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Military And Security Developments
Feb 21.
- Turkey: Arrest of IS member planning attacks against Jewish community underscores attack risks. On 19 February, the Turkish police confirmed the arrest of an Uzbek national in Istanbul (Istanbul province) suspected of planning co-ordinated terror attacks against Jewish schools and synagogues in Turkey and abroad. The security forces claim the suspect was in contact with an official in the Islamic State (IS) Asia branch, had no terrorist record and entered Turkey legally from an unspecified European country. Following the arrest, several Jewish institutions in Turkey have bolstered their private security posture. The arrest highlights elevated terrorism risk in Turkey targeting the Jewish community, elevating bystander security risks near Jewish institutions. Targeted attacks against Jewish individuals also remain a realistic possibility, elevating risks for Jewish personnel in the country, particularly in large cities such as Istanbul and the capital Ankara. We assess that the Turkish authorities will likely heighten their security posture and conduct additional counter-terrorism operations across Turkey in the coming days, moderately elevating travel disruption risks.
Feb 20.
- On 17 February, the IDF conducted a widespread arrest operation across the West Bank (Palestinian Territories). The IDF claimed it arrested 25 terror suspects across the West Bank, including in Abu Dis (Jerusalem governorate), Hebron (Hebron governorate) and Rammun (Ramallah and al-Bireh governorate). Such operations will exacerbate radicalisation risks among Palestinians and elevate the likelihood of attacks against the Israeli security forces in the West Bank, driving bystander risks near checkpoints. Furthermore, there is a realistic possibility further such operations will be conducted during the Ramadan period (likely 28 February to 30 March). This will further elevate the risk of attacks in the coming month, including against the Israeli civilian population in the West Bank, as well as in Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) and other major Israeli cities, such as Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district).
- Israel has maintained troop deployments in five locations in southern Lebanon beyond the 18 February withdrawal deadline; it is also continuing to conduct operations in Lebanon. In line with our previous assessment, the IDF has continued to occupy five hill zones along the Israel-Lebanon border (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 17 February 2025). The IDF has also continued to try to prevent efforts by LH to rearm, striking an LH-operated vehicle in Ayta ash-Shaab (Nabatieh governorate, Lebanon) on 19 February for allegedly transporting weapons. Further such strikes against LH members and possibly also militant infrastructure in Lebanon are likely in the coming weeks. Further such strikes and the continued presence of IDF troops in Lebanon are unlikely to prompt significant clashes with LH in the coming two weeks. However, there is a realistic possibility that LH will organise civilian protests near IDF positions in Lebanon. Such protests will elevate tensions with the IDF and sustain the risk of misidentification and misfire, driving bystander security risks near protest locations in the coming weeks.
- On 19 February, the IDF conducted airstrikes against several armoured vehicles and tanks abandoned by the former Syrian military in Sa’sa’ (Rif Dimashq governorate, Syria). The IDF claims that the equipment had not yet been taken into possession by the new government. The strikes likely reflect a continuation of previous efforts to prevent the transfer of the Assad government’s arsenal to militants; they were likely prompted by increasing efforts by militants, including LH, to acquire abandoned armaments. Further sporadic IDF strikes in Syria are likely in the coming months, elevating bystander security risks (though these are unlikely to result in armed conflict between Israel and Syria).
- The final release of hostages under Phase One of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement will take place on 22 February, with demonstrations highly likely to continue in major Israeli cities. On 20 February, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) released the remains of four deceased hostages from Gaza, in line with the ceasefire agreement. Commemorative gatherings will likely take place in Jerusalem, Kibbutz Nir Oz (Southern district) and Tel Aviv; we assess that domestic unrest remains highly unlikely. Corresponding releases of Palestinian prisoners from Israeli prison facilities also took place earlier on 20 February, triggering gatherings in Khan Yunis (southern Gaza, Palestinian Territories) and Ramallah. The final hostage and prisoner releases scheduled for Phase One of the agreement will take place on 22 February, when Hamas is scheduled to release the six living hostages. The releases are highly likely to trigger substantial protest activity in major Israeli cities, with demonstrators calling for the government to secure additional hostage releases and extend the ceasefire into Phase Two. Although the office of Israel’s prime minister announced on 16 February that an Israeli delegation would attend ceasefire extension negotiations in Egypt, an immediate extension into Phase Two remains highly unlikely. Announcements regarding the ceasefire transition are highly likely to trigger large-scale anti-government protests in major Israeli cities, while also triggering an uptick in pro-Palestine protests worldwide. Demonstrations in Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Jordan and Turkey will likely attract significant attendance, increasing the risk of unrest and operational disruption, particularly in major cities.
