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10 Aug 19. Iran unveils ‘upgraded missile defence system.’ Iran unveiled on Saturday what authorities said was a locally upgraded missile defence system with a range of 400 km (250 miles) and able to defend against cruise and ballistic missiles and drones.

The announcement comes at a time of rising tension between Iran and United States. Iran shot down a U.S. military surveillance drone in the Gulf with a surface-to-air missile in June. Tehran says the drone was over its territory, but Washington says it was in international airspace.

State television showed the Falaq, a vehicle and a mobile radar installation it said was an improved version of the Gamma system, which military experts said was of Russian origin. Western military analysts say Iran often exaggerates its weapons capabilities, though concerns about its long-range ballistic missile programme contributed to Washington last year exiting the pact that Iran sealed with world powers in 2015 to rein in its nuclear ambitions in exchange for an easing of economic sanctions.

“This system has high capabilities and can detect all types of cruise and ballistic missiles and drones,” Brigadier General Alireza Sabahifard, commander of the regular army’s air defences, was quoted as saying by semi-official news agency Mehr.

Sabahifard said the Falaq was a locally overhauled version of a system which had been out of operation for a long time, Mehr reported. He did not give the system’s country of origin.

U.S. President Donald Trump reimposed sanctions on Tehran after pulling out of the nuclear deal, which its other signatories are struggling to maintain as Washington also lobbies to establish a maritime security coalition to safeguard shipping in the Gulf in a related standoff with Iran over oil supplies. (Source: Reuters)

10 Aug 19. U.S.-based experts suspect Russia blast involved nuclear-powered missile. U.S.-based nuclear experts said on Friday they suspected an accidental blast and radiation release in northern Russia this week occurred during the testing of a nuclear-powered cruise missile vaunted by President Vladimir Putin last year.

The Russian Ministry of Defense, quoted by state-run news outlets, said that two people died and six were injured on Thursday in an explosion of what it called a liquid propellant rocket engine. No dangerous substances were released, it said. Russia’s state nuclear agency Rosatom said early on Saturday that five of its staff members died.

A spokeswoman for Severodvinsk, a city of 185,000 near the test site in the Arkhangelsk region, was quoted in a statement on the municipal website as saying that a “short-term” spike in background radiation was recorded at noon Thursday. The statement was not on the site on Friday.

The Russian Embassy did not immediately respond for comment.

Two experts said in separate interviews with Reuters that a liquid rocket propellant explosion would not release radiation.

They said that they suspected the explosion and the radiation release resulted from a mishap during the testing of a nuclear-powered cruise missile at a facility outside the village of Nyonoksa.

“Liquid fuel missile engines exploding do not give off radiation, and we know that the Russians are working on some kind of nuclear propulsion for a cruise missile,” said Ankit Panda, an adjunct senior fellow with the Federation of American Scientists.

Russia calls the missile the 9M730 Buresvestnik. The NATO alliance has designated it the SSC-X-9 Skyfall. A senior Trump administration official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said he would not confirm or deny that a mishap involving a nuclear-powered cruise missile occurred. But he expressed deep skepticism over Moscow’s explanation.

“We continue to monitor the events in the Russian far north but Moscow’s assurances that ‘everything is normal’ ring hollow to us,” said the official.

“This reminds us of a string of incidents dating back to Chernobyl that call into question whether the Kremlin prioritises the welfare of the Russian people above maintaining its own grip on power and its control over weak corruption streams.”

The official was referring to the 1986 explosion at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, in the former Soviet republic of Ukraine, which released radioactive airborne contamination for about nine days. Moscow delayed revealing the extent of what is regarded as the worst nuclear accident in history.

Putin boasted about the nuclear-powered cruise missile in a March 2018 speech to the Russian parliament in which he hailed the development of a raft of fearsome new strategic weapons.

The missile, he said, was successfully tested in late 2017, had “unlimited range” and was “invincible against all existing and prospective missile defence and counter-air defence systems.”

‘NOT THERE BY ACCIDENT’

Jeffrey Lewis, director of the East Asia Non-Proliferation Program at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies, said he believed that a mishap occurred during the testing of the nuclear-powered cruise missile based on commercial satellite pictures and other data.

Using satellite photos, he and his team determined that the Russians last year appeared to have disassembled a facility for test-launching the missile at a site in Novaya Zemlya and moved it to the base near Nyonoksa.

The photos showed that a blue “environmental shelter” – under which the missiles are stored before launching – at Nyonoksa and rails on which the structure is rolled back appear to be the same as those removed from Novaya Zemlya.

Lewis and his team also examined Automatic Identification System (AIS) signals from ships located off the coast on the same day as the explosion. They identified one ship as the Serebryanka, a nuclear fuel carrier that they had tracked last year off Novaya Zemlya.

“You don’t need this ship for conventional missile tests,” Lewis said. “You need it when you recover a nuclear propulsion unit from the sea floor.”

He noted that the AIS signals showed that the Serebryanka was located inside an “exclusion zone” established off the coast a month before the test, to keep unauthorized ships from entering.

“What’s important is that the Serebryanka is inside that exclusion zone. It’s there. It’s inside the ocean perimeter that they set up. It’s not there by accident,” he said. “I think they were probably there to pick up a propulsion unit off the ocean floor.”

Lewis said he didn’t know what kind of radiation hazard the Russian system poses because he did was unaware of the technical details, such as the size of the nuclear reactor.

But he noted that the United States sought to develop a nuclear-powered missile engine in the 1950s that spewed radiation.

“It represented a health hazard to anyone underneath it,” he said.(Source: Reuters)

09 Aug 19. Why China Can’t Target U.S. Aircraft Carrier. Critics of U.S. aircraft carriers have been arguing for decades that the survival of the world’s biggest warships will increasingly be at risk in an era of long-range, precision-guided anti-ship missiles. In recent years, China has typically been identified as the military power most likely to drive U.S. carriers from the sea.

But the U.S. Navy seems much less worried about carrier attacks than observers who lack military credentials and clearances. In fact, the outgoing Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral John Richardson, told an audience earlier this year that “we’re less vulnerable now than we have been since and including World War II.”

One reason the Navy is not alarmed is that it has invested heavily in new technologies aimed at bolstering the defenses of carrier strike groups. It also has changed its tactics for operating near China. But the biggest reason for confidence about the future resides in the difficulties China would face in trying to find and track U.S. carriers.

Large-deck, nuclear-powered aircraft carriers of the type the U.S. Navy operates seem like they would be easy to target. They are over a thousand feet long, they are 25 decks high, and they are made of steel that reflects radar signals. They have distinctive optical, infrared and radio-frequency signatures.

So what can be so hard about targeting them, using the extensive arsenal of anti-ship missiles that China has accumulated? Well for starters, there are the huge distances within which carriers operating in the Western Pacific can hide. The South China Sea alone measures 1.4 million square miles, and is only one of four marginal seas from which carrier air wings could launch attacks against China.

If a carrier is conducting sea control operations—keeping the sea lanes open to key allies such as Japan—it will likely be beyond the first island chain that parallels the Chinese coast, and thus able to hide in the vastness of the Western Pacific. It is hard to find anything in millions of square miles of open ocean, and in the case of U.S. carriers the target will be moving constantly.

Nuclear power makes that possible. U.S. carriers essentially have unlimited range. If China’s military actually sights a carrier, it will not be where it was seen by the time weapons arrive. At 35 miles per hour, the carriers can be anywhere in an area measuring over 700 square miles within 30 minutes. That area grows to over 6,000 square miles after 90 minutes, which is the more likely time elapsed between detecting a carrier and launching a missile from the Chinese mainland.

But let’s back up for a moment and consider the multiple hurdles that Chinese attackers would need to overcome to successfully target a carrier. First, they would have to find the carrier; then they would have to fix its location; then they would have to establish a continuous track of its movements; then they would have to actually target the carrier with specific weapons; then they would have to penetrate the carrier’s multi-layered defenses to reach the target; and finally they would need to assess whether the resulting damage was sufficient to disable the carrier.

The Navy refers to this process as a “kill chain,” and the metaphor is instructive. Because each step must be accomplished sequentially, if any “link” in the chain fails the whole process breaks down. The Navy and its partners in the joint force have plans for disrupting potential attackers at each step in the process.

Consider the initial steps of finding and fixing the carrier’s location. China has several options. First, it could use “over-the-horizon” radar located on land. These powerful radars monitor vast swaths of ocean by bouncing their radar signals off the ionosphere. The energy will reflect downward, and once it reaches the surface generate indications of anomalies that return to the original site of transmission via the same path.

China has at least two huge radars that can do this, but their utility is modest. First, they must operate at long wavelengths that generate relatively little information in order to bounce off the ionosphere rather than passing through it. Second, at each bounce to and from the target, much energy is lost. Third, the resulting picture of surveilled areas is of such low resolution that the radar cannot establish a target track even if it detects a carrier. Finally, the radar itself is a large, fixed object subject to preemption at the onset of war.

The second option China has is reconnaissance satellites. It has orbited dozens, some resembling the electronic listening satellites the U.S. Navy uses to monitor oceans, others employing optical sensors and “synthetic aperture” radar. But to obtain targeting-quality information, the satellites must be placed in low-earth orbit (about 660 miles above the Earth’s surface). At that elevation they are traveling at a rate of roughly 16,000 miles per hour—which means they quickly disappear over the horizon, not to return for more than an hour.

The Navy figures that in order to continuously surveil ocean areas near China, Beijing would need to establish three parallel north-south tracks in low-earth orbit, and populate each of those tracks with dozens of satellites spaced to assure continuous coverage. China is nowhere near having such a constellation, and even if it did, connecting all the overhead nodes with an earth-bound command and control system to dispatch weapons against a carrier would be hugely difficult.

