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09 Feb 21. Israeli Cabinet OKs $9bn US Arms Deal; Boeing KC-46As Top List. The $9bn is aimed at purchasing the KC-46As, a new heavy helicopter to replace the Israeli air force CH-53, the purchase of V-22s, all this in addition to more F-35s and F-15 EXs. The estimated price of the KC-46As will be $1bn.
A huge arms deal with the U.S has moved one step ahead as the Israeli cabinet approved the budget for $9bn for the purchase of US-made aircraft and special weapon systems.
The ministers finally approved the spending of $9bn out of the $38bn of the current Foreign Military Financing agreement the US has with Israel. The US State Department approved a possible sale of up to eight KC-46As and related equipment to Israel for an estimated cost of $2.4bn last March, marking the first time that Washington has allowed Jerusalem to buy new tankers.
Israeli sources told BD that the KC-46A tanker is Israel’s most urgent need to replace the current modified 707’s used by the Israeli Air Force. The country has asked the U.S to give it priority in the production line to assure a delivery as early as possible. The answer, according to one source, was not encouraging but may have helped push the cabinet’s approval of the budget: “First, make the order, and then we will consider.”
The problem for Israel is that early slots in the production line can only be given up to the point the aircraft goes from “international “configuration to the dedicated U.S Air Force line.
The $9bn is aimed at purchasing the KC-46As, a new heavy helicopter to replace the Israeli air force CH-53, the purchase of V-22s, all this in addition to more F-35s and F-15 EXs. The estimated price of the KC-46As will be $1bn.
The V-22 will also be given priority. Defense Minister Benny Gantz personally pressed for the Bell Boeing V-22 Osprey to be included in the deal. The VTOL aircraft is high on the wish list of the Israeli Air Force (IAF) Depth Command.
The new heavy helicopters will carry a price tag of about $2bn. The V-22 will cost about $1bn.
“The IAF needs 22-24 heavy helicopters, but the plan to purchase the V-22 will have an effect on this number,” a source here said.
The $9bn will also enable the IAF to acquire more F-35s and the new version of the F-15, dubbed by the IAF as the F-15IA (Israeli advanced). The additional F-35s will carry a price tag of about $2 bn. The F-15AI will cost $2 bn.
All these are rough estimates based on the cost of the platform, the changes the IAF wants to be made in the U.S, plus the infrastructure and spares.
On top of all that, Israel wishes to buy some special weapon systems, which are priced at $1bn. The money will be spent on “filling the stocks of the IAF in special bombs and missiles. These arsenals have shrunk in recent years as a result of the hundreds of attacks the IAF has performed against Iranian-related targets in Syria and ‘other places,’” one source said.
After the cabinet approval, the IAF will make its detailed recommendations. Then the Defense Ministry and its director-general will review those recommendations, which will be submitted for final approval by the procurement ministerial committee. It is expected that the IAF will now submit its detailed acquisition numbers and priorities so that the orders in the relevant companies can be formalized. (Source: glstrade.com/Breaking Defense.com)
12 Feb 21. UK sends armoured vehicles to Lebanon as Isis threat festers. Britain has sent 100 armoured patrol vehicles and a team of paratroopers to Lebanon to help the country patrol its borders and stop terrorists, drugs and weapons from entering Europe.
Lieutenant General Sir John Lorimer, the UK’s senior defence adviser on the Middle East and north Africa, warned that there were “festering sores of instability” in the wider region.
In an interview with The Times, he said bolstering Lebanon’s security would stop any spillover of the Syrian conflict and in turn make the UK safer. He made the comments as Rami Mortada, Lebanon’s top diplomat in Britain, compared Islamic State to a mutating virus.
He said the threat from terrorists in neighbouring Syria was still present and his country, which was experiencing economic and health crises, was a “gateway to Europe”.
“When you have the original virus and you manage to eliminate it, you think you’ve eliminated it but this virus could come back in a different variant,” Mortada said.
“The same applies to terrorist organisations, we’ve managed to contain one variant of this threat, Daesh 1.0, but the ideology remains. The human resources, although reduced, still remain.
“We should remain alert and vigilant for the reappearance of terrorism through possibly a different form, which means what the UK is doing in Lebanon is even more relevant.”
The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) was able to drive Isis out of Lebanese territory in 2017 but the threat from the group has persisted. The army said last week it had arrested 18 people, both Lebanese and Syrian, with links to Isis.
Those arrested confessed to belonging to the terror group and several weapons were confiscated, according to Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper.
The UK has already helped to build 79 watchtowers — some of which were used in Northern Ireland during the Troubles — along the border.
The Land Rovers,which have a revised weapons-mounted installation kit, can handle rugged terrain and can be mounted with heavy weapons. They have been given to the LAF’s Land Border Regiments that patrol the north and northeast border with Syria.
The vehicles, worth £1.5 million, were taken out of service by the UK military after use in Iraq and Afghanistan.
A specialist team of paratroopers from 16 Air Assault Brigade deployed to meet the vehicles on arrival in Beirut is giving vehicle training to the LAF.
Lorimer, who is leaving the military this summer after 40 years, said the vehicles would enable the land border regiments to secure the areas between the watchtowers. He said they will “help them secure their borders against extremists, terrorists and smugglers”.
“If things can go into Lebanon, things can get out of Lebanon”, he added.
Mortada, who said war in Syria was a breeding ground for terrorists, added: “This spillover effect is natural, that’s why controlling and maintaining border security is of utmost importance.”
James Heappey, armed forces minister, said “the UK will continue to work closely with our partners in the region.” (Source: Pen & Sword/The Times)
12 Feb 21. Abandoning Taiwan would signal ‘abdication’ of US leadership. The US and its allies must ensure Taiwan does not fall into Beijing’s hands, according to one analyst, who warns that withdrawal would only encourage the communist regime to more aggressively pursue its regional interests.
Since the turn of the year, Chinese warplanes have repeatedly entered Taiwan’s south-western air defence verification zone (ADIZ), prompting fears of an imminent confrontation.
In response, the US Department of State condemned Beijing’s provocation and reaffirmed its support for Taiwanese independence.
Beijing, however, was undeterred by the Biden administration’s tough rhetoric, with the regime continuing to send fighter jets into Taiwan’s ADIZ.
But according to Malcolm Davis, senior analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), the US and its allies “must stand firm”, warning that abandoning Taiwan would signal the end of Pax Americana in the region.
“A failure to defend Taiwan would be an abdication of US international leadership,” he writes.
“It would seriously damage America’s credibility in the Indo-Pacific and would invite China and others to become ever more aggressive.”
But Davis expects the Biden administration to stand by the democratic republic.
“Thankfully, all indications suggest that President Joe Biden is set to continue strengthening Washington’s relationship with Taipei,” he adds.