- In Israel, a military court indicted five IDF personnel for allegedly abusing a Palestinian prisoner, increasing the risk of unrest by far-right groups. On 19 February, a military court indicted five reservists on charges of assault for allegedly abusing a Palestinian prisoner in the Sde Teiman military facility in July 2024. Following the arrests on 29 July, demonstrators opposing the investigation protested outside the facility before violently breaching the perimeter and injuring several security force personnel (see Sibylline Israel-Hamas War Update – 29 July 2024). Developments in the case and announcements regarding court proceedings will possibly trigger further protests by far-right activists, increasing the risk of unrest targeting military bases hosting military tribunals in Israel’s Southern district. Targeted vandalism and clashes with the security forces will increase bystander and incidental risks, though demonstrations are unlikely to attract a large-scale attendance.
- Israel’s enforcement of anti-UNRWA legislation will increase long-term socio-economic health concerns in East Jerusalem, driving the risk of unrest and attacks. On 18 February, a spokesperson for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) stated that the Israeli authorities had ordered the agency to close four schools in the East Jerusalem area. On 29 October, the Knesset passed legislation preventing UNRWA from operating in Israel, as well as in areas under its administration in East Jerusalem and the West Bank (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 31 October 2024). The enforcement of the legislation will possibly trigger protest activity in the East Jerusalem area in the coming days, moderately increasing the risk of localised unrest and altercations with the police. However, widespread unrest or protest-related violence remains unlikely, moderating threats to bystanders and business continuity. In the medium term, school closures will likely moderately undermine labour flexibility for locally engaged firms, while compounding broader socio-economic health concerns. In the long term, continued school closures are highly likely to sustain elevated ethno-religious tensions within the city, driving the risk of escalating unrest, sole-perpetrator attacks and militant activity.
- Targeted pro-Palestine activism and vandalism will almost certainly continue driving physical security and reputational concerns for Israeli-linked businesses in the UK. On 18 February, the police in Newcastle (UK) arrested six individuals associated with the Palestine Action group after they vandalised a building within the Armstrong Works engineering facility. Protesters targeted the location as it is partially operated by Pearson Engineering, a firm which was bought by the Israeli firm Rafael Advanced Defense Systems in 2022. The protesters broke into the warehouse complex, threw paint on the premises and displayed banners claiming that the facility produces weapons for the IDF in Gaza. Pearson has repeatedly denied producing weapons employed in Gaza, stating that it provides specialised mine-clearing equipment to the Ukrainian armed forces. The incident highlights persistent risks of targeted activism, protest and vandalism for firms linked to Israeli defence contractors, particularly Rafael. This risk will extend to tangentially linked firms, including sub-contractors, industrial parks and event venues, increasing reputational concerns and operational disruption risks. The threat will remain particularly elevated in the short-to-medium term due to the likely resumption of IDF operations in Gaza in the coming weeks.
OVERALL FORECAST
The risk of protests, unrest and attacks will increase in Israel and the Palestinian Territories during the Ramadan period (likely 28 February to 30 March). Although the Israeli authorities have not issued guidelines regarding access to the al-Aqsa Mosque compound in Jerusalem at the time of writing, they will possibly issue ordinances restricting access to the facility during Ramadan, as happened in 2024. Attempts to enforce restrictions and enact crowd-control measures will increase localised unrest risks in the Jerusalem area, particularly before and during Friday prayers. If IDF operations in Gaza resume during the Ramadan period, this will likely drive radicalisation and militant recruitment, elevating the risk of militant and sole-perpetrator attacks in Israel, East Jerusalem and the broader West Bank. Attack risks will remain particularly elevated near Israeli security force positions and settlements in the West Bank, increasing security and bystander risks. The risk of attacks targeting crowded public locations in major Israeli cities, public transport hubs and Jewish religious sites will also remain elevated, particularly from sole perpetrators wielding household items such as knives and other bladed instruments.
