NEWS IN BRIEF – REST OF THE WORLD

Sponsored by Exensor

www.exensor.com

————————————————————————-

13 Mar 20. U.S. Strikes 5 Kata’ib Hezbollah Targets in Iraq. Just days after Wednesday’s rocket attack on Camp Taji, Iraq, killed two U.S. service members and a military medic from the U.K., the United States struck back by attacking five weapons sites, the commander of U.S. Central Command said during a Pentagon briefing today.

Marine Corps Gen. Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr. said the U.S. used manned aircraft to attack weapons sites associated with Iranian-backed militia Kata’ib Hezbollah yesterday at 6 p.m. EDT.

McKenzie said those sites — all within a 30-mile radius of Baghdad — were: the Nawar Ahmad rocket storage site; the Kata’ib Hezbollah advanced conventional weapons storage facility in Karbala; the Al Musayyib weapons storage site; and two locations at Jurf as Sakhr, one for storage of improved heavy rockets and another for propellant production and storage of advanced conventional weapons.

“We assessed that each location stored weapons that would enable lethal operations against U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq,” McKenzie said. “We also assessed that the destruction of these sites will degrade Kata’ib Hezbollah’s ability to conduct future strikes.”

Weather issues around Baghdad have prevented U.S. forces from doing a complete battle damage assessment of the sites following the attacks, but McKenzie said he remains confident that the attacks were effective.

“We’re confident that we’ve effectively destroyed these facilities and expect they will no longer be able to house the type of advanced Iranian-supplied weapons that were used in the Kata’ib Hezbollah attacks on the Iraqi base at Camp Taji,” McKenzie said.

The general also said he thinks collateral damage from the attacks was low and that there will be fatalities at the sites, but numbers can’t be confirmed right now.

McKenzie said that the Kata’ib Hezbollah attack on Camp Taji was meant to include a total of 33 Iranian-supplied 107mm Katyusha rockets, but only 30 had been fired.”Three were left in the vehicle and failed to ignite,” he said. “Of the 30 that were fired, between 8 and 12, or 8 and 15, landed in Taji; that’s a large strike … that’s intent to produce a lot of casualties.”

Radar information, he said, was able to track the origin of the launches, and Iraqi forces were able to capture the launch vehicle and the remaining unlaunched rockets.

“The Iraqis actually went out and got the vehicle for us, which was very much appreciated,” he said. “But, as usual, typically, the vehicles are left with a timer. There is nobody there when the rockets are fired, which is why the remaining three probably couldn’t be ignited because they set a timer on them and ran away. It’s a particularly cowardly way to fight, but there you go.”

The U.S. will process the captured vehicle and the remaining rockets and get intelligence from them. While there are a lot of other weapons sites in Iraq similar to the ones the U.S. struck yesterday — and the U.S. knows where most of those sites are — McKenzie said the United States carefully considers attacking such sites, taking into account the relationship with the Iraqi government and also the potential for collateral damage.

“We work with the government of Iraq to go after these sites all the time, with varying degrees of success,” McKenzie said. “If we have information on a site, we share it with our Iraqi partners, and they’ll go after those sites, sometimes effectively, sometimes not effectively. I’m not going to say that it always works, but it is their country, we need to give them the opportunity to do it.”

The general also said consideration for civilian activities are also a consideration for why additional weapons are not attacked.

“When we look at sites, often they’re commingled with civilian activities and there’s a very high probability of civilian damage if we strike those sites,” he said. “The United States is not going to do that. If we strike a site, we’re going to find a site that provides collateral damage consistent with the law of armed conflict and our values.”

Following the attack on Camp Taji, McKenzie said he has asked for two carrier strike groups to remain in the Centcom region. Both the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower and the USS Harry S. Truman were approved to stay on.

“We’re going to keep them for a while,” McKenzie said. “We can move [them] around to present a completely changing potential threat to an adversary. So, the carriers are very … important to us and we know that the Iranians watch them very closely, too.”

McKenzie also said the U.S. is moving Patriot missile batteries into Iraq, as well, along with other systems, including a counter rocket, artillery, and mortar system, to defend the Patriot once it’s in place.

“We are in Iraq to support the people of Iraq in their fight against ISIS,” McKenzie said. “We always reserve the right to defend our forces whenever they’re attacked or threatened … I would caution Iran and its proxies from attempting a response that would endanger U.S. and coalition forces or our partners. U.S. Central Command is well postured to defend our forces around the region and respond to any further aggression against our forces.” (Source: US DoD)

14 Mar 20. Iraq – New rocket attack injures US-led coalition forces, Canada issues updated NOTAM (UPDATE #3. On 14 March, a rocket attack involving at least 25 projectiles conducted by suspected Iranian-backed Iraqi Popular Mobilisation Unit (PMU) militia forces targeted Al Taji Army Airfield in Iraq’s Salah ad-Din Province. At least three US-led coalition personnel have been wounded as a result of the attack. On 13 March, Canada issued a NOTAM advising Canadian aviation operators to defer conducting flights within FIR Baghdad (ORBB) at all altitudes due to the enduring conflict zone environment in Iraq (CZYZ G0280/20). The US FAA issued a similar NOTAM on 12 March prohibiting US aviation operators from conducting flights within FIR Baghdad (ORBB) at all altitudes (KICZ A0036/20). The US & Canadian NOTAMs come in wake of a series of US military airstrikes on 12 March which reportedly targeted Iranian-backed Iraqi PMU militia group sites in several provinces of Iraq. The airstrikes were reportedly waged in response to the 11 March indirect fire attack on Al Taji Army Air Field which killed three US-led coalition personnel. EASA along with the UK, French and German civil aviation authorities each issued stringent guidance to operators in the past two months regarding the persistent threat to flight operations within Iraq at altitudes primarily below FL320. However, more restrictive short-notice airspace prohibitions for FIR Baghdad (ORBB) may be enacted by EASA along with the UK, French and/or German civil aviation authorities. Operators should remain prepared for at least a temporary loss of access to FIR Baghdad (ORBB) and potentially FIR Tehran (OIIX).