Allies must be prepared to back US
The ASPI analyst says the United States’ allies, including Australia, must be prepared to come to Taiwan’s aid in the event of military confrontation.
“If China decides that military adventurism, timed to exploit the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic and political turmoil in the US, is a way to further its goal of ending America’s strategic primacy in the Indo-Pacific, the worst thing Australia could do is look the other way,” Davis continues.
“Principles matter. As Australia enjoys all the benefits of a free and open society in a stable and functioning democracy, our principles and values must extend to supporting the survival of Taiwan as a vibrant democracy of 24 million people with a successful market economy.
“The examples of Hong Kong and Xinjiang suggest a dark future for the Taiwanese people if China decides to force unification with the mainland.”
Davis notes the broader ideological significance of Western support for Taipei’s independence, particularly as a means to countering President Xi Jinping’s efforts to reshape the regional order.
“Taipei’s success provides a powerful alternative to Beijing’s promotion of authoritarianism with Chinese characteristics as a model for development,” he continues.
“Ideological competition is intensifying as Xi Jinping pushes for a Chinese-led ‘community of common destiny’ as a basis for the future global order. It’s just as vital for Western democracies to win this new ideological battle as it was for us to resist Soviet communism during the Cold War.
“To turn away from a fellow democracy under threat from an aggressive authoritarian neighbour would make a mockery of the values we advocate and lower our credibility in the eyes of many developing countries.”
The ASPI analyst warns that Beijing has a geostrategic agenda that extends beyond annexation of Taiwan, which is a means to a “Beijing-dominated regional order” that would “dramatically worsen” the West’s strategic outlook.
“A Chinese-controlled Taiwan would ease the challenges for Beijing in projecting naval power across the Indo-Pacific and weaken the ability of the US to maintain a forward presence in the western Pacific,” Davis contends.
“From ports and air bases in Taiwan, the People’s Liberation Army could support the extension of its maritime militia and coast guard northwards through the Ryukyu Islands and against the Senkaku Islands.
“That would make it more difficult for Japan to protect its southern islands and give Beijing added coercive leverage against Tokyo in a crisis, including by interfering with Japan’s maritime commerce.”
According to David, Beijing could use Taiwan as a launching point for the PLA’s southward expansion, which would envelop the Philippines, providing Beijing with easier access to resources in Benham Rise.
“China has already sent oceanographic vessels there and challenged Manila’s sovereignty over those waters,” Davis notes.
“Chinese control of Taiwan would also strengthen Beijing’s ability to control the South China Sea by blocking the Luzon Strait and the Balintang and Babuyan channels, cutting off the traditional access paths used by US naval vessels.”
Davis adds that Beijing control over Taiwan would also extend the PLA’s anti-access capabilities beyond the first island chain.
This, he writes, would enable the PLA to operate Type 096 ballistic-missile submarines further out into the middle sea between the first and second island chains, bringing more of the US within reach of JL-3 nuclear-armed submarine-launched ballistic missiles.
Accordingly, Davis argues that the US and its allies can’t afford to stand by while Beijing expands its influence.
“If China were to provoke a crisis over Taiwan, whether this year or in a future year, some would no doubt argue that it’s not Australia’s business and that supporting a US response would increase the risk of devastating Chinese military, political and economic retaliation against us,” he notes.
“To accept that argument as policy would mark the end of our strategic alliance with the US, leaving us more exposed to Chinese coercive pressure and political warfare, or even a direct military threat.”
The loss of the US alliance, Davis concludes, would be “catastrophic” for Australia’s security.
“Acting alone, we’d need significant boosts to our defence spending to achieve a degree of self-sufficiency beyond the traditional levels of ‘self-reliance’ that past defence white papers have alluded to,” Davis states.
“That could include developing military capabilities normally not considered for our defence force to deter a nuclear-armed adversary.
“We may well see an intensification of the political and economic pressure Beijing applied to Australia for much of 2020.”
Davis concludes: “A military crisis across the Taiwan Strait would be a serious test of our national resolve, the strength of our most vital strategic relationship and our commitment to the values we stand for. The outcome of such a crisis would shape the strategic environment of the Indo-Pacific region for decades.” (Source: Defence Connect)
11 Feb 21. Respecting Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Statement by Ambassador Barbara Woodward at the Security Council briefing on the Minsk Agreement. UK condemns Russia’s ongoing violation of international law and calls on Russia to stop arming its proxies and fuelling the conflict in Eastern Ukraine
Remarks by Ambassador Barbara Woodward at Security Council briefing, 11 February 2021.
I would like to start by thanking our briefers. The United Kingdom reiterates its support for the Minsk agreements and the roadmap they provide for a peaceful resolution of the conflict in eastern Ukraine, and for French and German efforts through the Normandy process.
The significant reduction in violence is welcome, but the ceasefire remains fragile. Russia continues to supply arms and personnel to its proxies. Russia and its proxies continue to block new entry-exit points along the line of contact, and the full implementation of plans for disengagement and demining.
We agree that local elections must pave the way for Special Status for Donbas. Yet Russia will not support the security conditions needed to enable these elections.
Russia claims it is not a party to the conflict, but it instigated and continues to fuel the conflict. And innocent civilians suffer because of it. Nearly 3,500 civilians have died, and 3.4 million are in need of humanitarian assistance.
We remind Russia of its obligations. It must withdraw its military personnel and weapons from the territory of Ukraine, cease its support for the armed formations it backs and stop access restrictions and intimidation of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission in areas held by its proxies.
Russia’s only objective is to undermine Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. We urge Russia to match the political will demonstrated by Ukraine so that real progress can be made.
I reiterate the United Kingdom’s enduring support for Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, within its internationally recognised borders and territorial waters. The Ukrainian people deserve peace. We will hold Russia to account for this. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)
11 Feb 21. India and China agree to withdraw troops from parts of the LoAC. The Indian and Chinese armies have agreed to pull back from a bitterly contested region along their disputed Line of Actual Control (LoAC) in the Himalayas, where they have been locked in a stand-off since May 2020.
Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh told the parliament in New Delhi on 11 February that several rounds of talks between military commanders and diplomats from either side led to an agreement on troop disengagement along the northern and southern banks of the 4,350m-high Pangong Tso (Pangong Lake) – in the Himalayan Ladakh region – in a “phased, co-ordinated, and verified manner”.
The two sides also agreed to hold the next meeting between senior military commanders 48 hours after disengaging to address other outstanding issues, which Singh declined to elaborate upon.
Singh stated that under the agreement People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops will withdraw to the Lake’s northern bank, located to the east of the ‘Finger 8’ mountain spur, while Indian Army (IA) troops will return to their ‘Finger 3’ administrative camp to which they have had no access since the stand-off began.
