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22 Nov 18. Saudis Want a U.S. Nuclear Deal. Can They Be Trusted Not to Build a Bomb? Before Saudi Arabia’s crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman, was implicated by the C.I.A. in the killing of Jamal Khashoggi, American intelligence agencies were trying to solve a separate mystery: Was the prince laying the groundwork for building an atomic bomb?
The 33-year-old heir to the Saudi throne had been overseeing a negotiation with the Energy Department and the State Department to get the United States to sell designs for nuclear power plants to the kingdom. The deal was worth upward of $80 billion, depending on how many plants Saudi Arabia decided to build.
But there is a hitch: Saudi Arabia insists on producing its own nuclear fuel, even though it could buy it more cheaply abroad, according to American and Saudi officials familiar with the negotiations. That raised concerns in Washington that the Saudis could divert their fuel into a covert weapons project — exactly what the United States and its allies feared Iran was doing before it reached the 2015 nuclear accord, which President Trump has since abandoned.
Prince Mohammed set off alarms when he declared earlier this year, in the midst of the negotiation, that if Iran, Saudi Arabia’s fiercest rival, “developed a nuclear bomb, we will follow suit as soon as possible.” His negotiators stirred more worries by telling the Trump administration that Saudi Arabia would refuse to sign an agreement that would allow United Nations inspectors to look anywhere in the country for signs that the Saudis might be working on a bomb, American officials said.
Asked in Congress last March about his secret negotiations with the Saudis, Energy Secretary Rick Perry dodged a question about whether the Trump administration would insist that the kingdom be banned from producing nuclear fuel.
Eight months later, the administration will not say where the negotiations stand. Now lurking behind the transaction is the question of whether a Saudi government that assassinated Mr. Khashoggi and repeatedly changed its story about the murder can be trusted with nuclear fuel and technology. Such fuel can be used for benign or military purposes: If uranium is enriched to 4 percent purity, it can fuel a power plant; at 90 percent it can be used for a bomb.
Privately, administration officials argue that if the United States does not sell the nuclear equipment to Saudi Arabia someone else will — maybe Russia, China or South Korea.
They stress that assuring that the Saudis use a reactor designed by Westinghouse, the only American competitor for the deal, fits with Mr. Trump’s insistence that jobs, oil and the strategic relationship between Riyadh and Washington are all far more important than the death of a Saudi dissident who was living, and writing newspaper columns, in the United States.
Under the rules that govern nuclear accords of this kind, Congress would have the opportunity to reject any agreement with Saudi Arabia, though the House and Senate would each need a veto-proof majority to stop Mr. Trump’s plans.
Following Mr. Khashoggi’s death, Mr. Sherman has led the charge to change the law and make it harder for the Trump administration to reach a nuclear agreement with Saudi Arabia. He described it as one of the most effective ways to punish Prince Mohammed.
“A country that can’t be trusted with a bone saw shouldn’t be trusted with nuclear weapons,” Mr. Sherman said, referring to Mr. Khashoggi’s brutal killing in the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul last month.
Nuclear experts said Prince Mohammed should have been disqualified from receiving nuclear help as soon as he raised the prospect of acquiring atomic weapons to counter Iran.
“We have never before contemplated, let alone concluded, a nuclear cooperation agreement with a country that was threatening to leave the nonproliferation treaty, even provisionally,” said William Tobey, a senior official in the Energy Department during the Bush administration who has testified about the risks of the agreement with Saudi Arabia.
He was referring to the crown prince’s threat to match any Iranian nuclear weapon — a step that would require the Saudis to either publicly abandon their commitments under the nonproliferation treaty or secretly race for the bomb.
The Trump administration declined to provide an update on the negotiations, which were intense enough that Mr. Perry went to Riyadh in late 2017. Within the last several months, a senior State Department official engaged in further discussions over the deal in Europe.
The Saudi energy ministry said in a statement: “The Saudi government has repeatedly confirmed that every component of the Saudi atomic energy program is strictly for civil and peaceful uses. The Saudi government has decided to move with this project not only to diversify energy sources but also to contribute to our economy. Saudi Arabia has repeatedly called for a Middle East free from all forms of nuclear weapons.”
