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Military And Security Developments
Apr 07.
Iran-region: Strikes on energy, industrial facilities will sustain operational disruption across sectors.. On 6 April, Israel struck Iran’s largest petrochemical complex at Asaluyeh (Bushehr province), the onshore industrial component of the South Pars gas field. Iranian state media reported that the attack targeted electricity, water and oxygen supply systems serving petrochemical units, rather than core production infrastructure. State media also reported a near-simultaneous strike on a second petrochemical complex in Marvdasht (Fars province). Within hours of the Israeli strikes, Iranian missiles hit Saudi Arabia’s Jubail Industrial City complex (Eastern province), igniting fires at Saudi Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC) facilities. The exchange occurred ahead of a deadline set by US President Donald Trump, who threatened military action against Iranian infrastructure if no agreement is reached by 2000hrs (EDT) later on 7 April. While a deadline extension remains a realistic possibility, further tit-for-tat strikes within the next 24 to 48 hours are likely. The continued targeting of energy and industrial facilities will sustain operational disruption across the Gulf region’s petrochemical industries and elevate physical security risks to personnel.
Iran-US: Iran is unlikely to meet deadline to reopen Strait of Hormuz, raising conflict escalation risks. On 6 April, Iran rejected the US’ calls for a temporary ceasefire in the Israel-US-Iran war, insisting that only a permanent end to hostilities would be acceptable. Previously on 5 April, US President Donald Trump threatened strikes on Iranian bridges and power plants if Iran does not reopen the Strait of Hormuz or agree to halt hostilities by 2000hrs (EDT) later on 7 April. We assess that Iran is highly unlikely to reopen the strait in line with US demands, especially without US guarantees for an enduring ceasefire, which the US is unlikely to provide. Consequently, conflict escalation is likely in the coming days, which will likely involve an increase in US and Israeli strikes targeting Iranian infrastructure, including related to transport (such as bridges and railways) and power plants, heightening on-the-ground security risks and nationwide energy disruption. In response, Iran is likely to expand its targeting of energy and desalination infrastructure across the Gulf region, particularly in Bahrain, Kuwait and the UAE. This will raise the likelihood of more direct Gulf involvement in the conflict, possibly initially through action against Iran-backed militias in Iraq increasing the risk of conflict protraction over the coming weeks and months.
Apr 06.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
- US-IRAN: Ultimatum increases near-term conflict escalation risks despite last-minute ceasefire push. On 5 April, US President Donald Trump issued two statements threatening escalation, including strikes on Iranian bridges and power plants if Iran does not reopen the Strait of Hormuz by 2000hrs (Eastern Time) on 7 April. The statements represent one of the most explicit threats of a significant conflict escalation since hostilities began on 28 February. Later on 5 and 6 April, reports indicated a last-ditch effort to secure a 45-day ceasefire tied to reopening the Strait, with an agreement formulated by Pakistan for immediate signature and implementation. However, Iran is unlikely to reopen the Strait, its primary leverage, without formidable guarantees from the US for an enduring ceasefire agreement. The US is unlikely to be able to provide these guarantees, but will continue to demand the reopening of the Strait regardless. We assess that there is only a low-level possibility of a ceasefire, with conflict escalation in the coming days more likely. Expanded US and Israeli strikes targeting Iranian infrastructure are highly likely to trigger intense retaliatory attacks by Iran against energy, power, and technology assets, as well as possibly targeting desalination facilities across the Gulf, particularly in Bahrain, Kuwait and the UAE, in addition to Israel. Attacks against regional states by Iranian proxies in Yemen and Iraq are also a realistic possibility, as well as the resumption of attacks targeting shipping in the Red Sea. These dynamics are likely to increase the risk of Gulf states entering the conflict, while significantly elevating regional energy, water and physical security risks. Such escalation will significantly increase the likelihood of conflict protraction through at least another month, sustaining disruption to global trade flows, particularly energy, fertilisers and raw materials.