The funeral of LH leader Hassan Nasrallah on 23 February will significantly disrupt operational continuity in Beirut (Lebanon). Nasrallah’s funeral will take place in the Camille Chamoun Sports City Stadium at 1300hrs (local time), followed by a burial in Bourj el-Barajneh, between the Old Saida Road and the Beirut-Saida highway (see Sibylline Alert – 20 February 2025). Thousands of individuals will likely attend the funeral, with related gatherings almost certainly disrupting movement through southern Beirut. Mass attendance will increase the risk of crushes and minor altercations between attendees, increasing bystander risks. The security forces will almost certainly adopt an elevated posture in southern Beirut, compounding the risk of operational and supply chain disruption. LH will also likely erect numerous checkpoints throughout southern Beirut, further disrupting overland movement and increasing the risk of exposure to demands for bribes and facilitation payments. This will possibly drive ethno-religious tensions and trigger minor altercations, including after Friday prayers on 21 February (many attendees from overseas will arrive in Beirut in the days prior to the funeral). Even so, as numerous high-profile Shia individuals will attend the funeral (including LH’s leadership, associated militant leaders and political figures from across the region), the event represents a high-value target for attacks by rival militant groups and/or jihadist movements. The risk of attacks, ranging from low-capacity stabbings to higher-capacity IED/VBIED attacks, will remain elevated.
Lebanon’s Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) has announced that all flights from Beirut–Rafic Hariri International Airport (BEY) will be suspended between 1200hrs and 1600hrs (local time). The suspension of flights will almost certainly trigger substantial travel disruption in the coming days, while increased passenger flows at BEY will likely reduce the availability of commercial airline services. The aviation authorities in Iraq have also reported a significantly reduced availability of flights due to elevated demand, underscoring broader disruption to regional travel, particularly to and from areas with significant Shia populations.
- Iraq-Turkey: Kurdistan president’s disarmament call underscores peace efforts, likely PKK fracturing. On 18 February, Iraqi Kurdistan President Nechirvan Barzani called for the disarmament of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in a pre-recorded interview. The PKK’s jailed leader, Abdullah Öcalan, will likely call for the group’s disarmament in the coming weeks; this will likely drive fracturing within the PKK and elevate the risk of terrorism in Turkey, especially in major cities such as the capital Ankara and Istanbul (Istanbul province). Attacks will possibly involve small arms and IEDs, driving collateral risks for bystanders. Discontent with Öcalan’s announcement will likely drive domestic unrest, particularly in Kurdish-majority cities in Turkey’s south-east, elevating the risk of clashes with the security forces and arbitrary detentions, while exacerbating security threats near protest locations. In Iraq, hardline armed elements of the PKK in northern areas will possibly continue to conduct their insurgency, driving Turkish forces to target PKK camps in the Qandil mountains (Erbil governorate, Iraq). This will likely strain relations within the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), driving internal political instability and sustaining local security threats from Kurdish militants.
- Morocco: Thwarted terrorist plot underscores sustained risk of attacks. On 19 February, the authorities claimed they foiled an alleged plot by individuals affiliated with Islamic State-Sahel Province (ISSP) to attack key security facilities and public areas across Morocco. The statement followed a large anti-terror operation carried out by the national police in several cities, including Azemmour, Casablanca (both Casablanca-Settat region), Fez (Fez-Meknes region) and Tangier (Tangier-Tetouan-Al Hoceima region). In all, 12 individuals were arrested in the campaign and several homemade explosives were seized. We assess that further stop-and-search operations are likely in the coming days across Morocco, raising security risks in the aforementioned cities, as well as in the capital Rabat. These risks will also be higher in areas bordering Western Sahara, where security patrols are likely to be more frequent. An augmented security posture around governmental facilities, major tourist sites and traditional markets across Morocco is likely; however, major mobility disruption is unlikely.
Feb 19.
- Lebanon: Funeral will drive widespread transport disruption; exacerbate security risks. On 18 February, Lebanon’s Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) announced that all flights from Beirut–Rafic Hariri International Airport (BEY) will be suspended between 1200hrs and 1600hrs (local time) on 23 February during the funeral of Lebanese Hizballah (LH) leader Hassan Nasrallah. The suspension of flights will likely drive risks of travel and operational disruption over the weekend and days after due to increased passenger flows at the airport. The funeral will take place at the capital Beirut’s Camille Chamoun Sports City Stadium at 1300hrs (local time), followed by a burial in an unspecified location between the Old Saida Road and the Beirut-Saida Highway. We assess that significant overland movement disruption is likely during the funeral, particularly in Beirut’s Dahieh area and near BEY. A heightened security posture is almost certain throughout the southern suburbs of Beirut, possibly driving tensions between the authorities and attendees, elevating the risk of minor sporadic clashes and exacerbating bystander security risks.
