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14 Jun 19. World cannot afford major confrontation in the Gulf: UN chief. Antonio Guterres tells Security Council meeting that he strongly condemns latest incident involving oil tankers in Gulf of Oman. The world cannot afford a major confrontation in the Gulf, UN secretary-general Antonio Guterres said Thursday following suspected attacks on two oil tankers in the Gulf of Oman.

The latest incident, the second in the strategic sea lane in a few weeks, came amid spiralling tensions between Tehran and Washington, which has pointed the finger at Iran over earlier tanker attacks in May.

“I strongly condemn any attack against civilian vessels,” Guterres told a Security Council meeting on UN cooperation with the Arab League.

“Facts must be established and responsibilities clarified,” he said. “If there is something the world cannot afford is a major confrontation in the Gulf region.”

Arab League Secretary-General Ahmed Aboul Gheit warned both the targeting of oil tankers and attacks against Saudi Arabia were “dangerous developments.”

Yemen’s Iran-aligned Huthi rebels said they had fired missiles on an airport in southwestern Saudi Arabia on Wednesday.

“Some parties in the region are trying to instigate fires in our region and we must be aware of that,” Gheit told the council.

He urged the UN body to “act against those responsible to maintain security and stability in the region.”

The Norwegian Maritime Authority said three explosions were Thursday reported on board the Norwegian-owned tanker Front Altair after it was “attacked” along with the Singapore-owned ship Kokuka Courageous.

Iran said its navy had rescued 44 crew members after the two vessels, which were carrying highly flammable material, caught fire.

On May 12, four oil tankers — two Saudi, one Norwegian and one Emirati — were damaged in still unexplained attacks in the Gulf of Oman off the United Arab Emirates.

The UAE last week said initial findings of its investigation pointed to the likelihood that a “state actor” was behind the bombings, but did not specifically blame Iran.

The preliminary findings were presented to the council which may consider a response.

These showed that it was “highly likely” that four Limpet mines, which are magnetically attached to a ship’s hull, were used in the attacks, placed by trained divers who were deployed from fast boats. (Source: ArabianBusiness.com)

14 Jun 19. The Indo-Pacific’s maritime choke points: Straits of Malacca. The Indo-Pacific is indisputably a maritime orientated region with maritime choke points serving as key strategic and economic challenges for established and emerging economies alike. The Straits of Malacca is one of the busiest and strategically important waterways in the world.

For both Australia and the broader Indo-Pacific region, the Straits of Malacca, a narrow, 890-kilometre stretch of water between the Malay Peninsula and the Indonesian island of Sumatra, serves as the main shipping channel between the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

As one of the busiest waterways in the world, the Malacca Straits serve as a vital economic lifeline for the economies of China, Thailand, Indonesia, Vietnam, Singapore, Japan, Taiwan and South Korea.

On average, approximately 100,000 vessels pass through the straits annually, accounting for about a quarter of the world’s traded goods, including the liquid and gas energy resources essential for the enduring success of the regional and, more broadly, the global economy. For Australia, the Straits of Malacca and Singapore in particular are responsible for the vast majority of the nation’s liquid energy supplies, placing the waterway at the centre of the nation’s national security engagement with the Indo-Pacific.

At its narrowest point of 2.7 kilometres, the Straits of Malacca have long been a haven for congested maritime trade and piracy – regional navies, including Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, have responded, combining forces to respond to the threats to the regional and global economy, highlighting the continued importance of the strategic waterway.

It is important to recognise the geographic realities of the straits and the surrounding archipelagos – providing dramatically different operating environments for traditional naval assets like destroyers, frigates and aircraft carriers and asymmetric platforms like fast attack boats, influencing a new era of hybrid naval warfare combining traditional fleet engagements and asymmetric warfare.

Geography limiting the capacity, tightening global supply

Despite the geographic confines of the Straits of Malacca, namely the shallow depth, which has a minimum depth of 25 metres, combined with the propensity for forest fires in both Indonesia and the Malay Peninsula, severely limit the capacity of the strategic waterway and impact the economic security and stability of the Indo-Pacific.

Recognising this, a number of the larger vessels are forced to divert through the deeper water channels of Sunda and Lombok, adding travel time between markets. In response, nations, namely China through the One Belt, One Road initiative, have sought to counter the strategic vulnerabilities presented by the Straits of Malaccathrough over-land pipelines and deep water ports further west, in Pakistan.

Meanwhile, nations including Thailand and Japan have sought to develop a second passage through the Kra Isthmus in the form of a canal to further reduce the strategic vulnerability of the Straits of Malacca – the proposed Kra Canal would serve to provide reliable, unhindered passage for the larger, Malaccamax vessels, while also reducing the travel time to market via the South China Sea.

Australia’s role in strengthening the security of the straits

Further complicating the strategic environment is the increasing proliferation of highly capable conventional submarines, like the Russian Kilo Class, operated by many nations, including China, and the variants operated by nations throughout the Indo-Pacific – Singapore’s existing Archer and Challenger Class submarines and French Scorpene Class – combined with larger nuclear attack submarines. All serve as key asymmetric force multipliers capable of directly influencing the tactical and strategic calculations of nations dependent on the critical maritime choke points in the region.

Additionally, while submarines represent the high-end of the maritime asymmetric warfare calculations, fast, nimble and light torpedo and anti-ship missile carrying vessels supported by dedicated or pseudo-motherships are potent, cost-effective ways of establishing sea control while also providing close-in support for larger, power projection focused naval task groups.

Australia’s security and prosperity are directly influenced by the stability and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific, meaning Australia must be directly engaged as both a benefactor and leader in all matters related to strategic, economic and political security, serving as either a replacement or complementary force to the role played by the US – should the US commitment or capacity be limited.

The nation’s response can no longer be an “all or nothing” approach – rather it requires nuance and understanding. In particular, it requires an understanding that Australia will be required to present a more conventional force projection capability, supported by a fleet of advanced, high-speed and adaptable asymmetric sea control capabilities – combining doctrine and technology to enhance the independent and interoperable tactical and strategic capabilities of the RAN in particular.

Enhancing Australia’s capacity to act as an independent power, incorporating great power-style strategic economic, diplomatic and military capability, serves not only as a powerful symbol of Australia’s sovereignty and evolving responsibilities in supporting and enhancing the security and prosperity of Indo-Pacific Asia – shifting the public discussion away from the default Australian position of “it is all a little too difficult, so let’s not bother” will provide unprecedented economic, diplomatic, political and strategic opportunities for the nation. (Source: Defence Connect)

14 Jun 19. Identifying and developing national strategic industries. Robust, innovative and globally competitive industry is critical to any national security equation – clearly identifying and supporting the strategic industries Australia needs for prolonged national security supports the development of a holistic national security strategy.

Australia has long had a tough relationship with the ‘tyranny of distance’. On one hand, the nation’s populace has treated it with disdain and hostility, while Australia’s political and strategic leaders have recognised the importance of geographic isolation.

The rise of Indo-Pacific Asia means the ‘tyranny of distance’ has been replaced by a ‘predicament of proximity’. China, India, Indonesia, Thailand, Japan and several other regional nations are reshaping the economic and strategic paradigms with an unprecedented period of economic, political and arms build-up, competing interests and rising animosity towards the post-World War II order of which Australia is a pivotal part.

The rise of these economic powerhouses – driven by a combination of increased resource, energy and consumer goods consumption and the development of an advanced domestic manufacturing base – places Australia in both an opportune and precarious position, as the growing economic wealth has translated to increased demand for resources, energy, agricultural and consumer goods, but also increased investment in defence capability.

This rapidly evolving global and regional environment, combined with the increasing instability of the US administration and its apparent apprehension to intervene or at least maintain the global rules-based order following the radical shift in US politics, also forces Australia to reassess the strategic calculus – embracing a radically new approach to national security strategy and policy – more specifically, the role industry plays in supporting long-term national security.

Certain industries, including heavy manufacturing like steel production, shipbuilding, auto-manufacturing, aerospace and chemical engineering, resource and energy exploitation and agricultural output, serve core components of a strategic industry. Meanwhile, the growing complexity of the regional and global strategic paradigm supports the necessity for a cohesive industry development strategy.