- ISRAEL-IRAN: Strikes against Mahshahr petrochemical complex likely to degrade Iranian industrial capacity and intensify Iranian retaliation in the coming days. On 4 April, Israeli airstrikes hit the Fajr 1 and Fajr 2 utility plants supplying gas, power and industrial water to over 50 facilities across Iran’s largest petrochemical complex in Bandar-e Mahshahr (Khuzestan province). According to Iranian officials, the strikes forced a full shutdown of production at the facility, which also supports electricity provision to approximately 500,000 residents in Khuzestan province, and a full restoration of production capacity will likely take up to two years. Prolonged disruption to this critical industrial hub will likely have knock-on effects on downstream sectors, including automotive, food production, and textiles. In response, Iran has intensified attacks on Israel over the past 24 hours, with barrages impacting at least 30 locations across Haifa and Tel Aviv districts, including a direct hit on a residential building in Haifa (Haifa district), highlighting elevated security risks despite active air defences. Further Iranian strikes targeting Israeli infrastructure are likely in the coming days, alongside a realistic possibility of attacks against comparable industrial assets in regional states across the Gulf, increasing physical and operational risks to critical industries and infrastructure.
- GULF: Iranian strikes on regional energy and communications infrastructure continue broadly on trend, sustaining supply-chain disruption and broader operational risks. On 6 April, interception debris fell in the Mussafah area of the UAE’s capital, Abu Dhabi, damaging a local B2B technology business facility and injuring one Ghanaian national. In Fujairah emirate, on 6 April, authorities responded to an incident in which a drone or interception debris struck an asset linked to the state-backed telecommunications company, with no injuries reported. These incidents underscore persistent risks of disruption to digital and communications services throughout the Gulf. Similarly, on 5 April, Iranian drone strikes caused damage to energy infrastructure across several states, including Bahrain, Kuwait and the UAE. Most notably on 5 April in Kuwait, Iranian drone strikes caused ‘severe material damage’ and fires to Kuwait Petroleum Corporation (KPC) operating units, while separate strikes damaged two power and desalination plants, shutting down two electricity-generating units. These incidents underscore persistent threats to both regional energy infrastructure and global energy supply chains. Given that Kuwait relies almost completely on desalination for potable water, the strikes also elevate nationwide water security risks. Across the rest of the Gulf, targeting and interceptions remained broadly consistent with established patterns during the reporting period.
IRAQ: Iran-backed militant threats to energy infrastructure underscore persistent supply chain and conflict spillover risks; militant activity and US/Israeli strikes continue broadly on trend. On 6 April, the Iran-aligned Iraqi militia Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH) threatened regional energy infrastructure following US President Donald Trump’s ultimatum for Iran to reopen the Strait of Hormuz (see above). The statement underscores the risk of Iranian proxies concentrating resources to more explicitly focus on degrading energy security and associated global supply chains. KH also referenced the possible opening of a ‘Syrian front’ in what it described as a broader ‘defensive war’, without providing further details. Expanded militant activity in Syria would likely elevate on-the-ground security risks, particularly near military, dual-use and energy infrastructure sites along the Iraq border. It would also likely compound earlier concerns raised by Gulf states, which on 25 March called on Iraq to prevent Iran-aligned militias from targeting ‘neighbouring states’. As such, further cross-border attacks will possibly provide additional justification for Gulf states to pursue retaliatory measures against Iran-aligned groups in Iraqi territory in the coming days and weeks (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 30 March 2026). Meanwhile, on 5 April, two drones struck an office of the Kurdistan Toilers’ Party in Sulaymaniyah (Sulaymaniyah governorate), causing significant damage but no casualties. While no group has claimed responsibility, the attack was likely conducted by an Iran-aligned militant group, consistent with recent targeting patterns against Kurdish and perceived anti-Iranian entities in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). The cycle of militia attacks in the KRI, alongside US and Israeli strikes targeting militia positions across Iraq, has continued broadly in line with established trends.
