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13 Nov 19. Germany Reduces Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia. Germany drastically cut arms sales to Saudi Arabia in the first six months of 2019 — but did not cut them completely. The government had pledged no more sales after the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in 2018.
The German government approved two arms sales to Saudi Arabia in the first six months of the year, worth a total of €831,003 ($915,817), according to Economy Ministry figures released on Wednesday. Details of what was sold were not included in the report.
In the equivalent period of 2018, Saudi Arabia was Germany’s third biggest customer, after Algeria and the United States, mainly buying naval boats. Chancellor Angela Merkel’s administration approved five arms sales to the Middle Eastern kingdom from January to June 2018, worth a total of €161,874,673.
Saudi Arabia has continually been accused of human rights abuses, and the murder of Khashoggi in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul prompted a public outcry that led Germany to pledge to end arms exports to the kingdom.
The government had already pledged to end arms exports to “countries directly involved in the Yemen War” in its coalition contract made in early 2018, though some sales have continued since.
That pledge has since softened, as old arms deals are still being honored, and exports of arms goods that wouldn’t directly be used in the conflict are still being allowed. Saudi Arabia is also still buying weapons that are partially German-made, such as the Eurofighter plane and the MBDA ground-to-air missile systems that are built by a consortium of European companies.
New record in overall deals
This year’s top customer has so far been Hungary, which bought over €1.7bn worth of tanks and tank parts, and Egypt, which has bought over €800m worth of mainly rocket systems. Meanwhile, data revealed earlier by the Economy Ministry in response to a Left party information request showed that in the first 10 months of 2019, Germany authorized €7.4bn in arms exports, closing in on a new annual record. The current record is from 2015, when the government authorized €7.9n in arms exports, and it is possible that figure will be overshot before the end of the year.
In a statement accompanying its annual report, the Economy Ministry insisted that the total value of arms exports was not an accurate measure, since single large contracts (for example for submarines and tanks) can lead to big year-on-year changes. “For this assessment, it is necessary to consider the individual approval decisions, with reference to each country, the kind of defense equipment, and the expected purpose of the goods,” the ministry said.
Saudi Arabia, UAE use German-made arms
But the government’s answers also showed that the it rarely blocks an arms deal: In the January-to-October period of both 2018 and 2019, less than one percent of applications from German arms firms were denied: a total of 88 in 2018 and 56 in 2019, out of over 11,000 in 2018 and 9,900 in 2019.
“Nearly every request is a winner,” said Dagdelen in a statement. “If you apply for a weapons export contract, it will be approved. That’s not authorization policy, that’s rubber-stamp policy.”
The figures were revealed in response to an inquiry filed with the ministry by Left party politician Sevim Dagdelen. The report shows that €2.3bn in weapons of war and a further €5.1bn in arms-related materials were approved before October 31 this year. By mid-2019, Germany had already authorized €5.3bn in arms exports, surpassing the total annual figures for 2018 of €4.8bn. The figures indicate arms export contracts that have been approved for the future and not actual exports.
Economy Minister Peter Altmaier defended the difference by pointing to the political stalemate that followed elections in 2017, saying it caused a delay in decision-making and a consequent jump in export figures for 2019 that “only seems surprising.” (Source: defense-aerospace.com/Deutsche Welle German Radio)
14 Nov 19. Israelis Create Foreign Investment Overseer; China Targeted. The People’s Republic of China has taken an active interest in collaboration with Israel on innovation and technology. In 2018, bilateral trade between the countries hit a record of $15.3bn, up from just $51.5m in 1992 and $13.1bn in 2017. American pressure on Israel helped the government here decide to limit the involvement of Chinese companies in building infrastructure programs in Israel and other investments in defense-related programs.
Breaking Defense exposed the big concern among Israeli defense experts last year about the growing Chinese involvement in sensitive projects like the new Haifa port near the Israeli navy’s main base. The Chinese company will build it and manage it for 25 years.
