacturing industry
In response to restrictions and embargoes imposed by the US and EU on the transfer of foreign defence technology, China has adeptly turned constraints into opportunities. The country has bridged the gap between civil and military industries by nurturing a self-reliant defence equipment manufacturing industry.
Debbarma emphasises the success of China’s innovation-driven approach. “The strategic pivot was propelled by China’s leverage of non-defence technology for defence applications, bridging the divide between civil and military industries.
This innovation-driven approach not only revived a once struggling defence sector but also elevated China’s capabilities to engineer a wide spectrum of cutting-edge defence systems, from fighters and missiles to aircraft carriers and submarines.”
As China’s defence expenditure intensifies, its calculated investments in modernisation, innovation, and self-reliance suggest its determination to fortify its role in an increasingly complex global landscape.
The evolving dynamics in response to rising tensions, territorial disputes, and strategic alliances emphasise China’s ambition to assert its influence and position on the world stage. (Source: naval-technology.com)
23 Aug 23. Taiwan Proposes Largest-Ever Defense Budget for 2024. Taiwan’s government will seek to hike defense spending by 3.5 percent to a record NT$606.8 bn (US$19 bn) in 2024, according to details from the central government’s budget proposal released on Monday.
The plan, which was presented by the Cabinet to President Tsai Ing-wen, would set government spending at NT$2.882trn — up by about 7 percent from 2023 — and projects total revenues of NT$2.709trn, the Presidential Office said in a press release.
In the statement, Tsai was cited as saying that social welfare spending would account for the largest portion of the budget, and receive the largest funding increase, although no exact figure was given.
However, the plan will allocate NT$120.1bn on programs related to Taiwan’s low birth rate and aging population, and NT$87.6bn on long-term care services for the elderly, Tsai said.
Meanwhile, total defense spending — comprising allocations to the Ministry of National Defense, as well as special budgets and other funds — would reach NT$606.8 bn under the proposed budget, Tsai said. That figure, an increase of 3.5 percent over 2023, would be the highest absolute amount Taiwan has ever allocated for defense, and would amount to around 2.5 percent of GDP, according to Tsai.
In comparison, China in March announced a 7.2 percent increase in its defense budget for the coming year, from the 1.55trn yuan (US$213.5bn) it reported allocating in 2023.
The government’s budget plan would also allocate NT$115bn toward paying off the national debt, marking the highest total in 23 years, Tsai said.
More details on the proposed 2024 budget — the last of Tsai’s tenure — are expected to be released after it is presented at a Cabinet meeting on Thursday. Following approval by the Cabinet, the budget will also be debated and voted on by the Legislature. (Source: https://www.defense-aerospace.com/ China News Agency)
23 Aug 23. Thailand: New prime minister eases short-term political uncertainty, but longer-term concerns remain. On 23 August, Pheu Thai’s (PT) Srettha Thavisin will receive his letter of royal endorsement to officially become prime minister of Thailand, a day after comfortably securing the majority of votes from the National Assembly to be elected. The selection of prime minister and formation of the government took more than three months following the general election in May. The establishment of a new cabinet and outline of the government’s initial policies will take a further two to three weeks. The breakthrough has eased concerns linked to the delayed process, reflected in a positive reaction in Thailand’s stock exchange. However, the unlikely coalition between PT and many of the parties involved in the previous pro-military government will sustain longer-term challenges in the policy implementation, including PT’s promise of a new constitution. Possible disagreements or frictions within the 11-party coalition in the future will undermine government stability in the long term. (Source: Sibylline)
23 Aug 23. Ethiopia: Referendum on disputed territory elevates threats to peace deal with Tigray. On 22 August, the government announced plans to hold a referendum to determine whether disputed territory captured by Amharan forces during the Tigray conflict should be returned to Tigray. While no date has been set, the proposed referendum is highly likely to act as a flashpoint for tensions between Tigray and Amhara. Amharans will likely claim that a referendum disadvantages their historic claims due to the larger number of Tigrayans among the areas’ current residents. The government’s statement is likely to further bolster Amharan support for the ethno-nationalist Fano militia, driving further conflict with federal forces across the region (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 18 August 2023). Similarly, some Tigrayans will likely claim that Amharan occupational forces will manipulate the vote, elevating the risk of violence and disruption of the November 2022 peace agreement if the results are unfavourable to Tigray. (Source: Sibylline)
