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23 Aug 19. First Rafale jet to reach India in Sept, confirms French President. French President Emmanuel Macron on Thursday (local time) confirmed that the first Rafale aircraft will reach India by next month.
The remarks by the French President came after his bilateral meeting with Prime Minister Narendra Modi in Chantilly, a historical town located about 50 kilometres north of Paris.
In September 2016, India had signed a deal with the French government and Dassault Aviation to acquire 36 Rafale fighter jets, which will start arriving India from May next year, for over Euro 7.8 billion to arrest the fall of combat squadrons and meet urgent requirements on the eastern and western fronts.
Defence Minister Rajnath Singh and the Indian Air Force Chief Marshal BS Dhanoa will receive the first aircraft from the French authorities near the plane manufacturing plant in Bordeaux.
The officials said the Indian Rafale is far more advanced than the ones operating with the French Air Force and that is why the plane would continue to be used for training Indian pilots till May next year.
The Indian planes have been equipped with a lot of India specific enhancements, which have been fitted at a cost of around one billion euros.
During a joint interaction with the French President, Modi said, “We are happy that the first of the 36 Rafale fighter aircraft will be handed over to India next month.”Though small batches of Indian pilots have already trained on the French Air Force planes, the Indian Air Force would train 24 pilots in three different batches till next year May for flying the Indian Rafales.
The Indian Air Force will deploy one each squadron of the Rafale combat aircraft at its airbases in Ambala in Haryana and Hashimara in Bengal.
Defence industrial cooperation is one of the mainstays of the strategic partnership between India and France, said a statement issued after the joint interaction. The two sides expressed satisfaction over the progress made in the implementation of agreements signed, particularly the delivery of the first Rafale combat aircraft from this year.
“They reaffirmed their commitment to further strengthen cooperation in defence industry field and extended their support to existing and upcoming partnerships between the defence companies of the two countries in the spirit of “Make in India” and for the mutual benefit of both countries,” the statement said.
“Both sides noted with satisfaction that Indian MSMEs are increasingly becoming part of global supply chains of French Defence and Aerospace OEMs and reaffirmed to give further impetus to this trend. They welcomed the ongoing collaboration between aerospace and defence industrial associations of both countries, SIDM for India and GIFAS for France,” it added. ((Source: Google/ANI)
22 Aug 19. Russia, China seek U.N. Security Council meeting on U.S. missile developments. Russia and China have asked the United Nations Security Council to meet on Thursday over “statements by U.S. officials on their plans to develop and deploy medium-range missiles,” according to the request seen by Reuters.
Moscow and Beijing want to convene the 15-member council under the agenda item “threats to international peace and security” and have requested that U.N. disarmament affairs chief Izumi Nakamitsu brief the body.
The Pentagon said on Monday it had tested a conventionally configured cruise missile that hit its target after more than 500 km (310 miles) of flight, the first such test since the United States pulled out Cold War-era Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF).
U.S. Defense Secretary Mark Esper was asked in a Fox News Channel interview on Wednesday whether the test was aimed at sending a message to China, Russia or North Korea and indicated that the main concern was China.
“We want to make sure that we, as we need to, have the capability to deter Chinese bad behaviour by having our own capability to be able to strike at intermediate ranges,” he said.
Esper said on a visit to Australia this month he was in favour of placing ground-launched, intermediate-range missiles in Asia relatively soon.
Esper was also asked about a rocket test accident in Russia this month which U.S. officials believe was associated with the Kremlin’s hypersonic cruise missile program.
“Clearly they are trying to expand their strategic nuclear arsenal to deal with the United States,” he said, adding that all such new weapons would have to be included in any future strategic arms reduction treaty.
“Right now Russia has possibly nuclear-tipped … INF-range cruise missiles facing towards Europe, and that’s not a good thing,” he said.
Russian President Vladimir Putin said on Wednesday the United States was in a position to deploy a new land-based cruise missile in Romania and Poland, a scenario he considered a threat that Moscow would need to respond to.
The United States has said it has no imminent plans to deploy new land-based missiles in Europe.
This week’s U.S. test would have been banned under the INF, which prohibited land-based missiles with a range of between 310 and 3,400 miles, reducing the ability of the United States and Russia to launch a nuclear strike at short notice. China was not a party to the INF treaty and has a large arsenal of land-based intermediate-range missiles.
Washington formally withdrew from the landmark 1987 pact with Russia on Aug. 2 after determining that Moscow was violating the treaty, an accusation the Kremlin has denied.
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Geng Shuang said on Tuesday that the U.S. test showed the United States was stoking a new arms race and confrontation, which would have a serious negative impact on regional and global security. A North Korean spokesman said on Thursday the U.S. test and plans to deploy F-35 jets and offensive military equipment around the Korean peninsula were “dangerous” moves that would “trigger a new Cold War” in the region.
Asked whether he thought it was appropriate for Washington to continue to seek negotiations with Pyongyang after its repeated recent tests of short-range missiles, Esper said the biggest U.S. concern was about North Korea’s long-range missiles, tests of which it has frozen since 2017.
“I think you need to take a look at the bigger picture,” he said when asked if recent U.S. statements playing down the short-range tests amounted to giving North Korea permission to conduct them (Source: Reuters)
22 Aug 19. South Korea ends intel-sharing deal with Japan. South Korea will stop exchanging classified intelligence on North Korea with Japan amid a bitter trade dispute, Seoul said Thursday in a surprise announcement that is likely to set back U.S. efforts to bolster security cooperation with two of its most important allies in the Asian region.
South Korea’s decision to cancel the intelligence-sharing pact will also further aggravate its ties with Japan, which are already at their lowest point since the two countries established diplomatic ties in 1965. Japanese media said Tokyo lodged a protest with Seoul, and quoted unidentified Tokyo officials as calling the South Korean move “extremely regrettable” and “unbelievable.”
Many experts had predicted that South Korea would be unlikely to spike the 3-year-old intelligence-sharing deal for the sake of its relations with the United States. South Korea has been seeking U.S. help in resolving the trade dispute, and Seoul and Washington have also been working together to restart stalled talks on stripping North Korea of its nuclear weapons.
South Korea’s presidential office said it terminated the intelligence deal because Japan’s recent decision to downgrade South Korea’s trade status caused a “grave” change in security cooperation between the countries.
“Under this situation, the government has determined that maintaining the agreement, which was signed for the purpose of exchanging sensitive military intelligence on security, does not serve our national interests,” Kim You-geun, the deputy director of South Korea’s presidential national security office, said in a nationally televised statement.
He said South Korea will formally notify Japan of its decision before Saturday, the deadline for an extension of the pact for another year.
Since early last month, Japan has imposed stricter controls on exports to South Korea of three chemicals essential for manufacturing semiconductors and display screens — key export items for South Korea — and decided to remove South Korea from a list of countries with a preferential trade status.
South Korea accuses Japan of weaponizing trade to punish it over a separate dispute linked to Japan’s brutal colonial rule of the Korean Peninsula from 1910-1945. Japan denies that, saying its steps were taken because of unspecified security concerns.
The Japanese trade curbs triggered an outburst of anti-Japan sentiment in South Korea. Many South Korean citizens rallied in the streets, canceled planned holiday trips to Japan, and launched widespread boycotts of Japanese beer, clothes and other products. The South Korean government, for its part, decided to downgrade Japan’s trade status.
Some experts say the tit-for-tat actions could eventually hurt South Korea’s economy more than Japan’s. Many big South Korean manufacturers including Samsung heavily rely on materials and components imported from Japan, while Japan doesn’t import many vital materials from South Korea.
Liberal South Korean President Moon Jae-in, who earlier declared his country would “never again lose” to Japan, used the Aug. 15 anniversary of Korea’s liberation from Japan to extend an olive branch. Moon said Seoul will “gladly join hands” if Tokyo wanted to talk.
Lt. Col. Dave Eastburn, a Pentagon spokesman, encouraged Japan and Korea “to work together to resolve their differences.”
“The Department of Defense expresses our strong concern and disappointment that the Moon Administration has withheld its renewal of the Republic of Korea’s General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) with Japan. We strongly believe that the integrity of our mutual defense and security ties must persist despite frictions in other areas of the ROK-Japan relationship. We’ll continue to pursue bilateral and trilateral defense and security cooperation where possible with Japan and the ROK,” he said in an emailed statement.
On Wednesday, the top U.S. envoy on North Korea, Stephen Biegun, told reporters in Seoul that he appreciated what he called “strong and continued cooperation between the U.S., South Korea and Japan.”
