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07 June 19. How big is too big? Increasing the size of the ADF. The ADF is beset by an almost perfect storm. A period of modernisation combined with the increasing capability of regional peer and near-peer competitors is forcing Australia to ask, is the ADF large enough to reliably execute the mission in a radically evolving geo-political and strategic order?

Australia as both a continent and a nation is unique in its position, enjoying relative geographic isolation from the flash points of global and regional conflagration of the 20th century – blessed with unrivalled resource wealth and industrial potential, the nation has been able to embrace vastly different approaches to the nation’s strategic role and responsibilities.

Modern warfare has rapidly evolved over the last three decades, from high-tempo, manoeuvre-based operations that leveraged the combined capabilities of air, sea, land and space forces to direct troops, equipment and firepower around the battlefield during the first Gulf War, to low intensity humanitarian and peacekeeping operations in southern Europe and the south Pacific, and the eventual rise of asymmetrical, guerilla conflicts in the mountains of Afghanistan and streets of Iraq.

However, the growing conventional and hybrid capabilities of peer and near-peer competitors – namely Russia and China – combined with the growing modernisation, capability enhancements and reorganisation of force structures in the Army’s of nations including India, Indonesia, Vietnam and Thailand all contribute to the changing nature of contemporary warfare.

Over the past few months Defence Connect has received a range of feedback in response to articles regarding the recapitalisation, modernisation and expansion of the Australian Army, Royal Australian Navy and Royal Australian Air Force to better support and defend national interests in an increasingly challenging and complex Indo-Pacific environment.

The unique operating environments and both tactical and strategic responsibilities of the individual branches, combined with recent revelations in the Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s (ASPI) ‘Cost of Defence Report’ by Dr Marcus Hellyer, identified that while defence expenditure is rapidly heading towards the 2 per cent of GDP as committed to by the government, personnel recruitment remains a significant challenge.

As it stands, the personnel budget for the Australian Defence Force for 2018-19 is $11,776m, supporting 14,689 for the Royal Australian Navy, 14,295 for the Royal Australian Air Force and 30,810 Australian Army – for a total ADF strength of 59,794 personnel. Additionally, the budget supports 16,393 within the Australian Public Service (APS) and 19,850 reservists.

In light of the relatively small numbers fielded by the ADF, the question about personnel numbers becomes an increasingly important one – with the key question becoming: as the Indo-Pacific becomes increasingly contested and Australia’s interests are challenged, is the ADF large enough to reliably execute the mission in a radically evolving geo-political and strategic order?

Tthe 2016-17 annual report outlined in Dr Hellyer’s report identified that the ADF hit 97 per cent of its recruitment targets, which “is the best result for the past two decades”. Dr Hellyer also identifies that retention rates within the ADF remain good, with a 2016-17 separation rate of 9 per cent, below the 10.2 per cent average over the past two decades. Of particular concern is revelations that the recently upgraded HMAS Perth has remained out of operation since October 2017 due to the Navy’s inability to find a crew for the vessel.

“HMAS Perth, one of Navy’s frigates, had gone through a very extensive refit and upgrade, got new radar capabilities, so a lot of investment went into that, but at the end of that process Navy couldn’t find a crew for it,” Dr Hellyer told the ABC.

Further compounding these issues is Dr Hellyer’s observation: “Defence is finding it really hard to recruit: it takes a long time to train a submarine captain or to train a fighter pilot – you can’t just do that overnight.”

Increasing personnel expenditure

Australia’s pursuit of expensive, high-end military capabilities like the $17bn fleet of Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighters, $35bn Hunter Class frigates, $50bn Attack Class submarines, $5.2bn fleet of Boxer combat reconnaissance vehicles and $10-15bn acquisition of a yet to be determined armoured fighting vehicle fleet as part of LAND 400 Phase 3 are all important capability developments, however, such capabilities are useless without adequate manpower.

The ADF serves an important role within Australia’s policy making apparatus and is critical to long-term national security, and while the continued defence budget growth is expected to be widely welcomed by industry, the growing challenges to the Indo-Pacific region are raising questions about whether Australia’s commitment to 2 per cent of GDP is suitable to support the growing role and responsibilities that Australia will be required to undertake as regional security load sharing between the US and allies becomes a reality.

Dr Malcolm Davis of ASPI reinforced this, telling Defence Connect at the Avalon Airshow in late February, “The government aspiration of spending 2 per cent of GDP on defence is simply not enough any more. We need to look at planning our force structure, our capability requirements and spending on a number of factors, including allied strengths and potential adversarial capabilities, not arbitrary figures.

“It is time for us to throw open the debate about our force structure. It is time to ask what more do we need to do and what do we need to be capable of doing.”

The nation is defined by its relationship with the region, with access to the growing economies and to strategic sea-lines-of-communication supporting over 90 per cent of global trade, a result of the cost effective and reliable nature of sea transport. Indo-Pacific Asia is at the epicentre of the global maritime trade, with about US$5trn worth of trade flowing through the South China Sea and the strategic waterways and choke points of south-east Asia annually.

Enhancing Australia’s capacity to act as an independent power, incorporating great power-style strategic economic, diplomatic and military capability serves not only as a powerful symbol of Australia’s sovereignty and evolving responsibilities in supporting and enhancing the security and prosperity of Indo-Pacific Asia – shifting the public discussion away from the default Australian position of “it is all a little too difficult, so let’s not bother” will provide unprecedented economic, diplomatic, political and strategic opportunities for the nation. (Source: Defence Connect)

05 June 19. Malaysian Defence white paper to review role of Army will be tabled in Parliament, chief says. A white paper on defence to be tabled in Parliament in October will among others discuss the actual roles of the Malaysian Army to avoid sending soldiers who are not trained, to fight crimes, said Army chief Datuk Seri Ahmad Hasbullah Mohd Nawawi.

He said Army personnel do not have the authority and are not trained to eradicate crimes as it is under the authority and responsibility of the Royal Malaysia Police.

“The duty of Army is to protect the sovereignty of the country from external threats and we are always on full alert.

“Apart from that, Army top leadership is reviewing strategies in terms of post guard at operation areas at the country’s border,” he said.

Ahmad Hasbullah said officers and men have to be rotated from one location to another in operation to ensure they are in control, and be more alert as well as have better mobility in their operation.

The white paper will provide clearer information on the role of each agency, organisation and the people in effort to ensure peace in the country.

Earlier, the Malaysian Armed Forces (ATM) chief Gen Tan Sri Zulkifli Zainal Abidin said with the white paper, all parties including ATM, police and other related agencies would have clear guidelines on their respective duties and roles.

In March, Dr Mahathir when launching the Langkawi International Maritime and Aerospace Exhibition 2019 (Lima’19) said that the defence white paper is an important contribution to Malaysia’s defence landscape.

Earlier, Ahmad Hasbullah performed Aidilfitri prayer with Army personnel at Kem Sri Banding near here. Today Bernama joined the Armed Forces chief’s delegation in a Nuri helicopter to visit Kem Gubir in Sik, Kedah.

The operation base is the location of the 6th Battalion Royal Ranger Rgiment. The visit began with the presentation of Raya packages by Ahmad Hasbullah to all personnel on duty at the camp.

Yesterday, Ahmad Hasbullah visited two operation areas around Gerik, which is at Pos Pengkalan Hadapan November which has 29 personnel and Pos Pengkalan Hadapan Kenarong involving 25 members of the Second Battalion of the Royal Malay Regiment (2 RAMD). — Bernama. (Source: Google/https://www.malaymail.com)

05 June 19. Despite technology, conventional capabilities will still play a pivotal role. Despite the emphasis placed on revolutionary technologies like stealth, hypersonics, directed energy weapons, autonomous systems and cyber capabilities, history shows that conventional military capabilities still play a critical role in global power dynamics and on the battlefield.