Analysis

There remains an increased likelihood of additional US airstrikes against PMU sites in Iraq and/or Syria over the next 72 hours, specifically as Iranian-backed Iraqi militias responded to the 12 March airstrikes with the 14 March rocket attack which injured US-led coalition personnel. Beyond the next 72 hours, it remains a credible, likely scenario in the weeks ahead that PMU militias will launch additional kinetic attacks against US interests in Iraq and/or eastern Syria. Additional indirect fire attacks via rockets targeting bases in Iraq and eastern Syria where US military advisers are present remain the most likely scenario in the near term. PMU militias have conducted approximately 30 rocket attacks on bases in Iraq where US military advisers are present since October 2019, to include indirect fire events at Baghdad International Airport (ORBI/BGW) on 8 & 11 December 2019. Credible reporting from 2018-2019 indicates Iran has delivered short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) to several Iranian-backed Iraqi PMU militias. Iraqi PMU militia possession of military-grade drones provided by Iran has been documented since at least 2014. On 10 March, the US military stated that Iranian-backed Iraqi PMU militia forces had “conducted scores of unmanned aerial system reconnaissance (drone) flights near US and Iraqi security force bases” since May 2019. If PMU militias were to conduct high impact attacks via SRBMs and/or drones, military facilities, air bases and/or airports across Iraq (or eastern Syria) where US military advisers are present are assessed to be targets of significance under this scenario. Direct conflict with Iran remains a less likely but credible scenario in the near-term. However, the US military on 10 March also stated it was “in the process of bringing air defense systems, ballistic missile defense systems, into Iraq in particular, to protect ourselves against another potential Iranian attack.” We assess that PMU militias are in possession of man-portable air-defence systems (MANPADS) capable at altitudes below FL260. In addition, the US FAA stated the following on 27 February: “Iran has a history of proliferating advanced weapons capabilities, including advanced anti-aircraft weapons, to its proxy groups” and could provide Iranian-backed Iraqi PMU militias with “additional anti-aircraft capabilities, which could pose a risk to US civil aviation operations at altitudes below FL320.” We assess Iraq to be an EXTREME risk airspace environment at all altitudes.

Risk area recommendation: Defer all flights subject to an operation specific risk assessment

Advice

Approvals: As a precaution, conduct operational risk-based identification of divert and alternate airports for flight schedules with planned stops at aerodromes in the country or with overflight of the airspace. Operators are advised to ensure flight plans are correctly filed, attain proper special approvals for flight operations to sensitive locations and obtain relevant overflight permits prior to departure. In addition, ensure crews scheduled to operate to or over the country in the near term are fully aware of the latest security situation.

Missile Launches: Unannounced rocket and missile launches that transit airspace used by civilian aircraft pose a latent threat to operations at all altitudes. The country has a history of not issuing adequate notice of activities in its airspace that could affect flight safety. Multiple safety of flight concerns emanate from a situation where a missile malfunctions during the boost, mid-course or terminal phases of flight. Such an event would cause the missile to fly an unplanned trajectory and altitude profile which could expose overflying aircraft to mid-air collision, route diversion and or debris splashdown issues. Leading civil aviation governing bodies have standing notices advising operators of the threat to civil aviation in the airspace due to unannounced military activity, rocket test firings and or missile launches.

Shoot-down Policy: The country has an aggressive air intercept and shoot-down policy which allows air and air defence forces to intercept and disable aerial targets violating airspace regulations. Military air and air defence assets may be employed to down aerial targets under the auspice of the policy. While legal civil aviation flights are unlikely to be directly targeted, there remains a latent but credible risk of misidentification and interception by military air and air defence assets. (Source: Osprey)

13 Mar 20. North Korea had military forces on lockdown for 30 days over coronavirus – U.S. general. North Korea had its military forces on lockdown for about 30 days and in one instance did not fly a plane for 24 days, even though it has not confirmed any cases of coronavirus, the head of U.S. forces in South Korea said on Friday.

“Their armed forces has been fundamentally on lockdown for about 30 days and only recently have they started routine training again,” General Robert Abrams told reporters at the Pentagon, adding that he was fairly confident the country had cases of the virus.

North Korea, sandwiched between China and South Korea, has not confirmed any coronavirus cases but has stepped up border checks and imposed quarantine measures. (Source: Reuters)

12 Mar 20. New report urges consideration of submarine ‘plan B.’ A report commissioned by Submarines for Australia and conducted by Insight Economics, which called for both Defence and the government to consider a viable ‘plan B’ for the Attack Class program, was launched by Professor Hugh White at the National Press Club.

Gary Johnston of Submarines for Australia, who commissioned the report, said not only are we heading for an inevitable capability gap, but there was a “high risk” the project will fail.

The report, which was prepared by Insight Economics supported by an expert reference group that includes four retired admirals, says that the budget jumped by

60 per cent in two years and that already two project milestones have been missed.

As well, after initially promising 90 per cent local content, the French government owned company, Naval Group, has shown an “extremely low level of commitment” to Australian industry participation in the project.

Johnston said, “The government’s own advisory body, including three American admirals, even recommended the government should consider walking away from the project.”

