NEWS IN BRIEF – MIDDLE EAST – CONFLICT

Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

 

www.exensor.com

 

———————————————————————————————————————-

Military And Security Developments

Apr 22

KEY DEVELOPMENTS 

• US-IRAN-STRAIT OF HORMUZ: The US extended its ceasefire with Iran, though Iranian attacks targeting commercial vessels transiting through the Strait of Hormuz will possibly undermine US confidence in further negotiations.
• PANAMA: The Panama Canal is facing increasing transit delays due to an uptick in demand driven by the Israel-US-Iran war, increasing supply chain disruption risks.
• EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC REGION: The sustained disruption to naphtha supply is driving high prices and affecting the availability of medical equipment.
• EUROPE REGION: Looming jet fuel shortages are highly likely to cause a scaling back of flights and rising airfares.
• KENYA-SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REGION: Fuel shortages and price spikes are likely to exacerbate cost-of-living pressures, increasing the likelihood of violent anti-government unrest.
• US-IRAN-STRAIT OF HORMUZ: The US extended its ceasefire with Iran, though Iranian attacks targeting commercial vessels transiting through the Strait of Hormuz will possibly undermine US confidence in further negotiations. On 21 April, US President Donald Trump announced the indefinite extension of the Israel-US-Iran ceasefire until Iran presents a ‘unified proposal’ to the US. Trump also stated that the US blockade of Iranian ports would remain in place, though he called for further diplomatic engagement. Iranian state-affiliated media outlets have characterised the ceasefire extension as ‘unilateral’, while a spokesperson for the foreign ministry stated that Iran has not decided whether to engage in further negotiations, partially due to the ongoing US blockade. Iran also continues to enforce its effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz. On 22 April, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) conducted small-arms attacks on three cargo vessels in the waterway, two of which (the Liberia-flagged, Greek-owned Epaminondas and the Panama-flagged, Swiss-owned MSC Francesca) they later claimed to have detained. Both vessels last broadcast their positions approximately 10 nautical miles (18km) to the west of Bandar Sirik (Hormozgan province, Iran). These are not the first Iranian attacks on vessels traversing the strait since the US ceasefire began, as Iran previously attacked three vessels on 18 April (see Sibylline Alert – 18 April 2026). However, the potential hijacking of two vessels represents a substantial escalation in the Iranian enforcement of the Strait of Hormuz’s closure. We assess that the US’ and Iran’s attempts to secure diplomatic leverage through campaigns of economic attrition are highly likely to continue critically disrupting the movement of commercial vessels through the Strait of Hormuz, while maintaining an upwards price pressure on international energy and commodity markets. Although the ceasefire will likely remain in place in the coming days, further Iranian attacks on commercial vessels will drive the risk of conflict resumption. Nevertheless, we continue to assess there is a realistic possibility of further US-Iran diplomatic engagement in the coming days. Should further engagement occur, deadlock risks will remain acute given the two parties’ divergent negotiating positions. However, in this scenario, there remains a realistic possibility that Trump will unilaterally declare victory or accept minor concessions as proof of such, ending the blockade of Iranian ports and disengaging from the conflict. While such a decision would substantially decrease the risk of immediate conflict re-escalation, it would also be highly unlikely to resolve concerns regarding the navigability of the Strait of Hormuz, sustaining regional tensions and critical disruption to import-export activity in the Gulf region.
• IRAQ: The resumption of crude oil exports through Turkey will partially alleviate ongoing operational disruption in the energy sector, though geopolitical uncertainty will undercut investment. On 20 April, the Iraqi government announced that crude oil exports through the rehabilitated pipeline extending from Kirkuk governorate to the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan are set to commence soon, with a nominal capacity of 1.6 million barrels per day (bpd). The Ministry of Oil confirmed the pipeline will be brought back into service following the completion of hydrostatic testing, initially with limited volumes. No specific timeline was provided by the authorities, though we assess that exports are likely to resume within the next two weeks. Iraq has already been attempting to bolster its exports, by redirecting oil via land corridors to the Syrian port of Baniyas (Tartus governorate), though this route is considerably more costly than maritime shipping or pipeline export.  These measures are highly likely to partially alleviate severe operational disruption to Iraq’s energy sector. The lack of tanker traffic through the Strait of Hormuz has pushed storage capacity to maximum levels, forcing production from southern fields to decline by roughly 70%. Crude oil export revenues account for around 90% of Iraq’s government income, underscoring the acute fiscal pressure created by the disruption. As such, the gradual resumption of northern oil exports will bolster state revenues and enable greater production. This will ease pressure on operators in this sector, especially if the current Iran–US ceasefire holds. However, exports of 1.6 million bpd remain far below the 3.4 million bpd pre-war average. As such, government income will contract, undercutting the payment of public sector salaries and driving the risk of strikes and broader unrest. Combined with broader geopolitical uncertainty and the risk of sporadic attacks by fringe Iran-backed Shia groups, this will undermine investor confidence across most business sectors in Iraq, driving a contraction of the Iraqi economy.
• AMERICAS
• GUYANA: Fuel shortages demonstrate that net oil exporters remain vulnerable to global shortages, increasing energy security risks. On 13 April, some gas stations across the capital Georgetown, temporarily closed between 13 and 14 April due to delays impacting fuel imports. Although the authorities indicate that the situation has since stabilised, this incident demonstrated that net oil exporters remain vulnerable to shortages, particularly those such as Guyana who do not retain domestic refining capabilities. Similarly, the shortages demonstrate the supply chain vulnerabilities and possibility of delays for exporters not directly tied to the Strait of Hormuz; Guyana’s delays were highly likely linked to firms that typically ship fuel via the US, Trinidad and Tobago and/or other Caribbean hubs. The risk of fuel shortages will remain elevated in Guyana for the duration of the conflict, increasing the risk of disruption to business operations and transit.
• PANAMA: The Panama Canal is facing increasing transit delays due to an uptick in demand driven by the Israel-US-Iran war, increasing supply chain disruption risks. Reports throughout April indicate that delays have risen to up to three and a half days. The increase in demand has been largely driven by growing US liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports from the US East Coast to Asian markets via the canal (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 27 March 2026). Alongside transit delays, some vessels are facing waiting times of up to five weeks to book slots to pass through the canal, highlighting the growing competition between shippers. This competition has increased auction and premium rates for transit; an LNG tanker recently agreed to pay USD 4 million for a recent transit slot, compared with the usual USD 1 million or less that shippers typically paid in early March, indicating rising costs for shippers. Meanwhile, S&P Global reports on 10 April indicated that cargo vessels (specifically dry bulk) are facing the most acute disruption as a result, particularly increasing supply chain concerns for grains, metals and ores.