Apr 04.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
- US-IRAN: Iran shot down two US combat aircraft, increasing risks of conflict escalation in the coming days. On 3 April, Iranian air defences shot down a US F-15 Eagle in an unspecified location in southwestern Iran. Combat search and rescue (CSAR) operations subsequently located one crewmember, while the other remains unaccounted for at the time of writing. During CSAR operations, Iranian air defences downed another US aircraft, an A-10 Warthog, from which the pilot safely ejected into the Persian Gulf and was subsequently rescued. These incidents indicate that although US and Israeli airstrikes have substantially damaged Iranian air defences, certain systems remain operational and continue to pose a credible threat to US and Israeli aircraft, particularly when operating at low altitude. Although CSAR operations will likely trigger a temporary de-escalation in airstrikes targeting locations in south-western Iran, airstrikes are highly likely to continue at pace in Iranian territory more broadly. If Iranian forces capture the missing crew member, the US is highly likely to escalate the intensity of airstrikes targeting Iran’s security forces. Also on 3 April, the Wall Street Journal reported that regional efforts to broker a ceasefire have broadly stalled, underscoring diminishing prospects for a bilateral ceasefire agreement. Given recent statements from US President Donald Trump that the US will continue targeting civilian infrastructure (such as bridges), and will possibly begin targeting electricity generation facilities, in the coming days, risks of conflict escalation will substantially increase over this period. Escalating US and Israeli airstrikes targeting civilian infrastructure in Iran are highly likely to trigger retaliatory Iranian attacks targeting similar facilities in the Gulf, increasing risks of cross-sector operational disruption and possibly triggering energy and water insecurity (see below).
- IRAN-ISRAEL: Iranian cluster munition attacks and Lebanese Hizballah (LH) will sustain risks of air defence penetration and cascading infrastructure failures. In the past 24 hours, Iran launched six missile attacks targeting Israel, triggering sirens in the Central, Jerusalem, Northern, Southern, and Tel Aviv districts. In the Southern district, a ballistic missile impacted in the vicinity of the Neot Hovav industrial zone, triggering a fire. In central Israel, bomblets from an Iranian cluster munition impacted several locations at approximately 0300hrs (local time), triggering a partial building collapse in Ramat Gan (Tel Aviv district) and damaging a high-voltage electricity line in Rosh HaAyin (Central district), triggering a power outage. Lebanese Hizballah (LH) have also continued to launch attacks targeting the Haifa and Northern districts. In the coming days, Iran and LH are highly likely to continue targeting Israel, maintaining pressure on Israeli air defences. Attacks targeting industrial facilities will also sustain risks of major hazard events, while risks of exposure to explosions, interception-related shrapnel and cascading infrastructure failures will also remain elevated in the coming days.
- UAE-IRAN: The likely targeting of an Oracle facility underscores persistent disruption to regional technology business operations. On 4 April, interception debris hit the facade of the Oracle Systems Limited building in Dubai Internet City (Dubai emirate), though caused no injuries. The Oracle facility was likely the target of the strike, with Oracle included on an IRGC list of 18 US-linked technology, industrial and financial entities to be targeted in the event of further high-ranking assassinations among Iran’s leadership (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 1 April 2026). Iran has repeatedly demonstrated it considers technology and banking entities affiliated with Israel and the US as ‘legitimate targets’, recently targeting an Amazon Web Services (AWS) cloud computing facility in Bahrain on 1 April. Iranian efforts to disrupt private sector activity, threatening critical data infrastructure in the Gulf and communications and digital services, will almost certainly continue in the coming days, increasing economic pressure across the region.
IRAQ: A drone strike on foreign-owned oil facilities underscores ongoing security threats to strategic energy infrastructure in Iraq. On 4 April, a drone strike on storage facilities belonging to foreign oil companies near Basra (Basra governorate) caused a fire. At the time of writing, no injuries have been reported. While authorities have not confirmed the drone’s origin, it was likely launched by an Iran-aligned Iraqi militia group, underscoring their persistent threat to strategic energy infrastructure, especially foreign-owned assets. The incident will likely exacerbate disruption to local and regional energy supply chains. More broadly, the cycle of retaliatory strikes between Iranian-aligned militia against assets in the semi-autonomous Kurdistan region, and the US and Israel against militia positions across Iraq, continues on trend.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
- US-IRAN: The US will likely launch an intense airstrike campaign targeting civilian and dual-use infrastructure in Iran in the coming hours, substantially increasing the risk of conflict escalation.
- ISRAEL-US-IRAN: The US’ and Israel’s increasing targeting of Iranian civilian infrastructure will likely drive retaliation against education facilities in the coming days.
- US-ISRAEL-IRAN: Reported airstrikes targeting Kharg Island (Bushehr province, Iran) underscore the increasing likelihood of a ground offensive targeting Iranian territory in the Persian Gulf.
- GULF: Like-for-like strikes on energy and industrial facilities will sustain operational disruption for the petrochemical sector across the Gulf.