To get the project back on track with no further delays to the process, the report proposes a low-cost risk mitigation strategy – a ‘plan B’ – to inject competition into the process.

Under plan B, the government would commission Saab Kockums, designers of the Navy’s existing submarines, to develop a preliminary design study (PDS) for an

evolved version of the Collins Class submarine.

In 2022-23, both Naval Group and Saab would present a PDS for their respective designs together with a fixed price tender for building the first batch of three

submarines in Adelaide. The selection between the two designs would then be based on capability, delivery and local content, as well as price.

A second and more fundamental area of concern, however, is whether the submarines will even be fit for purpose in the 2030s and beyond. To address this, the review of submarine technologies flagged in the last Defence White Paper should be brought forward to the present.

Johnston said with China seeking to deny access to the South China Sea by investing heavily in advanced ships, aircraft and satellites, the finding in the report

that caused him the greatest worry is that by the 2030s our submarines’ effectiveness and survivability in a high intensity theatre will be threatened.

“If the government wants to continue deploying submarines to this theatre alongside the US Navy, the nation’s duty of care to the dedicated men and women of the ADF means we will need to begin the long and difficult process of acquiring nuclear-powered submarines,” he said.

This sentiment was somewhat shared by the Submarine Institute of Australia, with executive director of the SIA, David Nicholls, stating, “The Submarine Institute of Australia has noted the release of the report Australia’s Future Submarine – Do we need a plan B?.

“The SIA’s core position is that during the transition from the Collins Class submarines to the Attack Class submarines, there must be no gap in Australia’s submarine capability and this will require a life-of-type extension to most, if not all, Collins Class submarines, which needs to commence soon.

“Any major change or disruption to the Attack Class submarines program heightens the risk of a gap in Australia’s sovereign submarine capability and could delay the program for many years.

“Only a few weeks ago, the Australian National Audit Office released an independent assessment of the program and it found that, by and large, it is progressing.”

This was expanded on by Nicholls, who said, “The SIA continues to strongly support the construction of 12 new Attack Class submarines based on the rigorous design process which is currently underway and an effective construction program in Australia.

“Depending on all of the information it has in front of it – and much of this information is not in the public arena – an option for government could be to expedite the review based on strategic circumstances and developments in submarine technology, as flagged in the 2016 Defence White Paper, but this is, primarily, a decision for government.”

The full Insights Economics report commissioned by Submarines for Australia is available here.

The Attack Class submarines will be delivered as part of the multibillion-dollar SEA 1000 Future Submarine program. Naval Group will be responsible for building 12 regionally-superior submarines for the Royal Australian Navy at a specialist submarine shipyard at Osborne, South Australia.

The Commonwealth government’s Australian Naval Infrastructure (ANI) program will support the development of the future submarine shipyards.

The Commonwealth government formally signed the strategic partnering agreement (SPA) with Naval Group in February 2019 ahead of confirming the final design specifications and requirements for the Attack Class submarines.

The Attack Class will enter service with the RAN at a time when 50 per cent of the world’s submarines will be operating in the Indo-Pacific region. (Source: Defence Connect)

12 Mar 20. Statement by the Department of Defense on Iraq airstrikes. Earlier this evening, the United States conducted defensive precision strikes against Kata’ib Hizbollah (KH) facilities across Iraq. These strikes targeted five weapon storage facilities to significantly degrade their ability to conduct future attacks against Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) coalition forces. These weapons storage facilities include facilities that housed weapons used to target U.S. and coalition troops.

These strikes were defensive, proportional, and in direct response to the threat posed by Iranian-backed Shia militia groups (SMG) who continue to attack bases hosting OIR coalition forces.

Yesterday’s attack on Camp Taji killed two U.S. and one U.K. service members and wounded 14 others. It marked the latest in a series of rocket attacks conducted by Iranian-backed SMGs against U.S. and coalition personnel – killing five and wounding dozens more, including Iraqi Security Forces.

“The United States will not tolerate attacks against our people, our interests, or our allies,” Secretary of Defense Dr. Mark T. Esper said. “As we have demonstrated in recent months, we will take any action necessary to protect our forces in Iraq and the region.”

During discussions with senior Iraqi officials, the department re-emphasized its commitment to the force protection of coalition service members and to preventing SMG attacks on coalition forces.

These terror groups must cease their attacks on U.S. and coalition forces or face consequences at a time and place of our choosing.

The U.S. and the coalition remain committed to the lasting defeat of ISIS, and the long-term security, stability, and sovereignty of Iraq.

Additional information regarding tonight’s strikes will be provided at a briefing by General Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr., Commander, U.S. Central Command at 8:30am in the Pentagon Briefing Room.

(Source: US DoD)

13 Mar 20. Staying on track: The Defence Industrial Capability Plan.

As defence minister, Christopher Pyne spruiked the 2018 Defence Industrial Capability Plan as a plan to create “a robust, internationally competitive Australian defence industry base”. Just two years on, is that prognosis ringing true?

By 2028, Australia intends to operate a larger, more prepared defence industry, with the resident skills and expertise to meet current and potential capability requirements. In line with this goal, the Defence Industrial Capability Plan pointed to government investment in large-scale programs such as the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and naval shipbuilding programs.

This goes above and beyond the lip-service typically paid to these investment programs in Canberra. The ADF is undergoing significant modernisation (the greatest since the close of the Second World War) over the next five years, and the Integrated Investment Program will call for 10-20 per cent growth in the defence industry to meet these goals.