23 Aug 23. Sudan: Increasing pressure on military in Khartoum will likely prolong conflict. Fighting in the capital Khartoum between the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) paramilitary group and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) has escalated in recent days. Today (23 August) marks the fourth day of intense fighting around the Armoured Corp al Shajara base, the SAF’s last military stronghold in southern Khartoum. On 22 August, footage circulated showing that the RSF had secured part of the camp, though the SAF claimed to have resecured the facility later that day. The recent fighting has further underlined the SAF’s weakness in street-level engagements with the RSF, enabling the group to move throughout Khartoum, with the SAF relying on air superiority for its operations. This dynamic will significantly undermine efforts to resecure the capital, further delaying progress towards negotiations as the SAF previously posited RSF withdrawal from Khartoum as a prerequisite for substantive talks. As such, heightened levels of conflict will persist, sustaining collateral threats to assets and staff in the capital. (Source: Sibylline)
23 Aug 23. Chad: Rising conflict with rebel groups increases domestic unrest risk in capital. On 22 August, the Popular Front for Recovery (FPR) rebel group called for a national uprising to restore democracy in Chad. The development comes days after the Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT) rebel group terminated its 2021 ceasefire agreement with the Chadian army and the Military Command Council for the Salvation of the Republic (CCMSR) assaulted three Chadian positions in the Tibesti region. Both groups operate across southern Libya and northern Chad. The statements will increase the threat of attacks against military facilities and positions across northern Chad and raise the risk of a southern push towards the capital N’djamena. There is currently limited evidence that the groups have the capacity to successfully overcome the Chadian military, but it will raise pressure on Chadian security forces. This trend will increase the government’s vulnerability to pro-democracy protests in N’djamena, driving domestic unrest risks in the coming weeks and staff exposure to violent dispersal methods by the security forces. (Source: Sibylline)
23 Aug 23. Zimbabwe: Violence, possible post-election protests will likely elevate security risks to staff. Today (23 August), Zimbabweans will vote in the general election. There have been reports of the ruling ZANU-PF party supporters intimidating and using violence against opposition supporters, particularly in rural areas, driving the realistic possibility of clashes around polling stations. Internet services have been restricted ahead of the election, likely disrupting local business operations. There have been reports of logistical issues causing some polling stations to shut and voting to be delayed in opposition strongholds, such as in Bulawayo (Matabeleland region) and the capital Harare, elevating the likelihood of accusations of electoral fraud. ZANU-PF is likely to secure a victory, increasing the possibility of post-election protests (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 3 August 2023). Protests are likely in opposition strongholds in Bulawayo and Harare, with Nelson Mandela Avenue and Africa Unity Square being potential hotspots. Security forces are almost certain to utilise excessive dispersal methods, increasing risks to bystanders. (Source: Sibylline)
22 Aug 23. Pulling the South African defence industry out of the mud. The recent Public Private Partnerships (PPP) for Defence and Security conference provided an interesting outlook on an alternate future for the defence and security sector.
The PPP conference highlighted the complex nature of the rapidly deteriorating security environment combined with a lack of government resources.
The SA Defence Industry (SADI) environment problem analysis aligns with the grief process:
Shock & Denial – “I can’t believe this is happening.” The SADI has declined from 3 000 companies with 130 000 employees in 1990 to 120 companies employing up to 12 500 employees in 2017.
Anger – “I am so angry and I’m not sure why or who I am angry at.” The under-funding of the SANDF has had an impact on the SADI as there is an under-utilization of strategic capabilities. R&D funding has declined to such an extent that limited new products are being developed. The SADI capabilities are being kept alive by means of exports. New entrant countries to the market are even moving past the SADI in supplying our historic niche market solutions.
Bargaining – “If only I had done this differently.” There are companies that focus on niche markets, but in the main it is the companies with strong ties to one or more international defence group/s that give them additional access to the international market that are staying afloat.