Recognising the opportunities and potential challenges facing Australia – how does the nation respond to the rapidly evolving regional environment, while also identifying and supporting the development of critical national strategic industries in an increasingly competitive era?

Nationally critical heavy industries

Australia as a nation, like many Western contemporaries, has been an economy and nation traditionally dependent on heavy industries – capitalising upon the continent’s wealth of natural resources including coal, iron ore, copper, zinc, rare earth elements and manufacturing, particularly in the years following the end of the Second World War.

However, the post-war economic transformation of many regional nations, including Japan, Korea and China, and the cohesive, long-term, nation building policies implemented by these nations has enabled these countries to emerge as economic powerhouses, driven by an incredibly competitive manufacturing capability – limiting the competitiveness of Australian industry, particularly manufacturing.

Recognising this incredibly competitive global industry and the drive towards free trade agreements with nations who continue to implement protectionist policies buried in legislation, Australia needs to approach the development of nationally significant heavy industries in a radically different way, recognising the failures of the past and the limitations of Australia’s past incarnations of heavy industry.

Identifying these industries is the first step in building a cohesive, long-term plan as part of a broader National Strategic Industries Act – using the legislative power of government to counter-balance industry development policies of allied, yet still competitor nations like South Korea – which leverages the industrial development policies of export oriented industrialisation (EOI) to develop its economy into a major economic and modern, advanced manufacturing powerhouse.

Water security, agriculture and strategic resource reserves

As the driest permanently inhabited continent, Australia is dependent on reliable access to water both for consumption and industry use, particularly the agricultural industry, which is responsible for feeding both Australia’s growing population and increasingly the populations of the Indo-Pacific’s rising powerhouses.

Both agriculture and water security serve as pivotal components of a truly holistic nationally strategic industries policy and the broader introduction of a National Strategic Industries Act – embracing the potential of these factors, particularly water security infrastructure and the flow on economic impact on traditional heavy industry and manufacturing, combined with the environmental and broader national and regional economic opportunities, should necessitate the inclusion of both in the development of a national policy platform.

Furthermore, the growing importance of strategic resource reserves, is another area of critical importance within the confines of a national strategic industry support and development platform – contemporary Australia has been far removed from the harsh realities of conflict, with many generations never enduring the reality of rationing for food, energy, medical supplies or luxury goods, and even fewer within modern Australia understanding the socio-political and economic impact such rationing would have on the now world-leading Australian standard of living.

Transitioning to an advanced manufacturing economy

Despite Australia’s widely recognised position as providing a world-leading research and development capacity – supported by both private and public sector R&D programs driven by organisations like the CSIRO – traditional areas of high wage-costs and low productivity in Australia’s manufacturing industry, exemplified in the failure of Australia’s domestic car industry and in the series of cost overruns and delivery delays on both the Collins and Hobart Class programs, have characterised Australia’s reputation as a manufacturing economy.

Enter Industry 4.0 – the combination of additive manufacturing, automated manufacturing and data sharing, with a coherent National Strategic Industry development policy can compensate and in some cases overcome the traditional hindrances faced by the Australian economy, with public-private collaboration essential to ensuring the long-term sustainability and success of Australia’s defence industrial base and broader manufacturing economy.

While industry largely provides the technological expertise, government policy provides the certainty for investment – particularly when supported by elements of Australia’s innovation and science agenda combined with grant allocation and targeted, contractual tax incentives (signed between the Commonwealth and the company as a memorandum of understanding) linked to a combination of long-term, local job creation, foreign contract success, local industry content, and research and development programs, which are critical components that can be used to empower and enhance the overall competitiveness.

Australia’s position and responsibilities in the Indo-Pacific region will depend on the nation’s ability to sustain itself economically, strategically and politically. Despite the nation’s virtually unrivalled wealth of natural resources and agricultural and industrial potential, there is a lack of a cohesive national security strategy integrating the development of individual, yet complementary public policy strategies to support a more robust Australian role in the region.

This is done through a range of government-driven incentives for industry, including corporate tax incentives, employment incentives and payroll tax incentives. Australia’s now firm commitment to developing a robust domestic defence capability requires innovative and adaptive thinking in order to expand the capabilities and competitiveness of the domestic industry.

Establishing and implementing a cohesive, innovative and long-term vision for Australia’s sovereign industry capability can also serve as the basis for developing, and in some cases redeveloping, a robust, advanced manufacturing economy taking advantage of Australia’s unrivalled resource wealth – supporting the broader national security and interests in the Indo-Pacific. (Source: Defence Connect)

14 Jun 19. Saudi Arabia – Asir: Saudi-led coalition air defences down five Yemeni Houthi rebel drones targeting Abha Airport. At approximately 0000Z on 14 June, Saudi-led coalition air defences shot down five Yemeni Houthi rebel military-grade weaponised drones targeting Abha Airport (OEAB/AHB) along with the city of Khamis Mushait, both in Asir Province located in the southwest of the Kingdom. We assess US-made MIM-104 Patriot conventional surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems were employed by Saudi Arabia to down the drones. The Patriot has the capability to engage air targets at altitudes up to FL800 and at ranges out to 100 miles (160 km). Previously, the Houthis conducted a claimed cruise missile strike targeting Abha Airport on 12 June. The Saudi-led coalition has confirmed an attack occurred and noted the Hotuhi claim of cruise missile use, while also stating the airport’s arrivals hall was hit, injuring 26 civilian passengers. The southwest provinces of Asir, Jizan and Najran are located within the Security Control of Air Traffic and Air Navigation Aids (SCATANA) area of Saudi Arabia, which is covered by a notice and a publication issued by the civil aviation authority of the country (NOTAM OEJD W0438/18; AIP SUP AIRAC 05/18 and 07/18). EASA, Germany and France have issued notices to operators advising against conducting civil aviation flight activity within the southwest provinces of Saudi Arabia (EASA CZIB 2018-01-R2, NOTAM EDGG B0033/19, France – AIC A 03/19).

Analysis

The majority of Houthi rebel surface-to-surface missile (SSM) launches into the Kingdom and associated intercepts – along with drone downings – occur over the southwest provinces in the SCATANA area. There has been a notable spike in Houthi rebel drone activity in southwest Saudi Arabia since in the past 30 days. On 10 June, Saudi-led coalition air defences downed two Yemeni Houthi rebel military-grade weaponised drones targeting King Khaled Airbase (OEKM/KMX) in Asir Province. On 9 June, the Houthis claimed to have conducted a weaponised drone attack targeting Jizan Airport (OEGN/GIZ); however, the Saudi-led coalition has not issued a statement on the alleged incident to date. On 26 May, the Saudi-led coalition claimed to have shot down a Yemeni Houthi rebel military-grade drone targeting Jizan Airport. The Saudi-led coalition previously shot down a Houthi rebel military-grade drone targeting Najran Airport (OENG/EAM) on 23 May. Houthi rebels also attempted a military-grade weaponised drone attack targeting Najran Airport on 21 May. Our analysis indicates Saudi Arabia has shot down over 100 Houthi-launched SSMs and drones over its territory since the start of 2018, including seven over Riyadh as well as two over Mecca Province and one over Yanbu, located deep within the interior of the country. Comparatively, just 16 SSM intercepts occurred over Saudi Arabia during all of 2017, with only three taking place near Riyadh. Continued SSM and additional drone launches into the Kingdom by Yemen-based Houthi rebels and associated intercepts via Saudi military conventional SAM engagement are likely to occur weekly over the SCATANA area for the foreseeable future. In addition, quarterly SSM or drone intercepts near Riyadh or over main urban centres located deep within the Saudi interior are probable until a resolution between the factions in the Yemen conflict is reached. We assess territory in Saudi Arabia outside the SCATANA area to be a HIGH risk airspace environment at all altitudes. We assess the SCATANA area of Saudi Arabia to be an EXTREME risk airspace environment at all altitudes.

Advice

Approvals: As a precaution, conduct operational risk-based identification of divert and alternate airports for flight schedules with planned stops at aerodromes in the country or with overflight of the airspace. Operators are advised to ensure flight plans are correctly filed, attain proper special approvals for flight operations to sensitive locations and obtain relevant overflight permits prior to departure. In addition, ensure crews scheduled to operate to or over the country in the near term are fully aware of the latest security situation.