The third find-and-fix option China has would be manned or unmanned radar planes. But U.S. carrier strike groups maintain a dense defensive perimeter in the air around their locations that includes interceptor aircraft, networked surface-to-air missiles, surveillance planes and airborne jammers. No Chinese aircraft is likely to get close enough to a carrier to establish a sustained target track. The same applies to Chinese surface vessels and submarines, which are even more vulnerable to preemption by the strike group than airborne assets.

So the vital early steps of simply finding and fixing the carriers would not be easy. Connecting the assets required for those tasks with the other systems used in later stages of the kill chain would be challenging, especially given the brief timelines available in which to engage the continuously moving target. Any weapons dispatched against the intended target would need to negotiate multiple layers of active and passive defenses, including electronic countermeasures and, in the future, beam weapons.

Some observers have stressed the danger posed by China’s recent deployment of anti-ship ballistic missiles with maneuvering warheads. The Navy takes the threat seriously, and in response has moved most of its missile-defense warships to the Pacific. As a practical matter, though, these weapons make little difference to the balance of power if China cannot first find, fix, track and target a carrier. The longer the range of an anti-ship missile, the more updates it needs in flight to successfully engage a moving target. So without timely off-board sensor data and an agile command and control system, the weapon will be largely useless.

This generalization applies whether the attacking weapon is purely ballistic or a hypersonic glide vehicle. If the the location of the target vessel is not known in a timely and fairly precise fashion, then the munition is unlikely to strike its target.

The bottom line is that China is nowhere near overcoming the hurdles required for successful attacks against U.S. aircraft carriers. Whether those carriers are engaged in projecting air power ashore or maintaining control of sea lanes, Beijing will be hard-pressed to impede their operation in wartime. And it’s a safe bet that whatever assets China may have for executing such a mission on the first day of war will be quickly reduced by the combined efforts of the U.S. joint force, whether they be deployed on land, at sea, or in orbit. (Source: News Now/Forbes)

09 Aug 19. Readout of the Defense Ministerial Meeting Between the Republic of Korea and the United States. Department of Defense Chief Pentagon Spokesperson Jonathan R. Hoffman provided the following readout: Republic of Korea Minister of National Defense Jeong Kyeong-doo and the U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark T. Esper held a ROK-U.S. Defense Ministerial meeting August 9, 2019, in Seoul where they discussed the security situation on the Korean Peninsula, progress toward the transition of wartime operational control, and other key ROK-U.S. Alliance issues.

Minister Jeong and Secretary Esper shared their understanding through assessments of the recent security environment on the Korean Peninsula and in the region, and reaffirmed their commitment to support the two countries’ diplomatic efforts to achieve complete denuclearization and permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula. They also pledged to strengthen communication and cooperation to maintain stability in the region based on a robust U.S.-ROK Alliance.

Minister Jeong and Secretary Esper noted the significant strides made toward the fulfillment of conditions for the transition of wartime OPCON, and they look forward to discussing the assessment results of initial operational capability certification of the future Combined Forces Command Headquarters at this fall’s Security Consultative Meeting. They agreed that the transition should strengthen the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command and the Alliance, and ensured it continues to contribute to the peace and stability of not only the Korean Peninsula, but also of the region and the world. Minister Jeong and Secretary Esper affirmed the importance of continued close coordination in achieving denuclearization and peace on the Korean Peninsula, and pledged to maintain close communication at the ministerial level. (Source: US DoD)

08 Aug 19. Israeli Election Politics Slowing IAF Acquisitions. The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) ground forces command want an immediate replacement for the CH-53. “It is natural that operational needs differ, but this is the task of the highest command to evaluate the needs and make a decision,” a senior Israeli defense official said. The troubled coalition politics of Israel are begging to hurt the country’s weapons development. After Prime Minister Netanyahu’s failed attempts to form a coalition, all the military acquisition decision-making machinery slowed to a halt. It is expected that after a new government is formed and a new multi-year plan of the Israeli defense forces (IDF) is approved, the Israeli defense companies and their U.S subsidiaries will have to adapt themselves to a new reality. If the second election scheduled for Sept. 17 leads to a new, more stable coalition, the decision-making process will start to move again. In the meantime, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) faces a problem. IAF test pilots will soon visit the U.S for a series of test flights of the two helicopters competing for replacement of the CH-53. The two candidates are the Lockheed Martin CH-53K and Boeing’s CH-47. Israeli defense sources criticize what they call “foot dragging” that is delaying the selection. “The data is available — there are different wishes in the Israeli defense forces — but it is time to make a decision as the CH-53s are not getting younger,” one of the sources said. The Israeli sources say the relevant data about the two helicopters was made available to the IAF “months ago”.

What complicates the already messy situation, is the IAF’s clear need for the Bell-Boeing V-22 — in addition to a new heavy helicopter. The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) ground forces command want an immediate replacement for the CH-53. “It is natural that operational needs differ, but this is the task of the highest command to evaluate the needs and make a decision,” a senior Israeli defense official said.

The Israeli sources said they hope the IDF senior leadership will decide very soon, “because there are no reasons for any further delay” one of them said.

For a half century, DRS has provided military forces around the world with advanced technologies and capabilities to meet their mission needs. Here are some highlights. And as reported by Breaking Defense, another major decision has not been made, in spite of the fact that the data about the two options – additional F-35’s or the F-15X — was made available to the IAF months ago. (Source: glstrade.com/Breaking Defense.com)

09 Aug 19. Charting the middle path between the US-China strategic competition. Former SAS officer turned government MP Andrew Hastie has issued a call to arms for Australia to chart a middle path between the growing Chinese and American strategic competition – a key component of this, Hastie argues, is viewing the reality of the situation, the opportunities and challenges arrayed against the nation.

Over the past few days, Andrew Hastie, chair of the incredibly influential parliamentary intelligence and security committee, has drawn the attention and ire of Beijing with claims that both Australia and the world is quietly stumbling into a period of time similar to the 1930s-era prelude to conflict with Nazi Germany – a period characterised by increased assertiveness by totalitarian regimes, economic, political and strategic capitulation and accommodation for global democratic leaders and for Australia, an ignorant bliss that resulted in the nation being caught completely unaware of the myriad threats.

“Like many people across the world, I saw 9/11 as the geopolitical moment that would shape the 21st century. It shaped the next decade of my own life. But I was wrong,” Mr Hastie stated in an opinion piece for The Sydney Morning Herald – setting the scene for the tone of his thesis.

“The most significant geopolitical moment of the 21st century had already happened, five months earlier. And most of us, distracted by more dramatic events, failed to see it. It came on April Fool’s Day, 2001. A J-8 fighter jet from the People’s Liberation Army Navy collided with a US Navy EP-3 signals intelligence aircraft, 70 kilometres off the coast of Hainan Island.

“Both planes began plummeting toward the South China Sea. The PLAN fighter pilot did not survive. The 24 crew of the badly damaged US EP-3 managed a hard landing on the island, and, after being offered water and cigarettes, were held for 11 days by the Chinese government. The crew was released to the US, but the aircraft was returned much later – in many small pieces – via a Russian Antonov cargo plane. This was an early test for the Bush administration, only 10 weeks old. It was faced with brinkmanship, intelligence plundering and technology transfer.”

Australia’s need to chart a ‘middle path’

Hastie’s central thesis inadvertently draws on his experience, highlighting the strategic nature of his thinking in calling for Australia’s leaders to correctly identify the nation’s need to chart a middle path, navigating the complexities of the nation’s strategic relationship with the US and the self-inflicted economic dependence on China.

“Australia must now, somehow, hold on to our sovereignty and prosperity. We must balance security and trade. But most importantly, we must remain true to our democratic convictions while also seeing the world as it is, not as we wish it to be,” Hastie identified.

“This will be immensely difficult. It is impossible to forsake the US, our closest security and investment partner. It is also impossible to disengage from China, our largest trading partner. This is the central point: almost every strategic and economic question facing Australia in the coming decades will be refracted through the geopolitical competition of the US and the PRC.”

This conundrum, Hastie posited, requires Australia take a dose of reality medication – requiring the nation to stop, breath, view and assess both the nation’s position in the world and the rapidly evolving maelstrom of economic, political and strategic competition, development and sabre rattling, particularly in areas of contention like the South China Sea, parts of central Asia and more concerningly, Australia’s own backyard in the Pacific.

Dictate our own strategic direction or it will be dictated for us

Contemporary manoeuvre warfare is defined by using shock, disruption and rapid movement to disrupt an enemy’s capacity to respond, thus dictating both the momentum and outcome of the engagement – demonstrated with devastating affect in the Middle East this concept has now evolved to include the battlefield of ideology, economics and political competition in the Indo-Pacific.

Hastie identified the need for Australia to embrace a radically different approach to the way it views not only itself, but also its position within the rapidly evolving regional and global order, lest potential adversaries begin dictating those terms of engagement for us: “Right now our greatest vulnerability lies not in our infrastructure, but in our thinking. That intellectual failure makes us institutionally weak. If we don’t understand the challenge ahead for our civil society, in our parliaments, in our universities, in our private enterprises, in our charities – our little platoons – then choices will be made for us. Our sovereignty, our freedoms, will be diminished.”

Building on this, Hastie drew on the precedent established by history and the West’s response to Stalin and the Soviet Union’s emergence in the ashes of the Second World War as a basis for shaking off the hubris that has defined Western economic, political, ideological and geo-strategic thinking since the collapse of the USSR and end of the Cold War in 1991.

“The West has made this mistake before. Commentators once believed Stalin’s decisions were the rational actions of a realist great power … We must be intellectually honest and take the Chinese leadership at its word. We are dealing with a fundamentally different vision for the world. Xi Jinping has made his vision of the future abundantly clear since becoming President in 2013. His speeches show that the tough choices ahead will be shaped, at least on the PRC side, by ideology – communist ideology, or in his words, by ‘Marxist-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought’,” Hastie posited.

