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Military And Security Developments
Mar 07.
07 Mar 25. Scores of people were reported killed in Syria on Friday as members of the government’s security forces clashed with loyalists of deposed president Bashar al-Assad for a second day, marking the most violent episode for the country’s new leaders since the fall of the regime. Syrian officials said the clashes began on Thursday when gunmen attacked state security forces and killed an initial 13 people in the coastal province of Latakia amid calls for an “uprising” in what is a former Assad stronghold. More people were killed as fighting continued throughout the night, including an unknown number of civilians, according to officials in Latakia. Damascus has sent in heavy reinforcements. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, a war monitor, said nearly 150 people had been killed, including nearly 40 members of the armed forces, 34 Assad loyalist fighters and seven civilians. SOHR also said government forces stormed three villages near the coast in response, killing “dozens of men”. Lebanese pro-Assad broadcaster Al Mayadeen reported attacks on the three villages, saying more than 30 men had been killed in Mukhtariyeh alone. A video showing dozens of male bodies, some bloodied and piled in the streets, which claimed to have been filmed on Friday. (Source: FT.com)
07 Mar 25. Israel-Palestinian Territories: Limits at Friday Prayers will raise disruption, unrest risks in Jerusalem. On 6 March, the Israeli government announced restrictions to Palestinian civilians’ attendance at Friday prayers at the al-Aqsa Mosque compound in Jerusalem (Jerusalem governorate) during Ramadan (28 February – 30 March). The ordinances limit attendance to men aged over 55, women aged over 50 and minors aged under 12; attendees must receive a permit and make their way through security screenings to attend prayers on 7, 14, 21 and 28 March. Efforts to enforce restrictions are highly likely to increase congestion in the compound’s vicinity, elevating travel disruption risks in Jerusalem’s Old City. Efforts to deny entry to the compound will elevate the risk of altercations between attendees and the Israeli security forces, increasing bystander risks. Such altercations would possibly escalate into broader clashes and unrest, increasing security and collateral risks in the Old City and wider East Jerusalem area. The Israeli security forces will almost certainly adopt an elevated posture throughout the city to enforce the restrictions and deter unrest. Amid elevated ethno-religious tensions, we assess there is an increased risk of low-capacity sole-perpetrator attacks, such as stabbings and car-rammings. (Source: Sibylline)
07 Mar 25. Syria: Major clashes have elevated risk of wide-scale armed conflict in coastal region. On 6 March, major clashes broke out between pro-Assad militias and government forces in Jableh, Latakia, Qardaha (all Latakia governorate) and Tartus (Tartus governorate). Pro-Assad militias simultaneously cut highways connecting Latakia with Aleppo governorate, took control of the naval college in Tartus and attacked government forces in Jableh and Qardaha. At least 24 militia fighters, 20 government security personnel and four civilians have been killed at the time of writing. The highly co-ordinated attacks against the new government are unprecedented in scale and underscore the significant risk of wide-scale armed conflict in Syria’s coastal region, particularly in Alawite strongholds. The clashes will possibly extend to Homs governorate. The ongoing developments will likely trigger a wave of reprisals against Alawite communities across Syria by radical jihadist elements, further destabilising the country and elevating ethno-religious tensions, while also increasing attack risks for bystanders. We assess the current curfew in Latakia and Tartus will be extended until at least 9 March, as clearing operations will increase in intensity, driving operational disruption. (Source: Sibylline)
Mar 06.
* Israel’s new Chief of the General Staff, Eyal Zamir, has underlined his intent to expand the military capabilities of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). Zamir, who entered office on 5 March, has a background as a tank commander and is likely to expand the IDF’s focus on armoured and ground forces during his tenure. Zamir previously criticised the IDF’s increasing reliance on its air force. Upon entering his new role, he ordered the establishment of a new tank brigade and launched a process to examine options for an additional infantry brigade. By contrast, he is also seeking to slim down what he regards as a superfluous division of responsibilities. He immediately dissolved the Strategy and Iran wing in the General Headquarters (Matkal) and transferred its tasks to other departments. Even so, Zamir defined 2025 as a ‘year of war’. Under his command, the IDF is likely to focus on further developing its ground capabilities and bolstering its ground presence in Syria, Lebanon, Gaza and the West Bank (both Palestinian Territories).