ASIA-PACIFIC 

• EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC REGION: The sustained disruption to naphtha supply is driving high prices and affecting the availability of medical equipment. Naphtha is used to make plastics, chemical fibres and rubber, which are regularly used in medical devices. Sustained disruption has impacted medical glove supplies for both Japan and Malaysia. Estimates indicate that if sustained, the ongoing supply chain disruption will possibly cause glove shortages by late May in Malaysia, while some local surgeries and clinics in Japan only have two months of supplies left. Naphtha shortages are also affecting syringe supplies; some local hospitals in South Korea have reported only having between two and three weeks’ worth of remaining supplies. We assess that while uncertainty in US-Iran talks will continue to affect imports to the region, state interventions to guarantee industrial and medical supplies would likely help avoid immediate product shortages. Japan has announced that it will release 50 million medical gloves from its pandemic stockpile starting in May. Malaysia has also reportedly finalised a strategic agreement with China to increase naphtha supply for local industrial use. Meanwhile, however, South Korea has halted naphtha exports since 26 March (see Sibylline Daily Analytical Update – 27 March 2026). We assess there remains a realistic possibility that domestic supply instability will drive more countries in the East Asia and Pacific region to halt naphtha exports, which could further strain supplies.
• INDIA: The war-related disruption to natural gas and propane supplies is likely to exacerbate factory closures and reverse migration in industrial cities. There have been reports of ceramic factory closures throughout April in Morbi (Gujarat state; India’s ceramic industry hub) due to shortages of natural gas and propane (a type of liquefied petroleum gas, LPG) resulting from the Israel-US-Iran war. With more than 600 companies in the sector, Morbi produces about 80% of India’s ceramics, including tiles, bathtubs and washbasins. However, at least 450 of these companies have suspended operations since the war began on 28 February due to the disruption to the Strait of Hormuz, which is critical for India’s gas imports. Additionally, some factories that had initially closed temporarily and were due to open on 15 April have remained shut, impacting approximately 200,000 workers. Around 25% of these workers have since returned to their homes in poorer Indian states such as Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. We assess that factory closures will likely persist, especially if the war continues and India is unable to secure steady supplies of propane in the coming weeks. Additionally, given that around 25% of ceramics produced in Morbi are exported to countries in the Middle East region, the sustained disruption to shipping lanes will halt production and exacerbate job losses. Urban-to-rural migration trends are also likely to increase in other industrial cities such as Surat (Gujarat), due to rising costs and lower incomes leading domestic migrant workers to return to their hometowns, exacerbating labour flexibility risks.