Hastie’s commentary raises critical questions about the future direction of Australia and its positioning within the broader geo-strategic, political and economic order of the Indo-Pacific.

Your thoughts

The nation is defined by its relationship with the region, with access to the growing economies and to strategic sea-lines-of-communication supporting over 90 per cent of global trade, a result of the cost-effective and reliable nature of sea transport. Indo-Pacific Asia is at the epicentre of the global maritime trade, with about US$5trn worth of trade flowing through the South China Sea and the strategic waterways and choke points of south-east Asia annually.

Enhancing Australia’s capacity to act as an independent power, incorporating great power-style strategic economic, diplomatic and military capability serves not only as a powerful symbol of Australia’s sovereignty and evolving responsibilities in supporting and enhancing the security and prosperity of Indo-Pacific Asia. Shifting the public discussion away from the default Australian position of “it is all a little too difficult, so let’s not bother” will provide unprecedented economic, diplomatic, political and strategic opportunities for the nation. (Source: Defence Connect)

09 Aug 19. Calls for Australia to position itself as an ‘honest broker’ requires increased national capacity. The rapidly evolving economic, political and geo-strategic paradigm has prompted many from across Australian politics and strategic think tanks to call for Australia to play an increasingly important balancing role, acting as an ‘honest broker’ between great power rivalries and mediator between Indo-Pacific nations clashing over competing interests and ambitions, but is the nation up to the task?

Across the Indo-Pacific, competing economic, political and strategic interests, designs and ambitions are beginning to clash – driven by an unprecedented economic transformation, propelling once developing nations onto the world stage, the region, the globe and its established powers are having to adjust to a dramatically different global power paradigm.

From the South China Sea (SCS) to the increasing hostilities between India, Pakistan and China in the Kashmir region of the Himalayas, the Indo-Pacific’s changing paradigm, combined with the growing economic, political and strategic competition between the US and China, continued sabre rattling and challenges to regional and global energy supplies travelling via the Persian Gulf and an increasingly resurgent Russia all serve to challenge the global and regional order.

For Australia, a nation that has long sought to balance the paradigms of strategic independence and strategic dependence – dependent on strategic relationships with global great powers, beginning with the British Empire and now the US – the rapidly evolving order has prompted increasing discussion about the nation and its role and responsibilities as a strategic anchor in the Indo-Pacific.

Recognising this, Labor MP Peter Khalil has echoed the growing commentary about Australia and its position in the region, calling for Australia to play a larger role in mediating and mitigating tensions between the US and China – inadvertently calling for Australia to play a greater economic, political and strategic role in the broader Indo-Pacific.

“Australia no longer suffers the tyranny of distance. In fact, it’s the inverse now. We are right in the middle of the centre of what is going to be important for a peaceful and prosperous latter half of the 21st century,” Khalil said to The Sydney Morning Herald.

This perfect storm of factors, swirling like a maelstrom across Australia’s northern borders, has largely gone unnoticed by the Australian public, beyond the odd port visit by American or, as recently happened, Chinese naval vessels that seem to cause momentary flurries of concern. Meanwhile, Australia’s strategic and political leaders appear to be caught in an increasingly dangerous paradigm of thinking, one of continuing US-led dominance and Australia maintaining its position as a supplementary power.

Prior to establishing a new paradigm and priorities, it is critical to understand the nation’s history of strategic policy making and the key priorities that have defined Australia’s position in the Indo-Pacific since federation – traditionally, Australia’s strategic and defence planning has been intrinsically defined and impacted by a number of different yet interconnected and increasingly complex factors, namely:

Guaranteeing the enduring benevolence and continuing stability of its primary strategic partner – via continued support of their strategic ambitions;
The geographic isolation of the continent, highlighted by the ‘tyranny of distance’;
A relatively small population in comparison with its neighbours; and
Increasingly, the geopolitical, economic and strategic ambition and capabilities of Australia’s Indo-Pacific Asian neighbours.

This state of ‘strategic dependence’ has placed Australia at a disadvantage and entrenched a belief that the nation is both incapable of greater independent tactical and strategic action and must consistently support the designs and ambitions of great powers, with little concern for the broader impact on Australia and its national interests as a form of insurance.

In contrast, ‘strategic independence’ does not preclude great power relationships or strategic partnerships – what it does do is define Australia’s unique national interests and areas of responsibility – while also providing the avenue and impetus for Australia to take direct control of its strategic, political and economic future at a period of unprecedented upheaval.

Australia’s role as an ‘honest broker’

Establishing Australia as an ‘honest broker’ requires renewed focus on establishing economic and strategic independence – that is, ensuring that Australia is not solely dependent on any one nation for its economic prosperity and stability and is not solely dependent on any one great power for its long-term strategic security.

This does not preclude Australia’s participation in global alliances or an isolation from the global economy, rather it requires the development of a uniquely Australian strategy, in a similar manner to the National Security Strategy concept identified by former General and NSW senator Jim Molan – which recognises that that from the ‘hard power’ realm military and economic power and influence go ‘hand in glove’ and are intrinsically linked to the enduring success of such designs.

Economic diversity – that is targeting the remaining 2.5 billion people of the Indo-Pacific region who are eager to develop and enjoy a Western standard of living – supports the economic development of a diverse, ‘globally competitive’ economy serves to enhance the strategic weight of a nation.

As a nation, Australia is unlike any other. The continent enjoys a virtually unrivalled wealth of resources, including iron ore, coal, rare earth elements, uranium, natural gas, copper and is home to one of the most robust, yet underdeveloped industrial bases in the ‘developed world’ – the nation also enjoys a world-leading agriculture sector, one hindered by reliable access to water and, as expressed by speakers at an ABCC panel, a highly competitive, driven and dedicated labour force that has fallen victim to enduring stigma around competitiveness.

Further amplifying this potential is Australia’s geographic position at the cross roads of the Indian and Pacific Oceans – sharing long-standing economic partnerships with the rapidly growing economies of the region – which have voracious demands for energy, resources, agricultural and consumer goods and an overwhelming desire to enjoy a ‘Western’ standard of living.

From the military perspective, robust debate is critical to identifying the roles and capabilities Australia needs to develop in order to complement the capabilities of the US – while also focusing on establishing and maintaining Australia’s capacity to act independently in defence of its own unique economic, political and strategic interests and ambitions in the Indo-Pacific.

Doing so requires a holistic review of the size, doctrine and force structure of the Australian Defence Force and a frank discussion about the strategic realities of the Indo-Pacific and the changing economic, political and strategic environment not just of today, but equally in 20 years time.

It won’t be an easy sell for both Australia’s political leadership and the public at large, however the costs of not investing in and adequately developing the nation’s capacity to act as an independent actor – with its own economic, political and strategic designs in the Indo-Pacific, the region intrinsically linked to our own enduring prosperity, security and stability – will spell disaster for modern Australia and the standards of living many have become accustomed to.

History has been defined by the ambitions and conflagrations of ‘great powers’. Great powers typically combine a range of characteristics that set them apart from lower tier middle and minor powers, including a complementary balance of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power dynamics such as military and economic strength and diplomatic and cultural influence.

While the definition between superpowers and great powers has become increasingly blurred since the end of the Cold War – the now clear delineation between great powers like the UK, France and Germany, and to a lesser extent a resurgent Russia and Japan, and established global superpowers like the US and emerging superpower China, makes the definition increasingly flexible.

08 Aug 19. MINDEF outlines plans to expand Australia’s strategic relationship with NATO. Defence Minister Linda Reynolds has moved to strengthen Australia’s strategic partnership with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at a ceremony in Sydney – with common concerns about Iran, violent extremism and continuing stability and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific key focus points.

Australia has long been identified as a ‘de facto member of NATO’ and has emerged as one of the Cold War-era strategic partnership’s key global allies essential to supporting the preservation of the post-Second World War economic, political and strategic order.

The nation’s relationship echoes Australia’s earliest strategic relationship with the British Empire established a foundation of dependence that would characterise all of the nation’s future defence and national security relationships both in the Indo-Pacific and the wider world. As British power slowly declined following the First World War and the US emerged as the pre-eminent economic, political and strategic power during the Second World War, Australia became dependent on “Pax Americana” or the American Peace.

Australia’s relationship with both the UK and US served to position the nation well within the broader global alliance framework that supported NATO during the Cold War and has continued to serve as one of Australia’s linchpin strategic relationships within the post-Cold War balance of power. This relationship has been further enhanced as a result of joint operations against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Australia’s support of US-led operations in Iraq and against ISIS in the Middle East, which has seen Australian personnel operating with NATO member nations.

Recognising this long-standing relationship, combined with the growing conventional and hybrid capabilities of peer and near-peer competitors – namely Russia and China – and the growing modernisation, capability enhancements and reorganisation of force structures in the armies of nations including India, Indonesia, Vietnam and Thailand, all contribute to the changing balance of economic, political and strategic power in the Indo-Pacific.

While this perfect storm of factors, swirling like a maelstrom across Australia’s northern borders, has largely gone unnoticed by the Australian public, beyond the odd port visit by American or, as recently happened, Chinese naval vessels that seem to cause momentary flurries of concern – new Australian Defence Minister, Linda Reynolds, has moved to strengthen the unique relationship Australia shares with NATO.

Friendship enhanced by shared experiences in the Middle East

Australia’s partnership with NATO has come to the fore in recent years with the increased interoperability and joint operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria in particular serving as the key focus point of strengthening the relationship between Australia and NATO in the form of a new Cooperative Agreement.

Both Minister Reynolds and Stoltenberg highlighted the importance of operations in the Middle East and the role they have played in supporting the strengthening of the relationship – with growing joint concerns about the increasing security threats emerging in the Persian Gulf driven by a deteriorating situation between Iran and the US.