Depression – “I just feel so sad and alone.” The Defence Review 2015 presented a potential roadmap to a positive future. Failure to even fund the basic “arrest the decline” milestone has left the SANDF with no funds for even maintaining existing equipment, never mind acquiring new equipment or upgrading existing equipment. State owned Denel has been hollowed out with limited deliverables flowing to the SANDF, never mind export market. This has plunged the private led SADI into the depressed state of “you are on your own”.
Acceptance & Hope – “I have found peace”. The SADI has started to adjust to this new normal life without Denel as a lead. The SADI understand that there needs to be a push for an export focus only, even in an environment where there is a lack of support from government to promote the SADI’s products.
Two mud related idioms capture the current feeling within the defence industry. The first idiom, Stuck in the Mud captures the inability to complete a task due to a lack of understanding, competence or will. Advocate Vasu Gounden, Founder & Executive Director of ACCORD, provided the best summary of this state of affairs in his contribution to a PPP Conference discussion panel. The second idiom, Clear as Mud references problems that are confusing and unclear with the result that they are very difficult to understand or interpret.
The SADI, and by extension the SANDF, need to solve a stuck in the mud type challenge with a solution that isn’t clear as mud. The current solution is not working. Albert Einstein states, “We cannot solve our problems with the same thinking we used when we created them”, and then “Insanity is doing the same thing over and over and expecting different results.”
This is a complex problem, but turning the SADI around is still possible. PPP could be one of the mechanisms to accelerate a turnaround in total defence capabilities. What is clear is that the SADI has a very strong core capability. The potential is available to unlock significant value. The question is what we can make out of this core capability through exploiting alliances, initiatives, continuities, and discontinuities.
So, the Old SADI seated around State owned Denel is dead. Arise the new private led SADI.
The seeds of the complex problem analysis are provided in the Defence Review 2015, the South African Defence Industry Strategy 2020 and the Aerospace and Defence Industry Master Plan of 2020. The SA challenge is that these good plans achieved nothing without implementation.
The Minister of Defence has tasked the SANDF with the generation of the Long-term Capability Development Strategic Plan for review by March 2024. If it is possible, the SANDF needs to align with SADI, state owned and private sector capabilities. The PPP model also needs to be considered.
The Defence Industry is an Apex Ecosystem. The defence ecosystem has the potential of providing the country with a significant return on the investment. According to Helmoed Römer Heitman, in Business Day July 2023, there is evidence that defence spending does not have harm to an economy. The Singapore example shows that defence spending of up to 4% of GDP is not associated with lower rates of economic growth. The defence industry has more the opposite effect of stimulating opportunity and thus economic growth.
Team SADI need to take the lead in guiding the defence industry discussion. The target for the new SADI should be for minimum annual revenues of R70 bn coupled with the expansion of the employment capacity to over 50 000 employees. Transformation of resources is a natural progression with this amount of growth in employment. This growth can be achieved in the five-to-ten-year medium term. For this to be realised, the SADI Strategy 2020 desired course of action to “secure, stabilise, develop and sustain” the defence industry is the only course to be considered.
Current SADI capabilities are geared towards specialised, highly mobile combat capability solutions that can be rapidly deployed to remote areas for specific operations. The SADI has a well-developed landward combat force capability. The solutions can be configured as projectable, multi-role, lighter, infantry-based landward capabilities with enhanced firepower, manoeuvre and protection making the solutions suitable for a range of contingencies. SADI solutions can also cover many of the joint and supported airborne, air-landed and sea-landed assault operations, with air- and sea-deployable firepower, protection and manoeuvre.
The challenge remains securing funding for the SANDF’s capability rejuvenation. Local funding, offset with PPP solutions, will stimulate projects within the defence industry sector. The SADI needs projects to retain and attract skilled resources to implement technology for future products. The SANDF identified product developments need to align with the needs of the wider export market. This approach assists in ensuring the long-term sustainability of the defence industry. Government needs to place a focus on the defence sector and the SADI revenue generating potential. The SADI could use government support in supporting the export focus. In this aspect the streamlining of the export control system needs to be addressed. DIRCO assistance would also be useful in promoting SADI products. The SADI can then apply the partnership model to unlock the full potential of the sector.
