10 Oct 14. Reuters reported Thursday that negotiations between the UN’s nuclear watchdog (IAEA) and Iran – aimed at securing inspector access to sites where the Iranians are suspected of having conducted military-related atomic work – “appear not to have substantively advanced,” with the agency tersely announcing that “Iran did not propose any new measures during the meetings in Tehran” and that no date had been set for renewing negotiations. Diplomats had flown into Tehran for two days of talks aimed at making progress on Iranian transparency measures, just over a month after the IAEA issued a blistering report blasting the Islamic republic for failing to meet four out of five transparency obligations by an agreed August 25 deadline. The same report noted that the Iranians had instead spent the time destroying evidence in a way that “likely… further undermined the Agency’s ability to conduct effective verification.” The Jerusalem Post reported that Western officials in Vienna reacted to the news of the talks’ failure by emphasizing that continued Iranian stonewalling could jeopardize broader efforts to secure a nuclear deal between the P5+1 global powers and Tehran. At stake are international concerns over the so-called possible military dimensions (PMDs) of the Iranian nuclear program, the central significance of which has sometimes been underplayed by voices within the foreign policy community. While the P5+1 is charged with negotiating over Iran’s uranium work, its plutonium work, and its ballistic missile work – all of which the Iranians are obligated by half a dozen United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions to roll back – the IAEA seeks to establish the scope of Iran’s overall atomic program, including in those three more specific areas. The mandate stretches beyond full-blown weaponization work, and into military involvement in uranium mining, centrifuge construction, and so on. Full Iranian disclosure is considered a minimum to establishing a robust verification regime: The IAEA can’t verify that Iran has met its obligations to limit uranium work, for instance, unless it knows the full scope of the uranium work that’s being done. PMD-related transparency is seen as not just another issue – say, one that Iran could refuse to trade away by making concessions in other areas – but as a prerequisite to verifying Iranian compliance across all issues. (Source: theisraelproject.org)
08 Oct 14. Brazil to set aside BRL1bn in 2015 for Gripen purchase. The Brazilian government has indicated its intention to set aside around BRL1bn (USD417m) in the 2015 draft annual budget law for the acquisition of the 36 Saab Gripen NG multirole combat aircraft being purchased under the FX-2 Project. The announcement to earmark the funds was made on 6 October by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) FX-2 Project Monitoring Committee. Brigadier José Augusto Crepaldi Affonso, president of the Combat Aircraft Program Coordinating Committee, said in a statement: this “demonstrates the government’s commitment to the project” which, according to the original schedule, should see a contract signed by December this year. (Source: Defense News Early Bird/IHS Jane’s)
09 Oct 14. Russian Helicopters, part of State Corporation Rostec, has received an export licence to sell a range of military products outside Russia, including spare parts, components and technical documentation. The company may now also provide a full range of support services (technical maintenance, repairs, upgrades, etc.) and participate in joint ventures with non-Russian clients, and establish and equip service and maintenance facilities in other countries and train up foreign staff. Russian Helicopters has also been granted permission to import military goods needed for its own manufacturing. The approval was granted by the Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation (FSMTC), following Presidential Executive Order no. 232-rp issued on 21 June of this year. Russian Helicop