Following three years of deliberations and intense pressure from the US over growing Chinese investments in Israeli companies, particularly in technology firms, Israel’s security cabinet decided on October 30 to set up a new mechanism to monitor foreign investments. It appears to be similar to the American Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS).
This happens even as China is Israel’s second-largest trading partner and a significant foreign investor. The People’s Republic of China has also taken an active interest in collaboration with Israel on innovation and technology, which inspired the establishment of a “Comprehensive Innovation Partnership” between the two countries in March 2017. In 2018, bilateral trade between the countries hit a record of $15.3bn, up from just $51.5m in 1992 and $13.1bn in 2017.
The Chinese investments in vital and often sensitive Israeli infrastructure projects, including the Carmel Tunnel project in Haifa, the Tel Aviv light rail’s Red Line, and the ports in Ashdod and Haifa, as well as the sale of the food giant Tnuva to a Chinese firm.
Israeli sources told Breaking Defense that it is already clear that the involvement of Chinese companies in some “sensitive” programs will be denied.
The Army seeks a next-generation armed scout helicopter with increased speed, range, survivability and even autonomy – not just a conventional helicopter.
The initiative to set up a new advisory panel on foreign investments in Israel—defined as investments, mergers, and acquisitions—has been in the works for over a year, following a bill pushed by MK Omer Barlev in July 2018 to create a formal and organized process for vetting foreign investment. (An MK is a Member of the Knesset, equivalent to a Member of Parliament.) Israel joins many countries in the world, including the US, Canada, Britain, Germany, and Australia, that boast a mechanism to monitor foreign investment in their countries for national security reasons.
Although the Israeli Cabinet decision is framed as “supervision over foreign investment” in general, the real goal is to create a mechanism for screening investments by Chinese firms and investment funds in Israeli strategic assets. The companies subject to vetting would be in businesses designated as critical to the economy or national security, including firms involved in infrastructure or with access to Israelis’ data, such as telecommunications companies, financial institutions, and arms manufacturers.
According to the Cabinet decision, members of multiple government agencies will participate in the committee. It will include members of the National Security Council, the Treasury and Defense ministries, as well as observers from Foreign Affairs and Economy ministries, as well as the National Economic Council.
A paper by Mordechai Chaziza of the Begin–Sadat institute here, an expert on Chinese issues, reveals that regulators will consult with the committee voluntarily. Business transactions that do not require government approval will not be brought before it. Most importantly, the committee will have no authority over the tech sector, which was a major sticking point while the committee was being discussed: “The committee’s function is to help regulators incorporate national security considerations into the process of approving foreign investments in the finance, communications, infrastructure, transportation, and energy sectors”.
The committee will be created within 45 days, and regulators will be able to contact the committee starting on January 1 next year. The cabinet will convene in six months to review the body’s work and make adjustments if necessary. (Source: glstrade.com/Breaking Defense.com)
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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Home land Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need. A CNIM Group Company
13 Nov 19. India looks east to strengthen bilateral cooperation. Bilateral cooperation between India and Thailand received a new fillip when Prime Minister Narendra Modi held talks in Bangkok with his Thai counterpart Prayut Chan-o-cha on the sidelines of the ASEAN summit during a three-day visit commencing 3 November. Cooperation in defence and security figured high on the agenda.
A series of tweets from official accounts noted enhanced trade engagement while agreeing to explore further opportunities in the defence sector.
A strong historical and cultural connection underpins Indo-Thai relations. India’s ‘Look East’ policy commenced in 1992 with India becoming an ASEAN dialogue partner. This relationship has evolved and received strong impetus with Modi’s government transforming this into ‘Act East’.
A five-day trilateral naval exercise between India, Singapore and Thailand was held in the Andaman Sea in September. Furthermore, Indo-Thai coordinated patrols are a regular fixture in the two navies’ yearly calendar.
India has been identifying export customers for the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile developed through an Indo-Russian JV. Thailand has expressed interest in BrahMos during high-level exchanges, and technical discussions to take this initiative forward have already reportedly commenced.