“We are extremely, of course, concerned about the situation in the Strait of Hormuz, and all allies are also concerned about the destabilising activities of Iran in the region, its support to different terrorists groups, its missile program, and all allies also agree that Iran should never be able to develop any nuclear weapons. Freedom of navigation is extremely important for NATO, for NATO allies,” Stoltenberg said.

“Some NATO allies are already present in the Strait of Hormuz in the Gulf – the United States, United Kingdom, and some others. There’s no NATO presence as such, but of course, we are following the situation very closely because freedom of navigation is of course important for NATO.

“This is actually my first visit to Australia as the Secretary General of NATO, and Australia is a highly valued partner for the alliance, and we are extremely grateful for the support you provide to different NATO missions and operations in Afghanistan, the training in Iraq, but also the help you provide to our activities supporting Ukraine.”

Minister Reynolds expanded on this focus and the growing importance the Cooperative Agreement aims to play in calming tensions in the Middle East, while promoting freedom of navigation in the strategically vital waterways, saying, “As the Secretary-General has said, in the Middle East, in Afghanistan and Iraq. But also discussing our – a common interest in our own region in the Indo-Pacific. There’s a lot of opportunity for us to work together – with NATO – your 29 member countries.

“I can reiterate that the Australian government remains very concerned about the increased tensions in the Strait of Hormuz, and we are considering the American request, and also now the request from the United Kingdom, but we have not yet made any decision.”

Strengthening supply chain and R&D

As technology has evolved and become increasingly complex and dependent upon strategic resources like rare earth elements (REE), an area dominated by potential peer competitor China, the joint participation in maritime security, freedom of navigation and combined with the increasing prominence of asymmetric capabilities and ‘grey zone’ tactics figured as a core focus of the renewed Cooperative Agreement between Australia and NATO.

“Cyber is another a big challenge, it’s a truly global challenge. And to exchange information, to exchange best practices, to learn from each other and also to have Australia participating in our big cyber exercises will benefit NATO, and hopefully also benefit Australia. And then also how we can look into how we can work together on developing new capabilities, again, important for Australia. So this is a framework, and then I think we have proven, and we will prove also in the years ahead that we are able to fill that with concrete activities,” Stoltenberg added.

Minister Reynolds was quick to highlight the importance of the Cooperative Agreement and the strategic relationship, stating, “I’d also add, for us, this relationship with NATO is very important. Because as we all know, we are living in increasingly uncertain geo-strategic environments in both the Indo and the Pacific, and also to our south in the Southern Ocean. So for us, working with partners and longstanding allies who share our values is very, very important. And NATO practically, under this framework, is a single point of entry for us to 29 other valued allies. So this relationship is very important for us, as we deal with emerging challenges.

“Again, as the Secretary-General said, we also talked about space and cyber, and some other increasing challenges of how we can, in our own national interest, work with NATO to protect Australia.

“We discussed the issue of critical minerals and access to rare earths, and some of the other increasing issues that we’ve got together. So what it means is, we’ve said we’re working very closely together, but we now have new challenges that we’re both facing and that we think we need to work more closely together on.”

The ADF serves an important role within Australia’s policy making apparatus and is critical to long-term national security, and while the continued defence budget growth is expected to be widely welcomed by industry, the growing challenges to the Indo-Pacific region are raising questions about whether Australia’s commitment to 2 per cent of GDP is suitable to support the growing role and responsibilities that Australia will be required to undertake as regional security load sharing between the US and broader global allies like NATO becomes a reality.

08 Aug 19. Two killed in second Russian military facility explosion this week. Russia says ‘no harmful emmissions’ released into atmosphere and raditation levels ‘normal.’ Two people have been killed and six more injured after a rocket engine explosion at a Russian military base. The blast at a military testing range in the Arkhangelsk region in north-west Russia comes just three days after an explosion at an artillery depot in Siberia injured a dozen people and forced mass evacuations. “Two specialists have died of their injuries,” the Russian defence ministry said of the Arkhangelsk explosion. “Six representatives of the Defense Ministry…have sustained various injuries as a result of the accident,” “There were no emissions of harmful substances into the atmosphere, the radiation background is normal,” the ministry added. Russian media has reported that the incident occurred in a district where the central naval testing ground of the Russian Navy is located. (Source: FT.com)

07 Aug 19. With an eye on Russia, China and a horse, Pentagon chief visits Mongolia. U.S. Defense Secretary Mark Esper met senior Mongolian leaders on Thursday in a rare visit to the strategically important nation as the Pentagon seeks to implement its strategy of focusing on countering China and Russia.

On a map, Mongolia, locked between Russia and China, best represents the Pentagon’s priorities over the coming decades.

“It is my deep privilege to be here, to be with you and to have the opportunity to look at different ways we can further strengthen the ties between our two countries,” Esper said before the start of his meeting with his Mongolian counterpart.

Esper was welcomed to the capital Ulaanbaatar on Wednesday according to custom, trying dried milk curd upon stepping off the plane at Chinggis Khaan International Airport, named after the country’s warrior-emperor.

The ceremonial highlight of the visit was when Esper was given a seven-year old caramel colored horse as a present. Esper named the horse Marshall after former U.S. Defense Secretary General George Marshall.

“He’s happy, he likes his name,” Esper, standing next to the horse, said.

The horse will stay behind to be cared for in Mongolia, though Esper was given a framed photo of the it. Esper, in return, gave the caretaker a blanket for the horse which is used by the U.S. Army Old Guard.

Esper’s visit to Mongolia, on his first international trip since being confirmed as defense secretary, highlights the importance the country is seen as playing in the region.

This is the first visit to the country by a defense secretary since 2014, when Chuck Hagel spent about four hours there. Esper spent a night in Ulaanbaatar.

Mongolia is eager for investment from the United States and other countries it considers “third neighbors” to help it reduce its economic dependence on China, through which most of its exports of cashmere and other goods move.

Late last month, Mongolian President Battulga Khaltmaa visited Washington to meet with President Donald Trump.

Battulga, a businessman often described as “Mongolia’s Trump”, was elected in 2017 on a populist and sometimes anti-Chinese platform, with the country increasingly wary of Beijing’s growing regional dominance.

“They have been a good ally that punches above its weight, and I think Secretary Esper wants to acknowledge (that) and see if there are ways to grow the partnership further,” said a senior U.S. defense official, speaking on the condition of anonymity.

The official said that while this trip was not about promoting any specific initiative, the United States was keen to look at expanding ties, potentially in areas such as military training, which could take advantage of Mongolia’s cold weather.

REGIONAL IMPORTANCE

Esper’s trip to Mongolia comes at a particularly tense time in relations between the United States and China, which are locked into an escalating trade war.

Last year, the U.S. military put countering China and Russia at the center of a new national defense strategy, shifting priorities after more than a decade and a half of focusing on the fight against Islamist militants.

Mongolia has been a consistent U.S. military partner, providing troops to U.S.-led missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, where it still has about 200 troops.

It also has a relationship with North Korea that Washington could leverage as Trump seeks to revive stalled denuclearization talks with Pyongyang. The country is accessible by rail from North Korea.

“Mongolia is not going to side entirely with anybody against anybody,” said Abraham Denmark, a former U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense for East Asia.

“But they are looking to bolster their relationships with the United States because possibly they want American economic engagement and political engagement, but also because it gives them a bit more breathing space in their relations with Beijing and Moscow,” Denmark said. (Source: Reuters)

07 Aug 19. India – Pakistan: Remain prepared for escalation of armed clashes along Line of Control through 15 August. In wake of the Indian government revocation of the special status of the Indian-administered portion of the disputed Kashmir region on 5 August, Pakistan has raised the alert level of its armed forces along the Line of Control (LoC), separating the two countries. In addition, Pakistan has downgraded its diplomatic ties with India and suspended trade between the countries. Pakistani airspace remains open as of 1800Z on 7 August, despite traditional and social media reports to the contrary. However, air traffic routing over Pakistan remains shifted in accordance with the extension of NOTAMs OPLR A0784-5/19 and OPKR A0779/19. Of note, there has been daily artillery shelling along the LoC by both Indian and Pakistani military forces since 29 July coupled with a spike in aviation activity by the respective air forces of each country. India completed a large-scale deployment of Indian paramilitary personnel into Jammu & Kashmir State in early-August. Both India and Pakistan have military airbases with combat aircraft and air-defence units with conventional surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems operationally stationed in areas near the LoC. The SAM systems and combat aircraft are capable of engaging targets at altitudes well above FL260. On 23 March, the US FAA issued a revised conflict zone advisory and background information for Pakistani airspace, which notes that military activity by Pakistan and India along the LoC poses a potential inadvertent risk to US civil aviation operations at all altitudes (NOTAM KICZ A0008/19).

Analysis

As a result of the Indian government’s revocation of Indian-administered Kashmir’s special status, unrest in the region is expected, which may in part account for what the Indian authorities have described as an increased terrorist threat. Given the upsurge in military activity on both sides of the border and potential for unrest, we assess there is a significantly increased likelihood of further escalation in armed clashes along the LoC between Indian and Pakistani military forces through 15 August, which happens to include the national Independence Day dates of each country. Consequently, there is a significantly greater likelihood of short-notice airspace restrictions being enacted for Pakistani and/or Indian airspace through mid August. The situation through mid August has a heightened potential to mirror what occurred from late February to mid July when Indian and Pakistani air and air-defence forces were heavily active during armed clashes along the LoC as well as the border separating the two countries. The majority of FIR Karachi (OPKR) and FIR Lahore (OPLR) airspace was subsequently closed to overflight from late February to mid July due to the above activity. The Indian military used conventional SAM systems to shoot down Pakistani military drones along the shared border in late February and early March. Both sides reportedly used combat aircraft armed with air-to-air missiles to shoot down several of each other’s aircraft in late February. We continue to assess the entirety of Pakistan’s FIR Lahore (OPLR) and areas of India’s FIR Delhi (VIDF) covering Jammu & Kashmir State along with areas located within 32 miles (50km) of the Pakistan border to be HIGH risk airspace environments at all altitudes. In addition, we continue to assess the entirety of Pakistan’s FIR Karachi (OPKR) and areas of India’s FIR Mumbai (VABF) located within 32 miles (50km) of the Pakistan border to be HIGH risk airspace environments below FL260 and MODERATE above FL260. The risk ratings for the airspace over Pakistan and India are being kept under constant review.

