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NEWS IN BRIEF – REST OF THE WORLD

August 2, 2019 by

Sponsored by Lincad

http://www.lincad.co.uk

 

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02 Aug 19. Australia to deploy 270 troops to Middle East Region. The Australian Department of Defence has announced that more than 270 troops will deploy to the Middle East as part of the country’s contribution to boosting security in the region. The majority of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) personnel set for the deployment are from the Australian Army’s 1st Brigade based at Robertson Barracks in Darwin. Troops will deploy on a six to eight-month rotation as part of Theatre Communications Group-9 (TCG-9) and Force Protection Element-12 (FPE-12).

Australia Defence Minister Linda Reynolds said: “I am incredibly proud of each and every one of our personnel who leave their families to support Australia’s contribution to regional and global security in the Middle East region.

“I also thank their families and friends because without their support, the deployment of our personnel would not be possible.”

TCG is an ADF joint unit that provides communications support to deployed Australian personnel throughout the Middle East region.

Included in the TCG-9 contingent are about 100 ADF communications specialists who will deliver national command and welfare communications and information systems.

Meanwhile, personnel deployed as part of the FPE-12 contingent will be responsible for providing security and protected mobility support for ADF mentors and advisors near Kabul, Afghanistan.

The mentors and advisors are deployed in support of Australia’s contribution to the Nato-led non-combat Resolute Support Mission.

Launched in January 2015, the mission is designed to train, advise and assist the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) to help them develop the capability to defend Afghanistan. The ADF’s train, advise and assist mission support to Afghanistan is called Operation HIGHROAD. In the broader Middle East region, Australia currently has more than 1,000 Australian Defence Force troops on deployment duties.(Source: army-technology.com)

01 Aug 19. North Korea – Sea of Japan: North Korea launches suspected short-range ballistic missiles without issuing notice.  At approximately 1800Z on 1 August, North Korea conducted at least two suspected short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) launches from a test site on the east coast of the country with splashdown in the Sea of Japan within FIR Pyongyang (ZKKP), according to international media reports. Previously during the 2019 time-frames of 4-9 May and 24-30 July, North Korea conducted a combined total of at least eight SRBM test launches into the Sea of Japan. There are no indications that North Korea provided advanced warning of the SRBM launches noted above during August, July or May to aviation governing bodies and no NOTAMs were issued regarding such activity for FIR Pyongyang (ZKKP). In early May 2018, North Korea committed to the ICAO that it would provide advanced warning of “activity hazardous to aviation” within its airspace, such as prior notice of artillery, rocket and/or missile tests. ICAO previously called on North Korea to comply with international aviation standards related to missile and weapons tests in order to prevent the recurrence of “potentially hazardous activities” on 7 October 2017. In late September 2018, the US FAA extended its NOTAM and SFAR for North Korean airspace through 18 September 2020 (KICZ A0018/18). The UK, French and German civil aviation authorities also have active advisories in place for North Korean airspace due to the enduring potential for unannounced missile or rocket launches to occur within FIR Pyongyang (ZKKP) with little to no notice.

Analysis

The at least 10 apparent SRBM tests by North Korea from 4 May through 1 August mark the first confirmed ballistic missile launches by the country since 29 November 2017 when an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) was fired from an area near Pyongyang with splashdown in the Sea of Japan. Our analysis has now documented at least 35 unannounced ballistic missile launches conducted by North Korea since the start of 2017. North Korea stated on 20 April 2018 that it would unilaterally suspend ICBM and medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) tests. However, North Korea has not committed to suspending tactical guided missile launches, SRBM tests, space launch vehicle (SLV) programme activity, rocket engine development and guided/unguided rocket or artillery exercises. Osprey analysis indicates there has been a monthly average of 31 aviation security, safety and operational incidents recorded in North Korean airspace from March-July 2019; compared to an average of 11 incidents per month from July 2018 through February 2019. We assess there is a significantly increased likelihood of additional ballistic missile launches during August into the Sea of Japan by North Korea with no NOTAMs issued for FIR Pyongyang (ZKKP), as the US and South Korea are set to conduct a series of military drills which the Kim Jong Un regime remains opposed to. Despite the claimed suspension of ICBM and MRBM tests, we assess the continued potential for unannounced rocket, tactical guided missile, SRBM and SLV launches along with artillery live-firing makes North Korea a HIGH risk airspace environment at all altitudes. The airspace situation is assessed to remain in such a state until a comprehensive agreement between North and South Korea along with the US is reached. Such an agreement, coupled with follow-through on its pledge to provide advance notice of “activity hazardous to aviation,” would likely lead to the complete easing of restrictions and advisories in effect for overflight of North Korean airspace currently enacted by leading civil aviation governing bodies.

Advice

Approvals: As a precaution, conduct operational risk-based identification of divert and alternate airports for flight schedules with planned stops at aerodromes in the country or with overflight of the airspace. Operators are advised to ensure flight plans are correctly filed, attain proper special approvals for flight operations to sensitive locations and obtain relevant overflight permits prior to departure. In addition, ensure crews scheduled to operate to or over the country in the near term are fully aware of the latest security situation.

Missile Launches: Unannounced rocket and missile launches that transit airspace used by civilian aircraft pose a latent threat to operations at all altitudes. The country has a history of not issuing adequate notice of activities in its airspace that could affect flight safety. Multiple safety of flight concerns emanate from a situation where a missile malfunctions during the boost, mid-course or terminal phases of flight. Such an event would cause the missile to fly an unplanned trajectory and altitude profile which could expose overflying aircraft to mid-air collision, route diversion and or debris splashdown issues. Leading civil aviation governing bodies have standing notices advising operators of the threat to civil aviation in the airspace due to unannounced military activity, rocket test firings and or missile launches.

Aviation Safety: Do not act based on unverified information; however, operators should be flexible in their itineraries and prepared to adjust them due to an increased potential for heightened aviation safety and/or security measures for the airspace and/or airports in the near term resulting from the situation. Aviation safety incidents have the potential to cause follow-on disruption to airport security operations. Review internal and external mechanisms for aviation safety reporting. Any revisions to processes should account for air and ground safety occurrence provisions as part of a wider aviation risk management strategy to protect aircraft, passengers and crew. In addition, ensure emergency response and communications plans are up to date to enhance continuity during times of crisis. (Source: Osprey)

01 Aug 19. Somalia – Germany extends hazardous situation airspace notice below FL260 for Somalia through 2 November 2019. Germany has issued an extension of its hazardous situation advisory for the airspace over Somalia through 2 November regarding the threat posed to civil aviation activity in the country below FL260 due to the enduring conflict zone environment (NOTAM EDGG B0663/19). EASA along with the US, UK and French civil aviation authorities have each issued similar guidance to operators in the past year regarding the persistent threat to flight operations within Somalia (EASA CZIB-2017-05R4, NOTAMs KICZ A0027/17 & EGTT V0013/19, AIC France A 03/19). A UN report issued in October 2016 noted that the extremist al-Shabab violent non-state actor (VNSA) group established a training camp during 2015 in the autonomous Jubaland region of Somalia to train operatives in attacking civil aviation targets. The threat of asymmetric targeting of military installations and airports along with military and civilian aircraft in the country as a whole in the medium term remains credible. Aviation operators should monitor airport and airspace-specific NOTAMs, bulletins, circulars, advisories, prohibitions and restrictions prior to departure to avoid flight schedule disruption.

Analysis

Airports and air assets will remain vulnerable within Somalia due to the high-impact nature of attacks against aviation infrastructure. On 1 January of this year and 1 July 2018, suspected al-Shabab militants fired mortar rounds at the AMISOM military base co-located with Mogadishu’s Aden Adde International Airport (HCMM/MGQ). An explosion on board Daallo Airlines Flight 159 perpetrated by al-Shabab in Somalia in February 2016 used an explosive device concealed in a laptop and was likely facilitated by ‘insider’ assistance at Aden Adde International Airport. Al-Shabab and other VNSA groups in Somalia are assessed to possess light weapons, to include rocket-propelled grenades and low-calibre anti-aircraft artillery capable of engaging aircraft below FL100. Multiple credible reports indicate al-Shabab militants in Somalia possess man-portable air-defence systems (MANPADS) in limited numbers. According to the US FAA, the most capable variants of MANPADS can pose a threat to aircraft at altitudes below 25,000 feet AGL. Russian-made 9K38 Igla (SA-18 GROUSE) MANPADS were recovered in a weapons cache in Somaliland on 9 November 2010. Al-Shabab employed a SA-18 MANPADS to shoot down a Belorussian cargo aircraft on departure from Aden Adde International Airport in March 2007. We continue to assess Somalia to be a HIGH risk airspace operating environment below FL260.

Risk area recommendation: Comprehensive risk mitigation measures

  • Flights below FL260 not advised; essential flights over FL260 via measures below
  • Defer diverting from flight plan with the exception of life threatening situations
  • Security and operational risk-based identification of pre-planned divert airports
  • Reliable and redundant communications with an established communications plan
  • Fully-coordinated and robust emergency response plan supplemented by asset tracking

Advice

Approvals: As a precaution, conduct operational risk-based identification of divert and alternate airports for flight schedules with planned stops at aerodromes in the country or with overflight of the airspace. Operators are advised to ensure flight plans are correctly filed, attain proper special approvals for flight operations to sensitive locations and obtain relevant overflight permits prior to departure. In addition, ensure crews scheduled to operate to or over the country in the near term are fully aware of the latest security situation.

Indirect Fire: Indirect fire attacks; via rockets, mortars or artillery, against airports and airbases within the country pose a latent threat to civil aviation. VNSA groups are assessed to have a variety of rockets, mortars, and potentially military grade artillery pieces within their inventory. Aircraft on the ground at installations face a credible risk of being damaged due to indirect fire attacks. Security forces face difficulty controlling the wide area surrounding most installations which creates a vulnerability which is difficult for operators to mitigate.

Weapons Trafficking: Poor provisions of security through porous borders and an influx of weapons; including anti-aircraft systems, has facilitated a resurgence in VNSA activity in recent years. The country has historically been a hub of VNSA activity and a key route for arms-smuggling given its remoteness and anti-government sentiment due to the lack of economic opportunities. The presence of large, relatively unpoliced areas of the country are also vulnerable to security and or terrorism threats due to instability and porous borders, where VNSA groups are present. (Source: Osprey)

01 Aug 19. North Korea’s new weapons take aim at the South’s F-35 stealth fighters. North Korea’s latest test-firing of new short-range ballistic missiles and guided rockets are capable of inflicting damage to key South Korean and U.S. military installations, including an air base that will house stealth fighter jets in the South, military sources and analysts said.

On July 31, the North launched two rockets off its east coast. The test came less than a week after the country test-fired two short-range ballistic missiles identified as KN-23 missiles, modeled on Russia’s SS-26/Iskander, amid the continued stalemate in negotiations over the North’s denuclearization.

The ballistic missiles, launched July 25 off the eastern waters of the peninsula, flew about 600 kilometers at an altitude of 50 kilometers, according to South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff. The July 31 rockets flew some 250 kilometers at an altitude of 30 kilometers.