As Australia embarks on its largest peacetime rearmament program – worth $200bn out to 2025-26 – the emphasis on ‘traditional’ military capabilities including a fleet of advanced, anti-submarine frigates worth $35bn, a $17bn investment in a fleet of fifth-generation F-35 Joint Strike Fighters and the $5.2bn acquisition of locally-built Boxer combat reconnaissance vehicles (CRV), for example, have drawn ire from political and strategic commentators alike.

The advent of increasingly capable cyber warfare capabilities, electronic warfare, autonomous systems, low observable platforms, hypersonic weapons and directed energy are all touted as the next-stage of battlefield revolution that will serve to undermine the nation’s investment in conventional capabilities, raising the question, is Australia’s military investment “sunk money”?

Throughout history, technological advances have changed the nature of human conflict – from the advent of the bow and arrow and introduction of cavalry through to the addition of explosives, chemical weapons, aircraft, armoured vehicles and later atomic weapons, each served to have a dramatic impact on the battlefield and the course of a conflict.

Despite this evolution in capabilities, conventional, or even ‘traditional’, capabilities like infantry, fleets of warships and aircraft have adapted, particularly following the advent of increasingly capable strategic deterrence focused weapons systems – such as nuclear, chemical and biological weapons systems – and serve as the tactical and strategic guarantor that contemporary armed conflict won’t get out of hand.

Enter the next-generation of weapons systems and force multipliers that many believe will serve to undermine the capacity of traditional military capabilities, also significantly impacting the nature and tempo of contemporary conflict. Indeed, it is expected a number of these emerging technologies will change the very battlefield itself – changing from far flung mountains, deserts or oceans to the family computer or internet enabled device.

As with the advent of nuclear weapons and the threat of ‘mutually assured destruction’ that would follow a nuclear exchange between peer-competitors, each of these capabilities build on either existing capabilities or enhance the tactical and strategic deterrence capacity of nations and asymmetric threats. Nowhere is this more evident then in the continuing development of cyber and electronic warfare capabilities.

Next-generation deterrence capabilities

The dependence of modern society and economies on both electricity and the flow of information – supported by increasingly interconnected and vulnerable networks – exposes developed and developing nations to extreme vulnerabilities to cyber and electronic attack, establishing these two technologies as the next-stage in the evolution of deterrence capabilities.

Peer competitors like Russia and China and lower-tier middle powers and rogue nations including Iran and North Korea have pursued lethal cyber capabilities as a means of leveraging weaknesses within the capabilities of the US and its allies as a result of their dependence on the ready access to information and increasingly networked nature of major weapons systems, economies and operational-military organisations.

Cyber capabilities have also been used to seemingly influence the outcome of elections throughout the West, as well as accessing critical information through forms of corporate and cyber espionage often compromising the increasingly complex weapons systems that the US, Australia and key allies have become dependent upon.

A potent reminder of this is the alleged hacking of US defence contractor Lockheed Martin exposing technical secrets of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, allegations of Russian meddling in both the 2016 US election and Brexit elections. Furthermore, recent breaches in the cyber security of Australian Parliament House and Western Australia-based shipbuilder and defence contractor Austal all serve as permanent reminders.

However, the West is not defenceless in this realm, with the US and allies, including Australia, seeking to counter the cyber offensives of these nations, leading potential adversaries in the tactical deployability of potent electronic warfare capabilities through the widespread introduction of the EA-18G Growler platform.

Electronic warfare, like cyber capabilities, is emerging as one of the great tactical and strategic levelling forces in the 21st century concept of operations (CONOPS) and for nations like Australia, serves as a potent deterrence capability to replace and complement traditional ‘hard kill’ deterrence capabilities like long-range strike platforms across the air and sea domains.

A new-era of mutually assured destruction or back to the future?

The renewed arms race resulting in the development of linchpin technologies like cyber and electronic warfare capabilities is serving in some way to reset the balance of strategic deterrence. While autonomous platforms, directed energy weapons and low observable platforms serve a unique role within the 21st century tactical and strategic balance of power, their dependence on both electricity and cyber systems, while not as pronounced, exposes them to the same vulnerabilities as national economies and individuals.

While nuclear weapons provide traditional kinetic ‘hard kill’ systems, the advent of highly advanced and capable cyber and electronic warfare capabilities fill the niche below traditional nuclear deterrence, empowering even middle powers to level the balance of power and hinder the hard power influence of great powers and peer competitors alike.

It is here that traditional capabilities, including personnel and advanced, hardened platforms like armoured vehicles, ships and aircraft, serve to meet the traditional power projection and deterrence capabilities of nations. Meanwhile, the addition of next-generation technologies like hypersonic cruise and ballistic missiles, combined with advanced sensor suites, optionally-manned aerial and undersea platforms, and directed energy weapons further enhances the lethality of these platforms.

Conflict is a seemingly ingrained part of the human condition – technology has just enabled us to better coerce or directly influence through naked force those who seek to influence our respective national interests. It is here that traditional ‘hard kill’ alternatives and the potent reminder of ‘boots on the ground’, ‘ships off the coast’ or loitering tactical or strategic strike aircraft fill the niche.

Meanwhile, the development of these increasingly capable next-generation capabilities requires a new strategic arms limitation control agreement between both the major powers, including the US, Russia, China, the UK and the like, and smaller powers including Australia to ensure that modern society and economies are not effectively reset to the turn of the 20th century. (Source: Defence Connect)

06 June 19. Strengthening Australia’s defence industry through export hubs and partnerships. As Australia’s domestic defence industrial base continues to grow, the need to embrace export opportunities becomes critical to the enduring success – with policy needed to support the nation’s existing trade and strategic partners serving as valuable markets for industry collaboration and export growth.

While Australia’s defence industry has gone from strength to strength in a short period of time – relying solely on domestic consumption is a fateful trap that has previously hindered the sustainable development of Australia’s broader manufacturing industries. Avoiding this pitfall requires a dramatically different approach to the policies that have been used in the past, paired with a growing focus on leveraging the nation’s key economic and strategic partnerships.

The Defence Industrial Capability Plan released in 2018 identifies the government’s long-term vision to build and develop a robust, resilient and internationally competitive Australian defence industry base that is better able to help meet defence capability requirements.

The Defence Industrial Capability Plan sets out a comprehensive plan for Australia’s defence industry. The government is investing in Australia’s defence industry and ensuring that it is positioned to support delivery of the Integrated Investment Program over the next decade.

The plan acknowledges that as Australia builds its defence capability, we must also grow our defence industrial capability. By 2028, Australia will require a larger, more capable and prepared Australian defence industry that has the resident skills, expertise, technology, intellectual property and infrastructure to:

Enable the conduct of ADF operations today;
Support the acquisition, operation and sustainment of future defence capability; and
Provide the national support base for Defence to meet current needs and to surge if Australia’s strategic circumstances require it.

Recognising the importance of the export market, the government established the Defence Export Strategy, which identifies that “Australian industry cannot sustain itself on the needs of the Australian Defence Force alone. New markets and opportunities to diversify are required to help unlock the full potential of Australian defence industry to grow, innovate, and support Defence’s future needs”.

The Defence Export Strategy stated purpose is to “achieve greater export success to build a stronger, more sustainable and more globally competitive Australian defence industry to support Australia’s Defence capability needs” by 2028, which is supported by five key objectives:

Strengthen the partnership between the Australian government and industry to pursue defence export opportunities;
Sustain Australia’s defence industrial capabilities across peaks and troughs in domestic demand;
Enable greater innovation and productivity in Australia’s defence industry to deliver world-leading Defence capabilities;
Maintain the capability edge of the Australian Defence Force and leverage Defence capability development for export opportunities; and
Grow Australia’s defence industry to become a top 10 global defence exporter.