Large-scale programs like SA’s shipbuilding project are all too often plagued by employee shortages. Though tipped to create 15,000 jobs over the life of the program, Minister for Defence Industry Melissa Price puts the current figures at 4,000.

Employment efficiency

Obviously, this calls for moves to bring more potential employees into the fold. Maximum involvement in the defence sector can be stimulated by new models of skilling grants, improved accessibility for SMEs, and improving inclusion and gender diversity across the board. However, building Australian defence industry at a grassroots level also calls for efficiency in employment. Achieving the right balance of contingent and permanent employment will be a crucial component to this, and well as moves looking to attract multinationals to open Australian subsidiaries. Companies like SAAB Australia maintain strong ties to the nation, invest heavily in crucial R&D and technology areas, and employ hundreds of Australians.

A recent ASPI piece, titled ‘Australia needs to get smarter about building its defence industry workforce’, questions whether defence industry employment efficiency is being achieved. This question is particularly important, given the labour shortages the country suffers in defence and defence-adjacent trades.

The author, defence industry specialist Rob Kremer, writes in The Strategist that “the Australian worker is relatively immobile and is unlikely to move permanently between states for employment”. On the back of controversy surrounding possible relocation of full-cycle docking work from South Australia to Western Australia, this point seems particularly germane.

Challenges faced

One of the move’s most vocal opponents, Centre Alliance senator Rex Patrick (SA), obtained an interim ASC report suggesting that almost half the South Australian workforce would be made redundant. The document states, in no uncertain terms, that “the greatest risk to the enterprise in considering the potential transition … to WA is the loss of skill, knowledge and capability that ensures the [Collins Class submarines] are safe and capable of performing the operational requirements”.

Though this has been a hot-button debate topic, with WA Premier Mark McGowan making convincing arguments in support of the move. Kremer’s key point about worker mobility seems to be missed by Minister for Defence Industry Melissa Price. In a radio interview with ABC Adelaide’s David Bevan, she said that Holden technical staff soon to face redundancy would be a good fit for the SA submarine program.

When quizzed on whether these employees would have to be open to relocating to WA alongside a potential shift of the submarine maintenance work, Minister Price seemed to assume that these workers are highly transient. “We have got 15,000 jobs that we are going to create with our ambitious shipbuilding program. We’ve currently got 4,000. And where we get those people from, frankly, I don’t care,” she said.

“There’s capability with those people who are about to be retrenched. People will come from all parts of Australia and, of course, I’m not just interested in the subs jobs. I’m also interested in people working on the frigate program with BAE and, of course, the LAND 400 program, currently Rheinmetall based out of Brisbane, but you know there’s jobs and there’s businesses right across the country who are actually sharing in the defence industry space.”

Though calls for clarity on the SA submarine programs have been par for the course in recent months, Minister Price’s comments show a short-sighted appreciation of concerns Holden staff might face in applying for these jobs.

Other shortfalls Australia faces in maximising the defence industry employment market are linked to eligibility. As Kremer duly notes, obtaining visas or security clearances for non-citizens can be a particularly frustrating experience. Certain industries such as software engineering tend to be lacking in pre-cleared employees, and “it frustrates everyone when an experienced engineer from a Five Eyes nation ends up working in the rail sector because they’re ineligible for a security clearance and therefore can’t get work in defence”.

Though DFAT has been working on new visas to facilitate migration for Commonwealth non-citizens seeking to work directly in the ADF, defence-adjacent industries have been left in the lurch. Some have questioned whether a similar approach is warranted for the defence industry; although it is unclear how this would be defined.

Your thoughts

Arguments about gender diversity in defence industry also have their place in this discussion. According to some analysts, less than 20 per cent of defence industry employees, and less than one in seven defence industry managers, are women. Though the ADF has led several high-profile pushes for gender inclusion in historically male-dominated areas such as STEM and cyber, the “workforce behind the Australian Defence Force” is still obviously lacking in this area.

The government of South Australia – the self-titled “Defence State” – provide a clear overview of other avenues that could be drawn on to maximise involvement in the years to come. In the state’s Defence Industry Workforce and Skills Strategy (2018-2022), a number of other ideas are outlined. The document suggests establishing (and even subsidising) specific VET pathways for South Australian students, equipping them with the technical skills needed to transition smoothly into a defence industry career from senior school. Another proposal included supporting ex-service personnel to find employment in the defence industry through the Defence Teaming Centre (DTC). (Source: Defence Connect)

12 Mar 20. Maritime Advanced Force is key to ADF amphibious operations. A Maritime Advanced Force task unit has successfully demonstrated the Royal Australian Navy’s ability to open and maintain sea lanes for amphibious operations during Fleet Certification Period 2020 (FCP20).

The task unit, comprising of Australian Clearance Diving Team One (AUSCDT ONE) and minehunters Huon and Diamantina, worked together to provide a persistent forward presence by undertaking mine clearance operations in Tasmanian waters to safely clear a route for an amphibious landing.

Commanding Officer of HMAS Huon and Task Unit Commander, Lieutenant Commander Robert Short, said unit elements each took on different roles to create a positive combined effect.

“HMAS Huon and Diamantina predominately worked in waters greater than 12 metres and used their two mine disposable vehicles on-board to clear mines ahead of the force. Clearance Diving Team One worked in depths less than 12 metres and cleared the beach access,” LCDR Short explained.

During the exercise, AUSCDT ONE’s beach clearance was focused on anti-invasion mines, which are a very real threat to amphibious forces and a cost-effective and easy way for adversaries to deny access to land and sea.

AUSCDT ONE Expeditionary Reconnaissance and Clearance Officer, Lieutenant Douglas Allen, explained the importance of the Clearance Diver Teams in helping support amphibious warfare operations, while protecting larger fleet assets.