Advice

Approvals: As a precaution, conduct operational risk-based identification of divert and alternate airports for flight schedules with planned stops at aerodromes in the country or with overflight of the airspace. Operators are advised to ensure flight plans are correctly filed, attain proper special approvals for flight operations to sensitive locations and obtain relevant overflight permits prior to departure. In addition, ensure crews scheduled to operate to or over the country in the near term are fully aware of the latest security situation.

Military Air Activity: Increased military air operations have the potential to cause airspace congestion and impact the safety of civil aviation flights. Any significant increase in the amount of air operations over the country may impact the availability of airports along with access to the airspace. Aviation operators should monitor airport/airspace-specific airspace-specific notices, bulletins, circulars, advisories, prohibitions and restrictions prior to departure to avoid flight schedule disruption.

Shoot-down Policy: The country has an aggressive air intercept and shoot-down policy which allows air and air defence forces to intercept and disable aerial targets violating airspace regulations. Military air and air defence assets may be employed to down aerial targets under the auspice of the policy. While legal civil aviation flights are unlikely to be directly targeted, there remains a latent but credible risk of misidentification and interception by military air and air defence assets. (Source: Osprey)

07 Aug 19. Turkey and US vow to establish north Syria safe zone. Move will raise hopes a confrontation with Kurdish groups can be avoided. Turkey and the United States have resolved to establish a “safe zone” in northern Syria, the two countries said on Wednesday after days of talks aimed at averting a Turkish military assault. A joint statement published by the Turkish defence ministry and the US embassy in Ankara said that they had agreed on “the rapid implementation of initial measures to address Turkey’s security concerns” in the region. The two nations pledged to set up a joint operations centre in Turkey “to co-ordinate and manage the establishment of the safe zone together”. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan had long threatened to launch an incursion across Turkey’s southern border to push back Kurdish militant groups that control the area and are seen by Ankara as a national security threat. That has caused alarm in Washington, which has backed Kurdish forces as key allies in the fight against Isis jihadis, who earlier this year finally lost their last scrap of territory on the east bank of the Euphrates river.

Months of talks between the two sides had failed to make progress, prompting Mr Erdogan to warn that a Turkish military operation was imminent. “So far, we have been patient. But that patience has its limits,” he said on Sunday. US officials arrived in Ankara on Monday for a last-ditch drive to avert an assault. Wednesday’s joint statement will raise hopes in Washington that a violent confrontation between Turkey and a key US ally can be avoided. The text of the agreement gave no detail on how a safe zone might work. Previous talks have foundered on the depth and width of the region, how it would be patrolled, and which groups would be allowed to remain. The statement said only that the safe zone “shall become a peace corridor” and that efforts would be made to enable displaced Syrians to return home. Turkey is host to 3.6m Syrian refugees, and growing public discontent at their continued presence has become an important motivation behind Ankara’s drive to launch its third incursion into Syria since 2016. Turkish officials say that in recent years around 330,000 refugees have returned to a swath of northern Syria that is already controlled by Turkey. (Source: FT.com)

07 Aug 19. What’s the end goal of China’s pursuit of Pacific presence? China has moved to expand its soft power into Australia’s backyard – the south Pacific. The increased push for critical infrastructure development, debt relief and financing has prompted the Australian government to initiate the ‘Pacific Step-up’program, however, no one has stopped to ask: what is China’s end goal?

Like every ascendent economic, political and strategic power, China has used its period of rapid industrialisation and economic expansion to begin establishing its position within the broader global context – fuelled by a long memory of a “century of humiliation” at the hands of Western imperialism, finally ending with the successful Communist Revolution in 1949, China and its political leaders have dedicated the nation to establishing a new era of Chinese global primacy.

As China’s position within the global order has evolved and its ambitions towards the Indo-Pacific in particular have become increasingly apparent, the Chinese government, driven by an extremely ambitious leader, President Xi Jinping, has identified a number of factors of both ‘internal’ and ‘external’ concern for the rising superpower’s status.

These ‘concerns’ extend to traditional areas of Chinese focus, namely central Asia, Tibet and the Taiwan situation, and more concerning for nations like Australia, the south Pacific and south-east Asia – further compounding these issues is America’s resurgence, characterised by what China describes as: “intensified competition among major countries, significantly increased its defence expenditure, pushed for additional capacity in nuclear, outer space, cyber and missile defence, and undermined global strategic stability”.

In response, the Australian government and Prime Minister Scott Morrison have kicked off the renewed ‘Pacific Step-up’ program to counter the growing economic, political and diplomatic influence of China as a result of the growing expansion of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – the Lowy Institute identified the growing power and influence China’s BRI program has in supporting the Pacific.

“Infrastructure remains a crucial requirement for ensuring resilience in the Pacific. Considering the opportunities for collective engagement with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) merit careful analysis and discussion, particularly given that nine forum member countries have already signed bilateral memoranda of understanding to co-operate with China on the BRI,” it said.

It is important to ask, what is the end goal of this program of influence development, what is the impact on Australia and is the ‘Pacific Step-up’ enough?

Endebted island nations and a mafia ‘extortion racket’?

The Chinese people have long prided themselves as being students of history – the overt expansion of Chinese strategic capability and high-end military capability, particularly power projection forces, has drawn the attention of Australian, US and allied regional policy makers and strategic thinkers who have asked questions about the tactical and strategic intent behind the development of these forces.

Shifting the focus towards China’s ambitious designs and infrastructure packages offered to a range of Pacific island nations including Papua New Guinea, Fiji and others – these nations represent incredibly small markets for Chinese produced consumer goods, with limited natural resources and are of limited if any strategic value in the event of conflict.

Japan learned the lesson of overreaching in the Pacific during the Second World War as the Pacific island hopping campaign strained the ability of the Imperial Japanese Armed Forces to adequately support and supply deployed forces throughout the far flung islands and coral atolls in the Pacific – once again raising the question, what is the end goal of China’s infrastructure program?

It is equally important to take a closer look at the existing examples of China’s BRI program and infrastructure financing programs as they have been rolled out throughout the Indo-Pacific and into Africa, with examples in Sri Lanka’s Magampura Mahinda Rajapaksa Port located in Hambantota, which was financed by Chinese firms.

Looking to Africa, Chinese ‘debt traps’ in south-eastern Africa have resulted in the Chinese repossession of airports, mines, railways and similar infrastructure following the failure to service the loans by local governments – leaving these nations endebted to China with little to no control over their economic, political and strategic destiny.

An expansion of the South China Sea precedent?

Further compounding these ‘internal issues’ is the superpower’s willingness to declare any area of economic, political or strategic interest a part of China, and nowhere is this more evident than in the South China Sea – placing the rising superpower’s ambitions in direct conflict with the post-Second World War economic, political and strategic order established by the US and supported by a number of established regional powers, including Japan, Australia and South Korea.

China’s White Paper clearly articulates its position towards the South China Sea and its construction of military facilities on reclaimed islands throughout the international waterways: “China resolutely safeguards its national sovereignty and territorial integrity.

“The South China Sea islands and Diaoyu Islands are inalienable parts of the Chinese territory. China exercises its national sovereignty to build infrastructure and deploy necessary defensive capabilities on the islands and reefs in the South China Sea, and to conduct patrols in the waters of Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea.”

However, in late 2018 a Chinese colonel issued a stern warning to the US and its regional allies operating in the South China Sea and more broadly the western Pacific ocean where they may challenge China’s increased territorial and economic ambitions throughout the regions.

Dr Malcolm Davis of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) told Defence Connect, “2018 has been an interesting year in the South China Sea. It started fairly early on with the basing of anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM) on reclaimed islands in the SCS, the basing of the upgraded, H-6K nuclear-capable bomber on Woody Island and more recently the USS Decatur (DDG-73) incident really reinforces that China is not backing down from its territorial ambitions.”

This growing assertiveness and apparent disregard for international convention and United Nations agreements places increased pressure on regional nations and the security paradigm upon which the stability of Indo-Pacific Asia is built.

China’s bullying and intimidation tactics expand beyond direct military confrontation and thumbing their nose at international convention. The recent attempts by China to assert its influence and own wishes over ASEAN regarding the South China Sea Code of Conduct is particular evidence of this.

“What we saw recently with the ASEAN discussion about establishing a code of conduct for operating in the South China Sea was essentially a push by China to prevent all foreign navies from operating in the area. Given the amount of seaborne trade that flows through the South China Sea, that was obviously an unacceptable outcome for both the US and Australia,” Dr Davis explained.

Questions for Australia

Despite Australia’s enduring commitment to the Australia-US alliance, serious questions remain for Australia in the new world order of President Donald Trump’s America, as a number of allies have been targeted by the maverick President for relying on the US for their security against larger state-based actors, which has seen the President actively pressuring key allies, particularly NATO allies, to renegotiate the deals.

Enhancing Australia’s capacity to act as an independent power, incorporating great power-style strategic economic, diplomatic and military capability serves as a powerful symbol of Australia’s sovereignty and evolving responsibilities in supporting and enhancing the security and prosperity of Indo-Pacific Asia. Shifting the public discussion away from the default Australian position of “it is all a little too difficult, so let’s not bother” will provide unprecedented economic, diplomatic, political and strategic opportunities for the nation.