The strategy provides $20m in additional annual funding from 2018-19 to support Australia’s defence exports. A new Australian Defence Export Office will be created within the Department of Defence to provide a focal point for defence exports and drive implementation of the strategy.

International collaboration – leveraging key economic and strategic partnerships

Since the end of the Second World War, Australia has positioned itself as not only a reliable strategic ally, but a stable, robust and competitive economic partner, albeit one sometimes hindered by internal economic factors and a lack of long-term industry development and economic policy beyond dependence on resources and agriculture.

However, this shift in focus by the government is encouraging, particularly as the $200bn worth of modernisation and recapitalisation of the ADF with a focus on developing sovereign Australian industry capability and an export focus presents increased opportunities for Australia’s burgeoning defence industrial base to collaborate and partner with some of the most advanced defence industry and advanced manufacturing ecosystems in the world.

The growing complexity and increasing commonality of major defence acquisition programs between a number of allied nations – particularly five eye nations like the US, Australia, Canada and the UK – provides avenues for greater diplomatic and economic partnerships to support increased industry capability, strategic dispersal and interoperability.

These strategic relationships, in particular the development of greater bilateral trade and secondary supply chains, are a key focus for South Korea-based LAND 400 Phase 3 and LAND 8112 contender Hanwha, which is seeking to support the development of Australia’s defence industrial base as part of its offering for the two major Army modernisation programs.

Richard Cho, managing director and vice president, Hanwha Defense Australia, explained this focus to Defence Connect, saying, “The relationship between South Korea and Australia is based on $42bn worth of bilateral trade – the defence industrial aspect of the relationship is one that is still growing and Hanwha, on the directive of the South Korean government, is seeking to establish an entirely sovereign capability in Australia to support the continuing alliance and economic partnership.”

Australia’s participation as a critical component in the global supply chain for key defence programs has long been recognised, with Australia’s defence SMEs leading the charge and punching wildly above their comparative weight, including highly successful examples like Quickstep Holdings, Marand Precision Engineering, Varley Group, TAE Aerospace and Bisalloy Steel each showing Australia can be a true global competitor.

While these capabilities are impressive, growth has to be a critical focus – particularly as other global competitors’ market shares in projects like the F-35 program continue to evolve and in some cases decline.

“Australia’s relationships with the Five Eyes nations in particular is of key importance for Hanwha and it is these relationships Hanwha seeks to support and enhance through the development of a fully integrated Australian defence industrial capability – this is key to supporting Hanwha’s bid for both LAND 400 Phase 3 and LAND 8112,” Cho added.

Reciprocal allied manufacturing and Australian Export Hubs

Supporting the development of Australia’s naval shipbuilding industry also requires the legislative power of government to counter-balance industry development policies of allied, yet still competitor nations like South Korea – which leverages the industrial development policies of export oriented industrialisation (EOI) to develop its economy into a major economic and modern, advanced manufacturing powerhouse.

Korea’s industry development is driven by a range of government incentives for industry, including corporate tax incentives, employment incentives and payroll tax incentives. As a result, in order to develop Australia’s own naval shipbuilding industry, similar innovative and adaptive policy making is essential to developing a competitive domestic naval shipbuilding industry.

“One of the key benefits for both Australia and Korea is the proximity of Australian manufacturing centres to potential markets, combined with Korea’s pursuit of an advanced infantry fighting/armoured fighting vehicle, which the AS-21 Redback – Hanwha’s proposal for LAND 400 Phase 3 – will serve as the basis for, while the potential offering of the AS-9 self-propelled howitzer to the British Army provides further opportunities for Australian industry,” Cho explained.

Supporting the next stage of industry development requires a unique policy approach as well as combining the existing elements of Australia’s existing innovation and science agenda with a suite of grant allocation and targeted, contractual tax incentives (signed between the Commonwealth and the company as a memorandum of understanding) linked to a combination of long-term, local job creation, foreign contract success, local industry content, and research and development programs – in specialised export orientated industry clusters.

Developing centres of excellence supporting export growth in partnership with Australian and international primes can leverage the policy levers used to develop other national facilities and integration within global supply chain and programs to support the development and rehabilitation of local naval shipbuilding capabilities with a focus on capitalising on the growing demand for warships in the Indo-Pacific and Middle East in particular.

Establishing and implementing a cohesive, innovative and long-term vision for Australia’s sovereign defence industry capability can also serve as the basis for developing, and in some cases redeveloping, a robust, advanced manufacturing economy taking advantage of Australia’s unrivalled resource wealth – supporting the broader national security and interests in the Indo-Pacific. (Source: Defence Connect)

05 June 19. The carrier question and Australia’s options. As Korea, Japan, China and India continue to invest in aircraft carriers to enhance their maritime security and power projection capabilities – the question remains, should Australia reintroduce a fixed-wing naval aviation capability and what options are available should the nation choose to participate in the regional carrier race?

At the end of the Second World War, the aircraft carrier emerged as the apex of naval prestige and power projection. Unlike their predecessor, the battleship, aircraft carriers in themselves are relatively benign actors, relying heavily a their attached carrier air-wings and supporting escort fleets of cruisers, destroyers and submarines to screen them from hostile action.

In recent years, nations throughout the Indo-Pacific have begun a series of naval expansion and modernisation programs with traditional aircraft carriers and large-deck, amphibious warfare ships serve as the core of their respective shift towards greater maritime power projection.

Driving this change is an unprecedented period of Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea and the growing capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), which has seen the Chinese fielding or preparing to field a range of power projection capabilities, including aircraft carriers and supporting strike groups, fifth-generation combat aircraft, modernised land forces, area-access denial and strategic nuclear forces, combined with growing political and financial influence throughout the region.

Japan has closely followed the modernisation of the Chinese armed forces and raised concerns about the nation’s defence capabilities. As part of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s commitment towards shifting the paradigm following continued Chinese naval build up – particularly the growing capabilities of China’s aircraft carrier and amphibious warfare ship fleets – Japan has initiated a range of modernisation and structural refits for the Izumo Class vessels to develop small aircraft carriers.

Developing a blue water navy has been a major focus of Korea’s response to the mounting capabilities of North Korea and China’s continued assertiveness in the South and East China Seas. The centrepiece of Korea’s transition towards a blue water capable navy is the Dokdo Class vessels, which are slightly smaller than the Royal Australian Navy’s Canberra Class amphibious warfare ships. However, unlike HMA Ships Canberra and Adelaide, Korea is actively pursuing the acquisition and introduction of F-35B Joint Strike Fighters to provide an integrated fleet air defence and maritime strike capabilities.

For Australia, a nation defined by its relationship with traditionally larger, yet economically weaker regional neighbours, the growing economic prosperity of the region and corresponding arms build up, combined with ancient and more recent enmities, competing geo-political, economic and strategic interests, places the nation at the centre of the 21st century’s ‘great game’.

Further compounding Australia’s precarious position is an acceptance that ‘Pax Americana’, or the post-Second World War ‘American Peace’, is over and Australia will require a uniquely Australian approach and recognition that the nation is now solely responsible for the security of its national interests with key alliances serving a secondary, complementary role to the broader debate.

Recognising this changing regional environment – what carrier options are available to Australia should the nation’s leaders elect to pursue a return to fixed-wing naval aviation for the Royal Australian Navy?

Upgrade the LHDs or acquire a dedicated LHD?