It is now time for the Defence Industry Lekgotla, including decisions and actions on PPP, to assist in Pulling SADI out of the Mud.
Written by James Kerr, Orion Consulting CC, which provides Market Entry Strategy and Bid & Proposal services to the Aerospace & Defence related industry and assists international SME mission system product suppliers to gain traction in South Africa.
To view the presentations from the Public-Private Partnerships for Defence and Security conference, held on 16 August, click here: https://events.defenceweb.co.za/ppp2023/audio-presentations/
(Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
22 Aug 23. North Korea says Camp David agreements raise possibility of ‘thermonuclear war.’ North Korea on Tuesday denounced the annual military drills between the United States and South Korea, warning of a “thermonuclear war” over recent trilateral agreements to deepen ties between the leaders of the U.S., South Korea and Japan at Camp David. South Korea and the United States began the Ulchi Freedom Shield summer exercises on Monday, designed to enhance their joint responses to North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats. Pyongyang has long denounced the drills as a rehearsal for war. In a commentary carried by the KCNA news agency, North Korea said the summit between the United States, South Korea and Japan at the Camp David presidential retreat on Friday was aimed at formulating a “nuclear war provocation.”
“If the agreements fabricated at the Camp David Resort are additionally put into practice in the war drill … the possibility of outbreak of a thermonuclear war on the Korean peninsula will become more realistic,” the commentary said.
In the first standalone meeting between the leaders of the U.S., South Korea and Japan, the three countries agreed to deepen military and economic cooperation as they seek to project unity in the face of China’s growing power and the North’s nuclear threats.
The North’s commentary said the prevailing situation requires its military to “take the initiative, offensive and overwhelming action for a war,” though it did not elaborate.
North Korea has said it will launch a satellite between Aug. 24 and Aug. 31 in the direction of the Yellow Sea and East China Sea, the Japanese Coast Guard said on Tuesday, after a botched launch in May.
South Korean lawmakers have said the North could test-fire an intercontinental ballistic missile or take other military action to protest the allies’ drills or last week’s summit of South Korea, the United States and Japan. (Source: Reuters)
21 Aug 23. Pakistan: Row over new national security laws will fuel political instability, domestic unrest risks. On 20 August, President Arif Alvi wrote on social media that he did not sign the Official Secrets (Amendment) Bill and the Pakistan Army (Amendment) Bill into law, claiming his staff ‘undermined’ his command. The caretaker government insisted the bills had automatically become law as the president did not return them with his assent or observation within ten days, as stipulated in the constitution. The opposition Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party, of which Alvi is a member, strongly opposes the laws, which give the military and the intelligence services greater power on matters related to national security. The authorities have also used the new legislation to suppress political opposition, including the arrest of PTI Vice Chairman Shah Mehmood Qureshi on 19 August. The row will likely fuel the already heightened tensions between the government and the opposition, sustaining a volatile domestic political environment and unrest risks against the backdrop of the now-delayed general election. (Source: Sibylline)
21 Aug 23. Pentagon Policy Official Underscores Defense Ties With Djibouti. The longstanding defense relationship between the U.S. and Djibouti is a key facet to peace and stability in a critical region, a senior Pentagon policy official said.
Mara Karlin, performing the duties of deputy undersecretary of defense for policy, underscored the strong ties between the two countries today after meeting in Djibouti last week with senior leaders from U.S. Africa Command and the President of Djibouti Ismail Omar Guelleh.
“It’s amazing to see how the relationship with Djibouti has burgeoned over the last two-and-a-half decades,” said Karlin.
“Djibouti is a critical location, and it’s a critical partnership that we have with the Djiboutians,” she said.
Karlin met with Guelleh alongside U.S. Africom commander, Marine Corps. Gen. Michael Langley to talk through the U.S.-Djibouti partnership, which she said, “has only grown closer in recent years.”
“We talked through the contribution of this partnership to regional security and stability and how we see it going forward,” Karlin said. “We had a really positive set of conversations with them.”