The intelligence deal went into effect in 2016, reportedly at the strong urging of the United States, which wants to boost three-day security cooperation to better cope with North Korea’s nuclear threat and a rising China. The United States stations a total of 80,000 troops in the two Asian countries, the core of America’s military presence in the Asia-Pacific region.
Experts said the deal enabled a quicker exchange of information between Seoul and Tokyo; they had previously exchanged intelligence via the United States. In 2012, the countries nearly forged a similar deal, but it was scrapped at the last minute following a vehement backlash in South Korea.
However, it is unclear how effective the deal has been for both countries, especially in regard to intelligence on North Korea, one of the world’s most secretive countries. But there has been a general consensus that South Korea needed information gathered by Japanese satellites and other high-tech systems, while Japan enjoyed signal, voice and human intelligence from South Korea.
South Korea’s Defense Ministry said in a statement Thursday that it will try to maintain a “stable and perfect combined security posture” with the United States regardless of the termination of the intelligence deal. It called the South Korean-U.S. alliance “powerful.”
South Korean government and ruling party officials have publicly questioned how Seoul could share intelligence with a country that questioned Seoul’s handling of sensitive materials imported from Japan. Without providing concrete evidence, some Japanese officials, including Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, suggested that some critical Japanese materials with potential military applications exported to South Korea may have reached North Korea. Seoul flatly denies that.
The fate of the deal had divided people in South Korea. Some argued that South Korea should do whatever it could to inflict pain on Japan, and that just floating the idea of ending the intelligence deal could force the United States to persuade Japan to lift its trade curbs. But some stressed that the deal’s cancellation would impair relations with the United States at a time when South Korea faces many security challenges, including the stalemate of nuclear talks with North Korea.
Moon’s government has lobbied hard to facilitate talks between the U.S. and North Korea on the nuclear crisis. But the diplomacy has remained largely stalemated for months, and North Korea now says it won’t go through South Korea to talk to the United States. The North recently test-fired a series of short-range missiles and other weapons capable of striking much of South Korea.
Last month, a Russian military plane allegedly violated South Korean airspace in the first such trespassing by a foreign warplane since the end of the 1950-53 Korean War. Russian and Chinese warplanes allegedly also made a highly unusual joint entrance to South Korea’s air defense identification zone, in what analysts said was an attempt to see how the Seoul-Washington-Tokyo security cooperation worked.
South Korea’s main conservative opposition party accused the Moon government of confusing “genuine courage” with “foolhardy courage.” The Liberty Korea Party said security coordination with Washington and Tokyo needed to be solidified in the face of strengthening cooperation among Russia, China and North Korea.
“We would have lots of things to lose from the deal’s termination,” said analyst Go Myong-Hyun of the Seoul-based Asan Institute for Policy Studies. “If the U.S. turned its back on South Korea, we would be completely isolated in Northeast Asia.”
On Thursday evening, about 30 anti-Tokyo activists gathered near the Japanese Embassy in Seoul to welcome the intelligence deal’s termination. Jubilant participants held placards that read: “The scrapping of the South Korea-Japan deal is a people’s victory.” (Source: Defense News)
22 Aug 19. France May Offer 36 More Rafale Aircraft to India. France is likely to offer additional Rafale aircraft to India during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s upcoming visit to the European country for the G-7 Summit on Thursday, sources told ET. The French side, sources said, is set to offer an immediate sale of two more squadrons, which means 36 additional Rafale jets, to the Indian Air Force that has been grappling with depleting combat force levels. PM Modi is slated to meet French President Emmanuel Macron on Thursday during which both sides will hold detailed deliberations on a range of subjects including key issues like defence and maritime cooperation. While the 2016 deal for 36 Rafale jets was signed for €7.87bn, sources said additional 36 aircraft would cost significantly lesser because payment for fixed costs covering India-specific enhancements, training equipment and infrastructure has already been made. (end of excerpt)
Click here for the full story, on the Economic Times website https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/france-may-offer-36-more-rafale-aircraft-to-india/articleshow/70779501.cms
(defense-aerospace.com EDITOR’S NOTE: Rumors from India claim that France and India are finalizing a much bigger deal, worth over 30bn euros and covering up to 200 additional Rafales, which could be announced as early as this week, during Modi’s visit to France this week. Dassault Aviation declined to comment, and these rumors have not been confirmed. However, we are reporting them because the details are very plausible, and lend a degree of credibility. The rumored deal would cover 114 Rafales for the Indian Air Force, another 57 for the Indian Navy and possibly 30-40 more to ultimately replace the Indian Air Force’s fleet of upgraded Mirage 2000s. India has already launched two RFPs, for the Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft and Navy carrier fighter requirements, but neither seems to have made much progress. However, both could be met by Rafale, which exists in both land- and carrier-based versions. The structure of this rumored deal would substantially differ from earlier plans, which called for Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. (HAL), the Indian state-owned aircraft manufacturer, to assemble 108 Rafales that Dassault was required to guarantee. As the company refused to guarantee HAL’s work, that deal collapsed. This time, if the rumors are to be believed, the deal would be a government-to-government agreement, and Dassault would establish a final assembly line (FAL) of its own in India by 2024. This FAL would be operated by a new company (Dassault Aviation India Ltd.) in which the Government of India would control a 50% stake, with no role for HAL.
Deliveries of the additional Rafales would begin in 2022 and be completed 12-13 years later. All of the new aircraft would be to the latest F4 standard, which Dassault is developing under a €1bn contract, and earlier aircraft would also be upgraded. Dassault is said to have committed to increase local sourcing up to 75% of the aircraft’s value, beginning with the 150th aircraft.
Such a huge deal – it would probably be the biggest-ever fighter purchase by a single country – would make operational and financial sense for India, allowing it to reduce its fighter fleet to just two major types, Rafale and Su-30MKI, with proportionately big savings in training, logistics and weapons. It remains to be seen what develops this week during Modi’s visit. For the time being, however, these are only rumors, albeit plausible ones, and this report is highly speculative.)
22 Aug 19. Iran displays domestically built mobile missile defence system. Iran displayed what it described as a domestically built long-range, mobile surface-to-air missile system on Thursday, Iranian state media reported. The announcement comes at a time of rising tension between Iran and United States. Iran shot down a U.S. military surveillance drone in the Gulf with a surface-to-air missile in June. It says the drone was over its territory, but the United States says it was in international airspace. State television showed President Hassan Rouhani attending an unveiling ceremony for the Bavar-373 system, which Iranian media have described as a competitor to the Russian S-300 missile system.
The system’s unveiling came on Iran’s National Defence Industry Day. Iran has developed a large domestic arms industry in the face of international sanctions and embargoes that have barred it from importing many weapons.
Western military analysts say Iran often exaggerates its weapons capabilities, though concerns about its long-range ballistic missile programme contributed to Washington last year leaving the pact that Iran sealed with world powers in 2015 to rein in its nuclear ambitions in exchange for an easing of economic sanctions. (Source: Reuters)
21 Aug 19. China says it will sanction US firms in Taiwan warplane sale. China said Wednesday that it will levy sanctions against U.S. companies linked to a planned $8bn sale of advanced F-16V fighter jets to Taiwan in a move that has further strained Sino-American relations.
The U.S. should “immediately back away” from the arms sale proposal, Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Geng Shuang said at a daily briefing.
Geng said China urges the U.S. to “stop arms sales to and military interactions with Taiwan” or otherwise “bear all the consequences arising from it.”
“China will take all necessary measures to safeguard its own interests, including imposing sanctions on U.S. companies involved in this arms sale to Taiwan,” Geng said. He did not elaborate on any specific measures.
The Trump administration informed Congress last week that it plans to sell the warplanes despite repeated warnings from China. Earlier this week, the U.S. State Department approved the sale.
Beijing fiercely opposes all arms sales to Taiwan, which it regards as a renegade province, but has specifically objected to advanced fighter jets. Despite a lack of formal diplomatic ties, U.S. law requires Washington to ensure Taiwan has the means to defend itself.
Taiwan is a democratically governed island that broke away from the Communist Party-ruled mainland during a civil war in 1949.
China also pledged sanctions against the U.S. in July when the Trump administration said it was considering a $2.2bn sale of tanks and air missiles to Taiwan. Taiwan leader Tsai Ing-wen thanked the U.S. on Tuesday for approving the sales.
