NEWS IN BRIEF – MIDDLE EAST – CONFLICT

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Military And Security Developments

Apr 16.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS ·       US-IRAN: Efforts to extend the existing ceasefire will moderate the risk of conflict resumption in the coming days. ·       ISRAEL-LEBANON: A temporary ceasefire is increasingly possible amid a likely push from the US. ·       UK-EUROPE: Attempted attacks on Jewish and/or Israeli sites underscore sustained Iran-backed terrorism risks.

 

 

IRAN ·       US-IRAN: Efforts to extend the existing ceasefire will moderate the risk of conflict resumption in the coming days. On 15 April, a Pakistani delegation led by Chief of Defence Forces Field Marshal Asim Munir arrived in Iran, meeting with Speaker of Parliament Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf to discuss plans for further Iran-US negotiations. Although the US and Iran have not officially confirmed plans for further talks, we continue to assess that negotiations will likely take place in the coming days. If both parties assess that the other is engaging in good faith, Iran and the US will likely agree to extend the existing ceasefire beyond 22 April. However, despite the prospects for the temporary ceasefire’s extension, the substantial distance between the US’ and Iran’s negotiating positions will sustain long-term deadlock risks, particularly regarding Iran’s nuclear programme and attempts to assert control over the Strait of Hormuz (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 15 April 2026). Although Iran is highly unlikely to make concessions on broad principles relating to its nuclear programme and the Strait, it will possibly be open to compromise on technical limits, timelines and enforcement mechanisms. For instance, on 16 April, Reuters reported that Iran had proposed allowing an unspecified number of ships to transit the Strait of Hormuz without tolls or ‘hindrance’ if they used shipping lanes near Oman’s coastline. Such efforts to bridge disparate US and Iranian negotiating positions will increase the likelihood of the temporary ceasefire remaining in effect in the coming days, moderating short-term threats to regionally engaged staff and assets. However, such a proposal would be highly unlikely to result in the immediate resumption of pre-war shipping activity through the Strait of Hormuz. ·       US-IRAN: US efforts to maximise pressure on Iran’s negotiating position are likely to have a limited impact, sustaining the critical disruption of Iranian import-export activity. On 16 April, US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth told the press that the US has maintained an elevated force posture in the Middle East region and remains ‘ready to re-engage at a moment’s notice’ if Iran rejects US ceasefire proposals. These statements underscore US efforts to maximise pressure on Iran to make broad concessions in future negotiations by credibly threatening rapid conflict re-escalation in the event of a deadlock. US officials have also claimed that no vessels have bypassed the blockade since it came into force and that 13 Iran-linked vessels have reversed course following warnings from the US Navy. This underscores the continued disruption to Iranian import-export activity resulting from the US blockade, which will highly likely remain in place until the US and Iran agree to a permanent ceasefire. Despite this pressure, however, Iran is unlikely to make concessions on issues that it perceives to be central to its strategic autonomy (see above), highlighting persistent deadlock risks. However, the mounting fiscal pressure on Tehran over the coming days will possibly trigger isolated Iranian efforts to rush the blockade (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 15 April 2026). The disruption to Iranian import-export activity will also likely trigger shortages of imported goods, increasing risks of cross-sector operational disruption, particularly in the manufacturing and construction industries. The shortages of food imports such as soybeans, rice and corn will also possibly emerge in the coming weeks, increasing risks of food insecurity and lower agricultural yields across Iran, while disruption to imports of medical goods will increase broader public health concerns in the coming weeks. Such deteriorating socio-economic health conditions will likely exacerbate anti-government sentiment and will possibly trigger a resumption of protests and unrest. However, the Iranian security forces’ repressive capabilities will likely undercut any threats to government stability in the short-to-medium term, moderating the prospects for a successful popular uprising resulting in regime change.

