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NEWS IN BRIEF – MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT

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Military And Security Developments

Feb 28.

  • Turkey-Iraq: Fracture of major party is likely despite leader’s announcement, driving attack risks. Late on 27 February, Turkish forces clashed with the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in northern Duhok governorate (Iraq), with reports of heavy gunfire and sporadic explosions. The clashes followed a statement earlier in the day by the jailed leader of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan, in which he called for the disarmament and dissolution of the group (see Sibylline Alert – 27 February 2025). Turkey will likely increase operations against PKK splinter groups in northern Iraq in the coming days and weeks, specifically targeting PKK camps in the Qandil Mountains (Erbil governorate), driving bystander security risks and threats to business assets in the region. A further fracturing of the PKK is likely, driving insurgency and retaliation cycles, elevating the risk of terror attacks against state-affiliated businesses in major Turkish cities, including the capital Ankara, Istanbul (Istanbul province) and Turkey’s south-eastern provinces. In the event of attacks, the Turkish government will likely undertake mass detentions of Kurds throughout the country, driving ethno-religious tensions and conflict escalation.
  • Business, mobility disruption will be elevated throughout Ramadan. Later on 28 February, the holy month of Ramadan will begin, lasting until 30 March. Most governmental services in the Middle East and North Africa region will operate at reduced capacity and working hours, elevating moderate business disruption risks. These risks will be particularly high in the banking and financial sectors throughout the month. Mobility disruption risks will be largely elevated over the next 30 days, especially during the evening hours following the Iftar, possibly affecting the logistics sector. These risks will be particularly high in the capitals Amman (Jordan), Ankara (Turkey), Baghdad (Iraq), Beirut (Lebanon) and Cairo (Egypt), likely triggering moderate travel delays. Risks of attacks will be moderately elevated near major Shia mosques in Iraq, Kuwait, Oman and Saudi Arabia. An augmented security posture in most cities in the region is almost certain, especially around major mosques and tourist attractions. We assess that all the aforementioned risks will be further elevated during the last ten days of Ramadan as millions of worshippers attend the evening prayers.

Feb 27.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

  • On 25 February, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) killed two individuals in airstrikes targeting military infrastructure in Daraa, Quneitra and Rif Dimashq governorates (all Syria).
  • On 25 February, a rocket launched from Rafah in southern Gaza (Palestinian Territories) malfunctioned and fell within the strip.
  • On 26 February, the IDF conducted a drone strike against a Lebanese Hizballah (LH) operative in northern Lebanon allegedly responsible for smuggling weapons from Syria.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND OVERALL FORECAST

  • Israel and Hamas completed the final hostage-prisoner exchange as part of Phase One of the ceasefire; an immediate extension into Phase Two remains unlikely.
  • Protest activity linked to hostage releases is highly likely to increase in Israel in the coming days, elevating operational disruption risks.
  • In Israel, increasing tensions within the coalition government will elevate the risk of legislative deadlock amid efforts to adopt the 2025 state budget.
  • Lebanon’s government survived a parliamentary confidence vote with support from Lebanese Hizballah (LH), underscoring easing government stability risks.
  • In Iran, increased uranium enrichment efforts will elevate the risk of further US sanctions and possibly even backing from Washington DC for direct Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear infrastructure in the coming months.
  • OVERALL FORECAST: The end of Phase One of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire will significantly elevate the risk of a resumption in armed conflict in Gaza, while also elevating security risks across Israel and the Red Sea.
  • On 25 February, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) killed two individuals in airstrikes targeting military infrastructure in Daraa, Quneitra and Rif Dimashq governorates (all Syria). The strikes followed a speech by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on 23 February in which he demanded the demilitarisation of Daraa and Quneitra, as well as Suwayda governorate (Syria). Further Israeli strikes in southern Syria, including Rif Dimashq, are likely over the coming weeks. Such strikes will elevate domestic unrest risks in major cities across Syria and prompt calls to retaliate against Israel, raising the risk of rising anti-government sentiment. However, the new Syrian government is unlikely to retaliate against Israel and likely lacks the capacity to enforce control over these areas. As such, armed conflict between Israel and Syria remains unlikely, though Syria will likely seek international support in condemning Israel’s presence in Syria. This will possibly further raise regional tensions but is unlikely to prompt Israel to withdraw from Syrian territory or adjust its force posture in the coming weeks.
  • On 25 February, a rocket launched from Rafah in southern Gaza (Palestinian Territories) malfunctioned and fell within the strip. The IDF subsequently conducted an airstrike targeting the launch site. This came during a period in which the IDF claimed it was indefinitely suspending the release of Palestinian prisoners until Hamas agreed it would no longer hold large-scale public ceremonies around hostage releases. The incident underscores the relationship between the increased likelihood of attempted rocket strikes and periods of heightened instability in the Israel-Hamas ceasefire. In the event of a breakdown in the ceasefire, the risk of rocket attacks will increase across Israel, including attacks launched by the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen. However, any uptick in rocket strikes from Gaza targeting Israel is likely to be temporary and limited, only moderately increasing security risks.
  • On 26 February, the IDF conducted a drone strike against a Lebanese Hizballah (LH) operative in northern Lebanon allegedly responsible for smuggling weapons from Syria. The IDF targeted the operative’s vehicle along the Hermel-Qusayr road (Baalbek-Hermel governorate, Lebanon) close to the Lebanon-Syria border. The operative, Marwan eli netzer Aladdin, belonged to LH’s Unit 4400, which is responsible for smuggling weapons into Lebanon. IDF strikes targeting smuggling routes across Lebanon will likely continue in the coming weeks despite the Israel-Hizballah ceasefire, sustaining elevated bystander risks along roads near the Lebanon-Syria border as well as in the vicinity of border crossings. However, such strikes are unlikely to result in a breakdown of the ceasefire in the coming weeks.
  • Additional emergency information:

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

  • Israel and Hamas completed the final hostage-prisoner exchange as part of Phase One of the ceasefire; an immediate extension into Phase Two remains unlikely. On 26 February, Hamas released four deceased hostages from Gaza; the Israeli authorities subsequently released over 600 Palestinian prisoners from Israeli detention facilities. This marks the final hostage-prisoner exchange under Phase One of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement. Phase One will expire on 2 March. Despite substantial international pressure to negotiate an immediate transition into Phase Two (which would include a permanent ceasefire, as well as the release of all remaining hostages and a complete IDF withdrawal from Gaza), negotiations have repeatedly stalled. Although US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff stated on 26 February that he has spoken with representatives from Egypt, Israel and Qatar on several occasions in recent days, Hamas released a statement earlier on 27 February calling for Israel to ‘start’ negotiations on Phase Two. As such, it is unlikely that formal negotiations have progressed. Amid reports that Israeli and US representatives are seeking an extension of the temporary Phase One ceasefire in exchange for staggered hostage releases, Hamas also indicated that it has not received any formal proposals regarding a ceasefire extension. Diplomatic deadlock will likely persist in the coming days, substantially undermining prospects for an immediate ceasefire transition.
  • Protest activity linked to hostage releases is highly likely to increase in Israel in the coming days, elevating operational disruption risks. On 25 and 26 February, demonstrations emerged in central and southern Israel to mark the release and burials of deceased hostages. If the Israeli government fails to secure a ceasefire extension facilitating additional hostage releases, large-scale protests will almost certainly emerge in major cities in the coming days. The largest demonstrations are likely in Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) and Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district). While protests will likely remain broadly peaceful, they are highly likely to block key thoroughfares, elevating the risk of operational and travel disruption. Smaller-scale demonstrations are also highly likely to target key intersections along major highways in Central, Northern and Southern districts (all Israel), elevating the risk of supply chain disruption. On 26 February, the anti-government activist group Shift 101 also called for demonstrators to engage in a campaign of civil disobedience if the government fails to secure further hostage releases. The group has called for protesters to gather along Gaza Road in Jerusalem at 1600hrs (local time) on 2 March; the demonstration is highly likely to disrupt movement through the Rehavia area in the coming days and will possibly impact labour flexibility, though it is unlikely to trigger substantial unrest.
  • In Israel, increasing tensions within the coalition government will elevate the risk of legislative deadlock amid efforts to adopt the 2025 state budget. On 26 February, the leader of the ultra-Orthodox United Torah Judaism (UTJ) party, Yitzchak Goldknopf, re-iterated threats to trigger a general election unless the government passes legislation granting broad conscription exemptions to ultra-Orthodox men. Goldknopf indicated that UTJ will vote against the 2025 state budget unless the government adopts conscription exemption legislation in the coming weeks; the government does not have a sufficient majority to pass the budget without UTJ’s support. If the Knesset does not approve the budget by 31 March, the government will automatically dissolve, triggering a general election. In the coming weeks, coalition parties are highly likely to continue leveraging concerns regarding government stability to secure concessions on various policy initiatives, such as conscription legislation, settlement expansion in the West Bank (Palestinian Territories) and the resumption of IDF operations in Gaza. Such leveraging will elevate the risk of policy deadlock and possibly anti-government protests in major cities, particularly among pro- and anti-conscription movements.
  • Lebanon’s government survived a parliamentary confidence vote with support from Lebanese Hizballah (LH), underscoring easing government stability risks. On 26 February, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam’s government won a confidence vote in the Lebanese parliament. Crucially, this included the support of LH. As the group was excluded from the coalition government upon its formation in January, this marks a substantial shift in LH’s stance towards Salam’s cabinet. LH’s support for the government highlights the group’s substantial desire to prioritise the restoration of its weakened military capacity, political influence and domestic popularity. Although this approach will moderate the risk of government instability in the short term, tensions between LH and the government will almost certainly remain elevated vis-à-vis possible efforts to disarm the group, per the Israel-Hizballah ceasefire. Although the Lebanese government is unlikely to enforce the ceasefire’s disarmament clauses rigorously, there is a realistic possibility that efforts to restrict LH’s rearmament efforts will trigger protests and unrest. Enforcement efforts are also highly likely to undermine the group’s support for the government, sustaining latent government stability risks.
  • In Iran, increased uranium enrichment efforts will elevate the risk of further US sanctions and possibly even backing from Washington DC for direct Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear infrastructure in the coming months. On 26 February, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported that Iran has significantly increased its production and accumulation of highly enriched uranium (60% purity) in recent months. The agency also reported that there has been little progress in resolving outstanding monitoring and reporting issues, including unexplained uranium traces at undeclared sites. The report reflects increasing concerns regarding Iran’s possible development of a nuclear weapon. Iran will likely continue to prohibit IAEA experts from entering the country, undermining the oversight of its nuclear programme. In response, the US is highly likely to continue expanding sanctions targeting key Iranian industries in the coming months, as part of the ‘Maximum Pressure’ campaign. The expansion and enforcement of US sanctions is highly likely to increase compliance concerns for regionally engaged firms, particularly in the oil and shipping industries. Additionally, if Iran continues to accumulate highly enriched uranium, US backing for a direct Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear infrastructure will likely increase. We assess that such a strike will remain a realistic possibility in the coming months, driving the risk of armed conflict and substantial regional instability through 2025.