Saudi Arabia has long displayed interest in acquiring, or helping allies acquire, the building blocks of a program that could make nuclear weapons and protect the kingdom from potential threats from its neighbors — first Israel, then Iraq and Iran.
The Saudi government provided the financing for Pakistan to secretly build its own nuclear arms, the first “Sunni bomb,” as the Pakistani creators of the program called it. That financial link has long left American intelligence officials wondering if there was a quid pro quo: that if Saudi Arabia ever needed its own small arsenal, Pakistan could provide it — perhaps by moving Pakistani troops to Saudi territory.
The Saudis were also thinking of delivery systems. In 1988, the kingdom bought medium-range missiles from China that were designed to be fitted with nuclear, chemical or biological warheads, drawing protests from American officials.
Energy Secretary Rick Perry met with Saudi Arabia’s energy minister, Khalid al-Falih, in Riyadh last year.CreditFayez Nureldine/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images
Riyadh’s worries spiked in 2003 when it was revealed that Tehran had secretly built a vast underground plant for enriching uranium — a fuel for nuclear arms and reactors.
Back then, the Iranians made the same argument that the Saudis are currently making: that they needed to possess all of the production facilities necessary for fueling nuclear power plants. (The Iranians in 2011 opened one such plant, a nuclear reactor at Bushehr, built by the Russians. (Source: glstrade.com/New York Times.com)
22 Nov 18. French Submarine Boss Summoned to Canberra for Crisis Talks. The Australian government has summoned the head of the French company tasked with building a $50bn fleet of next-generation submarines for crisis talks in Canberra. Naval Group chief executive Hervé Guillou travelled from Paris to the national capital for two days of discussions which kicked off on Thursday. The federal government is yet to finalise a strategic partnering agreement with Naval Group, which is designing Australia’s fleet of 12 new submarines. There are hopes to have the agreement sorted by Christmas. A defence insider said there are tensions between Naval Group’s executive director in charge of the Australian submarine project, Jean-Michel Billig, and senior Defence officials. The source characterised the negotiations as tracking “poorly”. “There are some legitimate policy differences that have been greatly exacerbated by personality clashes,” the source said.
(defense-aerospace.com EDITOR’S NOTE: A spokeswoman for France’s Naval Group shipbuilder said by e-mail this morning that “Hervé Guillou, Naval Group’s CEO, goes to Australia on a very regular basis and went to Australia at the end of this week to discuss with the CoA.
She added that “I confirm that there is no problem in the negotiations. We are working together with the Commonwealth of Australia towards the swift conclusion of the strategic partnering agreement (and) we’re confident that we will soon reach an equitable and enduring agreement to deliver the Future Submarine capability over the next 30 years.”) (Source: defense-aerospace.com/The Guardian)
23 Nov 18. Indonesia registers USD284m in defence exports. The Indonesian Ministry of Defence (MoD) has pointed to a list of recent military exports as evidence of growing defence industrial capability within the country. In comments published by the MoD on 22 November, Rear Admiral Agus Setyadi, the head of the MoD’s Defence Facility Agency, which oversees defence procurement and exports, said Indonesian defence companies had secured exports worth USD284.1m between 2015 and 2018. He added that these sales were attributable to four companies: aerospace manufacturer PT Dirgantara Indonesia (PTDI), shipbuilders PT PAL and PT Lundin, and land systems company PT Pindad. Setyadi said PTDI secured exports worth USD161m through sales of the CN235 and NC212 transport aircraft the company builds under licence from Airbus, and that PT PAL’s exports were valued at USD86.9m for the sale of two Strategic Sealift Vessels to the Philippines. (Source: IHS Jane’s)
21 Nov 18. Malaysia’s Najib questioned over French submarine deal. Former Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak has been questioned over the purchase of two French-made submarines, according to an AFP report, citing an official inside the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC). The probe centres on a $1.2bn deal signed 16 years ago when Najib was defence minister to purchase two Scorpene-class submarines.