North Korea’s state media said the rockets were a new variant that could expand the country’s ability to strike major facilities across the South, including American military bases.

According to the North’s official Korean Central News Agency, or KCNA, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un oversaw the guided rockets launch. “It would be an inescapable distress to the forces becoming a fat target of the weapon,” Kim was quoted by the KCNA as saying.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, which had originally identified the weapon as the KN-23, confirmed the trajectory of the rockets proved the so-called pull-up maneuver in the dive phase. “In the reentry phase, the projectile pulled up to fly horizontally and then dived to a target with a near 90-degree falling angle, an apparent move to help avoid interception,” a Joint Chiefs of Staff source told Defense News on condition of anonymity.

The KN-23 was twice tested in May, with one of the missiles flying about 420 kilometers. Compared to liquid-fueled Scud missiles fired at launch sites, the new missile uses solid fuel, which makes it easier to transport and quicker to launch. The new missile is launched on mobile trucks and could carry a nuclear warhead with up to 500 kilograms.

How is the F-35 related?

Some weapons analysts believe the new missiles and rockets were developed for targeting a base for F-35As being delivered to the South Korean Air Force. The North has called the fifth-generation jets “extremely dangerous.”

“The blurred photos revealed by the North show the multiple-launch rocket system is a larger caliber than the existing 300mm MLRS, and it resembles the Chinese-made 400mm, guided WS-2 MLRS,” said Kim Dong-yub, an analyst with the Institute for Far Eastern Studies at Kyungnam University, Seoul.

“If the new rocket has a feature of passive homing guidance like the WS-2, the range, accuracy and power of the rocket would be improved to a greater extent,” he added. “Furthermore, the guided rocket could evade radars at key air bases, including the F-35 base in the mid-part of the South.”

South Korea bought 40 Lockheed Martin F-35As under a 2014 deal. Four have been delivered to the Air Force, and the remainder is set to arrive by 2021. The Ministry of National Defense plans to purchase 20 more.

The radar-evading stealth fighters are located at an Air Force base in Cheongju, about 130 kilometers south of the capital Seoul.

Before the KN-23 missile tests, North Korea already slammed Seoul’s deployment of F-35As, warning it would respond by developing and testing unspecified special weapons of its own to destroy the American-made aircraft.

“Seoul’s purchase of the U.S. jets was meant to please the United States, their master,” an unidentified research director affiliated with the North’s Foreign Ministry said on KCNA. “North Korea has no other choice but to develop and test the special armaments to completely destroy the lethal weapons reinforced in South Korea.”

An arms race

Shin Jong-woo, a senior analyst at the Korea Defense and Security Forum, said that “if ballistic missiles or guided rockets fly at a low altitude, the rate of interception would decrease, so that the South Korean military is required to bolster its air and missile defense shield.”

Indeed, the country is on track to set up the low-tier Korea Air and Missile Defense system. The shield includes Patriot Advanced Capability-2 and -3 interceptors, ship-based SM-2 missiles, and locally developed medium-range surface-to-air missiles.

“The South Korean military has PAC-2 batteries in place to protect key bases, but they are unequal to the new type of North Korean ballistic missiles in the case of an emergency,” said Kim Yeon-hwan, a defense professor at Kookmin University in Seoul. “To thwart new types of threats, the military needs to beef up air defense systems.”

South Korea has deployed eight batteries of upgraded PAC-2s bought from Germany, and it plans to procure newer PAC-3 missiles by 2020.

In a move to better detect signs missile launches from transporter-erector-launcher vehicles, or TEL, the South Korean military plans to acquire four Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System aircraft. Raytheon, Boeing and Israel Aerospace Industries are competing for the project, valued at about $1.7bn. North Korea is known to have some 800 ballistic missiles and operate about 100 TELs. Meanwhile, a newly constructed North Korean submarine would be capable of carrying three submarine-launched ballistic missiles, according to analysis from the South Korean Ministry of National Defense. On July 23, North Korean state media unveiled photos of North Korea’s leader inspecting a new sub.

“There is a possibility that the new submarine is slightly larger than a Gorae-class submarine,” said Rep. Lee Hye-hoon, chief of the parliamentary Intelligence Committee, according to a report by the ministry. The Gorae-class submarine falls into the 2,500-ton class.

Lee added that the North may have revamped an old-fashioned 1,800-ton Romeo-class submarine imported from the Soviet Union in the 1970s. (Source: Defense News)

01 Aug 19. ASDF Set to Resume F-35A Training Flights. Japanese Defense Minister Takeshi Iwaya said Thursday the Air Self-Defense Force would resume training flights using F-35A fighters later that day, ending their suspension following the crash of an F-35A in April. Iwaya said the training could resume because the ASDF has conducted safety checks on the aircraft and provided pilots with retraining programs. The minister also cited that the municipal government of Misawa, Aomori Prefecture — the location of the Misawa base that the crashed jet belonged to — has consented to the resumption. However, nighttime training flights will not be conducted for the time being, Iwaya said.

“We’ve taken all possible measures to ensure the safety of flights [by F-35As],” the minister said at a press conference.

The F-35A crashed into the waters off Aomori Prefecture in April during a nighttime training flight, killing the pilot. The ASDF said in June that the pilot had likely fallen into a state of spatial disorientation, or loss of situational awareness, at the time of the crash. (Source: defense-aerospace.com/Japan News)

02 Aug 19. Canary in the coal mine? Hong Kong, Taiwan and a new Cold War? At the close of the Second World War, Berlin became a city torn between the triumphant Allies who had now turned their hostilities towards one another. Today, the former British island colony of Hong Kong and the island ‘nation’ of Taiwan are at the epicentre of the 21st century’s new great power competition, raising questions about the future of the Indo-Pacific.

Like every ascendent economic, political and strategic power, China has used its period of rapid industrialisation and economic expansion to begin establishing its position within the broader global context – fuelled by a long memory of a “century of humiliation” at the hands of Western imperialism, finally ending with the successful Communist Revolution in 1949, China and its political leaders have dedicated the nation to establishing a new era of Chinese global primacy.

As China’s position within the global order has evolved and its ambitions towards the Indo-Pacific, in particular, have become increasingly apparent, the Chinese government, driven by an extremely ambitious leader, President Xi Jinping, has identified a number of factors of both ‘internal’ and ‘external’ concern for the rising superpower’s status.

These ‘concerns’ extend to traditional areas of Chinese focus, namely central Asia, Tibet and the Taiwan situation, and have now seemingly spread to Hong Kong as dissent continues to grow and nearly 200,0000 military police have been deployed to the border. More concerning for nations like Australia – America’s resurgence, characterised by “intensified competition among major countries, significantly increased its defence expenditure, pushed for additional capacity in nuclear, outer space, cyber and missile defence, and undermined global strategic stability”.

This perfect storm of moves and counter moves raises important questions for Australian, Japanese and American leaders: Is an ‘iron curtain’ descending across the Indo-Pacific and what does this mean for the future?

No need for concern, they’re just domestic issues

While China’s recently released Defence White Paper, China’s National Defense in the New Era, was quick to identify the issue of Taiwan’s independence as a matter of internal security, part of a larger suite of ‘internal’ issues, the nation has committed to using force to resolve the issue, including against external influences, read the US and its regional partners, as a means of supporting China’s primary national defence aims, identified as follows:

  • To deter and resist aggression;
  • To safeguard national political security, the people’s security and social stability;
  • To oppose and contain “Taiwan independence”;
  • To crack down on proponents of separatist movements such as “Tibet independence” and the creation of “East Turkistan”;
  • To safeguard national sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity and security;
  • To safeguard China’s maritime rights and interests – building on the nation’s expansion in the South China Sea;
  • To safeguard China’s security interests in outer space, electromagnetic space and cyber space;
  • To safeguard China’s overseas interests; and
  • To support the sustainable development of the country.

China remains resolute regarding the issue of Taiwan, stating: “China has the firm resolve and the ability to safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and will never allow the secession of any part of its territory by anyone, any organisation or any political party by any means at any time. We make no promise to renounce the use of force, and reserve the option of taking all necessary measures. This is by no means targeted at our compatriots in Taiwan, but at the interference of external forces and the very small number of ‘Taiwan independence’ separatists and their activities. The PLA will resolutely defeat anyone attempting to separate Taiwan from China and safeguard national unity at all costs.” (Emphasis added).

However, Hong Kong, the former British island colony handed back in the mid-1990s, has emerged as a major thorn in the side of the Chinese administration with pro-democracy riots in response to a systematic program by the Chinese government to eliminate threats to the Communist Party, bringing the concept of ‘One Country, Two Systems’ into question – positioning the small island as the Berlin of the new Cold War.

While both the Chinese government and its recently released DWP articulate that the majority of the rising power’s modernisation, recapitalisation and expansion plans are directed toward matters of internal security and reuniting dissident provinces, like Taiwan and Tibet, the direct willingness of the Chinese government to actively deploy troops, albeit military police, in conjunction with dissident ‘repatriation’ and a recently launched Chinese civilian travel ban to Taiwan raises significant and troubling questions.

South China Sea? No, just China’s Sea

Further compounding these ‘internal issues’ is the superpower’s willingness to declare any area of economic, political or strategic interest a part of China, and nowhere is this more evident than in the South China Sea – placing the rising superpower’s ambitions in direct conflict with the post-Second World War economic, political and strategic order established by the US and supported by a number of established regional powers, including Japan, Australia and South Korea.

China’s White Paper clearly articulates its position towards the South China Sea and its construction of military facilities on reclaimed islands throughout the international waterways: “China resolutely safeguards its national sovereignty and territorial integrity. The South China Sea islands and Diaoyu Islands are inalienable parts of the Chinese territory. China exercises its national sovereignty to build infrastructure and deploy necessary defensive capabilities on the islands and reefs in the South China Sea, and to conduct patrols in the waters of Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea.

“China is committed to resolving related disputes through negotiations with those states directly involved on the basis of respecting historical facts and international law.”

However, in late 2018 a Chinese colonel issued a stern warning to the US and its regional allies operating in the South China Sea and more broadly the western Pacific ocean where they may challenge China’s increased territorial and economic ambitions throughout the regions.

Dr Malcolm Davis of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) told Defence Connect, “2018 has been an interesting year in the South China Sea. It started fairly early on with the basing of anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM) on reclaimed islands in the SCS, the basing of the upgraded, H-6K nuclear-capable bomber on Woody Island and more recently the USS Decatur (DDG-73) incident really reinforces that China is not backing down from its territorial ambitions.”

This growing assertiveness and apparent disregard for international convention and United Nations agreements places increased pressure on regional nations and the security paradigm upon which the stability of Indo-Pacific Asia is built.

China’s bullying and intimidation tactics expand beyond direct military confrontation and thumbing their nose at international convention. The recent attempts by China to assert its influence and own wishes over ASEAN regarding the South China Sea Code of Conduct is particular evidence of this.