EUROPE-EURASIA 

• EUROPE REGION: Looming jet fuel shortages are highly likely to cause a scaling back of flights and rising airfares. On 21 April, German airline Lufthansa announced 20,000 flight cancellations through October to reduce fuel use. SAS Scandinavian Airlines and Aer Lingus have also cut their summer schedules, while Air France-KLM introduced a EUR 100 (USD 118) surcharge on long-haul tickets. These actions follow a 16 April warning from International Energy Agency (IEA) chief Fatih Birol that Europe may have only six weeks of jet fuel remaining. Supply constraints stem from the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz amid the Israel-US-Iran war. While the European Commission maintains that reserves are adequate, it is preparing contingency measures, including stock releases, potential mandatory fuel sharing between member states and an emergency package expected to be announced later on 22 April. We assess that high levels of fuel hedging among leading European carriers are likely to support operational continuity through May. However, sustained supply pressure is highly likely to drive increased airfares and a gradual scaling back of flights thereafter. Resulting constraints on air cargo capacity are likely to increase freight rates and transit times, posing operational continuity risks for firms dependent on just-in-time supply chains.
• EUROPE REGION: Increasing fertiliser costs are compounding the already-elevated risk to European food security. As roughly 33% of global seaborne fertiliser trade transits through the Strait of Hormuz, its de facto closure has driven severe price volatility throughout the spring. Prices for urea, nitrates and ammonium sulphate rose by up to 40% in March, compressing farm margins and intensifying affordability pressures. In response, UK farmers are reducing their fertiliser application rates, delaying purchases and shifting crop choices. These adjustments are likely to reduce yields and alter the supply mix of key staples. This, in turn, poses medium-term risks to national crop production and food price stability. The head of the UK’s Agricultural Industries Confederation (AIC) has warned that rising fuel and fertiliser costs will influence autumn planting decisions, potentially contributing to a broader food security crisis.
• UK: On 16 April, Business and Trade Secretary Peter Kyle confirmed that the UK government is preparing contingency plans in response to looming food and carbon dioxide (CO2) shortages linked to the Israel-US-Iran war. A continued Iranian and US blockade of vessel movement through the Strait of Hormuz is severely disrupting maritime supply chains and sustaining upward price pressure on international energy markets. As a result, global CO2 supplies – critical for food and drinks production, farming, hospitality and healthcare – are tightening, as rising energy costs reduce output from plants that produce the gas as a by-product. Kyle confirmed that the government has conducted a confidential ‘reasonable worst-case scenario’ assessment, in which the Strait of Hormuz remains closed through June, potentially reducing domestic CO2 supply to just 18% of current levels. Prospects for a lasting ceasefire between the US and Iran – or a near-term reopening of the Strait – continue to deteriorate. We therefore assess that corporations, particularly in CO2-dependent sectors such as food processing, beverages, agriculture and healthcare, are highly likely to face rising costs and production disruptions.

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 

• KENYA-REGION: Fuel shortages and price spikes are likely to exacerbate cost-of-living pressures, increasing the likelihood of violent anti-government unrest. On 21 April, the police arrested 11 people during a protest in the capital Nairobi’s central business district over high fuel prices. This comes after the Energy and Petroleum Regulatory Authority (EPRA) increased petrol and diesel prices by 16% and 24%, respectively, amid disruption to fuel imports transiting the Strait of Hormuz. Petrol and diesel prices will likely rise again following the EPRA’s next review on 15 May. This will intensify cost-of-living pressures, particularly given the cascading increases in the cost of basic commodities and transport, elevating the risk of further unrest. We assess that this dynamic is likely to emerge in other states across the region in the coming weeks, particularly in states encountering elevated fuel prices and shortages, such as Malawi, Madagascar and South Africa (see Sibylline Fuel and Energy Security Review – 16 April 2026). Furthermore, given regional budget deficit and debt distress pressures, governments are unlikely to have the capacity to implement measures to shield consumers from price spikes, increasing the likelihood of well-attended protests in major cities. The security forces will likely violently disperse such protests, increasing the exposure of proximate staff to tear gas, rubber bullets and possibly even live fire. Street-level assets near protest hotspots in major cities are also likely to be exposed to arson, looting and vandalism.
• WEST AFRICA: Disruption to fertiliser imports is likely to reduce application rates during the imminent planting season, increasing food security and socio-economic health concerns. On 21 April, the CEO of a regional bank warned that fertiliser shortages and price spikes stemming from disruption to the Strait of Hormuz will increase regional food insecurity (see Figure 2). The impact is likely to be particularly acute across West Africa, which is about to undergo its planting season (from late April to May). Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Mali all likely have fertiliser supply deficits of between 45% and 75%, likely resulting in lower application rates, reduced crop yields and elevated food insecurity. Furthermore, limited strategic reserves and inadequate logistics systems are likely to compound fertiliser supply constraints, sustaining disruption for several weeks, even in the event of an uptick in fertiliser imports. This will have broader implications for economic stability, with several states prioritising fertiliser application to commercial crops (such as cocoa and cotton), which are major sources of export revenue and foreign currency. We assess that this will undercut states’ capacity to procure agricultural imports, sustaining elevated food insecurity concerns through 2026. However, in East Africa, where the planting season is ongoing, states likely procured sufficient stocks before the Israel-US-Iran war, moderating the likelihood of reduced production yields in this cycle. Nonetheless, the region is particularly vulnerable to agricultural supply shocks, given prior heightened levels of food insecurity and the dependence of domestic consumption on imported staples. As such, sustained disruption to the Strait of Hormuz (and fertiliser imports) will exacerbate entrenched food insecurity risks, compounding humanitarian conditions, particularly in Ethiopia, northeastern Kenya and Somalia.