Shoot-down Policy: The country has an aggressive air intercept and shoot-down policy which allows air and air defence forces to intercept and disable aerial targets violating airspace regulations. Military air and air defence assets may be employed to down aerial targets under the auspice of the policy. While legal civil aviation flights are unlikely to be directly targeted, there remains a latent but credible risk of misidentification and interception by military air and air defence assets.

Drones: Operators are advised to review internal and external mechanisms for suspicious activity, safety and security reporting. Any revisions to processes should account for drone sightings as part of a wider aviation risk management strategy to protect aircraft, passengers and crew. Operators are advised to monitor government advisories as well as trends in terrorist tactics, such as the employment and proliferation of weaponised drones. In addition, we recommend aviation security managers to evaluate instances where drones were recovered in possession of terror suspects along with incidents where disrupted plots were to include drones for pre-attack reconnaissance and/or drone weaponisation. (Source: Osprey)

12 Jun 19. India launches ‘attaché’ plan to spur major increase in defence exports. Key Points:

India is aiming to achieve military exports worth USD5bn by 2025
The MoD wants defence attachés to play a leading role in efforts to achieve target

The Indian Ministry of Defence (MoD) has unveiled a plan to increase overseas diplomatic engagement to support a major boost in defence exports over the coming few years.

In a recent notice published by the MoD it confirmed a target to reach defence exports worth INR350bn (USD5bn) by 2025. It said that its defence attachés corps posted overseas can play a “pivotal role” in achieving the objective.

The notice stated, “Defence attachés understand the defence requirements of the respective country and can promote [the] export of Indian defence products in their respective countries.”

To support the initiative, which the MoD said “envisages promoting Indian defence exports globally”, defence attachés will be allocated funding to support exports across three categories of target markets.

In countries classed as ‘Category A’ the MoD will provide defence attachés with USD50,000 annually to promote exports, and in Category B and Category C defence attachés will be allocated USD30,000 and USD20,000, respectively.

The notice stated that the funds should be used by attachés for activities, including participating in defence shows, publicity campaigns, undertaking market studies, and organising seminars. It said all defence attachés should submit “yearly action plans” on how they propose to boost defence exports.

The MoD notice said the new initiative will play a “catalytic role in addressing interventions required for exploring new markets and promoting export-oriented activities by defence attachés in the countries to which they are attached”.

The attaché initiative, which will be piloted for one year before being extended, is costed by the MoD at INR170m annually and will be funded by government expenditures. In total India operates more than 200 foreign embassies and consulates globally. (Source: IHS Jane’s)

12 Jun 119. U.S. Intelligence Officials and Satellite Photos Detail Russian Military Buildup on Crimea. Russia has added troops, aircraft, and weapons to Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula in what amounts to a “significant” buildup of forces over the past 18 months, according to U.S. intelligence officials, observers, and new satellite photos that reveal the locations of new S-400 air defense systems and improvements to Soviet-era bases.

Those officials and observers of the region say the additional firepower gives Moscow greater defensive control over the Black Sea and puts offensive fighters and ships closer to the Middle East.

The photos, taken between January 2018 and April 2019 by private satellite imaging company Planet Labs and provided to Defense One, show five S-400 batteries, five S-300 air-defense systems, and fighter jets at four locations, Planet Labs analysts said. They also show improvements to Soviet-era military installations, they said.

In recent interviews, two U.S. intelligence officials authorized to speak only on background detailed Russia’s recent activity on Crimea. One said that it is the assessment of their agency that Russia was engineering “a deliberate and systematic buildup of their forces on the peninsula.” Both declined to confirm or deny what the Planet Labs photos purport to show.

Observers said the development likely means that Moscow has no near-term intention of returning the Ukrainian territory it seized in 2014, which the United States has said is required before it will resume normalized relations.

Instead, that buildup “suggests that Russia is interested in being able to exercise more control over the Black Sea, which then affords them the ability to project power beyond their immediate environment,” said Sarah Bidgood, the director of the Eurasia Nonproliferation Program at Middlebury College’s James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. “This is a significant buildup. NATO is going to be under increasing pressure from allies in the region to show that it’s able to push back against Russian attempts to gain greater control of the Black Sea. To me, that’s a really dangerous environment.”

Western leaders are concerned Russia is positioning its military to be able to shut down the sea lane into the Mediterranean, a key supply route for its Syria operations. Some U.S. lawmakers have called for a greater Western military presence to counter that possibility.

Sen. Ron Johnson, R-Wisc., speaking at the GLOBSEC security forum in Bratislava, Slovakia, on Saturday said “I’ve called for a multinational freedom of navigation operation in the Black Sea to show, when Russia aggressively is using military action, makes incursions into the West, [and] does not abide by its own commitments, in terms of the territorial integrity of Ukraine, [that] we need to respond military as well — not with kinetic military action, but with a very strong show of strength and resolve.”

The Buildup

Since 2014, Russia has added an airborne battalion to the naval infantry brigade that has guarded Crimea since the 1990s, doubling the total force there to an estimated 30,000 troops. Moscow plans to add another 13,000 within four years, said the first U.S. intelligence official.

The Russian military now has 81 airplanes and helicopters in Crimea. “The combat radius covers all Ukraine and beyond the Black Sea. It significantly increases their strike options, potentially extending to the Middle East,” the official said.

Russia’s Black Sea Fleet recently added 10 warships that can launch the Kalibr cruise missile: six-diesel electric Kilo-class attack submarines and four surface ships, the official said. The current versions of the Kalibr can hit targets up to 1,500 miles away; and Russia claims to be working on a new variant with a range of 2,800 miles.

The second U.S. intelligence official said the Kalibrs will allow the fleet “to strike targets beyond the Black Sea, including southern Europe and Syria, without even departing Sevastopol.”

In November, Russian officials announced they would be moving a fourth S-400 battery into Crimea. But Planet Labs’ photos show five S-400 batteries: one apiece near Kerch, Feodosia, Sevastopol (here’s a closeup), Dzhankoi, and Yevpatoriya. A Planet Labs graphic provided to Defense One last week shows the location of the S-400s, whose range would cover much of coastal Ukraine and the Black Sea.

The peninsula is “bristling with missiles like a hedgehog,” said Jeffrey Lewis, director of the East Asian Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center. “The scale raises this question…are they just defending the peninsula or using the peninsula to project power through the Black Sea?” Either way, Lewis said, “The scale is really quite something.”

He believes the buildup is not merely temporary: “This is a real investment in the defense of the Crimean peninsula.”

Meanwhile, Ukrainian officials say that Russia is upgrading four Crimean facilities to hold nuclear weapons, including one at Feodosia. The Ukranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been distributing a briefing that lists the sites since at least December. (Mustafa Dzhemilev, a member of Parliament and a leader of the Crimean Tarter movement, has been saying since 2016 that Russian nuclear weapons already are on Crimea, a view the Ukranian government has not endorsed.

The U.S. intelligence officials declined to endorse or refute this, saying that intelligence on the presence of nuclear warheads on the peninsula was classified.

But they did note that Crimea has hosted Russian nuclear-capable aircraft and ships. And they added that Russia is not forbidden by any treaty from deploying nuclear weapons to areas that it views as its sovereign territory — a view that Russian officials have been offering since 2015.

What’s It All For?

The deployment of the S-400 missile systems on Crimea is mostly defensive, the first U.S. intelligence official said, reflecting that Moscow may have “a sense of vulnerability about a Ukranian-NATO effort to retake it by force.”

“Russian force modernization focuses mainly on improvements to air and naval and coastal defense forces to create this anti-access area denial zone, as you pointed out with the deployment of the S-400s,” the official said. “We’ve seen the deployments of coastal defense missile batteries. We’ve seen the modernization of their air forces and naval forces.”

But others, including a second intelligence officer interviewed by Defense One, see the Black Sea Fleet modernization as intended to have effects far beyond Crimea.

“The reinvigoration of the Black Sea Fleet is not contained to the Black Sea,” the second official said. “A lot of the stuff for their operations in Syria was coming out of the Black Sea, so we would see a heightened [operational] tempo as a result for that…Any time it becomes apparent we might strike into Syria as a response for chemical weapons use or something like that, you’ll see ships coming out of the Black Sea, moving down into the Mediterranean.”

