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Military And Security Developments
Jan 02.
KEY POINTS
• Operations conducted by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in southern Lebanon and Lebanese Hizballah (LH)’s efforts to reconstitute its military strength will elevate tensions ahead of the end of the ceasefire transition period, possibly driving security risks in southern Lebanon.
• The increasing frequency of Israeli and US-led coalition strikes in Yemen amid the recent rise in Iran-backed Houthi missiles targeting Israel will drive bystander security risks in Houthi-held territories across Yemen.
• Gaza Strip: Two rockets targeting Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) triggered sirens in the area, reflecting the sustained threat of rocket attacks across Israel amid ongoing operations in Gaza. On 28 December 2024, the IDF intercepted two rockets launched by militants in Beit Hanon (northern Gaza) towards Jerusalem. On 29 December 2024, Gazan militants conducted multiple simultaneous attacks on IDF troops in Jabalia (northern Gaza), in squads numbering between ten and 30 militants. The incidents came amid continued IDF operations in Jabalia and were comparably larger than other armed clashes in Jabalia in the past month. Both events reflect Gazan militants’ response to continued IDF military operations, namely efforts to deplete rocket stockpiles before they are captured by the IDF, as well as efforts to break IDF cordons around Jabalia. As IDF operations continue, rocket threats across Israel, particularly in Southern district and to a lesser extent Central and Jerusalem districts, will remain elevated.
• Gaza Strip: The IDF’s Chief Military Prosecutor flagged issues with the assessment of the civilian population in conflict areas; this will possibly result in an adjustment to airstrike targeting, though the collateral risks facing civilians will likely remain severe. On 1 January, local media reported that the Chief Military Prosecutor highlighted failures in assessing the extent of the civilian population living in conflict zones to the IDF’s head of the Southern Command. The prosecutor found that more than 14,000 civilians were evacuated from Beit Lahia, where the IDF has been operating for the past three months. The IDF previously estimated that only around 3,000 civilians were in the area, a difference of nearly 470%. Subsequently, there is a possibility that the IDF will adjust its use of airstrikes in population centres. However, collateral risks across Gaza and particularly in areas undergoing extensive IDF military operations will remain severe.
• Israel-Yemen: Debris from an intercepted Houthi missile underscores the persistently elevated risks across Israel. On 30 December 2024, the IDF intercepted a missile launched from Yemen outside Israeli airspace. However, large fragments of the intercepted missile fell in Beit Shemesh (Central/Jerusalem district), causing light material damage and triggering sirens. The incident reflects the persistently elevated risks stemming from missiles and missile debris across Israel; fragments will possibly continue to fall up to ten minutes after sirens cease.
• Israel-Yemen: On 27 December 2024, Israel used the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense System (THAAD) during the interception of a Houthi missile. This marked the system’s first operational use, and underscores the further strengthening of Israel’s air defence capabilities. However, it is likely that the system will need more calibration to improve its capabilities and integration into Israel’s air defence envelope, sustaining risks of interception failure across Israel in the coming weeks.
• Israel-West Bank: A stabbing attack reflects the radicalisation risks among the Palestinian population, as well as sustained attack risks across Israel. On 27 December 2024, a Palestinian sole perpetrator stabbed and killed an elderly woman in Herzliya (Tel Aviv district). Post office security guards shot and seriously injured the perpetrator on the scene. Following the incident, the Israeli Shin Bet confirmed that the perpetrator, a resident of Tulkarm governorate, is a former West Bank informant. He was exposed, transferred to Israel and released six months ago from administrative detention (detention without trial). The incident highlights the elevated radicalisation risks among the Palestinian population and sustained attack risks across Israel. There is an elevated risk of sole perpetrators targeting both vulnerable individuals and the security forces; bystander security risks due to possible cross-fire during such attacks will also remain heightened.
• Israel-Lebanon-Syria: The IDF struck seven border crossings along the Lebanon-Syria border used by LH to smuggle weapons from Syria to Lebanon. The IDF conducted strikes on 27 December 2024; they came against the backdrop of a resumption of LH’s attempts to resume supplying arms. In the coming days there will be an elevated likelihood of IDF airstrikes in the Baalbek-Hermel and Beqaa governorates, particularly around border crossings, to prevent LH ‘reconstitution’ efforts.