‘Najib is being probed with regards to the purchase of the two Scorpene-class submarines,’ an official inside the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) familiar with the ongoing probe, told AFPon 20 November. ‘On Monday, MACC officials grilled Najib for four hours over the deal,’ the officer added, requesting anonymity. French submarine maker DCNS – now called Naval Group – is alleged to have paid more than €114m ($134m) to a shell company linked to an associate of Najib who brokered the deal. The MACC official said the associate may also be questioned to assist in their investigation of the submarine purchase. A French investigation into procurement has been running since 2010. Najib’s government has denied any wrongdoing. (Source: Shephard)
21 Nov 18. Liberman’s exit, and how Israel’s chips may fall. Israeli Defense Minister Avigdor Liberman’s Nov. 14 resignation disrupted the country’s politics at a sensitive time for regional security — and it could serve as the catalyst for the delay of several defense deals. His resignation comes in the wake of a cease-fire with Hamas in the Gaza Strip and after several high-profile visits by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his government ministers to Oman and the United Arab Emirates. Israel doesn’t have diplomatic relations with either state, but the Gulf countries are key to countering Iran and constructing a strategic concept in the region that dovetails with the current U.S. administration’s tough stance on Iran. As for potential defense deals, any forthcoming announcement for the purchase of F-15 fighter jets to upgrade Israel’s aging fleet could be put off for the time being. The resignation could also impact a deal for a new fleet of helicopters, likely Boeing’s CH-47 Chinooks or Lockheed Martin/Sikorsky CH-53K King Stallions. And Israel had revived the idea of purchasing V-22 Ospreys. It’s now unclear how these potential deals, which could total $11bn, will fare.
It was expected Liberman’s exit could also accelerate plans for early elections, but that fire seems to have been extinguished — at least into the new year. The most immediate effect of his departure is that Israel is without a dedicated defense minister; however, Netanyahu has taken on that portfolio for the time being.
As the largest recipient of U.S. security assistance, Israel receives $3.8bn annually from America. Israel’s defense budget was $19.6bn in 2017, and it is the seventh-largest global arms exporter, making stability at the helm of the Defense Ministry crucial to managing the U.S.-Israel security relationship.
Former U.S. Ambassador Daniel Shapiro, currently a fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies at Tel Aviv University, doesn’t see the vast majority of defense cooperation being affected by the ministerial change. “In terms of joint training, assistance, technology development and intelligence sharing, there won’t be any disruption whatsoever by a new defense minister or elections,” he said.
But it would be important for Israel that its new defense minister build a rapport with the U.S. defense secretary. Netanyahu’s takeover of Liberman’s post could make building a relationship with Pentagon head Jim Mattis difficult, Shapiro notes, as Netanyahu directly deals with the U.S. president.
Maj. Gen. Gershon Hacohen, a 42-year veteran of the Israel Defense Forces and currently at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, sees advantages to Netanyahu’s taking on another responsibility. “At the moment of critical decision-making, the one with the main responsibility is the prime minister and he must take the decision, and it is easier to do that when you are combining both duties,” he said.
Should Netanyahu look to replace Liberman with someone other than himself, he could choose a former general who shares his views on regional security, such as Yoav Galant, Benny Gantz or Gabi Ashkenazi, according to Brig. Gen. Avraham Benayahu, a former IDF spokesperson.
Liberman bristled at being corralled by Netanyahu and the security establishment, according to accounts from the last months before his resignation.
“I think it was not easy for Liberman to realize at the critical moment his opinion is not dominant amongst other opinions and not accepted by the prime minister,” Hacohen said, adding that it’s important for Netanyahu to make his expectations clear to the next defense minister.
“His views were different than the prime minister, he was less concerned than [Netanyahu] with our new regional posture,” said Eran Lerman, vice president of the Jerusalem Institute for Strategic Studies. A former deputy director for foreign policy and international affairs on Israel’s National Security Council, Lerman believes Liberman’s views contradicted Netanyahu’s vision and that of the security establishment, including Chief of Staff Gadi Eizenkot, Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet) head Nadav Argaman and Mossad chief Yossi Cohen. “That is a pretty dramatic situation for a defense minister to find himself.”