The Royal Thai Navy operates Dornier 228 maritime reconnaissance aircraft that are still manufactured by HAL in India. Thailand could benefit from capabilities developed by HAL for servicing and upgrading these aircraft. Indian companies have also offered to maintain and upgrade Thailand’s coastal surveillance systems.
Also in the same neighbourhood, the Indian Navy (IN) has been actively supporting Vietnam’s efforts to raise its naval aviation wing since 2009. Vietnam is another potential BrahMos customer.
Additionally, Indian President Ram Nath Kovind visited the Philippines in October, where one agreement signed included the exchange of ‘white shipping’ information between the Philippine Coast Guard and IN.
Moving forward, cooperation between India and Southeast Asian countries is expected to gradually experience a gearshift from ‘Look East’ to ‘Act East’. (Source: Shephard)
13 Nov 19. Thai defence industry receives shot in the arm. The Thai armed forces are emphasising greater coordination with government agencies and commercial enterprises to support R&D for equipment that can be produced domestically and which will meet international standards. This approach will improve self- sustainability and job creation within the kingdom.
The newly formed ‘democratic’ government approved a defence budget for 2020 that has been raised to $7.8bn, which is equal to 1.3% of GDP. It has allocated $2.6bn for equipment procurement alone.
In this fiscal year, the Royal Thai Army is acquiring US equipment including 70 Stryker vehicles worth $123m, and eight AH-6i light attack helicopters with weapon systems worth $140m.
The Royal Thai Navy (RTN) signed a contract in September for Type 071E landing platform docks from China worth $203m, and the service has approved acquisition of a medium-range air defence missile system (supposedly the KS-1C from China) worth $66 m. Interestingly, the RTN also ordered AK-306 30mm automatic cannons for its warships, the first time it has ordered Russian weaponry.
A proud induction is a new 2,000t OPV built by the RTN Shipyard. Recently, the RTN selected Schiebel S-100 Camcopter UAS for both land- and sea-based operations.
This year the Royal Thai Air Force procured and deployed 17 U1 medium-sized UAVs produced in Thailand.
In the commercial sector, many privately owned companies have produced indigenous solutions such as First Win II 4×4 vehicles, new 4×4 ATV vehicles and tracked APCs from Chaiseri, products that will be shown at Defense & Security 2019.
Panus Assembly will unveil its AFV-420P 4×4 and R600 8×8 armoured vehicles in the same exhibition too.
Prime Minister and Defence Minister Gen Prayudt Chan-o-cha has put in place policies to promote and support all sectors involved from defence R&D to production, and pushing industry to be self- reliant. The procurement of new equipment is looking at in-house products as a first priority.
Furthermore, a royal decree allows defence industries to commercially produce items that are the result of JVs between the Defense Technology Institute and privately owned businesses. (Source: Shephard)
12 Nov 19. Korea’s 4.5-Generation Fighter KF-X Targets Southeast Asian Market. A joint fighter jet development project between South Korea and Indonesia, widely known as the KF-X or Korean Fighter eXperimental aircraft project, has a great potential in the Southeast Asian market with its low price.
The KF-X fighter jet is a 4.5-generation fighter jet whose “stealth” technologies fall behind those of fifth-generation fighters like the U.S.’ F-35s or F-22s. The KF-X, however, has a great price advantage with 65 percent of its parts localized.
The project is going smoothly, an official with the Korean Aerospace Industries said Tuesday, during a presentation of the project review for reporters visiting the company headquarters in Sacheon, South Gyeongsang Province. The South Korean government contracted the KAI in December 2015 to complete the development of KF-X by 2028.
If successfully developed, the KF-X would be a platform targeting the Southeast Asian markets, industry watchers say, as the operating expenses for a KF-X jet are around half of those of the U.S. F-35A.
The KF-X project is the biggest project since the foundation of the South Korean military with its total budget being about 8.8trn won ($7.56bn). The South Korean and Indonesian governments cover 60 percent and 20 percent of the budget, respectively, while South Korean defense companies make 20 percent of contribution.