• Israel-Yemen-US: A large-scale Israeli strike in Yemen targeting Houthi positions reflects growing security risks. On 26 December 2024, Israel conducted a large-scale airstrike campaign against Houthi-linked targets, including against Sanaa International Airport (SAH). The strike came in response to growing Houthi attacks targeting Israel in recent weeks. Local media reported that the strike disabled the control tower in SAH, damaged several planes, killed at least three individuals and injured 30 others at the airport. The UN World Health Organization (WHO) Director General, Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, and several other UN staff were present at the airport during the strike. Additionally, the US Central Command (US CENTCOM) confirmed it conducted strikes on Houthi targets on 30 and 31 December 2024, underlining an increase in the frequency of US-led coalition strikes against the Houthis in recent weeks. The strikes highlight the elevated security risks in Houthi-controlled areas in Yemen, including to NGO staff. These risks are likely to remain elevated in the coming weeks; they will increase in the event that the Houthis target central Israel.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• Despite relative progress in Israel-Hamas ceasefire negotiations in late December 2024, talks have stalled, moderating prospects for an agreement in the coming week. On 27 December 2024, local media outlets began reporting that Israel-Hamas ceasefire negotiations had stalled, with parties trading allegations of inflexibility. Subsequently, negotiations have not substantially progressed, despite significant international pressure on both parties to reach an agreement. Disputes reportedly centre on disagreements regarding the number of hostages who would be released in the initial phases of a ceasefire. Yet despite relative delays, a Hamas spokesperson confirmed on 2 January that representatives would engage in further rounds of ceasefire negotiations in Qatar in the coming days. Negotiations will remain fragile and prone to stalling, moderating prospects for an agreement being reached before the inauguration of US President-elect Donald Trump on 20 January. Even so, continued progress in negotiations in the coming weeks will possibly bolster prospects for an agreement being implemented in Q1 2025.
• Humanitarian conditions continue to deteriorate in northern Gaza, with restricted access to healthcare facilities driving the risk of communicable disease outbreaks. On 31 December 2024, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reported that an IDF raid at the Kamal Adwan Hospital in Beit Lahia (northern Gaza) has rendered the facility non-operational since 28 December 2024. The hospital was the last major healthcare centre operating in northern Gaza amid the continued intensification of IDF clearing operations in the area. The IDF stated that Hamas militants had established a command centre within the hospital and that all patients had been evacuated to other facilities. Even so, the hospital’s temporary closure will almost certainly continue undermining humanitarian conditions in northern Gaza and restrict access to critical medical services. In the coming months, the risk of communicable disease outbreaks will remain elevated, particularly respiratory infections throughout the winter (December-March). NGO staff operating in northern Gaza will face elevated risks of exposure to infection, increasing health risks, particularly for medical support personnel and staff engaging with vulnerable populations such as children.
• Increasing tensions within the coalition government will drive the likelihood of a general election in 2025, increasing government stability and policy risks. On 31 December 2024, the Knesset voted to adopt government-backed legislation related to the 2025 budget by 59-58 votes. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu left hospital following surgery to cast the deciding vote after two coalition parties announced that they would oppose the bill. The Otzmah Yehudit party, led by National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir, voted against the legislation due to ongoing efforts to dismiss the Attorney General and broader concerns over possible changes to the National Security Ministry’s budget in 2025. A United Torah Judaism (UTJ) party faction also voted against the legislation due to long-running disputes related to the conscription of ultra-Orthodox men into the IDF (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 10 October 2024). The narrow vote margin underscores increasing tensions within Israel’s multi-party coalition government as the Knesset considers legislation relating to the 2025 budget. In the coming weeks, escalating disputes within the coalition will likely drive increasing legislative deadlock and undermine efforts to adopt a state budget by 31 March. Failure to adopt a budget by this deadline would automatically trigger a general election, increasing government stability and policy risks in H1 2025 (see FORECAST below).