The idea that Russia uses Crimea to project power was echoed by Ben Hodges, Pershing Chair in Strategic Studies at the Center for European Policy Analysis.

“This is their launching pad into the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean. It’s essential for their resupply into Syria, [which] has to come through the Black Sea, through the Dardanelles,” said Hodges, formerly the 3-star commanding general of U.S. Army Europe.

He added that Russia is using its enlarged Black Sea Fleet to constrain Ukraine.

“Russia, being a Black Sea littoral nation, has a sovereign right to move on the sea. But by illegally annexing Crimea and assaulting Ukraine Navy ships in November, they are positioning themselves to deny freedom of navigation on the Black Sea. That’s a huge concern.”

The increased regional military presence also helps Russia evade sanctions levied by the United States and the European Union after the UN voted to condemn the annexation, Hodges said. For example, Turkish cargo ships have put into Crimean ports in violation of EU sanctions.

“I don’t know how many ships of Turkish origin have done this,” he said. “Turkey maintains that every time it is done, they are charged. I am skeptical and would be of any claim that this is not done with tolerance, if not endorsement.”

Better maritime monitoring would help, he said. “Something that needs to be done is improve intelligence sharing in [the Romanian city of] Constanta. Ukraine and Georgia see everything there. If you could establish a common shared maritime picture of the Black Sea and what’s going in and out, that would help in identifying ships bringing commerce into Crimea when it’s not supposed to.”

But it won’t solve everything. The Russian Navy has shown a willingness to mount electronic attacks on ships in the region.

Russia’s additional military muscle also will help Moscow shape the economic futures of Black Sea nations, Hodges said, including NATO member Romania and NATO-aspirant Georgia. China’s One Belt, One Road Initiative is expanding toward the Black Sea, which could become an important “portal between Eurasia and Europe,” he said. “Georgia becomes the portal on the east end and Romania becomes the portal on the west end of the Black Sea. With rail infrastructure, a whole lot of markets become accessible out of Eurasia.”

The Future of Crimea

Since 2014, the U.S. government has treated Russia’s occupation of Crimea as an illegal annexation. State Department Special Representative Kurt Volker recently described the situation as an “occupation.”

President Donald Trump long has been softer on the issue. In 2016, Trump told ABC News’ George Stephanopoulos, “Putin would not to go into Ukraine, all right? You can mark it down and you can put it down.” After Stephanopoulos pointed out that Russia was already in Crimea, Trump offered a line of reasoning that has become a Kremlin talking point: “You know, the people of Crimea, from what I’ve heard, would rather be with Russia than where they were.”

Since then, various people in his orbit have tried to sell the president on a peace plan that would recognize Russia’s annexation of the Crimean Peninsula. Former Trump lawyer and current federal prison inmate Michael Cohen, along with Trump business associate Felix Slater, discussed such a plan with aspiring Ukrainian politician Andrii V. Artemenko in 2016. Artemenko said that the proposal had Putin’s backing. It reportedly made it as far as former National Security Advisor Michael Flynn’s desk before he was fired after lying to the FBIabout his conversations with the Russian ambassador.

At the State Department, Russia’s current military buildup on Crimea doesn’t alter their policy position, yet.

“The United States does not and will not recognize Crimea’s claim to annexation by Russia,” Volker said during a May press event. “We have put in place under Secretary [Mike] Pompeo a long-term policy of refusing to recognize this, and we have sanctions in place as a result, and that’s not going to change.”

But the buildup diminishes any prospect of the United States evicting the Russians from the peninsula by force. “It would be very, very challenging from a military standpoint,” Hodges said.

The result appears to be an intractable standoff.

“We must never officially acknowledge and not tolerate” Russia’s illegal presence, Hodges said. “I’m not optimistic that there will be a resolution any time soon.” (Source: Defense One)

12 Jun 119. Load sharing: Enhancing the Australia-Japan strategic partnership. As challenges to the modern economic and strategic balance of power in the Indo-Pacific continue to mount, closer collaboration between Australia and Japan will become increasingly important – particularly as peer competition between the US, China and Russia serves to hinder the capability of the US to unilaterally guarantee the regional status-quo. China’s continued assertiveness in the South China Sea (SCS) has prompted a resurgence in Japan’s own assertiveness in the region. As an island nation, Japan, like Australia, is dependent on the unrestricted access to strategic sea-lines-of-communication (SLOC) for access to both export markets and strategic resources.

Growing Chinese assertiveness in the SCS and modernisation efforts resulting in the fielding of key power projection capabilities, including aircraft carriers and supporting strike groups, fifth-generation combat aircraft, modernised land forces, area-access denial and strategic nuclear forces, combined with growing political and financial influence throughout the region, is serving to shake Japan’s confidence.

However, Japan’s geo-strategic realities have rapidly evolved since the end of the Cold War, when the US could effectively guarantee the security of the island nation. Accordingly, the Japanese government has responded with a period of unprecedented defence budgets as the pre-war power seeks to shake off the chains of the pacifist constitution enforced upon it by the US, UK, Australia and other allies following the end of the war in the Pacific.

In response, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has repeatedly earmarked increased funding for the nation’s defence budget, expanding the capabilities of the Japanese Self-Defense Force (JSDF) to operate independently of direct US support – establishing the nation as an emerging great power with traditional great power style strategic economic, diplomatic and military capabilities.

The Australia-Japan relationship is the nation’s closest and most mature in Asia and is underpinned by the strategic, economic, political and legal interests of both countries. The countries work closely in strategic alliance with the US, and lead in critical regional partnerships with countries such as India and the Republic of Korea.

Promoting closer industrial collaboration

Australia and Japan regularly participate in joint defence exercises and frequently consult on regional security issues, such as the nuclear tests and ballistic missile launches undertaken by North Korea. Meanwhile, the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation (JDSC) signed in 2007 provides a foundation for wide-ranging co-operation on security issues for both countries, including law enforcement, border security, counter terrorism, disarmament and counter-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Enhancing the economic relationship between Australia and Japan is a key component for enhancing the strategic partnership between the two nations – the joint operation of key platforms including the Aegis combat system and F-35 Joint Strike Fighter provide avenues for greater industrial collaboration and research and development between the two nations.

This is identified in the JFY2019 Defense Related Budget Request, which recognises the broad importance of the Australia-Japan relationship, saying, “The Japan-US alliance as well as defence co-operation with India, Australia, ASEAN countries and other partners can work very effectively in maintaining peace and stability of Japan and the region. Japan should develop a defence capability that can further deepen and expand these endeavours.”

The budget also focuses on encouraging structural reform of the nation’s industrial and research and development (R&D) capabilities as part of building closer collaboration, improved interoperability and distributed lethality.

Australian industry, defence and academia are well positioned to benefit from Japan’s arms build-up across a number of areas. Australian involvement in the global F-35 program, as both a key supply chain contributor and as an Asia-Pacific regional maintenance, upgrade and overhaul hub, combined with the growing interoperability of key naval platforms, serves as catalysts for this integration.

Increased military deployments and engagement

While Australia and Japan enjoy a robust and productive military-to-military relationship, the changing regional dynamics necessitate increased regional collaboration and integration – this is especially critical given the mutual dependence on unrestricted access to SLOCs and the ocean more broadly.

Increasing joint Australian-Japanese military-to-military participation and interoperability is an important part of supporting the development of load sharing in the region. This could include increased forward basing of Australian military assets including Collins Class submarines, Hobart Class destroyers, Anzac Class frigates, P-8A Poseidons and F-35s to Japanese facilities.

Further enhancing these capabilities is the integration of Japan’s planned Aegis ashore sites with Australia’s world-leading JORN network, the expected AIR 6500 integrated air and missile defence program and the various layers of Australia’s expected air and missile defence systems across the Army, Navy and Air Force.

Incorporating these capabilities, combined with enhanced interoperability as a result of operating similar or in some cases the same platforms, enhances the development of a theatre-based integrated air and missile defence system supporting the defence of key air, land, sea and space-based assets of Japan, Australia and, more broadly, US military assets based in the region.

For both Australia and Japan, nations defined by their relationship with traditionally larger, yet economically weaker regional neighbours, the growing economic prosperity of the region and corresponding arms build up, combined with ancient and more recent enmities, competing geo-political, economic and strategic interests, places the nations at the centre of the 21st century’s ‘great game’.