The notion of Australia acquiring a third, F-35B dedicated Canberra Class LHD has been discussed at great length by both strategic policy analysts and politicians since the RAN acquired the vessels. Currently, the HMA Ships Canberra and Adelaide lack a number of structural and technical modifications that would enable the ships to safely and effectively operate the aircraft and any third vessel would need to incorporate the modifications from the keel up, in a similar manner to the Turkish Navy’s recently launched TCG Anadolu (based on the Canberra/Juan Carlos Class vessels).

Despite the apparent structural limitations of HMA Ships Canberra and Adelaide, the vessels’ base design, the Juan Carlos I, was designed from the keel up to accommodate a fixed-wing naval aviation capability. The Spanish vessel, when acting in the light carrier role, is capable of accommodating 10-12 AV-8B Harrier IIs or Lockheed Martin F-35Bs combined with an additional 10-12 helicopters by using the light vehicles bay as an additional storage space.

Meanwhile, despite continuing issues with Turkey’s access to the F-35, Turkey fully expects to operate a small fleet of the Lockheed Martin F-35B from the TCG Anadolu. Despite the relative success of the platform in the light carrier role, it is important to recognise the limitations of the LHDs in the carrier capacity and role, and identify alternatives that would better suit the introduction of a dedicated aircraft carrier role.

The Italian job

The Italian Navy, like it’s Spanish, American and British counterparts, operates a specialised, small-aircraft carrier designed to accommodate fixed-wing naval aviation capabilities – the Fincantieri aircraft carrier Cavour and the recently launched Trieste fulfil the aircraft carrier role. The Cavour has a maximum displacement of 30,000 tonnes, maximum speed of 29+ knots with a range of 7,000 nautical miles (12,964 kilometres) at a speed of 16 knots.

Cavour is designed to accommodate a combined fleet of 12 support helicopters and 10 AV-8B Harrier IIs or Lockheed Martin F-35Bs in the hangar with an additional six parked on the flight deck. It combines the aircraft carrier capability with the capacity to to serve as a traditional LHD with accommodation for a maximum capacity for 450 amphibious infantry.

The rising sun

The Japanese government has closely monitored the rise of the Chinese Navy and its growing force of aircraft carriers and territorial ambitions, particularly in the South China Sea and the Southern Ryukyu and Senkaku Islands. In response, Japan recently announced that it would begin the refit of the Izumo Class vessels to reintroduce an integrated fixed-wing naval aviation capability to the JMSDF.

Izumo and her sister ship Kaga are capable of supporting airwings of 28 aircraft, with capacity for about 10 ‘B’ variant of the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter, with both 27,000-tonne vessels capable of supporting 400 marines. While in the early stages of design phase for the refit of the vessels, incorporating the F-35B into the two vessels enhances the maritime strike and broader deterrence options for Japan.

However, the Japanese decision is not without challenges. China’s growing fleet of aircraft carriers, and the increasingly potent area-access/area denial (A2AD) capabilities provided by anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) systems like the DF-21 and DF-26, increase the risk to aircraft carriers and large-deck amphibious warfare ships – accordingly, the Japanese and Korean navies have responded by increasing the quantity and quality of escort vessels including destroyers and frigates.

The introduction of a dedicated aircraft carrier benefits Australian industry as well, through increased procurement programs for support and escort vessels, larger F-35 supply chain contributions and larger sustainment and maintenance contracts, which are key to keeping the Navy ‘battle ready and deployed’.

Australia’s security and prosperity are directly influenced by the stability and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific, meaning Australia must be directly engaged as both a benefactor and leader in all matters related to strategic, economic and political security, serving as either a replacement or complementary force to the role played by the US – should the US commitment or capacity be limited.

Both fixed-wing naval aviation and amphibious capabilities are one of the key force multipliers reshaping the Indo-Pacific. The growing prevalence of fixed-wing naval aviation forces in particular serves to alter the strategic calculus and balance of power. (Source: Defence Connect)

05 June 19. U.S. pursues sale of over $2bn in weapons to Taiwan, sources say, in test for China. The United States is pursuing the sale of more than $2bn (1.6bn pounds) worth of tanks and weapons to Taiwan, four people familiar with the negotiations said, in a move likely to anger China as a trade war between the world’s two biggest economies escalates.

An informal notification of the proposed sale has been sent to the U.S. Congress, the four sources said on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to speak about the possible deal.

The potential sale included 108 General Dynamics Corp M1A2 Abrams tanks worth around $2bn as well as anti-tank and anti-aircraft munitions, three of the sources said. Taiwan has been interested in refreshing its existing U.S.-made battle tank inventory, which includes M60 Patton tanks.

The United States is the main arms supplier to Taiwan, which China deems its own and has never renounced the use of force to bring the self-ruled island under its control.

Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen said in March the United States was responding positively to Taipei’s requests for new arms sales to bolster its defences in the face of pressure from China. The United States has no formal ties with Taiwan but is bound by law to help provide it with the means to defend itself.

China and the United States are engaged in a fierce trade war, with clashes over Taiwan and the South China Sea exacerbating tensions.

A spokesman for the State Department, which oversees foreign military sales, said the U.S. government does not comment on or confirm potential or pending arms sales or transfers before they have been formally notified to Congress.

The congressional notifications included a variety of anti-tank munitions, including 409 Raytheon Co and Lockheed Martin Corp-made Javelin missiles worth as much as $129m, two of the sources said.

The notifications also included 1,240 TOW anti-tank missiles worth as much as $299m, one of the sources said. There were also 250 stinger missiles worth as much as $223m in the notification, the source said. Stingers are often used in portable anti-aircraft weapons systems. (Source: Reuters)

05 June 19. Saudi Arabia continues to acquire arms from Eastern Europe. Saudi Arabia has continued to acquire Soviet-type weapons and equipment that are not known to be used by its own armed forces, according to reports released by the UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNCROCA).

Bulgaria told the UNROCA that it exported six BTR armoured personnel carriers (APCs) and six BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launchers to Saudi Arabia in 2018.

Saudi Arabia has now received 38 BM-21s since Slovakia exported two to the kingdom in 2014, according to reports submitted to the UNROCA, although the type has never been seen in service with the Royal Saudi Land Forces (RSLF), which uses the Brazilian ASTROS instead.

Saudi Arabia has also received a total of 30 BTRs, 12 MT-LB tracked carriers, and 50 OT-64 SKOT wheeled APCs, none of which are known to be in Saudi service.

Serbia reported that it supplied another 50 unidentified combat vehicles and 50 large-calibre artillery systems to Saudi Arabia in 2018, the latter of which could be mortars with a calibre larger than 75 mm. Riyadh has received more than 1,900 such weapons from former Eastern European countries since 2014.

The UNROCA reports also show that the Saudis have received sufficient infantry weapons between 2014-18 to equip several divisions: 113,000 assault rifles and 5,600 light machine guns, 1,900 heavy machine guns (including 23 mm anti-aircraft guns), 450 smaller mortars, and 4,270 grenade launchers.

The RSLF and some Saudi Interior Ministry forces use AK derivatives alongside NATO-calibre weapons, but most of these appear to be older Romanian-origin rifles. There has been no indication of units being re-equipped with new Bulgarian rifles.

Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia and Russia are negotiating a deal under which AK-103 assault rifles – a type already used by RSLF special forces – will be license produced in the kingdom. (Source: IHS Jane’s)

04 June 19. French weapons sales to Saudi jumped 50 percent last year. France’s weapons sales to Saudi Arabia rose 50 pct in 2018 despite the government calling for an end to the “dirty war” in Yemen, figures released on Tuesday showed. An annual government report showed that total arms sales rose 30 percent to 9.1bn euros in 2018, driven by a sharp increase in sales to European allies. France sold about 1bn euros worth of arms to Saudi Arabia, with the main item being patrol boats. A partial naval blockade of ports controlled by the Houthi movement is one of the tactics used by a Saudi-led coalition in Yemen that has been criticised by campaigners for worsening a humanitarian crisis.