“It has also been agreed to have a temporary moratorium on military activities by both sides along the North Bank, including patrolling to traditional areas,” said Singh. Patrolling will only resume after both sides reach an agreement in subsequent diplomatic and military talks, added the minister. (Source: Jane’s)
11 Feb 21. India lists over 230 military items for export. India has earmarked about 230 military platforms, weapons, and systems for potential sale to ‘friendly countries’ as part of efforts to increase its materiel exports fivefold to USD5bn by fiscal year (FY) 2024/25.
Released on 4 February by the Ministry of Defence (MoD)-run Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and the Department of Defence Production (DDP), the export list includes a range of indigenously developed aerial, land, and naval items as well as licence-built equipment.
It also encompasses varied missiles, assorted electronics, communication systems, and equipment to protect against nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) contamination.
Besides the Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA), airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) systems, and the Lakshya pilotless target aircraft, the list includes the Dhruv Advanced Light Helicopter, the Light Combat Helicopter, as well as licence-built Dornier 228 twin-turboprop multirole aircraft.
The Arjun Mk 1A main battle tank, the 155 mm/52 calibre Advanced Towed Artillery Gun System (ATAGS), and the K-9 Vajra-T 155mm/52 calibre tracked self-propelled howitzer also feature in the catalogue, as do a range of armoured engineer reconnaissance, recovery, and repair vehicles, varied small arms, and bridging systems.
The BrahMos cruise missiles, the Akash surface-to-air (SAM) missile, the Nag anti-tank guided missile, the Astra beyond-visual-range air-to-air missile, and the Pinaka multiple rocket launcher are also listed as potential export items. (Source: Jane’s)
11 Feb 21. Presentation by the UK Chairperson of the OSCE Security Committee, Ambassador Neil Bush. Ambassador Neil Bush briefs OSCE Permanent Council on the 2021 priorities of the Security Committee on transnational threats.
Thank you Chair.
I am grateful for the opportunity to return to brief the Permanent Council for a second year as Chair of the Security Committee.
Thank you to the Swedish Chairpersonship for putting its faith in me to continue in this role and to implement your priorities in the field of transnational threats.
I am especially eager to be working again with all participating States to advance our work in this area. Indeed, I am already grateful for the dedicated and active participation of your experts in the informal meeting of the Security Committee on 25 January – including the colleagues who so expertly facilitated discussion in the virtual breakout rooms. This greatly helped in the planning of our work.
I am pleased to start the year by building on the success at the Tirana Ministerial Council with the agreed Declaration on Strengthening Co-operation in Countering Transnational Organized Crime.
According to the World Bank, the value of transnational criminal networks engaged in various manifestations of organised crime is growing and exceeded $US 1.3trn by 2018—equivalent to around 1.5 percent of global GDP.
It is particularly important to break the cycle of recruitment and ensure that institutions to fight transnational organised crime continue to be fit for purpose.
The COVID-19 pandemic of course affects this threat. After some initial disruption to their operations, transnational organised crime groups are benefitting from the ongoing crisis by exploiting or exacerbating long-term or structural vulnerabilities. This makes preventing the scourge even more important.
Malicious cyber activity causes economic loss and individual suffering and poses a national security threat to our countries. The last year has forced all of us to rely even more heavily on digital technologies for nearly all aspects of our lives – this has brought the cyber skills gap and cyber security itself into much sharper focus.
The threat from terrorism and violent extremism has also sadly not diminished. Last year saw appalling terrorist attacks and loss of life in the OSCE area, including here in Vienna. The pandemic has provided another febrile atmosphere for terrorists and violent extremists to thrive, including those on the far right.
So the Security Committee work programme seeks to focus on these core areas. Transnational organised crime is a priority of the Swedish Chairpersonship-in-Office (CiO). Our meetings on this topic seek to operationalise the Tirana declaration in key strategic areas. Across all transnational threats, there is also a priority to implement existing commitments.
Our programme recognises the importance of cyber security. It also recognises your feedback that counter terrorism and violent extremism and radicalization leading to terrorism (VERLT) continue to be priority themes for many participating States and we’ve selected a framework of themes in this area to explore.
Through the timings of the meetings, I aim to maximise links and synergies with Chairperson and OSCE conferences: the OSCE wide counter-terrorism conference in April, the CiO cyber conference in May and the drugs conference in June.
Importantly, there is also a link, either directly or through the wider issues raised, between the programme and the overarching horizontal Chairperson themes for each month. And I aim to add value in the context of the work of the Committee to these monthly themes.
In the delivery of our programme, I aim for an inclusive, dynamic and de-politicised debate with more discussion and interaction with and between experts to explore the technical issues in detail.
While, like all of you, I hope for a safe return to in-person meetings soon, while the virtual format remains I aim to maximise the opportunities it offers to facilitate diverse expert participation, including in capitals.
I will seek ways through the structure of our meetings to help maximise debate and interaction, and to be as creative as possible. But, as ever, I rely on your help too to make their delivery a success.
I will continue an approach of meaningful gender mainstreaming, as well as the mainstreaming of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Gender dynamics are part the transnational threat ecosystem we face so must therefore be part of our discussions in preventing and combatting it.
And we can only effectively do that in full compliance with our human rights commitments. The voices and experience of civil society are a way to help guide us in this and I will ensure robust civil society representation in our meetings.
I will also continue to fully involve the OSCE field missions in our meetings to help bridge the gap between the work in Vienna and activity on the ground. I am hopeful we will this year meet the ambition for the Committee to visit an OSCE field mission.
I set out at the Permanent Council around this time last year my belief in the potential of the Security Committee. A year on, I have seen how this potential can be realised through our collective hard work and political will. I am excited to continue this journey and my team and I seek to be open, transparent and responsive to your feedback on how we’re doing. Thank you.(Source: https://www.gov.uk/)
11 Feb 21. Philippines military keen to keep U.S. troop deal – minister. The Philippines defence apparatus wants to keep a Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) with the United States, its defence minister said on Thursday, as officials met to settle differences over a pact central to Washington’s Asia strategy. Thursday’s meeting in Manila between U.S. and Philippine officials comes after President Rodrigo Duterte, who openly disapproves of the U.S. alliance, unilaterally cancelled the two-decade-old VFA last year, in an angry response to an ally being denied a visa.
The withdrawal period has been twice extended, however, to create what Philippine officials say is a window for better terms to be agreed.
“We at the defence department and the armed forces, the general feeling is for the VFA to continue,” Defence Secretary Delfin Lorenzana told news channel ANC.
The meeting is the first under U.S. President Joe Biden’s administration, which has reaffirmed the alliance in the face of China’s growing assertiveness in the South China Sea.