“What we saw recently with the ASEAN discussion about establishing a code of conduct for operating in the South China Sea was essentially a push by China to prevent all foreign navies from operating in the area. Given the amount of seaborne trade that flows through the South China Sea, that was obviously an unacceptable outcome for both the US and Australia,” Dr Davis explained.

Questions for Australia

Despite Australia’s enduring commitment to the Australia-US alliance, serious questions remain for Australia in the new world order of President Donald Trump’s America, as a number of allies have been targeted by the maverick President for relying on the US for their security against larger state-based actors, which has seen the President actively pressuring key allies, particularly NATO allies, to renegotiate the deals.

Enhancing Australia’s capacity to act as an independent power, incorporating great power-style strategic economic, diplomatic and military capability serves as a powerful symbol of Australia’s sovereignty and evolving responsibilities in supporting and enhancing the security and prosperity of Indo-Pacific Asia. Shifting the public discussion away from the default Australian position of “it is all a little too difficult, so let’s not bother” will provide unprecedented economic, diplomatic, political and strategic opportunities for the nation.

However, as events continue to unfold throughout the region and China continues to throw its economic, political and strategic weight around, can Australia afford to remain a secondary power or does it need to embrace a larger, more independent role in an era of increasing great power competition? (Source: Defence Connect)

02 Aug 19. Australian Defence and industry agree to rules of engagement. The Department of Defence and Ai Group have formally established an agreement on industry engagement and negotiation principles to support the development of Australia’s defence industry capabilities.

Ai Group chief executive Innes Willox and Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group deputy secretary Tony Fraser signed the Engagement and Negotiation Principles in Canberra on Thursday on behalf of defence industry and Defence.

The agreement articulates a set of core principles, values and shared objectives for engagement between Defence and all defence industry participants. It provides guidance on expected behaviours underpinning engagements and negotiations during the procurement process.

As part of the agreement, both parties have identified a series of mutual benefits, including:

  • Strengthened, enhanced and more positive relationships based on mutual trust and respect;
  • Promotion of good faith engagements and negotiations;
  • Reduced transaction costs through enhancing the effectiveness of engagements and negotiations;
  • Strengthened reputations and stakeholder perceptions for both Defence and industry; and
  • Mutually beneficial outcomes for both Defence and industry with a shared goal of achieving “best for capability outcomes” for the ADF.

“This document has been developed collaboratively between Defence and industry and is underpinned by strong commitment from all involved. It creates a solid base for strengthened, enhanced and more positive relationships based on mutual trust and respect,” Willox said.

Additionally, the agreement identifies a series of steps that will be used as reference points by both parties to inform a code of conduct during any engagement and/or negotiation, including:

  • Working collaboratively and promoting honesty, trust and mutual respect and high ethical standards as the key foundations of all engagement;
  • Communicating with appropriate openness, and in a clear and timely manner, including in relation to levels of authority, delegations, attendees and escalation;
  • Timely communication of the number of and role of all attendees;
  • Understanding and respecting the approval processes of Defence and industry participants;
  • Engaging and negotiating from a position of ‘fact rather than emotion’;
  • Where doing so, facilitating the interests of Australian SMEs, including Indigenous and disability enterprises;
  • Emphasising the importance of time frames and efficient use of resources; and
  • Accepting, respecting and upholding decisions, while taking responsibility and accountability to deliver on commitments.

Fraser said both Defence and the Australian government were committed to the development of a robust, resilient and internationally competitive Australian industry base and that the signing of the principles would further strengthen the link between Defence and industry.

“Durable relationships between Defence and industry are critical to the development and growth of defence industry and ultimately the achievement of Australia’s defence capability goals,” Fraser said.(Source: Defence Connect)

02 Aug 19. China is reticent about new nuclear missile treaty as INF ends – Germany. A new international treaty, replacing the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) which ends on Friday, should include China, Germany’s Foreign Minister Heiko Maas said, but added that Beijing was acting reticently on the matter.

A new treaty to control nuclear armament should not only include the United States and Russia, but also China, Maas told DLF radio, but added: “The Chinese government is extraordinarily reticent and therefore we have to continue putting the issue on the agenda.” The United States announced last year it was withdrawing from the historical pact struck during the Cold War, accusing Russia of failing to comply with it. Moscow denies this.

Maas on Friday said the end of the treaty did not imply a renewed global armament race and added that Europe would not take part in any such process. (Source: Reuters)

01 Aug 19.  Iran says ready for worst in battle to save nuclear deal amid standoff with U.S.. President Hassan Rouhani said on Thursday that Iran was ready for the worst in an uphill struggle to salvage its nuclear deal with world powers abandoned by the United States, but that he was sure Tehran would eventually prevail.

Fears of a Middle East war with global repercussions have risen since U.S. President Donald Trump withdrew last year from the 2015 deal and revived a panoply of sanctions meant to push Tehran into wider security concessions.

Iran has retaliated by breaching the deal, resuming uranium enrichment seen in the West as a potential conduit to developing an atom bomb, but faces severe economic damage under intensified U.S. sanctions designed to strangle its vital oil trade.

“We have a hard battle ahead, but we shall surely win,” Rouhani said on live state television.

“We are not acting on the assumption we will get results through talks and accords,” Rouhani said, alluding to European powers trying to salvage the deal that reined in Iran’s disputed nuclear advances but unable to protect from U.S. sanctions the trade benefits that Tehran was promised in return.

“Instead we are planning based on the assumption that we will not achieve results. Our budget for this year and next, our ministries are also acting on this basis … We are acting and going step-by-step with long-term prudence.”

The downbeat remarks by Rouhani, architect of the landmark 2015 accord and a strong proponent of negotiations, hinted he was losing hope of avoiding a final collapse of the deal, though he left the door open to further contacts with Europe.

ATTACKS ON OIL TANKERS

After several attacks in May and June on oil tankers – blamed by Washington on Tehran, which denied responsibility – Trump has been trying to forge a military coalition to secure Gulf waters, though European allies have been loath to join for fear of provoking open conflict.

Britain, France and Germany have instead appealed for diplomatic moves to defuse the crisis.

But longtime foes Tehran and Washington have taken hard lines and on Wednesday the Trump administration imposed sanctions on Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif.

France voiced concern over the U.S. move and said that along with Britain and Germany it disagreed with the decision, the French Foreign Ministry said.

“We consider that all diplomatic channels should stay open, particularly in a context of high tensions,” the ministry said.

Iran’s Rouhani described the sanctions on Zarif as “childish behaviour.”

A pivotal player in the nuclear deal who was educated and lived for years in the United States, Zarif said the U.S. action would not affect him as he had no property or other interests in America.

U.S. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin said Zarif “implements the reckless agenda of Iran’s Supreme Leader … (We are) sending a clear message to the Iranian regime that its recent behaviour is completely unacceptable”.

In repudiating the nuclear deal reached by his predecessor Barack Obama, Trump said he wanted to secure a more far-reaching accord that would not only put stricter limits on Iran’s nuclear activity but also curb its ballistic missile programme and end its support for armed proxies in Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Lebanon.

Iran has long said its nuclear work is solely for civilian energy and its missiles only for defence and deterrence.

NO SWAP OF SEIZED TANKERS, BRITAIN SAYS

As U.S.-Iranian tensions have spiralled, the security of shipping in the Gulf, through which about a fifth of the world’s oil passes, has shot up the international agenda.

Washington has accused Iran of being behind explosions that holed six oil tankers in May and June.

In July, Iran seized a British-flagged tanker in the Strait of Hormuz, the Gulf’s outlet to the open seas, in apparent retaliation for Britain’s seizure of an Iranian ship accused of violating European sanctions by taking oil to Syria.

Britain on Thursday ruled out a swap of the two tankers. “We are not going to barter: if people or nations have detained UK-flagged illegally then the rule of law and rule of international law must be upheld,” Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab said.

In a sign of increasing jitters over security in the Gulf, Royal Dutch Shell (RDSa.L) said on Thursday it was not taking any British-flagged tankers through the Strait of Hormuz for the time being.

The U.S. Embassy in Berlin said on Tuesday the United States had asked Germany to join France and Britain in a mission to protect shipping through the strait and “combat Iranian aggression”. Germany rejected the request.

On Thursday, Richard Grenell, U.S. ambassador to Germany, urged Berlin to take on a global responsibility to match its economic might. “Germany is the biggest economic power in Europe. This success brings global responsibilities,” he said. (Source: Reuters)

01 Aug 19. Australia’s OneSKY integrated civil-military air traffic system running 10 years late. The OneSKY programme to modernise and integrate Australia’s civil and defence air traffic management systems is running 10 years late and will cost more than double the original estimate to acquire, the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) has reported.

Australian airspace covers 11% of the globe and includes several of the world’s busiest air routes. Thales Australia was named by lead entity Airservices Australia as successful tenderer for the OneSKY programme and its Civil Military Air Traffic Management System (CMATS) in February 2015. The Department of Defence (DoD) signed a separate agreement with Airservices to receive elements of CMATS. Unusually, OneSKY was declared a government ‘project of concern’ in August 2017 only to be removed from that list six months later. (Source: IHS Jane’s)

31 Jul 19. The US Air Force is ramping up its airstrikes in Somalia. The US Air Force has already carried out as many airstrikes in Somalia in the first seven months of 2019 as it did in all of 2018. In an email Monday, Col. Chris Karns, a spokesman for United States Africa Command, said that a July 27 airstrike in Somalia brought the total number of airstrikes in the African nationto 47, the same as 2018′s total.

“The 47 for 2019 are all in support of the Federal Government of Somalia,” Karns said. “It is imperative that pressure is maintained on violent extremist organizations to create conditions for further political and economic development in Africa.”

In a Sunday release, AFRICOM said the July 27 airstrike targeted suspected Islamic State militants in the Golis Mountain region of Somalia, which the command said is known for terrorist activity.

AFRICOM said one suspected ISIS member who played a key role in the group was killed, but that no civilians were believed to have been injured or killed.

Karns said the airstrikes are helping create opportunity for the Somali government’s efforts to reach citizens and develop the country’s economy.

The strikes create organizational confusion in terror groups such as Al Shabab and remind its members that “they will be persistently and relentlessly pursued and where necessary, permanently stopped,” he said. Karns also said airstrikes are just one part of the strategy to fight terrorists. The U.S. military and other international partners are working with Somalis to strengthen the nation’s defense capabilities and institutions, and create opportunities for economic development, to undercut terrorist groups’ ability to disrupt Somalia.

“The old narratives of the past aren’t indicative of Somalia’s future or where it stands today,” Karns said. “Education and economic opportunities are key to ultimately defeating and eroding the influence of groups like Al Shabaab. However, effective security underpins both.” (Source: Defense News Early Bird/Airforce Times)

01 Aug 19. Australian Naval shipbuilding time frame presents risk of skills atrophy and project delays. Australia’s $90bn naval shipbuilding program has been described as a major step-change in the way the nation conducts not only naval shipbuilding, but establishes industry policy in the era of industry 4.0 – however, do time frames, albeit relatively short ones, between construction of major warships and submarines present a series of risks to program cost, delivery and naval capability?