• Increasing concerns over militant activity in the West Bank will likely sustain tensions between the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Qatar. On 1 January, the PA indefinitely banned the Qatar-based media outlet Al Jazeera from broadcasting within the West Bank. The PA cited the network’s ‘dissemination of inciting material’ as the cause for the ban, particularly regarding its coverage of ongoing PA counter-terrorism operations in Jenin (Jenin governorate; see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 19 December 2024). The ban likely reflects broader tensions between the PA and Qatar, which maintains relations with numerous Islamist groups operating in the West Bank, such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). The ban also likely reflects elevated concerns within the PA that the rapid toppling of the Assad regime in Syria by the Islamist Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) will inspire local militant groups to attempt a similar uprising targeting the PA. Amid sustained government stability concerns, the PA will likely continue extending restrictions on Al Jazeera and affiliated media outlet activity in the coming weeks, particularly as counter-terrorism operations continue at pace. Even so, local media reported on 29 December that Israel refused a US request to transfer weapons to the PA to facilitate counter-terrorism operations, maintaining substantial pressure on the security forces’ capacity and possibly prolonging operations in the coming weeks.
FORECAST
Increasing tensions within Israel’s government coalition will drive the risk of protests and unrest in the coming weeks. On 1 January, the former defence minister, Yoav Gallant, announced his immediate resignation from the Knesset, citing disagreements with the government over forthcoming legislation that would broadly exempt ultra-Orthodox men from conscription into the IDF. In the coming weeks, the government will likely present legislation that nominally expands the eligibility of ultra-Orthodox men for conscription, but that also sets indefinite and imprecise recruitment targets; such measures would maintain de facto exemptions for the majority of ultra-Orthodox men without violating the government’s legal obligations following a Supreme Court ruling on conscription eligibility on 25 June 2024. Amid increasing tensions and coalition factionalism, the Likud-led government will likely back such legislation to gain the support of ultra-Orthodox coalition parties in adopting the 2025 state budget by the 31 March deadline. The adoption of this legislation would likely trigger substantial pro-conscription and anti-government demonstrations in major population centres in the coming weeks, increasing localised operational and travel disruption risks, particularly in Tel Aviv. In response, anti-conscription demonstrations will likely emerge in ultra-Orthodox population centres such as Bnei Brak (Tel Aviv), Beit Shemesh and Jerusalem, increasing the risk of clashes with pro-conscription demonstrators and the security forces, while also driving unrest risks in the short term.
Gallant’s resignation will likely increase pressure on government stability, driving the risk of legislative deadlock During his resignation speech, Gallant stated that he would remain a member of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s governing Likud party. In the coming months, there is a realistic possibility that Gallant will formally challenge Netanyahu’s leadership of the party with a vote of no confidence within the party, particularly if ceasefire and hostage release negotiations continue to stall. Alternatively, there is also a realistic possibility that Gallant will defect from Likud and form a competing political party, possibly in collaboration with high-profile, right-wing figures such as the former prime minister Naftali Bennett. Such a challenge would likely increase factionalism risks within the Likud party and the broader government coalition, driving the risk of legislative deadlock and possibly delaying the passage of budget legislation beyond 31 March, while also triggering a general election. Such an election would undermine government stability and likely result in lengthy coalition-formation negotiations, delaying policy passage and moderately increasing governance risks in the short-to-medium term.
Continued IDF operations in southern Lebanon and the recent intensification of LH reconstitution efforts will escalate tensions as the 60-day ceasefire transition period comes to a close on 25 January. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) continues to mobilise deployments to southern Lebanon, including to towns previously controlled by the IDF. Despite relative progress to date, the LAF will likely face significant challenges in fulfilling its obligations under the Israel-Hizballah ceasefire, due to continued LH efforts to re-arm itself and re-establish positions within southern Lebanon. While the IDF will likely adhere to the ceasefire agreement, LH’s continued challenges to LAF deployments will elevate the risk of the IDF seeking to extend the ceasefire transition period and maintain its presence in southern Lebanon, particularly in the immediate vicinity of the Israel-Lebanon border. Such an extension would likely trigger a limited resumption of hostilities, though this would likely remain limited to Israel-Lebanon border areas. Additionally, there is a realistic possibility that the IDF will intensify ceasefire enforcement operations, including airstrikes in Baalbek-Hermel, Beqaa, Nabatieh and South governorates in the coming weeks to further degrade LH military infrastructure and weapons transfers ahead of 25 January.