- Syria: Integration of Kurdish forces into army will likely lower risks of major Turkish operation in 2025. On 17 February, Abu Omar al-Idlibi, a commander in the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), announced that a deal had been reached between the Kurds and Damascus to integrate the SDF into the restructured Syrian army. The deal will also include integrating the Kurdish security forces affiliated with the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) into the Syrian military. Notably, al-Idlibi added that both sides agreed to remove non-Syrian Kurdish fighters from the SDF’s ranks, likely referring to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) members. If the agreement is officially confirmed, we assess that it will likely be followed by a ceasefire in northern Syria between the Kurdish forces and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) as the fronts remain largely stabilised. Such an agreement, compounded with the expulsion of the PKK fighters, will likely reduce the risks of a direct Turkish operation against the SDF in 2025, driving partial stability in north-eastern Syria.
Feb 18.
- Turkey: Crackdown on alleged PKK members will drive unrest risks, undermine peace process. Earlier on 18 February, Turkish Minister of the Interior Ali Yerlikaya announced that the Turkish police had detained 282 alleged members of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), including academics, journalists and politicians. This comes as the jailed leader of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan, will likely call for the disarmament of the group in the coming weeks (see Sibylline Special Report – 11 February 2025). Protests are likely in south-eastern provinces and major cities, including the capital Ankara and Istanbul (Istanbul province), driving the risk of domestic unrest. The Turkish authorities are likely to employ heavy-handed tactics to control demonstrations, elevating the risk of sporadic clashes and exacerbating bystander security risks. Further arrests of Kurdish opposition figures are likely. We assess these would exacerbate ethno-religious tensions and human rights risks, possibly undermining the mooted peace deal between the government and the PKK, while driving the risk of attacks and conflict escalation with Kurdish groups in neighbouring Iraq and Syria.
- Iraq: Anti-IS campaign will elevate security, bystander risks in border regions. On 17 February, the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), in co-ordination with the Iraqi army, launched a large-scale security campaign targeting the Islamic State (IS) group in the desert region spanning across al-Anbar, Nineveh and Saladin governorates. We assess that the Iraqi army is highly likely to conduct airstrikes in this region in order to provide aerial cover for ground forces, significantly increasing collateral and misidentification risks, particularly in areas bordering Syria. Small arms engagements and IS’ use of IEDs along routes will exacerbate the threat during overland movement (particularly to logistics firms) in the coming days. Clearing operations are likely to be prolonged due to the region’s challenging terrain and extreme weather conditions, sustaining armed conflict risks in the coming weeks. We also assess that the Iraqi security forces will continue to close roads leading to the Syrian border, likely prolonging the current shutdown of the al-Qa’im border crossing, at least through March.
Feb 17.
- On 13 and 14 February, Lebanese protesters blocked routes to Beirut-Rafic Hariri International Airport (BEY) and attacked a UN convoy.
- On 16 February, the IDF killed three Hamas police officers in three airstrikes across central and southern Gaza.
- On 17 February, the IDF killed Muhammed Shaheen, the head of Hamas’ Operations Department in Lebanon, in a drone strike on a vehicle in Sidon (South governorate, Lebanon).
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND OVERALL FORECAST
- Despite significantly elevated tensions, the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement continues to hold, though an immediate extension into Phase Two remains highly unlikely.
- Pro-ceasefire protesters attended rallies in Israel’s major cities to mark 500 days since the 7 October 2023 attacks, increasing operational disruption risks.
- Regional diplomatic efforts to resolve tensions regarding possible US involvement in reconstruction efforts in Gaza continue at pace, with several conferences planned for the coming days.
- Israel’s Civil Administration issued land tenders for settlement expansion in the Bethlehem governorate, likely exacerbating ethno-religious tensions.
- Israel’s Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar will travel to the Belgian capital Brussels to meet with EU representatives, increasing risks of protest and localised unrest.