Lerman added that U.S.-Israel security cooperation — which includes a wide range of programs such as missile defense, counter-UAVs and anti-tunnel training — won’t be affected; although Liberman was quick to grasp the learning curve necessary to manage the Defense Ministry and work with the U.S., he was not a lynchpin of U.S.-Israel relations.
Industrial perspective
Israel’s largest defense companies — Rafael, Elbit and Israel Aerospace Industries — have been close-lipped on Liberman’s departure.
The Israeli defense industry is at a key juncture with Elbit’s acquisition of IMI that took place this month. After increasing exports by 40 percent in 2017 to $9.2bn, the defense industry continues to grow. IAI signed $1.3bn in contracts in India in October.
Liberman was not shy about communicating with private businesses. He claimed to have tamped down on companies sabotaging each other’s foreign deals. “I met with the heads of the defense industries and gave them a clear message about it,” he told business news outlet Globes this year.
The IDF is in the midst of a five-year plan, known as the Gideon Doctrine, which is meant to enable long-term planning and modernization, streamline the budgetary process, and avoid conflicts between the Defense and Finance ministries. The plan envisions a strategy to confront nonstate actors and strategic missile threats by using Israel’s advanced technological prowess.
Most of the programs associated with Gideon are expected to continue, such as the rolling out of the new eight-wheel drive Eitan armored personnel carrier.
“We can now state that within a decade, the IDF ground forces will undergo dramatic upgrading of its capabilities,” Liberman said in March. He had suggested Israel develop a new “missile corps,” but that pitch may now be in jeopardy. Announced with fanfare in February and again in August, his idea foresaw $145m in financing precision-guided surface-to-surface missiles that could reach 150 kilometers.
What is safe, experts agree, are Israel’s ongoing programs with the U.S., including joint efforts on the Iron Dome, David’s Sling and Arrow 3 air defense systems, as well as counter-drone cooperation. (Source: Defense News)
22 Nov 18. The Rafale Deal: The Real Loss to India. ‘The greatest loss from replacing the 126 Rafale proposal with the 2016 contract for 36 Rafales might not be the extra money paid, but the opportunity that India’s aerospace industry lost of obtaining access to critical aviation technologies and manufacturing skills,’ Ajai Shukla points out in the second of a three-part series. In buying 36 Rafale fighters from the French vendor Dassault in September 2016, senior defence ministry sources indicate the Indian government is paying 40 per cent higher than the price quoted in 2012 for 126 Rafales. That deal was eventually aborted. Dassault had quoted €19.5bn for 126 Rafale fighters, averaging €155m per aircraft. Before that deal could be finalised, the National Democratic Alliance government purchased 36 Rafale fighters for €7.85bn in September 2016. In other words, €217m per aircraft — 40 per cent higher than the earlier quote. Defending the 2016 contract against charges of overpaying, the government argued the new price included — over the basic aircraft cost of €3.3bn — four additional elements not included in the Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft tender.
These are ‘India-specific enhancements’ to the Rafale avionics to boost its combat capability (€1.7bn), a weapons package (€700m), additional spares (€1.8bn) and logistical guarantees (€350m).
Contrary to the government’s argument, a detailed review of the request for proposal (RFP) for the MMRCA, issued on August 28, 2007, shows that the 211-page document stipulates the supply of weapons, along with the first 18 aircraft.
‘It is essential that the direct flyaway aircraft be delivered with a full complement of weapons and the weapons package should be integral to the flyaway aircraft,’ says the RFP.
Part 1 of the RFP specifies the missiles and bombs to be supplied, such as 336 Active Beyond Visual Range (BVR) missiles, 168 All Aspect Missiles, etc. A separate section (Annexure IV to Appendix A) specifies the capabilities that the weapons must have. The BVR missiles are required to have a range ‘greater than 60 km against targets flying at high altitude’. This range would point to a lesser missile than the 100 km-plus-range Meteor that MBDA is supplying with the 36 Rafales. In the air-to-ground weapons category, the 2007 RFP specifies a ‘combination of stand-off weapons with ranges of 100-200 km [and] a war head of more than 250 kg’. This may or may not cover the SCALP (Système de Croisière Autonome à Longue Portée) missile that is being supplied with the Rafale.