The 14-year project that began in 2015 is divided into two phases, with the systems development for the basic flight performance and air-to-air combat capability to be completed by 2026, followed by additional armaments for air-to-surface combat capabilities by 2028.
With the critical design review for the KF-X conducted September this year, following the preliminary design review in June 2018, the first KF-X fighter jet prototype is set to be rolled out in the first half of 2021. The first test flight will be conducted a year later. After 2,100 test flights set to be completed by the first half of 2026, the KAI will produce six of the first KF-X fighter jets that year.
The South Korean government unveiled a full-sized mock-up of the KF-X during the International Aerospace and Defense Exhibition (ADEX), the country’s biennial defense exhibition held Oct. 15 to 20. (Source: defense-aerospace.com/Korea Times)
13 Nov 19. A $5bn bill and Japan tensions in focus as U.S. defence heads visit South Korea. A $5bn (£4bn) demand to meet the cost of hosting American troops, and tensions between Seoul and Tokyo that threaten to undercut regional cooperation are set to top the agenda when senior U.S. defence officials visit South Korea this week.
U.S. President Donald Trump’s insistence Seoul take on a greater share of the cost of American military presence as deterrence against North Korea has tested South Korea’s confidence in the security alliance with Washington.
Trump has floated the idea of pulling U.S. troops from the Korean peninsula, which remains in a technical state of war under a truce that suspended the 1950-53 Korean War.
A South Korean lawmaker said last week that U.S. officials demanded up to $5bn a year, more than five times what Seoul agreed to pay this year under a one-year deal, for stationing the 28,500 U.S. troops.
U.S. officials have not publicly confirmed the number, but Trump has previously said the U.S. military presence in and around South Korea was “$5bn worth of protection”.
Gen. Mark Milley, chairman of the U.S. Joints Chief of Staff, said the American public needed an explanation why “very rich and wealthy” South Korea and Japan cannot defend themselves and why U.S. soldiers were deployed there.
Milley, who was speaking to reporters en route to Tokyo on Sunday, arrives in Seoul on Wednesday for the annual Military Committee Meeting.
Secretary of Defence Mark Esper will visit from Thursday for the Security Consultative Meeting with South Korean Defence Minister Jeong Kyeong-doo.
‘UNACCEPTABLE, DISAPPOINTING’
Randall Schriver, assistant defence secretary and Esper’s top Asia policy advisor, said the secretary did not intend to negotiate burden sharing, a job for diplomats, but he would emphasise U.S. interests.
“They have to be willing to pick up a larger share of the burden, as the president has emphasised globally, not just related to South Korea,” Schriver told a small group of reporters ahead of the trip.
Trump has similarly accused allies including Japan, Germany and NATO of not shouldering their fair share of defence costs. Separate negotiations for new defence cost-sharing deals between the United States and all three are set to start next year.
South Korean lawmakers have criticised what they called “unacceptable, disappointing” U.S. demands.
Some progressive groups in South Korea have called for a fundamental shift in the 70-year alliance with the United States, including a withdrawal or drastic reduction of U.S. troops.
A survey by the government-affiliated Korea Institute for National Unification released last week showed 96% of South Koreans were against paying more for the U.S. military presence.
“U.S. demands would get more reasonable as negotiations progress, after raising alarm with extremely high numbers,” said Shin Beom-chul, a senior fellow at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies in Seoul.
“But there’s real pressure from Trump, and even if it goes down from $5bn to $2bn, it’s still a tremendous burden on the South Korean administration.”
INTELLIGENCE SHARING WITH JAPAN
Esper and Milley are also expected to step up pressure on South Korea to reverse its decision to end an intelligence-sharing agreement with Japan amid a spiralling diplomatic and trade feud.
The pact, called GSOMIA, or the General Security of Military Information Agreement, is set to expire next week after Seoul decided not to renew it following Tokyo’s imposition of export controls on South Korea.
Washington has criticised the move, seeing the deal as vital to three-way cooperation in fending off North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats.