As a maritime nation, Australia is dependent on unlimited access to the ocean – as the regional paradigm changes, there is greater strain on the Navy to protect the national interests and naval assets like the Canberra Class amphibious warfare ships, combined with concerns about the continuity of Australia’s sovereign naval shipbuilding industry in between major programs.

Now, for the first time in the nation’s history, Australia’s prosperity, security and way of life is intrinsically linked to the ambition, stability and direction of its Indo-Pacific neighbours. Guaranteeing this requires the nation to find a balance between the expeditionary and interventionist focused ‘Forward Defence’ and the continental defence focused ‘Defence of Australia’ doctrines to counter the high- and low-intensity threats to the nation’s security and interests.

Australia’s focus on the Indo-Pacific region makes a great deal of sense, particularly given the positioning of key regional economic and strategic partners across what has been referred to as the ‘Arc of Instability’, which plays host to a range of traditional state and asymmetric economic and political challenges. However, the growth of China and India and smaller nations surrounding them, combined with the importance of the Indo-Pacific as a pillar of the national, regional and global economy, now requires renewed Australian focus.

Woth the Defence Industrial Capability Plan and the $95bn Naval Shipbuilding Plan set out how the government is delivering on the commitment to build a strong, sustainable and innovative Australian naval shipbuilding industry.

The NSP states, “The goal of the Naval Shipbuilding Plan is to ensure that the regeneration of the Royal Australian Navy over the coming decades will ensure both a cost-effective solution for the government provide Navy the assured capability to fight and win. The National Naval Shipbuilding Office has been established to implement the Naval Shipbuilding Plan.”

With $90bn worth of naval shipbuilding programs, the Royal Australian Navy and naval shipbuilding industry would appear to be in an enviable position, however, the long lead time on key programs and ramp-up in delivery poses challenges for industry – in particular, the $50bn SEA 1000 Attack Class submarine and $35bn Hunter Class programs face the potential for delay as a result of growing windows between the construction periods of major surface warships and submarines in Australia.

Further complicating matters is the thinly defined concepts of ‘sovereign’ and ‘sustainable’ as they relate to Australia’s naval shipbuilding leave many unanswered questions, as does the ever-present spectre of the infamous ‘valleys of death’ between major projects that severely impact the capability, sustainability and cost of delivering major naval platforms.

A short time between drinks still has an impact

The complexity of contemporary naval platforms, like landing helicopter dock ships (LHD), guided-missile destroyers, frigates and submarines, equates to long design, capability definition, lead materials and workforce development prior to the commencement of construction. This is particularly evident in the case of the relatively short period between the delivery of the final Anzac Class frigate and work beginning on major block components for the Hobart Class guided-missile destroyers in the mid-2000s.

The relatively short delay between the delivery of the final Anzac Class vessel and construction commencing on HMAS Hobart revealed the startling rate at which naval shipbuilding skills and project management capabilities atrophy in the modern naval shipbuilding environment, raising a poignant question: if Australia is serious about developing its naval shipbuilding industry, should continuous shipbuilding actually mean continuous shipbuilding?

Looking towards the delivery of the HMAS Hunter and HMAS Attack, the questions come at a timely junction for Australia’s defence industry and political leaders as they seek to avoid repeating the mistakes of the past and dooming another generation of major surface and submarine acquisition to the same fate as the much-maligned, yet highly capable Collins and Hobart Class vessels, both of which were frequently on the projects of concern list.

So, how does Australia avoid repeating these issues, project delays and cost overruns on projects that are incredibly politically sensitive, support capability delivery to the warfighter, while maximising value for money for the Australian taxpayer and supporting the development of Australia’s sovereign naval shipbuilding industry?

Your thoughts

Developing and implementing a cohesive, innovative and long-term vision for Australia’s sovereign defence industry capability and the naval shipbuilding industry as a whole can also serve as the basis for developing, and in some cases redeveloping, a robust, advanced manufacturing economy taking advantage of Australia’s unrivalled resource wealth – supporting the broader national security and interests in the Indo-Pacific. (Source: Defence Connect)

31 Jul 19. New N. Korean Submarine Seen as Capable of Carrying 3 SLBMs: S. Korea. A newly constructed North Korean submarine seems to be capable of carrying three submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), South Korea’s defense ministry was quoted as saying on Wednesday. The defense ministry determined that the North’s submarine is ready to be deployed soon, Rep. Lee Hye-hoon, the chief of the parliamentary intelligence committee, told reporters after the ministry’s closed-door briefing. North Korean leader Kim Jong-un inspected a new submarine, which the deployment of which he says is “near at hand,” according to reports last week by North Korean media. The ministry said the North’s sub appears to be slightly larger than a 2,500-ton Gorae-class submarine. The ministry added that North Korea fired two missiles on May 4, revising its earlier report of the North launching one missile.  (Source: defense-aerospace.com/The Korea Herald)

30 Jul 19. US Formally Asks Germany to ‘Help Secure’ Strait of Hormuz. The US wants Germany to take part in a UK-proposed, European-led naval mission to protect ships sailing near Iran. German politicians were less than thrilled by the initiative, which aims to “combat Iranian aggression.”

The United States has formally asked Germany to join a European naval mission to protect shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, the US embassy in Berlin said Tuesday.  Earlier, embassy spokeswoman Tamara Sternberg-Greller told the DPA news agency about the request. The embassy confirmed the statements to DW.

“We’ve formally asked Germany to join France and the UK to help secure the Strait of Hormuz and combat Iranian aggression,” she said.

“Members of the German government have been clear that freedom of navigation should be protected,” Sternberg-Greller said. “Our question is, protected by whom?”

‘Suddenly’ part of a war

According to the DPA news agency, the request had actually been sent to Berlin some days ago but failed to make an impression on the German government. Berlin had not yet made any plans for “any contribution” to a US-led mission, Germany’s Foreign Ministry said on Tuesday.

German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas repeatedly stated that Germany sees “de-escalation and diplomatic efforts” as a priority. “Taking part in the American strategy of maximum pressure is out of the question,” he was quoted as saying by the AFP news agency.

Senior lawmakers in both the SPD and Angela Merkel’s CDU party also rejected the idea. Ranking SPD lawmaker in charge of foreign policy Nils Schmid also criticized the initiative in a statement to Germany’s public broadcaster ARD. If Germany joined the mission, “you would suddenly be siding with Americans in a war with Iran.”

A European answer

The chief of Bundestag’s Foreign Policy Committee, conservative Norbert Röttgen, said that the crisis required a European answer. “We cannot have a joint mission with the US right now, because the Europeans are pursuing a completely different policy towards Iran,” Röttgen said.

Separately, the foreign policy spokesman for German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s CDU/CSU parliamentary group told DW that it was too early to assess whether Germany should join it.

“I would only like to pass judgement about such an operation after more details are presented,” Jürgen Hardt said. He added that the German military would nevertheless be “prepared” to make a “positive” contribution should the government opt to take part in the force.”

German Vice Chancellor and Finance Minister Olaf Scholz said on Wednesday the risk of being dragged into a greater conflict was too great. “That’s why I think this is not a good idea,” he told public broadcaster ZDF.

Insecure shipping

The UK last week proposed the European-led force to protect shipping in the Gulf in response to Iran’s seizure of the UK-flagged Stena Impero oil tanker on July 19.  France, Denmark, Poland, Portugal, Spain and Sweden are reportedly interested in the mission. The seizure of the Stena Impero came two weeks after the UK detained an Iranian supertanker near Gibraltar for allegedly transporting oil to Syria in violation of EU sanctions. The UK-Iran tanker dispute comes amid rising tensions between Iran and Europe over a string of separate tanker attacks and Iran’s decision to abandon parts of a 2015 deal that restricted its nuclear program. Relations between the United States and Iran have also worsened. Both countries claim to have shot down drones belonging to the other state in the past several weeks. The Strait of Hormuz is one of the world’s most important shipping lanes. Almost a third of all oil exports pass through the waterway, which is located between Iran and Oman.  (Source: defense-aerospace.com/Deutsche Welle German Radio)

31 Jul 19. India invites Korean cos to set up units in UP.  Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath has invited Korean companies to set up units in the Defence Corridor, saying that Korean presence in UP’s industrial scenario has bolstered state’s economy and relations between the two countries.

“Korean companies have strong imprints in UP market. Samsung has set up the largest factory of the world in Noida. I invite Korean entrepreneurs to set up units in Defence Corridor which is likely to come up along Bundelkhand Expressway,” Yogi told a Korean delegation that met him at Lok Bhawan on Tuesday.

The Chief Minister said that many Korean companies had already made investments in the state because they were feeling safe here. “They have made investments in electronic sector and now the companies should invest in manufacture and defence sectors too,” he said. “We have investor-friendly policy. In framework of that policy, Korean companies should make a foray into defence and aerospace sector, which is likely to bring prosperity in the region,” Yogi said.

The CM said that the government was acquiring land for construction of Bundelkhand Expressway and along it, the Defence Corridor will come up.

“If Korean companies invest there, it would be a great opportunity for both Korea and Uttar Pradesh, as the state is home to 22 crore people and it will provide a big market to the investors,” the CM said.

Yogi also spoke at length about cultural relations between the two countries and how economic partnership would help in increasing ties between two great nations.

The Korean delegation was led by Deputy Director of National Security Kim Yu Geun. DG of Project Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA), Gang Eunho was also present in the meeting. (Source: Google/https://www.dailypioneer.com/)

30 Jul 19. North Korea fires short-range ballistic missiles for the second time in a week. North Korea fired two short-range ballistic missiles early on Wednesday, the South Korean military said, only days after it launched two similar missiles intended to pressure South Korea and the United States to stop upcoming military drills. The latest launches were from the Wonsan area on North Korea’s east coast, the same area from where missiles were fired last week, South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said in a statement. It said it was monitoring in case of more launches. The JCS said later the North had fired ballistic missiles that flew about 250km (155 miles) and that they appeared to be similar to those launched last week.

Wednesday’s launch follows ballistic missile firings on July 25, North Korea’ first missile tests since leader Kim Jong Un and U.S. President Donald Trump met on June 30 and agreed to revive stalled denuclearisation talks.

“North Korea’s actions do not help ease military tensions, nor do they help keep the momentum for talks that are under way,” South Korean Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-wha told reporters. She urged North Korea to halt the missile launches. The White House, the Pentagon and the U.S. State Department did not respond immediately to requests for comment.

Trump and U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo both played down last week’s launches and Pompeo has continued to express hope for a diplomatic way forward with North Korea.

Colonel Lee Peters, a spokesman for U.S. military forces in South Korea, said: “We are aware of reports of a missile launch from North Korea and we will continue to monitor the situation.”

NEW MISSILES

A South Korean defence official said initial estimates showed the missiles fired on Wednesday could be similar to those last week, although they were still working to confirm details.

Dubbed the KN-23, those missiles are designed to evade missile defence systems by being easier to hide, launch, and manoeuvre in flight, experts said.