Djibouti hosts the only U.S. base in Africa, Camp Lemonnier, home to more than 5,000 deployed service members, Department of Defense civilians and contractors.
Camp Lemonnier serves as a strategic location from which the U.S. remains postured to address a variety of security challenges ranging from violent extremist organizations to U.S. strategic competitors.
The base is also situated along the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, one of the world’s busiest shipping routes that is the gateway from the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean.
In April 2023, Camp Lemonnier served as a key staging area for the Defense Department’s support to the evacuation of the U.S. Embassy in Khartoum, Sudan.
In addition to meeting with Guelleh, the visit gave Karlin the opportunity to discuss regional security issues with U.S. Africom and Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa leadership and visit service members stationed at Camp Lemonnier.
Karlin said in addition to contributing to security in the region, the service members stationed at the base have helped deepen the ties between the two countries.
Camp Lemonnier is home to a variety of events designed to enrich the U.S.-Djibouti relationship and spur interaction between DOD personnel and the local community.
For the past 16 years, the base has hosted a biannual bazaar that connects U.S. military members with Djiboutians through art.
Over the past year, the bazaar raised more than $123,000 that is reinvested directly into the local community.
Camp Lemonnier personnel also organize an annual visit to the Islamic cemetery on base and share an Iftar meal with the local community during Ramadan.
“U.S. service members who deploy to Camp Lemonnier engage with our allies and Djiboutian partners through hosted events and volunteer opportunities in the community,” said Navy Capt. Suzanne J.M. Krauss, Camp Lemonnier’s commanding officer. “We not only deploy here, we are part of a larger community and work to have a positive impact.”
“It was an honor to have Dr. Karlin and her team visit Camp Lemonnier and see our facilities, work and mission firsthand,” she said.
Karlin said it was “a really lovely thing” to hear about U.S. personnel interacting with the community in such positive ways.
“It wasn’t just the tremendous contribution our service members have to regional security, but also to a long-term partnership with Djiboutians,” she said. (Source: U.S. DoD)
21 Aug 23. Niger: Disagreement over transition timeline increases risk of ECOWAS intervention. On 19 August, the military leader of Niger, Abdourahmane Tchiani, proposed a three-year transition to civilian rule. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has refused this timeline, reducing prospects for successful negotiations between the junta and the bloc’s delegation which arrived in the Nigerien capital Niamey on 19 August. The development comes after ECOWAS military chiefs confirmed that a ‘D-Day’ had been set for military intervention, with the operation launched if an agreement is not reached by this date. All member states apart from Cape Verde and the suspended members have allegedly agreed to contribute to the force. The threat of military intervention in Niger is increasing. However, repeated large-scale demonstrations in Niamey demonstrate that the military will likely be able to rely on some popular support, even if their hold of the military is tenuous. This threatens to prolong conflict and drive significant unrest in Niamey if ECOWAS intervenes. (Source: Sibylline)
21 Aug 23. Gabon: Opposition cooperation increases likelihood of organised post-election unrest. On 18 August, major opposition parties under the Alternance 2023 alliance agreed to back Albert Ondo Ossa in the 26 August general election, in an effort to undermine incumbent President Ali Bongo Ondimba’s re-election. Alternance 2023 announced that five of the 19 candidates on the ballot have agreed to back Ossa. While the alliance has somewhat improved prospects for the opposition by reducing fracturing, there remains a realistic possibility that President Bongo Ondimba will utilise vote manipulation, among other tactics, to secure re-election. If Ondimba is victorious it is highly likely that the opposition will reject the vote and allege fraud, while the alliance will increase its capacity to coordinate protests in the capital Libreville in the post-election period. Security forces will likely utilise excessive dispersal methods, elevating safety risks to bystanders and assets. (Source: Sibylline)
21 Aug 23. Mali: Further deterioration in security environment will likely intensify risks to staff, assets. On 18 August, unidentified gunmen killed around 23 civilians in an attack on the village of Yarou (Mopti region). Although no group has claimed responsibility for the attacks, the Al-Qaeda-aligned Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) maintains a strong presence in northern and central Mali, frequently targeting civilians. The development comes amidst increasing operations by JNIM, particularly around the city of Timbuktu (Tombouctou region), which the group has been blockading for the last two weeks. Compounded by the accelerated withdrawal of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), the security environment in northern and central Mali will likely continue deteriorating. As such, further attacks are highly likely, elevating safety risks to local NGOs operating in rural areas, and to staff and assets operating out of the region’s major cities, such as Timbuktu.