Further compounding the precarious position of the two US-allies is the need to accept that ‘Pax Americana’, or the post-Second World War ‘American Peace’, is over and Australia and Japan will be required to develop both unique national responses to defend their unique national interests, with a focus on supporting the key alliances. (Source: Defence Connect)

12 Jun 119. Defining Australia’s area of responsibility. Since 2009, successive Australian governments have sought to slowly shift the nation’s focus away from the Middle East towards what has become known as the Indo-Pacific. As the driver of both economic and strategic competition the 21st century, Australia’s own region is increasingly central to the nation’s long-term national interests, but what constitutes the nation’s primary area of responsibility?

Australia emerged from the Second World War as a middle power, essential to maintaining the post-war economic, political and strategic power paradigm established and led by the US – this relationship, established as a result of the direct threat to Australia, replaced Australia’s strategic relationship of dependence on the British Empire and continues to serve as the basis of the nation’s strategic policy direction and planning.

However, as a nation Australia has often walked the line, balancing traditional middle power and minor power characteristics, which have served to exacerbate the partisan nature of the nation’s strategic and defence policy making.

In particular, Australia has historically been dependent upon the benevolence of the broader international community, at both an economic and strategic level – this is most evident in two specific arenas, firstly the nation’s continued economic dependence on China and strategic dependence on the US.

The emergence of economic, political and military superpowers like China and India continue to develop as the economic, political and strategic powers at the core of Indo-Pacific Asia. Additionally, Australia has also witnessed the development of the region’s periphery powers including Indonesia, Vietnam and Thailand, each with competing priorities and objectives, combined with the rise of complex asymmetric challenges to national security serving to challenge the established geo-political, economic and strategic security and prosperity of the region.

Recognising these factors, combined with the traditional understanding of the Indo-Pacific – which is defined as the biogeographic region encompassing the tropical waters of the Indian Ocean, the western and central Pacific Ocean and the seas connecting the two in the general area surrounding Indonesia and Australia – what is Australia’s primary area of responsibility?

Australia in the Asian century

While much of the post-Cold War focus had been on the Middle East, countering violent extremism and asymmetric threats like violent extremists and the growing prominence of organised criminal groups – the 2009 Defence White Paper identified “Australia’s enduring interest in the stability of what it called the wider Asia-Pacific region”.

“The Indo-Pacific is a logical extension of this concept, and adjusts Australia’s priority strategic focus to the arc extending from India though south-east Asia to north-east Asia, including the sea lines of communication on which the region depends,” it said.

Building on this recognition, Australia’s 2013 Defence White Paper sought to expand the growing importance of the Indo-Pacific following a growing economic and strategic pivot by the US towards the region with a renewed focus on ensuring the peaceful rise of major Asian nations.

These developments have resulted in increasing suspicions towards China – particularly following Chinese assertiveness throughout the region, such as in the Taiwan Strait and the international waters of the South China Sea (SCS) – and has brought the rising power into contest with both the United Nations and the broader regional community.

While recognising the rise of China and, to a lesser extent, India is a major milestone, the 2013 Defence White Paper also recognised the growing importance of other regional powers including Japan, South Korea and Indonesia within the regional strategic power paradigm and Australia’s continued engagement and role within the rapidly shifting sands of the Indo-Pacific.

“The emerging Indo-Pacific system is predominantly a maritime environment with south-east Asia at its geographic centre. The region’s big strategic challenges will last for decades and their mismanagement could have significant consequences … For Australia, this more complex environment will make it more challenging for us to achieve or influence outcomes. Asian countries will balance a broader range of interests and partners, and Australia’s voice will need to be clearer and stronger to be heard,” the 2013 Defence White Paper explained.

The rules-based order 2.0 and Australia’s place in it

The 2016 Defence White Paper moved quickly to recognise the rapidly evolving nature of the economic, political and strategic status quo of the Indo-Pacific – the DWP correctly identifies: “Australia’s strategic outlook to 2035 also includes a number of challenges which we need to prepare for. While there is no more than a remote prospect of a military attack by another country on Australian territory in the foreseeable future, our strategic planning is not limited to defending our borders.”

This clearly identifies a shift in the nation’s attitude towards the Indo-Pacific.

“Our planning recognises the regional and global nature of Australia’s strategic interests and the different sets of challenges created by the behaviours of countries and non-state actors such as terrorists,” it said.

This recognition was used as the basis for informing the acquisition and modernisation plans for the broader Australian Defence Force with a specific focus on modernising and recapitalising the Royal Australian Navy –incorporating Australia’s defence capabilities within allied task groups based on the US remaining the pre-eminent global military power.

However, the rise of China and resurgence of Russia in particular, combined with the aforementioned emergence of other regional powers, is limiting the capability of the US to operate unencumbered or unchallenged, requiring Australia to rapidly develop and embrace a new strategic doctrine focusing on the nation’s immediate strategic environment – from the south Pacific to the SCS through to the Diego Garcia islands in the Indian Ocean.

The nation is defined by its relationship with the region, with access to the growing economies and to strategic sea-lines-of-communication supporting over 90 per cent of global trade, a result of the cost effective and reliable nature of sea transport. Indo-Pacific Asia is at the epicentre of the global maritime trade, with about US$5trn worth of trade flowing through the SCS and the strategic waterways and choke points of south-east Asia annually.

For Australia, a nation defined by its relationship with traditionally larger, yet economically weaker regional neighbours, the growing economic prosperity of the region and corresponding arms build up, combined with ancient and more recent enmities, competing geo-political, economic and strategic interests, places the nation at the centre of the 21st century’s ‘great game’.

11 Jun 119. Saudi Arabia – Asir: Saudi-led coalition air defences down two Yemeni Houthi rebel drones targeting airbase. At approximately 2100Z on 10 June, Saudi-led coalition air defences downed two Yemeni Houthi rebel military-grade weaponised drones targeting King Khaled Airbase (OEKM/KMX) in Asir Province located in the southwest of the Kingdom. We assess the Saudi-led coalition employed a US-made MIM-104 Patriot conventional surface-to-air missile (SAM) system to complete the engagements. The Patriot has the capability to engage air targets at altitudes up to FL800 and at ranges out to 100 miles (160 km). On 9 June, the Houthis claimed to have conducted a weaponised drone attack targeting Jizan Airport (OEGN/GIZ); however, the Saudi-led coalition has not issued a statement on the alleged incident to date. On 26 May, the Saudi-led coalition claimed to have shot down a Yemeni Houthi rebel military-grade drone targeting Jizan Airport. The Saudi-led coalition previously shot down a Houthi rebel military-grade drone targeting Najran Airport (OENG/EAM) on 23 May. On 21 May, the Saudi-led coalition stated that a Houthi rebel weaponised drone had “tried to target” a “vital” facility used by civilians in Najran. Houthi rebels claimed that one of their military-grade Qasef-2K drones had successfully targeted a weapons facility located within Najran Airport on 21 May. The southwest provinces of Asir, Jizan and Najran are located within the Security Control of Air Traffic and Air Navigation Aids (SCATANA) area of Saudi Arabia, which is covered by a notice and a publication issued by the civil aviation authority of the country (NOTAM OEJD W0438/18; AIP SUP AIRAC 05/18 and 07/18).

Analysis

EASA, Germany and France have issued notices to operators advising against conducting civil aviation flight activity within the southwest provinces of Saudi Arabia (EASA CZIB 2018-01-R2, NOTAM EDGG B0033/19, France – AIC A 03/19). The majority of Houthi rebel surface-to-surface missile (SSM) launches into the Kingdom and associated intercepts – along with drone downings – occur over the southwest provinces in the SCATANA area. Our analysis indicates Saudi Arabia has shot down over 100 Houthi-launched SSMs and drones over its territory since the start of 2018, including seven over Riyadh as well as two over Mecca Province and one over Yanbu, located deep within the interior of the country. Comparatively, just 16 SSM intercepts occurred over Saudi Arabia during all of 2017, with only three taking place near Riyadh. Continued SSM and additional drone launches into the Kingdom by Yemen-based Houthi rebels and associated intercepts via Saudi military conventional SAM engagement are likely to occur weekly over the SCATANA area for the foreseeable future. In addition, quarterly SSM intercepts near Riyadh or over main urban centres located deep within the Saudi interior are probable until a resolution between the factions in the Yemen conflict is reached. We assess territory in Saudi Arabia outside the SCATANA area to be a HIGH risk airspace environment at all altitudes. We assess the SCATANA area of Saudi Arabia to be an EXTREME risk airspace environment at all altitudes.