“With such transfers revealing a geopolitical alliance with these regimes and total violation of international commitments, one can only expect worsening conflicts in Yemen or the Horn of Africa, where the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia are beginning to redeploy in partnership with France,” said Tony Fortin at the Paris-based Observatory for Armamanent.

The French government says its arms sales are governed by strict procedures that are in line with international treaties.

“Maintaining economic relations with these countries means keeping a presence in key regions for our security interests and our energy supplies. It is also about fighting terrorism and protecting our nationals on the ground,” Armed Forces Minister Florence Parly said in a preface to the report.

France is among the world’s leading arms exporters, its sales surging in recent years on the back of its first lucrative overseas contracts for Rafale fighter jets, notably to India and Qatar, as well as a multi-billion submarine deal with Australia. Paris has sought to increase its diplomatic weight in the Middle East through the sale of naval vessels, tanks, artillery and munitions to the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Egypt.

That has brought with it criticism from non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and some lawmakers who have urged it to scale back support for Arab states that are part of the Saudi-led offensive in Yemen against fighters from the Iranian-aligned Houthi movement that controls the capital.

French arms exports to the Middle East increased to 4bn euros from 3.9bn last year, but because of bigger increases elsewhere now make up a smaller share of the total.

The bulk of those sales came from Qatar, which ordered Rafale-fighter jets and helicopters accounting for about 2.4bn euros. Qatar is a rival of Saudi Arabia and is not part of the coalition fighting in Yemen.

In contrast, sales to Egypt, which has been one of France’s top customers over the last five years, stagnated at about 270m euros and orders from the United Arab Emirates, the other key member of the coalition in Yemen, fell sharply.

France has also been pushing for more sales within the European Union as it looks to stem an aggressive sales policy from the United States and increase the bloc’s security independence.

The report showed a stark improvement on that front with 25 percent of orders coming from Europe compared to just 10 percent the previous year, including from Belgium and Spain, which bought helicopters and heavy armoured vehicles. (Source: Reuters)

03 June 19. 4 questions about South Korea’s weapons wish list. As South Korea’s Moon Jae-in administration prioritizes rapprochement with North Korea, the country’s force improvement plans are shifting toward regional threats beyond its nuclear-armed neighbor. Such threats include potential territorial disputes and well as Chinese and Russian surveillance aircraft, which reportedly violate South Korea’s air defense identification zone. Defense News caught up with retired Maj. Gen. Jung Soo, who currently heads the Institute of Defense Management at Kookmin University in Seoul, to talk about the country’s weapons wish list.

Jung previously led the command and reconnaissance aircraft program office of the Defense Acquisition Program Administration. He retired from the South Korean Air Force in 2013. He is a former classmate of Defense Minister Jeong Kyeong-doo and serves as a key policy adviser to the defense chief.

Why is the South Korean military’s operational focus shifting so rapidly?

I believe the security environments on the Korean Peninsula are on a path to peace, slowly but surely, in spite of the stalled nuclear disarmament negotiations — though the North fired off some short-range missiles recently, an apparent move to attract the attention of U.S. President Donald Trump. In the face of the changing security paradigm, South Korea should brace for responding to potential regional threats beyond the North. That’s why the government has decided to raise its defense spending over the next five years by 7.6 percent annually.

What is the military’s key focus in terms of weapons acquisition?

It is largely centered on boosting air power. F-35 stealth fighters and air-refueling tankers have just started to be deployed, which are to upgrade South Korea’s air power significantly.

On top of these aircraft, in particular we need more information, surveillance and reconnaissance, or ISR, assets, which are also key components to help South Korean armed forces lead theater operations after taking over wartime command authority from the U.S. military. For example, we need two more airborne early warning aircraft, in addition to the existing four E-737 AEW&Cs, for more effective ISR operations in the region. The military also has a plan to introduce a Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System to monitor and detect moving targets on the ground. The Air Force has also set the requirement for acquiring electronic warfare aircraft.

What emerging technologies is South Korea eyeing?

The South Korean military is very much interested in adopting unmanned technologies. The Army has launched a weaponized drone unit not only could engage in reconnaissance missions to key enemy areas, but it could also be used to launch swarm attacks against the enemy.

In an effort to enhance the so-called Kill Chain preemptive strike system, the military is considering an option to procure unmanned aerial vehicles equipped with radar-evading stealth functions, which would be able to penetrate into an enemy site to shorten the sensor-to-shooter timeline.

What are key challenges to South Korea’s weapons development schemes?

As for fighter jets, South Korea has a top capability to manufacture platforms, as the KF-X fighter development program is going on. The rub, [or flaw], is we don’t have our own air-launched weapons. A project to locally develop a long-range air-to-ground missile in the Taurus class has only started. Developing air-launched missiles is such a difficult mission since it requires state-of-the-art technologies, and it requires advanced weapons integration techniques and the weapon’s interface to a radar. (Source: glstrade.com/Defense News)

04 June 19. Beyond the ‘black’ or ‘white’ thinking of Australia’s strategic discussion. Over the past century, Australia’s defence and national security strategy has vacillated between wild extremes, often embodying a narrow ‘black’ or ‘white’ view of the nation and its role in the world. In recent months, Defence Connect has received a range of feedback embodying this approach to the nation’s position and role in the Indo-Pacific.

These factors, combined with the nation’s dependence on a benevolent great power security partner, have engendered a culture of dependence that continues to characterise Australia’s strategic policy debate and conversation. However, Australia has never experienced the perfect storm of global events that is currently transforming the global geo-political, economic and strategic power paradigm, including:

The rate of technological development means that any significant investment in capability will be sunk money affecting both tactical and strategic deterrent forces;
Australia’s capabilities, no matter the level of development and investment, will never be significant enough to threaten any potential major-power adversary, so don’t bother;
Regional alliances and security frameworks will only serve to agitate China and will be of little benefit; and
We might upset China in appropriately responding to their rapidly developing capabilities and overt willingness to use their economic, political and military power to coerce regional nations, including Australia.

Each of these individual arguments form part of a reductive, ‘black’ or ‘white’ approach to strategic policy, which fails to recognise the precarious position Australia now finds itself in, with the relative decline and strategic schizophrenia exhibited by the US, combined with the rise of China and resurgence of nations like Russia in combination with the rise of regional great powers challenges the nation’s now precarious position.

Shifting beyond this reductionist approach requires nuance, it also requires an acceptance that ‘Pax Americana’, or the post-Second World War ‘American Peace’, is over and Australia will require a uniquely Australian approach and recognition that the nation is now solely responsible for the security of its national interests with key alliances serving a secondary, complementary role to the broader debate.

This nuanced approach and acceptance of Australia’s precarious position mandates a layered, complex and self-reliant approach not exhibited in Australia before across traditional military capabilities, industrial and economic output and the development of a unique, Australian ‘Grand Strategy’ to support the development of Australia’s self reliance.

Australia invested in the Indo-Pacific

To assume that Australia will remain immune to any hostilities that break out in the region is naive at best and criminally negligent at worst. As a nation, Australia cannot turn a blind eye to its own geo-political, economic and strategic backyard, both at a traditional and asymmetric level, lest we see a repeat of Imperial Japan or the Iranian Revolution arrive on our doorstep.

Australia cannot simply rely on the US, or Japan, or the UK, or France to guarantee the economic, political and strategic interests of the nation. China is already actively undermining the regional order through its provocative actions in the South China Sea and its rapid military build-up – this new paradigm is not merely theoretical anymore, it is a harsh reality and the only answer is an increased capacity for self reliance.