Lorenzana said the VFA, which sets out rules for U.S. soldiers operating in the Philippines, has been vital in boosting the capabilities of under-resourced Philippine forces through dozens of annual joint training exercises.
Its importance was stressed by U.S. counterpart Lloyd Austin during a call with Lorenzana on Wednesday.
Ties between the United States and its former colony have been complicated by Duterte’s rise to power in 2016 and his frequent statements condemning U.S. foreign policy, and open embrace of China.
But while the Philippines-U.S. relationship “has always been strong”, Lorenzana said the Southeast Asian nation “should not be made to choose” between Washington and Beijing.
Lorenzana has also expressed concern about a new Chinese law empowering coastguard to fire on what it sees as threats, and repeated U.S. navy patrols that China sees as provocations.
“I told Secretary Austin we don’t want any miscalculations or accidents in the South China Sea because we are right smack there in the centre of conflict,” Lorenzana said. (Source: Reuters)
10 Feb 21. Addressing the global threat of Daesh. Statement by Ambassador Jonathan Allen at the Security Council briefing on international threats to peace and security caused by terrorist act.
- UK stresses Daesh’s continued threat on Syria and Iraq and urges that perpetrators face justice.
Remarks by Ambassador Jonathan Allen at Security Council briefing, 10 February 2021
I join others in condemning this morning’s attack on 26 UN peacekeepers from Togo serving in the MINUSMA mission in Mali. We wish all those injured a swift and complete recovery.
As the Secretary-General’s report underscores, Daesh continues to pose a global threat. Despite territorial losses, the group remains able to inflict deadly harm in Syria and Iraq. We are concerned particularly by the IDP camps highlighted by the Secretary-General’s report. The United Kingdom facilitates the return of unaccompanied or orphaned children on a case-by-case basis and subject to national security concerns. But those who have fought for or supported Daesh should face justice for their crimes in the most appropriate jurisdiction – often where those crimes were committed.
Further afield, we’re concerned about Daesh’s presence worldwide, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. Its online recruitment and incitement must also be tackled. The United Kingdom remains an active member of the Global Coalition against Daesh. We co-lead coalition efforts to tackle the propaganda threat.
At the United Nations level, the United Kingdom will continue to advocate for increasing focus on preventing terrorists’ misuse of the internet and aviation security, as well as emerging threats beyond Daesh like right-wing terrorism. We will also emphasise the need to protect and promote human rights and the rule of law while countering terrorism, and will prioritise prevention and whole-of-society approaches.
I want to conclude by associating myself with the comments of the representative of France in defence of the White Helmets. We’re used to hearing these slurs in our Syria debates and have responded in those meetings. It’s rather sad to hear it raised in a serious debate on counter-terrorism. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)
09 Feb 21. Iran may pursue nuclear weapon, intel minister warns West. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei speaks during a meeting with army’s air force and air defense staff in Tehran, Iran, Sunday, Feb. 7, 2021. (Office of the Iranian Supreme Leader via AP)
Iran’s intelligence minister warned the West that his country could push for a nuclear weapon if crippling international sanctions on Tehran remain in place, state television reported Tuesday.
The remarks by Mahmoud Alavi mark a rare occasion that a government official says Iran could reverse its course on the nuclear program. Tehran has long insisted that the program is for peaceful purposes only, such as power generation and medical research.
A 1990s fatwa, or religious edict, by the country’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei states that nuclear weapons are forbidden.
“Our nuclear program is peaceful and the fatwa by the supreme leader has forbidden nuclear weapons, but if they push Iran in that direction, then it wouldn’t be Iran’s fault but those who pushed it,” Alavi was quoted as saying.
“If a cat is cornered, it may show a kind of behavior that a free cat would not,” he said and added that Iran has no plans to move toward a nuclear weapon under current circumstances.
Israel has long accused Iran of trying to develop nuclear weapons, and the 2015 nuclear accord between Iran and world powers put strict limits on Iranian nuclear activities to prevent it from reaching weapons capabilities. In exchange, Iran was given sanctions relief.
Then-President Donald Trump withdrew from the deal in 2018, prompting Iran to resume some of its nuclear activities. The new Biden administration has signaled it would like to revive the deal, raising concerns in Israel.
The Israeli military estimates that Iran is still two years away from reaching the capability of producing a bomb. But in a briefing with reporters, a senior military official said the army believes Iran has made “significant progress” in collecting fissile material and research and development. He said the army is especially concerned about “irreversible” progress, such as the knowledge it has gained from using sophisticated centrifuges. The official spoke on condition of anonymity because he was discussing an intelligence assessment.
The 81-year-old Khamenei, who has the final say on all matters of state in Iran, on Sunday urged the United States to lift all sanctions if it wants Iran to live up to commitments under its 2015 nuclear deal. However, President Joe Biden has said the U.S. won’t be making the first move.
Iran President Hassan Rouhani in comments aired on state TV on Tuesday reiterated the U.S. must first take steps to honor nuclear deal agreements. “Any day that the U.S. resumes implementing its commitments under the nuclear deal, we will fully implement our promises under the deal as well,” he said.
Following the killing last December of an Iranian scientist credited with spearheading the country’s disbanded military nuclear program, Iran’s parliament has approved a law to block international nuclear inspectors later this month — a serious violation of the accord.
Alavi, the intelligence minister, was also quoted as saying that a member of the Iranian armed forces “facilitated” the killing of the scientist, which Iran has blamed on Israel.
The minister did not expand on what he meant — and it was not clear if the soldier had carried out the explosion that killed the scientist, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh. Israel, which has been suspected of killing Iranian nuclear scientists over the last decade, has repeatedly declined to comment on the attack.
This was the first time that Iran acknowledged a member of its armed forces may have acted as an accomplice in the killing of Fakhrizadeh, who headed Iran’s so-called AMAD program, which Israel and the West have alleged was a military operation looking at the feasibility of building a nuclear weapon.
The International Atomic Energy Agency — the U.N.’s nuclear watchdog — says that “structured program” ended in 2003. U.S. intelligence agencies concurred with that assessment in a 2007 report.
In December, Rouhani vowed to avenge Fakhrizadeh’s killing, saying his country will decide time or venue of any retaliatory action.
In response to Trump’s so-called “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran, the country began to gradually violate its atomic commitments under the nuclear deal. It also threatened further provocations in a bid to increase its leverage and get Biden to prioritize a return to the deal as he moves to dismantle Trump’s legacy.