A spokesman at South Korea’s foreign ministry reiterated Seoul is willing to reconsider the decision if Japan withdraws its trade regulations.
Milley said Seoul and Tokyo should “get past some of these friction points” as those only benefit North Korea and China. (Source: Reuters)
10 Nov 19. Australia’s F-35s: Lessons from A Problematic Purchase. In a startling statement reported this month, two recent Air Force chiefs assert Australia has made some grave force structure errors. It seems the RAAF needs a new bomber, as the new F-35 Joint Strike Fighter now entering service is inadequate for future strike operations. The chiefs’ intervention raises questions about how this could have happened and, given growing international tensions, how such expensive strategic missteps can be avoided.
Australia joined the US-led F-35 program in a rush in 2002. There was no tender process or formal evaluation. Nor could there be. The aircraft was still brochure-ware, with delivery schedule and cost unknown, albeit thought to be Australia’s most expensive defence equipment purchase.
The sudden decision surprised many, as the Howard Government’s 2000 Defence White Paper had set out a comprehensive decision-making process that investigated alternative force structure options, including single-role fighters, multi-role aircraft, long-range missiles, and unmanned aircraft. The rationale behind the unexpected rush to purchase F-35s was explained publicly by the then Air Force chief. Unfortunately, soon after the decision, the F-35 began suffering technical problems, cost growth, and long delays.
The first two F-35s finally arrived in Australia in late 2018, with the last nine planned for mid-2023. These nine are expected to be the Lot 15 Block 4 version, the fully developed standard broadly envisaged back in 2002. The rest, comprising six different interim-build standards, will then be progressively modernised to this definitive configuration.
The Lot 15 aircraft has significant hardware and software changes so the complete maintenance and support system, simulators and training centres will also need modernising. This will take time and additional money, but there is no choice. If not modernised, the earlier F-35s – almost all the RAAF’s brand-new fleet – will become hard to maintain or software update, and gradually operationally deficient.
The nine Lot 15 aircraft arrival will allow the RAAF to declare Final Operational Capability and start wrapping the acquisition project up. Over 20 years, the project has slipped 10 years.
This delay meant an interim aircraft, the Super Hornet, was necessary. Funding this meant the overall air-combat capability project had the largest cost overrun of any Australian defence acquisition in history, in absolute terms.
Yet making matters worse, the threat environment evolved.
In 2017, USAF reviewed its air combat programs and determined that, all things considered, the F-35 would be unable to penetrate defended airspace past 2030. The logic underpinning this formal report was later explained publicly by its lead author. The recent pronouncements by the retired RAAF chiefs are then unsurprising. They consider that the RAAF’s force structure is now passé, being unable to defend “our lines of communication or prevent the lodgment of a hostile power in the Indo-Pacific region.” (Source: defense-aerospace.com/Lowy Institute)
12 Nov 19. Confront Beijing in South China Sea: Top Defence and DFAT bureaucrat. Former head of the Defence and Foreign Affairs and Trade departments, Dennis Richardson, has set the cat among the pigeons, calling on Australia and the Royal Australian Navy in particular to take the fight to China in the South China Sea in defiance of Beijing and in support of the global ‘rules based order’.
The transformation of the Indo-Pacific provides the opportunity to develop a range of productive relationships with emerging great powers, enhancing Australia’s own economic, political and strategic capability.
This recognition has sparked a flurry of Australian engagement with major regional partners, including Japan, Malaysia and Indonesia – supported by an increased operational tempo for the Royal Australian Navy as it seeks to promote both a renewed and continuous Australian presence in the region.
Australia emerged from the Second World War as a middle power, essential to maintaining the post-war economic, political and strategic power paradigm established and led by the US.
This relationship, established as a result of the direct threat to Australia, replaced Australia’s strategic relationship of dependence on the British Empire and continues to serve as the basis of the nation’s strategic, economic and diplomatic policy direction and planning.
However, as a nation, Australia has often walked the line, balancing traditional middle power and minor power characteristics, which have served to exacerbate the partisan nature of the nation’s strategic and defence policy making.