Guaranteeing this requires the nation to find a balance between the expeditionary and interventionist focused ‘Forward Defence’ and the continental defence focused ‘Defence of Australia’ doctrines to counter the high and low intensity threats to the nation’s security and interests.

What does self reliance look like?

True strategic self reliance requires a holistic approach to national security – it incorporates a coherent, long-term plan for developing true economic and industrial diversity, which given Australia’s enviable endowment of natural resources and the relative blank slate starting point of the fourth industrial revolution positions Australia well, combined with enhancing the diplomatic reorientation towards the ‘Arc of Instability’ across Australia’s northern approaches.

Developing strategic self reliance also requires a shift away from acting entirely as the ‘loyal deputy’ to the US, particularly in the event of further costly interventions in the Middle East – rather reorientating the nation’s strategic position and engagement to focus on Australia’s primary area of responsibility, namely Indo-Pacific Asia.

This reorientation also requires a controversial shift in focus away from China’s now sputtering economic growth to leverage Australia’s capacity to supply and support the economic miracle transforming a large number of Indo-Pacific nations, mainly growing regional titans including Thailand, Indonesia, Vietnam, India and the like, minimising the nation’s economic dependence and subsequent vulnerability to any single nation.

Additionally, this shift towards strategic self reliance requires the development of a layered tactical and strategic defence capability – with a focus on developing a strategic deterrence-focused ‘joint force’ concept requiring development of ‘great power’ level capabilities. Key to these ‘joint force’ strategic capabilities is developing a range of capabilities, including:

Rapidly deployable expeditionary focused ground forces – combining amphibious units and traditional, high-intensity and manoeuvre warfare-focused ground combat elements;
Comprehensive naval power projection forces including aircraft carrier strike groups, amphibious assault groups, and conventionally-focused at sea deterrence submarine forces; and
Integrated, expeditionary capable air forces combining tactical fighter aircraft, tactical and strategic strike, air lift and tanker, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities.

Developing these individual forces requires an acceptance of Australia’s position within this shifting regional environment, and an acceptance that Australia’s precarious position and dependence on the Indo-Pacific will require increased investment and targeted policy development to maintain the nation’s prosperity, security and way of life.

04 June 19. Australian Advanced manufacturing, Industry 4.0 and resetting industrialisation. Advanced manufacturing, including the internet of things, additive manufacturing and automation, is serving to reshape the industrial capacity of many once great manufacturing nations. For countries like Australia, Industry 4.0 is serving as the opportunity to reindustrialise to support continued growth and competitiveness, while providing opportunities to enhance broader national security.

As typically innovative industries, both aerospace and defence have moved quickly to adopt the revolutionary technologies of ‘Industry 4.0’ – the name given to the current trend of automation and data exchange in manufacturing technologies. Industry 4.0 includes cyber-physical systems, the internet of things, cloud computing and cognitive computing, and is commonly referred to as the fourth industrial revolution.

The development of these capabilities has served to reset the industrialisation and manufacturing capacity of nations, which has shifted since the beginning of the first industrial revolution. In doing so, the advent of these technologies and the relative resetting of the global industrial and manufacturing balance of power serves Australia’s broader economy and defence industry well.

Australia’s period of unprecedented defence investment, which is worth $200bn and will see the recapitalisation and modernisation of the nation’s defence capability supporting the development of a truly sovereign, sustainable and competitive domestic defence industry capability, is uniquely positioned to take advantage of the Industry 4.0 revolution, relatively unencumbered by domestic factors that have long hindered Australia’s capacity to be an advanced manufacturing economy.

Recognising this, the Defence Industrial Capability Plan released in 2018 identifies the government’s long-term vision to “build and develop a robust, resilient and internationally competitive Australian defence industry base that is better able to help meet defence capability requirements” in recognition of the rapidly evolving geo-strategic environment and Australia’s changing role in the region.

The plan acknowledges that as Australia builds its defence capability, we must also grow our defence industrial capability. By 2028, Australia will require a larger, more capable and prepared defence industry that has the resident skills, expertise, technology, intellectual property and infrastructure to:

Enable the conduct of ADF operations today;
Support the acquisition, operation and sustainment of future defence capability; and
Provide the national support base for Defence to meet current needs and to surge if Australia’s strategic circumstances require it.

In two recent articles, Defence Connect has taken a closer look at the role of Australia’s defence industry in advancing the future economic and industrial and manufacturing capability of the nation and the necessity for developing a suite of supporting policy mechanisms – Industry 4.0 is now positioned to directly support the sustainable development of Australia’s domestic defence industrial base.

Countering areas of weakness

Despite Australia’s widely recognised position as providing a world leading research and development capacity –supported by both private and public sector research and development programs driven by organisations like the CSIRO – traditional areas of high wage-costs and low productivity in Australia’s manufacturing industry exemplified in the failure of Australia’s domestic car industry and in the series of cost overruns and delivery delays on both the Collins and Hobart Class programs have characterised Australia’s reputation as a manufacturing economy.

Enter Industry 4.0 – the combination of additive manufacturing, automated manufacturing and data sharing, with a coherent National Strategic Industry development policy can compensate and in some cases overcome the traditional hindrances faced by the Australian economy, with public-private collaboration essential to ensuring the long-term sustainability and success of Australia’s defence industrial base and broader manufacturing economy.

While industry largely provides the technological expertise, government policy provides the certainty for investment – particularly when supported by elements of Australia’s innovation and science agenda combined with grant allocation and targeted, contractual tax incentives (signed between the Commonwealth and the company as a memorandum of understanding) linked to a combination of long-term, local job creation, foreign contract success, local industry content, and research and development programs, which are critical components that can be used to empower and enhance the overall competitiveness.

Supporting the development of both Australia’s defence industrial base and the broader manufacturing economy also requires the legislative power of government to counter-balance industry development policies of allied, yet still competitor nations like South Korea – which leverages the industrial development policies of export oriented industrialisation (EOI) to develop its economy into a major economic and modern, advanced manufacturing powerhouse.

This is done through a range of government-driven incentives for industry, including corporate tax incentives, employment incentives and payroll tax incentives. Australia’s now firm commitment to developing a robust domestic defence capability requires innovative and adaptive thinking in order to expand the capabilities and competitiveness of the domestic industry.

Developing and implementing a cohesive, innovative and long-term vision for Australia’s sovereign defence industry capability can also serve as the basis for developing and in some cases redeveloping a robust, advanced manufacturing economy taking advantage of Australia’s unrivalled resource wealth – supporting the broader national security and interests in the Indo-Pacific. (Source: Defence Connect)

03 June 19. Taiwan passes defence industry law. Taiwan’s government has approved new legislation to support the development of its domestic defence industrial base. The National Defense Industry Development Act – approved by the country’s Legislative Yuan on 31 May – is aimed at reducing Taiwan’s dependency on military imports. The legislation is expected to be enacted gradually over the next few months.

The Ministry of National Defense (MND) said in a statement that the legislation introduces a “classification system” intended to match local defence manufacturers with requirements to develop and build defence equipment locally, as well as reducing risks in indigenous defence projects.

Under the new system, the MND will assign one of three gradings to local defence companies according to their size, capability, experience in defence research, development and production, and their track record of collaboration with local agencies and foreign contractors. (Source: IHS Jane’s)

01 June 19. Australia-Japan-United States Strategic Action Agenda. The defense ministers of Australia, Japan and the United States affirm their countries’ alignment in strategic interests and universal principles, including a commitment to democracy, human rights, free trade, and the rules-based international order. Together, the three countries recognize the importance of enhancing engagement with our Indo-Pacific partners, in order to foster regional prosperity, resilience and transparency in a time of geostrategic change. The trilateral relationship complements the strong and effective bilateral defense relationships between each of the three countries, and enables us to pool our resources in support of peace, security and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region. The three defense ministers are committed to advancing trilateral cooperation, enhancing engagement with like minded partners in the region, and reinforcing the rules-based global order through actively supporting key regional security and defense architectures.