As part of those steps, Iran has begun enriching uranium closer to weapons-grade levels and said it would experiment with uranium metals, a key component of a nuclear warhead. Iran insists that all breaches of the pact are easily reversible. (Source: Defense News Early Bird/Military Times/AP)
10 Feb 21. Saudi Arabia/Yemen – Abha Airport: Saudi-led coalition downs two Yemeni Houthi drones, civilian aircraft damaged on ground. On 10 February, the Saudi-led coalition confirmed that it had shot down two Yemeni Houthi rebel drones over Asir Province in the southwest of Saudi Arabia. The drones were reportedly targeting Abha Airport (OEAB/AHB) in Asir and at least one civilian aircraft parked at the installation was damaged as a result of the attack, although it is not clear if this was due to falling debris or a successful strike. No casualties have been reported, though details are still emerging. The situation remains fluid and subject to rapid change. Of note, confirmed Houthi military-grade weaponised drone or cruise missile attacks targeting Abha Airport occurred during 2020 on 20 August and 28 October and in 2019 on 12 June, 23 June, 1 July and 28 August.
The US designated the Houthis a foreign terrorist organisation (FTO) on 11 January; however, the Biden administration rescinded the Houthi FTO designation on 5 February. In addition, the Biden administration announced on 5 February that the US was ending military support to Saudi-led coalition offensive operations in Yemen against Houthi rebel forces. However, the US military will reportedly continue to provide defensive air and air-defence support to Saudi Arabia to assist in protecting the kingdom from SSM and/or drone attacks. In total, the Saudi-led coalition has shot down at least 10 Houthi rebel drones launched towards unspecified areas in the southwest provinces of the kingdom so far in 2021, including seven from 7-10 February alone.
On 23 and 26 January, the Saudi-led coalition reportedly employed US-made MIM-104 Patriot conventional surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems to shoot down suspected SSMs or drones over Riyadh. Disruption to operations occurred at Riyadh’s King Khalid International Airport (OERK/RUH) during the periods that the reported downings over the capital occurred. The Patriot has the capability to engage air targets at altitudes up to FL800 and at ranges out to 160km (100 miles). During 2020, the Saudi-led coalition reportedly shot down SSMs and/or drones launched from Yemen by Houthi rebels targeting Riyadh on 28 October, 10 September, 23 June and 27 March; there has been no official attribution for the 26 January incident.
International media outlet reporting from 13 January indicates that Iran has provided the Houthis with Shahed-136 military-grade weaponised drones with an approximate range of 2,000-2,200km (1,240-1,370 miles). Commercial satellite imagery indicates that the Houthis have deployed the Shahed-136 drones to Al Jawf Governorate in northwest Yemen. Acquisition of Shahed-136 drones from Yemen indicates that Houthi rebels now have the capability to target all of Saudi Arabia, the UAE and even Israel. Of note, media reporting from early January indicates that Israel has deployed Patriot and Israeli-made Iron Dome conventional SAM systems to the Red Sea city of Eilat due to “threats of attack from Yemen” via weaponised drones such as the Shahed-136.
The southwest provinces of Asir, Jizan and Najran are located within the Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) area of Saudi Arabia, which is covered by a notice issued on 28 January and a publication issued by the civil aviation authority of the country (NOTAM OEJD W0336/20, W0120/21 & AIP SUP 02/21). EASA, Germany and France have issued notices to operators advising against conducting civil aviation flight activity within the southwest provinces of Saudi Arabia (EASA – CZIB-2018-01R6, Germany – AIC 18/20 & France – AIC A 23/20).
The German and UK civil aviation authorities mandate that flights be deferred to airports in Yemen and within the airspace over Yemeni territory, with the exception of ATS routes R401, UL425, UM551 and N315. US aviation operators are prohibited from conducting flights in Yemeni airspace, with the exception of over-water ATS routes M99 & UT702. France currently requests its operators not to enter the entirety of FIR Sanaa (OYSC), and EASA has an active conflict zone information bulletin in place for Yemen.
The UAE General Civil Aviation Authority (GCAA) has an active notice warning that due to the ongoing conflict between the Saudi-led coalition and Houthi rebels, there exists the potential for Houthi “weapons” to affect civil aviation outside of Yemen (NOTAM OMAE A1557/20). The GCAA notice also states that the country has enacted measures to mitigate risks that might result from Houthi rebel weaponised drone activity that may target air operations within UAE airspace (NOTAM OMAE A1557/20).
Analysis
The majority of Houthi rebel SSM launches into Saudi Arabia and associated intercepts – along with drone attacks/downings – occur over the southwest provinces in the ESCAT area along the border with Yemen, though some attacks have targeted sites deep into the interior of the country. On 23 November, the Saudi-led coalition confirmed that a Houthi cruise-missile strike targeted an Aramco site in Jeddah. On 16 August 2019, the Saudi-led coalition confirmed that Houthi rebels conducted a military-grade weaponised drone attack targeting the Shaybah Oil Field facility in Eastern Province. On 1 August 2019, the Houthis claimed to have launched an SSM at a military site in the eastern city of Dammam. On 26 July 2018, the Houthis reportedly conducted a Samad-3 attack launched from northwest Yemen against Abu Dhabi International Airport (OMAA/AUH) in the UAE. Saudi Arabia has shot down over 200 Houthi-launched SSMs and drones over its territory since the start of 2018, including thwarting at least 12 attacks over Riyadh, as well as two over Mecca Province and at least two over Yanbu, located deep within the interior of the country.
During 2019-2020, the US military deployed additional Patriot conventional SAM systems to locations in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and the Gulf Region. On 14 September 2019, large-scale attacks targeted two major oil facilities in Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia involving 18 military-grade weaponised drones and seven cruise missiles. Despite the Houthi claim of responsibility for these strikes, they did not emanate from Yemen, and the US claims the missiles and drones were launched by Iranian military forces from southwest Iran. Saudi Arabia has Patriot systems deployed in its southwest provinces along the Yemeni border and in main urban centres of the country. At various points since 2015, the Saudi-led coalition has deployed Patriot systems within Yemen for strategic air-defence coverage of western areas of Yemeni airspace. The UAE also maintains a Patriot system capability deployed within its borders. Each of these military entities also has combat aircraft capable well above FL260 deployed at operating locations in the Middle East region for air and air-defence purposes.
Overall, SSM and drone attacks against the southwest provinces over Saudi Arabia have dropped significantly since the August-September 2019 time-frame and have remained at consistent levels through 2020 and into 2021. Continued SSM and additional drone launches by Houthi rebels and associated intercepts via Saudi military conventional SAM engagement, as well as fighter jet air-to-air weapon employment, are likely to occur several times monthly over both Yemen and the ESCAT area of Saudi Arabia for the foreseeable future. In addition, quarterly SSM or drone attacks and associated intercepts near Riyadh or over main urban centres located deep within the Saudi interior are probable until a resolution between the factions in the Yemen conflict is reached. Attacks against targets in Israel or the UAE from Yemen by Houthi rebels remain a credible outlier scenario and, while less likely to occur than the activity noted above, cannot be ruled out completely.
