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11 Oct 18. What Australia’s response to China could look like. Some of the nation’s top strategic minds think Australia needs to shake-up its thinking in response to China’s unprecedented military build-up and influence in South-East Asia, but what could this look like? Defence Connect spoke to a range of experts with views on the matter.
Australia’s history of strategic policy has evolved since the end of the Second World War. Where the nation was once directly engaged in regional strategic affairs, actively deterring aggression and hostility in Malaya during the Konfrontasi and communist aggression in Korea and Vietnam as part of the ‘Forward Defence’ policy, growing domestic political changes following Vietnam saw a dramatic shift in the nation’s defence policy, and the rise of the ‘Defence of Australia’ doctrine.
This shift toward focusing on the direct defence of the Australian mainland dramatically altered the nation’s approach to intervention in subsequent regional security matters. These included Australia’s intervention in East Timor and later, to a lesser extent in the Solomon Islands and Fiji during the early-to-mid 2000s.
Now, the rise of China, it’s unprecedented military build-up, namely the development of key power projection capabilities, including aircraft carriers and supporting strike groups, fifth-generation combat aircraft, modernised land forces, area-access denial and strategic nuclear forces, combined with growing political and financial influence throughout the region is serving to shake-up Australia’s way of thinking.
For the first time since the introduction of the ‘Defence of Australia’ doctrine, growing consensus is developing amongst Australia’s strategic community in response to the growing power of China, that Australia needs to re-think its approach to politics, diplomacy and defence on the matter.
In recent months and days, and for the first time since the introduction of the ‘Defence of Australia’ doctrine, there is increasing debate about what a “Plan B” for Australia might look like, in the face of both an increasingly assertive China and unpredictable United States.
US instability and what it means for Australia
Leading a charge for change is Peter Jennings, Executive Director of ASPI, with the article ‘Trump means we need a Plan B for Defence’; a recent article siting former senior-Defence bureaucrat, Brendan Sargeant; architect of the Dibb Report, which would inform the ‘Defence of Australia’ doctrine, Professor Paul Dibb; and finally recent calls made by Queensland, LNP Senate Candidate, Gerard Rennick for Australia to develop its own nuclear arsenal to act as a deterrent against future hostilities.
In his article, which argues a need for Australia to think about a ‘Plan B’ in the face of mounting US instability under President Trump, Mr Jennings believes there is need for a shift in Australia’s defence force structure and the corresponding doctrine to support the nation’s increased role in the region.
Speaking to Defence Connect, Jennings was quick to highlight that while the existing ADF was the most capable it has ever been, largely as a result of the material investment and operational engagements of the last two decades, there was room for improvement.
“We need to be placing more effort into developing the long-range strike capability, this includes things like cruise missiles which can launched by platforms across the ADF. We also need to place greater emphasis on upgrading the capability provided by Collins, not just as a stop-gap, but as an imperative, as these submarines will continue to form the point of our deterrence spear for some time yet,” he said.
Jennings also encouraged more consideration and collaboration across government, Defence and industry to develop the capabilities we will need, not just in the immediate future but out to 2040.
“While we have to ask what are the sorts of capabilities we can field now, we also have to ask what are the capabilities we will need to field in the future, out to 2040? This is where an organisation like DARPA becomes particularly powerful in helping the us to locally develop key technologies which will provide us with a tactical and strategic deterrent in the future,” he explained.
Redefining long-range strike
Echoing these calls, Malcolm Davis, Senior Analyst at ASPI, specialising in strategy and capability development, future warfare and military technology, Chinese military modernisation and Asian security, believes the growth of China’s military capabilities and it’s increasing influence in the region is a major concern.
“We do need to think about doing more to share the regional strategic burden with the United States, particularly in the face of an assertive China, not only in the South China Sea, but also in the Indian Ocean and increasingly in the south Pacific,” Davis said.
“We need to have a more visible forward defence posture, working closely with our allies in Japan, India and Indonesia. This means we need to enlarge our forces, and see 2 per cent of GDP expenditure as the mandatory floor, not an aspirational goal.”
“We need to increase the permanent basing of key US forces, for example increasing the Marine Rotational Force in Darwin from 2,500 to 5,000 or even 7,500, increase the basing options for the US Air Force in northern Australia and US Navy in Freemantle,” Davis said.
When discussing the key capability gaps Australia needs to plug, in order to maximise the capabilities the nation can bring to the alliance, Davis reinforced that the ‘air/sea gap’ that serves as the moat and central defensive measure of ‘Defence of Australia’ no longer exists.
In response, Davis believes Australia needs to work closely with the US: “The capability provided by the future submarines will be delivered too late, that means we need to work with the US on developing a potent air-based long-range strike capability.”