Kim described the two KN-23s launched last week as having a “low-altitude gliding and leaping flight” pattern that would make them hard to intercept. Analysts said the range and altitude of Wednesday’s flights could indicate a test of those capabilities. South Korean defence minister Jeong Kyeong-doo told a defence forum in Seoul that stopping a missile like the KN-23 would be difficult, although South Korea’s missile defence systems would be able to detect and intercept them.

South Korea’s defence ministry also told lawmakers in Seoul it had concluded that a new submarine the North showcased last week was capable of carrying up to three ballistic missiles.

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe said there was no impact from Wednesday’s launch on Japan’s security. (Source: Reuters)

30 Jul 19. Rivals Iran and UAE to hold maritime security talks. Iran was to revive maritime security talks on Tuesday with traditional foe the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in an apparent bid to calm tensions in the Gulf, although a Gulf official described the discussions as routine and technical. The talks follow weeks of heightened political friction around the strategic waterway stemming from hostility between Tehran and Washington, the main Western ally of Gulf Arab states long wary of the Islamic Republic. The discussions had been off since 2013, but the UAE is widely seen in the region as wanting to guard its reputation as a safe business hub.

“The 6th joint meeting will be held on Tuesday between a visiting seven-member delegation from the United Arab Emirates’ coast guard and Iranian officials in Tehran,” Iran’s semi-official Students News Agency (ISNA) reported.

Without giving a source, ISNA said issues from shared borders, visits by citizens of each nation, illegal entries, and maritime connections would be discussed. A Gulf official said the meeting was not related to tensions in the region.

“It is a technical meeting that was organized a long time ago to discuss routine maritime issues,” the official told Reuters.

Attacks on Saudi tankers and other vessels off the UAE coast in May increased tensions between the United States, Iran and Gulf Arab states. Washington and its Sunni Arab allies blamed Iran for the attacks, but Tehran denied that.

The UAE tempered its reaction to the attacks, and has also scaled back its military presence in Yemen, where Saudi Arabia is involved in a proxy war with Shi’ite Iran.

Iran has said it wants to improve relations with its regional Sunni rivals Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

“Iran has always given extreme importance to the security of the Persian Gulf and it needs cooperation among all Persian Gulf states,” said an Iranian official who asked not to be named.

Washington and Tehran are in a protracted standoff over Iran’s nuclear and missile programs, and its regional influence.

Washington has imposed and tightened sanctions on Iran’s oil exports after President Donald Trump pulled out of Iran’s 2015 deal with major powers, under which Tehran got access to world trade in return for curbs on its nuclear programme.

Tehran has repeatedly warned it would block exports through the waterway if the United States tried to strangle its economy. (Source: Reuters)

30 Jul 19. Here’s Everything We Know About The Alleged Israeli Air Force F-35 Air Strike on an Iranian Base in Iraq. According to Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper that cites anonymous western diplomats, the Israeli Adir was inolved in at least one air strike in Iraq. Here’s everything we know.

On July 19 and again on Jul. 28, the Israeli Air Force carried out air strikes on Iranian warehouses storing arms and missiles at Camp Ashraf, north-east of Baghdad, in Iraq. What is more, during the first raid, the base was struck by an F-35I Adir stealth jet. This is what Israeli media outlets are reporting after the London-based Arabic newspaper Asharq Al-Awsat broke the news, citing Western diplomats, on Jul. 30.

Little details about the air strikes have been disclosed (none of those have been officially confirmed) so far. For sure the air strikes targeted a base deep inside the Iraqi airspace: some 80 km from the Iranian border. And this represents a sign that Israel has expanded the scope of its anti-Iranian operations in the region. Indeed, “Over the past year, an number of strikes targeting the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and the Lebanese militia Hezbollah in Syria were attributed to Israel,” Haaretz reported. But this is the first time the IAF strikes targets so close to the Iranian border.

Provided the F-35I Adir jets (most probably more than one but we can’t be sure) were really used in one or both the air strikes, it would also be interesting to understant the route they followed and, above all, the support they got: for instance, the distance between Nevatim Air Base and Camp Ashraf is in excess of 1,000 km: aerial refueling would probably be required for the jets, supposedly in “stealth mode” and without external fuel tanks, to reach their targets and safely return home.

It’s not the first time a foreign (Arabic) media outlet reports the involvement of the Adir in missions over Syria, Iraq or Iran.

Last year the news of an alleged Israeli F-35 mission over Iran spread through the social media. According to an “informed source” who talked to Kuwaiti Al-Jarida newspaper two Adir stealth jets flew undetected over Syria and Iraq and snuck into the Iranian airspace, flying reconnaissance missions over the Iranian cities Bandar Abbas, Esfahan and Shiraz.

This is what I wrote to debunk the claim:

There are many weird things:

First of all the source. Al-Jarida is often used to deliver Israeli propaganda/PSYOPS messages, according to several sources. For instance, here’s how Haaretz commented a previous scoop of the Kuwaiti outlet (again, highlight mine):

“Al-Jarida, which in recent years had broken exclusive stories from Israel, quoted a source in Jerusalem as saying that “there is an American-Israeli agreement” that Soleimani is a “threat to the two countries’ interests in the region.” It is generally assumed in the Arab world that the paper is used as an Israeli platform for conveying messages to other countries in the Middle East.

Then, the Israeli Air Force operates more than seven F-35s (at least 9) and their range (about 2,000 km) does not allow the aircraft in stealth mode (i.e. without external fuel tanks) to fly to Iran, twice, without stopover or aerial refueling.

And, above all, although the involvement of the F-35 in real missions has been considered “imminent” by some analysts since the Israeli Air Force declared its first F-35 “Adir” operational on Dec. 6, 2017, it’s highly unlikely such a mission, if real, would be leaked.

There have been a series of unconfirmed rumors that the F-35Is have been used to attack Syrian targets, but there is no confirmation that the jets have flown any combat missions yet. The mission over Iran seems to be just one of these: a bogus claim most probably spread on purpose as part of some sort of PSYOPS aimed at threatening Israel’s enemies.

The main difference today is that the Israeli F-35s have had their “baptism of fire” as officially confirmed by the IAF Chief on May 22, 2018.

Here’s what I’ve written last year, commenting the combat debut of the Adir (most of the commentary still applies to today’s news):

With no more details as to where and how the Adir were committed, it’s hard to make any further analysis. For sure, what can be said is that the IAF has proved once again its ability to pioneer combat testing of new aircraft. Although we don’t know the real stategic value of the missions undertaken by the 5th generation aircraft, it’s clear the Israeli have considered the sorties worth the risk. A risk that has become more real on Feb. 10, 2018, when one F-16I Sufa that had entered the Syrian airspace to strike Iranian targets in response to an Iranian drone that had violated the Israeli airspace (before being shot down by an AH-64 Apache helicopter) was targeted by the Syrian Air Defenses and crashed after a large long-range outdated SA-5 missile (one of 27 fired against the jets), hit the Israeli F-16. In that case, in spite the on board warning system of the F-16I alerted the crew of the incoming threat, the pilot and navigator failed to deploy countermeasures.

Although the IAF determined the loss of the Sufa was caused by a “professional error” many sources suggested that the first downing of an IAF jet to the enemy fire since the First Lebanon War could accelerate the commitment of the stealthy F-35Is for the subsequent missions.

What kind of missions? Hard to say. We can’t but speculate here but unless there was some really critical target to hit in a heavily defended airspace, the F-35s might have been initially involved as part of larger “packages” that included other special mission aircraft and EW (Electronic Warfare) support where the Adir jets would also (or mostly) exploit their ELINT abilities to detect, geolocate and classify enemy‘s systems. In fact, along with its Low Observability feature, the F-35 provides the decision makers high-end electronic intelligence gathering sensors combined with advanced sensor fusion capabilities to create a single integrated picture of the battlefield: in other words, not only can the F-35 conduct an air strike delivering bombs but it can also direct air strikes of other aircraft using standoff weapons. The F-35s are known to be able to carry out a dual role: “combat battlefield coordinators,” collecting, managing and distributing intelligence data while also acting as “kinetic attack platforms,” able to drop their ordnance on the targets and pass targeting data to older 4th Gen. aircraft via Link-16, if needed. More or less the same task considered for the USMC F-35B that have flown this kind of missions in exercises against high-end threats in 2016.

There have been a series of unconfirmed rumors that the F-35Is have been used to attack Syrian targets, but there is no confirmation that the jets have flown any combat missions yet. The mission over Iran seems to be just one of these: a bogus claim most probably spread on purpose as part of some sort of PSYOPS aimed at threatening Israel’s enemies.

So, the new reports seem to suggest the Israeli F-35s were used in combat for a long range strike not far from the Iranian border. We can’t say much but we can just highlight a couple of things:

  1. the target location would probably require aerial refueling (or external fuel tanks that we don’t know anything about) – even though stand-off weapons were used. The published combat radius of the F-35A is 590NM. The distance (straight line) between Nevatim and the target area is about 520NM. Considered that the route from departure to target is not straight but a path that takes into consideration civilian and military airports, airways, navaids, etc, as well as threats, it safe to say the aircraft, without AAR, with stand off weapons, would still operate at the edge of their combat radius. Possible but unlikely. An AAR (in friendly airspace) is more than likely.
  2. it’s not clear whether one or more F-35I Adir jets were involved
  3. based on the Arabic newspaper report, the type of involvement of the F-35 was probably “kinetic” (meaning that the aircraft dropped bombs) rather than “passive” (as an intelligence gathering platform).
  4. the participation of the F-35s in the air strikes has not been officially acknowledged.

Let’s wait and see if the F-35 participation in the strike is confirmed. Hopefully, more details will emerge in the following days.

(Source: News Now/https://theaviationist.com)

 

30 Jul 19. Inside China’s national defence White Paper. China’s Ministry of National Defence issued a white paper on 24 July, which outlines the biggest threats to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and how it plans to ensure military dominance. The white paper explores everything from foreign military power to near-peer challenges and the threat of “secessionists” to national security. Split into various sections the document shows how the PRC plans to respond to changing economic and military dominance. The document also serves as a check-up on the progress of the People’s Liberation Army in terms of modernisation, reforms and effectiveness, promoting an image of a peaceful nation that is also ready to stand up to adversaries at a moment’s notice.

International defence environment

The document outlines the threats to international security presented by cultural hegemony – leadership or dominance – and continued “regional conflicts”. Like previous white papers, China insinuates that the US is undermining “global stability” with its pursuit of new space-based systems, renewed nuclear capabilities, and ever-increasing defence budget.

The white paper also touches on Russia’s shoring up of conventional and nuclear arsenals, to “safeguard its strategic security space and interests”, but does not mention Russian intervention in Eastern Europe and its aggressive pursuit of cyber-attacks.

The document cites the enlargement of NATO and the alliances more visible presence across Eastern Europe in response to Russian actions. The document also praises the strengthening of military relationships between China and Russia.

Declaring that: “the military relationship between China and Russia continues to develop at a high level, enriching the China-Russia comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination for a new era and playing a significant role in maintaining global strategic stability.”

The document spends time discussing the setbacks of disarmament treaties across the world. With the US pulling out of the Iran Nuclear Deal and the suspension of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Agreement.