This Strategic Action Agenda articulates our vision for trilateral activities, and our strong commitment to work both trilaterally and together with our regional partners. To that end, Australia, Japan and the United States intend to pursue the following lines of effort:

Strengthen trilateral cooperation in the areas of maritime security, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, peacekeeping, counter-terrorism, amphibious activities, and non-conventional domains like space, cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum.
In close collaboration with regional partners, identify and coordinate opportunities to build partner capacity through regular information sharing, complementary programs and cooperative activities.
Increase the complexity and sophistication of trilateral exercises to enhance interoperability, build common understanding, and better enable our defence forces to work together to contribute to peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region.
Promote transparency, regional cooperation and the rule of law through port visits and other defense-related activities that demonstrate every nation’s right to freedom of navigation and overflight, in accordance with international law.
Improve common understanding and shared regional situational awareness through enhanced trilateral information sharing.

The three defense ministers commit to identifying new opportunities to further trilateral cooperation, with the objectives of maintaining and promoting a free, open, stable and prosperous Indo-Pacific region. (Source: US DoD)

30 May 19. New Zealand announces major increase in defence spending. Key Points:

Government announces spending increase to support New Zealand Defence Force acquisition objectives
Budget in line with 2018 defence policy to modernize NZDF in light of emerging strategic threats

New Zealand has announced a major increase in its defence budget for fiscal year 2019-20 to support military recapitalisation efforts. The expenditure, announced by the government on 30 May, provides NZD5.06bn (USD3.29bn) to defence, which represents a 23% increase over the budgeted 2018-19 defence allocation of NZD4.11bn. New Zealand’s defence funding is calculated from two allocations administered by the Minister of Defence. The ‘Vote Defence Force’ allocation covers salaries, training costs, and military preparedness, and the ‘Vote Defence’ allocation includes funding for the “purchase, modification, or refurbishment of major items of defence equipment for the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF)”. In the 2019-20 defence budget, Vote Defence Force received NZD4.29bn, 18% more than in 2018-19, while Vote Defence received NZD766m, which is a 63% increase over the NZD470m budgeted for 2018-19.

Vote Defence Force contains NZD916 m for the army, NZD907m for the air force, and NZD493m for the navy. The vote also contains NZD1.3bn for capital expenditures, a 74% increase over 2018-19, for the “purchase or development of assets”, according to budgetary documents. Vote Defence spending for 2019-20 receives funding for several procurement priorities, most notably New Zealand’s procurement of four Boeing P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft (MPA). New Zealand confirmed this deal in July 2018 at a cost of NZD2.34bn, with payments spread over fiscal years until 2026. In the 2019-20 budget the P-8A procurement receives NZD108m. (Source: IHS Jane’s)

31 May 19. DOD Releases Indo-Pacific Strategy Report. The Department of Defense’s Indo-Pacific Strategy Report was publicly released the morning of June 1, 2019, and can be accessed, under “Publications” on Defense.gov.

The first Indo-Pacific Strategy Report released by the Department, the document is a comprehensive articulation of DoD’s role within a whole-of-government strategy for the Indo-Pacific region. As an implementation document, the report provides clarity on the U.S. National Defense Strategy as it applies to the region and highlights the role of allies and partners in implementing our shared vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific.

The report details the Department’s enduring commitment to upholding a free and open Indo-Pacific. The execution of this vision is articulated in the context of preparedness, partnerships, and the promotion of a networked region.

Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick M. Shanahan delivered key messages from the report during his plenary remarks at the 18th Asia Security Summit: the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore.

https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/31/2002139210/-1/-1/1/DOD_INDO_PACIFIC_STRATEGY_REPORT_JUNE_2019.PDF?source=GovDelivery (Source: US DoD)

03 June 19. Balancing export and domestic consumption – Diversifying Australia’s naval shipbuilding capabilities. While Australia’s defence industry has gone from strength to strength in a short period of time –naval shipbuilding and the $95bn program has been central to the success – relying solely on domestic consumption is a fateful trap that has previously hindered the sustainable development of Australia’s broader manufacturing industries. So, how does Australia’s naval shipbuilding industry avoid the pitfalls and set an example?

A core component of the Australian government’s $200bn investment and modernisation of the nation’s defence capability is the $95bn Naval Shipbuilding Plan, which will oversee the largest modernisation and recapitalisation of Australia’s naval capabilities since the Second World War. Released in May 2017, the plan outlines the government’s vision for the Australian naval shipbuilding enterprise and the significant investment required in coming decades.

The plan sets out how the government is delivering on the commitment to build a strong, sustainable and innovative Australian naval shipbuilding industry, with the government stating, “The goal of the Naval Shipbuilding Plan is to ensure that the regeneration of the Royal Australian Navy over the coming decades will ensure both a cost-effective solution for the government provide Navy the assured capability to fight and win. The National Naval Shipbuilding Office has been established to implement the Naval Shipbuilding Plan.”

As with the broader Defence Industrial Capability Plan, the Naval Shipbuilding Plan identifies the need for Australia to grow the domestic defence industrial base and its capacity to compete internationally – a core component of this is the focus on developing a larger, more capable and prepared defence industry that has the resident skills, expertise, technology, intellectual property and infrastructure to:

Enable the conduct of ADF operations today;
Support the acquisition, operation and sustainment of future defence capability; and
Provide the national support base for Defence to meet current needs and to surge if Australia’s strategic circumstances require it.

Recognising this, the government focuses on four key enablers to successfully and sustainably implement the Naval Shipbuilding Plan:

Modern, innovative and secure naval shipbuilding infrastructure;
Workforce growth and development;
A sustainable and cost-competitive Australian industrial base; and
A national collaborative approach.

Australia’s naval shipbuilding industry has particularly in recent decades been the focus of much ire, with one defence minister declaring that he wouldn’t trust Adelaide-based ASC to “build a canoe” following ‘valleys of death’ as a result of a combination of issues including small unit acquisitions, poor corporate structure and accountability, and inconsistent acquisition programs.

However, as with the changing currents of the Indo-Pacific’s geo-political and strategic order, Australia’s naval shipbuilding industry requires the support of a new policy agenda to nurture and develop locally – a key component of this is the development of a National Strategic Industry Act to support the development of the nation’s naval shipbuilding industry. But what does this look like?

Corporate incentives and export-focused shipbuilding hubs

Australia’s naval shipbuilding industry has a small number of export success stories – mainly WA-based Austal, which has achieved extensive local and export success designing and manufacturing a range of vessels for the Australian Border Force, Pacific Island, the US and Middle Eastern Navies largely without government support.

Warship centres of excellence

Australia has a number of naval shipyards beyond those located at Osborne and Henderson. The Williamstown facility just outside of Melbourne and former-Forgacs naval shipyard located in Newcastle, which were responsible for the fit out of the Canberra Class and construction of the Anzac and Adelaide Class frigates, respectively.

These existing facilities, combined with the model established by the temporary BAE Systems Australia acquisition of ASC Shipbuilding throughout the life of the $35bn Hunter Class construction phase provides, an ideal model for the Australian government to collaborate with local or international naval warship designers and builders to develop specialised ‘warship centres of excellence’.

Developing these centres of excellence can leverage the policy levers used to develop other national naval shipbuilding facilities and integration within global supply chain and programs to support the development and rehabilitation of local naval shipbuilding capabilities with a focus on capitalising on the growing demand for warships in the Indo-Pacific and Middle East in particular.