21 Aug 23. Gabon: Opposition cooperation increases likelihood of organised post-election unrest. On 18 August, major opposition parties under the Alternance 2023 alliance agreed to back Albert Ondo Ossa in the 26 August general election, in an effort to undermine incumbent President Ali Bongo Ondimba’s re-election. Alternance 2023 announced that five of the 19 candidates on the ballot have agreed to back Ossa. While the alliance has somewhat improved prospects for the opposition by reducing fracturing, there remains a realistic possibility that President Bongo Ondimba will utilise vote manipulation, among other tactics, to secure re-election. If Ondimba is victorious it is highly likely that the opposition will reject the vote and allege fraud, while the alliance will increase its capacity to coordinate protests in the capital Libreville in the post-election period. Security forces will likely utilise excessive dispersal methods, elevating safety risks to bystanders and assets.
21 Aug 23. Mali: Further deterioration in security environment will likely intensify risks to staff, assets . On 18 August, unidentified gunmen killed around 23 civilians in an attack on the village of Yarou (Mopti region). Although no group has claimed responsibility for the attacks, the Al-Qaeda-aligned Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) maintains a strong presence in northern and central Mali, frequently targeting civilians. The development comes amidst increasing operations by JNIM, particularly around the city of Timbuktu (Tombouctou region), which the group has been blockading for the last two weeks. Compounded by the accelerated withdrawal of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), the security environment in northern and central Mali will likely continue deteriorating. As such, further attacks are highly likely, elevating safety risks to local NGOs operating in rural areas, and to staff and assets operating out of the region’s major cities, such as Timbuktu. (Source: Sibylline)
21 Aug 23. China: Spy’s arrest will deter investments, sustain economic uncertainty, geopolitical tensions. On 21 August, China’s main intelligence agency, the Ministry of State Security (MSS), announced the arrest of a 39-year-old ministry official surnamed ‘Hao’ for allegedly spying for the US’s CIA. Announcements by the MSS are rare and reflect a growing trend of increased publicity, likely for bolstering domestic support for national security policies and Beijing’s counter-espionage campaign. Noting the MSS’s recent calls for the public to report alleged espionage, such announcements by the MSS likely seek to bolster ‘whole of society’ intelligence collection methods. Retaliatory accusations of espionage and related investigations increasingly feature US-China relations and domestic discourses, underscoring sustained tensions and policy risks. The MSS’s announcement also stresses that the related investigation was conducted according to Chinese legislation, likely in an effort to improve domestic support and discourse on China’s law and order and legal system. Despite this, foreign businesses and investors will continue to remain deterred from increasing their investments, especially amid China’s worsening socio-economic health
(Source: Sibylline)
21 Aug 23. Bangladesh: Continued anti-government protests will sustain political instability, unrest risks. On 19 August, clashes erupted between the police and supporters of the main opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) in Habiganj’s north-eastern district (Sylhet division), the latest in a series of nationwide protests since July. The clashes broke out as thousands of BNP supporters marched through the streets, attempting to break barricades blocking procession routes. The BNP is demanding the resignation of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina due to the imprisonment of opposition leaders and allegations of interference in previous elections. The police used batons, tear gas and live fire to disperse the crowd, which resulted in 300 injured and repeatedly no fatalities. The use of force by the state, coupled with the government’s resistance to allow an impartial caretaker setup to oversee the elections, will intensify the already strained political environment. These will result in higher risks of further protests and rallies in the lead-up to the polls. (Source: Sibylline)
21 Aug 23. Guatemala: Anti-graft crusader wins presidential vote, sustaining government instability risks. On 20 August, Bernardo Arevalo won Guatemala’s presidential election by a wide margin, receiving 58% of the votes, with opponent Sandra Torres receiving 37%. The former diplomat campaigned on an anti-corruption platform with his centre-left Movimiento Semilla party. Arevalo’s victory comes after other opposition figures were controversially barred from the election race. Many see the result as a public rebuke of entrenched political elites and pushback against numerous graft allegations targeting government figures. However, Arevalo will face resistance from government allies and a Congress that his party does not control. This will likely lead to policy stagnation in the medium to long term, which may increase the risk of domestic political instability. (Source: Sibylline)