Apr 21.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

• US-IRAN: Iran continues to deny that it will participate in ceasefire negotiations with the US in Pakistan, undermining prospects for a diplomatic breakthrough in the coming days.
• US-IRAN-GLOBAL: The US boarded an Iranian-linked tanker in the Indian Ocean, underscoring expanding efforts to enforce the blockade of Iranian ports.
• KUWAIT: A force majeure declaration on oil shipments will elevate legal and financial risks for businesses.
• UAE-IRAN: Arrests underscore the persistent threat of Iran-backed sleeper cells across the Gulf region.

IRAN

• US-IRAN: Iran continues to deny that it will participate in ceasefire negotiations with the US in Pakistan, undermining prospects for a diplomatic breakthrough in the coming days. Over 20-21 April, Iranian state media repeatedly stated that Iran will not participate in upcoming talks with the US in Pakistan. Although US Vice President JD Vance has reportedly arrived in the capital, Islamabad, Iran has yet to dispatch a delegation, indicating that talks are unlikely to begin in the coming hours. Even so, we currently assess that these statements likely represent increasing Iranian brinkmanship ahead of the ceasefire’s expiry on 22 April and that there is a realistic possibility of the Iranian authorities agreeing to further talks in the coming 24 hours. While engagement between Tehran and Washington DC will bolster prospects for a formal ceasefire extension, escalating brinkmanship will possibly trigger a deadlock that extends beyond the current ceasefire’s official term. Tensions remain particularly acute between the US and Iran, with both states alleging that the other has violated the ceasefire since it came into effect. US President Donald Trump has also stated that he does not ‘want’ to extend the ceasefire and that the US security forces are prepared to immediately resume airstrikes targeting Iran should negotiations fail to progress. This dynamic will undermine prospects for a rapid diplomatic breakthrough, particularly one that results in a more comprehensive agreement relating to Iran’s nuclear programme and the movement of vessels through the Strait of Hormuz. While there is a realistic possibility of a de facto or de jure extension to the existing ceasefire, failure to secure a long-term ceasefire will increase the risk of a re-escalation in the coming days. The resumption of hostilities would increase the likelihood of cross-sector operational disruption in Israel and the Gulf, while almost certainly prolonging the de facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Conflict re-escalation would also highly likely trigger regional airspace and airport closures, disrupting international air travel and restricting the access of locally engaged staff to commercially available evacuation routes.
• US-IRAN-GLOBAL: The US boarded an Iranian-linked tanker in the Indian Ocean, underscoring expanding efforts to enforce the blockade of Iranian ports. Earlier on 21 April, the US Department of War announced that the US Navy had interdicted and boarded an Iranian-linked vessel in the Indian Ocean. The M/T Tifani is a Botswana-flagged oil tanker that the US sanctioned in July 2025 due to its involvement in Iran’s global oil smuggling network and sanctions evasion efforts (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 31 July 2025). While the Department of War has not disclosed the vessel’s current status and location, commercially available automatic identification system (AIS) data indicates that it was intercepted approximately 375 nautical miles (700km) south-east of Sri Lanka and has halted transit towards its declared destination of Singapore. Also on 21 April, President Trump stated that the US had intercepted an unidentified ship carrying a ‘gift’ from China to Iran. The Department of War has not commented on this incident at the time of writing, though Trump’s statement likely refers to the interception of a vessel carrying military and/or dual-use components from China to Iran, amid Iranian efforts to reconstitute its air defences. In the coming days, US Central Command (CENTCOM) and US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) are highly likely to continue enforcing the US blockade of maritime transit to and from Iranian ports within their respective areas of responsibility, increasing risks of vessel interception, inspection and detention. These risks will be particularly acute for vessels with direct and tangential links to Iran, including those that have historically docked at Iranian port facilities or engaged in ship-to-ship oil transfers involving Iranian-linked vessels. Increasingly frequent vessel interceptions will elevate risks of temporary maritime supply chain disruption in the Indian Ocean and knock-on delays to delivery schedules. Repeated interceptions of oil tankers transiting from Iran to China will also likely exacerbate bilateral tensions between the US and China. However, this is unlikely to significantly degrade relations ahead of Trump’s scheduled visit on 14 May.