The ever shrinking moat
Author of the 1986 Dibb report, which outlined the ‘air/sea gap’ and laid the foundation for the largely defensive ‘Defence of Australia’ policy, Professor Paul Dibb of the ANU Strategic and Defence Studies Centre in a recent speech before an ANU hosted panel event ‘Why Australia Needs a Radically New Defence Policy’ recognised the need for the nation to develop and implement a new strategic posture in response to a number of factors, including growing regional instability.
“First, we need to focus more on our own region of primary strategic concern, which includes south-east Asia (including the South China Sea), the eastern Indian Ocean, the south Pacific and the Southern Ocean,” he said.
Dibb described why he believes a re-focus is needed: “while aiming for greater defence self-reliance it is vital that we continue to have access to highly advanced American military equipment, combat systems and weapons, defence science, as well as intelligence and surveillance, to ensure that we maintain a margin of military advantage over our region.”
While Professor Dibb declined to directly articulate what kind of capability Australia needed to “maintain a margin of military advantage over our region” when asked by Defence Connect, his recent piece for ASPI, ‘Should Australia develop its own nuclear deterrent?’, tentatively presented two long-range, strategic strike options.
“The two most obvious delivery options are ballistic missiles launched from a nuclear-powered submarine, or a long-range nuclear cruise missile carried by a strategic bomber,” he wrote.
Professor Dibb’s colleague and fellow guest speaker, Dr Richard Brabin-Smith, focused more on the industrial side of the equation, stating, “Industry would have a key role here, given its critical role in the [supply and] maintenance of much ADF equipment. Industry needs as well to make sure that it is secure, including from cyber attack. In a defence contingency, industry would need to be able to increase its rates of effort (i.e. have a surge capacity).”
Defending Australia’s networks
Additionally, Brabin-Smith sees a need to expand and upgrade existing critical defence infrastructure in the north of Australia, while also improving the reliability of existing fuel supplies, providing further avenues for industry to play a major role in Government’s response to countering potential threats to critical Sea-Lines of Communication (SLOCs).
“To my mind, the case for an Australian industry program would need to be thought through in detail, and would have to be compelling before the government should decide to go down such a path, not least because the likely costs and technical risks. Perhaps an international program could be considered,” he said.
It is clear that there is a growing ground swell from the nation’s leading strategic policy thinkers that Australia must do more to guarantee its own security.
There is clearly a robust, mounting debate on the role the defence industry plays in Australia-China relations, and what its future looks like. (Source: Defence Connect)
10 Oct 18. PLA’s H-20 stealth bomber to take to the skies soon. The long-awaited H-20 is set to have an operational range of 8,000 kilometers without mid-air refueling. Chinese media have confirmed that the Hong-20, or H-20, the nation’s next generation strategic stealth bomber that has been more than a decade in the making, may take to the skies very soon.
In August, state broadcaster China Central Television revealed in a documentary marking the 91st anniversary of the founding of the People’s Liberation Army that the first H-20, a genuine “game changer”, could roll off its production line sooner than estimated.
Earlier this month, CCTV confirmed that the first H-20 trial flight was on the horizon.
The Beijing-based Global Times then concluded that the Xi’an plant of the Aviation Industry Corp of China must have wrapped up tests of the new bomber’s avionics, hydraulics and electronics.
Previous overseas reports noted that the H-20 was designed by the Shanghai Aircraft Design and Research Institute. Then, in 2008, a painstaking, decade-long endeavor began to replace the antiquated H-6 series still in service.
The H-6 series and its revamped version the H-6K – a modified model of a 1950s-era Soviet Union Tu-16 Badger – remain the backbone of the Chinese Air Force’s strategic deterrence, often seen taking part in symbolic circumnavigation missions in breach of Taiwan’s airspace.
Known specifications of the new bomber include a wing design that mimics that of the American Northrop Grumman B-2 Spirit stealth bomber to ensure a minimal profile that can slip through an adversary’s radar.
Its weapon bay should carry a payload of no less than 10 tons, either conventional cruise missiles or thermonuclear weapons, with the ability to strike targets from standoff ranges.
Observers say the design objective is for the long-range H-20 to remain airborne for some 8,000 kilometers to jet way beyond the second island chain – formed by Japan’s Ogasawara and Volcano Islands as well as Guam and the US Mariana Islands in the middle portion of the Pacific – without aerial refueling.
News Corp Australia Network also speculated in May that the H-20 could reach northern parts of Australia, after taking off from PLA artificial island bases reclaimed in the South China Sea.
The Global Times once quoted aviation commentator Fu Qianshao as saying that the ultimate goal for the H-20 was to expand its operational range to 12,000 kilometers with 20 tons of payload.