In particular, Australia has historically been dependent upon the benevolence of the broader international community, at both an economic and strategic level. This is most evident in two specific arenas – the nation’s continued economic dependence on China and strategic dependence on the US.
The emergence of economic, political and military superpowers like China and India continue to develop as the powers at the core of Indo-Pacific Asia, flanked by traditional established powers like Japan and South Korea.
Additionally, Australia has also witnessed the development of the region’s periphery powers, including Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam and Thailand, each with competing priorities and objectives, combined with the rise of complex asymmetric challenges to national security serving to challenge the established geopolitical, economic and strategic security and prosperity of the region.
Linchpin of the Indo-Pacific: The South China Sea
The core focus for many established and emerging nations has been China’s pursuit of regional primacy, which has prompted the rising superpower to pursue the development of an integrated system of natural and man-made island fortresses.
These islands are designed with a single goal in mind: dominating and controlling foreign access to the South China Sea through which approximately US$5trn worth of maritime trade passes annually and serves as a potent anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) system as a buffer for expanding China’s designs for south-east Asia.
The growing deployment and respective capabilities of China’s armed forces, particularly the force projection capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), have prompted increased concern from established regional powers, including Japan, Korea and Australia.
Additionally, smaller regional nations with competing territorial claims and ancient fears of Chinese expansion, namely Vietnam, the Philippines and Indonesia, have all raised growing concerns about China’s militarisation and reclamation programs in the South China Sea.
Recognising the potential for confrontation and illegality of China’s land reclaimations in the SCS, the US announced its ‘pivot’ towards the Indo-Pacific under the former Obama administration in 2013 moving to reassure regional US allies like Australia, Japan and emerging allies like Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam that the pre-eminent global power was committed to the enduring freedom and stability of the region.
Despite these early reassurances and renewed investment in the strategic capabilities of the US military under the Trump administration – the global responsibilities of the US, particularly in the Middle East, and the ever present potential for conflict with Iran has once again drawn the attention of the US, providing an opportunity for China to enhance its military presence in the South China Sea.
Dr Malcolm Davis, senior analyst at ASPI, spoke to Defence Connect earlier in the year following revelations that China had been rapidly militarising Woody Island, Spratly Islands and Fiery Cross Reef in the SCS, explaining the impact, “China’s forward deployment of the J-10s to Woody Island will enable China to more broadly extend their control of the airspace over the South China Sea. Woody Island enables an expanded air control capacity over aircraft based at Hainan Island and could potential preclude a Chinese push toward the Spratly Islands, challenging Vietnam’s interests.”
Expanding Australia’s SCS presence
Enter former head of the Defence and Foreign Affairs and Trade departments, Dennis Richardson, who has called for Australia to conduct an increasing number of ‘freedom of navigation’ operations in the region, including directly confronting Beijing’s island fortresses within the 12 nautical mile boundary of the disputed islands.
Mr Richardson reportedly explained to Paul Malley of The Australian that the nation and Navy should “not be afraid to sail within 12 nautical miles of the man-made atolls that China has constructed in the South China Sea and which Beijing claims as territorial islands — a claim not recognised under international law”.
“These so-called freedom-of-navigation exercises could be conducted discretely and with little or no fanfare so as not to gratuitously antagonise China, an outcome Australian policy-makers have been eager to avoid, Mr Richardson says,” Malley expanded.
Nevertheless, Australia has moved to support enduring US-led freedom of navigation patrols throughout the region as part of Operation GATEWAY, which is Australia’s commitment to preserving regional security and stability in south-east Asia – with a specific focus on both the north Indian Ocean and South China Sea.
It is important to recognise that should the US be distracted by conflict in Iran, Australia could be required to play a bigger role in the region.
Australia has long looked to larger powers as the guarantors of its economic, political and strategic security. However, as the global dynamics evolve, the nation’s enduring stability and prosperity will be increasingly dependent upon the strength, resilience and integration of its key relationships.
This has been increasingly recognised by the Australian government and is forming the next stage of Australia’s evolving “middle power” diplomacy.