- Ethno-religious tensions linked to the Israel-Hamas war continue to drive risks of targeted violence worldwide.
- There is a realistic possibility Israel will maintain deployments to five positions across southern Lebanon, beyond the withdrawal deadline, elevating risks of violent domestic unrest in Lebanon and bystander risks.
- On 13 and 14 February, Lebanese protesters blocked routes to Beirut-Rafic Hariri International Airport (BEY) and attacked a UN convoy. Protests began on 13 February after Lebanese authorities prevented a Mahan Air flight from landing at BEY amid Israeli allegations that Iran is using civilian flights to smuggle funds to LH. Protesters holding LH flags blocked roads leading to BEY with burning tyres and clashed with Lebanese security forces, before being dispersed with tear gas. The demonstrations resumed on 14 February and protesters attacked a UN Interim Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL) convoy, injuring two peacekeepers including the force’s outgoing deputy commander. Lebanese security forces arrested 26 individuals in connection with the attack. Iran subsequently suspended all flights to Lebanon until 18 February in line with a request from the Lebanese government. LH will likely attempt to facilitate further anti-government unrest in the coming weeks to undermine support for the new government. Outbreaks of violence during such protests remain a realistic possibility, elevating security risks to bystanders, particularly for individuals and assets perceived as Western or pro-Western. Iranian attempts to smuggle funds and arms to LH will likely continue in the coming weeks, driving the risk of Iranian airstrikes on smuggling routes. Such strikes are most likely in Lebanese border areas, but there remains a possibility BEY will also be targeted. There is also a realistic possibility that Lebanese security forces will seek to augment their posture around BEY and on roads leading to the airport over the coming days, elevating travel disruption risks.
- On 16 February, the IDF killed three Hamas police officers in three airstrikes across central and southern Gaza. One of these strikes targeted allegedly armed individuals when they approached IDF troops close to the Philadelphi Corridor in southern Gaza, while the other two hit vehicles crossing through central Gaza on unauthorised roads. The incidents highlight currently elevated levels of alertness on the part of Israeli forces in Gaza, increasing bystander risks emanating from possible misidentification and misfire and likely driving allegations of ceasefire violations. Over the coming weeks, there is a realistic possibility militant groups will gradually escalate efforts to test IDF responsiveness in preparation for the possible collapse of the ceasefire, compounding the aforementioned security risks.
- On 17 February, the IDF killed Muhammed Shaheen, the head of Hamas’ Operations Department in Lebanon, in a drone strike on a vehicle in Sidon (South governorate, Lebanon). According to the IDF, Shaheen was recently involved in promoting Iranian-directed and funded terror plots from Lebanon against civilians in Israel as well as Jews abroad. The assassination highlights enduring bystander security risks across Lebanon, particularly during overland transit. Israel will likely continue targeting Hamas and LH personnel and assets across the coming weeks despite the Israel-Hizballah ceasefire.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND OVERALL FORECAST
- Despite significantly elevated tensions, the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement continues to hold, though an immediate extension into Phase Two remains highly unlikely. On 15 February, scheduled Hamas hostage releases and Israeli prisoner releases triggered celebratory demonstrations in major cities across Israel and the West Bank respectively. Despite significantly elevated tensions, the ceasefire agreement continues to hold and on 16 February, Israel’s Prime Minister’s Office announced that a delegation had been sent to Egypt to engage with mediators. However, the delegation will receive information regarding its mandate after Israel’s security cabinet meets on 17 February. Despite the re-engagement in negotiations an immediate transition into Phase Two of the agreement (which would establish a permanent ceasefire) remains highly unlikely.
- Pro-ceasefire protesters attended rallies in Israel’s major cities to mark 500 days since the 7 October 2023 attacks, increasing operational disruption risks. On 17 February, demonstrators gathered in major cities to call for the government to secure additional hostage releases under the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement. Rallies have emerged in Hostages’ Square in Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district) and on Gaza Street in Jerusalem (Jerusalem district), moderately disrupting movement through both cities. Demonstrators also temporarily blocked several major intersections, including the Glilot Ma’arav Interchange on Highway 2 (Tel Aviv), Ra’anana Junction on Highway 4 (Central district) and the Sha’ar Hanegev Junction on Highway 34 (Southern), disrupting overland movement. Several teachers and student unions have also announced plans for campus sit-ins and related pro-ceasefire demonstrations, increasing risks of travel disruption around university campuses in the coming hours, particularly in Beersheba (Southern), Haifa (Haifa district) and Herzliya (Tel Aviv). Although several pro-ceasefire groups have called for continued demonstrations in the coming days, substantial attendance remains unlikely, moderating risks of sustained disruption. Unrest and protest-related violence remain highly unlikely.