* On 4 March, Israel conducted a joint exercise with a US B-52 bomber. The UK’s Royal Air Force (RAF) also took part in the exercise over the Mediterranean Sea. The drill was designed to enhance interoperability, including aerial refuelling. This indicates an aim to be ready for long-range missions. The exercise likely reflects increasing preparations for the resumption of joint strikes against the Iranian-backed Houthis’ military infrastructure in Yemen in the event of further attacks in the Red Sea. Furthermore, such interoperability would likely also be necessary to facilitate a strike against Iranian nuclear facilities, underscoring Israel’s persistent efforts to maintain its capacity to exercise this option in the event of further escalation with Tehran.
* On 3 March, the IDF conducted airstrikes against weapons depots and military sites in Latakia and Tartus governorates (both Syria). The IDF conducted a series of airstrikes against the town of Qaradha (Latakia) and near the port of Tartus (Tartus). On the same day, the IDF also conducted ground operations against military infrastructure and weapons depots near the Tel al-Mal peak in Daraa governorate (Syria). These ground operations mark the deepest incursion by IDF troops into Syria since the Yom Kippur war (1973). IDF ground operations and airstrikes in and against Syria, particularly its southern governorates, are likely to continue in the coming days, sustaining elevated bystander security risks near military sites, ports and, to a lesser extent, governmental facilities. The risk of sporadic armed clashes between the IDF and armed militants, as well as Syrian government-affiliated security forces, will gradually increase in the coming months, elevating the risk of armed conflict. However, a full-scale armed confrontation comprising open hostilities between Israel and Syria remains unlikely.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
* Egypt announced a plan for the post-war reconstruction and administration of Gaza, though opposition from Israel and the US will undermine the prospects for its implementation. On 4 March, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi announced that numerous Arab leaders had agreed to an Egyptian-led post-war reconstruction plan for Gaza following an emergency summit. The plan calls for international parties to contribute approximately USD 53 billion to a reconstruction fund based in the West Bank, which would oversee incremental clearing and construction projects in Gaza, allowing Palestinian civilians to remain within the enclave. The plan also calls for the formation of a temporary governing committee, staffed by non-Hamas technocrats, which would transfer administrative responsibilities to the Palestinian Authority (PA) after an unspecified period of time, contingent on the PA holding elections (see below). The plan also outlines the formation of an International Stabilisation Force of unspecified Arab states, monitored by a multi-national council involving representatives from the EU, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the UK and the US. Although Hamas announced its conditional support for the plan on 4 March, both Israel and the US immediately rejected the plan. Israel is highly unlikely to delegate military and civil administrative authority to the committee outlined by the plan, undermining the prospects for its implementation in the short-to-medium term. Additionally, Egypt is highly unlikely to secure the necessary funding to implement the plan without support from the US, due to its influence over major regional powers, including Saudi Arabia.
* PA President Mahmoud Abbas announced plans to hold a general election in the Palestinian Territories; however, the process is highly likely to face continual delays. During an Arab leaders’ summit on 4 March, Abbas announced that the PA would hold elections in 2026 if circumstances are ‘suitable’. These would mark the first elections in PA-administered territory since 2006. Also on 4 March, Abbas announced a general amnesty for all dismissed members of the ruling Fatah party, underscoring efforts to bolster domestic and international perceptions of the party’s legitimacy. Despite this overture, Abbas will almost certainly face substantial opposition from competing factions within Fatah during election preparations, particularly from factions aligned with Mohammed Dahlan (the former leader of Fatah in Gaza). More broadly, Abbas and Fatah are highly likely to face substantial domestic opposition during any such elections, elevating the risk of protests and election-related violence in major population centres across the West Bank. Consequently, Abbas is highly likely to delay election preparations as part of a long-term effort to maintain his control of the PA. Delays to the envisioned elections would sustain substantial governance risks for firms engaged in the Palestinian Territories, with announcements relating to delays possibly triggering temporary upticks in anti-government protest activity and consequent unrest.