- US-IRAN: The US will likely launch an intense airstrike campaign targeting civilian and dual-use infrastructure in Iran in the coming hours, substantially increasing the risk of conflict escalation. Between 5 and 7 April, US President Donald Trump has repeatedly threatened airstrikes against bridges and energy facilities in Iran unless Tehran agrees to US ceasefire proposals and ends the de facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Trump has stated that airstrikes would begin at 2000hrs (EDT) on 7 April; this would indicate that strikes will begin in Iran at 0330hrs (local time) on 8 April. Although there is a realistic possibility that Trump will announce extensions to the deadline, Iran remains unlikely to present the US with a ceasefire proposal that meets key US demands, particularly regarding reopening the Strait of Hormuz. Consequently, the US is likely to escalate its airstrike campaign in the coming days, with particularly intense strikes on key infrastructure nodes and energy facilities servicing cities such as Isfahan (Isfahan province) and the capital Tehran. Notably, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have already conducted several attacks on petrochemical facilities over the coming days, including those in Asaluyeh (Bushehr province) and Marvdasht (Fars province) on 6 April. Sustained hostilities targeting Iranian energy infrastructure will substantially increase the likelihood of rolling blackouts in Iran’s major cities. Such an escalation will also increase the likelihood of damage to water infrastructure, increasing threats to staff sheltering in place and driving the risk of rationing and shortages. Subsequently, risks of uncontrolled escalation will substantially increase, critically disrupting cross-sector operational continuity throughout the region and likely triggering severe price volatility on international oil, gas and commodity markets.
- ISRAEL-US-IRAN: The US’ and Israel’s increasing targeting of Iranian civilian infrastructure will likely drive retaliation against education facilities in the coming days. On 6 April, Israeli airstrikes targeted installations associated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Tehran’s Sharif University of Technology, triggering a localised gas outage. Following the strike, the state-affiliated Tasnim media outlet published an article characterising US-linked universities in the Gulf region as ‘legitimate targets’ for retaliation. The text included US-based universities’ satellite campuses, US-accredited universities and universities with ‘strategic partnerships’ with US-based entities. The report explicitly referenced US-linked universities in the Education City area of the Qatari capital Doha, as well as universities in Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. This underscores the likelihood of escalating Iranian hostilities targeting these locations in the coming days. Consequently, university staff, students, facilities and proximate infrastructure will face elevated risks of exposure to Iranian munitions, explosions and associated shrapnel near targeted installations.
- GULF-ISRAEL-IRAN: Airstrikes targeting transport infrastructure in Iran will increase the risk of tit-for-tat retaliation in the Gulf and Israel. On 6 April, the IDF announced that it had conducted airstrikes targeting Tehran’s Mehrabad International Airport (THR); airstrikes also targeted two unindexed airfields in Tehran province, described as the Azmayesh and Bahram airports. The airstrikes almost certainly form part of efforts to degrade Iran’s conventional aerial capabilities, as well as its radar and air defence capabilities. However, continued strikes targeting dual-use facilities such as THR will compound the risk of long-term disruption to airport operations and Iran’s capacity to facilitate evacuations upon the re-opening of Iranian airspace. In response to the repeated targeting of airports and airfields, Iran will likely continue engaging in missile and drone attacks targeting airports in Israel and the broader Gulf region, including major international transit hubs such as Dubai International Airport (DXB, UAE), Hamad International Airport (DOH, Qatar) and Kuwait International Airport (KWT, Kuwait). On 7 April, the IDF also issued a warning to Iranian civilians to avoid travelling by rail throughout the day; this statement highly likely indicates that airstrikes targeting rail infrastructure, associated facilities and nearby installations will materialise in the coming hours. The routine targeting of Iranian transport infrastructure, including airports, bridges and railways, will substantially increase the risk of Iranian attacks targeting similar facilities in Israel and the Gulf, in turn exacerbating the risk of travel, supply chain and cross-sector operational disruption. The risk of protracted disruption will be particularly acute in the event of substantial damage to key transport infrastructure, increasing the pressure on socio-economic health in the medium term.