 

ISRAEL – click here to return to Key Developments ·       ISRAEL-LEBANON: A temporary ceasefire is increasingly possible amid a likely push from the US. On 16 April, local news reported that Lebanese President Joseph Aoun rejected a direct call with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Aoun emphasised in a later statement that a ceasefire is a prerequisite before any direct negotiations take place, compounding reported mounting US pressure for a temporary ceasefire. The development follows a meeting of the Israeli Security Cabinet on 15 April, which focused on a one-week ceasefire in Lebanon to facilitate broader negotiations. However, the meeting concluded without a decision. Such a ceasefire would be highly unusual for Israel, which has historically taken part in negotiations while conducting military operations. Israel’s active consideration of such a proposal likely reflects mounting US pressure to ease sticking points in US-Iran negotiations, with the latter demanding the cessation of hostilities in Lebanon. We assess that the agreement of a temporary ceasefire in Lebanon is a realistic possibility over the weekend and will grow more likely over the course of next week. However, Israeli forces are likely to maintain their positions in southern Lebanon in the event of any such ceasefire. In the longer term, the disarmament of Lebanese Hizballah (LH) will likely remain an unresolved challenge, sustaining elevated tensions and armed conflict risks in Lebanon over the coming months. ·       ISRAEL-LEBANON: An IDF strike against a medical team affiliated with the Amal Movement signals growing security risks. On 15 April, Lebanese paramedic groups claimed that three consecutive Israeli strikes in Mayfadoun (Nabatieh governorate) killed four Lebanese rescue workers and injured six others. According to local reports, the first two Israeli strikes targeted paramedic teams from the LH-affiliated Islamic Health Committee, with the third hitting a paramedic team from the Islamic Risala Scout Association (which is affiliated with the Amal Movement, a political ally of LH). At the time of writing, Israel has yet to confirm these reports. However, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has targeted Islamic Health Committee medical teams over the past month in connection to the alleged military use of ambulances and medical facilities. Over this period, the IDF has also targeted other LH-affiliated organisations, particularly those facilitating LH’s finance network, such as foreign currency exchanges and banks. However, the attack against a team affiliated with the Amal Movement underscores the possible further expansion in the IDF’s target suite to include groups affiliated with LH’s political allies in the coming months, particularly in southern Lebanon. Even so, the official position of the Amal Movement within Lebanon’s politics and government will moderate these risks. Furthermore, there is a realistic possibility that the IDF misidentified the Islamic Risala Scout Association medical team as an Islamic Health Committee team. Regardless, the incident reflects persistently elevated security risks in southern Lebanon for medical teams, NGOs and journalists, among other such entities.

 