“Anti-invasion mines are smaller and targeted towards landing craft and amphibious vehicles. Their capabilities range from basic contact to magnetic, acoustic, seismic pressure and any sensors that are able to fit into the package,” LEUT Allen said.

To ‘link’ the two operational areas, a new mine countermeasure capability was tested with Navy Innovations Team working with Defence Science and Technology Group to integrate automated underwater vehicles (AUVs) into the operation.

LCDR Short added, “The AUVs are a step change for the Australian Navy in that we can search, locate, identify and potentially prosecute mines with our people outside the mine field.

“The more distance we can put between a potential explosion and our people, the safer and potentially more accurate it will be as we integrate autonomous activities and human processing power.”

LCDR Short said FCP20 has been a positive exercise for the task unit who took the opportunity to work out better engagement processes with the ever-adapting Maritime Task Group.

“Operating with the Maritime Task Group has been very beneficial in ironing out our reporting requirements and making sure we have a clear message when the beach is ready for the Task Group to conduct amphibious operations,” he said.

Exercises like FCP20 are a critical component of delivering Chief of Navy’s Plan Pelorus 2022, as outlined at Pacific 2019 in Sydney.

A key component of Plan Pelorus 2022 is the renewed focus on Australia’s immediate region, the Indo-Pacific:

“We live in an increasingly complex geo-political environment, within a dynamic Indo-Pacific region. The maritime domain is central to the security and prosperity of our nation. As resources become increasingly scarce, and the competition greater, all elements of national power must work together to achieve the desired outcomes for our nation, and those of our friends. Fuelled by technological advances and availability of information, the future is increasingly unpredictable,” the planning statement said.

For Chief of Navy and the government as a whole, Navy operating as a critical ‘sensor-shooter’ combination within the broader ‘joint force’ will serve as a major force multiplier for Navy and as the guiding development principles for the introduction of Plan Pelorus 2022.

This renewed focus is broken down into seven key focal points, each with an interlocking and overlapping tactical and strategic impact for the development of the future Navy, its operating capacity and strategic capability into the middle of the 21st century.

Plan Pelorus 2022 reflects a significant undertaking when each element of the statement is defined:

Workforce: We will be fully crewed at sea and staffed ashore, able to train for future demand, and prepared for continued growth;
Lethal: We will be able to deny, deter and defeat our adversaries in the face of evolving threats and challenges;
Integrated: We are integrated with the joint force and operate effectively with our allies and like-minded partners;

Battleworthy: We will provide sea, air and cyber worthy platforms to the Chief of Joint Operations;

Sustained: Our resources are optimised to enable conduct of all our activities and our future commitments;
Persistent: We will be able to maintain a long-term presence away from our home ports; and
Near region: Engaged across the Indo-Pacific; we meet all domestic requirements and work closely with our friends and partners in the near region.

Involving more than 2,000 military personnel, the sea phase of FCP20 was held in the Bass Strait until 6 March, with participating ships also visiting ports in Victoria and Tasmania. (Source: Defence Connect)

11 Mar 20. Iraq – Defer all flights to & over country for 72-96 hours due to rocket attack which killed US personnel. On 11 March, a rocket attack involving at least 15 projectiles conducted by suspected Iranian-backed Iraqi Popular Mobilisation Unit (PMU) militia forces targeted Al Taji Army Airfield; where US & UK military advisers are present, located approximately 20 miles (32km) north of the Iraqi capital Baghdad. One US solider, one US civilian contractor and a UK armed forces member were killed due to the attack. The US military has reportedly initiated a series of limited airstrikes against PMU targets along the Iraq-Syria border and additional strikes may follow in the next 72-96 hours. Credible reporting since October 2019 indicates that Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force (IRGC-QF) has provided specific PMU militias with rockets and sophisticated launch platforms for use in attacks targeting bases in Iraq where US military advisers are present. PMU militias have conducted approximately 30 rocket attacks on bases in Iraq where US military advisers are present since October 2019, to include indirect fire events at Baghdad International Airport (ORBI/BGW) on 8 & 11 December 2019. In response to the 27 December 2019 rocket attack which killed a US civilian contractor, the US conducted a series of airstrikes against PMU sites along the Iraq-Syria border on 29 December 2019. In addition, the US conducted airstrikes in Iraq on 2 January at Baghdad International Airport which killed the leader of the Iranian-backed Iraqi PMU Kataib Hezbollah militia along with Iran’s IRGC-QF commander. In response, Iran launched 16 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) targeting US military sites in Iraq on 7-8 January. EASA along with the US, UK, French and German civil aviation authorities each issued stringent guidance to operators in the past two months regarding the persistent threat to flight operations within Iraq at altitudes primarily below FL320 due to the enduring conflict zone environment.