Advice

11 June 19. Australia’s answer to NORAD: The growing need for continental IAMD. While AIR 6500 goes part of the way to introducing an Australian integrated air and missile defence and multi-domain battle management system, the growing complexity of contemporary air and missile threats mean that larger parts of the Australian continent will become vulnerable. Combining Australia’s leading-edge over-the-horizon radar technologies with disparate sensor suites and distributed networks provides avenues for developing a truly continental IAMD network.

From the earliest days of cruise and ballistic missiles, the evolution of technology between defence and offence has been a game of cat and mouse, with technology empowering both attacker and defender, serving to create a constant state of tactical and strategic flux.

The advent of multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV) during the Cold War and the rise of hypersonic ballistic and cruise missiles in recent years have constantly undermined efforts to develop a reliable, cost-effective and survivable missile defence system and capabilities.

The complexity of modern missile systems, combined with speed, improved manoeuvrability and re-targetable systems has required a layered approach to tactical and strategic missile defence, adding both cost and complexity to missile defence countermeasures. Missile defence is broken down into three layers, each requiring different levels of technology and platform.

In response, the US, Russia, China, India, Israel and France have all invested heavily in developing a range of land, air and sea-based missile defence technologies and systems, supported by a range of air defence identification zones (ADIZ) to develop an integrated air and missile defence system.

Established at the height of the Cold War, the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) is a joint effort between the US and Canada that incorporates a range of air and missile defence sensors designed to protect the North American landmass from surprise air or missile attack – while also supporting a hardened, survivable network of command and control infrastructure in the event of nuclear exchange between the US and Soviet Union.

As a continent, Australia is increasingly exposed to the modernisation and developments of offensive tactical and strategic weapons systems namely advanced cruise and ballistic missile systems operated by major global powers, namely Russia and China – the varying nature of these systems requires a range of defensive measures based on the threat level presented, including:

Tactical: Designed to counter short-range, tactical ballistic missiles designed to travel less than 1.5km/s. Tactical anti-ballistic missiles (ABMs) typically have short ranges, from 20-80 kilometres, and are designed to provide area defence for major infrastructure including cities, ports, airfields and forward-deployed military bases. Currently fielded defence systems include the US MIM-104 Patriot, Israeli Iron Dome and Russian S-300V systems.
Theatre: Countering medium-to-intermediate range missiles designed to travel at approximately 3km/s providing defensive coverage across a localised region of military operations (typically a radius of several hundred kilometres). Currently fielded systems include the US Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD), Israeli Arrow and Russian S-400 systems.
Strategic: Designed to counter long-range intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of travelling at approximately at 7km/s. These systems rely on a complex series of sensors, targeting computers and anti-ballistic missile systems to counter threats. Current examples include the Russian A-135 system responsible for the defence of Moscow and the US Ground-Based Midcourse Defence system responsible for defending the continental US from missiles launched in Asia.

Despite these clearly defined capabilities, the constantly evolving nature of missile systems, combined with the mobility and proliferation of capabilities among state and asymmetric-based threats, presents a series of challenges, mandating an equally agile and formidable response to protect critical infrastructure and forward deployed military capabilities from attack.

Australia’s NORAD and centralised decision making

Australia’s geographic isolation and size presents a series of operational and strategic challenges for implementing a layered system of continental defence. Nevertheless, there has been an introduction of increasingly capable ballistic missiles throughout the region, most recently with announcements of a successful precision guided long-range ballistic missile by North Korea and the increasing capability of China’s own ballistic and cruise missile systems.

While both AIR 6500 and Plan Jericho serve as the basis for Australia’s pursuit of a complex, integrated air and missile defence system responsible for providing a range of capabilities – ranging from tactical air and missile area defence for forward deployed Army expeditionary units, through to a layered, continental air and missile defence system – the lack of a specialised, central command and control decision making centre limits the effectiveness of Australia’s continental air and missile defence network.

At the core of these programs is a focus on developing a complex ‘system of systems’ linking the disparate family of platforms and systems, like the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, E-7A Wedgetail, P-8A Poseidon, Hobart Class and Hunter Class, which will provide a quantum surge in the way the ADF conducts independent and coalition operations.

AIR 6500 is a joint battle management system that will interconnect the many disparate platforms, systems and sensors across the air, land, space, electromagnetic and cyber domains into a collaborative environment that provides shared situational awareness of the battlespace and the ability to rapidly plan responses to threats.

Supporting the introduction of the $1bn AIR 6500 program is the $1.2bn AIR 2025 Phase 6 upgrade of JORN, which will focus on enhancing the capability of the JORN system to provide 24-hour military surveillance of the northern and western approaches to Australia, maximising the nation’s ‘defence in depth’ capabilities.

JORN – Australia’s world-leading over-the-horizon technology, provides wide area surveillance at ranges of 1,000 to 3,000 kilometres and plays a vital role in supporting the ADF’s air and maritime operations – paves the way for developing a uniquely Australian layered defence system combining an Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD) Battle Command System (IBCS) with multi-domain, anti-access, area denial (A2AD) capabilities.

Further supporting these continental air and missile defence and underlying A2AD capabilities is the growing long-range, distributed lethality capabilities of the ADF’s broader network of ‘sensors’ and ‘shooters’, including systems like the Hobart Class, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, E-7A Wedgetail, P-8A Poseidon and the recently announced $2bn LAND 19 Phase 7B program.

Former commander, Forces Command, Major General (Ret’d) Gus McLachlan, explained the role of each individual platform within the broader ‘system of systems’ or ‘joint force’ from the Army perspective: “Army’s response to the ADF’s journey to develop an internet of things (IoT) approach to data gathering nodes across the services, like Navy’s AWDs and Air Force’s F-35s, and then Army being able to provide a shooting solution, should it be required.”

Each of these platforms form part of an intricate jigsaw puzzle, each filling a unique purpose within the broader ‘joint force’ concept – coming together to form an integrated tapestry of capabilities. As part of this, the ADF will also acquire ground-based active electronically scanned array radars from around 2020, expanding Australia’s access to air and space situational awareness information, including through space-based systems.

This combination of disparate ‘sensors’ and ‘shooters’ operating under different operational commands in spite of the ‘joint force’ doctrine and concept reveals the limitations of the plan without the development of an Australian equivalent of NORAD – incorporating traditional air and missile defence and the space situational awareness, space surveillance and space-based defensive capabilities.

Australia’s world-leading SSA capabilities combined with renewed government focus on developing an offensive domestic cyber capabilities, domestic development of directed-energy weapons to ‘dazzle’ or ‘blind’ competitor space assets, and the nation’s growing electronic warfare capabilities provide avenues for Australia to develop a complementary ‘soft kill’ capability.

The rapid development of peer and near-competitor anti-satellite and counterspace capabilities, recently exemplified by the successful Indian anti-satellite weapons test and the resulting threat of space debris, requires the development of a robust and considered Australian response – enabling the nation to protect and deter its sovereign space interests while supporting the long-term development of Australia’s own sovereign aerospace defence capabilities. (Source: Defence Connect)

11 June 19. Balancing the need for ‘green’ and ‘blue’ water naval capabilities. In recent weeks we have taken a closer look at how the shift towards the contested waterways of the Indo-Pacific, combined with advances in technology, provides the opportunity for developing a potent new form of sea control – while balancing the necessary development of Australia’s own naval force projection capabilities, creating some confusion about the capabilities. Contemporary maritime warfare and key technologies are both evolving at a similar pace to that of other domains – the rise of unmanned technologies, advanced sensor suites, smart munitions combined with the increasing proliferation of cost-effective submarines, small surface warships including modern fast torpedo and missile attack boats, are serving as low-end balances for fleets of destroyers, frigates, large-deck amphibious warfare ships and aircraft carriers.