REGIONAL AND GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS – click here to return to Key Developments ·       IRAQ-SYRIA: An alternative export route for Iraqi crude oil will partially mitigate the Israel-US-Iran war’s impact on the national energy sector. On 15 April, state-owned Syrian Petroleum Company began loading Iraqi fuel oil shipments at the port of Baniyas (Tartus governorate), ahead of their export via the Mediterranean Sea. Notably, throughout last week, between 500 and 700 tanker trucks carrying Iraqi oil have crossed daily into Syria via the Al-Tanf/Al-Waleed border crossing, heading towards the Baniyas oil terminal. This significant uptick in Iraqi overland oil shipments through Syria is primarily due to the Strait of Hormuz’s de facto closure, which has disrupted around 80% of Iraqi oil exports. However, this alternative overland route is considerably more costly than the maritime one and cannot facilitate the movement of the same volume of fuel. However, it will likely partially mitigate the current disruption to Iraq’s strategic energy sector, which accounts for most of the country’s revenue earnings. Although this will ease some socio-economic pressure on the Iraqi government this year, general investor confidence across most business sectors is highly likely to remain low as geopolitical uncertainty persists. Meanwhile, exports are also highly likely to reduce political tensions between Damascus and Baghdad, deepening their economic co-ordination through 2026. This will possibly enable greater bilateral co-operation in securing their shared border, which currently remains a key node for organised crime groups (OCGs) and smugglers. ·       US-IRAN-GLOBAL: The US has sanctioned 28 individuals, entities and vessels associated with Iran and LH, increasing compliance risks in the energy, shipping and finance sectors. On 15 April, the US Department of the Treasury issued sanctions primarily targeting individuals, entities and vessels associated with Mohammad Hossein Shamkhani, an Iranian shipping magnate linked to Iran’s oil export operations and shadow fleet. The sanctions also target several vessel operators and finance firms operating in India and the UAE, underscoring increasing compliance risks for regionally engaged entities, particularly in the energy and shipping sectors. Despite the prospects for further Iran-US negotiations aimed at securing a permanent ceasefire and broader peace agreement, the US is highly likely to continue expanding and enforcing sanctions targeting key Iranian economic sectors as part of its ‘maximum pressure’ campaign (see Sibylline Sanctions Watch – 13 April 2026). As Iran is highly likely to prioritise immediate sanctions relief during negotiations, this campaign will likely compound bilateral tensions between negotiators, increasing the risk of deadlock. The Treasury has also sanctioned Seyed Naiemaei Badroddin Moosavi, an Iranian national associated with Iranian oil exports, LH’s financing network and gold smuggling between Iran, Turkey and Venezuela. Amid the increasing regulatory scrutiny over Iran and its proxies’ financing networks, regionally engaged entities operating in the finance, precious metals and shipping industries will continue to face elevated risks of exposure to primary and secondary US sanctions. These risks will be particularly acute in the UAE, sustaining broader compliance and governance risks for locally engaged entities. ·       UK-EUROPE: Attempted attacks on Jewish and/or Israeli sites underscore sustained Iran-backed terrorism risks. On 15 April, the UK Metropolitan Police arrested two suspects linked to an attempted arson attack targeting Finchley Reform Synagogue in the capital London. A 47-year-old woman and 46-year-old man allegedly threw two bottles (likely containing petrol) at the building; there were no injuries or material damage. The authorities are treating the incident as an antisemitic hate crime. The new Islamist group Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamia (HAYI) has claimed responsibility, which we assess is likely linked to Iranian intelligence agencies (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 31 March 2026). HAYI has claimed responsibility for several incidents in recent days, including arson attacks targeting a synagogue in Skopje (North Macedonia) on 12 April and an Israeli restaurant in Munich (Germany) on 10 April. On 15 April, HAYI posted footage of an arson attack allegedly targeting the Iranian opposition media outlet Iran International’s headquarters in London. While it remains unclear if responsibility can be attributed to the group, this concentration of incidents following a decrease in attacks earlier in April points to a persistent risk of low-intensity attacks against Jewish, Israeli and/or US-linked institutions across Europe. Additionally, the images of a civilian unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) with the HAYI logo that have circulated online underscore the latent threat of HAYI-affiliated individuals adopting drone technology to carry out attacks, which we will continue to monitor.

 

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

• US-IRAN: US President Donald Trump has repeatedly stated that further talks with Iran will occur in the coming days, though divergent negotiating positions will sustain risks of deadlock.
• RUSSIA-GLOBAL: Russian export controls will further exacerbate global supply disruption.
• US: Growing domestic anti-war sentiment will sustain elevated domestic unrest risks and incentivise the Trump administration to engage in negotiations in the short term.