While the 2016 contract may have incorporated a superior BVR missile like the Meteor, the 2007 RFP also clearly had a weapons component, which was factored into the €19.5 bn price.
The government has argued that India-specific enhancements have raised the Rafale’s price, including helmet mounted sights, radar warning receiver, radio altimeter, Doppler radar and cold start.
The 2007 RFP contains all of these elements.
Annexures II and III to Appendix A specify a high-end avionics suite, including AESA (active electronically scanned array) radar, helmet mounted display sights, radar warning receiver, missile approach warning receiver and an airborne self-protection jammer.
Indian Air Force sources explain there were Indian specific enhancements in both the Rafale configurations. The 2016 avionics might have had marginally improved capabilities, but with no significant effect on price.
Spares and maintenance were an integral part of the 2007 RFP and were included in the €19.5 bn tag.
Appendix D to the RFP stipulates detailed requirements for spare parts and maintenance facilities needed to support 126 Rafales, operating from three bases.
‘The IAF would like to avoid dependence on the manufacturer in terms of factory repair. Thus all repairs are to be carried out by this [Depot Level Maintenance Facility set up in India},’ says the RFP.
The RFP specifies a detailed ‘Manufacturer’s Recommended List of Spares’ (MRLS) needed to keep the 126 Rafales flying.
‘MRLS to sustain the equipment for a period of five years will need to be provided.’
This maintenance back-up is priced into Dassault’s quote, in the same manner as in the 36-Rafale contract. The 2007 RFP also requires vendors to ensure a 75 per cent aircraft readiness across the fleet — a requirement that the government claims to have paid an extra €350 m in the 2016 contract for 36 Rafales.
The greatest loss from replacing the 126-Rafale proposal with the 2016 contract for 36 Rafales might not be the extra money paid, but the opportunity that India’s aerospace industry lost of obtaining access to critical aviation technologies and manufacturing skills.
The Request for Proposals (RFP, or tender) that the IAF floated in 2007 for 126 MMRCA, had detailed conditions that bound all competing vendors to transfer key aerospace technologies that would have proven invaluable to Indian scientists and technologies working on two futuristic fighter aircraft — the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) and the Tejas Mark II.
However, the €7.85 bn purchase of 36 Rafales that Prime Minister Narendra Damodardas Modi unexpectedly announced on April 10, 2015 in Paris made no provision for any design or manufacturing technology transfer.
All that the IAF will get is fully built aircraft and the skills and technology to maintain them. The 2007 RFP imposed stringent conditions for transfer of technology (ToT) — essential when 108 of the 126 aircraft bought are to be manufactured in India. The MMRCA procurement was based on guidelines issued by then defence minister A K Antony, who told the Defence Acquisition Council that the contract must give ‘Indian defence industries an opportunity to grow to global scales’.
The RFP is forthright in demanding ToT, with Annexure I to Appendix M stipulating ‘key technologies’ for transfer.
The list includes 13 airframe technologies, such as super plastic forming, composite radomes and special coatings; nine engine technologies, including single crystal blades, thrust vectoring and radio crystallography; 21 avionics and communications technologies, such as weapon control radar, ring laser gyros and accelerometers; and 12 accessory technologies such as ejection seats.
‘Technologies used shall be current, state of art as used in the contemporary systems… The ToT shall be comprehensive, covering all aspects of design, manufacturing know-how and detailed technical information… Design data shall include the details that are needed to analyse, carry out trouble shooting’ of systems, stipulates Appendix M of the RFP.
‘The Bidder should confirm in the proposal that all necessary Government approvals for ToT required for manufacture, repair/overhaul, upgrade and all the conditions indicated [above] are in place for the aircraft, engines and all its systems and components and that there would be no denial/delays in future for the ToT,’ it says.