- US-ISRAEL-IRAN: Reported airstrikes targeting Kharg Island (Bushehr province, Iran) underscore the increasing likelihood of a ground offensive targeting Iranian territory in the Persian Gulf. On 7 April, the US likely engaged in airstrikes targeting military installations on Kharg Island, including radar facilities, a military base and a nearby dock. While entirely consistent with broader efforts to degrade Iranian military capabilities, the airstrikes possibly reflect efforts to specifically degrade Kharg Island’s defensive capabilities ahead of US ground operations, such as limited raids or broader efforts to seize and occupy the island. However, we assess it is equally possible that the airstrikes form part of the US’ strategic deception ahead of ground operations targeting other Iranian islands in the Persian Gulf, such as Abu Musa, Farur Island, Greater Tunb, Kish Island, Lesser Tunb and/or Siri Island (all Hormozgan province). Regardless of their specific target, any such US ground operations would almost certainly trigger intense retaliation from Iran, which we assess would consequently target locally engaged US forces, as well as US military installations across the broader region and in allied Gulf states, particularly the UAE. It is also highly unlikely that ground operations would trigger the immediate and unconditional reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, sustaining critical disruption to maritime supply chains (both regionally and globally). Rather, naval engagements between the US and Iran would increase security risks for proximate vessels, with Iran’s possible deployment of sea mines in active combat areas compounding the risk of protracted disruption to maritime supply chains.
- ISRAEL-LEBANON: Lebanese Hizballah (LH)’s maritime strike claim highlights an elevated risk to vessels off the Lebanese coast despite conflicting reports. On 5 April, LH claimed it had struck an Israeli Navy vessel using a cruise missile approximately 68 nautical miles off the coast of Lebanon. The IDF rejected the claim. Israeli media reports initially suggested that a British vessel had been mistakenly targeted; however, UK defence officials denied that any Royal Navy assets were hit. We assess that the claim is likely LH misinformation. Regardless, it highlights possible LH intent to target maritime assets operating off the Lebanese coast. This will increase physical security risks to Israeli-affiliated vessels in the area in the coming weeks. It will also elevate the threat to foreign vessels off Lebanon’s coast from misidentification.
- ISRAEL-LEBANON: An IDF warning for the Masnaa border crossing underscores the elevated risk of strikes on Lebanese-Syrian border infrastructure, despite ongoing mediation efforts. On 4 April, the IDF issued an evacuation warning for the Masnaa border crossing (Beqaa governorate), alongside advisories against travel along the M30 highway, a key route leading to the crossing. The crossing has remained closed since 4 April. Diplomatic efforts to prevent a strike are ongoing (reportedly being mediated by Egypt and supported by the US). While there is a realistic possibility that diplomatic efforts will succeed, reflected by the absence of such strikes at the time of writing, its identification as a possible target by Israel will sustain the risk of airstrikes on the crossing in the coming weeks. Even if mediation efforts are successful, airstrikes targeting areas near to the crossing (on either the Lebanese or Syrian side), particularly key access routes such as the M30 highway, remain likely. More broadly, the risk of strikes on and around border crossings between Lebanon and Syria will persist over the coming weeks, driving disruption to the movement of staff and supplies.
- ISRAEL: US and Israeli escalation will elevate security risks across Israel in the coming days. Over the past 24 hours, Iranian and LH attacks against Israel have continued broadly on trend, though an increase in the targeting of central Israel and the use of cluster munitions has driven a surge in alerts. However, more frequent Israeli strikes and targeting of key Iranian facilities over the past 72 hours, together with the possible escalation of US attacks against Iran (see above), will drive the risk of ‘like-for-like’ strikes across Israel in the coming days, in turn elevating the risk of power disruption.
- GULF: Like-for-like strikes on energy and industrial facilities will sustain operational disruption for the petrochemical sector across the Gulf. Overnight between 5 and 6 April, at least one Iranian drone struck Kuwait’s Ali Al Salem Air Base (Jahra governorate), reportedly injuring 15 US servicemen. The incident has not yet been confirmed by US Central Command (CENTCOM) or corroborated by other media outlets. Separately, on 6 April, an Iranian drone hit a residential area in northern Kuwait and injured six civilians. On the same day, Iran struck Saudi Arabia’s Jubail Industrial City Complex (Eastern province), igniting fires at Saudi Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC) facilities. The strike was highly likely retaliation for earlier Israeli strikes on Iran’s largest petrochemical complex at Asaluyeh (Bushehr province). Notably, Jubail is the largest industrial complex in the region, a critical hub for the Saudi petrochemical sector and one of the main economic arteries for Saudi Arabia. The IRGC stated it specifically targeted US-affiliated companies operating within the Jubail complex, including Dow Chemical, ExxonMobil and Sadara Chemical. The IRGC also claimed it conducted a simultaneous attack targeting the petrochemical facilities of the US company Chevron Phillips Chemical situated in Saudi Arabia’s Juaymah Industrial Complex (also Eastern province). Notably, following the attacks, in the early hours of 7 April, the Saudi authorities temporarily suspended traffic on the nearby King Fahd Causeway (Eastern province), the key arterial bridge linking Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, as a precautionary measure. The strikes come ahead of US President Donald Trump’s 2000hrs EDT deadline (see above). In the likely event that the US follows through on its threat to target Iranian national infrastructure, Iran will likely escalate strikes on Gulf energy and industrial facilities over the next 24 to 48 hours. Iran will also likely broaden the scope of its strikes against multiple Gulf states to include desalination infrastructure, particularly in Bahrain, Kuwait and the UAE. This would raise the likelihood of more direct Gulf involvement in the conflict, possibly initially through action against Iran-backed militias in Iraq (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 6 April 2026), increasing the risk of conflict protraction over the coming weeks and months.