- Regional diplomatic efforts to resolve tensions regarding possible US involvement in reconstruction efforts in Gaza continue at pace, with several conferences planned for the coming days. On 17 February, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio travelled to Saudi Arabia as part of a regional diplomatic tour. While the visit will primarily facilitate Saudi-mediated talks between the US and Russia regarding Ukraine, Rubio is also highly likely to engage with Saudi leadership regarding possible US engagement in post-war reconstruction and administration of Gaza (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 6 February 2025). On 20 February, representatives from Egypt, Jordan, Qatar and the UAE will also attend a Saudi-hosted summit in Riyadh to discuss post-war reconstruction in Gaza. Egypt will then host an Arab League summit in the capital Cairo on 27 February. These conferences will increase risks of moderate travel disruption and delays in Cairo and Riyadh respectively, though major operational disruption remains highly unlikely. In the coming weeks, participating states will likely announce plans to finance major reconstruction efforts in Gaza. These plans will possibly include direct engagement in administrative capacity-building efforts, however, there is a realistic possibility that broader disputes regarding the PA and its role in Gaza will undermine efforts to reach a consensus on long-term governance arrangements in the enclave. Regional powers will possibly condition support for the PA on its engagement in substantial leadership reforms; however, such reforms remain unlikely in the short to medium term, sustaining diplomatic impasse. Additionally, Israel will almost certainly oppose post-war governance plans for Gaza involving the PA, driving deadlock and sustaining regional tensions.
- Israel’s Civil Administration issued land tenders for settlement expansion in the Bethlehem governorate, likely exacerbating ethno-religious tensions. On 16 February, the anti-settlement Peace Now organisation published a report stating that on 11 February, Israel’s Civil Administration issued a tender for approximately 1,000 new residences in the Efrat settlement (Bethlem governorate). The bidding process will begin on 2 March; if successful, the development would substantially increase the size and population of the settlement and limit the possible long-term expansion of the Bethlehem metropolitan area (Bethlehem). The tender process will possibly increase ethno-religious tensions in the southern West Bank, though an imminent uptick in militant activity remains unlikely. However, in the coming weeks, the Civil Administration’s continued approval of settlement expansions will likely embolden expansionist settlers to construct additional settlement outposts, increasing risks of clashes with Palestinian communities. Expanding settlement activity will also likely further exacerbate regional tensions vis-à-vis the Palestinian Territories.
- Israel’s Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar will travel to the Belgian capital Brussels to meet with EU representatives, increasing risks of protest and localised unrest. The visit, scheduled for 18 February, will likely trigger pro-Palestine demonstrations, particularly in the European Quarter, with an elevated security posture increasing risks of transit delays. To coincide with the visit, the pro-Palestine Hind Rajab foundation announced on 16 February that it had filed a complaint with the International Criminal Court (ICC) calling for the court to issue an arrest warrant and charge Sa’ar with war crimes and crimes against humanity. Given the short timeline, the ICC is highly unlikely to issue warrants during Sa’ar’s visit. However, the complaint highlights sustained risks of pro-Palestine organisations launching legal complaints against Israeli nationals with demonstrable links to government and military activity, particularly during travel to states where courts retain universal jurisdiction.
- Ethno-religious tensions linked to the Israel-Hamas war continue to drive risks of targeted violence worldwide. On 14 February, unidentified individuals attacked two Israeli nationals in the Greek capital, Athens; Israeli media reported that the perpetrators attacked the individuals with a knife after hearing them speak Hebrew. Though neither individual was seriously injured, the incident highlights elevated risks of violence targeting Israeli nationals and Jewish individuals while travelling, particularly in states with active pro-Palestine protest movements. Conversely, on 15 February, a sole perpetrator shot and injured two Jewish Israeli nationals in an attack on a vehicle in Miami (Florida, US). The perpetrator later stated he targeted the individuals as he thought they were Palestinian. The attack highlights elevated risks of violence targeting individuals perceived to belong to ethno-religious groups associated with the Israel-Hamas war, including misidentified individuals.