Triggers and indicators for escalation (we will continue to review and update these points):
• A successful terror attack by LH and/or Hamas targets Israeli/Jewish entities outside Israel
• High-casualty incidents occur in the West Bank due to IDF miscalculation or attacks by Israeli settlers and/or Palestinian militants
• Calls by Hamas to mobilise receive substantial support from Palestinian communities
• Israeli airstrikes against Gaza inflict high casualty numbers, prompting LH and/or West Bank-based militants to retaliate
• Israel re-launches widespread, high-intensity military operations in Gaza
• An uptick in Israeli airstrikes against Syria to prevent weapons transfers prompts an escalation by Lebanon-based militants
• US support for Israel ramps up beyond the current posturing level
• Israel conducts further strikes against Hamas’ leadership in Lebanon
• An IDF-targeted strike kills a senior LH commander(s)
• An LH strike causes a mass casualty event in Israel
• An IDF strike causes a mass casualty event in Lebanon
• An IDF strike kills civilians in Lebanon
Sibylline’s forecasting is underpinned by specifically chosen probability terminology, which aims to quantify levels of certainty throughout our assessments. (Source: Sibylline)
02 Jan 25. U.S.-Led Coalition Deploys 70-Truck Convoy to Construct Military Base in SDF-Held Kobani. Local news sources, including the Syrian-based North Press Agency are reporting that the U.S.-led Global Coalition against ISIS has begun constructing a military base in the city center of Kobani, northern Syria. Kurdish journalist Mustafa Al-Ali reported that a convoy of roughly 50-70 trucks carrying logistical reinforcements and construction materials arrived in Kobani on Thursday. The convoy included prefabricated rooms, surveillance cameras, trench-digging machines, cement blocks, and fuel tanks, according to the outlet. The materials were transported to a designated site, a hotel in the city center, where construction is underway. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
02 Jan 25. US forces launch multiple strikes from air and sea on Houthi rebels in Yemen. US forces have launched a number of attacks against Houthi targets in Yemen, with navy ships and aircraft used in the strikes.
US Central Command (Centcom) carried out the strikes against the Iranian-backed forces in the capital, Sana’a, and coastal locations within territory controlled by the group.
Centcom shared a video of the strikes which showed US aircraft taking off to carry out the strikes, as well as missiles being launched from a US Navy vessel.
• Sailor who saved lives after shooting down Houthi drone with 30mm cannon recognised
• Watch: US strikes Houthi targets in Yemen – and shoots down cruise missile
• Red Sea trade declines as Houthis grow in strength despite Western airstrikes
The footage appears to show F/A-18 Super Hornets taking off, with the aircraft capable of carrying a number of weapons.
These include the AGM-65 Maverick air-to-ground missile, which may have been used in the strikes against the Houthis.
Super Hornets can also carry the AIM-120 air-to-air missile, with the aircraft capable of carrying six of these, the AIM-9 Sidewinder, a short-range air-to-air missile, of which the aircraft can carry two on the wing tips as well as additional missiles on the underwing.
The video also shows Tomahawk cruise missiles being fired from a ship.
The Houthi targets were a command and control facility and advanced conventional weapon (ACW) production and storage facilities, which included missiles and uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAV).
Watch: Greek navy downs Houthi drones in the Red Sea
The US Department of Defence said these had been used by the Houthis to attack warships and merchant vessels in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.
A Houthi coastal radar site, seven cruise missiles and a one-way attack UAV over the Red Sea were also destroyed.
The Pentagon said there were no injuries or damage to US personnel or equipment in either incident, and the aim of the strikes was to degrade Iranian-backed Houthi efforts to threaten partners and military and merchant ships in the region.
(Source: forces.net)
02 Jan 25. Israel Eliminates Hamas Commander Linked to October 7 Kibbutz Nir Oz Attack. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and Shin Bet have confirmed the targeted killing of Abd al-Hadi Sabah, a senior Hamas commander responsible for leading the attack on Kibbutz Nir Oz during the October 7, 2023, Hamas assault on Israel.
Sabah, a Nukhba Platoon commander in the Hamas Western Khan Yunis Battalion, was killed in a drone strike in the Khan Yunis area of southern Gaza on Tuesday, according to the IDF. He was reportedly hiding in a shelter at the time of the attack.
Aside from playing a central role in planning and executing the October 7 massacre at Kibbutz Nir Oz, Sabah was also implicated in numerous attacks against IDF forces throughout the current conflict in Gaza.
The IDF stated, “The IDF and ISA (Israel Security Agency) will continue to operate against all of the terrorists who took part in the murderous October 7 massacre.”
On October 7, 2023, Hamas launched a large-scale attack on Israel, killing more than 1,200 people, injuring thousands, and taking over 250 hostages. Kibbutz Nir Oz, near the Gaza border, was one of the hardest-hit locations.