IRAN

• US-IRAN: US President Donald Trump has repeatedly stated that further talks with Iran will occur in the coming days, though divergent negotiating positions will sustain risks of deadlock. On 14 April, US President Donald Trump stated that Iran and the US will possibly meet for further negotiations in the coming two days, amid continued international efforts to broker a permanent ceasefire. Although the Iranian authorities have not commented on this statement at the time of writing, we continue to assess that further negotiations are likely within the next ten days (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 14 April 2026). Even so, while the Iranian authorities will likely remain open to further talks, Iran is unlikely to compromise on its nuclear programme and self-asserted ‘right’ to regulate the movement of vessels through the Strait of Hormuz. While Iran will likely be willing to discuss temporary limitations to its uranium enrichment capabilities but will almost certainly reject proposals to permanently dismantle its nuclear programme. Similarly, Iran will likely adopt a relatively flexible negotiating position over its regulation of vessel movements through the Strait of Hormuz but will likely insist that the US recognises its ‘right’ to enforce restrictions and levy tolls. Despite increasing optimism over a diplomatic breakthrough, the substantial distance between the US and Iran’s negotiating positions will moderate prospects for the establishment of a permanent ceasefire and broader bilateral agreement in the coming days. Even so, the US and Iran will likely agree to a temporary ceasefire extension to facilitate further negotiations, provided both sides feel the other is engaging in good faith. Although negotiations will face a substantial risk of deadlock with subsequent conflict re-escalation, we continue to assess that there is a realistic possibility of President Trump unilaterally declaring victory over Iran during this period, likely triggering a conflict de-escalation thereafter. Given substantial ambiguity over regional stability, investor confidence regarding operational conditions in the Gulf is unlikely to improve materially in the short term, particularly in the aviation, hospitality and energy sectors.
• US-IRAN: The US Navy has likely prevented the transit of seven Iran-linked oil tankers out of the Strait of Hormuz, increasing economic pressure on Iran ahead of possible negotiations. On 14 April, the commander of the US Central Command (CENTCOM), Admiral Brad Cooper, stated that no vessels have defied the blockade since its implementation. Unverified reports from US media indicate that at least six Iran-linked vessels have reversed course following instructions from the US Navy not to transit through the Strait of Hormuz, without kinetic engagement. These developments are consistent with our assessment that earlier vessel passage was only permitted due to an initial grace period (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 14 April 2026). Despite this initial success, however, tensions between the US and Iran regarding their respective blockades will almost certainly remain elevated in the coming days. On 15 April, Iran’s most senior joint military command, the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters, stated that the US’ continued enforcement of the blockade on Iranian ports would constitute a ‘prelude to violating the ceasefire’. The command also issued a statement indicating that if the US continues to restrict the movement of Iran-linked vessels through the Strait of Hormuz, the Iranian armed forces would not allow ‘any imports or exports’ to move through the Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Oman or the Red Sea. Iran has repeatedly threatened shipping in the Gulf of Oman and the Persian Gulf since the Israel-US-Iran war began. However, the reference to the Red Sea likely reflects Iran’s willingness to maximise pressure on the US to make concessions in their upcoming talks. The failure to secure such concessions and the US’ continued blockade of Iranian ports will increase the risk of Iran attempting to bypass the blockade covertly, refusing to adhere to the US Navy’s orders or targeting US vessels operating near Iranian territorial waters. Any Iranian attempts to bypass the blockade will substantially increase naval confrontations risks in the Gulf of Oman, increasing risks of exposure to explosions, munitions use and associated hazards for proximate vessels. Commercial activity in the Strait of Hormuz is highly unlikely to resume in the coming days given these tensions, particularly in the absence of a broader ceasefire agreement between the US and Iran.

ISRAEL

• ISRAEL-LEBANON: Hostilities continue, sustaining elevated security risks in southern Lebanon and northern Israel. Over the past 24 hours, Lebanese Hizballah (LH) attacks against Israeli population centres in northern Israel have continued, focusing mainly on the Israel-Lebanon border areas and Upper Galilee region (as far south as Karmiel, Northern district). Over the same period, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have continued to concentrate the bulk of their operations in southern Lebanon, with strikes on over 200 LH targets in the area. Additionally, on 15 April, the IDF reiterated their evacuation warning to civilians living south of the Zahrani River. We continue to assess that hostilities will continue over the coming days despite the ongoing ceasefire negotiations between Israel and the Lebanese government. This will sustain elevated security and socio-economic risks in northern Israel and southern Lebanon, particularly impacting the agricultural sector in these areas and elevating long-term risks to food supply chains in both countries.