OVERALL FORECAST

The end of Phase One of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire will significantly elevate the risk of a resumption in armed conflict in Gaza, while also elevating security risks across Israel and the Red Sea. There is a realistic possibility that Israel’s prioritisation of a number of ongoing military objectives in Lebanon, Syria and the West Bank will delay the resumption of hostilities in Gaza in the immediate aftermath of the end of Phase One, effectively resulting in an informal extension of Phase One. However, without a formal agreement and/or negotiations on Phase Two, a resumption in armed conflict in Gaza is increasingly likely. A resumption of armed conflict will elevate the likelihood of an uptick in rocket launches from Gaza targeting Israeli population centres in southern and, to a lesser extent, central districts, moderately elevating attack risks and impacting business operations. In turn, widespread IDF operations would likely resume across northern, central and southern Gaza. The resumption of operations in Gaza would likely have a knock-on effect on the IDF’s presence in the West Bank, elevating militant attack risks in the West Bank, Jerusalem and Israel, particularly during Ramadan. Furthermore, a resumption of hostilities during Ramadan is likely to elevate domestic unrest risks across the region, particularly in Jordan, Iraq and Turkey, exacerbating anti-West and (particularly) anti-US sentiment. This would likely elevate local hostility to foreign investment, including boycotts on US brands. A breakdown in the ceasefire would also likely prompt the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen to resume their attacks on Israel and maritime vessels in the Red Sea, elevating global supply chain disruption risks.