21 Aug 23. Israel-Palestinian Territories: Palestinian attacks, Israeli response increase risk of further incidents. On 21 August, a drive-by shooting attack on Route 60 near Hebron (southern West Bank) killed one Israeli and severely wounded another. The shooting followed a similar attack on 19 August in the Palestinian town of Huwara (northern West Bank), resulting in two Israeli fatalities. The incidents reflect the volatility of the security environment across the West Bank. There is a realistic possibility of retaliatory violence by Israeli settlers against Arab towns in the coming days in the form of riots, elevating bystander risks for staff and material damage to business assets. A heightened Israeli security forces’ posture in the coming days is likely, elevating mobility risks in the West Bank. The incidents, the security forces’ response and/or settlers’ violence will likely further elevate ethno-religious tensions and sustain security risks in the West Bank in the coming weeks. (Source: Sibylline)
22 Aug 23. SAAF aircraft unavailability to be questioned in Parliament. Armscor’s seeming inability to “conclude” maintenance contracts for equipment in SA National Defence Force (SANDF) service, especially aircraft, has reached an untenable point, with questions coming for Defence and Military Veterans Minster Thandi Modise. She, as government’s shareholder representative for the State-owned defence and security acquisition and project management company, will be called to account for Armscor failings by way of Parliamentary questions from Kobus Marais. The Democratic Alliance (DA) shadow minister for Modise’s portfolio sees weekend revelations of another SA Air Force (SAAF) type grounding as the proverbial straw breaking the camel’s back.
The grounding of 41 Squadron’s eight Cessna 208 Caravan light transport aircraft because there is currently no maintenance contract in place follows a similar state of affairs with 2 Squadron’s Gripens not allowed to fly for the same reason. This was remedied, after a year on the ground, ahead of last year’s Africa Aerospace and Defence (AAD) exhibition when OEM (original equipment manufacturer) Saab was awarded a maintenance and service contract for the 26-strong frontline fighter fleet. The three-year contract runs until 2025. It appears the engine support contract for Gripen has not yet been awarded.
Marais noted Armscor is responsible for maintenance contracts across the national defence force adding it is “embroiled in controversies”. This, he says, has seen a decline in South Africa’s defence capabilities.
“Among others, Armscor is tasked to ensure maintenance contracts are renewed timeously so situations such as that with the Gripens and Caravans do not arise.” On this, he will ask Modise, as minister in President Cyril Ramaphosa’s Cabinet responsible for the national defence force and Armscor, among others, to “act urgently and decisively to ensure maintenance contracts are renewed and to bring to book the culprits who undermine South Africa’s defence capabilities”.
As background to the questions to be asked of Modise, Marais points out he was earlier this year made aware “contrary to what was reported to the parliamentary defence oversight committees, maintenance contracts for the SAAF primary fixed-wing fleet have not been concluded”. This, according to him, is still the case.
Marais points to 41 and 21, tasked with VIP transport, squadrons as being affected by the absence of maintenance.
He wants Modise and Armscor management to focus on making the SANDF workable, ensuring prime mission equipment (PME) is operational and serviceable to provide proper defence readiness.
“It is unacceptable that the Minister, her senior officials, Armscor top management and support staff spend too much money travelling locally and abroad, a cost National Treasury is of the opinion can, must and should be reduced significantly.
“It seems the political and management will is lacking to make important decisions to address real challenges and deficiencies to improve our dire defence capabilities and readiness urgently.
“The Minister, the Department of Defence (DoD) and Armscor should forget about government’s failed policies and priorities and focus on doing what is necessary to improve Armscor operations and the capabilities of the national defence force. If not, they are accomplices to letting down defence capabilities, South Africa’s safety and security and the Constitution,” Marais maintains. (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
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