Analysis

Operators should remain prepared for at least a temporary loss of access to FIR Baghdad (ORBB) and potentially FIR Tehran (OIIX) should tensions continue to escalate between the US & Iranian-backed Iraqi PMU militia forces as well as Iran. It remains a credible, likely scenario in the weeks ahead that PMU militias will launch additional kinetic attacks against US interests in Iraq and/or eastern Syria. Direct conflict with Iran remains a less likely but credible scenario in the near-term. However, the US military stated on 10 March that it was “in the process of bringing air defense systems, ballistic missile defense systems, into Iraq in particular, to protect ourselves against another potential Iranian attack.” Credible reporting from 2018-2019 indicates Iran has delivered SRBMs to several Iranian-backed Iraqi PMU militias. Iraqi PMU militia possession of military-grade drones provided by Iran has been documented since at least 2014. On 10 March, the US military stated that Iranian-backed Iraqi PMU militia forces had “conducted scores of unmanned aerial system reconnaissance (drone) flights near US and Iraqi security force bases” since May 2019. If PMU militias were to conduct high impact attacks via SRBMs and/or drones, military facilities, air bases and/or airports across Iraq (or eastern Syria) where US military advisers are present are assessed to be targets of significance under this scenario. We assess that PMU militias are in possession of man-portable air-defence systems (MANPADS) capable at altitudes below FL260. In addition, the US FAA stated the following on 27 February: “Iran has a history of proliferating advanced weapons capabilities, including advanced anti-aircraft weapons, to its proxy groups” and could provide Iranian-backed Iraqi PMU militias with “additional anti-aircraft capabilities, which could pose a risk to US civil aviation operations at altitudes below FL320.” Due to spike in tensions between the US & Iranian-backed Iraqi PMU militia forces as well as Iran, we now assess Iraq to be an EXTREME risk airspace environment at all altitudes.

Risk area recommendation: Defer all flights subject to an operation specific risk assessment

Advice

Military Air Activity: Increased military air operations have the potential to cause airspace congestion and impact the safety of civil aviation flights. Any significant increase in the amount of air operations over the country may impact the availability of airports along with access to the airspace. Aviation operators should monitor airport/airspace-specific airspace-specific notices, bulletins, circulars, advisories, prohibitions and restrictions prior to departure to avoid flight schedule disruption.

11 Mar 20. From ‘war on terror’ to ‘great power competition’: A role change for special ops? The outward strategy of the US and it allies is shifting away from the ‘war on terror’ towards ‘great power competition’ between global powers like China and Russia. What does this mean for the role of US and allied special operations forces?

From the beginning of the war on terror, special operations forces (SOF) have been the cornerstone of counter terrorism efforts around the world with high profile missions including Task Force 145’s successful tracking of the infamous leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq Abu Musab al Zarqawi in 2006 or the renowned SEAL raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound in 2011, and more recently the killing of ISIS caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in 2019. These missions dramatically display SOF’s centrality in the US counter terrorism machine.

In nearly 20 years of constant deployment throughout the world, the SOF of the US military, in close partnership with the intelligence community, have developed into a highly efficient and effective counter terrorism force with globe-spanning reach.

In the eyes of the public only the image of a drone taking out a key al-Qaeda connection in places such as Yemen can outdo these teams of operators as the emblematic instrument of the war on terror. Indeed, the use of these covert masters of special operations has paradoxically become routine and expected.

History of special ops

Modern special forces as they exist were created during World War II, however military establishments considered them misfits of only peripheral utility. SOF units became another competitor within the military’s inter- and intra-service rivalries over missions and resources.

The US military’s general view was that SOF should serve as an auxiliary component, such as conducting deep reconnaissance, in support of the main conventional effort in the planned wars of Europe or north-east Asia. However, the special operations community, often over the fierce objections of traditional military leadership, benefited from key political patronage and protection to grow and expand within the military establishment.

The independence of SOF only grew throughout the Cold War, in particular the US Army Special Forces (Green Berets) was tasked with countering the Soviet-supported guerrilla movements that sprang up across Africa, Asia and Latin America through unconventional warfare.

The 9/11 attacks brought on yet more focus on SOF’s. The “war on terror” meant that for the first time in modern American history, the greatest threat to national security was not a nation-state but a network of groups and individuals within a larger global movement.

The unique security challenges of terrorism are ideally suited to the strengths of special operations forces. JSOC, as the parent of the United States’ premier counter terrorism units that also already enjoyed an established cooperative relationship with the intelligence community, logically took a leading role in this new war.

SOF’s in the new millenium

In their paper, published by The Washington Quarterly titled, ‘The New American Way of War: Special Operations Forces in the War on Terrorism’, Daniel Byman and Ian Merritt outline the state of special forces operations during the war on terror.

“Although less dramatic than the killings or arrests of high-value terrorists, the liaison and training skills that SOF honed in the anti-communist counterinsurgency era became invaluable again against jihadist-linked insurgencies around the Muslim world. With the exception of the major American war efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, SOF were (and still are) often in a supporting role working ‘by, with, and through’ partner nation forces — be they national militaries or local militias — that do much of the heavy lifting in counter terrorism and counterinsurgency operations,” Byman and Merritt state.

“In Africa alone, the US SOF presence has grown almost exponentially since 2006, to a current [2018] presence of 1,700 personnel operating in 20 countries in nearly 100 different training, advising, and assistance missions.2 In 2016, as part of the global campaign against al-Qaida, the Islamic State, and their many affiliates and offshoots, American operators were present on every continent except Antarctica, primarily in small training and liaison roles to support partner nation capacities in their respective fights against jihadist-inspired terrorism and insurgency.”

SOF into the 2020s shift to the great power competition.

In the opening paragraphs of the 2018 National Defense Strategy lies a statement signalling a great shift is to occur in the world of special operations. It states: “Inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in US National security.”

Through this document the Trump administration suggested a strategic re-emphasis with far-reaching consequences for the missions and activities of the nations SOF.

Since 9/11, America has more than doubled the size of its SOF and tripled its budget. With this shift occurring it may require intricate details and guidance about changes, cuts, priorities as well as mission structures and overall strategies for SOF to remain relevant as security concerns and doctrine shift towards new goals.