  • Iran: Increased uranium enrichment will drive regional security risks, elevate diplomatic tensions. On 26 February, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported that Iran has increased its production and accumulation of highly enriched uranium (60% purity) significantly in recent months. It also reported there has been little progress in resolving outstanding issues, including unexplained uranium traces at undeclared sites. The report reflects serious international concerns surrounding Iran’s prospective development of a nuclear weapon, increasing the likelihood of censure resolutions by the IAEA and further international sanctions against Iran. These developments will increase socio-economic health and compliance risks for Iran and further elevate diplomatic tensions between Tehran and the West. Iran will likely continue to prohibit IAEA experts from entering the country, undermining the oversight of its nuclear programme and driving nuclear safety risks. We assess that a direct US-backed Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear infrastructure in 2025 remains a realistic possibility, particularly if Iran continues to accumulate highly enriched uranium. Such a strike would significantly increase the risk of armed conflict and exacerbate regional instability.
  • Lebanon: Confidence vote win will partially mitigate against security, economic instability in 2025. On 26 February, the new Lebanese government, headed by Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, won a confidence vote in the parliament, including with the support of Lebanese Hizballah (LH). The shift in LH’s stance towards the new government is likely driven by the group’s desire to prioritise rebuilding its weakened military capacity and restoring its political influence and domestic popularity. This approach will reduce the risk of political unrest in the medium term. However, several flashpoints are likely to persist between LH and the new government, particularly regarding disarmament plans for all Lebanese factions, though these are unlikely to be enforced. We also assess that the formation of the new government will partially mitigate against security and economic instability in 2025, boosting international investment in the infrastructure, energy and tourism sectors. Government stability will also likely prompt Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries to support Lebanon’s deteriorating banking and financial sectors by extending loans to the government. These will likely help stabilise the Lebanese pound (LBP) and ease banks’ insolvency in the coming year.

Feb 26.

  • Iraq: BP agreement will reduce energy security risks, elevate tensions between Baghdad, Erbil. On 25 February, Iraq’s Ministry of Oil and BP signed an agreement worth USD 25 bn to invest in four oil fields in Kirkuk governorate. The deal provides for the redevelopment of the fields and includes options for future oil exploration, underscoring the Iraqi government’s efforts to strengthen its oil production capabilities. The deal will reduce energy security risks over the coming three years, with related construction work likely to start within the coming 12 months. The deal will likely create job opportunities for citizens and business opportunities for local companies, driving economic growth and moderating socio-economic health risks for Kirkuk. However, the absence of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in the decision-making process will likely elevate tensions between the local authorities and Baghdad. This will elevate domestic unrest risks, driving energy-based supply chain disruption. While there are security risks emanating from possible sporadic clashes between the Kurdish Peshmerga and Iraqi authorities, we assess that armed conflict remains unlikely.
  • Israel-Syria: Strikes have elevated regional tensions, domestic unrest risks; armed conflict is unlikely. On 25 February, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) killed two individuals in airstrikes targeting military infrastructure in Daraa, Quneitra and Rif Dimashq governorates (all Syria). The IDF confirmed the strikes, claiming it targeted weapons stores in southern Syria. The strikes likely reflect Israeli efforts to create a new demilitarised zone following demands by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on 23 February for the demilitarisation of southern Syria. In the coming days, further strikes are likely, particularly in border areas, elevating security and bystander risks. Such strikes would also elevate domestic unrest risks across Syria and tensions between the new Syrian government and Israel. However, we assess the new Syrian government is unlikely to have the capacity to respond, and that armed conflict between the two states remains unlikely.

Feb 25.

  • Syria-EU: Suspension of sanctions will moderate energy security, socio-economic health risks. On 24 February, the EU suspended a range of restrictions and sanctions on banking, energy and transportation sectors in Syria. The move is highly likely to increase the availability of affordable and legal energy supply. Since the start of the civil war, power has been supplied to much of the population through several illicit entities and the informal economy. This will moderate energy security risks and mitigate operational and compliance threats to businesses and NGOs. Furthermore, the lifting of sanctions will likely increase inflows of investment by European companies into Syria, with increased aid and reconstruction efforts improving socio-economic conditions. Efforts to rehabilitate key infrastructure to full capacity, including the thermal power plant in Baniyas (Tartus governorate), are also likely and will further moderate energy security risks. The bloc also eased restrictions on five commercial banks and Syria’s central bank, underscoring the perceived moderation of money laundering risks. However, we assess that the persistent presence of armed groups will sustain exposure to money laundering for firms engaging with local financial institutions.
  • Iraq: New sanctions targeting companies affiliated with Iran-backed militias are likely. On 24 February, unnamed Iraqi officials leaked to local media that Baghdad is attempting to prevent US sanctions against leaders of the Iran-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and affiliated companies. The sanctions will likely target three financial and three transportation companies, all operating within the Iraqi oil fleet, increasing compliance risks in the banking and energy sectors. We assess that Washington DC will likely issue such sanctions in March to pressure Baghdad into disarming Iran-backed militias and limiting Tehran’s political influence in Iraq. However, given the significant political influence of the PMF in Iraq as well as its crucial role in supporting internal security with the Iraqi army, full disarmament is highly unlikely. We assess that this will represent a significant flashpoint between Baghdad and the Trump administration, elevating risks of further US sanctions in 2025, particularly those targeting the financial sector, impacting operations in several local banks.