“These packages reaffirm the United States’ long-standing commitment to helping maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait,” Tsai said. She also urged China to respect Taiwan’s right to defend itself. (Source: Defense News)
22 Aug 19. South Korea outlines plans for fleet modernisation, capability expansion. South Korea has responded to the continuing challenges to Indo-Pacific stability and prosperity, particularly in the contested maritime domain, with the reveal of a range of next-generation capabilities, ranging from an aircraft carrier and arsenal ship to larger air defence destroyers and large, conventionally powered strategic deterrence submarines. As both China and Japan surge ahead with plans to build potent aircraft carrier capabilities, South Korea has joined the race and announced plans to build a modified large-deck aircraft carrier based on the Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN) Dokdo Class amphibious warfare ships – seemingly leaving Australia as the only established Indo-Pacific power without a plan for a traditional, fixed-wing naval aviation and aircraft carrier capability. At the end of the Second World War, the aircraft carrier emerged as the apex of naval prestige and power projection. Unlike their predecessor, the battleship, aircraft carriers in themselves are relatively benign actors, relying heavily a their attached carrier air-wings and supporting escort fleets of cruisers, destroyers and submarines to screen them from hostile action.
In recent years, nations throughout the Indo-Pacific have begun a series of naval expansion and modernisation programs with traditional aircraft carriers and large-deck, amphibious warfare ships serving as the core of their respective shift towards greater maritime power projection.
Driving this change is an unprecedented period of Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea and the growing capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), which has seen the Chinese fielding or preparing to field a range of power projection capabilities, including aircraft carriers and supporting strike groups, fifth-generation combat aircraft, modernised land forces, area-access denial and strategic nuclear forces, combined with growing political and financial influence throughout the region.
Further adding to China’s development of an increasingly capable aircraft carrier and fixed-wing naval aviation capability is China’s ongoing construction of the Type 075 and Type 075A vessels, currently under construction at the Hudong-Zhonghua shipyards is designed to operate in a similar manner to the LHDs of the US, Australian, Japanese and South Korean navies.
These vessels are capable of providing amphibious power projection, sea-control and amphibious air support with an impressive helicopter complement and command and control capabilities – with a displacement of between 30,000-40,000 tons, the Type 075 also incorporates a floodable well-dock capable of supporting both Russian and Chinese designed landing craft air cushions (LCAC).
Korea’s carrier
Building on this, the long-term threat from North Korea has prompted South Korea to embark on a series of land, air and sea acquisition programs that support the Republic of Korea’s transition towards developing a robust, deployable, conventional power projection and deterrence focused force – at the core of this redevelopment is the planned construction of a 30,000-ton short take-off, vertical landing (STOVL) aircraft carrier.
This new vessel – which is expected to be double the size of the ROKN’s two previous Dokdo Class, which weigh in at 14,500 tonnes of displacement – will serve as the basis for Korea’s burgeoning carrier capability and will be slightly larger than Japan’s Izumo Class vessels at 27,000 tonnes of displacement, which will be modified to accommodate a fleet of STOVL-variant F-35B Joint Strike Fighters beginning in the mid-2020s.
It is expected that the new vessel will accommodate up to 20 F-35Bs, in conjunction with 3,000 marines and 20 armoured vehicles – further supporting the power projection capabilities of the new vessel and the broad ROKN. This announcement fits in with the broader reorganisation of the ROKN – this new vessel is similar in size to the Royal Australian Navy’s Canberra Class amphibious warfare ships: HMA Ships Canberra and Adelaide.
Serving in a complementary role in Korea’s transition towards a blue water capable navy is the original Dokdo Class vessels, which will serve as the flagship in Korea’s ‘Rapid Response Fleet’ structure. Korea has recently announced plans for three additional 7,600-tonne block two Sejong the Great Class Aegis guided missile destroyers worth a total of US$3.3bn, to be completed by 2028 – these vessels are expected to serve part of Korea’s broader integrated air and missile defence capabilities with a secondary focus on anti-surface and land attack capabilities.
New destroyers, arsenal ships and the long-range punch
The mid-term defence plan released by the Korean government reveals a 7.1 per cent increase in national defence expenditure between 2020 and 2024 with critical escort capable surface combatants serving as a key component of this enhanced maritime capability enhancement – the KDX-III is based on the existing Sejong the Great Class vessels and will from the onset be designed to counter the increasing ballistic missile capabilities of North Korea and increasingly the anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities developed by China.
Additionally, Korea has initiated a further modification of its existing, locally designed and built KDX-II destroyers to develop a heavily armed arsenal ship incorporating a range of weapons systems, including precision guided missiles, for area-air and missile defence, ship-to-shore bombardment and surface combat to enhance the long-range strike capabilities of the ROKN.
This concept builds on a concept initially proposed by the US Navy in 1996 – the early concepts of the arsenal ship highlighted a ship with a comparatively small crew and as many as 500 vertical launch tubes to provide ship-to-shore bombardment and fire support for amphibious operations fulfilling the role traditionally occupied by the battleships of old and, to a limited extent, guided missile cruisers, destroyers and frigates.
Arsenal ships are designed to fulfil a unique role within the overall confines of contemporary naval doctrines and force structures. Such vessels when integrated as part of carrier or amphibious strike groups can also serve two roles – one of the supplementary air defence escort and the second being the long-range maritime strike for ship-to-shore and anti-ship roles.
A credible at-sea strategic deterrent
The very nature of South Korea’s geographic location and the inherent volatility of the North Korean regime has necessitated the long-term development and maintenance of a credible strategic deterrent capability – submarines naturally fit this niche tactical and strategic capability. As a result, South Korea has invested heavily in this critical capability.
Korea’s next-generation KSS III program marks the nation’s entry into the elite club of the few nations globally that are capable of independently designing and building advanced submarines – the KSS III vessels in particular are large vessels with over 3,000 tonnes of displacement, an approximate length of 83.5 metres, maximum submerged speed of 20 knots, cruising range of 10,000 nautical miles and a crew of 50.
A key component of the KSS III program was the use of 10 vertical launch system (VLS) tubes, capable of launching a range of conventional long-range strike missiles, with endurance and stealth supported by improved South Korean designed lithium ion batteries and high-temperature superconductor (HTS) motor technologies supporting an integrated and full electric propulsion system.
Your thoughts
Korea’s focus on establishing itself as a regional power capable of intervening in regional affairs serves as a model for Australian force structure planners – the comparable economic, political and demographic size of Australia and South Korea combined with the similarity in the platforms and systems operated by both nations serve as a building block for both interoperability and similar force structure models.
As an island nation, Australia is defined by its relationship with the ocean. Maritime power projection and sea control play a pivotal role in securing Australia’s economic and strategic security as a result of the intrinsic connection between the nation and Indo-Pacific Asia’s strategic sea-lines-of-communication in the 21st century.
Further compounding Australia’s precarious position is an acceptance that ‘Pax Americana’, or the post-Second World War ‘American Peace’, is over and Australia will require a uniquely Australian approach and recognition that the nation is now solely responsible for the security of its national interests with key alliances serving a secondary, complementary role to the broader debate.
Increasingly, multi-domain air power plays an important role in the efficacy of naval forces and serves as a key component in both the force structure and capability development plans for both South Korea and Australia – these similarities support not only closer relationships between the two nations that share unique geo-political and strategic similarities but also provide the opportunity to develop robust force structures to respond to the rapidly evolving regional strategic environment. (Source: Defence Connect)
20 Aug 19. Putin Speaks About Mysterious Nuclear Explosion In Russia. Russian President Vladimir Putin said that there was no threat whatsoever in connection with the incident at a military training ground near the city of Severodvinsk in the Arkhangelsk region of Russia.
“If you mean the incident in Severodvinsk, then there is no threat there. There’s no spike in radiation levels there either. Experts, including independent ones who monitor the situation, were sent there. I receive reports from our experts, both military and civil ones. We don’t see any serious changes there, but preventive measures are being taken so that there are no surprises,” Putin said answering a question from a French journalist prior to his meeting with French President Emmanuel Macron.
“The people who, unfortunately, were affected and died, were certainly executing a state function of paramount importance. All of them will be recommended for state decorations of the Russian Federation,” he added.
During the farewell ceremony for the killed, which was held on August 12, first deputy head of the presidential administration Sergei Kiriyenko read out Putin’s decree on awarding eight employees of the Sarov Nuclear Center with the Order of Courage. Five employees will be decorated posthumously, the administration of Sarov said.