- IRAQ: Iran-linked attacks on the Kurdish security forces will elevate conflict escalation risks in the coming weeks. Overnight on 6 to 7 April, at least five drone attacks targeted Peshmerga-linked locations across the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) condemned the attacks and attributed them to Iran and Iran-aligned militias. Sustained targeting of government and security-linked assets in the KRI will increase the risk of escalation in the coming days and weeks, particularly in the event of strikes against high-value individuals, including senior Kurdish leaders, such as KRI President Nechirvan Barzani (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Weekend Update – 29 March 2026). Meanwhile, during the reporting period, Iran-aligned groups also targeted the regional capital’s Erbil International Airport (EBL) and the US consulate (Erbil governorate). In both cases, drones were successfully intercepted by air defence systems. However, these incidents underscore persistent risks to on-the-ground personnel from interception debris, as well as continued disruption to civil aviation and consular operations. Across the rest of Iraq, the cycle of Iran-aligned militia attacks against key infrastructure, alongside US and Israeli strikes targeting militia positions, has continued broadly in line with established patterns.
- ISRAEL-TURKEY: An attack near the Israeli consulate has underscored the persistent security threats to Israeli-linked assets globally. At approximately 1230hrs (local time) on 7 April, three assailants killed one person and injured four others in a small arms attack near the Israeli consulate in the Levent neighbourhood of Beşiktaş district (Istanbul, Istanbul province). The police neutralised the attackers following a brief exchange of gunfire and have since launched an investigation. Turkish Minister of the Interior Mustafa Çiftçi stated that the attackers had travelled from İzmit (Kocaeli province) in a rental vehicle, and that at least one had links to an ‘organisation that exploits religion’. No Israeli diplomats are stationed at the consulate building. The attack underscores elevated security risks near Israeli and Jewish-linked assets globally. It comes amid heightened regional tensions and anti-Israeli sentiment linked (at least partially) to the ongoing Israel-US-Iran war, Israel’s operations in Lebanon and the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza. The Levent area is a densely populated commercial and financial district hosting numerous international companies, which highlights the collateral risks facing business assets and personnel in proximity to targeted facilities. Further such attacks remain possible; however, we assess that high-casualty incidents will be partially mitigated by Turkey’s robust counterterrorism capabilities.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
- US-IRAN: Ceasefire negotiations have failed to progress demonstrably, underscoring broader risks of deadlock and conflict escalation. On 6 April, Pakistani mediators reportedly presented the US and Iran with a ceasefire proposal instituting an immediate 45-day ceasefire to facilitate broader negotiations regarding a permanent ceasefire. Iranian state media subsequently rejected the proposal publicly. Iranian government representatives indicated that Tehran would only accept a permanent and region-wide ceasefire that also included a mechanism through which Iran could seek reparations. US President Donald Trump subsequently stated that he would not agree to a ceasefire that did not meet unspecified US criteria. This likely refers to previously detailed commitments for Iran to abandon its missile, drone and nuclear capabilities, re-open the Strait of Hormuz and end its support for regional proxies (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 25 March 2026). We assess that these contrasting positions underscore the limited prospects for an imminent diplomatic breakthrough between the US and Iran, amid broader conflict escalation risks in the coming hours and days. (Source: Sibylline)
08 Apr 26. Epic Fury Quelled for Now, Objectives Accomplished, U.S. Forces Remain Ready.
In fewer than 40 days, unrelenting military action by America’s joint force has helped accomplish all the goals President Donald J. Trump set for Operation Epic Fury.