Feb 24.

  • On 20 February, three IEDs placed on Israeli buses detonated in central Israel; though they did not result in any injuries, the incident reflects elevated security risks across Israel.
  • On 23 February, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) expanded its operations in the northern West Bank and deployed a tank platoon to Jenin (Jenin governorate).
  • On 24 February, international news outlets reported that Lebanese Hizballah’s (LH) leadership had ordered non-resident operatives to evacuate from southern Lebanon.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND OVERALL FORECAST

  • Increasing tensions between Israel and Hamas regarding ceasefire violations and hostage releases are highly likely to undermine ceasefire mediation efforts.
  • Demonstrations linked to hostage releases will likely continue undermining operational disruption in Israel.
  • Stabilising security conditions in Israel’s Northern district highlights decreasing risks of operational disruption for locally engaged firms.
  • Risks of sole-perpetrator attacks targeting individuals and installations associated with the Jewish and Israeli communities in Europe will likely increase in the coming weeks amid elevated ethno-religious tensions linked to the Middle East Crisis.
  • Elevated ethno-religious tensions will also likely sustain risks of attempted attacks targeting Israeli embassies worldwide; however, an elevated security posture will moderate risks of successful, high-capacity attacks.
  • On 20 February, three IEDs placed on Israeli buses detonated in central Israel; though they did not result in any injuries, the incident reflects elevated security risks across Israel. At approximately 2030hrs (local time) on 20 February, a bus exploded at a parking lot on Ha-Amal Street in the Bat Yam area (Tel Aviv district). Shortly afterwards, two additional buses exploded in the parking lot of the Country Bat Yam country club (Tel Aviv); the police later confirmed that all the explosions had been triggered by IEDs detonated within the vehicles. The Israeli police also discovered and deactivated a fourth IED weighing 5kg in a bus parked at the Wolfson Medical Center in Holon (Tel Aviv). A message left on the IED in Holon indicates Palestinian militants from Tulkarm (Tulkarm governorate, West Bank) were likely involved in the attempted attack. The incident highlights the continued efforts by Palestinian militants to conduct terror attacks targeting civilians in Israel, sustaining elevated security risks in Israeli population centres, particularly in central Israel. The Israeli security forces will likely adopt a heightened posture within Israel and at border crossings in the coming weeks. This will elevate travel disruption and supply chain continuity risks, particularly for cross-border movement between Israel, Jordan and the West Bank. • On 23 February, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) expanded its operations in the northern West Bank and deployed a tank platoon to Jenin (Jenin governorate). Following the attempted IED attack on 20 February (see above) the IDF bolstered its forces in the northern West Bank with infantry forces from the Duvdevan Unit and the Nahal Brigade. The IDF deployed a platoon of three tanks from the 188th Brigade to Jenin (Jenin governorate). This marks the first tank deployment into the West Bank since 2002 and likely reflects Israeli efforts to deter militant activity and attacks as opposed to conducting offensive operations. Even so, in the coming weeks, the IDF will likely continue expanding operations in the northern West Bank, possibly to new Palestinian population centres, sustaining elevated security and bystander risks therein. Furthermore, the continuation of intense military operations in the West Bank will elevate risks of radicalisation among Palestinian civilians, particularly during the Ramadan period (28 February to 30 March). These will further increase risks of attacks targeting the Israeli security forces and Israeli civilians in the West Bank and Jerusalem areas, as well as in major Israeli cities (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 20 February 2025). Attacks, including car-ramming, shooting attacks and stabbings will likely primarily target IDF positions, major roads, public transportation and public transportation hubs.
  • On 24 February, international news outlets reported that Lebanese Hizballah’s (LH) leadership had ordered non-resident operatives to evacuate from southern Lebanon. The reported order comes as LH has replenished some of its forces with operatives from Syria in the past month. The evacuation order likely signals that the organisation is primarily focusing on reconstituting its military capabilities rather than engaging in further armed clashes with Israel. This approach will likely decrease the risks of resumed armed conflict in the coming weeks and reduce pressure on the Israel-Hizballah ceasefire agreement. However, there is a realistic possibility of sporadic clashes and kinetic exchanges between IDF personnel and Lebanon-based militants in southern Lebanon in the coming days, sustaining the threat of misidentification and, as a result, bystander and security risks.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND OVERALL FORECAST