In the meantime, it became known that two radiation monitoring stations stopped transmitting data on August 13. It goes about the stations in the town of Bilibino in Chukotka and in the Altai village of Zalesovo.
Earlier, Lassina Zerbo, the Executive Secretary of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBT), said that radiation monitoring stations in Dubna and Kirov stopped transmitting data two days after the explosion near Severodvinsk.
The above-mentioned stations monitor the amount of radioactive particles in the air. Another such station is located in Ussuriysk. It operates without interruptions. It still remains unknown when the stations resume their work. Representatives of the Russian Embassy in Washington redirect questions about the radiation monitoring stations to the Russian Ministry of Defense.
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia Sergey Ryabkov said that the data from radiation monitoring stations is transmitted on a voluntary basis. “The accident in the Arkhangelsk region does not pose any risks either to the environment or the population,” the diplomat said on August 20.
It was reported that the personnel of the Arkhangelsk regional hospital, where three people were hospitalised as a result of the explosion, had not been warned about the radioactive pollution. It was also said that radioactive cesium-137 was found in the body of one of the doctors. Yet, officials with the Ministry of Health of the Russian Federation assure that excessive levels of tolerant radioactivity have not been found with any of the doctors.
According to unconfirmed reports, local residents are not recommended to approach the coast of the White Sea.
Five Rosatom employees (Russian Federal Atomic Energy Agency) were killed as a result of the explosion on the sea platform in the area of the village of Nenoksa, some 40 km from Severodvinsk. There is little information about the accident. It was said that the explosion occurred during a test of a liquid-fuel propellant rocket system with an isotopic power source. Supposedly, it could be the Burevestnik cruise missile, the Poseidon underwater drone, the Zircon hypersonic anti-ship missile, or the Skif bottom-based missile.
Officials with the administration of Severodvinsk said that the radiation background was three times higher than the permissible norm for about 30 minutes after the explosion. The Russian Meteorological Service (Roshydromet) later reported that the radiation level exceeded the norm 4-16 times presumably due to the “passage of a cloud of radioactive inert gases.” All this suggests that the authorities distribute incomplete information about the radioactive contamination. (Source: defense-aerospace.com/Pravda)
20 Aug 19. UN Impasse Could Mean Killer Robots Escape Regulation. It’s no longer the stuff of science fiction: Wars could soon be decided by lethal autonomous weapons systems. But a concerted effort to ban “killer robots” through international law at the UN appears to have hit a wall. UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres has labeled autonomous weapons “politically unacceptable and morally repulsive,” and called for them to be banned under international law. “Consider the consequences if an autonomous weapons system can independently select people as targets and attack them,” Guterres has repeatedly told the international community, whose representatives are currently debating a ban on so-called killer robots in Geneva. Agreement, however, is not in sight. In fact, as one of the participants told DW, the talks are making no progress.
The secretary-general’s fears have already become reality — many armies around the world are testing weapons that combine artificial intelligence and robotics to form potentially lethal technology. When machines fight independently on the battlefield, according to military logic, the lives of soldiers are spared. Supporters argue that unlike humans, machines do not get tired and are less prone to making mistakes. This, they say, could help avoid civilian casualties.
Violation of international law
According to the generally accepted definition of the International Committee of the Red Cross, autonomous weapons select their targets independently and fight them independently — soldiers are no longer involved, no triggers are pulled. Guided weapons that hover in the air until their target is in a favorable position before they attack already exist. On the battlefields of the future, scientists say, algorithms will decide over life and death, not humans. That, however, violates international humanitarian law stipulating a clear distinction must be made between combatants and civilians in attacks. Autonomous weapons systems cannot do that. Critics argue these weapons can’t very well be equipped with implants that allow them to make decisions in accordance with international law, which makes it important to ensure a human being always has ultimate control over an attack. An international coalition of activists, along with 28 states, are calling for a ban on ‘killer robots’
Difficult talks
That has been under discussion for five years at the UN in Geneva, within the framework of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. In 1995, the Convention succeeded in banning the use of blinding laser weapons before they were used in wars. The opponents of autonomous weapons hoped for a similar outcome, but these talks have been sluggish.
Pioneering countries in the field of autonomous weapons systems — Russia, the United States and Israel — reject a binding ban under international law. These military heavyweights face a group of 28 states that are demanding a binding ban, including Austria — the group’s only European Union country. Their backing from civil society groups is strong and continues to grow — 113 nongovernmental organizations from more than 50 countries support the international Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, along with the European Parliament and 21 Nobel Peace Prize winners.
Condemnation on paper only
Germany has not joined either camp. The government made a clear commitment in its coalition agreement, stating: “We reject autonomous weapon systems that are beyond man’s control. We want to outlaw them worldwide.” All the same, the German delegation in Geneva considers a binding ban under international law to be unenforceable at present, arguing US and Russian opposition is too great, as is the danger that the negotiations could fail completely. The German government fails to mention that it, too, has an interest in autonomous weapons systems, including as part of the Franco-German Future Combat Aerial System.
Two more years of negotiations?
Amidst the possibility that current talks may fail, a new proposal suggests continuing the negotiations for another two years in hopes that by then, the vague formulation reads, a “normative framework” has been reached. This is far removed from the binding ban demanded by 28 states.
The current proposal’s “nebulous formulations” are disappointing, said Thomas Küchenmeister, German spokesman of the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots. The necessity of human control in the use of armed force is being “played down,” he told DW. Küchenmeister expressed concerned that the talks in Geneva “will never lead to a binding ban on autonomous weapons.”
The critics of autonomous weapons systems are not ready to give up, however. When an agreement over a ban on anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions could not be reached at the UN in Geneva, activists campaigned internationally for agreements that were eventually signed in Ottawa (1997) and Oslo (2008) respectively. Today, they are part of existing international law. (Source: defense-aerospace.com/Deutsche Welle German Radio)
21 Aug 19. Indonesia allocates USD8.9bn to defence in 2020. The Indonesian government has formally proposed a fiscal year (FY) 2020 defence budget of IDR127.4trn (USD8.9bn). According to budgetary documents published by the Ministry of Finance (MoF), the defence budget represents a 16% increase over the 2019 allocation of IDR109.6trn.
The documents state that the 2020 defence budget, which amounts to about 5% of total government expenditure in the year, will be used to support procurement efforts in line with the country’s Minimum Essential Force (MEF) military modernisation programme.
“In FY 2020 the Ministry of Defence will continue strategic priority programmes and activities in order to support MEF fulfilment,” said the MoF. (Source: IHS Jane’s)
21 Aug 19. Australia commits to help secure the Persian Gulf. Prime Minister Scott Morrison, alongside Foreign Minister Marise Payne and Defence Minister Linda Reynolds, has announced a renewed Australian commitment to freedom of navigation and maritime security operations in the Middle East. The Morrison government is reaffirming its commitment to freedom of navigation and safe passage through the Persian Gulf by announcing it will support an international maritime security mission.
This mission will see the Australian Defence Force work alongside its international partners to assure the security of merchant vessels in the Strait of Hormuz.
Australia’s contribution will include the deployment of:
- a P-8A Poseidon maritime surveillance aircraft to the Middle East for one month before the end of 2019;
- an Australian frigate in January 2020 for six months; and
- ADF personnel to the International Maritime Security Construct headquarters in Bahrain.
The joint media statement said, “The government has been concerned with incidents involving shipping in the Strait of Hormuz over the past few months. This destabilising behaviour is a threat to Australian interests in the region.
“We have been working closely with our allies and partners, particularly the United States and the United Kingdom, on this issue, which impacts global security and stability. Freedom of navigation through international waters is a fundamental right of all states under international law. All states have a right to expect safe passage of their maritime trade consistent with international law.”(Source: Defence Connect)
21 Aug 19. Expanding allied interoperability by enabling F-35 cross-decking. With a number of Australia’s allies investing in the short take-off, vertical landing ‘B’ variant of the F-35 and Australian leaders and policy thinkers still on the fence about a return of fixed-wing naval aviation for the Royal Australian Navy, does closer collaboration, including active ‘cross-decking’, provide an opportunity for Australia to dip its toes in the water?
Despite Australia’s proud post-Second World War history of fixed-wing naval aviation, the retirement of both HMAS Sydney and HMAS Melbourne as part of the broader force posture and strategic reorientation beginning in the late-1980s has meant that the potential for Australia reacquiring such capabilities has been met with a range of responses, with the conversation heating up in recent years.