* Direct talks between Hamas and the US underscore ongoing attempts to extend the ceasefire, though these are unlikely to be successful. On 5 March, the White House confirmed that the Trump administration engaged in direct talks with Hamas in Doha (Qatar); earlier reports suggested that the talks focused on the release of US hostages held in Gaza and the possibility of a broader deal to end the war. Shortly after this confirmation, US President Donald Trump posted an ultimatum to Hamas on Truth Social, threatening to destroy the militant group if it did not release all hostages. Despite the ultimatum, direct and indirect talks between the US and Hamas will likely continue in the coming days, as the US will attempt to salvage a bridging proposal to extend the current ceasefire for at least another month and secure the release of more hostages. However, given Hamas’ commitment to a complete end to the war and tensions over the recent suspension of aid into Gaza by Israel, the likelihood of a month-long ceasefire extension remains low. We assess that, without a significant breakthrough in the current negotiations, the full resumption of Israeli operations inside Gaza is a realistic possibility in the next two weeks.
* The US’ redesignation of the Iran-backed Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) will increase compliance risks and humanitarian concerns in Houthi-controlled territory. US President Donald Trump previously designated the Houthis as an FTO in January 2021; the Biden administration subsequently repealed the designation, before classifying the group as a ‘Specially Designated Global Terrorist’ (SDGT) entity in February 2024 (see Sibylline Extremism Watch – 29 February 2024). The FTO designation criminalises any and all financial interactions with the group, including financial transfers to Houthi-controlled administrative bodies, such as port authorities, as well as co-operation with Houthi-linked aid distribution networks. Approximately 75% of the Yemeni population lives in Houthi-controlled territory, which includes the capital Sanaa and the ports of al-Hodeidah and Saleef (both al-Hodeidah governorate, Yemen). The designation will almost certainly increase compliance concerns for locally engaged firms, particularly NGOs providing critical humanitarian resources. Financial entities facilitating remittances and payments to governing authorities will also face substantially elevated sanction-exposure risks and governance concerns. These concerns are highly likely to disrupt NGO operations in Houthi-controlled territory, exacerbating food, water and energy security risks therein. In response, the Houthis are also highly likely to increase scrutiny of NGOs and entities linked to the US, increasing the risk of surveillance, detention and expulsion for associated staff in the coming weeks.
* Arrests during anti-Israel protests at Columbia University (New York City, New York, US) underscore persistent security and bystander risks on and around university campuses. On 5 March, around 200 pro-Palestine activists gathered at Columbia University campus to denounce the visit of the former Israeli prime minister, Naftali Bennet. During Bennet’s visit, tens of students also occupied the lobby of the Barnard College library. Shortly afterwards, the college administration received a bomb threat, which prompted the police to evacuate the building and arrest at least ten students who refused to leave. However, no bomb was found at the scene. These incidents underscore the persistent bystander and security risks inside and around university campuses during anti-Israel and anti-Trump protests, which are highly likely to increase in frequency in the coming weeks. The resumption of Israeli operations inside Gaza would almost certainly trigger wide-scale protests on campuses, augmenting the aforementioned risks. Stop-and-search operations targeting Iranian oil tankers will increase the risk of Iranian maritime attacks against vessels in the Persian Gulf. Recent reports indicate that the US is currently considering plans to conduct regular stop-and-search operations against Iranian vessels under an international accord on countering the spread of weapons of mass destruction. The plan likely reflects another stage of the Trump administration’s maximum pressure strategy. Previous instances in which the US and other countries stopped and confiscated sanctioned Iranian oil tankers prompted Iran to retaliate with attacks and hijacking attempts against vessels affiliated with the confiscating country. As such, the enforcement of such a plan would raise the likelihood of hijacking attempts facing vessels in the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf in the coming weeks, disrupting operations and increasing the risks of asset losses and duty of care concerns for maritime staff, as well as further increasing regional tensions.