The Indo-Pacific presents a different geo-strategic environment to the Mediterranean and Atlantic – the importance of maritime choke points is enhancing the lethality of these platforms, giving rise to a new era of asymmetric naval warfare particularly in the Indo-Pacific where maritime choke points like the Straits of Malacca, Lombok and Sunda challenge traditional maritime protection doctrine.

Recently, Defence Connect has taken a closer look at both traditional force projection capabilities and asymmetricnaval capabilities including the return of advanced, fast-attack torpedo and missile attack boats – both of which serve unique, yet complementary roles in modern tactical and strategic naval operations. These two topics have resulted in a wave of feedback.

The vast majority of the feedback received has fallen prey to the traditional mindset of Australian strategic thinking, the dichotomy of ‘black’ and ‘white’, failing to recognise the nuance needed for Australia to respond to the increasingly precarious position the nation finds itself in as a result of the relative decline and strategic schizophrenia exhibited by the US, combined with the rise of China and resurgence of nations like Russia in combination with the rise of regional great powers challenges the nation’s now precarious position.

Shifting beyond this reductionist approach requires nuance, it also requires an acceptance that ‘Pax Americana’, or the post-Second World War ‘American Peace’, is over and Australia will require a uniquely Australian approach and recognition that the nation is now solely responsible for the enduring security of its national interests with key alliances serving a secondary, complementary role to the broader debate.

This nuanced approach and acceptance of Australia’s precarious position mandates a layered, complex and self-reliant approach not exhibited in Australia before across traditional military capabilities, industrial and economic output and the development of a unique, Australian ‘Grand Strategy’ to support the development of Australia’s self reliance.

Air combat capabilities of the last 50 years have been defined by the ‘high’-‘low’ mix between specialised air supremacy platforms like the F-22, F-15 and the multi-role air combat capabilities of aircraft like the F-16, F-18, Eurofighter Typhoon and the F-35. Similarly, naval operations are defined by ‘brown’, ‘green’ and ‘blue’ water power capabilities.

‘Green water’ sea control and ‘blue water’ force projection

The geographic realities of the Indo-Pacific range from narrow maritime strategic choke points bound by archipelagos to vast swathes of open ‘blue’ water ocean, requiring a balance of capabilities to support both contemporary sea-control capabilities and naval force projection – with each serving niche, yet complementary roles in modern tactical and strategic engagements.

Australia has long been identified as a ‘green water’ navy – with a rapidly developing force projection capability on the back of the HMAS Choules and the two Canberra Class landing helicopter docks supported by a modern fleet of destroyers, frigates and offshore patrol vessels – however, the very nature of Australia’s operating environment means that the nation straddles the line between both a ‘green water’ and ‘blue water’ navy.

As a result of this confusing position, Australia’s capabilities and growing responsibilities in the Indo-Pacific have placed the nation in a unique position, requiring a nuanced response to ensure that the complementary ‘green’ and ‘blue’ water capabilities fully support the implementation of Australia’s maritime doctrine as both an independent and supporting actor in the increasingly contested 21st century.

A naval high-low mix?

The geo-strategic nature of the Indo-Pacific requires nuance. Balancing maritime asymmetric force multipliers and traditional naval force projection capabilities enables Australia to directly confront the increasing range of contingencies the Royal Australian Navy as part of the broader ‘joint force’ – with common communications, sensor suites and weapons systems all serving as potent force multipliers.

In particular, the advent of highly capable asymmetric force multiplying platforms like the Norwegian Navy’s fleet of superfast, stealth ‘missile corvettes’ in the Skjold Class, which incorporates a potent arsenal for a vessel of their size, including eight Kongsberg Naval Strike Missiles and a 76mm mounted gun when operating in conjunction with a pseudo-mothership.

The future-Arafura Class offshore patrol vessels could serve as that pseudo-mothership for small hunter-killer groups of the Australian Skjold Class vessels to support Australia power projection and sea control operations, while also supporting and protecting larger naval assets like the Canberra Class in high intensity operations – effectively establishing a ‘high’ and ‘low’ capability mix for the RAN.

At the ‘high’ end of the naval capability mix is the increasing conversation about a return to Australian fixed-wing naval aviation capabilities and the continued development of Australia’s own amphibious force projection capabilities, enabling Australia to reliably deploy Australian air, land and sea forces independently or as part of an allied task group.

Further supporting these ‘high’ end capabilities is the acquisition of advanced anti-submarine warfare frigates as part of the $35bn SEA 5000 Hunter Class and the $50bn SEA 1000 Attack Class submarine programs, which will support the interoperability and broader naval combat capability of the RAN when it operates either independently or in conjunction with allied nations.

Enhancing Australia’s capacity to act as an independent power, incorporating great power-style strategic economic, diplomatic and military capability serves not only as a powerful symbol of Australia’s sovereignty and evolving responsibilities in supporting and enhancing the security and prosperity of Indo-Pacific Asia – shifting the public discussion away from the default Australian position of “it is all a little too difficult, so let’s not bother” will provide unprecedented economic, diplomatic, political and strategic opportunities for the nation. (Source: Defence Connect)

10 June 19. India may buy Rs6,000 cr-worth of air missiles from US to shield Delhi. India has begun the process of acquiring the National Advanced Surface to Air Missile System-II (NASAMS-II) from the US to fully secure its airspace against aerial threats ranging from drones to ballistic missiles. A defence ministry source told Times of India, “the US is likely to send the final draft of the ‘letter of acceptance’ for the sale of NASAMS-II to India under its foreign military sales programme, at a cost of over Rs 6,000 crore, by July-August.”

Once the deal is inked, the deliveries will take place in two to four years, according to a report published in TOI. The NASAMS-II will be used along with indigenous, Russian and Israeli systems to establish a multi-layered missile shield over the National Capital Territory of Delhi. As per the proposed overall air defence plan for Delhi, the innermost layer of protection will be through the NASAMS. Defence acquisitions council (DAC), chaired by India’s Defence Minister Nirmala Sitharaman, had in 2018, approved the “acceptance of necessity (AoN) for the acquisition of NASAMS-II.

What is NASAMS-II?

NASAMS-II is an upgraded version of the Kongsberg Defence & Aerospace/Raytheon National Advanced Surfaceto-Air Missile System (NASAMS) and features new 3D mobile surveillance radars and 12 missile launchers for quicker reaction. The new air-defence system will eventually supplement the long-delayed indigenous two-tier ballistic missile defence (BMD) shield that is in an advanced stage of development by Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO).

A NASAMS battery consists of up to 12 multimissile launchers, each of which can carry six AIM-120-series advanced medium-range air-to-air missiles (AMRAAMs) or other surface-to-air missiles (SAMs); up to eight AN/MPQ-64 Sentinel X-band 3D radars; up to four Fire Distribution Centres (FDCs); and up to four MPS 500 electrooptical/infrared (EO/IR) sensor system vehicles.

US to offer India alternative to Russian S-400 missile defence system

Meanwhile, the US is working with India to offer an alternative to the Russian S-400 Triumf missile defence system. Upset with India’s $5.4bn Moscow deal, the US has offered Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and Patriot Advance Capability (PAC-3) missile defence systems to India in as an alternative to Russian S-400s. According to a report published in HT, the Trump administration is understood to have made the offer in May, 2019. The exact cost of a THAAD defence system could not be ascertained, but according to a CNBC report, each unit can cost an estimated $3bn. (Source: Google/https://www.business-standard.com)

10 June 19. Defining the end goal for the Naval Shipbuilding Plan. Any good policy identifies an end objective then works its way back to the beginning. As Australia’s naval shipbuilding capability steadily grows, is it time to set an end objective beyond carefully worded media announcements and clearly define what it is we want the Australian naval shipbuilding industry to be?

With $90bn worth of naval shipbuilding programs, the Royal Australian Navy and naval shipbuilding industry would appear to be in an enviable position, however, the long lead time on key programs and ramp up in delivery poses challenges for industry.

Meanwhile, as a maritime nation, Australia is dependent on unlimited access to the ocean – as the regional paradigm changes, there is greater strain on the Navy to protect the national interests and naval assets like the Canberra Class amphibious warfare ships, combined with concerns about the continuity of Australia’s sovereign naval shipbuilding industry in between major programs.