Australia has long sought to balance the paradigms of strategic independence and strategic dependence – seemingly limited by a comparatively small population and industrial base, the pendulum has always swung more heavily towards a paradigm of dependence, however the changing nature of domestic and global affairs requires renewed consideration.
The growing conventional and hybrid capabilities of peer and near-peer competitors – namely Russia and China – combined with the growing modernisation, capability enhancements and reorganisation of force structures in the armies of nations including India, Indonesia, Vietnam and Thailand, all contribute to the changing balance of economic, political and strategic power in the Indo-Pacific.
This perfect storm of factors, swirling like a maelstrom across Australia’s northern borders, has largely gone unnoticed by the Australian public, beyond the odd port visit by American or, as recently happened, Chinese naval vessels that seem to cause momentary flurries of concern. Meanwhile, Australia’s strategic and political leaders appear to be caught in an increasingly dangerous paradigm of thinking, one of continuing US-led dominance and Australia maintaining its position as a supplementary power.
Recognising this, both Japan and South Korea have initiated a program of capability modernisation and expansion with a focus on incorporating fixed-wing naval aviation capabilities into their respective navies, with the Lockheed Martin F-35B figuring as a central capability enhancing the power projection and naval aviation capabilities for each nation.
Despite these regional developments, a number of studies have shed light on the costs associated with Australia upgrading its Canberra Class LHDs to incorporate an indigenous fleet air combat capability, combined with the cost of aircraft acquisition and follow on sustainment and operational expenses, most notably by Richard Brabin-Smith and Benjamin Schreer in a report for ASPI, which found:
“Despite their capacity to accommodate a number of STOVL aircraft, the LHDs are multi-purpose amphibious assault ships – not dedicated aircraft carriers. Because of their finite capacity, they can’t carry a full complement of helicopters, and amphibious troops with their vehicles and equipment, and simultaneously deploy a useful number of STOVL aircraft and additional support aircraft. Even in a ‘STOVL-only’ configuration, the LHD would face challenges in generating enough F-35B sorties continuously to protect itself and ships in company against a capable adversary.”
Further compounding the operational issues was the associated cost, which Malcolm Davis at ASPI expanded on, saying, “But using the F-35B would also present us with some real challenges. It seems unlikely that the Canberraand Adelaide would be converted to operate the jets because of the significant work and money involved and the associated reduction in the ships’ amphibious potential. Brabin-Smith and Schreer estimated in 2014 that it would cost $500m to convert one LHD, including adapting the deck to handle the heat generated by the F-35B’s engine.”
However, what if Australia didn’t have to solely foot the bill for modernising and upgrading the capacity of the Canberra Class vessels to accommodate the F-35B? What if Australia actively pursued what the United States Studies Centre (USSC) defines as “capability aggregation and collective deterrence in the Indo-Pacific” by enabling the cross-decking of American, Japanese, South Korean and eventually British F-35Bs operating in the region?
Australian opportunities, allied burden sharing
Increasingly, multi-domain air power plays an important role in the efficacy of naval forces and serves as a key component in both the force structure and capability development plans for Japan, South Korea and Australia – these similarities support not only closer relationships between the two nations that share unique geo-political and strategic similarities, but also provide the opportunity to develop robust force structures to respond to the rapidly evolving regional strategic environment.
Promoting greater interoperability and duplication of capabilities serves to support the broader regional order, while also serving to share the tactical and strategic burden between key US allies at a time when the current US administration is placing increasing emphasis on allies sharing the financial, personnel and material burden of maintaining the post-Second World War economic, political and strategic order.
While the notion of Australia acquiring a third, F-35B-dedicated Canberra Class LHD has been discussed at great length by both strategic policy analysts and politicians since the RAN acquired the vessels. The HMA Ships Canberra and Adelaide lack of key structural and technical modifications that would enable the ships to safely and effectively operate the aircraft and any third vessel would need to incorporate the modifications from the keel up, in a similar manner to the Turkish Navy’s recently launched TCG Anadolu (based on the Canberra/Juan Carlos Class vessels). Recognising this and Australia’s continued role as a critical ally in the region, there is potential scope for allies including Japan, the US and UK in conjunction with Australian investment to support the modernisation and upgrades of the two Canberra Class vessels to serve as additional launch points, maintenance and sustainment support vessels for allied fleet airpower.
More broadly, the concept of ‘cross-decking’ also provides avenues for the Royal Australian Air Force and/or Royal Australian Navy to embed both support and aircrew within allied naval aviation operations to enable Australia to rapidly develop its own such capability over the course of a number of years, should the need arise for Australia to reintroduce its own fixed-wing naval aviation capabilities.
The introduction of a dedicated aircraft carrier benefits Australian industry as well, through increased procurement programs for support and escort vessels, larger F-35 supply chain contributions and larger sustainment and maintenance contracts, which are key to keeping the Navy ‘battle ready and deployed’.
Australia’s security and prosperity are directly influenced by the stability and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific, meaning Australia must be directly engaged as both a benefactor and leader in all matters related to strategic, economic and political security, serving as either a replacement or complementary force to the role played by the US – should the US commitment or capacity be limited. (Source: Defence Connect)
21 Aug 19. Japanese report to say North Korea has miniaturised nuclear warheads: newspaper. Japan has upgraded its estimate of North Korea’s nuclear weapons capability in an upcoming annual Defence White Paper, saying it seems Pyongyang has already achieved the miniaturisation of warheads, the Yomiuri newspaper said in an unsourced report on Wednesday.
That compares with the assessment in last year’s report in which the government said it was possible North Korea had achieved miniaturisation, the Japanese daily said without citing sources.
The report, to be approved at a Cabinet meeting in mid-September, will maintain the assessment that North Korea’s military activities pose a “serious and imminent threat”, the Yomiuri said.
South Korea’s 2018 Defence White Paper, released in January, reported that North Korea’s ability to miniaturise nuclear weapons “appears to have reached a considerable level.”
According to South Korean media reports late last year, the South Korean intelligence agency told lawmakers that North Korea had continued to miniaturise nuclear warheads even after the Singapore summit between Trump and Kim in June 2018.
At that time, North Korea committed “to work towards complete denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula” and destroyed some tunnels and buildings at its Punggye-ri nuclear test site.
But a second Trump-Kim meeting in February collapsed without an agreement, and North Korea has since resumed missile tests. American officials have concluded for years that North Korea had likely produced miniaturised nuclear warheads. A leaked report by the Defence Intelligence Agency in 2017 concluded that North Korea had successfully produced a miniaturised nuclear warhead that can fit inside its missiles, according to The Washington Post.
In last year’s Defence White Paper, Japan said “miniaturising a nuclear weapon small enough to be mounted on a ballistic missile requires a considerably high degree of technological capacity,” and that “it is possible that North Korea has achieved the miniaturisation of nuclear weapons and has developed nuclear warheads.” (Source: Reuters)
20 Aug 19. Russia, China accuse U.S. of stoking tensions with missile test. Russia and China accused the United States on Tuesday of stoking military tensions by testing a ground-launched cruise missile, but the foreign ministry in Moscow said it would not be drawn into an arms race.
The Pentagon said on Monday it had tested a conventionally-configured cruise missile that hit its target after more than 500 km (310 miles) of flight, its first such test since the demise of a landmark nuclear pact this month. The United States formally withdrew from the Cold War-era Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) with Russia on Aug. 2 after accusing Moscow of violating it, a charge dismissed by the Kremlin.
The text would have been banned under the INF, which prohibited land-based missiles with a range of between 310 and 3,400 miles, reducing the ability of both countries to launch a nuclear strike at short notice.
Washington had “obviously taken the course of escalating military tensions,” Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov said
Russia would, however, not allow itself “to be pulled into a costly arms race” and did not plan to deploy new missiles unless the United States did so first, he was quoted as saying by TASS news agency.
The Kremlin said the U.S. missile test showed that Washington had long been preparing to exit the nuclear pact.
“It is simply not possible to prepare for such tests in a few weeks or a few months. This …shows that it was not Russia, but the United States with its actions that brought the breakdown of the INF,” Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said.
China also expressed concern.
In Beijing, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Geng Shuang said the test showed the United States was stoking a new arms race and confrontation, which would have a serious negative impact on regional and global security.