REGIONAL AND GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS 

• IRAQ: Sporadic drone attacks targeting the Kurdistan region are likely to continue in the coming days, elevating physical security risks near US and Kurdish military assets. On 14 April, an unclaimed drone strike on an opposition Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan camp in the Surdas area (Sulaymaniyah governorate) of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) injured three people. On the same day, another drone strike targeted a camp belonging to the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI) near Koy Sanjaq (Erbil governorate), with no casualties. The attacks are the first of their kind since the Israel-US-Iran ceasefire began overnight on 7-8 April. We assess that rogue Iran-backed Shia groups are highly likely to have conducted these attacks, despite the de facto ceasefire implemented by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI). The IRI operates as a loose umbrella coalition rather than a unified command, with fringe factions maintaining a consistent pattern of independent action. As such, sporadic attacks, particularly across the KRI, are likely to continue throughout the ceasefire window in the coming days. This will sustain elevated physical security risks in Iraq near US and Kurdish military assets, Iranian opposition camps and local infrastructure such as airports, oil fields, energy facilities and telecommunication towers.
• SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REGION: The disruption to fertiliser exports will elevate food security risks, particularly in East Africa. On 13 April, the IMF and the World Bank warned that supply chain disruption from the Israel-US-Iran war will compound food security risks across Sub-Saharan Africa. Rising commodity (particularly fertiliser) and logistics costs from the conflict have already undermined states’ capacity to procure imports, exacerbating regional food security conditions (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 30 March 2026). Even in a scenario where the Strait of Hormuz fully reopens, the lingering disruption would likely persist for several weeks, sustaining elevated cost pressures and associated food insecurity concerns. These risks would be particularly acute in states dependent on imports or international aid to meet their food demands, including Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan. Additionally, we assess that disruption to supply chains is likely to reduce fertiliser application rates region-wide, weakening crop yields and driving food insecurity risks through H2 2026 and into 2027. This is particularly relevant in East Africa, which is currently undergoing its planting season, increasing long-term food security risks therein. This will also compound regional humanitarian needs from a potentially intense El Niño period later this year.
• RUSSIA-GLOBAL: Russian export controls will further exacerbate global supply disruption. On 14 April, the Russian government announced the introduction of export controls on helium until the end of 2027, aimed at prioritising domestic demand. As the world’s third-largest helium producer, accounting for around 8% of global output, Russia’s decision is highly likely to intensify disruption to global helium supply chains, which have already been significantly affected by the Israel-US-Iran war. Increased volatility in global helium markets will impact several sectors, most notably the semiconductor industry (which relies heavily on the gas for chip manufacturing), as well as the pharmaceutical and medical imaging industries. Since the Middle East conflict’s onset, Russia has also imposed export restrictions on other key commodities, including petrol and fertiliser inputs, which are both highly affected by regional instability in the Middle East (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 9 April 2026).
• US: Growing domestic anti-war sentiment will sustain elevated domestic unrest risks and incentivise the Trump administration to engage in negotiations in the short term. According to an Ipsos/Reuters poll released on 14 April, approximately 24% of Americans think that the Israel-US-Iran war has been ‘worth the costs and benefits’. Among Republican respondents, 55% were in favour – a much lower level of support among the Republican voter base compared to President Trump’s other policies. Furthermore, Vice President JD Vance was heckled at a Turning Point USA event at the University of Georgia on 13 April. Student demonstrators demanded an end to the Israel-Hamas war and to US involvement in the Israel-US-Iran war. These developments underscore heightened anti-war sentiment in the US, which will likely sustain elevated risks of domestic unrest at major urban centres, including in California, Massachusetts, New York and the capital Washington DC. We assess that growing affordability concerns and anti-government sentiment ahead of the November midterm elections will encourage the Trump administration to engage in further diplomatic negotiations in the short term. Nevertheless, divergent negotiating positions between the US and Iran will sustain the risk of further deadlock.

Apr 15.

Italy-Israel-US: Defence agreement suspension reflects war’s impact on commercial, security ties. On 14 April, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s government suspended its defence co-operation agreement with Israel. The memorandum covering joint training, exchange of military material and . . technological research was due for automatic five-year renewal. Meloni said the decision reflected ‘the current situation’, indicating growing disagreement with Israel’s military campaign in Lebanon. Italy has traditionally been one of Israel’s closest European partners; however, bilateral tensions have increased since Israel Defense Force (IDF) soldiers reportedly fired warning shots at an Italian peacekeeping convoy in Lebanon on 8 April. The suspension marks a notable pivot in Italy’s stance on the Israel-US-Iran war. Meloni has also increasingly distanced her government from US President Donald Trump, denying US warplanes access to Naval Air Station Sigonella (Sicily) and calling his critical remarks about Pope Leo XIV ‘unacceptable’. President Trump has condemned Meloni’s actions, underscoring a deterioration in US-Italian relations. Italian defence ministry officials are reviewing the suspension’s legal and practical implications. Given the agreement’s scope covers industrial co-operation, procurement and export licences, we assess it will likely increase operational challenges for defence and advanced technology firms operating in both jurisdictions.

Apr 14.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

• IRAN-US-STRAIT OF HORMUZ: Despite the US’ implementation of a blockade on Iranian ports, Iranian-affiliated vessels have continued to transit the Strait of Hormuz, increasing risks of naval confrontation in the coming days.
• ISRAEL-LEBANON: Israel Defense Forces (IDF) operations and Lebanese Hizballah (LH) attacks are likely to continue despite ceasefire negotiations.
• GULF-IRAQ-IRAN: Sporadic Iranian and proxy drone attacks against Gulf countries are likely to continue throughout the ceasefire window.