ISRAEL

• ISRAEL-LEBANON: Israel Defense Forces (IDF) operations continue despite preparation for negotiations between Israel and Lebanon. Over the past 24 hours, IDF operations in south Lebanon continued on trend. Israel and Lebanon are scheduled to hold a second round of talks in Washington DC on 23 April. According to unverified reports, Lebanon intends to request an extension of the ceasefire, which is currently slated to end on 27 April at 0000hrs (local time). We assess that under the current ceasefire conditions, such an extension is a realistic possibility. However, even if the ceasefire is extended, security risks as well as operational disruption for businesses active within, or utilising supply chains from, southern Lebanon will remain elevated throughout at least the next two weeks. If the ceasefire is not extended, we assess that an expansion of kinetic activity by both the IDF and Lebanese Hizballah (LH) remains a realistic possibility, including in the capital Beirut. However, in such a scenario, conflict levels would likely remain below those observed in the week before the ceasefire. While LH targeting of Israeli population centres in northern Israel remains a realistic possibility, such attacks are likely to be sporadic, with LH instead likely to focus on IDF personnel within the ‘yellow line’ inside Lebanese territory.

REGIONAL AND GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS 

• KUWAIT: A force majeure declaration on oil shipments will elevate legal and financial risks for businesses. On 20 April, international media outlets reported that the state-owned Kuwait Petroleum Corporation (KPC) has declared force majeure on its crude oil and refined product shipments, citing the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz amid the Israel-US-Iran war. The measure follows a previous declaration in March and reflects the sustained disruption to Kuwait’s export capacity. The cessation of vessel movement through the Strait of Hormuz has pushed regional oil storage capacity to its limits. Additionally, Kuwait’s production capacity has been undermined by damage from several Iranian missile and drone strikes since 28 February, which will likely take months to repair. The suspension of KPC’s deliveries will elevate contractual and legal exposure risks for buyers of Kuwaiti crude and refined products. This will create supply gaps that equivalent clauses in downstream contracts will possibly be unable to cover, increasing exposure to breach-of-contract disputes. Financial risks will also increase, as firms will face delayed deliveries and potential contract renegotiations, straining cash flows and elevating counterparty risk, particularly for smaller traders and intermediaries. As such, the decision is likely to decrease investor confidence in the Kuwaiti markets over at least the next three months; this will also lower prospects for new foreign direct investment (FDI) in general.
• UAE-IRAN: Arrests underscore the persistent threat of Iran-backed sleeper cells across the Gulf region. On 20 April, the UAE’s State Security Department announced that it had dismantled a local terrorist organisation that was allegedly planning systematic sabotage operations across the country. The authorities claimed that the 27-member group had held clandestine meetings inside and outside the UAE, seeking to recruit young Emirati nationals to support ‘foreign allegiances’. While the officials did not directly name Iran, their investigations revealed the organisation’s ties to the governing Iranian religious-political doctrine known as Vilayat-e Faqih. This underscores the persistent threat posed by Iran-backed sleeper cells across Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, despite the current Israel-US-Iran ceasefire. This will elevate the risk of sabotage (including bombings) near military installations, critical infrastructure and high visibility targets such as national landmarks and tourist attractions. Throughout the remainder of 2026, other GCC states, particularly Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, are highly likely to conduct further pre-emptive security operations targeting Shia-majority communities to foil Iran-backed plots. Such campaigns will likely fuel domestic unrest, ethno-religious tensions and clashes between local populations and the security forces throughout the year.

Apr 20.

Pakistan: Potential US-Iran peace talks will drive heightened security, disruption in Islamabad. On 19 April, the police announced that the extended Red Zone, which houses key buildings, including the prime minister’s house and diplomatic missions, will remain closed to all types of traffic. This comes as security has been placed on high alert ahead of a potential second round of US-Iran peace talks in the capital Islamabad later on 20 April, which will likely be attended by the US Vice President JD Vance if they go ahead. The talks also come amid Pakistan’s efforts to mediate talks between the US and Iran to broker peace. According to the authorities, all public and private transport will remain suspended in Islamabad and neighbouring Rawalpindi (Punjab province), while key roads, including parts of the Islamabad Expressway and Srinagar Highway, will remain closed. Security measures will be particularly heightened around the Serena Hotel in the capital, where the talks are expected to be held. Around 18,000 security personnel, including paramilitary forces, are likely to be deployed in Islamabad and enhanced checks at city entry points are almost certain. There is also a realistic possibility that local internet services will be temporarily suspended. These heightened measures, with some adjustments, will likely remain in place for the duration of any negotiations, which will possibly extend over several days.