* Jordan: Armed clashes at border highlight elevated security risks. Earlier on 6 March, the Jordanian border forces killed four smugglers during clashes on the Jordan-Syria border. The troops seized large quantities of narcotics as well as a rifle; the rest of the smugglers retreated back to Syria. Jordan’s 224-mile (360km) border with Syria presents a substantial security challenge due to the proliferation of drug production in Syria and increasing smuggling attempts over recent years. In January, Jordan and Syria agreed to form a joint security committee to improve their border security against arms and drug smuggling as well as militant organisations. While Jordan has bolstered its northern border security with artificial intelligence (AI), drones and other advanced surveillance technologies, the border remains vulnerable to smuggling attempts, particularly during periods of unstable and foggy weather conditions. This vulnerability sustains elevated bystander security risks in border regions. We assess that a greater shift in focus towards Jordan’s southern borders is likely from smugglers in the coming months, elevating security and bystander risks in southern border regions.
* Syria: New security campaigns will drive persistent security, armed conflict risks. On 5 March, following earlier clashes on 3 March, the Syrian government forces launched substantial security operations in the city of Al-Sanamayn (Daraa governorate). The forces clashed with a local militia comprised of former pro-Assad fighters led by warlord Mohammad Al Humaid. Clashes have killed at least eight members of the government-affiliated forces, four gunmen and a civilian since 3 March. Additionally, on 5 March, the government forces continued to engage pro-Assad militias in Latakia (Latakia governorate), resulting in an unspecified number of casualties. We assess that similar clashes will highly likely occur in the coming weeks as the new government in the capital Damascus continues its attempts to disarm local militias, particularly in the southern governorates of Daraa and Suwayda. These clashes will possibly evolve into an insurgency against Damascus in these governorates, augmented by the ethnic grievances of the local Druze community. However, insurgency risks remain unlikely in the Alwite strongholds in Tartus and Latakia governorates, as Damascus’ security presence is being augmented in these areas.
Mar 05.
* Palestinian Territories: Egyptian plan is unlikely to mitigate against risk of armed conflict resuming. On 4 March, Arab leaders met at the Arab Summit in Cairo (Egypt), where they adopted the Egyptian reconstruction plan for Gaza (Palestinian Territories). The plan envisions the creation of an independent administration committee made up of professional Palestinian technocrats who will govern Gaza, manage the strip and supervise aid after the end of the war. The plan envisions the return of the Palestinian Authority (PA) to govern Gaza, sidelining Hamas. While Hamas welcomed the plan, it insists on approving the new committee’s tasks, members and agenda. This would effectively mean retaining the group as a major political force within Gaza. Furthermore, the plan does not include the disarming of Hamas, something that is likely to be a red line for Israel and a key flashpoint in the coming months. We assess that the plan is a long-term solution and does not deal with the immediate grievances that threaten the resumption of hostilities in Gaza in the coming weeks, sustaining the risk of armed conflict.
*Iraq: Iranian proxies’ refusal to disarm will fracture ruling coalition, elevating policy risks. On 3 March, Iraqi media revealed that government officials held discussions with the leaders of several groups comprising the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), calling for them to disarm. However, the groups reportedly rejected any initiatives for disarmament or full integration within state security institutions. This comes amid significant pressure from the US aimed at the Iraqi government to dismantle Iranian-backed proxies. As such, the US will likely impose new sanctions on companies affiliated with the PMF in the coming weeks, elevating compliance and operational disruption risks in the banking, energy and logistics sectors. Furthermore, the PMF’s refusal to disarm is highly likely to trigger further fractures within the ruling Shia Coordination Framework, elevating policy risks in the coming weeks and complicating parliamentary discussions around PMF restructuring. However, despite the existing political rifts, we assess that clashes between PMF groups and the government’s security forces remain unlikely.