IRAN

• IRAN-US-STRAIT OF HORMUZ: Despite the US’ implementation of a blockade on Iranian ports, Iranian-affiliated vessels have continued to transit the Strait of Hormuz, increasing risks of naval confrontation in the coming days. At 1730hrs (local time, Iran), the US blockade of Iranian ports came into force (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 13 April 2026). US Central Command (CENTCOM) has stated that humanitarian shipments of food, medical supplies and other essentials will be allowed to transit to and from Iranian ports, subject to inspection. CENTCOM also specified that ‘neutral vessels’ will be granted an unspecified grace period to depart Iranian ports and territorial waters; the grace period will likely expire in the coming hours. Despite the implementation of the blockade, however, five Iranian-linked vessels (one bulk carrier, three oil tankers and one asphalt carrier) have transited the waterway in the past 18 hours. Commercially available shipping data also indicates that at least three non-Iranian-linked vessels have also transited through the strait during this period. These ships have possibly been allowed to transit the waterway as part of the grace period, though its imminent expiry will likely see increasing US efforts to limit vessel transit to and from Iranian ports in the coming days. This will likely include direct communication to vessels perceived to be violating the blockade, followed by interception, diversion and possibly capture in the event of non-compliance. Earlier on 14 April, a Malawi-flagged oil tanker (‘Rich Starry’) signalling China as its destination began moving through the Strait of Hormuz, before executing a U-turn at approximately 1445hrs (local time, Iran) and reversing course back towards the Persian Gulf. Although neither the Iranian nor US authorities have commented on this event at the time of writing, there is a realistic possibility that the vessel operator executed this manoeuvre following US instructions to return to port. If confirmed, this would mark the first reversal under the blockade, underscoring risks of critical supply chain disruption in the coming days. Continued US and Iranian efforts to regulate the movement of vessels through the Strait of Hormuz are highly likely to continue to disrupt maritime supply chains in the coming days, maintaining upwards price pressure on global energy and commodity markets.
• US-IRAN: Despite reports indicating that the US and Iran are prepared to engage in further negotiations, their divergent negotiating positions will sustain the risk of further deadlock. On 13 April, US President Donald Trump stated that Iran had contacted the US to request a ceasefire; Reuters subsequently published a report claiming that the US and Iran will re-engage this coming weekend. Although several Iranian media outlets disputed the claim that talks will occur in the coming days, both the US and Iran will likely remain open to further talks in the coming two weeks. Reports claim that the US has proposed that Iran agree to a 20-year moratorium on uranium enrichment, export its highly enriched uranium stockpiles and restore freedom of navigation to the Strait of Hormuz, in exchange for the partial release of frozen assets. Contrastingly, Iran’s counterproposal centred on the immediate release of frozen assets, the down-blending of its uranium stockpiles, a five-year pause on uranium enrichment and a recognition of Iran’s ‘right’ to regulate shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. It currently appears likely that Iran will not moderate these positions ahead of further talks. On 14 April, the IRGC-affiliated Tasnim news outlet published a report stating that the Iranian authorities ‘should’ emphasise that Iran will be unwilling to extend the current ceasefire beyond its two-week term unless the US softens its negotiating position vis-à-vis the Strait of Hormuz. Although there is a realistic possibility of a de facto or de jure extension of the current agreement beyond 22 April, sustained diplomatic deadlock will drive the risk of conflict resumption, particularly if both parties continue to implement their respective blockades of the Strait of Hormuz.
• IRAN: Significant infrastructure repair costs will almost certainly maintain socio-economic pressure and Iran’s ambitions to secure reparations from the US and regional allies. On 14 April, a spokesperson for the Iranian government announced that the total reconstruction costs for US and Israeli damage to Iranian infrastructure exceeds USD 270 billion. While this is likely an overestimation given Iran’s long-standing economic challenges stemming from sanctions and entrenched corruption, the country is highly likely to face significant constraints in financing reconstruction projects. Consequently, Iran is highly likely to continue calling for the US to provide reparations. As the US is highly unlikely to agree to such an arrangement, Iran is highly likely to continue framing its toll revenue from the Strait of Hormuz as a form of compensation. Amid broader efforts to prevent the resumption of anti-government protests associated with socio-economic health concerns, Iran is unlikely to cease its practices of securing facilitation payments from vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz and employing its shadow fleet to export crude oil to China. This dynamic will sustain broader tensions with the US, particularly in the absence of a formal extension to the two-week ceasefire beyond 22 April.