Last night, Iranian leaders agreed to a ceasefire and to working with the president on a way ahead that includes, among other things, opening the Strait of Hormuz and abandoning Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons.
In a statement by the Iranian minister of foreign affairs, Iran agreed to negotiations with the U.S., a ceasefire and allowing two weeks of safe passage for ships through the strait.
On social media, the president said it was a “big day for world peace” and predicted a positive outcome for Iran and its neighbors. “Just like we are experiencing in the U.S., this could be the golden age of the Middle East.”
The United States kicked off combat operations against Iran on Feb. 28, as part of Operation Epic Fury, with the goal of destroying Iran’s offensive missiles, missile production, the Iranian navy and other security infrastructure — ensuring Iran never has nuclear weapons. Those goals have been accomplished.
“Together with our Israeli partners, America’s military achieved every single objective on plan, on schedule, exactly as laid out from day one,” Secretary of War Pete Hegseth said during a press briefing this morning at the Pentagon. “Iran’s navy is at the bottom of the sea. … Iran’s air force has been wiped out. Iran no longer has … any sort of a comprehensive air defense system; we own their skies. Their missile program is functionally destroyed: launchers, production facilities and existing stockpiles depleted and decimated.”
Last night, Hegseth said, in more than 800 strikes in Iran, the U.S. completed the destruction of Iran’s defense industrial base, meaning it will take decades for the Iranians to rebuild what was taken from them by America’s joint force.
“We finished completely destroying Iran’s defense industrial base, a core pillar of our mission objective,” Hegseth said. “They can no longer build missiles, build rockets, build launchers or build [unmanned aircraft systems]. Their factories have been razed to the ground, set back in historic fashion.”
Over the course of 38 days of combat operations, said Air Force Gen. Dan Caine, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the American joint force struck more than 13,000 targets, including 4,000 dynamic targets that materialize once aircraft are already in the air.
“[U.S. Central Command] forces destroyed approximately 80% of Iran’s air defense systems, striking more than 1,500 air defense targets, more than 450 ballistic missile storage facilities, 800 one-way attack drones storage facilities — all of these systems are gone,” Caine said. “We’ve devastated Iran’s command and control and logistical networks, destroying more than 2,000 command and control nodes and degrading their ability to target U.S. and friendly forces.”
Assessments indicate the joint force has sunk more than 90% of the regular Iranian fleet — 150 ships are at the bottom of the ocean, he said, as well as half of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps navy’s small attack boats.
As a warrior himself, Caine sympathized with the Iranian commanders.
“It is, and we know this, incredibly frustrating right now to be a lower-level Iranian commander trying to fight your fight,” he said.
Most important, Caine said, is that Iran’s defense industrial base has been destroyed.
“We attacked, along with our partners, approximately 90% of their weapons factories,” he said. “Every factory that produced Shahed one-way attack drones was struck; every factory that produces the guidance systems to go into those drones was struck. Their missile defense industrial base is shattered, with more than 80% of their missile facilities gone, as well as their solid rocket motor production capability.”
With the destruction of more than 20 naval production facilities, Caine said, it will take Iran years to rebuild its surface fleet. And with 80% of its nuclear industrial base also hit, its ability to attain a nuclear weapon is also significantly degraded.
While Iran has agreed to a ceasefire, to reopen the Strait of Hormuz and to sit down for negotiations with the United States, the U.S military remains in theater and on watch, he said.
“A ceasefire is a pause, and the joint force remains ready, if ordered or called upon, to resume combat operations with the same speed and precision as we’ve demonstrated over the last 38 days — and we hope that is not the case,” Caine said.
The secretary said the conditions have been set by the joint force, and that now is the time for a deal to be reached.
“Now we have a chance at real peace and a real deal,” he said. “The War Department, for now … has done its part. We stand ready in the background to ensure Iran upholds every reasonable term. And as everyone knows, nobody makes a better deal than President Trump. To the warriors of Epic Fury, I say, ‘Well done.’ You’re the backbone of our country. Your skill, your bravery and sheer guts and grit showed the world what America is all about. I’m proud of you; we’re proud of you; the president is proud of you. Job well done.” (Source: U.S. DoD)
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