* UAE: Cyber operation will raise long-term security, cyber espionage risks to CNI. On 4 March, the cyber security company Proofpoint reported that a new threat group (‘UNK_CraftyCamel’) had conducted a cyber espionage operation against UAE critical transportation and satellite communications sectors since at least October 2024. The group used phishing emails as initial attack vectors to trick potential victims into opening a malicious attachment. The attachment contained malicious polyglot files; these are specially crafted files that contain multiple file formats, allowing them to be interpreted differently by various applications. This technique showcases the actors’ defence evasion capabilities and skillsets. This executed the ‘Sosano’ backdoor onto compromised systems, facilitating communication with command-and-control (C2) infrastructure, the exfiltration of data and the deployment of additional malicious payloads. Critical national infrastructure (CNI) in the UAE is an attractive target for cyber espionage operations, given the regional strategic relevance of this sector. We assess that this report points to long-term security and espionage risks to Emirati CNI and transportation sectors.
Mar 04.
- Tunisia: Trial of opposition leaders will elevate domestic unrest, bystander security risks. Earlier on 4 March, the trials of 40 high-profile defendants, including prominent Tunisian opposition figures and critics of President Kais Saied, will begin in the capital Tunis. The defendants, including former diplomats, lawyers, media figures, and politicians, face a range of charges, including plotting against the state and belonging to a terrorist group. Rights groups and opposition figures denounced the trials as politically motivated. In the coming days, protests in Tunis are highly likely, particularly near the court and government offices. While demonstrations will likely be largely peaceful, a heightened security posture in these areas is likely, elevating risks of arbitrary detention and sporadic clashes; use of force by the police against protesters remains a realistic possibility, elevating bystander security risks. Similarly, protests and a heightened security presence will moderately elevate risks of traffic disruption near demonstrations. We assess that the trials reflect increasing human rights risks associated with reducing freedom of expression, raising the risk of arbitrary detention, including to NGO staff deemed critical of the government.
- Syria: Armed conflict risks will continue, gradually increasing in southern Syria in coming months. On 3 March, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted airstrikes in Syria, targeting weapon depots in the town of Qaradha (Latakia governorate) and a military site near the port of Tartus (Tartus governorate). On the same day, local Syrian media reported that the IDF conducted ground incursions in Daraa governorate, targeting weapon depots in the Tel al-Mal hill as well as cutting the road between the towns of Mashara and Eltyha. This is the deepest IDF incursion into Syria since the Yom Kippur War (1973). Although no clashes were reported, risks of armed conflict between the Syrian government forces and the IDF will gradually increase in the coming months as Israel will almost certainly conduct further operations in southern Syria, particularly Daraa and Quneitra governorates. We assess that security and bystander risks will continue to be significantly elevated near military sites, ports and, to a lesser extent, governmental facilities in all major Syrian cities, including the capital Damascus. This is due to the persistent threat of Israeli airstrikes.
Mar 03.
- On 28 February, the Lebanese authorities intercepted a USD 2.5m cash delivery to Lebanese Hizballah (LH) transported by a man travelling from Turkey.
- On 3 March, a stabbing attack in Haifa Bay central bus station (Haifa district) killed one individual and injured four others, highlighting elevated ethno-religious and attack risks.
- On 28 February, the Israeli police bolstered its security posture in the al-Aqsa mosque compound, reflecting heightened ethno-religious tensions and risks of sporadic clashes.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND OVERALL FORECAST
- Phase One of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire expired on 2 March, elevating risks of conflict resumption and exacerbating humanitarian concerns in Gaza.
- In Israel, there was an uptick in demonstrations calling for hostage releases, highlighting increasing risks of protest activity and operational disruption in the coming weeks.