In that somewhat far-fetched scenario, the H-20 would be able to traverse the Pacific and fly close enough to the contiguous United States to be able to fire missiles at American mainland targets.(Source: News Now/http://www.atimes.com)
05 Oct 18. India Tests US Sanctions with Purchase of Russian Arms, Iranian Oil. India and Russia have announced a major arms deal, violating US sanctions. Energy sector sources also say New Delhi will purchase 9 million barrels of Iranian oil. Both moves will test India’s relations with the US. There were hugs, smiles and warm words between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Russian President Vladimir Putin as the two held a press conference in New Delhi on Friday. Although a number of trade deals — including rail, space and nuclear technologies — were publicly signed during Putin’s two-day visit, the most spectacular and controversial agreement was penned away from the cameras.
In that deal, India agreed to buy more than $5.2bn (€4.5bn) worth of Russian-made S-400 surface-to-air missile systems, a move that directly defies US sanctions on the purchase of Russian military hardware.
Testing CAATSA
In September, the US slapped sanctions on China for its purchase of Russian fighter jets and S-400 systems. In August, the US State Department said that future sanctions would specifically focus on the S-400 system as Washington made clear that trade with Russia’s military and intelligence sector would be punished with automatic sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA).
India would seem to be banking on the US exempting it from penalty due to its strategic importance as a counterweight to Chinese dominance in Southeast Asia. Prime Minister Modi and US President Donald Trump are also known to have a close relationship. Initial US reaction from its embassy in New Delhi was cautious, stating that sanctions were designed as a punishment for “malign behavior,” and not to “impose damage to the military capabilities of our allies and partners.” The embassy noted that sanctions waivers would be reviewed on a “transaction-by-transaction basis.”
An important part of a complicated puzzle
The US is an important trading partner for India and the two countries have also pledged to work more closely on defense. Last month the two announced joint military exercises to be held in 2019 as well as agreeing to the exchange of sensitive military information. The balance of power in the region is complicated, with India and China facing off as adversaries, such as during a tense military showdown last year in the Himalayas, yet China has also made attempts to gain Indian trust as a way of keeping New Delhi from being drawn too closely into the US sphere of influence. This was evident when Prime Minister Modi traveled to China to meet with President Xi Jinping in April.
Although Modi did not mention military cooperation in his remarks alongside Putin, the Russian president emphasized it as an “important part” of Russian-Indian relations. Russia, historically a close ally of India, remains its largest military supplier. The United States is India’s second largest supplier of military hardware, having sold New Delhi some $15bn worth of arms over the last decade.
Optimistic on trade
Trade between Russia and India, however, has declined of late as India has leaned more heavily on the US and Russia has cozied up to China and Pakistan — both of which New Delhi sees as strategic competitors. Voices at the two-day summit were optimistic. Andrei Kostin, the president of the Russian state bank VTB, said India and Russia “have a strategic partnership and a very harmonious dialog at the political level but we have to complete this with the strengthening of economic ties.” Kostin said the two countries were aiming at tripling bilateral trade from its current $10bn annual volume.
Testing American resolve on Iran
In another move that is sure to draw ire from Washington, sources in India’s energy sector told Reuters news agency on Friday that the country will purchase 9 million barrels of oil from Iran this November. New US sanctions targeting Tehran’s oil industry are set to go into effect on November 4. The sanctions are part of Washington’s efforts to isolate Iran, which it claims is “the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism.”
Although the 9 million-barrel figure represents a drop in Indian imports of Iranian oil — 10 million barrels were imported in October — New Delhi does not seem likely to stop imports altogether. In May, Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj said “India follows only UN sanctions and not unilateral sanctions by any country.”
Protecting investments
India has also been critical of US President Trump’s decision to pull out of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), otherwise known as the Iran nuclear deal, as Iranian isolation threatens India’s long-term strategic partnerships with the Islamic republic.
One of the largest such partnerships is represented by the Chabahar port development project on the Gulf of Oman. India has already invested $500m in the project, which is scheduled to be operational in 2019. International isolation of Iran could put the port at risk. (Source: defense-aerospace.com/Deutsche Welle German Radio)
05 Oct 18. Japan’s New Defense Minister Takeshi Iwaya Distances Himself from Earlier LDP Weapons Proposals. Newly appointed Defense Minister Takeshi Iwaya, who has long been a key defense policymaker of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, distanced himself Thursday from its earlier proposal that Japan should consider doubling its defense budget and procuring an aircraft carrier and F-35B stealth jets. Iwaya, a Lower House member elected from Oita Prefecture, was a key member of the LDP’s policy panel on defense affairs before he was appointed defense minister in Tuesday’s Cabinet reshuffle.
“Of course, I have participated in the discussions at the party and will certainly take into consideration the proposals from the ruling LDP,” Iwaya said during his first joint interview with media outlets Thursday at the Defense Ministry.
But nothing has been decided yet about what weapons should be procured, Iwaya said, although “the names of some equipment such as a multipurpose mother ship and F-35B have been floated,” he noted. (Source: (Source: defense-aerospace.com/The Japan Times)
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