  • Increasing tensions between Israel and Hamas regarding ceasefire violations and hostage releases are highly likely to undermine ceasefire mediation efforts. On 20 February, Hamas released the remains of four Israeli hostages. However, on 21 February, the Israeli medical authorities announced that while three of the deceased individuals had been positively identified, the fourth individual could not be identified, indicating that it was not the hostage that Hamas had agreed to release. Although Hamas subsequently transferred the positively identified remains of the hostage to the Red Cross later on 22 February, the incident exacerbated already-elevated tensions between Israel and Hamas regarding the extension of the ceasefire into Phase Two. On 22 February, Hamas released six living hostages from Gaza, though Israel indefinitely delayed the corresponding release of over 600 Palestinian prisoners, citing Hamas’ violation of the agreement by routinely hosting high-profile hostage release ceremonies. In response, Hamas stated it would not engage in mediated ceasefire negotiations until Israel released the prisoners. Unverified reports indicate that Israel will possibly release the prisoners if Hamas refrains from holding a high-profile ceremony during the scheduled release of four deceased hostages on 24 February. Escalating disputes regarding ceasefire violations are highly likely to undermine efforts to facilitate an immediate transition from Phase One into Phase Two. As such, the IDF will likely remobilise ground operations in Gaza in the coming weeks, driving conflict escalation and attack risks in Israel and the Palestinian Territories.
  • Demonstrations linked to hostage releases will likely continue undermining operational disruption in Israel. Hostage releases triggered demonstrations in Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) and Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district) from 20 February to 23 February, moderately disrupting movement through central areas. On 26 February, three deceased hostages (Shiri, Ariel and Kfir Bibas) will be buried near Kibbutz Nir Oz (Southern district). Although the funeral will be a private event, the Hostage and Missing Families’ Forum has called for the public to gather along the funeral procession’s route from Rishon LeZion (Central district) to Nir Am (Southern district) from 0745hrs to 0915hrs (local time). The demonstrations will elevate risks of temporary travel and supply chain disruption along Highway 4, including to and from the Port of Ashdod (Southern district). The Israeli Business Forum has also announced that numerous private-sector businesses will delay the start of the working day to allow employees to attend the procession, highlighting moderate risks of operational disruption and labour flexibility concerns. The scheduled release of four additional deceased hostages on 24 February will likely trigger similar pro-agreement protests and public commemorations in the coming days, sustaining travel, operational and supply chain disruption risks for locally engaged firms.
  • Stabilising security conditions in Israel’s Northern district highlights decreasing risks of operational disruption for locally engaged firms. On 23 February, the IDF’s Home Front Command (HFC) announced that it had lifted all remaining restrictions on gatherings and activities in population centres on the Israel-Lebanon border. The HFC initially imposed restrictions on residency, gathering size and civilian activity in northern Israel due to sustained LH rocket attacks and the subsequent escalation of the Israel-Hizballah war. The designation will facilitate the resumption of ‘full activity’ in Israeli population centres throughout the Northern district and highlight the stabilising security risk environment in northern Israel. As the Israel-Hizballah ceasefire continues to hold, a significant shift in HFC restrictions remains unlikely, moderating risks of operational disruption for locally engaged firms. However, ad hoc adjustments remain possible based on developments in cross-border tensions in the coming months.
  • Risks of sole-perpetrator attacks targeting individuals and installations associated with the Jewish and Israeli communities in Europe will likely increase in the coming weeks amid elevated ethno-religious tensions linked to the Middle East Crisis. On 22 February, a sole perpetrator stabbed and severely injured a Spanish national visiting the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe in Germany, in the capital Berlin. The German police reported that the perpetrator was a Syrian asylum seeker who stated he hoped to ‘kill Jews’, possibly due to elevated ethno-religious tensions. The attack highlights elevated risks of attacks targeting individuals in locations associated with the Jewish and Israeli communities in Germany including community centres, Holocaust memorials and religious institutions. Although risks of targeted violence will be most acute for Israeli and Jewish individuals, risks of misidentification and broader bystander risks will sustain threats to individuals frequenting targeted locations. The possible resumption of IDF operations in Gaza during the Ramadan period (28 February to 30 March) will increase the risks of an uptick in sole-perpetrator attacks in the coming weeks, particularly in Austria, France, Germany and Sweden.
  • Elevated ethno-religious tensions will also likely sustain risks of attempted attacks targeting Israeli embassies worldwide; however, an elevated security posture will moderate risks of successful, high-capacity attacks. On 21 February, the German police confirmed the arrest of a Russian national for planning an explosive attack in Berlin, possibly targeting the Israeli embassy. Also on 21 February, the Swedish police arrested three individuals near the Israeli embassy in the capital Stockholm on suspicion of planning to commit a violent crime. Similarly, on 21 February, the Turkish authorities announced they had arrested an Uzbek national on suspicion of planning attacks targeting the Israeli consulate, Jewish schools and various synagogues in Turkey. The arrests highlight sustained risks of violence and criminal activity targeting locations associated with the Israeli government, particularly in major cities in Europe. Although an elevated security posture from the police will likely moderate risks of critically successful attacks in the coming weeks, risks of targeted violence and attacks will sustain collateral and bystander risks.