OVERALL FORECAST
There is a realistic possibility Israel will maintain deployments to five positions across southern Lebanon, beyond the withdrawal deadline, elevating risks of violent domestic unrest in Lebanon and bystander risks. Speculation over such a decision has increased after sources corroborated the plan to Israeli media. These positions have not been identified but there is a realistic possibility they comprise, Jabal Blat (South and Nabatieh governorates), Tal Aaziyyeh (Nabatieh governorate), Tal al Awida (Nabatieh), Tal al Hamamis (Nabatieh) and Tal Labbouneh (South governorate). The Lebanese government has stated that while it opposes any Israeli presence in southern Lebanon following 18 February, it will resolve any Israeli presence by diplomacy and not by force.
Israel’s continued presence in southern Lebanon is likely to elevate risks of domestic unrest in large cities across Lebanon, particularly the capital Beirut. LH will likely seek to encourage and support these protests, further elevating tensions between the group and the new government, driving risks of localised violence and associated bystander risks. LH will likely also encourage displaced residents of southern Lebanon to return to their communities, increasing the risk of clashes with Lebanese security forces at checkpoints, elevating travel disruption risks. Additionally, the return of civilians to areas occupied by IDF forces in southern Lebanon will elevate risks of misidentification and misfire by IDF troops. Civilian deaths will further elevate regional tensions and are likely to be leveraged by LH against the new Lebanese government.
However, while incidents of sporadic localised armed clashes between Israel and LH operatives in southern Lebanon are likely to increase in the coming days, a full resumption of hostilities remains unlikely. LH rocket and drone launches targeting Israeli population centres in the Northern district remain unlikely, however, any such incident will likely act as a trigger for an escalation in IDF hostilities, including strikes north of the Litani river.
- New coalition will raise Turkish military influence in Syria, increase tensions with Kurds. On 16 February, Arabic media, citing a Turkish diplomatic source, reported that Iraq, Jordan, Syria and Turkey agreed to establish a regional alliance against the Islamic State (IS) group. The initiative will reportedly focus on border security, intelligence sharing, and joint operations. We assess that such a step will partially mitigate the threats of IS reemergence following the fall of the Assad government in Syria. However, the alliance is highly likely to further augment Turkish military influence inside Syria, elevating the risks of direct armed clashes with the Kurdish Syria Democratic Forces (SDF). Furthermore, Turkey will likely frame the new alliance as an alternative to the US forces in Syria fighting IS (and backing up SDF). There is a realistic possibility this will prompt the latter to start gradually withdrawing from the country through 2025. However, we assess that an uncoordinated withdrawal of US forces will elevate the risks of IS operations increasing throughout the year. (Source: Sibylline)
18 Feb 25. IDF Strike in Lebanon Kills Hamas Leader Allegedly Involved in Planning Terror Attacks on Israeli Civilians. An Israeli drone strike on a vehicle in the southern Lebanese city of Sidon killed senior Hamas commander Mohammed Shaheen, who was identified by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) as the head of Hamas operations in Lebanon. The strike, carried out on Monday at the northern entrance of Sidon, caused the vehicle to burst into flames. Footage from the scene showed the burning car with a crowd gathered around the wreckage. According to the IDF, Shaheen had played a critical role in planning and coordinating terror attacks against Israeli civilians, allegedly with financial and strategic support from Iran.
“Shaheen was a significant source of knowledge within the organization and was involved throughout the war with advancing various terror attacks, including rocket fire on the Israeli home front,” the IDF added.
Hamas later confirmed his death, but the group identified Shaheen as a military commander and not a Hamas head in Lebanon. The drone strike occurred despite the ongoing ceasefire between Israel and Hamas and just one day before Israel was set to complete a partial withdrawal from Lebanon under the terms of a ceasefire agreement with Hezbollah. While Lebanese President Joseph Aoun said that the Lebanese officials are “working diplomatically to ensure a full Israeli withdrawal,” he urged the sponsors of the ceasefire deal to assist Lebanon, expressing concerns that Israel might not fully withdraw from Lebanon by Tuesday.
Aoun said that the ceasefire agreement “must be respected,” and that he would not accept any Israeli presence remaining on Lebanese territory. (Source: Breaking Defense.com)
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