ISRAEL

• ISRAEL-LEBANON: Israel Defense Forces (IDF) operations and Lebanese Hizballah (LH) attacks are likely to continue despite ceasefire negotiations. Later on 14 April, Israeli and Lebanese representatives are slated to meet in Washington DC for ceasefire negotiations. While several Israeli officials have floated the idea of a normalisation of Israel-Lebanon relations, the disarmament of LH will likely remain a key issue in any agreement. Over the past few days, LH voiced its opposition to the negotiations and said that it will not abide by any agreement. This will likely limit the impact of any prospective agreement, prolonging negotiations in search of meaningful measures and effective enforcement mechanisms. As Israel refuses to halt its military operations until a ceasefire agreement is reached, hostilities between the IDF and LH are likely to continue in the coming weeks. These will sustain elevated security risks across both countries, particularly in southern Lebanon and northern Israel, as Israel proceeds with efforts to secure its new buffer zone south of the Litani River.

REGIONAL AND GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS

• GULF-IRAQ-IRAN: Sporadic Iranian and proxy drone attacks against Gulf countries are likely to continue throughout the ceasefire window. On 12 and 13 April, the Bahraini authorities intercepted at least seven drones in the country’s airspace, initially without disclosing their origin. However, on 13 April, Bahrain formally summoned Iraq’s chargé d’affaires in the capital Manama over drone attacks launched from Iraqi territory against Bahrain and other Gulf states, despite the ongoing US-Iran ceasefire. This also came one day after Saudi Arabia took similar diplomatic action. We assess there is a strong possibility that rogue Iraqi Shia factions conducted these strikes despite the de facto ceasefire implemented by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI). The IRI operates as a loose umbrella coalition rather than a unified command, with fringe factions such as Saraya Awliya al-Dam and Ashab al-Kahf maintaining a consistent pattern of independent action not reliably subject to top-down direction from Tehran or broader IRI leadership. An equally possible alternative is that Iran itself launched these drones to maintain surveillance over US military assets in Bahrain. Regardless of attribution, the sporadic attacks and presence of drones underscore the persistent physical security threat across Gulf states, particularly in proximity to dual-use infrastructure and military installations. Such activity is likely to continue throughout the current ceasefire window (albeit at significantly reduced frequency compared to the preceding month), sustaining operational disruption and hampering the full resumption of business activity and travel, particularly in Bahrain and Kuwait.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

• IRAN-US-STRAIT OF HORMUZ: A US blockade on Iranian-linked vessels attempting to transit the Strait of Hormuz, will increase risks of kinetic naval hostilities in the coming days.
• IRAN-STRAIT OF HORMUZ-GULF: Iranian threats to target port facilities in the Gulf will delay efforts to resume pre-conflict shipping activity.
• ISRAEL-LEBANON: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF)’s operations and Lebanese Hizballah (LH)’s rocket launches have continued broadly on trend; an escalation in LH attacks remains a realistic possibility in the coming 48 hours.