“We advise the U.S. side to abandon outdated notions of Cold War thinking and zero-sum games, and exercise restraint in developing arms,” Geng told a daily news briefing. (Source: Reuters)
20 Aug 19. Japan leads development of regional ‘capability aggregation and collective deterrence.’ The Japanese government’s approval of the F-35B acquisition and modernisation of its maritime capabilities has been designed to reinforce the nation’s commitment to the regional and global rules-based order. The growing commonality of platforms and weapons systems fielded by Japan, Australia, the US and South Korea provides avenues for Australia ahead of the new Defence White Paper.
Australia has long sought to balance the paradigms of strategic independence and strategic dependence – seemingly limited by a comparatively small population and industrial base, the pendulum has always swung more heavily towards a paradigm of dependence, however the changing nature of domestic and global affairs requires renewed consideration.
The growing conventional and hybrid capabilities of peer and near-peer competitors – namely Russia and China – combined with the growing modernisation, capability enhancements and reorganisation of force structures in the armies of nations including India, Indonesia, Vietnam and Thailand, all contribute to the changing balance of economic, political and strategic power in the Indo-Pacific.
This perfect storm of factors, swirling like a maelstrom across Australia’s northern borders, has largely gone unnoticed by the Australian public, beyond the odd port visit by American or, as recently happened, Chinese naval vessels that seem to cause momentary flurries of concern. Meanwhile, Australia’s strategic and political leaders appear to be caught in an increasingly dangerous paradigm of thinking, one of continuing US-led dominance and Australia maintaining its position as a supplementary power.
Recognising the increasing confluence of challenges facing enduring US tactical and strategic primacy, the University of Sydney-based United States Studies Centre (USSC) has released a telling study, titled ‘Averting Crisis: American strategy, military spending and collective defence in the Indo-Pacific’, which makes a series of powerful recommendations for Australian and allied forces in the region.
Key to these recommendations for Australian and regional partners, like Japan and South Korea, is: “Pursue capability aggregation and collective deterrence in the Indo-Pacific with regional allies and partners.” This can be more broadly defined as emphasising increased training, platform commonality driving interoperability, collaboration on operating doctrine and force structure and a joint pursuit of key, ‘joint force’ strategic deterrence platforms.
As a result of the nation’s proximity to China and repeated provocations by the rising superpower in the East China and South China Seas, combined with the increasing capability of the People’s Liberation Army and its respective branches, the Japanese government under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe embarked on a series of expansive modernisation, force posture and capability modernisation and acquisition programs.
Central to this is Japan’s recently approved acquisition of a fleet of 42 Lockheed Martin F-35B short take-off, vertical landing (STOVL) fighter aircraft and the subsequent modernisation and upgrade of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force’s (JMSDF) Izumo Class multipurpose amphibious warfare ships to serve as light aircraft carriers, in a similar fashion to the ‘Lightning Carrier’ concept pioneered by the US Marine Corps.
Allies carrying the mantle
One of the core challenges facing the US in the Indo-Pacific and, more broadly, key allies like Australia, Japan and South Korea, is the growing atrophy of America’s armed forces in the region, and the report cites a number of contributing factors directly impacting the capacity of the US to wage war, particularly as China, a peer competitor, presents an increasingly capable, equipped and well funded array of platforms, doctrine and capabilities.
“America has an atrophying force that is not sufficiently ready, equipped or postured for great power competition in the Indo-Pacific — a challenge it is working hard to address. Twenty years of near-continuous combat and budget instability has eroded the readiness of key elements in the US Air Force, Navy, Army and Marine Corps. Military accidents have risen, ageing equipment is being used beyond its lifespan and training has been cut,” the study identifies.
The USSC spells out the one thing few of Australia’s strategic policy thinkers and political leaders seem willing to come to terms with, beyond the radical fluctuations between doom and gloom scenarios: some of which range from a complete retreat by the US, leaving Australia and other regional allies alone, or a semi-retreat and focus on limiting risk to key American assets in the region.
In doing so, the USSC recognises that for the first time America has a true competitor in China – a nation with immense industrial potential, growing wealth and prosperity, a driving national purpose and a growing series of alliances with re-emerging, resource rich great powers in Russia, and supported by a growing network of economic hubs and indebted psuedo-colonies throughout the Indo-Pacific and Asia.
As part of this recognition, the USSC identifies the growing need for capability aggregation and collective deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, with both Australia and Japan playing critical roles in balancing any decline in the US and its capacity to unilaterally project power, influence and presence throughout the region.
“Prudent capability aggregation between the armed forces of Australia, Japan and the United States will be critical to addressing the shortfalls that America is likely to face in its military power over the coming years. The strategic purpose of such efforts should be to strengthen the collective capacity to deter prospective Chinese fait accompli aggression in strategically significant regional flashpoints, particularly along the First Island Chain and in the South China Sea,” the USSC paper identifies.
“Australia and Japan have credible roles to play in an Indo-Pacific collective balancing strategy. For capability aggregation to work, the United States must fully ‘read in’ allies like Australia and Japan, starting with more integrated intelligence sharing and evolving towards regional operational military planning. Establishing pathways towards joint operational directives are necessary building blocks for an effective denial strategy, as knowing how multi-national forces will be employed in peacetime and war is critical to the reliability of the collective deterrent.”
“As Tokyo and Canberra continue to modernise their militaries over the next decade, they will maintain — and in some cases, expand — their collective inventory of assets in several crucial areas: attack submarines, anti-submarine warfare assets and principal surface combatants,” the USSC paper adds, which also identifies the potential for both Australia and Japan to bring forward the planned acquisition of their respective future submarine capabilities to counter balance any decline in the US Navy’s nuclear attack submarine fleet in the 2020s.
Major surface units, amphibious capabilities and naval Aviation will continue to play a key role
While much has been made about the growing capabilities of China’s seemingly impregnable anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) network rapidly developing throughout the Indo-Pacific the USSC identifies the continued importance of major surface units and the power of interoperability between Australian naval units like the Hobart and Hunter Class vessels and Japan’s own growing fleet of Aegis powered major surface combatants.
“The fact that Japan and Australia will have a combined total of 20 major surface combatants equipped with sophisticated Aegis missile defence systems will permit them to play a crucial warfighting role in degrading and blunting missile strikes against immobile allied targets. Major surface combatants from Australia and Japan could also play critical roles in facilitating and escorting coalition amphibious operations to reverse Chinese territorial gains, or providing missile defence for forces providing offensive operations,” the paper said.
The growing proliferation of advanced submarines, combined with the growing naval aviation capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army Navy and the People’s Liberation Army Air Force have triggered a robust response from both Australia and Japan to invest heavily in a range of capabilities that will enhance the anti-submarine, maritime patrol, anti-surface and long-range strike capabilities of their respective armed forces.
“Australian and Japanese naval and maritime air forces can also make significant contributions to coalition strategic anti-submarine warfare operations. Large-scale, co-ordinated and networked ASW campaigns remain a critical area of asymmetric advantage for coalition forces in the Indo-Pacific … Over the next decade, the Royal Australian Air Force will operate up to 15 P-8s, while the JMSDF will have 70 P-1s in its inventory,” the USSC states.
“Australia’s surface vessel recapitalisation is also adding sophisticated ASW capability to the entire feet, with nine new ASW frigates, towed-array sonars for the new destroyers and 24 MH-60 Romeo maritime helicopters. Taken together, these capabilities mean that Tokyo and Canberra will possess a genuinely credible capability to bring to bear in any major ASW campaign in the Indo-Pacific — finding, tracking and, if necessary, countering Chinese submarines as part of an overall defensive strategy of deterrence by denial.”
However, Japan, like South Korea and China, has begun a rapid period of naval aviation capability modernisation and expansion with the approval of 42 F-35 aircraft to form the basis of the island nation’s growing power projection and amphibious warfare capabilities — this acquisition flies in direct contradiction to Japan’s post-World War II constitution.
As part of Abe’s commitment toward shifting the paradigm following continued Chinese naval build up – particularly the growing capabilities of China’s aircraft carrier and amphibious warfare ship fleets, Japan has initiated a range of modernisation and structural refits for the Izumo Class vessels to develop small aircraft carriers capable of supporting airwings of 28 rotary-wing aircraft, with capacity for approximately 10 ‘B’ variants of the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter, with both 27,000-tonne vessels capable of supporting 400 marines.
The smaller Hyuga Class vessels, weighing in at 19,000 tonnes, are capable of supporting an airwing of 18 rotary-wing aircraft, with space for amphibious units and supporting equipment. Additionally, it is speculated that like their larger Izumo Class cousins, the Hyuga and sister Ise can be modified to accommodate the F-35B.