- Lebanon’s government continues efforts to diversify its regional partnerships, elevating risks of tensions with LH.
- The US announced additional weapons shipments to Israel, increasing reputational risks for firms in the aerospace, automotive and technology industries.
- In Russia, risks of terror attacks targeting locations associated with the Jewish community will remain elevated ahead of the anniversary of the Crocus Hall attack in the capital Moscow on 22 March.
- OVERALL FORECAST: Israel will likely delay the full resumption of military operations in Gaza over the coming days, though it will likely increase its use of belligerent rhetoric.
Israeli airstrikes in Lebanon
The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) buffer zone and airstrikes in the Gaza Strip
Time to find shelter in the event of rocket launches
Operational shelters in Tel Aviv
- On 28 February, the Lebanese authorities intercepted a USD 2.5 m cash delivery to Lebanese Hizballah (LH) transported by a man travelling from Turkey. The seizure is the first since Israel highlighted attempts to smuggle finance to the organisation from Iran, including through Turkey. The allegation has likely prompted an escalation in efforts by the Lebanese government to tackle smuggling through Beirut-Rafic Hariri International Airport (BEY) and thereby reduce risks of Israeli strikes against it. This shift will likely drive increasing levels of official scrutiny in BEY, particularly for flights from Iran and Turkey, possibly increasing travel delays for new arrivals.
- On 3 March, a stabbing attack in Haifa Bay central bus station (Haifa district) killed one individual and injured four others, highlighting elevated ethno-religious and attack risks. The perpetrator, a dual Israeli-German national of the Druze faith, lived in Germany over recent months and returned to Israel last week. The incident follows a car-ramming attack in Karkur Junction (Haifa district) on 27 February in which the perpetrator, an illegal immigrant from the West Bank, injured 14 people. These attacks reflect increasing ethno-religious tensions and attack risks across Israel. The expiration of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire, an ongoing IDF operation in the West Bank and the holy month of Ramadan will likely further compound these trends over the coming month.
- On 28 February, the Israeli police bolstered its security posture in the al-Aqsa mosque compound, reflecting heightened ethno-religious tensions and risks of sporadic clashes. On 28 February, Israel’s government spokesperson told journalists that restrictions for public safety will be in place at the al-Aqsa mosque compound ‘as they have been every year’. However, the Israeli police have yet to outline particular restrictions on prayers in the compound and instead emphasised that it bolstered its forces across Jerusalem (Jerusalem district), particularly near the compound and the Old City. An increased police presence will likely elevate travel disruption around the compound and the Old City and drive the risk of clashes between the security forces and those attempting to pray at the site, particularly given the rising risks of radicalisation. Additionally, uncertainty about the state of restrictions will increase risks of misunderstandings, over-zealous policing and spikes in ethno-religious tension, driving unrest risks in Jerusalem.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
- Phase One of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire expired on 2 March, elevating risks of conflict resumption and exacerbating humanitarian concerns in Gaza. On 2 March, the Israeli Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) proposed extending Phase One of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement until at least 19 April. The proposal stipulates that Hamas release half of the remaining hostages on the first day of the ceasefire; a temporary ceasefire would remain in place until at least the end of Passover (12-20 April), with the remaining hostages released upon the establishment of a permanent ceasefire. A spokesperson for the US National Security Council subsequently indicated Washington DC’s support for Israel’s negotiating position. That said, Qatari mediators have indicated their opposition to the proposal. On 2 March, Hamas repeatedly rejected the proposal, stating that the group would only release further hostages as part of Phase Two of the ceasefire agreement. In response, the PMO announced that Israel would block the entry of all goods, including humanitarian aid, into Gaza effective immediately. The restriction will almost certainly critically disrupt NGO operations in Gaza and severely restrict access to humanitarian aid, exacerbating energy, food and water security risks. Hamas is unlikely to accept Israel’s proposal to extend Phase One in the coming days, elevating risks of conflict resumption in the coming days and weeks. Such a resumption would likely trigger a resurgence in regional pro-Palestine protest activity, particularly in Iraq, Jordan and Turkey (and to a limited extent in Egypt). Large-scale protests will increase risks of unrest and hostility to foreign investment risks in major cities, increasing bystander, collateral and security risks.