Syria: Foiled plot underscores persistent threat of Iran-backed groups’ resurgence in border regions. On 19 April, the Syrian authorities announced that they had foiled a cross-border attack by a local cell linked to Lebanese Hizballah (LH) in Quneitra governorate and had arrested several cell members. While the authorities did not disclose further operational details, we assess that the cell almost certainly targeted Israeli territory adjacent to the governorate. The incident underscores persistent attempts by Iran-backed groups and residual Assadist cells to re-establish their networks and operational capacity in Syria, particularly along the borders with Lebanon and Israel. In the coming days, further security operations against militant networks in Quneitra by the Syrian authorities are likely, possibly in co-ordination with Israel and the US to mitigate misfire risks. Similar measures are also likely along Syria’s border with Lebanon, especially in Homs governorate. This will increase the risk of armed conflict with local clans and LH elements positioned near Syria’s borders.

Iran-US: Seizure of Iranian vessel will elevate risks of retaliation, ceasefire collapse. On 19 April, the US Navy fired at and later boarded the Iran-flagged container M/V Touska in the Gulf of Oman. According to the US Central Command (CENTCOM), the vessel was en route to Bandar Abbas (Hormozgan province, Iran) and failed to comply with repeated warnings that it had violated the US blockade. The incident comes amid elevated tensions between the US and Iran following Iranian attacks on commercial ships over the weekend and the enforcement of their respective blockades (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 19 April 2026). Earlier on 20 April, Iran’s semi-official news agency Tasnim reported that Iran had conducted drone attacks against US military vessels, though these reports remain unconfirmed at the time of writing. Further Iran-US negotiations in the coming days are a realistic possibility, though recent events will sustain the gradually increasing risk of ceasefire collapse. This risk will significantly increase in the event of Iranian retaliation against the US’ blockade enforcement, which remains a realistic possibility in the coming hours and days. Such retaliation will elevate security risks to military and commercial vessels in Gulf waters, as well as to assets at the port (currently unknown) that M/V Touska is directed.

21 Apr 26.

Ethiopia: Governance conditions will likely deteriorate in Tigray, increasing armed conflict risk. On 19 April, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) called for the re-establishment of the Tigray Regional Council (TRC) and a broader restructuring of the region’s administrative bodies. Currently, the Tigray region is administered by the Tigray Interim Administration (TIA), established as part of the 2022 Pretoria Agreement. While the TIA remains largely under the TPLF’s influence, it has been unsuccessful in restoring the front’s authority over the region. On 9 April, the federal government unilaterally extended TIA President Tadesse Werede’s term by one year, which the TPLF characterised as a violation of the Pretoria Agreement. There are longstanding tensions between the TPLF and the federal Ethiopian government over the agreement’s slow implementation. We assess that any attempts to establish rival administrative bodies will possibly enflame these tensions critically and will increase governance risks for entities operating in Tigray. Disputes over the TIA’s and the TRC’s administrative authority will increase the risk of operational disruption for locally engaged entities, particularly NGOs seeking permits to continue operating in the region. TPLF efforts to secure funding for the TRC or any attempt to contest the control of government buildings will increase the risk of a federal deployment to the region and of a possible return to conflict (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 24 February 2026).

Kuwait: Force majeure declaration on oil shipments will elevate legal, financial risks for businesses. On 20 April, international media reported that state-owned Kuwait Petroleum Corporation (KPC) has declared force majeure on its crude oil and refined product shipments, citing its inability to meet contractual obligations due to the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz amid the Israel-US-Iran war. The measure follows a prior declaration in March and reflects the sustained disruption to Kuwait’s export capacity. The cessation of vessel movement through the Strait of Hormuz has pushed regional oil storage capacity to its limits. Additionally, Kuwait’s production capacity has also been undermined by several Iranian missile and drone strikes since 28 February, which will likely take several months to repair. The suspension of KPC’s delivery obligations will elevate contractual and legal exposure risks for buyers of Kuwaiti crude and refined products. This will create supply gaps that equivalent clauses in downstream contracts will possibly be unable to cover, increasing exposure to breach-of-contract disputes. Financial risks will also increase, as firms will face delayed deliveries and potential contract renegotiations, straining cash flows and elevating counterparty risk, particularly for smaller traders and intermediaries.