IRAN

• IRAN-US-STRAIT OF HORMUZ: A US blockade on Iranian-linked vessels attempting to transit the Strait of Hormuz, will increase risks of kinetic naval hostilities in the coming days. On 12 April, US President Donald Trump announced that the US would blockade the Strait of Hormuz, preventing any vessel that has paid tolls to Iran from moving through the waterway. US Central Command (CENTCOM) subsequently announced that the blockade would apply to any vessels calling at or planning to call at Iranian port facilities in the Persian Gulf or the Gulf of Oman. CENTCOM has stated that the blockade will not apply to vessels calling at non-Iranian ports. However, this combined with Iranian restrictions, which apply to any vessel that has not secured its explicit permission (in exchange for toll payment and/or calling at Iranian ports), means that no ship is free to traverse the Strait of Hormuz. This move almost certainly forms part of US efforts to maximise pressure on Iran by broadly disrupting key Iranian revenue streams, particularly crude oil exports to major trade partners, such as China. Amid broader efforts to undermine Iran’s security force capacity, the US is also likely to be pre-emptively undermining Iran’s attempt to reconstitute its missile, drone and air defence systems by disrupting key imports. The blockade came into force at 1730hrs (Iranian local time) on 13 April. The US Navy will likely enforce the blockade by ordering vessels attempting to transit the Strait of Hormuz to return to their port of origin; failure to comply with these commands will likely trigger physical interceptions, inspections and subsequent diversions to temporary at-sea holding areas. However, US efforts to balance tensions with China will likely complicate any interceptions of Chinese-flagged or affiliated vessels in the coming days, undermining prospects for a broad and comprehensive blockade. Even so, repeated vessel transit attempts, with or without an Iranian naval accompaniment, will increase the likelihood of kinetic US hostilities targeting non-compliant vessels in the short term. While these actions will likely take place in international waters beyond the Strait of Hormuz to moderate risks of sustained clashes with shore-based Iranian security force units, hostilities targeting Iranian-linked commercial vessels will compound risks of conflict re-escalation in the coming days. Continued disruption to maritime supply chains will likely sustain upwards pressure on international oil prices, particularly in the event of prolonged disruption to Iranian oil exports to China.
• IRAN-STRAIT OF HORMUZ-GULF: Iranian threats to target port facilities in the Gulf will delay efforts to resume pre-conflict shipping activity. Earlier on 13 April, Iran’s most senior joint military command, the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters, announced that ‘no port in the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman will be safe’ if Iran’s ports are ‘threatened’. This is likely a reference to US plans to blockade Iranian ports by preventing Iranian-linked vessels from transiting the Strait of Hormuz (see above). Iran likely aims to deter the US from disrupting the movement of Iranian vessels by threatening the security of major port facilities in the Gulf region, given their centrality to global economic activity. The risk of Iranian strikes against vessels moored in the Persian Gulf, including those located near to major port facilities, will be most acute if the US engages in kinetic attacks on Iranian-linked vessels. Such attacks will substantially increase the risks of damage, cargo ignition and system malfunction for targeted vessels, while proximate vessels and installations will face increased risks of exposure to shrapnel and explosions. An ongoing US blockade is highly likely to compound operators’ concerns over the stability of shipping in the Middle East, while sustaining elevated risk premiums across regional maritime insurance and freight markets.

ISRAEL

• ISRAEL-LEBANON: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF)’s operations and Lebanese Hizballah (LH)’s rocket launches have continued broadly on trend; an escalation in LH attacks remains a realistic possibility in the coming 48 hours. Over the past 24 hours, the IDF has maintained its operational tempo in southern Lebanon, after scaling down strikes on the capital Beirut over the weekend. The IDF’s ground operations and military efforts are currently concentrated in and around Bint Jbeil (Nabatieh governorate). LH has sustained regular strikes targeting northern Israel, with most barrages focusing on population centres along the Israel-Lebanon border, with only sporadic strikes on locations deeper into Northern district, such as Karmiel and Nahariya. LH’s rocket launches targeting areas within Haifa district (Israel) have significantly decreased. However, sporadic drone incursions have persisted and activated sirens throughout the weekend, sustaining elevated security risks in Haifa. We assess that Israel’s commemoration of the Holocaust Remembrance Day (from the evening of 13 April to the evening of 14 April) will possibly drive an uptick in LH attacks against Israel, with a realistic possibility of sporadic rocket launches targeting central Israel.

REGIONAL AND GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS

• GULF: Unexploded ordnance sustains elevated security risks across the region; likely efforts to defuse them over the coming week will drive bouts of localised operational disruption. On 12 April, Kuwait’s army announced that shrapnel and explosives disposal operations throughout the day would possibly result in explosions. The announcement highlights Kuwait’s efforts to defuse and dispose of unexploded ordnance remnants within its territory; other Gulf countries are likely to undertake similar operations. Unexploded ordnance will sustain elevated security risks across the Gulf region in the coming days. Furthermore, operations to defuse and dispose of such ordnance will elevate operational risks for businesses near bomb sites, due to the likely establishment of security cordons nearby and associated movement restrictions. Such measures will possibly include the temporary evacuation of facilities and residences, as well as limitations on travel in areas near bomb sites. Security risks for bystanders and assets near such sites will also remain elevated.

(Source: Sibylline)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Home land Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent 15 Apr 26.

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