The RFP makes exceptions for highly sensitive and high-value technologies that the vendor might not be willing to share. Categorising these as ‘proprietary technologies’, it states: ‘The list of such items shall be far and few and generally restricted to components/processes specifically designed by the OEM for the licensed product.’
If the government had signed the 126 MMRCA contract with Dassault on April 10, 2015 instead of announcing the 36 Rafale buy, the first squadron of 18 flyaway Rafales would be currently in delivery and completed by April 2019.
According to the delivery schedule specified in the RFP, the first six Rafales would have been manufactured in India by April 2020, and all 126 fighters (six squadrons) would be in service by 2026.
Now, however, the IAF will get just two squadrons of Rafales by late 2022. Another tender has been floated for 110 fighters, which seven global vendors have responded to.
However, this could take years to even result in a contract.
‘The greatest loss from replacing the 126 Rafale proposal with the 2016 contract for 36 Rafales might not be the extra money paid, but the opportunity that India’s aerospace industry lost of obtaining access to critical aviation technologies and manufacturing skills,’ Ajai Shukla points out in the second of a three-part series.
PART 1: From €155m to €217m, Rafale cost went up by 40%
In buying 36 Rafale fighters from the French vendor Dassault in September 2016, senior defence ministry sources indicate the Indian government is paying 40 per cent higher than the price quoted in 2012 for 126 Rafales. That deal was eventually aborted.
Dassault had quoted €19.5bn for 126 Rafale fighters, averaging €155m per aircraft.
Before that deal could be finalised, the National Democratic Alliance government purchased 36 Rafale fighters for €7.85 bn in September 2016. In other words, €217m per aircraft — 40 per cent higher than the earlier quote.
Defending the 2016 contract against charges of overpaying, the government argued the new price included — over the basic aircraft cost of €3.3bn — four additional elements not included in the Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft tender.
These are ‘India-specific enhancements’ to the Rafale avionics to boost its combat capability (€1.7bn), a weapons package (€700m), additional spares (€1.8bn) and logistical guarantees (€350m). Contrary to the government’s argument, a detailed review of the request for proposal (RFP) for the MMRCA, issued on August 28, 2007, shows that the 211-page document stipulates the supply of weapons, along with the first 18 aircraft.
‘It is essential that the direct flyaway aircraft be delivered with a full complement of weapons and the weapons package should be integral to the flyaway aircraft,’ says the RFP.
Part 1 of the RFP specifies the missiles and bombs to be supplied, such as 336 Active Beyond Visual Range (BVR) missiles, 168 All Aspect Missiles, etc. A separate section (Annexure IV to Appendix A) specifies the capabilities that the weapons must have.
The BVR missiles are required to have a range ‘greater than 60 km against targets flying at high altitude’. This range would point to a lesser missile than the 100 km-plus-range Meteor that MBDA is supplying with the 36 Rafales.
In the air-to-ground weapons category, the 2007 RFP specifies a ‘combination of stand-off weapons with ranges of 100-200 km [and] a war head of more than 250 kg’. This may or may not cover the SCALP (Système de Croisière Autonome à Longue Portée) missile that is being supplied with the Rafale.
While the 2016 contract may have incorporated a superior BVR missile like the Meteor, the 2007 RFP also clearly had a weapons component, which was factored into the €19.5bn price. The government has argued that India-specific enhancements have raised the Rafale’s price, including helmet mounted sights, radar warning receiver, radio altimeter, Doppler radar and cold start.
The 2007 RFP contains all of these elements.
Annexures II and III to Appendix A specify a high-end avionics suite, including AESA (active electronically scanned array) radar, helmet mounted display sights, radar warning receiver, missile approach warning receiver and an airborne self-protection jammer.
Indian Air Force sources explain there were Indian specific enhancements in both the Rafale configurations. The 2016 avionics might have had marginally improved capabilities, but with no significant effect on price.
Spares and maintenance were an integral part of the 2007 RFP and were included in the €19.5bn tag.
Appendix D to the RFP stipulates detailed requirements for spare parts and maintenance facilities needed to support 126 Rafales, operating from three bases.