- In Israel, there was an uptick in demonstrations calling for hostage releases, highlighting increasing risks of protest activity and operational disruption in the coming weeks. On 1 March, thousands of protesters attended demonstrations calling for the government to secure hostage releases. The largest demonstrations took place in Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) and Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district); smaller-scale demonstrations emerged in Beersheba (Southern district), Hadera, Haifa (both Haifa district), Herzliya (Tel Aviv) and Ness Ziona (Central district). Demonstrations continued in Herzliya, Jerusalem and Tel Aviv on 2 March, marking a moderate expansion of protest activity compared to recent weeks, though demonstrations did not critically disrupt business operations or overland movement. On 2-3 March, demonstrators observed funeral processions for two deceased hostages as they moved from Herzliya to Kibbutz Nir Oz (Southern district) via Highways 4 and 31, delaying movement along the thoroughfares. In the coming days, increasing concerns regarding the government’s capacity to secure additional hostage releases will sustain risks of protest activity, particularly in major urban centres. In the event of the IDF re-mobilising operations in Gaza, large-scale protests will almost certainly emerge in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv in the subsequent hours, likely disrupting operational and supply chain continuity therein.
- Lebanon’s government continues efforts to diversify its regional partnerships, elevating risks of tensions with LH. On 1 March, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun announced that he will request that Saudi Arabia resume its financial support for the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) during an upcoming diplomatic visit to the kingdom. Saudi Arabia suspended disbursements of a USD 3 bn aid package for the LAF in 2016 after Lebanon did not condemn mob attacks targeting Saudi diplomatic missions in Iran on 2 January 2016. The request highlights the Lebanese government’s continued efforts to bolster the LAF’s capacity and diversify its regional partnerships. If granted, the resumption of Saudi aid is highly likely to increase the LAF’s capacity and recruitment efforts; it would also likely signal broader Saudi engagement in Lebanon’s financial sector and long-term reconstruction projects. Even so, warming relations with Saudi Arabia will possibly increase political tensions between the Lebanese government and LH, elevating risks of protests and government instability in the medium-to-long term.
- The US announced additional weapons shipments to Israel, increasing reputational risks for firms in the aerospace, automotive and technology industries. On 1 March, the US State Department confirmed that it had approved three weapons shipments to Israel, valued at approximately USD 3bn and scheduled for delivery by 2027. The deliveries include bulldozer equipment, munition guidance systems and several high-payload munitions. Subsequently, on 2 March, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced that the Trump administration had approved over USD 12bn in military sales to Israel since taking office in January and would expedite the delivery of over USD 4bn in military equipment in the coming weeks. In the coming weeks, defence and technology firms supplying the deliveries will face elevated risks of protests and vandalism targeting their premises, increasing collateral risks for proximate installations. More broadly, firms associated with the shipments will also face elevated reputational and corporate governance concerns amid elevated risks of shareholder divestment and targeted boycotts. Additionally, firms engaged in the aerospace, automotive and engineering industries will also face elevated risks of targeting based on direct or tangential links to major US defence contractors, particularly in locations with active pro-Palestine movements.