The security situation in the Asia-Pacific

The white paper spends a section looking at China’s relationship with its neighbours including South Korea and Japan to the east, India and Pakistan to the west and Australia to the south. Again the white paper focuses its attention on the US for “destabilising the region”.

The report says: “Even as the world economic and strategic centre continues to shift towards the Asia-Pacific, the region has become a focus of major country competition, bringing uncertainties to regional security.”

It identifies the US deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) system in South Korea as a cause of unease, which, it says, upsets the strategic balance of the region.

A key focus of this section is what China calls “regional hotspots”, like the Korean Peninsula and the ongoing India-Pakistan dispute over the Kashmir region. India and Pakistan have seen an uptick in border hostilities with an Indian fighter jet being shot-down after it entered Pakistani airspace.

The white paper compares the threat caused by uncertainty in both areas this with the relative stability of South Asia

Threats to China’s national security

Despite the ongoing persecution of ethnic Uighurs in Northern China and ongoing pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong, The white paper describes how China “continues to enjoy political stability, ethnic unity and social stability. There has been a notable increase in China’s overall national strength, global influence, and resilience to risks”.

The chief security risks for China’s ministry of national defence is that of “separatist” regions such as Taiwan, Tibet and East Turkistan. China says pushes for independence are posing a threat to “national security and social stability”. The white paper decries Taiwan, officially known as the Republic of China, for seeking ‘Taiwan independence’.”

PRC has been increasing pressure for reunification and tensions have increased in the Taiwan Strait after the US agreed a large-scale arms deal with the state.

The document adds: “The ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist forces and their actions remain the gravest immediate threat to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and the biggest barrier hindering the peaceful reunification of the country.”

The white paper also strongly asserts China’s sovereignty over the waters that surround it. It outlines ways in which the country can ensure its dominance on water, from declaring that “The South China Sea islands and Diaoyu Islands are inalienable parts of the Chinese territory” to writing of the country’s readiness to deploy defence apparatus on islands and reefs to bolster these claims.

China’s defensive priorities

The most notable aims are “to oppose and contain ‘Taiwan independence’” and “to crack down on proponents of separatist movements such as ‘Tibet independence’ and the creation of ‘East Turkistan’”. These aims make clear that the PLA will be taking more steps to quell unrest in regions already teaming with security to stamp out what PRC sees as threats.

In the case of Taiwan, China is pushing for a policy similar to its rule over Hong Kong – One China, Two Systems. In a strongly-worded section, China promises to “resolutely defeat anyone attempting to separate Taiwan from China and safeguard national unity at all costs.”

China emphasises how its armed forces have never started a conflict while setting out their strength. The document states: “No matter how it might develop, China will never threaten any other country or seek any sphere of influence.” This, however, contradicts the legacy of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s belt and road initiative expanding China’s influence on its neighbours.

The project has seen Chinese investment flood into poorer nations to build military bases in Sri Lanka, ports in Pakistan and thousands of infrastructure projects across the African continent to increase China’s trade dominance and enshrine its political influence.

Modernising the People’s Liberation Army

The white paper outlines how the PLA will keep pace with technology. The document declares the Chinese Armed Forces’ intentions “to generally achieve mechanisation by the year 2020 with significantly enhanced informationisation and greatly improved strategic capabilities” [sic]. Also “to comprehensively advance the modernization of military theory, organizational structure, military personnel, and weaponry and equipment in step with the modernization of the country and basically complete the modernization of national defence and the military by 2035.”

And finally “to fully transform the people’s armed forces into world-class forces by the mid-21st century.”

The white paper shows China’s ambitions to assert itself while not acting as an aggressor, preferring to highlight the country’s focus on quashing internal trouble’s rather than actively seeking to expand its influence. It declares the PLA a “staunch force for world peace, stability and the building of a community with a shared future for mankind”. However, the country’s foray into the South China Sea and ratcheting pressure on regions seeking autonomy paint a different picture. (Source: army-technology.com)

30 Jul 19. Israeli Warplanes Expand Operations Against Alleged Iranian Targets to Iraq, Media Claims. The alleged airstrikes come as the Islamic Republic continues to deny the Jewish state’s right to exist; Israel, in turn, blames Iran for supporting what Tel Aviv describes as “terrorist” groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas. Israeli Air Force planes launched a series of strikes on Iranian targets in Iraq, which they bombed twice in ten days, the Times of Israel reported, citing Asharq Al-Awsat, an Arabic-language newspaper published in London, which in turn cited unnamed Western diplomatic sources as saying. The Israel Defence Forces (IDF) have not commented on the reports yet. The sources claimed that an Israeli F-35 fighter jet had staged a strike on a rocket depot in a Shiite militia base located north of the Iraqi capital Baghdad on 19 July. The alleged developments followed Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu tweeting earlier this month that Iran is within range of Israeli warplanes. Netanyahu responded to Iranian MP Mojtaba Zolnour’s previous warning that if the US attacks Iran, “only half an hour will remain of Israel’s lifespan”.

This comes as Tehran rejects the Jewish state’s right to exist and Tel Aviv accuses Iran of establishing a permanent military presence in Syria. The IDF have been conducting airstrikes against what they have claimed were Iranian military targets in the Arab country, while Tehran insists that it has only been sending military advisers to Damascus to help it fight terrorism.

Israel also accuses the Islamic Republic of supporting what Tel Aviv dubs “terrorist” groups, including Hezbollah and Hamas, which the Jewish state says pose a threat to its security. (Source: defense-aerospace.com/Sputnik News)

29 Jul 19. Japan wants to be an official F-35 partner. The Pentagon plans to say no. Japan is committed to buying 105 F-35As and 42 F-35B models, such as the one pictured here. But could their role in the program expand?  Japan has formally expressed interest in joining the F-35 program as a full partner, but the Pentagon plans to shoot down that request, Defense News has learned.

Sources say Japan’s request to join the partnership creates major political headaches for the Pentagon, with fears it would cause new tensions among the international production base for the joint strike fighter and open the door for other customer nations to demand a greater role in future capability development.

In a June 18 letter from Japan’s Ministry of Defense to Pentagon acquisition head Ellen Lord, obtained by Defense News, Atsuo Suzuki, director general for the Bureau of Defense Buildup Planning, formally requests information on how Japan could move from being a customer of the F-35 to a full-fledged member of the industrial base consortium.

“I believe becoming a partner country in F-35 program is an option,” the letter reads. “I would like to have your thoughts on whether or not Japan has a possibility to be a partner country in the first place. Also, I would like you to provide the Ministry of Defense with detailed information about the responsibilities and rights of a partner country, as well as cost sharing and conditions such as the approval process and the required period.”

“We would like to make a final decision whether we could proceed to become a partner country by thoroughly examining the rights and obligations associated with becoming a partner country based on the terms and conditions you would provide,” the letter concludes.

Lord, the Pentagon acquisition head, is scheduled to meet with Japanese officials this week, and the question of membership is expected to come up. But Tokyo won’t like the answer.

Although Lord’s office will be responsible for carrying the final message to Japan, the F-35 Joint Program Office told Defense News that the partnership remains limited to the initial wave of F-35 investors.

“The F-35 cooperative Partnership closed on 15 July 2002,” stated Brandi Schiff, a spokesperson for the F-35 JPO.

The decision was documented in an April 2002 memo by the Pentagon’s acquisition executive stating that, “except for those countries with which we are already engaged in Level III System Development and Demonstration partnership negotiation by 15 July 2002, we will not be able to accommodate any additional Level III partners due to our inability to offer equitable government-to-government benefits and U.S. industry’s inability to offer equitable ‘best value’ workshare arrangements,” according to Schiff.

The F-35 partners in 2007 reiterated in a separate memo that only the partners who participated in the development phase of the F-35 program would be eligible to remain partners during the production, sustainment and modernization stages.

A source familiar with internal discussions says the Pentagon is concerned that letting Japan become a program partner would lead to other nations demanding similar access.

Japan’s query is hitting the F-35 program at a time of change. Vice Adm. Mat Winter, the head of the JPO, retired this month after only two years on the job, and Turkey’s pursuit of a Russian air defense system has resulted in them being booted from the F-35 consortium, with all work being done by its companies to end early next year.

So in many ways, Japan asking to be made a full partner now makes sense, said a former senior official in the F-35 program, who agreed to speak on background out of respect for current decision makers.

“You now lost a partner in Turkey, so there is a vacant parking space, so to speak. And other than the U.S. services, [Japan] will be the one nation with the most F-35s,” the former official said, noting two changes that have happened in just the last year.

“Ultimately, the Department of Defense, in coordination with the State Department, made up the rules,” the former official said. “The Department of Defense can change the rules.”

Global impact

There are two tiers of participation in the F-35 program. The first-tier members are considered “partners” in the program, which comes with direct involvement in the joint program office. That includes having national representatives stationed in the JPO, weighing in on decisions about future capabilities, and deciding what future industrial participation looks like.

And that industrial participation is important — building parts of the jet that go into the global supply chain is expected to net the partner nations billions in revenue over the lifetime of the program. The partners are made up of the first nine nations to sign onto the program: Australia, Canada, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States.

The second tier consists of “customers” for the jet, comprising nations that came later to the program. Those nations command less industrial participation, lack voting power on what future development of the jet looks like, and do not have officials assigned to the JPO. That tier is made up of Israel, South Korea, Belgium and Japan, but could expand in the future with Finland, Singapore and other nations.

In December 2018, Japan announced a plan to expand procurement of F-35s from 42 to 147 jets, making it the single largest F-35 operator outside of the United States, as well as one of only three foreign nations to operate the F-35B jump-jet model. But Tokyo appears interested in increasing its teaming with the program, in large part because it wishes to take part in guiding new capabilities development as the plane gets ready for its Block 4 upgrade.

“There are various merits in participating in continuous capability development and delivery deliberation process by partner countries. In addition, there is a further need to obtain flight safety information for accountability to the public,” the letter from the Japanese defense ministry reads. “I understand that partner countries are allowed to join [JSF Executive Steering Board], to be involved in capability improvement, to dispatch their personnel to JPO, to participate in parts production and to access further information.”

The emphasis on the need to obtain flight safety information is notable, after an F-35A crashed into the ocean in April, resulting in the loss of both the plane and its pilot. Japanese officials have since blamed the crash on spatial distortion for the pilot. However, customer nations receive the same safety information that partners do, albeit slightly delayed due to the need to clear information.

The letter also acknowledges that “partner countries share significant costs,” an indication that Japan would be willing to pony up more cash in order to join the inner circle of F-35 members.

From a pure program logistics perspective, Japan becoming a partner would not be a problem, and in fact program officials would likely find it easier to deal with the largest foreign buyer of the F-35 as a partner rather than customer overall. The politics, however, quickly get tricky.

Should Japan be allowed to join, the former official noted, “you’ve opened Pandora’s box.”

The former official specifically said that South Korea, due to its complicated political relationship with Japan, and Israel, which was the first nation to be added as a customer after the partnership option was closed, would try to use Japan’s joining the program as a way in, as well. The official also highlighted Belgium, for now the sole NATO ally buying the F-35 as a customer and not a partner, as a nation with a strong case for promotion should Japan be allowed in.