OVERALL FORECAST

Israel’s Defence Minister announced that he ordered the IDF to maintain positions in three areas of the West Bank for a year, increasing risks of attacks and domestic unrest. On 23 February, Defence Minister Israel Katz announced that approximately 40,000 Palestinians have been ‘evacuated’ from Jenin (Jenin governorate), Nur Shams and Tulkarm (both Tulkarm governorate) during IDF operations in recent weeks. Katz also announced that the IDF will remain within these locations for the coming year to prevent the return of displaced populations. Despite Katz’s statement, we assess that the IDF are highly unlikely to maintain positions within these locations throughout the coming year or to forcibly prevent the return of displaced populations during this time. Even so, the announcement and any prolonged IDF presence in the northern West Bank will likely exacerbate already-elevated ethno-religious tensions, increasing radicalisation and domestic unrest risks among the Palestinian population, particularly during the Ramadan period (28 February to 30 March). As such, attack risks will likely increase in the West Bank, Jerusalem and Israel in the coming months. Attacks will likely target Israeli positions in the West Bank, particularly checkpoints and border crossings, elevating bystander risks. Attempts to conduct sole perpetrator and militant attacks targeting Israeli civilians will also remain likely in the West Bank, Jerusalem and Israel, particularly targeting crowded public areas, public transportation, roads, transportation hubs and worship locations. More broadly, Katz’s announcement and a prolonged IDF presence in the northern West Bank will increase risks of pro-Palestine protests and domestic unrest risks across the region, particularly in Iraq, Jordan and Turkey. In the long term, there is also a realistic possibility of militant spillover into other parts of the West Bank, including central and southern West Bank, elevating risks of militant recruitment, activity and attacks in these areas over the coming year.

  • Syria: Government-SDF oil deal to moderate threats to energy security, reduce operational risks. On 22 February, Syria’s oil ministry announced that the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the country’s north-east had started providing oil from local fields to the central government in the capital Damascus. The SDF has begun transporting 5,000 barrels per day (bpd) for use in refineries in Syria’s east and is also likely to start providing gas via the country’s pipeline in the coming weeks. The deal will likely mitigate energy security risks in Syria, reducing the threat of power cuts and shortages of refined oil. Consequently, this will likely moderate socio-economic risks and reduce operational risks for businesses. In the coming weeks, the deal will likely reduce tensions between the central government and SDF, tempering ethno-religious tensions and moderating conflict risks. However, we assess that the risk of militants, including the Islamic State (IS), attacking convoys transferring oil will remain elevated, sustaining security risks.
  • Syria: New military council will exacerbate ethno-religious tensions, instability in southern Syria. On 23 February, local factions in the Suwayda governorate announced the formation of the Suwayda Military Council, to co-ordinate between local military factions and enhance local security. Shortly after, the Suwayda’s Joint Operations Room, affiliated with the new government, stated that the new council was illegitimate. While no further details were disclosed, the new council is highly likely formed by factions from the Druze community, likely increasing ethno-religious tensions with Damascus in the coming days. These tensions will increase the possibility of armed clashes between Syria’s newly restructured military and several Druze factions in the Suwayda governorate as Damascus seeks to consolidate its control over the strategic area. Any direct confrontations between both sides will China-Taiwan: Further undersea cable incidents are likely amid heightened cross-strait tensions