‘The IAF would like to avoid dependence on the manufacturer in terms of factory repair. Thus all repairs are to be carried out by this [Depot Level Maintenance Facility set up in India},’ says the RFP.
The RFP specifies a detailed ‘Manufacturer’s Recommended List of Spares’ (MRLS) needed to keep the 126 Rafales flying.
‘MRLS to sustain the equipment for a period of five years will need to be provided.’
This maintenance back-up is priced into Dassault’s quote, in the same manner as in the 36-Rafale contract.
The 2007 RFP also requires vendors to ensure a 75 per cent aircraft readiness across the fleet — a requirement that the government claims to have paid an extra €350m in the 2016 contract for 36 Rafales.
The greatest loss from replacing the 126-Rafale proposal with the 2016 contract for 36 Rafales might not be the extra money paid, but the opportunity that India’s aerospace industry lost of obtaining access to critical aviation technologies and manufacturing skills.
The Request for Proposals (RFP, or tender) that the IAF floated in 2007 for 126 MMRCA, had detailed conditions that bound all competing vendors to transfer key aerospace technologies that would have proven invaluable to Indian scientists and technologies working on two futuristic fighter aircraft — the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) and the Tejas Mark II.
However, the €7.85bn purchase of 36 Rafales that Prime Minister Narendra Damodardas Modi unexpectedly announced on April 10, 2015 in Paris made no provision for any design or manufacturing technology transfer.
All that the IAF will get is fully built aircraft and the skills and technology to maintain them.
The 2007 RFP imposed stringent conditions for transfer of technology (ToT) — essential when 108 of the 126 aircraft bought are to be manufactured in India.
The MMRCA procurement was based on guidelines issued by then defence minister A K Antony, who told the Defence Acquisition Council that the contract must give ‘Indian defence industries an opportunity to grow to global scales’.
The RFP is forthright in demanding ToT, with Annexure I to Appendix M stipulating ‘key technologies’ for transfer.
The list includes 13 airframe technologies, such as super plastic forming, composite radomes and special coatings; nine engine technologies, including single crystal blades, thrust vectoring and radio crystallography; 21 avionics and communications technologies, such as weapon control radar, ring laser gyros and accelerometers; and 12 accessory technologies such as ejection seats.
‘Technologies used shall be current, state of art as used in the contemporary systems… The ToT shall be comprehensive, covering all aspects of design, manufacturing know-how and detailed technical information… Design data shall include the details that are needed to analyse, carry out trouble shooting’ of systems, stipulates Appendix M of the RFP.
‘The Bidder should confirm in the proposal that all necessary Government approvals for ToT required for manufacture, repair/overhaul, upgrade and all the conditions indicated [above] are in place for the aircraft, engines and all its systems and components and that there would be no denial/delays in future for the ToT,’ it says.
The RFP makes exceptions for highly sensitive and high-value technologies that the vendor might not be willing to share. Categorising these as ‘proprietary technologies’, it states: ‘The list of such items shall be far and few and generally restricted to components/processes specifically designed by the OEM for the licensed product.’
If the government had signed the 126 MMRCA contract with Dassault on April 10, 2015 instead of announcing the 36 Rafale buy, the first squadron of 18 flyaway Rafales would be currently in delivery and completed by April 2019.
According to the delivery schedule specified in the RFP, the first six Rafales would have been manufactured in India by April 2020, and all 126 fighters (six squadrons) would be in service by 2026.
Now, however, the IAF will get just two squadrons of Rafales by late 2022. Another tender has been floated for 110 fighters, which seven global vendors have responded to. However, this could take years to even result in a contract. (Source: News Now/www.rediff.com)
21 Nov 18. Iran says U.S. bases and aircraft carriers within missile range. An Iranian Revolutionary Guards commander said on Wednesday that U.S. bases in Afghanistan, the UAE and Qatar, and U.S. aircraft carriers in the Gulf were within range of Iranian missiles, as tensions rise between Tehran and Washington.