Changes may already be changing as President Donald Trump is seemingly keen to exit “never ending wars” in the Middle East and reduce the American footprint in Africa as forces there continue to fight the global jihadist movement on the ground in places like Yemen, Somalia and the Sahel; military operations that came to public light after the death of four American special operations soldiers in Niger. Since then, President Trump has been toying with the idea of reducing the number of forces in Africa to free them up for use in the new objectives of power competition. This has not been without criticism, for example this month Jim Inhope, a Republican senator, wrote for The Washington Post outlining the importance of continued operations in the African continent for counter terrorism as well as highlighting its role in the power struggle with China and Russia.

“Americans can’t afford for them to lose [American trained local forces combating terrorist groups]. Terrorists hate freedom everywhere, but they hate the United States the most. If they’re allowed to operate in failed states or ungoverned territory, they’ll be planning, training and launching terrorist attacks against our allies — and eventually us,” said Inhope.

“The need to be involved in Africa is about more than just countering the terrorist threat. If we don’t maintain — or, frankly, even expand — our commitment there, we will cede influence and access across the continent to Russia and China. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping see what I see: the strategic importance of Africa. But as the United States is considering pulling back, Russia and China are surging in their investment.”

This example of contention or disagreement signals the difficulty of knowing the balance needed to maintain current operation while shifting to new goals, or if this is even possible at the same time, and is highlighted in growing difficulty of local defence forces in combating a growing Jihadist movement in north and west Africa led by al-Qaeda and Islamic State affiliate groups, such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic Maghreb, Ansar Dine, Boko Haram and Al Shabaab.

Alice Friend and Shannon Culbertson, writing for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, provide a number of possible scenarios that could occur with this shift in doctrine:

Business as usual – Without explicit changes in missions, deployments or force structure, special operations may be inclined to continue with what has been the status quo for 20 years. The forces have spent a vast majority of their years focused almost exclusively on terrorism and insurgency, continuation would be comfortable. It may also be very agreeable to policy makers who still fear the threat of terrorism and wish for a group such as SOF to continue to focus on counter-terrorism despite the shift of conventional forces elsewhere.
Home alone – With a lack of clarity about its role in the new strategic landscape SOF may be able to forge its own way forward distinct from the shift of conventional forces. This entrepreneurship may be expressed through minor changes such as internal recalibration of resources and activities, however this may lead to increased disconnect between civilian leadership and SOF leading to increased friction. When left on their own there is no doubt SOF elements can be engines of innovation, but without guidance of frame work this could possibly drive them in the wrong direction alienating them from civilian leadership and more conventional military planning.
The art of the possible – SOF has the capability to play a major role in strategic competition. For example, in robust nuclear deterrence relationships force on force confrontations are highly unlikely, leading to a push into the grey zone where irregular warfare takes pre-eminence and could be highly valuable. With the use of economic power and the use of private military companies in areas like Ukraine, the strategic power competition is already highly irregular as it stands.

If greater conflict was to occur, SOF could play a key role, for example by limited demonstrations of force to take out targets previously thought to be beyond reach such Qassem Soleimani, or in war to use its capabilities to capture key targets such as airfields, conduct sabotage, complete reconnaissance, and by targeting enemy leadership.

To support such a shift to a campaign of competition would require invention of new mission areas, a reprioritisation of current funding and forces, as well as a high level of innovation to find its capabilities within the new strategy. This would be an extremely lengthy and difficult task.

Supply side of SOF – For the first time in almost 20 years, SOF will be faced with flat rather than growing resources, increase in one area may need to be met with cuts in another. For example, cuts may need to occur in African and Middle Eastern operations to enable resources to be stretched for new objectives. This would at the least lead to review of current operations to fit into the new strategic nexus. However, current operations may be reshaped or re-marketed to support new goals, for example a continued presence in Africa, Iraq or Afghanistan could be argued is within the interest of the great power competition by stabilising the region and helping to combat influence from China and Russia.

What these examples demonstrate is that there is not yet any clear guidance in the way that SOF are to be deployed as greater strategy changes, and it is not until guidance in the way of concrete new policy that the role of SOF and how it may transition can be determined. (Source: Defence Connect)

10 Mar 20. International arms transfers up in last five years: SIPRI. International arms transfers in the five years 2015 to 2019 increased by 5.5% compared with 2010 to 2014, with the US, Russia, France, Germany and China leading arms exports, according to research from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

The data from SIPRI also shows that the flow of arms into the Middle East has increased in the last five years, with Saudi Arabia being the biggest importer of weapons in the region.

The US has seen its arms exports grow by over a fifth in the past five years, making the US responsible for around 36% of global arms exports. From 2015 to 2019, US arms exports were 76% higher than the next closer exporter, Russia, with the US shipping weapons to 96 countries across the globe.

SIPRI senior researcher Pieter D. Wezeman said: “Half of US arms exports in the past five years went to the Middle East, and half of those went to Saudi Arabia, at the same time, demand for the USA’s advanced military aircraft increased, particularly in Europe, Australia, Japan and Taiwan.”

In the past year alone the US has signed deals to export the Lockheed Martin F-35 to several countries and signed agreements with Taiwan to bolster the countries land and aerial forces.

In the same period, France saw its exports reach a high unseen since 1990, accounting for 7.9% of global arms exports, in part due to interest in French military equipment from Egypt, Qatar and India. All three countries operate the Rafale fighter built by the French defence contractor Dassault.

SIPRI researcher Diego Lopes Da Silva said that interest in French equipment from Egypt, Qatar and India had bolstered the countries defence output.

Top five arms exporting countries:

The US, 36% share of total arms exports.
Russia, 21% share of total arms exports.
France, 7.9% of total arms exports.
Germany, 5.8% of total arms exports.
China, 5.5% of total arms exports.