Earlier on 25 February, Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration (CGA) detained the Togolese-registered vessel Hongtai 168 and its eight-member Chinese crew on grounds of possible sabotage. This followed the severing of the No.3 telecommunications cable between Taiwan and its outlying Penghu Islands at approximately 0300hrs (local time) 9.1 miles (14.7km) off the coast of Tainan city. Communication between Taiwan and Penghu was unaffected as services were rerouted. The CGA stated that Chinese ‘grey-zone’ activity ‘could not be ruled out’ as Hongtai 168 had been anchored near the damaged cable. This marks the fifth telecommunication cable malfunction in Taiwan in 2025. We assess that China was highly likely responsible for at least some of these cases given its intent to undermine Taiwan’s security (see Sibylline Special Report – 23 January 2025). Further incidents are likely over the coming months, particularly during periods of heightened cross-strait tensions. We assess that most incidents are unlikely to cause significant disruption to internet services in Taiwan and will likely focus on cables connecting Taiwan’s outlying islands. (Source: Sibylline)

 

27 Feb 25. Israeli Airstrike Kills Senior Hezbollah Operative Involved in Arms Smuggling. An Israeli air strike on Wednesday killed Mahran Ali Nasr al-Din, a senior operative within Hezbollah’s Unit 4400. The strike occurred near the town of Al-Qusayr, situated along the Lebanese-Syrian border. According to a statement from the Israeli Defense Forces, (IDF) Unit 4400 serves as Hezbollah’s weapons acquisition and transfer division, primarily responsible for smuggling arms into Lebanon from Iran and its affiliates. The IDF added that since its inception in 2000, the unit has established multiple smuggling routes along the Syria-Lebanon border to bolster Hezbollah’s arsenal.

“Mahran Ali Nasser Al-Din played a significant role in Hezbollah’s weapons smuggling operations, and he was directly involved in coordinating with smugglers operating along the Syria-Lebanon border,” the IDF added.

Lebanon’s National News Agency (NNA) confirmed in its report that an Israeli drone conducted another airstrike in Hermel. “An enemy drone targeted a vehicle on the Hermel-Qasr road, leaving one dead and one wounded,” the news outlet said.  (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

 

 

26 Feb 25. Israel Warns Attempts to Establish Syrian Military Presence in Southern Security Zone to Be ‘Met with Fire.’ Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz has warned that “any attempt by the Syrian regime forces and the country’s terrorist organizations to establish themselves in the security zone in southern Syria will be met with fire.” The statement comes amid reports of ongoing Israeli airstrikes around Damascus.  Katz confirmed that the Israeli forces are now “attacking strongly” in southern Syria as part of a “new policy” to pacify the region. “We will not endanger the security of our citizens,” he added. On Tuesday, additional airstrikes believed to be carried out by Israel, were reported in Quneitra and Daraa, located in the southwest of Syria. Unconfirmed reports also claimed that Israeli forces advanced into the northern part of Quneitra Governorate, deploying military vehicles and equipment.  In a statement on Tuesday, the IDF said it targeted military sites including command centers and several weapon storage locations, in southern Syria.

“The presence of military forces and assets in the southern part of Syria pose a threat to Israeli civilians. The IDF will continue to operate in order to remove any threat to Israelis,” IDF said in a post on X.  (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

 

23 Feb 25. Israeli tanks moved into the occupied West Bank on Sunday for the first time in decades in what Palestinian authorities called a “dangerous escalation,” after the defense minister said troops will remain in parts of the territory for a year and tens of thousands of Palestinians who have fled cannot return. Associated Press journalists saw several tanks move along unpaved tracks into Jenin, long a bastion of armed struggle against Israel. Israel is deepening its crackdown on the Palestinian territory and has said it is determined to stamp out militancy amid a rise in attacks. It launched the offensive in the northern West Bank on Jan. 21 — two days after the current ceasefire in Gaza took hold — and expanded it to nearby areas. Palestinians view the deadly raids as part of an effort to cement Israeli control over the territory, where 3 m Palestinians live under military rule. (Source: Defense News Early Bird/AP)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Home land Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

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