In the event that further SSMs or drones are launched towards key sites in the southwest provinces of Saudi Arabia or main urban centres deep in the interior of the kingdom, like Riyadh and Jeddah, the Saudi authorities are likely to respond by holding all inbound flights or diverting them to other airports, as well as suspending all departures. Whilst the amount of time between these closures and the resumption of activity can vary, previous incidents have resulted in the cessation of civilian air traffic for a period of hours. Once the restrictions are lifted, landings are also likely to be restricted for an additional length of time whilst the backlog is cleared and aircraft in holding patterns are permitted to land.
We assess territory in Saudi Arabia outside the ESCAT area to be a HIGH risk airspace environment at all altitudes. We assess Yemen and the ESCAT area of Saudi Arabia to be EXTREME risk airspace environments at all altitudes. We assess the UAE to be a MODERATE risk airspace operating environment at all altitudes. We assess Gaza, along with areas inside Israel situated within 50km (32 miles) of Gaza and the Egyptian border, to comprise a HIGH risk airspace environment below FL260 and MODERATE risk airspace environment above FL260.
Advice
Approvals: As a precaution, conduct operational risk-based identification of divert and alternate airports for flight schedules with planned stops at aerodromes in the country or with overflight of the airspace. Operators are advised to ensure flight plans are correctly filed, attain proper special approvals for flight operations to sensitive locations and obtain relevant overflight permits prior to departure. In addition, ensure crews scheduled to operate to or over the country in the near term are fully aware of the latest security situation.
Missile Launches: Unannounced rocket and missile launches that transit airspace used by civilian aircraft pose a latent threat to operations at all altitudes. The country has a history of not issuing adequate notice of activities in its airspace that could affect flight safety. Multiple safety of flight concerns emanate from a situation where a missile malfunctions during the boost, mid-course or terminal phases of flight. Such an event would cause the missile to fly an unplanned trajectory and altitude profile which could expose overflying aircraft to mid-air collision, route diversion and or debris splashdown issues. Leading civil aviation governing bodies have standing notices advising operators of the threat to civil aviation in the airspace due to unannounced military activity, rocket test firings and or missile launches.
Shoot-down Policy: The country has an aggressive air intercept and shoot-down policy which allows air and air defence forces to intercept and disable aerial targets violating airspace regulations. Military air and air defence assets may be employed to down aerial targets under the auspice of the policy. While legal civil aviation flights are unlikely to be directly targeted, there remains a latent but credible risk of misidentification and interception by military air and air defence assets. (Source: Osprey)
11 Feb 21. Attack on Abha International Airport, Saudi Arabia: E3 statement. The governments of France, Germany and the UK have strongly condemned the attack claimed by the Houthis on Abha International Airport on 10 February.
Statement from the governments of France, Germany and the UK:
The E3 (Germany, France and the United Kingdom) strongly condemn the attack claimed by the Houthis on Abha International Airport, in the South of Saudi Arabia, on February 10.
Continued attacks of this nature, including those which target civilian areas in violation of international law, illustrate the seriousness of the threat that the proliferation of drones poses to the stability of the region. We reiterate our firm commitment to the security and integrity of Saudi territory, and reaffirm our strong support for a swift resolution of the Yemeni conflict which will bring much-needed stability to the region. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)
09 Feb 21. Beijing to benefit from heavy-handed US response to Myanmar coup. The Biden administration has been warned against imposing heavy sanctions on Myanmar following a military takeover of its democratically elected government.
Earlier this month, military officials ousted Myanmar’s democratically elected government, detaining political representatives including State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi and President Win Myint.
The military coup was sparked by a dispute over the outcome of Myanmar’s election in November, which senior military officials alleged was fraudulent.
Myanmar’s chief of the armed forces, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, has assumed control of the government under a one-year-long state of emergency.
The coup was widely condemned by the international community, with G7 nations – Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK, and the US – jointly calling for the release of detainees.
“We stand with the people of Myanmar who want to see a democratic future,” the statement reads.
Western leaders have since backed the imposition of a new wave of sanctions on the embattled south-east Asian nation, with US President Joe Biden warning that the coup would “necessitate an immediate review of our sanctions laws”.
But according to Brahma Chellaney, professor of strategic studies at the New Delhi–based Centre for Policy Research, tougher sanctions would be a mistake.
In a piece published by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), Chellaney cast doubt over the utility of a punitive response, given the current regional environment.
“The retreat of the ‘Myanmar spring’ means all the countries of continental south-east Asia – Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam and Myanmar – are under authoritarian rule, like their giant northern neighbour, China,” he writes.
“More fundamentally, the reversal of democratisation in Myanmar is a reminder that democracy is unlikely to take root where authoritarian leaders and institutions remain deeply entrenched.
“Given this, a punitive approach would merely express democratic countries’ disappointment, at the cost of stymying Myanmar’s economic liberalisation, impeding the development of its civil society, and reversing its shift towards closer engagement with democratic powers. And, as in the past, the brunt of sanctions would be borne by ordinary citizens, not the generals.”
Chellaney noted that US-led sanctions on Myanmar would call into question Western relations with other authoritarian regimes in south-east Asia.
“Thailand’s army chief, with the support of an increasingly unpopular king, has remained ensconced in power in civilian garb since staging a coup in 2014,” he continues.
“If the United States can do business with Thailand, where a crackdown on pro-democracy protesters has extended to the use of a feared lèse-majesté law to imprison those who insult the royal family, why hold neighbouring Myanmar to a higher standard?
“Likewise, the US, India, Japan and others have established close defence ties with communist-ruled Vietnam. Indeed, the US boasts that in recent years it has established a ‘robust security partnership’ with Vietnam.”
The professor argues that opening lines of communication and cooperation with Myanmar’s generals would help democratic powers influence developments.
“In the past decade, as Myanmar’s democratic transition unfolded, the West neglected to build close relations with the force behind it – the military,” he adds.
According to Chellaney, a heavy-handed response to the military coup in Myanmar would only play into China’s hands.
“Crippling US-led sanctions from the late 1980s paved the way for China to become Myanmar’s dominant trading partner and investor,” he writes.
“But in 2011, Myanmar’s bold suspension of a controversial Chinese megaproject, the Myitsone Dam, became a watershed moment for the country’s democratic opening. It set in motion developments that reduced Myanmar’s dependence on China, balanced its foreign policy and spurred domestic reforms.
“Today, nothing would serve Chinese interests more than new US-led efforts to isolate Myanmar, which serves China as a strategic gateway to the Indian Ocean and important source of natural resources.”
Chellaney warns that renewed sanctions and isolation would likely turn Myanmar into “another Chinese satellite”, like Laos, Cambodia and Pakistan, which would undermine regional security.