“They are within our reach and we can hit them if they (Americans) make a move,” Amirali Hajizadeh, head of the Revolutionary Guards’ airspace division, was quoted as saying by Tasnim news agency. Hajizadeh said the Guards had improved the precision of their missiles, and specifically said they could hit the Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, Al Dhafra base in the United Arab Emirates and Kandahar base in Afghanistan that host U.S. forces.
U.S. President Donald Trump pulled out of an international agreement on Iran’s nuclear programme in May and reimposed sanctions on Tehran. He said the deal was flawed because it did not include curbs on Iran’s development of ballistic missiles or its support for proxies in Syria, Yemen, Lebanon and Iraq.
The Islamic Republic’s government has ruled out negotiations with Washington over its military capabilities, particularly its missile programme run by the Guards.
Iran, which says its missile programme is purely defensive, has threatened to disupt oil shipments through the Strait of Hormuz in the Gulf if the United States tries to strangle Iranian oil exports.
In October, the Revolutionary Guards fired missiles at Islamic State militants in Syria after the Islamist group took responsibility for an attack at a military parade in Iran that killed 25 people, nearly half of them members of the Guards. (Source: Reuters)
16 Nov 18. N. Korea May Have Tested New Long-Range Artillery: Source. North Korea’s newly developed tactical weapon is thought to be a long-range artillery piece, a government source in Seoul said Friday, hours after Pyongyang’s media reported on leader Kim Jong-un’s supervision of its recent testing. The North’s official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) said the communist leader oversaw the test of the “ultramodern” weapon and called it a “decisive turn in bolstering the fighting capacity” of his military.
“We presume it to be a new type of long-range artillery,” the source said on condition of anonymity. “This is a weapon that has been under development since the era of Kim Jong-il, and our intelligence authorities have continuously been following up on it,” he added, referring to the North’s former leader and late father of the current ruler.
The KCNA report came amid Pyongyang’s sense of unease over Washington’s insistence on maintaining sanctions until its final, fully verified denuclearization and the resumption of marine drills between South Korea and the United States. Some observers raised the possibility that the weapon test might have been designed for the domestic audience to highlight the country’s military prowess, given that, unlike “strategic” weapons, tactical ones do not pose a direct threat to a far-flung country like the U.S.
“The high-tech weapon may signal to North Korean citizens that the regime is continuously seeking to become a militarily strong country,” a military source said on condition of anonymity. “The tactical weapon test also indicates that it may not be any show of force intended for the foreign audience.”
However, the North’s use of its mouthpiece to announce the test might reflect its dismay over a perceived lack of progress in negotiations between the U.S. and the North over denuclearization.
The North has been seeking “corresponding measures” from the U.S., such as an agreement to declare a formal end to the 1950-53 Korean War or sanctions relief, in exchange for its disarmament steps, such as the shutdown of its major nuclear facilities at the Yongbyon complex. (Source: defense-aerospace.com/Yonhap News Agency)
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About Lincad
Lincad is a leading expert in the design and manufacture of batteries, chargers and associated products for a range of applications across a number of different sectors. With a heritage spanning more than three decades in the defence and security sectors, Lincad has particular expertise in the development of reliable, ruggedised products with high environmental, thermal and electromagnetic performance. With a dedicated team of engineers and production staff, all product is designed and manufactured in-house at Lincad’s facility in Ash Vale, Surrey. Lincad is ISO 9001 and TickITplus accredited and works closely with its customers to satisfy their power management requirements.
Lincad is also a member of the Joint Supply Chain Accreditation Register (JOSCAR), the accreditation system for the aerospace, defence and security sectors, and is certified with Cyber Essentials, the government-backed, industry supported scheme to help organisations protect themselves against common cyber attacks. The majority of Lincad’s products contain high energy density lithium-ion technology, but the most suitable technology for each customer requirement is employed, based on Lincad’s extensive knowledge of available electrochemistries. Lincad offers full life cycle product support services that include repairs and upgrades from point of introduction into service, through to disposal at the end of a product’s life. From product inception, through to delivery and in-service product support, Lincad offers the high quality service that customers expect from a recognised British supplier.
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