Now, for the first time in the nation’s history, Australia’s prosperity, security and way of life is intrinsically linked to the ambition, stability and direction of its Indo-Pacific neighbours. Guaranteeing this requires the nation to find a balance between the expeditionary and interventionist focused ‘Forward Defence’ and the continental defence focused ‘Defence of Australia’ doctrines to counter the high and low intensity threats to the nation’s security and interests.

Australia’s focus on the Indo-Pacific region makes a great deal of sense, particularly given the positioning of key regional economic and strategic partners across what has been referred to as the ‘Arc of Instability’, which plays host to a range of traditional state and asymmetric economic and political challenges, however the growth of China and India and smaller nations surrounding them, combined with the importance of the Indo-Pacific as a pillar of the national, regional and global economy, now requires renewed Australian focus.

While both the Defence Industrial Capability Plan and the $95bn Naval Shipbuilding Plan set out how the government is delivering on the commitment to build a strong, sustainable and innovative Australian naval shipbuilding industry, stating: “The goal of the Naval Shipbuilding Plan is to ensure that the regeneration of the Royal Australian Navy over the coming decades will ensure both a cost-effective solution for the government provide Navy the assured capability to fight and win. The National Naval Shipbuilding Office has been established to implement the Naval Shipbuilding Plan.”

The thinly defined concepts of ‘sovereign’ and ‘sustainable’ as they relate to Australia’s naval shipbuilding leave many unanswered questions, as does the ever-present spectre of the infamous ‘valleys of death’ between major projects that severely impact the capability, sustainability and cost of delivering major naval platforms.

Supporting Australia’s naval shipbuilding capacity

Contemporary naval shipbuilding expands beyond the traditional manufacturing side of the process and requires extensive and costly research and development processes throughout the concept development and life of the platforms to enhance capability and sustainability over the life of service – something often overlooked in existing policy.

Accordingly, supporting Australia’s domestic ability to design warships, designed by both government and the private sector, with a focus on providing through-life support for both domestic and export customers in a manner similar to the model implemented by BAE Systems through the $35bn Hunter Class program is an existing model of success for Australian industry and government to use as a reference point for developing future policy.

Further supporting this is the requirement to begin developing and implementing a National Strategic Industry Act to support the development of the nation’s naval shipbuilding industry and broader reindustrialisation of the Australian economy using defence industry as a best-of-practice model to draw examples from.

Supporting the development of Australia’s naval shipbuilding industry also requires the legislative power of government to counter-balance industry development policies of allied, yet still competitor nations like South Korea – which leverages the industrial development policies of export oriented industrialisation (EOI) to develop its economy into a major economic and modern, advanced manufacturing powerhouse.

Korea’s industry development is driven by a range of government incentives for industry, including corporate tax incentives, employment incentives and payroll tax incentives. As a result, in order to develop Australia’s own naval shipbuilding industry, similar innovative and adaptive policy making is essential to developing a competitive domestic naval shipbuilding industry.

Defining Australia’s role in the domestic and allied supply chain

Australia has a number of naval shipyards beyond those located at Osborne and Henderson, such as the Williamstown facility just outside of Melbourne and the former-Forgacs naval shipyard located in Newcastle, which were responsible for the fit out of the Canberra Class and construction of the Anzac and Adelaide Class frigates, respectively.

These existing facilities, combined with the model established by the temporary BAE Systems Australia acquisition of ASC Shipbuilding throughout the life of the $35bn Hunter Class construction phase, provides an ideal model for the Australian government to collaborate with local or international naval warship designers and builders to develop specialised ‘warship centres of excellence’.

Developing these centres of excellence across the full spectrum of naval shipbuilding operations, including research and development, design, production and through-life sustainment can leverage the policy levers used to develop other national naval shipbuilding facilities and integration within global supply chains and programs to support the development and rehabilitation of local naval shipbuilding capabilities with a focus on capitalising on the growing demand for warships in the Indo-Pacific and Middle East in particular.

Additionally, this international collaboration also provides further avenues for Australian shipyards to increase domestic unit acquisition of platforms like the Hobart Class destroyers or the Hunter Class (Type 26 Global Combat Ship) vessels in support of international, allied acquisition programs – namely the British and Canadian acquisition of the Type 26 vessels and the potential US acquisition of a variant of the Australian Hobart Class as part of the FFG[X] program, which will see up to 20 vessels procured.

Australia’s ‘value add’ proposition fits in the edge of acquisition and operational cycle of naval acquisition –namely in the research and development and design phases, with production costs impacting the bottom line due to small economies of scale (which have been discussed at length here), and through life support, modernisation and sustainment adding additional value throughout the life of warship and submarine development and acquisition programs.

Diversifying Australia’s naval shipbuilding capabilities beyond focusing on Australia’s own shipbuilding requirements is a necessity should the broader naval shipbuilding plan be successful – targeting growing export demands in the region and Middle East, combined with international industry collaboration and partnerships, is central to this.

Developing and implementing a cohesive, innovative and long-term vision for Australia’s sovereign defence industry capability can also serve as the basis for developing, and in some cases redeveloping, a robust, advanced manufacturing economy taking advantage of Australia’s unrivalled resource wealth – supporting the broader national security and interests in the Indo-Pacific. (Source: Defence Connect)

10 June 19. Japan’s military says pilot vertigo likely cause of F-35 crash. Japan’s air force said on Monday “spatial disorientation” likely caused one of its pilots to fly his F-35 stealth fighters into the Pacific Ocean in April, hitting the water at more than 1,100kph (683mph).

The Lockheed Martin Corp jet disappeared from radar screens during an exercise with three other F-35s over the ocean off northwest Japan on April 9. The 41-year-old pilot was killed.

“We believe it highly likely the pilot was suffering from vertigo or spatial disorientation and wasn’t aware of his condition,” Defence Minister Takeshi Iwaya told a briefing.

“It can affect any pilot regardless of their experience.”

By dismissing mechanical or software problems as a cause for the advanced fighter’s crash, Japan’s assessment is likely to come as a relief to other countries that operate or plan to introduce the jet, including the United States, Britain and Australia.

Japan, Iwaya said, would increase vertigo training for its pilots, check its remaining F-35s and meet residents living near the base from which they operate, in Misawa, Aomori prefecture, before restarting flights.

The air force has yet to recover any intact data from the $126m aircraft’s flight data recorder to back its assessment, which is based on data and communication received by ground controllers and interviews with other pilots.

The pilot, who had only 60 hours flying time in the F-35, gave no indication he was in trouble and did not try to avoid a collision despite advanced instrumentation and a ground proximity warning system that should have alerted him to pull up.

The air force did not find any indication he had attempted to eject.

His plane, which was less than a year old and part of a squadron that had just became operational, crashed 28 minutes after taking off. Debris from the plane is spread across the sea floor about 1,500 metres below where it slammed into the water.

Japan in December said it would buy 45 more F-35 stealth fighters, including some short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL)B variants, worth about $4bn, adding to the 42 jets it has ordered.

Japan says it eventually wants to field a force of about 150 F-35s, making it the biggest overseas purchaser of the fighter, as it tries to keep ahead of China’s advances in military technology. (Source: Reuters)

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About Lincad

Lincad is a leading expert in the design and manufacture of batteries, chargers and associated products for a range of applications across a number of different sectors. With a heritage spanning more than three decades in the defence and security sectors, Lincad has particular expertise in the development of reliable, ruggedised products with high environmental, thermal and electromagnetic performance. With a dedicated team of engineers and production staff, all product is designed and manufactured in-house at Lincad’s facility in Ash Vale, Surrey. Lincad is ISO 9001 and TickITplus accredited and works closely with its customers to satisfy their power management requirements.

Lincad is also a member of the Joint Supply Chain Accreditation Register (JOSCAR), the accreditation system for the aerospace, defence and security sectors, and is certified with Cyber Essentials, the government-backed, industry supported scheme to help organisations protect themselves against common cyber attacks. The majority of Lincad’s products contain high energy density lithium-ion technology, but the most suitable technology for each customer requirement is employed, based on Lincad’s extensive knowledge of available electrochemistries. Lincad offers full life cycle product support services that include repairs and upgrades from point of introduction into service, through to disposal at the end of a product’s life. From product inception, through to delivery and in-service product support, Lincad offers the high quality service that customers expect from a recognised British supplier.

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