“US policymakers must not ignore how often American sanctions against other countries have worked to China’s advantage,” he writes.
“They should perhaps be most worried by how sanctions have forced Russia to pivot to China, turning two natural competitors into becoming close strategic partners. And China has been the main trade and investment beneficiary of US sanctions against Iran.”
Chellaney notes that President Biden has expressed a readiness to co-operate with Beijing, the largest authoritarian power in the world, adding that the US should adopt a similar approach with “weaker” Myanmar.
“To help influence Myanmar’s trajectory, Biden has little choice but to address what US officials have recognised as a weak spot in American policy – lack of ties with the country’s strongly nationalist military,” he states.
“The US must not turn Myanmar from a partner into a pariah again.” (Source: Defence Connect)
08 Feb 21. PLA continues modernising land equipment in Xinjiang Military Command. China is continuing to modernise the equipment and enhance the combat capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army Ground Force’s (PLAGF’s) Xinjiang Military Command.
Only a few days after announcing that the China North Industries (Group) Corporation (Norinco) Type 15 (also known as ZTQ-15) lightweight tank had entered service with the command, state-owned broadcaster China Central Television (CCTV) said in a 6 February news report that PLAGF units in the region have also been supplied with several other land platforms. These platforms included 155 mm PCL-181 wheeled self-propelled howitzers (SPHs), CSK181 wheeled armoured vehicles, and wheeled bridging systems.
Footage published in CCTV’s ‘Military Report’ programme showed a commissioning ceremony for at least 18 PCL-181s. It is unclear when exactly the ceremony took place but the broadcaster said the vehicles recently entered service with an artillery brigade near Tianshan.
The 22-tonne SPH, which is manufactured by Norinco and has the export designation SH-15, features an automatic gun-laying system, a semi-automatic ammunition loading system, a digitised control board, and also has room for six personnel in the cabin area (including the driver). According to Norinco, the SH-15, which is based on a truck chassis and is capable of travelling at a top speed of 90 km/h on roads, is fitted with a 155mm L52 howitzer capable of firing between four and six rounds per minute. (Source: Jane’s)
07 Feb 21. Saudi Arabia / Yemen – Saudi-led coalition downs 4 total Yemeni Houthi rebel drones targeting the Kingdom. On 7 February, the Saudi-led coalition confirmed that it had shot down four total Yemeni Houthi rebel drones launched towards unspecified areas in the southwest provinces in the Kingdom. In total, the Saudi-led coalition and their aligned forces have now shot down at least 12 Houthi rebel drones launched towards unspecified areas of in the southwest provinces of the Kingdom or over Yemeni airspace since 15 January. Also on 7 February, the Houthis reportedly conducted surface-to-surface missile (SSM) and military-grade weaponised drone attacks in Yemen’s Marib Governorate.
The US designated the Houthis a foreign terrorist organisation (FTO) on 11 January. However, the Biden administration rescinded the Houthi FTO designation on 5 February. In addition, the Biden administration announced on 5 February that the US was ending military support to Saudi-led coalition offensive operations in Yemen against Houthi rebel forces. However, the US military will reportedly continue to provide defensive air and air defence support to Saudi Arabia to assist in defending the Kingdom from SSM and/or drone attacks.
On 23 and 26 January, the Saudi-led coalition reportedly employed US-made MIM-104 Patriot conventional surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems to shoot down suspected SSMs or drones over Riyadh. Disruption to operations occurred at Riyadh’s King Khalid International Airport (OERK/RUH) during the periods that the reported downings over the capital occurred. The Patriot has the capability to engage air targets at altitudes up to FL800 and at ranges out to 160km (100 miles). During 2020, the Saudi-led coalition reportedly shot down SSMs and/or drones launched from Yemen by Houthi rebels targeting Riyadh on 28 October, 10 September, 23 June and 27 March; there has been no official attribution for the 26 January incident.
International media outlet reporting from 13 January indicates that Iran has provided the Houthis with Shahed-136 military-grade weaponised drones with an approximate range of 2,000-2,200km (1,240-1,370 miles). Commercial satellite imagery indicates that the Houthis have deployed the Shahed-136 drones to Al Jawf Governorate in northwest Yemen. Acquisition of Shahed-136 drones from Yemen indicates that Houthi rebels now have the capability to target all of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and even Israel. In late December, a senior Israeli defence official claimed that Iran was developing weaponised military-grade drone and missile programmes for its proxy forces in Yemen and Iraq in order to be able to target Israel. Of note, media reporting from early January indicates that Israel has deployed Patriot and Israeli-made Iron Dome conventional SAM systems to the Red Sea city of Eilat due to “threats of attack from Yemen” via weaponised drones such as the Shahed-136.
The southwest provinces of Asir, Jizan and Najran are located within the Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) area of Saudi Arabia, which is covered by a notice issued on 28 January and a publication issued by the civil aviation authority of the country (NOTAM OEJD W0336/20, W0120/21 & AIP SUP 02/21). EASA, Germany and France have issued notices to operators advising against conducting civil aviation flight activity within the southwest provinces of Saudi Arabia (EASA – CZIB-2018-01R6, Germany – AIC 18/20 & France – AIC A 23/20).
The German and UK civil aviation authorities mandate that flights be deferred to airports in Yemen and within the airspace over Yemeni territory, with the exception of ATS routes R401, UL425, UM551 and N315. US aviation operators are prohibited from conducting flights in Yemeni airspace, with the exception of over-water ATS routes M99 & UT702. France currently requests its operators not to enter the entirety of FIR Sanaa (OYSC), and EASA has an active conflict zone information bulletin in place for Yemen.
The UAE General Civil Aviation Authority (GCAA) has an active notice warning that due to the ongoing conflict between the Saudi-led coalition and Houthi rebels, there exists the potential for Houthi “weapons” to affect civil aviation outside of Yemen (NOTAM OMAE A1557/20). The GCAA notice also states that the country has enacted measures to mitigate risks that might result from Houthi rebel weaponised drone activity that may target air operations within UAE airspace (NOTAM OMAE A1557/20).
Analysis
The majority of Houthi rebel SSM launches into Saudi Arabia and associated intercepts – along with drone attacks/downings – occur over the southwest provinces in the ESCAT area along the border with Yemen, though some attacks have targeted sites deep into the interior of the country. On 23 November, the Saudi-led coalition confirmed that a Houthi cruise-missile strike targeted an Aramco site in Jeddah. On 16 August 2019, the Saudi-led coalition confirmed that Houthi rebels conducted a military-grade weaponised drone attack targeting the Shaybah Oil Field facility in Eastern Province. On 1 August 2019, the Houthis claimed to have launched an SSM at a military site in the eastern city of Dammam. Saudi Arabia has shot down over 150 Houthi-launched SSMs and drones over its territory since the start of 2018, including thwarting at least 12 attacks over Riyadh, as well as two over Mecca Province and at least two over Yanbu, located deep within the interior of the country. In addition to the above, several key developments related to Iranian support to Houthi rebel missile and drone activity have emerged in recent months:
– Houthi rebels have also been blamed by the Yemeni government for the SSM strikes on Aden International Airport (OYAA/ADE) on 30 December.