- In Russia, risks of terror attacks targeting locations associated with the Jewish community will remain elevated ahead of the anniversary of the Crocus Hall attack in the capital Moscow on 22 March. On 3 March, Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) reported that its officers shot and killed an alleged terror operative in Moscow oblast. The suspect had reportedly acquired firearms and components for IED construction and planned to attack an undisclosed Jewish religious institution and a metro station. Risks of terror attacks in Russia will remain particularly elevated in the coming weeks due to the upcoming anniversary of the Islamic State attack on the Crocus Hall concert venue in Moscow oblast on 22 March 2024, which killed 145 people. Militants and sole perpetrators aiming to commemorate the 2024 attack will possibly target community centres, Jewish individuals and religious institutions, increasing security and bystander risks. In the capital Moscow, these risks will be particularly acute in areas with high-profile Jewish communities and religious institutions (such as Arbat, Kitay-Gorod and Maryina Roshcha). Attack risks will also remain elevated in St Petersburg (Leningrad oblast) and the Muslim-majority republics of Chechnya and Dagestan (both Russia).
- Israel will likely delay the full resumption of military operations in Gaza over the coming days, though it will likely increase its use of belligerent rhetoric. Without changes to either Hamas or Israel’s stance or new offers by mediators, resumption of conflict in Gaza is likely in the coming two weeks. However, efforts by mediators to delay the resumption of large-scale military operations, such as a planned visit by US envoys this week (combined with Israel’s security posture), indicate that such a resumption is unlikely in the coming days. Even so, due to the increasing tensions, there is a realistic possibility of sporadic rocket launches from Gaza towards Israel. Furthermore, an escalation in IDF strikes against militants in Gaza remains likely, elevating misidentification and bystander security risks. A resumption of war in Gaza will increase the risks of domestic unrest both in Israel and across the region, driving bystander risks to proximate staff and assets in major cities, including Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district) and Jerusalem (Jerusalem district).
- Israel: Stabbing attack highlights increasing security threats in Israeli cities. On 3 March, a dual Israeli and German national of the Druze faith killed one person and injured four others in a stabbing attack at Haifa Bay central bus station in Haifa (Haifa district). An early police investigation indicates that the local security forces shot the deceased victim, though their death was later confirmed as the result of stabbing wounds to the neck. Nevertheless, the incident highlights the elevated bystander security risks due to misidentification and crossfire amid an increasing risk of attacks across Israel. The risk of attacks will remain elevated throughout Israel this month, particularly across big cities, in crowded areas, on public transport (including hubs) and at places of worship. Attacks are likely to be low capability, such as stabbings and car rammings; small-arms attacks also remain possible, as do (to a lesser extent) IED attacks. In addition, as the perpetrator in the latest incident arrived in Israel a month ago, we assess there is a realistic possibility of further security questioning and delays for individuals arriving in Israel, elevating travel disruption risks.
- Turkey-Iraq: Risk of attacks by rogue PKK members remains elevated despite ceasefire. On 1 March, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) declared a ceasefire with the Turkish government following a statement by its jailed leader, Abdullah Öcalan, calling for the disarmament and dissolution of the group. The PKK also emphasised that it would not engage in any military activities unless attacked, though it made the release of Öcalan a condition for holding a congress to disarm itself. While the release of Öcalan is unlikely in the coming months, Ankara will likely engage in negotiations with PKK leadership to advance full disarmament through the possible release of other low-level PKK figures. While most armed clashes between both sides in northern Iraq will reduce in the coming days, we assess the likelihood of sporadic attacks in this region by rogue PKK members is elevated, underscoring the persistent risk of intra-PKK fracturing. This will sustain the risk of terror attacks against state-affiliated businesses in major Turkish cities in the coming three months. (Source: Sibylline)
06 Mar 25. Update: air strikes against Daesh. The RAF are continuing to take the fight to Daesh in Iraq and Syria. Royal Air Force aircraft continue to conduct armed reconnaissance patrols over Syria to counter Daesh terrorism threats, ready to strike such targets should they be identified. On Tuesday 25 February, a remotely-piloted Reaper aircraft tracked a known Daesh terrorist in the Aleppo Governate of north-west Syria. The Reaper’s crew kept a close watch on the individual: when he was seen alone on foot, and could be struck with minimal risk to any civilians, they successfully targeted the terrorist using the Reaper’s Hellfire missile system. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)
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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Home land Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.
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