However, as events continue to unfold throughout the region and China continues to throw its economic, political and strategic weight around, can Australia afford to remain a secondary power or does it need to embrace a larger, more independent role in an era of increasing great power competition? Further to this, without adding a degree of cynicism to the debate, what is China’s end goal for this focus on Australia’s backyard? (Source: Defence Connect)

06 Aug 19. Myanmar Navy sees largest active-duty deployment in Rakhine conflict. The Myanmar Navy (MN) is undertaking its largest-ever active-duty deployment as a main element in the growing counter-insurgency campaign by the Myanmar Armed Forces (Tatmadaw) in western Rakhine state. The MN’s role increased notably in July, according to local observers and defence analysts, who noted that the monsoon season, which began in June, had put a growing premium on naval assets deployed in support of operations against the Rakhine nationalist Arakan Army (AA). The AA-led insurgency, which aims to wrest far-reaching autonomy for the seaboard state, has escalated this year. This, in turn, has led to a large-scale commitment of Tatmadaw air and ground forces, both of which were heavily engaged throughout the dry season. (Source: IHS Jane’s)

06 Aug 19. War with Iran is the mother of all wars: Iran president. War with Iran is the mother of all wars, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani said on Tuesday in a speech broadcast live on state TV, warning once again that shipping might not be safe in the Strait of Hormuz oil waterway. Tensions have risen between Iran and the West since last year when the United States pulled out of an international agreement which curbed the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program in return for an easing of economic sanctions on Iran.

“Peace with Iran is the mother of all peace, war with Iran is the mother of all wars,” Rouhani said at the Foreign Ministry in a speech which also praised Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif after the United States imposed sanctions on him on July 31.

If the United States wants to have negotiations with Iran then it must lift all sanctions, Rouhani said, noting that Iran must be allowed to export oil. Fueling fears of a Middle East war with global repercussions, the Guards seized British tanker Stena Impero near the Strait of Hormuz in July for alleged marine violations, two weeks after British forces captured an Iranian oil tanker near Gibraltar accused of violating sanctions on Syria.

“A strait for a strait. It can’t be that the Strait of Hormuz is free for you and the Strait of Gibraltar is not free for us,” Rouhani said.

Approximately one-fifth of the world’s oil traffic passes through the strategic Strait of Hormuz.

On Sunday, the Guards seized an Iraqi oil tanker in the Gulf which they said was smuggling fuel and detained seven crewmen, Iran’s state media reported. (Source: Reuters)

06 Aug 19. China warns of countermeasures if U.S. puts missiles on its ‘doorstep.’ China threatened countermeasures on Tuesday if the United States deploys intermediate-range, ground-based missiles in Asia and warned U.S. allies of repercussions if they allow such weapons on their territory. U.S. Defense Secretary Mark Esper said on Saturday he was in favour of placing ground-launched, intermediate-range missiles in the region soon, possibly within months.

Washington formally pulled out last week from the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty, a 1987 pact with the former Soviet Union that banned ground-launched nuclear and conventional ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of 500-5,000 km (310 to 3,400 miles).

U.S. officials had accused Russia of not complying with the treaty but the withdrawal also allows the Pentagon to develop new weapons to counter China, which boasts an increasingly sophisticated land-based missile force. Beijing was not a party to the deal and refused to join.

Fu Cong, director general of the arms control department at China’s foreign ministry, said Beijing “will not stand idly by” and watch the United States base missiles in Asia.

“If the U.S. deploys missiles in this part of the world, at the doorstep of China, China will be forced to take countermeasures,” Fu told reporters.

“I urge our neighbours to exercise prudence and not to allow the U.S. deployment of intermediate-range missiles on their territory,” Fu said.

He specifically mentioned Japan, South Korea, and Australia, warning it would not serve their national security interests.

Fu did not specify how China would respond but said “everything will be on the table” if U.S. allies made allowances for the missiles.

He also reiterated that China had no interest in taking part in any trilateral talks with the United States and Russia to come to new terms on such weapons, arguing that most of China’s missiles could not reach the U.S. heartland.

“Given the huge gap between the nuclear arsenals of China and that of the U.S. and the Russian Federation, I don’t think it is reasonable or even fair to expect China to participate in an arms reduction negotiation at this stage,” Fu said.

Esper and other Trump administration officials have accused China of aggressive behaviour that is destabilising the Indo-Pacific region. The war of words over missile deployment in Asia has raised concerns about an arms race in the region.

The United States is expected to test a ground-launched cruise missile in the next few weeks. The Pentagon will also aim to test an intermediate-range ballistic missile in November.

However, unrestrained by the treaty, China has already been deploying intermediate-range missiles in massive numbers and has installed military equipment on artificial islands it has made in the disputed and energy-rich South China Sea.

China’s People’s Liberation Army has used sustained budget increases to build an arsenal of advanced missiles, many of which are designed to attack the aircraft carriers and bases that form the backbone of U.S. military dominance in the region and protect its allies.

China is also making rapid strides in developing so-called hypersonic missiles, which can manoeuvre sharply and travel at five times the speed of sound, or faster.

The United States has limited defences against such missiles, according to Pentagon officials, and is scrambling for new weapons and strategies to counter them. (Source: Reuters)

05 Aug 19. UK joins United States for maritime security mission in Gulf. Britain on Monday joined the United States in a maritime security mission in the Gulf to protect merchant vessels travelling through the Strait of Hormuz after Iran seized a British-flagged vessel. British officials stressed that there was no change to London’s policy on Iran but joining the United States is the most significant non-Brexit foreign policy move to date of Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s 12-day-old government. Just two weeks ago, Britain was calling for a European-led naval mission. Now, it has joined what it said was a U.S.-led “international maritime security mission”.

No other countries are yet involved.

“It is vital to secure the freedom for all international shipping to navigate the Strait of Hormuz without delay, given the increased threat,” said British Defence Secretary Ben Wallace.

“The deployment of Royal Navy assets is a sign of our commitment to our UK flagged vessels and we look forward to working alongside the U.S. and others to find an international solution to the problems in the Strait of Hormuz.”

The U.S. Defense Department welcomed the British decision.

“This is an international challenge and we look forward to the opportunity to work together with the Royal Navy and with additional partners and allies who share the common goal of ensuring the free flow of commerce,” Commander Rebecca Rebarich, a Pentagon spokeswoman, said in a statement.

Tanker traffic through the Strait – through which a fifth of the world’s oil passes – has become the focus for a standoff between Iran and the United States, which has beefed up its military presence in the Gulf since May.

Last month, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards seized a British tanker, Stena Impero, near the Strait of Hormuz for alleged marine violations. That came two weeks after Britain seized an Iranian oil tanker near Gibraltar, accusing it of violating sanctions on Syria.

Britain has repeatedly ruled out any exchange.

“NO CHANGE ON IRAN”

The tanker dispute has tangled the United Kingdom in the diplomatic differences between the EU’s big powers – which want to preserve the Iran nuclear deal – and the United States which has pushed for a tougher policy on Iran.

“Our approach to Iran hasn’t changed,” British Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab said. “We remain committed to working with Iran and our international partners to de-escalate the situation and maintain the nuclear deal.”

A British source said the focus of the new mission would be protecting the security of shipping and Britain would not be joining U.S. sanctions against Iran.

Another British source said London hoped the U.S.-led mission would transition towards a European-led mission. The United Kingdom has also offered to lead one of the U.S.-led mission’s maritime task groups.

No other nations have signed up to the U.S. mission.

Britain has deployed a destroyer HMS Duncan and a frigate HMS Montrose to the Gulf to accompany UK-flagged vessels through the strait. So far, 47 ships have been accompanied by the naval vessels, British officials said.

Later this year, another Type 23 Frigate, HMS Kent, will take over from HMS Duncan, while HMS Montrose completes planned maintenance. HMS Montrose will remain stationed in the Middle East until 2022.

Earlier on Monday, Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif said Tehran would no longer tolerate “maritime offences” in the strait.

It has threatened to block all exports via the Strait, through which a fifth of global oil traffic passes, if other countries comply with U.S. pressure to stop buying Iranian oil. (Source: Reuters)

03 Aug 19. U.S. Defence Secretary says he favours placing intermediate-range missiles in Asia. U.S. Defence Secretary Mark Esper said on Saturday that he was in favour of placing ground-launched, intermediate-range missiles in Asia relatively soon, a day after the United States withdrew from a landmark arms control treaty.

Esper’s comments are likely to raise concern about an arms race and could add to an already tense relationship with China.

“Yeah, I would like to,” Esper said, when asked whether he was considering placing such missiles in Asia.

“I would prefer months … but these things tend to take longer than you expect,” he told reporters travelling with him to Sydney when asked about a timeline for when the missiles could be deployed.

The United States formally left the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty with Russia on Friday after determining Moscow was violating the treaty, an accusation that the Kremlin has denied.

On Friday, senior U.S. officials said that any deployment of such weaponry would be years away.

Within the next few weeks, the United States is expected to test a ground-launched cruise missile, and in November, the Pentagon will aim to test an intermediate-range ballistic missile. Both would be tests of conventional weapons – and not nuclear.

The 1987 pact banned ground-launched nuclear and conventional ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of 310 to 3,400 miles (500-5,500 km).

U.S. officials have been warning for years that the United States was being put at a disadvantage by China’s development of increasingly sophisticated land-based missile forces, which the Pentagon could not match due to the U.S. treaty with Russia.

The United States has so far relied on other capabilities as a counterbalance to China, like missiles fired from U.S. ships or aircraft. But advocates for a U.S. land-based missile response say that is the best way to deter Chinese use of its muscular land-based missile forces.

“I don’t see an arms race happening, I do see us taking proactive measures to develop a capability that we need for both the European theatre and certainly this theatre,” Esper said, referring to the Asia-Pacific region.