Additionally, this international collaboration also provides further avenues for Australian shipyards to increase domestic unit acquisition of platforms like the Hobart Class destroyers or the Hunter Class (Type 26 Global Combat Ship) vessels in support of international, allied acquisition programs – namely the British and Canadian acquisition of the Type 26 vessels and the potential US acquisition of a variant of the Australian Hobart Class as part of the FFG[X] program, which will see up to 20 vessels procured.

Diversifying Australia’s naval shipbuilding capabilities beyond focusing on Australia’s own shipbuilding requirements is a necessity should the broader naval shipbuilding plan be successful – targeting growing export demands in the region and Middle East, combined with international industry collaboration and partnerships, is central to this.

Developing and implementing a cohesive, innovative and long-term vision for Australia’s sovereign defence industry capability can also serve as the basis for developing, and in some cases redeveloping, a robust, advanced manufacturing economy taking advantage of Australia’s unrivalled resource wealth – supporting the broader national security and interests in the Indo-Pacific. (Source: Defence Connect)

03 June 19. Australian Air Force recapitalisation and is the air force big enough? Like its counterparts, the Royal Australian Air Force is undergoing a period of unprecedented modernisation and expansion. However, as regional air forces continue to develop peer-competitor capabilities and increase size and complexity, is the Air Force large enough to reliably execute the mission in a radically evolving geo-political and strategic order?

Throughout history, military operations have favoured those who occupy the high ground. Command of the skies empowers both offensive and defensive operations, while also providing powerful deterrence options as part of the broader implementation of power projection and national security doctrines.

Air dominance reflects the pinnacle of the high ground, where both a qualitative and quantitative edge in doctrine, equipment and personnel support the unrivalled conduct of offensive or defensive air combat operations. Air dominance proved influential as a tactical and strategic operating concept, with the use of tactical fighters providing air dominance, close air support and escort essential to the Allied triumph in the Second World War.

Long-range strike, typically conducted by strategic bombers and strike fighters supported by air-to-air refueling and airborne early warning and command aircraft, serves as a complementary doctrine to air dominance, with each serving a unique, yet symbiotic role in the survivability and effectiveness of tactical units and the broader strategic deterrence.

Further complementing these traditionally ‘hard’ capabilities is the growing tactical and strategic importance of electronic warfare (EW), intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), battlefield communications and early warning and tactical and strategic airlift capabilities, which empower tactical and strategic mobility for any modern air force and broader branches of an integrated, ‘joint force’ Australian Defence Force.

The RAAF has traditionally relied upon a qualitative, technological edge over potential regional adversaries, with broader interoperability with regional allies, namely the US and Japan, enabling Australia to establish and maintain relative regional superiority.

However, as the strategic realities of the Indo-Pacific continue to evolve and Australia’s responsibilities continue to increase, the question remains, given the geographic area of responsibility Australia will become increasingly responsible for and dependent on, is the RAAF and the existing recapitalisation and modernisation programs currently underway enough for Australia to maintain its qualitative and quantitative lead over regional peers?

Fifth-generation force multipliers

As technology has evolved, both air dominance and long-range strike platforms and doctrines have adapted to maximise the effectiveness of the symbiotic concepts within the broader confines of a nation’s power projection doctrines.

The advent of fifth-generation air combat capabilities, namely fighters like the Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter family, and strategic bombers like the Northrop Grumman B-2 Spirit and next-generation B-21 Raider, incorporate a range of technologies including advanced sensor suites, low observable, high performance airframes and coatings to successfully conduct their operations with relative impunity, even in heavily defended, integrated air defence networks.

These capabilities leverage the information gathering and distribution capabilities of advanced platforms like the Boeing E-7A Wedgetail, the Northrop Grumman MQ-4C Triton and endurance enhancing capabilities like the Airbus KC-30A Multirole Tanker Transport (MRTT) – meanwhile, the addition of dedicated EW platforms like the EA-18G Growler and the planned acquisition of the MC-55A Peregrine all serve to establish the foundations of a truly integrated, fifth-generation air combat capability.

However, given the geographic size and growing complexity of the regional tactical and strategic environment, does the RAFF operate sufficient air combat platforms to protect Australia’s airspace, while also supporting power projection capabilities and responsibilities into the region?

Furthermore the current basing arrangements for the majority of Australia’s air combat capabilities raises further questions about the survivability of Australia’s air combat capability in the event of hostilities.

Long-range strike and the rise of allied strike platforms

Australia’s acquisition of the Reaper-based RPAS, MQ-4C Triton and development of the fighter-like Boeing Airpower Teaming System all serve niche roles as part of a broader and increasingly complex air dominance, ISR and close-air support strike mix – neglecting the critical long-range strike capabilities once filled by the F-111.

Australia is not alone in its pursuit of these increasingly capable and reliable unmanned/autonomous systems; the US, the UK, France, Germany, Russia and China are all at various stages of development or operating such systems. This seemingly global race, particularly the pursuit of ‘optionally-manned’ long-range strike systems, like the B-21 Raider, and Australia’s long-range aerial strike gap presents unique opportunities for Australia and broader allied co-operation and industry collaboration.

The US has developed increasingly capable long-range, low observable unmanned platforms including the Lockheed Martin RQ-170 Sentinel; the highly-secretive Northrop Grumman RQ-180 high-altitude, long endurance, low observable intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft; and Northrop Grumman’s X-47 series of carrier-based, low observable strike platform.

Meanwhile, BAE Systems has successfully developed and tested the Taranis unmanned platform at the Woomera Test Range as a proof of concept for future collaboration and development – each of these individual platforms provide a unique opportunity for Australia to collaborate with a global industry prime and a global ally to fill a critical capability gap for each of the respective forces.

Such a capability would also enjoy extensive export opportunities with key allies like the US and UK, who could operate the platform as a cost-effective replacement for larger bombers like the ageing B-52H Stratofortress, B-1 Lancer and B-2 Spirit, and complement the in-development B-21 Raider long-range strategic bomber.

For the UK, the co-development and participation in such a system will fulfil a unique role – complementing the air-to-air and air-to-ground strike capabilities of the Eurofighter Typhoon and F-35 Joint Strike Fighter as a low observable, long-range, heavy strike aircraft to counter the rapidly modernising bomber fleet of an increasingly resurgent and assertive Russia.

Similarly, Australia needs a credible, long-range strike option capable of replacing the lost capability of the F-111 to penetrate increasingly advanced and complex integrated air defence networks and anti-access/area denial (A2AD) systems rapidly developing in the Indo-Pacific region.

The introduction of such a system could also support the development and eventual modernisation of the US B-21, which is being developed in response to the increasing air defence capabilities of both Russia and China, particularly the widespread introduction of the S-300 and S-400 integrated air and missile defence systems.

Tactical and strategic airlift empowering the broader ‘joint force’

Australia operates a diverse fleet of tactical and strategic airlift aircraft – combining the heavy lift capabilities of the C-17 Globemaster III with the venerable tactical airlift capabilities of the C-130J Super Hercules and battlefield airlift capacity of the C-27J Spartan as the core of the RAAF’s airlift capabilities.

Meanwhile, the addition of the airlift capabilities of the KC-30A MRTT platform seemingly provide Australia with a reasonable airlift capability. However, as Australia’s responsibilities in the region continue to increase, combined with the increased ‘hard’ capabilities of the respective branches of the ADF – namely the Army – the Air Force’s modest airlift fleet will need to be expanded in order to accommodate an expanded expeditionary focus.

Furthermore, the increased expeditionary capabilities of platforms like the F-35 and the Super Hornet fleet require strategic and tactical airlift capabilities limiting the capacity of the ADF to respond to regional security responsibilities should such platforms be deployed for other operations – raising the question, does Australia have a large enough airlift capability to support increased regional responsibilities? (Source: Defence Connect)

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