Apr 17

KEY DEVELOPMENTS 

• US-IRAN: Commercial transit is unlikely to return to pre-conflict levels imminently despite Iran’s stated reopening of the Strait of Hormuz during the ceasefire between Israel and Lebanese Hizballah (LH); its reopening will possibly facilitate more productive diplomatic engagement in the coming days.
• ISRAEL-LEBANON: Armed clashes remain possible in southern Lebanon despite the announced ceasefire; security risks remain elevated, particularly near Israel Defense Forces (IDF) positions.
• IRAN-RED SEA-GLOBAL: Rhetorical threats to vessels transiting the Bab el-Mandeb strait will likely continue triggering vessel diversion via the Cape of Good Hope (South Africa) in the coming weeks.

IRAN

• US-IRAN: Commercial transit is unlikely to return to pre-conflict levels imminently despite Iran’s stated reopening of the Strait of Hormuz during the ceasefire between Israel and Lebanese Hizballah (LH); its reopening will possibly facilitate more productive diplomatic engagement in the coming days. On 17 April, Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi announced that the Strait of Hormuz would be ‘completely open’ for the duration of the Israel-LH ceasefire, subject to vessels moving along the ‘co-ordinated route’ established by the Iranian Ports and Maritime Organisation (PMO). Although the Iranian authorities have not issued any further clarification at the time of writing, the statement likely indicates that Iran will allow a larger number of vessels to transit the Strait of Hormuz in the coming days, provided that they do so through the designated corridor between Larak Island and Qeshm Island (both Hormozgan province). The statement marks a substantial shift in Iran’s approach to the movement of vessels through the Strait of Hormuz, which has broadly stalled since the Israel-US-Iran war began on 28 February. In the coming hours, traffic through the Strait of Hormuz will likely increase partially, though it is highly unlikely to return immediately to pre-conflict levels given three main factors. Firstly, the Larak-Qeshm channel is relatively narrow, placing physical limits on vessel numbers and driving the risk of severe bottlenecks and vessel collisions in the coming hours. Secondly, while the statement possibly indicates that the Iranian authorities will no longer levy tolls on vessels attempting to transit the waterway, it remains unclear whether they will cease this activity. Should Iran continue to do so, Western vessel operators will likely remain reluctant to transit due to the risks of sanctions violations, constraints on insurance coverage and vessel interception due to non-payment. Thirdly, larger vessels operating at slower speeds will also remain reluctant to transit the waterway, amid broader concerns that the Israel-LH ceasefire will break down in the coming days. In the event of a ceasefire breakdown, Iran is highly likely to re-implement restrictions to vessel passage immediately, possibly leaving vessels stranded near Iran’s southern coastline, thereby facing acute attack risks. Nevertheless, the conditional re-opening of the waterway likely forms part of Iranian efforts to demonstrate goodwill ahead of possible ceasefire negotiations with the US (see below). There is a realistic possibility that this will trigger a partial diplomatic breakthrough in the coming days, bolstering the prospects for an extension of the current two-week ceasefire and the establishment of an interim US-Iran agreement.
• US-IRAN: Despite increasing optimism regarding the prospects for a permanent ceasefire between the US and Iran, hardline elements are unlikely to agree to major concessions on Tehran’s nuclear programme, sustaining risks of longer-term deadlock. On 16 April, US President Donald Trump stated that a deal between the US and Iran is ‘close’, reflecting continued US efforts to secure a ceasefire with Iran, while also claiming that Iran had agreed to turn over its enriched uranium stockpiles and cease domestic enrichment. Iranian state media has not commented on this claim at the time of writing, and we continue to assess that Iran is unlikely to agree to permanent limits to its nuclear programme. Additionally, on 16 and 17 April, several IRGC-affiliated media outlets, such as Tasnim, published opinion pieces implying that further engagement with the US is unlikely to result in a broader agreement. Even so, earlier on 17 April, Reuters cited two unnamed Iranian officials claiming that negotiations would focus on securing an interim agreement. In combination with the temporary re-opening of the Strait of Hormuz, the US and Iran will likely agree to further talks in the coming days, bolstering the prospects of a broader agreement being reached in the coming weeks. Although Tehran is unlikely to make permanent concessions on matters it views as central to its strategic autonomy (particularly its nuclear programme), should the US demonstrate relative flexibility in its approach to Iran’s uranium enrichment programme and sanctions relief, the likelihood of an interim agreement will increase in the coming days.