While no decisions have been made, the United States could theoretically put easier-to-hide, road-mobile conventional missiles in places like Guam.

Esper did not say where in Asia he was considering placing missiles, but he is expected to meet senior regional leaders during his visit to Asia.

ASIA TRIP

In a sign of the importance Asia – and countering China – has for the Pentagon, Esper is visiting the region just two months after his predecessor made a similar trip.

In Australia, Esper and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo will take part in talks with their Australian counterparts.

The meetings come amid heightened Western concern about Chinese influence in the Pacific.

In addition to China, the talks and much of Esper’s trip, are likely to be dominated by discussion on what the departure of the U.S. from the INF treaty means for Asia and recent missile tests by North Korea.

U.S. President Donald Trump sought on Friday to play down North Korea’s three tests in eight days of short-range missiles, saying they did not break any agreement he had with Kim Jong Un.

Asian allies will also have questions for Esper on a U.S.-led maritime force in the Strait of Hormuz.

Washington in June first proposed some sort of multinational effort open to all allies and partners to bolster maritime security in the Gulf after accusing Iran of attacking oil tankers around the Strait of Hormuz, a critical maritime chokepoint.

On Thursday, Japan said it would not send warships to join the U.S-led coalition but it may send patrol aircraft.

“I think we’ll have some announcements coming out soon in the coming days, where you’ll see countries begin to sign up,” Esper said, referring to contributions from other countries on the maritime initiative. (Source: Reuters)

05 Aug 19. Supporting the development of Australia’s growing expeditionary capability. The Australian government’s unprecedented period of military modernisation may have been prompted by a growing power shift in the global and regional paradigm. Recognising this, the Australian government has sought to expand the nation’s expeditionary capabilities with LAND 4503 the Tiger ARH replacement program, seeking to enhance the development of a ‘networked and hardened Army’ capable of greater high intensity operations.

When the forces of Germany launched themselves over the borders of Poland in the opening days of the Second World War, the nature of combat was changed forever. The seamless integration of mechanised, armour, artillery, infantry and, for the first time on a major scale, close air support units enabled the doctrine of Blitzkrieg to overwhelm successive opponents from Poland to France and the British Empire and highlighted the role air support would play in future conflicts.

The power of close air support was not limited to land warfare, shifting to the naval domain, the power of fixed wing naval aviation became unquestionable following the Japanese sneak attack on Pearl Harbour and the routing of the Japanese Navy at the Battle of Midway. The post-war threat of the Red Army in Europe combined with technological developments enhanced the lethality and effectiveness of close air support.

American and Soviet advances in helicopter technology resulting in the AH-1 Cobra and the Mi-24, combined with the advent of tactical fighter aircraft like the F-111, paved the way for the introduction of potent close air support platforms that were designed to dominate the Cold War battlefields of Europe and south-east Asia.

However, the constant rate of technological evolution in both land and close air support platforms resulted in the modern pinnacle of close air support weapons systems, the A-10C Warthog, Su-25 Frogfoot, AH-64 Apache, evolved versions of the AH-1 Cobra like the US Marine Corps’ ‘Zulu’ AH-1Z Vipers, the Mi-28 and Australia’s own Tiger Armed Reconnaissance Helicopters.

Close air support attack and reconnaissance helicopters have emerged as powerful force multipliers in contemporary force structures, with expeditionary focused units like the US Marines ‘Marine Expeditionary Units’ (MEU) and the larger Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTF) deployment of integrated, combined arms forces serving as a model for the development of Australia’s own expeditionary and power projection capabilities.

Recognising the importance of such capabilities, particularly the combination of close-air support, reconnaissance and rapidly deployable expeditionary capabilities of attack helicopters, the Australian Army has initiated the LAND 4503 Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH) replacement program to support the Army’s transition from the maligned ARH Tiger to a next-generation attack helicopter platform.

Drawing on the experience of the USMC

Australia’s focus on developing a rapid response, amphibious task force is a step in the right direction. The model established by the US MEUs provides a best practice model of expeditionary-focused power projection, however an expansion in the size of the Army could see the development of four regiment size (2,200+) amphibious regiments capable of rotating as the tip of the spear.

The Marines and the globally deployed MEUs and MAGTFs provide the US with an unrivalled rapid response to contingencies ranging from humanitarian disaster relief and counter-insurgency to sea control and high-intensity, power projection combat operations against a peer competitor.

Developing such amphibious capabilities would serve as a key capability for extending the nation’s reach, while also introducing the ability to rapidly deploy, a tactical and strategic force multiplier capable of low-to-high intensity combat operations, humanitarian support and interventions and A2/AD operations at key strategic chokepoints, like the Straits of Malacca or Lombok Strait.

As a ‘combined arms’ force, both the MEU and MAGTF models incorporate four key elements, including:

Command Element (CE): Providing command and control, including management and planning for manpower, intelligence, reconnaissance, operations and training, and logistics functions.
Ground Combat Element (GCE): Composed primarily of infantry units, the GCE also includes reconnaissance (scout/sniper units); forward air controller; nuclear, biological and chemical defence; communications; logistics support and service; artillery; armour (including amphibious armoured vehicles and armoured reconnaissance); and combat engineer capabilities.
Aviation Combat Element (ACE): Contributes to the air power component including fixed wing aircraft (ranging from strike to air lift and aerial refuelling), helicopters (both attack and airlift), tiltrotor (airlift) and UAV capabilities.
Logistics Combat Element (LCE): Provides the majority of combat service support including heavy motor transport, ground supply, heavy engineer support, ground equipment maintenance, and advanced medical and dental support roles.

Javier Ball, international campaign manager, Asia, global military sales and strategy for Bell Flight and a former US Marine, explained to Defence Connect the importance of interoperability for both Australia and the US – particularly as the geo-strategic dynamics of the Indo-Pacific continue to evolve.

“Interoperability is more than being able to move, shoot and communicate, if we have the same or similar platform, it means we can land on one another’s ships, it means we can service and sustain one another’s platforms, reduces logistics tails, thus enhancing the capacity to operate as part of a ‘joint force’,” Ball said.

Viper as part of the ‘combined arms’ expeditionary force

These developments serve as the basis for ‘Accelerated Warfare’ – the next evolution of Plan Beersheba – and the continued development of Australia’s expeditionary and combined arms capabilities, which Major General Gus McLachlan, retired Commander Forces Command, described to Defence Connect in late 2018: “In Plan Beersheba we have the spine, the backbone of our 21st century, combined arms force, but it isn’t the future. That is where Accelerated Warfare comes into play, it aims to make Army an adaptable and capable force.”

The shifting focus towards specialist amphibious warfare capabilities, combined with the structural reorganisation of the Army to focus on integrating infantry, armour, artillery, combat signals, engineers and support elements across Army’s three regular force combatants – 1st, 3rd and 7th Brigades – served as the fundamental basis for refocusing the structure and combat capabilities of the Army between 2011 and 2017.

Responding to these unique challenges has served to establish Accelerated Warfare not only as the successor to Plan Beersheba, but the next stage in the evolution of the Australian Army as a fully-fledged, combined arms fighting force capable of fighting and winning in every key domain of the 21st century battlefield.

A core component of this future focus is the introduction of key platforms and technologies to ensure that Army remains ahead of potential adversaries, while also being capable of leveraging the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance and strike capabilities of key Navy and Air Force platforms, like the air warfare destroyers, Canberra Class amphibious warfare ships, the E-7A Wedgetails and the F-35A.

Viper was designed from the skids up as an expeditionary focused platform, it is designed “from the get go to fly off a ship, and to be rapidly deployed from Air Force air lift platforms like the C-17 Globemaster within 30 mins”, Bell stated – with the Canberra Class LHDs and HMAS Choules each capable of supporting the deployment of the Viper platform with the ‘marinised’ platform benefits capable of supporting full operational and strategic capability in the ADF arsenal.

As Australia’s role in Indo-Pacific Asia and the strategic balance of power continues to evolve, the Australian Army will be called upon to fulfil a range of roles beyond those it has conducted over the past 50 years. Power projection and the application of ‘hard power’ in both a high and low intensity capacity will dramatically reshape the Australian Army despite an unprecedented level of investment. (Source: Defence Connect)

05 Aug 19. Joint Statement: Australia-U.S. Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN) 2019. Minister for Foreign Affairs Marise Payne and Minister for Defence Linda Reynolds hosted Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Secretary of Defense Mark Esper on 4 August in Sydney for the 29th Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN) to deepen economic, security, and strategic cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region and globally.

As Prime Minister Morrison and President Trump reaffirmed at the G20 in Osaka on June 27, Australia and the United States are the closest of allies. This year marks the 75th anniversary of the D-Day landings and the 50th anniversary of the Apollo 11 moon landing: momentous events in our shared history, and emblematic of Australia and the United States’ long partnership in war and peace.

Minister Payne and Secretary Pompeo agreed that our alliance today is more vital than ever, with our work together in the Indo-Pacific region the clear, shared focus. The Ministers and Secretaries emphasized the need for an increasingly networked structure of alliances and partnerships to maintain an Indo-Pacific that is secure, open, inclusive and rules-based; and where nations conduct themselves in ways that enhance regional stability, reinforce international law, and respect the sovereignty of all countries. Both countries stand ready to work with all nations to strengthen a regional order based on these principles.

Australia and the United States underscored their shared commitment to the security, stability and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific region. Minister Payne and Secretary Pompeo welcomed ASEAN’s recent ‘Outlook on the Indo-Pacific’, which shares many of the underlying principles identified in our respective visions for the region, and discussed ways to support ASEAN in implementing its Outlook. Both nations reaffirmed their strong support for ASEAN centrality and the ASEAN-led regional architecture, underlining the value of the East Asia Summit as the region’s premier Leaders-led forum for addressing political and security challenges.