Sabah’s killing is part of Israel’s broader campaign to eliminate Hamas leadership and operatives responsible for the attack.
Earlier on the same day, the IDF and Shin Bet killed Anas Muhammad Saadi Masri, a commander in Palestinian Islamic Jihad responsible for overseeing rocket attacks on Israeli border communities. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
31 Dec 24. CENTCOM Launches New Joint Strikes on Houthi Military Facilities. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) announced Tuesday that it carried out precision strikes against Houthi-controlled targets in Yemen on Dec. 30 and 31. The operations targeted sites in Sana’a and along the Yemeni coastline, focusing on key military facilities used by the Iran-backed group. According to CENTCOM, U.S. Navy ships and aircraft struck a Houthi command and control facility, as well as advanced conventional weapons (ACW) production and storage sites. The facilities included missiles and uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs) linked to attacks on U.S. Navy warships and merchant vessels in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. Additionally, U.S. Navy and Air Force aircraft destroyed a Houthi coastal radar installation, seven cruise missiles, and one-way attack UAVs over the Red Sea. The strikes aimed to diminish the Houthis’ operational capabilities and reduce threats to regional partners and international shipping routes. No injuries or damage to U.S. personnel or equipment were reported. CENTCOM emphasized that these operations are part of an ongoing effort to counter Houthi actions, which they said pose a danger to military and civilian vessels in the region.
A Houthi spokesperson denounced the strikes as a “blatant violation of Yemen’s sovereignty” and framed them as support for Israel. The Houthis have claimed responsibility for several missile and drone attacks targeting Israel, stating these efforts are in solidarity with Palestinians amid the ongoing Israel-Hamas conflict in Gaza. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
31 Dec 24. Houthi Rebels Allegedly Down 13th U.S. MQ-9 Reaper Drone in Yemen. On December 28, 2024, Houthi forces in Yemen reportedly shot down a U.S. Air Force MQ-9 Reaper drone in the Al Bayda Governorate, west of Yemen. The Iranian-backed rebels released video evidence showing a missile, purportedly launched from a Soviet-era 2K12 Kub surface-to-air missile system, successfully striking the drone. This incident would mark the 13th MQ-9 Reaper the Houthis claim to have downed since October 7.
The MQ-9 Reaper was reportedly conducting intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations when it was targeted. Yahya Saree, a spokesperson for the Houthi military, stated that the drone was shot down using a locally made surface-to-air missile. The footage released via Houthi media channels corroborates the claims, showing the missile hitting the drone mid-flight. The United States Central Command (CENTCOM) has acknowledged awareness of the reports but has not yet provided an official confirmation or comment. Each MQ-9 Reaper costs approximately $30m, bringing the estimated financial impact of the 13 reported losses since October to over $400m. The Houthis have reportedly modernized the 2K12 Kub, a mobile, medium-range surface-to-air missile system developed in the 1960s. Since November 2023, the group has launched nearly 100 attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea, framing these actions as solidarity with Palestinians amidst the Israel-Gaza conflict.
(Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
31 Dec 24. IDF Intercepts Ballistic Missile Launched by Houthis. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) intercepted a ballistic missile launched from Yemen. The missile, believed to have been fired by the Iran-backed Houthi rebel group, was destroyed by Israeli air defenses before entering Israeli territory. Fragments of the missile reportedly landed near Beit Shemesh, west of Jerusalem, without causing injuries or major damage.
U.N. Ambassador Danny Danon issued a warning on Monday to Yemen’s Houthis, urging them to stop their missile attacks on Israel. He warned that if they continued, they would face the same “miserable fate” as other Iranian allies, such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria. Danon also cautioned Tehran, stating that Israel has the capability to strike any target in the Middle East, including within Iran, and would not tolerate attacks by Iranian proxies.
The Houthis, an Iranian-backed rebel group, have launched 11 ballistic missiles and at least nine drones at Israel in the past month.
In response to Houthi attacks, the IDF has targeted Houthi-controlled infrastructure in Yemen. Strikes have focused on key ports like Hodeida, Salif, and Ras Issa, vital for Houthi military and economic operations.
These ports have been under siege since December 18, following Israeli airstrikes. Previous strikes on Hodeida have caused significant losses, reportedly exceeding $300m, further straining the Houthis amid Yemen’s ongoing economic crisis. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
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