– On 4 December, Saudi-led, coalition-backed Yemeni forces claimed to have interdicted a cell of Lebanese, Iranian and Iraqi nationals linked to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force (IRGC-QF) who were allegedly providing operational support to Houthi SSM activity in Sanaa and Marib Governorate. The claims also alleged that Houthi rebels were using Sanaa International Airport (OYSN/SAH) as a training centre for SSM and drone activity, supervised by experts linked to the IRGC-QF.
– On 23 November, the Saudi-led coalition claimed the IRGC-QF was providing continued support to Houthi rebel SSM and drone activities in Yemen.
– Reporting from 14 October indicated that several high-level Saudi Arabian officials expressed concerns about three dozen Houthi rebels who were being sent back to Yemen having received specialised training from the IRGC-QF on drones and SSMs.
– During late September, a spokesman for the Iranian Armed Forces publicly acknowledged the country had sent missiles and drones to Yemen in support of the Houthis.
During 2020, the US military deployed additional Patriot conventional SAM systems to locations in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and the Gulf Region. On 14 September 2019, large-scale attacks targeted two major oil facilities in Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia involving 18 military-grade weaponised drones and seven cruise missiles. Despite the Houthi claim of responsibility for these strikes, they did not emanate from Yemen, and the US claims the missiles and drones were launched by Iranian military forces from southwest Iran. Saudi Arabia has Patriot systems deployed in its southwest provinces along the Yemeni border and in main urban centres of the country. At various points since 2015, the Saudi-led coalition has deployed Patriot systems within Yemen for strategic air-defence coverage of western areas of Yemeni airspace. The UAE also maintains a Patriot system capability deployed within its borders. Each of these military entities also has combat aircraft capable well above FL260 deployed at operating locations in the Middle East region for air and air-defence purposes.
Continued SSM and additional drone launches by Houthi rebels and associated intercepts via Saudi military conventional SAM engagement, as well as fighter jet air-to-air weapon employment, are likely to occur several times monthly over both Yemen and the ESCAT area of Saudi Arabia for the foreseeable future. In addition, quarterly SSM or drone attacks and associated intercepts near Riyadh or over main urban centres located deep within the Saudi interior are probable until a resolution between the factions in the Yemen conflict is reached. Attacks against targets in Israel or the UAE from Yemen by Houthi rebels remain a credible outlier scenario and, while less likely to occur than the activity noted above, cannot be ruled out completely.
We assess territory in Saudi Arabia outside the ESCAT area to be a HIGH risk airspace environment at all altitudes. We assess Yemen and the ESCAT area of Saudi Arabia to be EXTREME risk airspace environments at all altitudes. We assess the UAE to be a MODERATE risk airspace operating environment at all altitudes. We assess Gaza, along with areas inside Israel situated within 50km (32 miles) of Gaza and the Egyptian border, to comprise a HIGH risk airspace environment below FL260 and MODERATE risk airspace environment above FL260.
Advice
Approvals: As a precaution, conduct operational risk-based identification of divert and alternate airports for flight schedules with planned stops at aerodromes in the country or with overflight of the airspace. Operators are advised to ensure flight plans are correctly filed, attain proper special approvals for flight operations to sensitive locations and obtain relevant overflight permits prior to departure. In addition, ensure crews scheduled to operate to or over the country in the near term are fully aware of the latest security situation.
Missile Launches: Unannounced rocket and missile launches that transit airspace used by civilian aircraft pose a latent threat to operations at all altitudes. The country has a history of not issuing adequate notice of activities in its airspace that could affect flight safety. Multiple safety of flight concerns emanate from a situation where a missile malfunctions during the boost, mid-course or terminal phases of flight. Such an event would cause the missile to fly an unplanned trajectory and altitude profile which could expose overflying aircraft to mid-air collision, route diversion and or debris splashdown issues. Leading civil aviation governing bodies have standing notices advising operators of the threat to civil aviation in the airspace due to unannounced military activity, rocket test firings and or missile launches.
Shoot-down Policy: The country has an aggressive air intercept and shoot-down policy which allows air and air defence forces to intercept and disable aerial targets violating airspace regulations. Military air and air defence assets may be employed to down aerial targets under the auspice of the policy. While legal civil aviation flights are unlikely to be directly targeted, there remains a latent but credible risk of misidentification and interception by military air and air defence assets. (Source: Osprey)
07 Feb 21. Indian Government To Spend $130bn In Next Eight Years On Modernising Indian forces: Defence Minister Rajnath Singh “By self-reliance, we do not mean to be isolated from the world. It actually seeks to promote globalisation by making India a more competitive player on the global stage and inviting the global companies to set up shops in India,” said Defence Minister Rajnath Singh. India Today In the next seven to eight years India plans to spend over $130bn dollars on military modernisation to strengthen its security machinery in the country, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh said on Friday. Speaking at Asia’s largest military aviation exhibition -‘Aero India’ the Minister said, “By self-reliance, we do not mean to be isolated from the world. It actually seeks to promote globalisation by making India a more competitive player on the global stage and inviting the global companies to set up shops in India”, The Indian Express reported. The Minister added that we are going to invest more than $130n dollars on military modernisation in the next 7-8 years. Singh said the government has set a target to achieve a turnover of ₹1,75,000 crore in Defence manufacturing including export of ₹35,000 crore in Aerospace and Defence goods and services, by 2024. Many international players were invited to the event to showcase the government’s initiatives to assist them in setting up manufacturing units in the country. “It reflects the growing optimism of the global community.” Chief Guest of the event, President Ram Nath Kovind, said that it is the world’s first mega event of this kind to be held in a hybrid format. He said that the event will contribute towards strengthening India’s self-reliance in the defence sector and establishing India credentials as a manufacturer for the world. Advertisement “Despite the challenges posed by the pandemic, I’m happy that Aero India 2021 has been organised successfully without compromising its spirit while following Covid-19 appropriate norms”, added by the President. President Kovind is the first President to attend the Aero India event. Speaking about the Mission Sagar 1, Kovind said, “After the Covid-19 outbreak, we reached out to our neighbours and assisted them with medical teams, medicines as well as diagnostic kits, ventilators, masks, gloves and other medical supplies. (Source: Google/https://thelogicalindian.com/)
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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Home land Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need. A CNIM Group Company
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