The best argument DoD could make would be that the sheer size of Japan’s buy deserves special privileges, but that sets a bar that other nations could look to climb and effectively buy their way into a partnership.

“This is a very interesting political football that DoD has to wrestle with. This is a bigger political decision than a programmatic one,” the former official noted. “I personally think DoD doesn’t want the headache if they say yes.”

No other countries have made formal requests to join the program, Schiff confirmed. Requests for comment from Lord’s office, as well as the Japanese MoD, were not returned by press time.

Benefits for Japan

In terms of industrial participation, there are opportunities for Japanese firms to pick up work that has been removed from Turkey, said Richard Aboulafia, an analyst with the Teal Group.

Major Turkish defense firms have had a hand in building hundreds of parts for the jet. Turkey’s expulsion from the program, which includes the United States blocking Turkey’s planned procurement of 100 fighters, means that production will at least temporarily move to the United States, with a plan to farm it out to other partners in the future.

Turkey’s aerostructures work could be picked up by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, and to a lesser extent Kawasaki and Subaru, Aboulafia said. But he said he was “baffled” by the idea Japan would want more industrial participation at the same time they have publicly moved away from its domestic final assembly and check out (FACO) facility, which since 2013 has handled final production on Japan’s domestic F-35s. The FACO facility, which is operated by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, will continue to carry out production work until FY22 to fulfill the F-35As contracted by Japan between FY15 and FY18.

Instead, Aboulafia sees Japan’s interest as being driven by a desire for future developments, given the decision to increase the island nation’s planned procurement of the jet.

“If they are going to base their fighter force on this plane for decades to come, they clearly want a say in how this plane is upgraded,” he said. “It’s a sovereignty thing.”

And floating in the background is another potential complicating factor for the Pentagon: Japan’s continued drive to develop an indigenous fighter. Japan is developing a new fighter type to replace the indigenous Mitsubishi F-2 fighter currently in service, and wants the new design to enter service in the 2030s. It is also looking at development pathways for this project, with a fully indigenous design, collaboration with a foreign partner, or a spinoff from an existing fighter design being considered as possible options.

The country is already conducting research and development into a number of relevant areas for fighter design, including stealth technologies, fighter engines and active electronically scanned radars, and had previously built a technology demonstrator, the X-2 Shinshin, and carried out a series of test flights with this aircraft to validate these technologies.

Asked if the Japanese could be considering the fighter program in their decision to pursue membership in the F-35, Aboulafia bluntly responded, “How could they not?”

Schiff, the JPO spokesperson, said the F-35 remains a critical focal point of the U.S.-Japan alliance.

“Any opportunities to strengthen the alliance through interoperability and cooperation will be emphasized. As an FMS customer, Japan participates in F-35 user groups and other bi-lateral forums and engagements,” she said. (Source: Defense News)

30 Jul 19. The Australian government’s Defence Export Agenda has made great strides in a relatively short amount of time – in order to take the development of Australia’s defence industry to the next level, focus needs to shift towards supporting industry, including unsuccessful bids establishing a presence onshore to support the sovereign capability plan.

Australia’s defence industry has gone from strength to strength in a short period of time – however, global competition and world-leading capabilities requires a shift in gear to support continued growth and competitiveness for Australian manufacturers, but what does this look like?

A core component of the Australian government’s $200bn investment, recapitalisation and modernisation of the nation’s defence capability is the focus on developing a truly sovereign, sustainable and competitive domestic defence industry capability.

The introduction of the Defence Industrial Capability Plan in 2018 outlines the government’s long-term vision to “build and develop a robust, resilient and internationally competitive Australian defence industry base that is better able to help meet defence capability requirements” in recognition of the rapidly evolving geo-strategic environment and Australia’s changing role in the region.

The plan acknowledges that as Australia builds its defence capability, we must also grow our defence industrial capability. By 2028, Australia will require a larger, more capable and prepared defence industry that has the resident skills, expertise, technology, intellectual property and infrastructure to:

  • Enable the conduct of ADF operations today;
  • Support the acquisition, operation and sustainment of future defence capability; and
  • Provide the national support base for Defence to meet current needs and to surge if Australia’s strategic circumstances require it.

The very nature and scale of Australia’s unprecedented period of defence materiel recapitalisation and modernisation means that there will be unsuccessful bids – but this doesn’t mean that Australia should miss out on the opportunity for these multi-national, advanced manufacturing industries to establish a local presence capable of supporting the government’s strategic industry ambitions.

Defence Export Strategy Mk 1

Recognising the importance of the export market, the government established the Defence Export Strategy, which identifies that “Australian industry cannot sustain itself on the needs of the Australian Defence Force alone. New markets and opportunities to diversify are required to help unlock the full potential of Australian defence industry to grow, innovate and support Defence’s future needs”.

The Defence Export Strategy stated purpose is to “achieve greater export success to build a stronger, more sustainable and more globally competitive Australian defence industry to support Australia’s Defence capability needs” by 2028, which is supported by five key objectives:

  • Strengthen the partnership between the Australian government and industry to pursue defence export opportunities;
  • Sustain Australia’s defence industrial capabilities across peaks and troughs in domestic demand;
  • Enable greater innovation and productivity in Australia’s defence industry to deliver world-leading Defence capabilities;
  • Maintain the capability edge of the Australian Defence Force and leverage Defence capability development for export opportunities; and
  • Grow Australia’s defence industry to become a top 10 global defence exporter.

The strategy provides $20m in additional annual funding from 2018-19 to support Australia’s defence exports. A new Australian Defence Export Office will be created within the Department of Defence to provide a focal point for defence exports and drive implementation of the strategy.

Leveraging Australia’s reputation and position in the Five Eyes

Since the end of the Second World War, Australia has positioned itself as not only a reliable strategic ally, but a stable, robust and competitive economic partner, albeit one sometimes hindered by internal economic factors and a lack of long-term industry development and economic policy beyond dependence on resources and agriculture.

However, this shift in focus by the government is encouraging, particularly as the $200bn worth of modernisation and recapitalisation of the ADF with a focus on developing sovereign Australian industry capability and an export focus presents increased opportunities for Australia’s burgeoning defence industrial base to collaborate and partner with some of the most advanced defence industry and advanced manufacturing ecosystems in the world.

The growing complexity and increasing commonality of major defence acquisition programs between a number of allied nations – particularly Five Eye nations like the US, Australia, Canada and the UK – provides avenues for greater diplomatic and economic partnerships to support increased industry capability, strategic dispersal and interoperability.

This focus on interoperability, international partnerships and allied commonality positions Australia well to enhance industrial partnerships with North American, European and Asian allies eager to diversify their local industrial capability and supply chain. Looking more broadly, expanding market access and industry penetration for leading-edge companies from South Korea and Japan in particular serves as an avenue for domestic industry development and diversification.

Meanwhile, Australia’s participation as a critical component in the global supply chain for key defence programs has long been recognised, with Australia’s defence SMEs leading the charge and punching wildly above their comparative weight, including highly successful examples like Quickstep Holdings, Marand Precision Engineering, Varley Group, TAE Aerospace and Bisalloy Steel each showing Australia can be a true global competitor.

While these capabilities are impressive, growth has to be a critical focus – particularly as other global competitors’ market shares in projects like the F-35 program continue to evolve and in some cases decline.

A role for government – supporting industry development

The foundation established by the government’s Defence Export Strategy and the broader Defence Industrial Capability Plan provides a strong basis for supporting the early stage development of Australia’s sovereign industry capability – looking forward, government will play a critical role in attracting additional industry partners through cohesive, long-term policy.

Supporting the next stage of industry development requires a unique policy approach as well as combining the existing elements of Australia’s existing innovation and science agenda with a suite of grant allocation and targeted, contractual tax incentives (signed between the Commonwealth and the company as a memorandum of understanding) linked to a combination of long-term, local job creation, foreign contract success, local industry content, and research and development programs – in specialised export orientated industry clusters.

Developing centres of excellence supporting export growth in partnership with Australian and international primes can leverage the policy levers used to develop other national facilities and integration within global supply chains and programs to support the development and rehabilitation of local naval shipbuilding capabilities, with a focus on capitalising on the growing demand for warships in the Indo-Pacific and Middle East in particular.

Despite Australia’s widely recognised position as providing a world-leading research and development capacity – supported by both private and public sector research and development programs driven by organisations like the CSIRO – traditional areas of high wage-costs and low productivity in Australia’s manufacturing industry, exemplified in the failure of Australia’s domestic car industry and in the series of cost overruns and delivery delays on both the Collins and Hobart Class programs, have characterised Australia’s reputation as a manufacturing economy.

This is done through a range of government-driven incentives for industry, including corporate tax incentives, employment incentives and payroll tax incentives. Australia’s now firm commitment to developing a robust domestic defence capability requires innovative and adaptive thinking in order to expand the capabilities and competitiveness of the domestic industry. (Source: Defence Connect)

29 Jul 19. Accused of Leaking Brahmos Aerospace Files to Pakistan’s ISI, Nagpur Engineer Denied Bail.  Prosecution lawyer Nitin Telgote had told the court that there was a prima facie evidence against the accused. Telgote had contended that sensitive information of Brahmos was stored in the laptop and hard disk of engineer. The sessions court here on Monday rejected the bail plea of Brahmos Aerospace engineer Nishant Agrawal accused of passing off sensitive information to the Pakistan’s intelligence agency ISI. In his application filed before the Nagpur district court last month, Agrawal had said that he never possessed any secret information with him. The bail application was rejected by district and sessions court judge F M Ali.

Agrawal, a senior systems engineer in Brahmos Aerospace facility in Nagpur, was arrested on October 8, 2018 in a joint operation by Uttar Pradesh and Maharashtra Anti- Terrorism Squad (ATS).

Brahmos Aerospace is a joint venture between the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and the Military Industrial Consortium (NPO Mashinostroyenia) of Russia.

Last week, prosecution lawyer Nitin Telgote had told the court that there was a prima facie evidence against the accused. Telgote had contended that sensitive information of Brahmos was stored in the laptop and hard disk of Agrawal.

“Agrawal had been asked to download an app from a fake ID as a part of honey trap. As a result, Brahmos files and mechanism were automatically made available to Pakistani agents, which can pose danger to the country’s security.

“As a Brahmos employee, Agrawal was not supposed to reveal his identity which he did on a social media platform. This indicates his direct involvement in anti-national activities,” the prosecution lawyer had argued.

Presenting his arguments prior to prosecution, defence counsel Prakash Jaiswal had contented that the prosecution’s allegation that a spy from Pakistan was operating two Facebook accounts with whom the engineer was in touch with, cannot be verified.

He had said the director of Brahmos had said in his reply that there was no specific information given to Agrawal which could have been forwarded by him to others. “Moreover, all the laptops and computers in Brahmos have an in-built technology which could not be copied, which means Agrawal could not have forwarded any information,” Jaiswal had said.