ISRAEL 

• ISRAEL-LEBANON: Armed clashes remain possible in southern Lebanon despite the announced ceasefire; security risks remain elevated, particularly near Israel Defense Forces (IDF) positions. On 16 April, US President Donald Trump announced a temporary ten-day ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon, which entered into force at 0000hrs (local time) on 17 April. The ceasefire is aimed at facilitating negotiations between Israel and Lebanon towards a permanent security and peace agreement. During the ceasefire period, the IDF will maintain its position in southern Lebanon and retain the right to act against any planned, imminent or ongoing attacks. Since the ceasefire’s official launch, dozens of Lebanese civilians have crossed back into southern Lebanon, despite IDF warnings. Lebanese Hizballah (LH) operatives tasked with intelligence gathering, resupply and the rebuilding of military infrastructure are likely among the returnees. Given the ongoing IDF siege of LH forces in Bint Jbeil (Nabatieh governorate), we assess that IDF-LH armed clashes remain possible in this area, as well as across southern Lebanon. This will sustain elevated security risks around IDF positions in the coming days, including those arising from misidentification and exposure to crossfire. However, limited clashes are unlikely to trigger a breakdown of the ceasefire in the coming days.

REGIONAL AND GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS 

• IRAN-RED SEA-GLOBAL: Rhetorical threats to vessels transiting the Bab el-Mandeb strait will likely continue triggering vessel diversion via the Cape of Good Hope (South Africa) in the coming weeks. On 16 April, the Iranian government-affiliated War Message Centre published a statement attributed to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps – Quds Force (IRGC-QF) warning that all vessels attempting to transit the Bab el-Mandeb strait should exercise ‘maximum vigilance across all directions’ from 1200hrs (local time) on 17 April. Although the publication is unlikely to indicate that the Yemen-based and Iranian-backed Houthis will imminently launch attacks targeting vessels moving through the Red Sea, it likely forms part of broader Iranian efforts to increase commercial pressure on maritime supply chains in the wider region and thereby incentivise the US to secure a deal. Although the announcement is unlikely to indicate an increase in attack risks for proximate vessels, elevated insurance costs and security concerns for vessel operators will likely continue depressing shipping levels through the Bab el-Mandeb strait in the coming weeks. Continued vessel diversion via the Cape of Good Hope will continue to extend transit times for international supply chains, while maintaining inflationary pressure on consumer goods due to higher shipping costs, longer crew engagement and increased fuel usage.
• EUROPE: Possible jet fuel shortages will trigger severe passenger travel and air freight disruption. On 16 April, International Energy Agency (IEA) Executive Director Fatih Birol warned that Europe could face jet fuel shortages as early as May if the Strait of Hormuz is not reopened. Soaring fuel costs have already forced major European airlines to scale back operations. Also on 16 April, Lufthansa announced plans to retire its entire 27-aircraft CityLine fleet in the coming days, while Dutch airline KLM confirmed that it will operate 80 fewer flights from the capital’s Amsterdam Schiphol Airport (AMS). Birol warned that Europe has approximately six weeks of jet fuel remaining; stocks will reportedly reach a tipping point by June if at least 50% of Middle Eastern imports cannot be replaced. The European Commission (EC) is expected to present measures on 22 April to mitigate the shortfall, including maximising domestic refinery output and strengthening oversight of kerosene supplies. However, these proposals are unlikely to offset the risk of kerosene shortages fully if the Strait of Hormuz remains closed in the coming weeks. Shortages will increase the risk of commercial flight cancellations and air freight supply chain disruption in the coming months. Belgium, the Netherlands and the UK are particularly vulnerable due to their heavy reliance on imported jet fuel and crude oil (see Sibylline UK-Ireland National Resilience Monitor – 9 April 2026).
• UK-EUROPE: An attack on the Israeli embassy in the UK capital London, claimed by Iran-affiliated Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamia (HAYI), underscores persistent conflict spillover risks in Europe. On 16 April, HAYI posted a video of two individuals dressed in protective clothing claiming to have launched drones with ‘dangerous substances’ targeting the Israeli embassy in the Kensington area of London. On 17 April, the Metropolitan Police stated that while the embassy had not been targeted, police personnel were ‘assessing a number of discarded items’ in the nearby Kensington Gardens, closing the park throughout the day. Since the Israel-US-Iran war began, HAYI has claimed responsibility for numerous attacks targeting locations associated with Israeli and Jewish communities throughout Europe (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 31 March 2026). Despite the Israel-US-Iran ceasefire, we assess that broader ethno-religious tensions stemming from the conflict will sustain the risks of HAYI activity and low-capacity attacks across Europe. Specifically, Israeli embassies and consulates will continue to face an elevated risk of targeting, as will locations associated with local Jewish communities such as community centres, NGOs, religious schools, restaurants, retail outlets and synagogues. Attacks employing rudimentary explosives, modified drones and/or incendiary devices will increase the risk of collateral damage to nearby installations and individuals. However, the robust police force capacity across much of Europe will likely prevent any high-capacity attacks from being conducted successfully in the coming weeks. (Source: Sibylline)

——————————————————————————————————————–

Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Home land Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need. A CNIM Group Company