The principals shared a commitment to deepen cooperation with a range of partners, including with Japan and India, and welcomed the recent Trilateral Strategic Dialogue and Trilateral Defence Ministerial meetings as ways to advance trilateral policy coordination. The Ministers and Secretaries also welcomed the increased engagement in the Indo-Pacific by the United Kingdom, France, Germany and the EU, and expressed their readiness to further boost cooperation on development, infrastructure investment and defense cooperation.

Both countries recognized the growing strategic and economic importance of India, and the significance of South Asia and the Indian Ocean region to ensuring an open, rules-based Indo-Pacific. They committed to further collaboration with India and other partners to support regional architecture, including IORA, regional infrastructure, and to deeper engagement with them on a broad range of security issues, including maritime security and oceans governance, cyber security, counter-terrorism and transnational crime.

They committed to further support Southeast Asian states, in particular through maritime and other security cooperation, infrastructure development, and good governance. In maritime Southeast Asia they recognized the importance of Indonesia as a maritime axis between the Pacific and Indian Oceans while in the Mekong sub-region, they discussed U.S. and Australian initiatives to improve water governance, address transnational crime, expand connectivity, and support the Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS) and the Mekong River Commission.

In the Pacific, Australia and the United States intend to strengthen their cooperation with Pacific Island partners to realize the Pacific’s vision for a region of peace, harmony, security, social inclusion, and prosperity. They pledged to support Pacific partners to advance their economic and security priorities, including those set out in the Boe Declaration on Regional Security.

Ministers and Secretaries affirmed support for democratic systems, encouraging strong civil society, countering foreign interference, combatting corruption, and fortifying institutions to help nations attract high-quality private investment and secure their sovereignty.

Recognizing the immense demand for infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific region, both countries reiterated their commitment to the G20 Principles for Quality Infrastructure Investment, which G20 leaders recently endorsed at the Osaka Summit. They pledged to apply these principles to projects in the region: through the Australia-Japan-U.S. Trilateral Infrastructure Partnership, the new Australian Infrastructure Financing Facility for the Pacific, and the U.S. Development Finance Corporation.

Minister Reynolds and Secretary Esper emphasized the importance of Australia-U.S. defense cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region – including through enhanced defense engagement and capacity building with partners in Southeast Asia and the Pacific.

Minister Reynolds and Secretary Esper underscored the importance of fostering closer industry partnership to safeguard supply chains through programs such as the Joint Strike Fighter. They noted Australia’s inclusion in the US National Technology Industrial Base will strengthen their respective industrial bases and collaboration into the future.

They also welcomed a major milestone in the Force Posture Initiatives, as the rotational deployment of U.S. Marines in Darwin has reached 2500 personnel in 2019. The principals emphasized the value of Marine Rotational Force – Darwin (MRF-D) in strengthening the alliance, and in deepening engagement with regional partners.

Minister Reynolds and Secretary Esper affirmed their commitments to strengthening defense collaboration in science and technology, from research and development to missile defense, as well as coordinating security cooperation with partners in the region through joint training and exercise opportunities. They also noted this year’s first iteration of Exercise Pacific Vanguard and looked forward to future exercises including the United States, Australia, the Republic of Korea and Japan.

The principals expressed serious concerns at continued militarization of disputed features in the South China Sea. They strongly objected to coercive unilateral actions by any claimant state that could alter the status quo and increase tensions. The Ministers and Secretaries also expressed concern about disruptive activities in relation to long-standing oil and gas projects as well as fisheries in the South China Sea. They emphasized the importance of upholding freedom of navigation, overflight and other lawful uses of the sea and of all States’ acting in accordance with international law. They called on all countries to make and pursue their maritime claims in accordance with international law, as reflected in the UN Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS). The Ministers and Secretaries underscored the importance of the July 2016 decision in the Philippines-China Arbitral Tribunal’s Award, which is binding on the parties. They called for any Code of Conduct to: be fully consistent with international law, in particular UNCLOS; not prejudice the interests of third parties or the rights of states under international law; and support existing, inclusive regional architecture.

The Ministers and Secretaries expressed concern about the potential establishment of new military bases that could undermine stability and sovereignty in the Indo-Pacific region. They exchanged views on recent reports, such as in relation to Cambodia, and undertook to remain in close contact on developments.

Both countries reaffirmed the shared objective of North Korea abandoning all its weapons of mass destruction and missile programs as required by multiple UN Security Council Resolutions. Australian Ministers welcomed the United States’ commitment to continue talks with North Korea toward the goal of final, fully verified denuclearization of North Korea. The Secretaries and Ministers intend to continue to work together closely, and with other partners, to maintain pressure on North Korea, including by implementing all existing UN Security Council Resolutions.

The United States and Australia shared concerns about threats to freedom of navigation and the uninterrupted passage of maritime trade in the strategic sea-lanes in the Middle East, and noted that attacks on civilian shipping were of grave concern and a serious threat to the safety of navigation.

Recalling the territorial defeat of ISIS (Da’esh) announced in March 2019, the Ministers and Secretaries reaffirmed their commitment to continuing cooperation under the US-led Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS (Da’esh). Australia and the United States are also working with NATO to ensure Afghanistan never again becomes a base for international terrorism. Both countries underscored the need to remain vigilant to the threat of the dispersal of foreign terrorist fighters across the region, including in Southeast Asia. The United States welcomed Australia’s recent announcement of a further contribution of air assets in support of continuing Global Coalition efforts to defeat ISIS (Da’esh) remnants in Syria and Iraq, as well as Australia’s financial contributions to support demining and other stabilization programs in Iraq.

The principals underscored the crucial role that women play in peace and security work around the globe. Both nations remain committed to collaboration in protecting the human rights of women and girls in fragile and conflict-affected contexts and to promoting meaningful participation by women in conflict prevention, security responses, peacebuilding and relief and recovery efforts.

Ministers and Secretaries commended U.S. and Australian leadership on the Global Health Security Agenda. They welcomed new initiatives, such as the U.S.-Australia Military Health Security Summit, and joint support for capacity building activities to mitigate infectious disease threats.

The United States and Australia remain committed to realizing an open, interoperable, reliable, free and secure internet, and will increase collaboration, including with likeminded countries and the private sector, to advance this objective. The principals welcomed the recent G20 Leaders’ Statement on Preventing Exploitation of the Internet for Terrorism and Violent Extremism Conducive to Terrorism, and reiterated the importance of online platforms stepping up the ambition and pace of their efforts to prevent terrorist and violent extremist content from being streamed, uploaded, or re-uploaded. Both nations also committed to promoting responsible state behavior in cyberspace.

The Ministers and Secretaries affirmed the need for a new era in arms control that expands the number of states and weapon systems included in negotiated agreements and increases efforts to reduce nuclear risks. To this end, and without foreclosing the possibility of New START extension, they called on Russia and China to come to the table and join the United States in its efforts to advance a future-oriented agenda on arms control, building on the enduring importance of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The Ministers and Secretaries intend to build resilience in sensitive sectors of our respective economies, including critical technologies, infrastructure, systems and minerals.

The principals welcomed the strong relationship between the Australian Space Agency (ASA) and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the first Australia-U.S. Civil Space Dialogue. Both countries remain committed to working constructively with partners in multilateral fora to promote norms for appropriate behavior in outer space.

The United States will host the next AUSMIN in 2020. (Source: US DoD)

02 Aug 19. Will we see a new arms race? That depends on Russia, says NATO chief. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg insists that despite the “demise” of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), avoiding a new arms race with Russia is possible. But, speaking in Brussels on Friday, he said this depended entirely on Moscow “changing its behavior.”

“We will not mirror what Russia does and we do not want a new arms race,” Stoltenberg said. NATO continues to aspire to a constructive relationship with Russia, but at same time we must ensure we have a credible defense.”

Speaking specifically about the end of the INF, Stoltenberg added: “Today is the day when we see the final demise of the treaty and I regret that. However, we must find a right balance between being strong but without over reacting or reaching conclusions too quickly.We will react in a prudent and responsible way.”

He also placed the blame on Moscow for the expiration of the INF treaty, a landmark agreement of Cold War-era arms control signed by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and U.S. President Ronald Reagan in 1987. The 1987 pact banned ground-launched nuclear and conventional ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of 310 to 3,400 miles.

By banning medium-range land-based missiles, which are capable of reaching Russia from Western Europe and vice versa, the treaty aimed to avert an arms race on the continent. The United States announced last year it was withdrawing from the pact, accusing Russia of failing to comply. Moscow denies it has violated the treaty and says Washington is withdrawing because it wants to pursue a new arms race.

But Stoltenberg told reporters, “Russia today remains in violation of the treaty, despite years of U.S. and allied engagement, including a final opportunity over six months to honor its treaty obligations. As a result, the United States decision to withdraw from the treaty, a decision fully supported by NATO allies, is now taking effect.”

“I welcome the fact that NATO is united on this all the way and that all allies agree with the U.S approach. I am confident we will stay united.”

Russia, he insisted, bears “sole” responsibility for the treaty’s demise, adding that he “regrets” that Russia has shown “no willingness and taken no demonstrable steps to return to compliance with its international obligations.”

“A situation whereby the United States fully abides by the treaty, and Russia does not, is not sustainable,” he noted, confirming that NATO will respond in a “measured and responsible” way to the “significant risks” posed by the Russian 9M729 missile.

The Trump administration issued formal protests that the new Russian missile had been tested at ranges prohibited under the treaty. Stoltenberg said the deployment was part of a “broader pattern,” with Russia also more recently investing in new and advanced defense capabilities.

“Allies are firmly committed to the preservation of effective international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation,” he said. “Therefore, we will continue to uphold, support, and further strengthen arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation, as a key element of Euro-Atlantic security.” (Source: Defense News)

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