He had told the court that the accused did not have any secret information and what he stored in his laptop was the study material that he had received after joining Brahmos in 2013.

It was alleged that Agrawal was in contact with two Facebook accounts — ‘Neha Sharma’ and ‘Pooja Ranjan’ — suspected to be operated by Pakistani intelligence agents. He has been booked under the Official Secrets Act and is currently lodged in Nagpur Central Jail. (Source: Google/https://www.news18.com)

29 Jul 19. Record USMC deployment provides opportunities and sends a message. With revelations of a US$300m commitment by the US to expanding facilities at Darwin and a record deployment of US Marines, the relationship between Australia and the US is at a record high – this combination of factors provides an opportunity for Australia and a message to the broader region, but it shouldn’t be blown out of proportion.

Australia’s pursuit of a dedicated amphibious force in the 2nd Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (RAR) as part of Plan Beersheba has been recognised as an important step in the nation developing both a rapidly deployable ‘combined arms’ force structure and potent land-based power projection force structure capable of supporting Australia’s tactical and strategic ambitions and responsibilities.

The Indo-Pacific’s geographic realities combined with the regional capability developments have served as the driving force behind Australia’s pursuit of a modern, networked and hardened army capable of conducting a range of operations – with amphibious operations and the power projection capabilities serving as a core responsibility.

However, developing such capabilities requires significant investment in personnel, materiel, doctrine and commitment, it equally requires support from subject matter experts, which has prompted Australia to draw on experience from amphibious warfare experts in both the UK Royal Marine Commandos and the US Marine Corps.

The US Marines also serve as America’s first responders in the Indo-Pacific and one of the premier amphibious operations and power projection forces in the world – building on this, the US Marines have been pivotal to America’s ‘Indo-Pacific Pivot’ since it was announced by former president Barrack Obama and have come to play an important role in Australia’s future defence planning.

This position has resulted in a growing US Marine presence in the Northern Territory, culminating in the recent record deployment of 2,500 Marines as part of the Marine Rotational Force-Darwin (MRF-D) and serves as a potent reminder of the unique relationship between the US and Australia as the regional geo-political, economic and strategic paradigm continues to evolve.

Defence Minister Linda Reynolds welcomed the milestone achievement in a recent media statement, saying, “This milestone demonstrates the enduring nature of the Australia-US alliance and our deep engagement with the Indo-Pacific region.

“The Marine Rotational Force-Darwin improves interoperability between Australian and US defence forces, and enhances our ability to work together with regional partners in the interests of stability and security in the Indo-Pacific.”

While it is critical to understand the capabilities delivered by the growing US Marine Corps units rotating through Darwin and the supporting force structure packages, it is equally critical to recognise the limitations of US power in the Indo-Pacific and the growing need for greater Australian tactical and strategic capability.

First to fight – a fully integrated, combined arms power projection package

Australia’s ambitious force structure modernisation and major capability acquisition and recapitalisation program has focused on replicating the capability of both the US Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) and the larger Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU), at least in some capacity, with a uniquely Australian characteristic to support Australia’s own unique doctrine, personnel and material capabilities.

The Marine Corps and its globally deployed MEUs and MAGTFs provide the US with an unrivalled, rapid response to contingencies ranging from humanitarian disaster relief and counter-insurgency to sea control and high-intensity, power projection combat operations against a peer competitor.

Both the MEU and MAGTF concepts utilise US Navy landing helicopter docks (LHDs) and landing platform docks (LPD) supported by surface combatants to rapidly deploy integrated, ‘combined arms’ forces, including amphibious landing, infantry, artillery, armour, combat engineers, both rotary and fixed wing air support (both lift and attack), logistics, medical and supply chain services.

As a ‘combined arms’ force, both the MEU and MAGTF models incorporate four key elements, including:

  • Command Element (CE): Providing command and control, including management and planning for manpower, intelligence, reconnaissance, operations and training, and logistics functions.
  • Ground Combat Element (GCE): Composed primarily of infantry units, the GCE also includes reconnaissance (scout/sniper units); forward air controller; nuclear, biological and chemical defence; communications; logistics support and service; artillery; armour (including amphibious armoured vehicles and armoured reconnaissance); and combat engineer capabilities.
  • Aviation Combat Element (ACE): Contributes to the air power component including fixed wing aircraft (ranging from strike to air lift and aerial refuelling), helicopters (both attack and airlift), tiltrotor (airlift) and UAV capabilities.
  • Logistics Combat Element (LCE): Provides the majority of combat service support including heavy motor transport, ground supply, heavy engineer support, ground equipment maintenance, and advanced medical and dental support roles.

Supporting these elements is the sea-lift and sea control elements of the US Navy – this includes large-deck amphibious warfare ships, including LHDs, which are typically equipped with fixed-wing strike aircraft, LPDs and pre-positioned, strategic sea-lift vessels – providing additional sea control and task group defence is a combination of surface and submarine forces.

The addition of an air defence focused Ticonderoga Class guided missile cruiser, or later-built Arleigh Burke Class guided missile destroyer, and taskforce of Arleigh Burke Class guided missile destroyers providing force protection and shore fire support, while an attack submarine provides task-group anti-submarine support – this combination of platforms supports high-intensity, manoeuvre-focused warfare capabilities, and a secondary focus on supporting counter-insurgency and humanitarian support operations.

Supporting the growing force structure deployment made by the US is a recent commitment for a US$300m program of infrastructure developments at Darwin to support Australia’s Canberra Class LHDs and US LHDs as part of an ever growing US presence in the Indo-Pacific and broader allied deployments and basing operations.

Recognising the limitations of US power in the Indo-Pacific

It is important to recognise that for the first time America has a true competitor in China – a nation with immense industrial potential, growing wealth and prosperity, a driving national purpose and a growing series of alliances with re-emerging, resource rich great powers in Russia, and supported by a growing network of economic hubs and indebted psuedo-colonies throughout the Indo-Pacific and Asia.

Unlike the Soviet Union, China is a highly industrialised nation – with an industrial capacity comparable to, if not exceeding, that of the US, supported by a rapidly narrowing technological gap, supporting growing military capability and territorial ambitions, bringing the rising power into direct competition with the US and its now fraying alliance network of tired global allies.

Additionally, it would be pertinent for Australian strategic planners to remember the limitations of such a small force structure – despite the potent capabilities possessed by the forward-deployed MRF-D forces – and doing so positions Australia well to avoid repeating the same tactical and strategic mistakes of Australia’s military planners prior to the Fall of Singapore and the Japanese sinking of Force Z.

Believing in the invincibility of any platform, doctrine or force structure is a critical flaw in any strategy – and history is full of examples of such hubris, ranging from Xerxes’ attempts to conquer Greece, to the Maginot Line of 1940s France and America’s hubris during the Vietnam conflict. Australia must equally recognise the importance of both supporting the US, but also developing its own independent capability.

Whether consciously recognising the potential of this challenge or not, the US President’s direct, often confrontational approach towards allies belies domestic concerns about America’s ability to maintain the post-WWII global order. Andrew Davies of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) highlighted the importance of recognising the limitation of US power in a recent piece for ASPI, saying, “The assumption of continued US primacy that permeated DWP 2016 looked heroic at the time. It seems almost foolishly misplaced now.”

Questions for Australia

Despite Australia’s enduring commitment to the Australia-US alliance, serious questions remain for Australia in the new world order of President Donald Trump’s America, as a number of allies have been targeted by the maverick President for relying on the US for their security against larger state-based actors, which has seen the President actively pressuring key allies, particularly NATO allies, to renegotiate the deals.

Enhancing Australia’s capacity to act as an independent power, incorporating great power-style strategic economic, diplomatic and military capability serves as a powerful symbol of Australia’s sovereignty and evolving responsibilities in supporting and enhancing the security and prosperity of Indo-Pacific Asia. Shifting the public discussion away from the default Australian position of “it is all a little too difficult, so let’s not bother” will provide unprecedented economic, diplomatic, political and strategic opportunities for the nation. (Source: Defence Connect)

27 Jul 19. Aerospace technology: Malaysia must grab opportunity offered by Turkey, says Dr M. Malaysia appreciated Turkey’s willingness to offer opportunities for technology transfer in the field of “aerospace and defence industries” and such opportunities should be grabbed by Malaysia, said Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad (pic).

The Prime Minister said Turkey had now achieved extraordinary success in the “aerospace industry” within a short period of time and it was something outstanding.

“During my visit here, they have shown their ability in technologies such as those concerning aeroplanes, helicopters and the UAV (unmanned aerial vehicle). Twenty years ago, when I came here (Turkey), they could only assemble the F16 aircraft.

“Now they can design, test their own products. Their helicopters look very sophisticated. Within a short time, they have succeeded to acquire sophisticated technology,” he told Malaysian journalists at the end of his official visit to Turkey at the Istanbul Sabiha Gokcen International Airport, here on Saturday (July 27). Dr Mahathir said the cooperation offered was rather interesting. Turkey was prepared to give positive access to technology, something that was difficult to obtain from other parties.

“They offered cooperation in specific fields, and we do not have to look from other countries to obtain such technologies because they are prepared to offer their technology.

“We believe the opportunities offered should be taken to leapfrog, to gain technology in the fields of aircraft and UAV. The UAV is most important, everything uses UAV controlled from the ground. This had been exhibited by Turkey who displayed their capabilities, performing numerous military action,” he said.

The Prime Minister said Turkish companies showed strong interest on Malaysia and this was proven during his four-day visit to the country.

“Usually companies possessing sophisticated technology would not be willing to expose their ability, but here they stated their willingness to take our engineers (from Malaysia) in the various fields, in the designing sector, manufacturing, testing and so on. Cooperation in the field of defence is very important to us. We can control technology but it would take a long time,” he said. (Source: Google/https://www.thestar.com.my)

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About Lincad

Lincad is a leading expert in the design and manufacture of batteries, chargers and associated products for a range of applications across a number of different sectors. With a heritage spanning more than three decades in the defence and security sectors, Lincad has particular expertise in the development of reliable, ruggedised products with high environmental, thermal and electromagnetic performance.  With a dedicated team of engineers and production staff, all product is designed and manufactured in-house at Lincad’s facility in Ash Vale, Surrey. Lincad is ISO 9001 and TickITplus accredited and works closely with its customers to satisfy their power management requirements.

Lincad is also a member of the Joint Supply Chain Accreditation Register (JOSCAR), the accreditation system for the aerospace, defence and security sectors, and is certified with Cyber Essentials, the government-backed, industry supported scheme to help organisations protect themselves against common cyber attacks. The majority of Lincad’s products contain high energy density lithium-ion technology, but the most suitable technology for each customer requirement is employed, based on Lincad’s extensive knowledge of available electrochemistries. Lincad offers full life cycle product support services that include repairs and upgrades from point of introduction into service, through to disposal at the end of a product’s life.  From product inception, through to delivery and in-service product support, Lincad offers the high quality service that customers expect from a recognised British supplier.

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BATTLESPACE Technologies

An international defence electronics news service providing our readers with up to date developments in the defence electronics industry.

Recent News

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