Despite some high-profile arms sales and the export success of the S-400 missile system, Russia’s overall defence exports dropped during the 2015-19 period by 18% when compared to the five years prior.

SIPRI researcher Alexandra Kuimova said: “Russia has lost traction in India—the main long-term recipient of Russian major arms—which has led to a sharp reduction in arms exports. This decrease was not offset by the increase in Russian arms exports to Egypt and Iraq in 2015 to 209.”

Russia’s main clients for defence equipment during this time were India, China and Algeria. Overall, however, despite the decrease in exports Russia still accounted for 21% of the world’s arms exports. In total, Russia delivered arms to 47 countries.

Arms exports to the Middle East increased by 61% from between 2010 to 2014 and 2015 to 2019. These sales made up 35% of total arms imports in the past five years. Saudi Arabia imported more arms than any other country during the 2015 2019 period. Imports into Saudi Arabia increased by 130% when compared with the prior five year period.

Top five arms importing countries:

Saudi Arabia, 12% of total arms imports.
India, 9.2% of total arms imports.
Egypt, 5.8% of total arms imports.
Australia, 4.9% of total arms imports.
China, 4.3% of total arms imports.

Saudi Arabia imported the majority of its arms from the US, UK and France despite concerns over the ongoing war in Yemen, where Saudi Arabia-led coalition is supporting the forces of Yemen’s Cabinet, SIPRI noted.

Following Saudi Arabia, SIPRI found that the second-biggest arms importer was India, significantly ahead of its neighbour Pakistan, the eleventh biggest importer.

SIPRI senior researcher Siemon T. Wezeman said: “As in previous years, in 2019 India and Pakistan—which are nuclear-armed states—attacked each other using an array of imported major arms. Many of the world’s largest arms exporters have supplied these two states for decades, often exporting arms to both sides.”

In the Middle East, the UAE also saw significant imports of arms with two-thirds of imports coming from the US. SIPRI noted that the UAE also has ongoing import deals with Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Russia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, and the UK as well as the US.

Turkey has since 1995 to 1999 seen a steady decrease in arms imports, ranking as the 15th biggest importer in 2015-2019 despite ongoing conflicts with Kurdish forces and increasing presence as a force in the Syrian Civil War. SIPRI found that imports decreased by 48% in the years 2015 to 2019 when compared with 2010 to 2014.

According to SIPRI, some factors can be attributed to this decline, with delays to the delivery of new submarines from Germany and a shift to sovereign procurement that has seen more Turkish military equipment made inside the country. Last year, Ankara was blocked from purchasing 100 F-35s from Lockheed Martin as punishment by the US for acquiring the Russian S-400 air defence system. The sale of the F-35 would have significantly increased Turkish Arms imports over the next five years. (Source: army-technology.com)

09 Mar 20. North Korea – Sea of Japan: North Korea launches suspected short-range ballistic missiles without NOTAMs. On 9 March, North Korea conducted approximately four suspected short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) launches from a site in South Hamgyong Province with splashdown in the Sea of Japan, the second such tests in the past week. North Korea previously conducted live-fire artillery exercises on its east coast on 28 February. Since May 2019, North Korea has conducted a combined total of 29 SRBM and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) test launches into the Sea of Japan. There are no indications that North Korea provided advanced warning of the SRBM and SLBM launches noted above to aviation governing bodies and no NOTAMs were issued regarding such activity for FIR Pyongyang (ZKKP). In late September 2018, the US FAA extended its NOTAM and SFAR for North Korean airspace through 18 September 2020 (KICZ A0018/18). The UK, French and German civil aviation authorities also have active advisories in place for North Korean airspace due to the enduring potential for unannounced missile or rocket launches to occur within FIR Pyongyang (ZKKP) with little to no notice.

Analysis

The apparent SRBM and SLBM tests by North Korea since May 2019 mark the first confirmed ballistic missile launches by the country since 29 November 2017 when an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) was fired from an area near Pyongyang with splashdown in the Sea of Japan. Our analysis has now documented at least 50 unannounced ballistic missile launches conducted by North Korea since the start of 2017. We assess there remains increased likelihood of additional ballistic missile launches through mid-2020 into the Sea of Japan by North Korea, without NOTAMs issued for FIR Pyongyang (ZKKP). We continue to assess North Korea to be a HIGH risk airspace environment at all altitudes. The airspace situation is assessed to remain in such a state until a comprehensive agreement between North and South Korea along with the US is reached. Such an agreement, coupled with follow-through on commitments of providing advance notice of activity hazardous to aviation, would likely lead to the complete easing of restrictions and advisories in effect for overflight of North Korean airspace currently enacted by leading civil aviation governing bodies.

Advice

Aviation Safety: Do not act based on unverified information; however, operators should be flexible in their itineraries and prepared to adjust them due to an increased potential for heightened aviation safety and/or security measures for the airspace and/or airports in the near term resulting from the situation. Aviation safety incidents have the potential to cause follow-on disruption to airport security operations. Review internal and external mechanisms for aviation safety reporting. Any revisions to processes should account for air and ground safety occurrence provisions as part of a wider aviation risk management strategy to protect aircraft, passengers and crew. In addition, ensure emergency response and communications plans are up to date to enhance continuity during times of crisis. (Source: Osprey)

————————————————————————-

Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Home land Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need. A CNIM Group Company

————————————————————————-

NEWS IN BRIEF – REST OF THE WORLD

Congress Avoids Government Shutdown

UK Forces Deployed to Kosovo

RAF Fighter Jets Deploy To Poland