Australia’s renewed and expanded role in the Indo-Pacific and the South China Sea in particular and Richardson’s calls for greater Australian boldness was recently reinforced by by the University of Sydney-based US Strategic Studies Centre (USSC) in a paper titled Averting Crisis: American strategy, military spending and collective defence in the Indo-Pacific, which makes a series of powerful recommendations for Australia furthering the level of interoperability between Australian and allied militaries.
In particular, the USSC identifies the growing need for capability aggregation and collective deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, with both Australia and Japan playing critical roles in balancing any decline in the US and its capacity to unilaterally project power, influence and presence throughout the region.
“Prudent capability aggregation between the armed forces of Australia, Japan and the United States will be critical to addressing the shortfalls that America is likely to face in its military power over the coming years. The strategic purpose of such efforts should be to strengthen the collective capacity to deter prospective Chinese fait accompli aggression in strategically significant regional flashpoints, particularly along the First Island Chain and in the South China Sea,” the USSC paper identifies.
Despite these calls, the question becomes, what platforms and crew is the Royal Australian Navy going to pressure into increased operational tempo, dramatically impacting the service life, operational effectiveness of the vessels and crew to play a greater role in the South China Sea? (Source: Defence Connect)
11 Nov 19. Chairman Travels to Indo-Pacific With American Strategic Thinking. Army Gen. Mark A. Milley’s first overseas trip as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is to the Indo-Pacific region, re-emphasizing the importance of the region in American strategic thinking.
Milley will visit Japanese and South Korean leaders over the next week, discussing ways to improve bilateral and multilateral cooperation in Northeast Asia.
While aboard a U.S. military aircraft en route to the region yesterday, Milley said U.S. treaty allies Japan and South Korea — along with Australia and New Zealand — are key to American strategy in Asia. “The United States, South Korea and Japan are stronger when we are together and shoulder to shoulder,” the chairman said to reporters traveling with him.
But there have been disagreements between South Korea and Japan arising from Japan’s occupation of Korea from 1905 to 1945.
From a security standpoint, South Korean officials have announced they are withdrawing from an intelligence-sharing agreement the nation has with Japan that was signed in 2016. The pact — called the General Security of Military Information Agreement — is key for security and stability in the region, Milley said.
The only countries well served by a falling out between Japan and South Korea are North Korea and China, the chairman said. “These are friction points within the alliance that need to be resolved amicably between countries that have way more in common — common values, common outlook, common security needs,” Milley said. “We’ve got to get past some of these friction points in a way that is helpful to the alliance.”
All countries operate in their own interests and Japan and South Korea are no different, the general said. Japan and South Korea have common interests when it comes to national security. Both nations must work together to deter attacks, provocations and threats from North Korea and China. “They have common security problems to solve and that they will [be] stronger together rather than separate,” Milley said. “It is clearly in China’s interests and North Korea’s interests, to separate South Korea from Japan and the United States. It is in our interests to keep all three of us very closely aligned.”
Milley’s visit is a chance to take the temperature of the U.S. alliance with both nations, and an opportunity to tout the value of the alliances. He said the average American looking at the forward deployed U.S. troops in South Korea and Japan ask some fundamental questions: Why are they needed there? How much does it cost? These are very rich and wealthy countries, why can’t they defend themselves?
“These are main street USA questions,” the general said. “It is incumbent on us … to make sure we adequately explain how the U.S. military is a stabilizing force in Northeast Asia in preventing and deterring the outbreak of armed conflict.”
The international order in place since 1945 has been a true boon to the world: It has given 70 years of great power peace, Milley said.
“We’re in the seventh decade of great power peace,” Milley said. “There has been wars — the Korean War, the Vietnam War, to Gulf Wars, our current campaigns against terrorists — but they have been limited wars. There hasn’t been a great power war.”
If we can maintain overwhelming, unquestioned military power and economic strength, I think we will be able to sustain great power peace, he said. (Source: US DoD)
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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Home land Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need. A CNIM Group Company
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