Supporting this, Abe’s government plans to operate a fleet of approximately 147 fifth-generation aircraft, including the 42 ‘B’ variant STOVL F-35 aircraft, in a similar manner to American amphibious warfare ships and the UK’s Queen Elizabeth Class aircraft carriers. The introduction of these capabilities will directly support Japan’s long-range maritime strike, air interdiction and fleet aviation capabilities, which are critical to defending Japanese territorial and economic interests in Indo-Pacific Asia.
These vessels, in conjunction with smaller Osumi Class transports, will also play host to the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force’s (JGSDF) ‘Amphibious Rapid Deployment’ brigade – a specially developed amphibious unit similar to US Marine Expeditionary Units designed to defend Japanese interests in the South China Sea, namely the Senkaku Islands, which have served as a flash point between the two nations.
The rapidly developing qualitative and quantitative capabilities of regional surface warship and submarine fleets, namely by Russia and China – combined with the increasing proliferation of surface vessels and submarines designed and built by the aforementioned nations by emerging peer competitors – serves to stretch the tactical and strategic capabilities of the RAN.
Additionally, the increasing proliferation of advanced anti-ship ballistic and anti-ship cruise missiles, combined with the growing prominence of naval aviation – again led by China but also pursued by Japan and India – is serving to raise questions about the size and the specialised area-air defence, ballistic missile defence, power projection and sea control capabilities of the RAN.
Australia is defined by its relationship and access to the ocean, with strategic sea lines of communication supporting over 90 per cent of global trade, a result of the cost-effective and reliable nature of sea transport. Indo-Pacific Asia is at the epicentre of the global maritime trade, with about US$5trn worth of trade flowing through the South China Sea and the strategic waterways and choke points of south-east Asia annually.
The Indian Ocean and its critical global sea lines of communication are responsible for more than 80 per cent of the world’s seaborne trade in critical energy supplies, namely, oil and natural gas, which serve as the lifeblood of any advanced economy.
Enhancing Australia’s capacity to act as an independent power, incorporating great power-style strategic economic, diplomatic and military capability, serves not only as a powerful symbol of Australia’s sovereignty and evolving responsibilities in supporting and enhancing the security and prosperity of Indo-Pacific Asia – shifting the public discussion away from the default Australian position of “it is all a little too difficult, so let’s not bother” will provide unprecedented economic, diplomatic, political and strategic opportunities for the nation. (Source: Defence Connect)
19 Aug 19. China now strong enough for a surprise move in the Indo-Pacific. China is gaining an increasingly favorable military position in the Indo-Pacific, leaving the United States no longer able to enjoy military primacy in the region, a new report by an Australian think tank has warned. The Sydney-based United States Studies Centre says the region is now vulnerable to China making a quick move to secure a military or strategic advantage, with the cost of an American counter-move potentially too high to bear. In its report, analysts also lament the “combined effect of ongoing wars in the Middle East, budget austerity, underinvestment in advanced military capabilities and the scale of America’s liberal order-building agenda has left the US armed forces ill-prepared for great power competition in the Indo-Pacific.”
The report, titled, “Averting crisis: American Strategy, Military Spending and Collective Defence in the Indo-Pacific,” adds that over the next decade, the U.S. defense budget “is unlikely to meet the needs of the National Defense Strategy owing to a combination of political, fiscal and internal pressures.”
Meanwhile, the regional balance of power has tilted in China’s favor, which the report says is also a product of the way Beijing has modernized and postured its armed forces. Central to this is the massive investment in conventionally-armed ballistic and cruise missiles, which analysts consider the centerpiece of China’s “counter-intervention” efforts.
This “growing arsenal of accurate long-range missiles,” some of which are able to reach the critical American air and naval bases located at the U.S. territory of Guam in the northern Marianas from mainland China, “poses a major threat to almost all American, allied and partner bases, airstrips, ports and military installations in the Western Pacific.”
According to a 2017 article by Capt. Thomas Shugart, then a senior military fellow at the Center for a New American Security, open-source satellite imagery suggests that China has been testing its ballistic missiles against mockup targets similar in layout to those found at American and allied bases in the region.
These mockup targets range from vehicles to above-ground fuel tanks, runways, hardened aircraft shelters and moored ships, with Shugart pointing out that the latter are arranged in a “near-mirror image of the actual inner harbor at the U.S. naval base in Yokosuka.” He posited that “the only way that China could realistically expect to catch multiple U.S. ships in port … would be through a surprise attack.”
The risk is compounded by the fact that many of the U.S. and allied operating bases in the Indo-Pacific that are exposed to possible Chinese missile attack lack hardened infrastructure, while “forward-deployed munitions and supplies are not set to wartime requirements” even as “America’s logistics capability has steeply declined.”
China’s growing military might in what is known as the “first island chain,” which stretches from Japan and the Ryukyu Islands archipelago down to Taiwan and the Philippines, has now effectively been flipped, according to the think tank. That provides China “with the coercive leverage it would need to quickly seize coveted territory or overturn other aspects of the status quo by pursuing a fait accompli strategy.”
This “anti-access, area-denial” bubble that China could activate within the first island chain and beyond will mean follow-on forces coming from Hawaii and the West Coast would have to fight their way into the region, analysts wrote. And while the report says the U.S. military “would probably — but not certainly — prevail in an extended war, escalation at this point would be enormously costly and dangerous”.
In response to this shifting regional balance of power, the think tank also calls for a strategy of collective defense to offset shortfalls in America’s regional military power.
Australia, in particular, is urged in the report to beef up its own network of regional partnerships and alliances by pursuing “capability aggregation and collective deterrence with capable regional allies and partners such as the United States and Japan, as well establishing new and expanding its existing, high-end military exercises with allies and partners to develop and demonstrate new operational concepts for Indo-Pacific contingencies.”
The report also calls on Australia to rebalance its defence resources from the Middle East to the Indo-Pacific, acquire robust land-based strike and denial capabilities as well as increase its own stockpiles and create sovereign capabilities in the “storage and production of precision munitions, fuel and other materiel necessary for sustained high-end conflict.” (Source: Defense News)
14 Aug 19. S. Korea to Acquire More Anti-Missile Radars, Interceptors to Counter NK Threats. South Korea plans to add two more ground-based anti-missile early warning radars and build three Aegis-equipped destroyers in the next five years in an effort to better detect and intercept incoming missiles from North Korea, the defense ministry said Wednesday.
The plan was one of the key projects that the ministry unveiled in its five-year defense blueprint for 2020-2024 amid heightened concerns about North Korea’s missile capabilities in the wake of a series of test-firings of what Pyongyang claimed were new weapons.
The five-year plan calls for spending 290.5trn won ($239.88bn), a 7.1 percent on-year hike on average over the next five years. Of the total, 103.8trn won is on improving defense capabilities and the remaining 186.7trn won on force management, the ministry noted.
The plan came at a time when North Korea has apparently been focusing on the modernization of its conventional weapons by test-firing short-range ballistic missiles, including its version of the Iskander, in recent weeks, amid stalled denuclearization negotiations with the United States.
Under the plan, the ministry seeks to earmark 34.1trn won for projects aimed at “securing strategic deterrent capabilities” against threats from nuclear arms and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
In order to advance its independent, low-tier missile shield called the Korea Air and Missile Defense system, the military plans to expand its detection coverage of ballistic missiles by securing two early warning radars and building three more Aegis-equipped destroyers with an advanced radar system.
It will also seek to enhance its multi-layered interception capabilities by deploying the improved version of interceptors — Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-3 and Cheolmae-II missiles, while wrapping up the development of L-SAM, a long-range surface-to-air missile.
With a goal to boost its “strategic target strike” capabilities against nuclear and missile facilities, the ministry vowed to secure more precision-guided missiles to be launched from the ground, the sea, submarines and fighter jets. (Source: defense-aerospace.com/The Korea Herald)
18 Aug 19. Russia says no plans to install new missiles unless U.S. deploys them. Russia will not deploy new missiles as long as the United States shows similar restraint in Europe and Asia, Russian defence minister Sergei Shoigu said on Sunday, after Washington’s withdrawal from a Soviet-era arms pact. The United States formally left the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty with Russia earlier this month after accusing Moscow of violating the treaty and deploying one banned type of missile, allegations the Kremlin denies. Russia has also pulled out of the deal, but Shoigu said it had no plans to deploy new missiles.
“We still stick to that. Unless there are such systems in Europe (deployed by Washington), we won’t do anything there,” he told the Rossiya-24 TV channel, according to Interfax news agency.
The pact banned land-based missiles with a range of between 310 and 3,400 miles (500-5,500km), reducing the ability of both countries to launch a nuclear strike at short notice. Russian President Vladimir Putin has warned that Moscow would start developing short and intermediate-range land-based nuclear missiles if the United States started doing the same after the demise of the arms control treaty. (Source: Reuters)
19 Aug 19. US Studies Centre study calls for greater Australian Indo-Pacific pivot. The perfect storm of factors is seeing the US military capability in the Indo-Pacific “atrophy” in the face of rising tactical and strategic challenges driven by China, which has prompted a sharp decline in US military primacy and calls from within the United States Studies Centre for Australia to begin a renewed period of reorientation towards the region.
Australia has long sought to balance the paradigms of strategic independence and strategic dependence – seemingly limited by a comparatively small population and industrial base, the pendulum has always swung more heavily towards a paradigm of dependence, however the changing nature of domestic and global affairs requires renewed consideration.
Australia’s earliest strategic relationship with the British Empire established a foundation of dependence that would characterise all of the nation’s future defence and national security relationships both in the Indo-Pacific and the wider world. As British power slowly declined following the First World War and the US emerged as the pre-eminent economic, political and strategic power during the Second World War, Australia became dependent on “Pax Americana” or the American Peace.
The growing conventional and hybrid capabilities of peer and near-peer competitors – namely Russia and China – combined with the growing modernisation, capability enhancements and reorganisation of force structures in the armies of nations including India, Indonesia, Vietnam and Thailand, all contribute to the changing balance of economic, political and strategic power in the Indo-Pacific.
This perfect storm of factors, swirling like a maelstrom across Australia’s northern borders, has largely gone unnoticed by the Australian public, beyond the odd port visit by American or, as recently happened, Chinese naval vessels that seem to cause momentary flurries of concern. Meanwhile, Australia’s strategic and political leaders appear to be caught in an increasingly dangerous paradigm of thinking, one of continuing US-led dominance and Australia maintaining its position as a supplementary power.
Prior to establishing a new paradigm and priorities, it is critical to understand the nation’s history of strategic policy making and the key priorities that have defined Australia’s position in the Indo-Pacific since federation – traditionally, Australia’s strategic and defence planning has been intrinsically defined and impacted by a number of different yet interconnected and increasingly complex factors, namely:
- Guaranteeing the enduring benevolence and continuing stability of its primary strategic partner – via continued support of its strategic ambitions;
- The geographic isolation of the continent, highlighted by the ‘tyranny of distance’;
- A relatively small population in comparison with its neighbours; and
- Increasingly, the geopolitical, economic and strategic ambition and capabilities of Australia’s Indo-Pacific Asian neighbours.
This state of ‘strategic dependence’ has placed Australia at a disadvantage and entrenched a belief that the nation is both incapable of greater independent tactical and strategic action and must consistently support the designs and ambitions of great powers, with little concern for the broader impact on Australia and its national interests as a form of insurance.
Recognising the increasing confluence of challenges facing enduring US tactical and strategic primacy, the University of Sydney-based United States Studies Centre (USSC) has released a telling study, titled ‘Averting Crisis: American strategy, military spending and collective defence in the Indo-Pacific’, which makes a series of powerful recommendations for Australian and allied forces in the region.
Declining US capacity spells need for greater Australian capability
One of the core challenges facing the US in the Indo-Pacific and, more broadly, key allies like Australia, Japan and South Korea, is the growing atrophy of America’s armed forces in the region, and the report cites a number of contributing factors directly impacting the capacity of the US to war of a peer competitor that is increasingly capable, equipped and well funded.
“America has an atrophying force that is not sufficiently ready, equipped or postured for great power competition in the Indo-Pacific — a challenge it is working hard to address. Twenty years of near-continuous combat and budget instability has eroded the readiness of key elements in the US Air Force, Navy, Army and Marine Corps. Military accidents have risen, ageing equipment is being used beyond its lifespan and training has been cut,” the study identifies.
“Military platforms built in the 1980s are becoming harder and more costly to maintain; while many systems designed for great power conflict were curtailed in the 2000s to make way for the force requirements of Middle Eastern wars — leading to stretched capacity and overuse.”
The USSC spells out the one thing few of Australia’s strategic policy thinkers and political leaders seem willing to come to terms with, beyond the radical fluctuations between doom and gloom scenarios: some of which range from a complete retreat by the US, leaving Australia and other regional allies alone, or a semi-retreat and focus on limiting risk to key American assets in the region.
In doing so, the USSC recognises that for the first time America has a true competitor in China – a nation with immense industrial potential, growing wealth and prosperity, a driving national purpose and a growing series of alliances with re-emerging, resource rich great powers in Russia, and supported by a growing network of economic hubs and indebted psuedo-colonies throughout the Indo-Pacific and Asia.
Unlike the Soviet Union, China is a highly industrialised nation – with an industrial capacity comparable to, if not exceeding, that of the US, supported by a rapidly narrowing technological gap, supporting growing military capability and territorial ambitions, bringing the rising power into direct competition with the US and its now fraying alliance network of tired global allies.
Whether consciously recognising the potential of this challenge or not, the US President’s direct, often confrontational approach towards allies belies domestic concerns about America’s ability to maintain the post-Second World War global order. Andrew Davies of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) highlighted the importance of recognising the limitation of US power in a recent piece for ASPI, saying, “The assumption of continued US primacy that permeated DWP 2016 looked heroic at the time. It seems almost foolishly misplaced now.”
Australia’s need for strategic independence and strong alliances
Responding to these challenges requires an approach that recognises each of these factors are all part of national security policy. This includes a dedicated focus on developing a robust economic and industrial capacity – devoid of dependence on any single source of economic prosperity – while focusing on developing a robust and independently capable tactical and strategic military capability, supported by Australia’s enduring diplomatic good will and relationships in the region.
These responses do not hinder Australia’s economic growth or strategic stability – rather, if developed, communicated and implemented correctly they support the economic growth, diversity and development of the nation, building on a record period of economic growth and prosperity, providing flow on benefits for Australia’s strategic capacity to act as an independent strategic benefactor.
The USSC highlights a suite of suggestions for Australian strategic policy and its political leaders to consider to position Australia as an increasingly capable and invaluable ally committed to supporting and defending the global and, more specifically, the Indo-Pacific’s rules-based order: “A strategy of collective defence is fast becoming necessary as a way of offsetting shortfalls in America’s regional military power and holding the line against rising Chinese strength. To advance this approach, Australia should:
- Pursue capability aggregation and collective deterrence with capable regional allies and partners, including the United States and Japan.
- Reform US-Australia alliance co-ordination mechanisms to focus on strengthening regional deterrence objectives.
- Rebalance Australian defence resources from the Middle East to the Indo-Pacific.
- Establish new, and expand existing, high-end military exercises with allies and partners to develop and demonstrate new operational concepts for Indo-Pacific contingencies.
- Acquire robust land-based strike and denial capabilities.
- Improve regional posture, infrastructure and networked logistics, including in northern Australia.
- Increase stockpiles and create sovereign capabilities in the storage and production of precision munitions, fuel and other materiel necessary for sustained high-end conflict.
- Establish an Indo-Pacific Security Workshop to drive US-allied joint operational concept development.
- Advance joint experimental research and development projects aimed at improving the cost-capability curve.”
Australia emerged from the Second World War as a middle power, essential to maintaining the post-war economic, political and strategic power paradigm established and led by the US – this relationship, established as a result of the direct threat to Australia, replaced Australia’s strategic relationship of dependence on the British Empire and continues to serve as the basis of the nation’s strategic policy direction and planning.
The nation is uniquely located, straddling both the Indian and Pacific Ocean at the very edge of south-east Asia, enhancing the nation’s status as the key regional ally for the US – with Australia increasingly dependent upon the economic stability and growth of major established and emerging economic, political and strategic Indo-Pacific powers, namely China, Japan, India, Korea and smaller nations.
Recognising this, Australia’s security and prosperity are directly influenced by the stability and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific, meaning Australia must be directly engaged as both a benefactor and leader in all matters related to strategic, economic and political security, serving as either a replacement or complementary force to the role played by the US – should the US commitment or capacity be limited. (Source: Defence Connect)
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