NEWS IN BRIEF – MIDDLE EAST

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Military And Security Developments

Apr 02.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

ISRAEL-US-IRAN: US and Israeli airstrikes are highly likely to continue in the coming days, with the degradation of Iranian air defences likely facilitating an increase in strikes targeting eastern Iran.
IRAQ-US: The US embassy’s warning underscores elevated attack risks in the capital Baghdad over the coming hours and days, though broader strike risks continue on trend.
US-IRAN: Conflicting messaging regarding US ambitions for a ceasefire will undermine prospects for conflict de-escalation in the coming days.
ISRAEL-US-IRAN: US and Israeli airstrikes are highly likely to continue in the coming days, with the degradation of Iranian air defences likely facilitating an increase in strikes targeting eastern Iran. Over the past 24 hours, the US and Israel have continued to launch airstrikes targeting locations throughout Iran amid efforts to degrade Iranian missile and drone capabilities critically. Local media reports indicate that airstrikes have continued to target installations in the vicinity of major cities, including Isfahan (Isfahan province), Khorramshahr (Khuzestan province) and Tabriz (East Azerbaijan province). The US and Israel have also continued to engage in intense attacks targeting Iran’s naval and port facilities, with airstrikes targeting associated infrastructure in Bandar Abbas, Bandar Charak, Bandar Lengeh, Kish Island, Qeshm Island (all Hormozgan province), Bandar Ganaveh, Bushehr (both Bushehr province), Bandar-e Mahshahr (Khuzestan) and Chabahar (Sistan and Baluchistan province). Despite the intense targeting of Iranian naval facilities, Iran is highly likely to retain the capacity to enforce the de facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz, particularly for vessels linked to the US and its allies. Airstrikes also targeted several Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) positions in the Mashhad area (Razavi Khorasan province), as well as Mashhad Shahid Hasheminejad International Airport (MHD), possibly impacting the airport’s fuel storage tanks and terminal facilities. Increasingly frequent attacks in eastern Iran underscore the progressive degradation of Iran’s air defences and the expansion of US and Israeli air superiority. In the coming days, further such airstrikes along this axis are highly likely, increasing the risk of disruption to overland evacuation routes via Iran’s eastern borders. Amid persistent diplomatic deadlock, the US and Israel will possibly intensify airstrikes against major economic installations within Iran in the coming hours and days, increasing the risk of Iranian retaliation targeting similar facilities in Israel and the broader Gulf region (see below).
ISRAEL: Over the past 24 hours, Iranian and Iran-backed proxy strikes on Israel have continued largely on trend, though with an uptick in the number of projectiles per barrage. While the number of barrages on 1 April remained within average levels for the past five days, the number of alerts resulting from Iranian ordnance was significantly above average. This suggests that Iran has increased the number of projectiles per barrage. Iran has also shifted its targeting, prioritising central over southern Israel, likely contributing to the increased number of alerts. However, we assess that the strikes broadly remain within established Iranian targeting and retaliation trends, with the shift to prioritise central Israel likely due to the Passover holiday (until 8 April; see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 31 March 2026). We assess that Iran will gradually shift to rely on Lebanese Hizballah (LH)’s targeting of Israel as the war continues, in order to preserve ammunition. This will likely reduce the frequency of Iranian attacks on Israel, with Iran likely concentrating efforts on impactful strikes targeting critical infrastructure and military facilities, driving bystander exposure near these facilities over the coming weeks.
ISRAEL-LEBANON: Over the past 24 hours, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF)’s strikes and operations across Lebanon continued on trend. On 1 April, IDF airstrikes continued across Lebanon, including within the capital Beirut. The IDF also announced that it conducted strikes against currency exchange services, following its warning earlier on the same day (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 1 April 2026). In line with this warning, strikes also targeted BOA CHANCE exchange company and Trade Point International S.A.R.L. company facilities. We assess that over the coming days, the IDF will continue targeting currency exchange services affiliated with LH and other institutions within the organisation’s finance network. These targets will include banks and charity organisations, driving widespread bystander exposure to strikes across Lebanon.
GULF: Iranian strikes across the Gulf region have continued in line with established trends, sustaining elevated regional security risks. Throughout our reporting period, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE experienced routine Iranian targeting, with interception rates also remaining broadly on trend. This underscores the persistent threats to on-the-ground personnel from direct strikes and interception debris. On 1 April, international media confirmed that the previously unnamed company targeted in Bahrain earlier on the same day had been an Amazon Web Services (AWS) facility (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 1 April 2026). The incident highlights the exposure of critical data infrastructure in the Gulf and the potential for disruption to communications and digital services. We assess that Iranian efforts to disrupt private sector activity, particularly targeting US-linked assets, will almost certainly continue in the coming days, as part of a broader strategy to increase economic pressure across the region.
IRAQ-US: The US embassy’s warning underscores elevated attack risks in the capital Baghdad over the coming hours and days, though broader strike risks continue on trend. Earlier on 2 April, the US embassy in Baghdad issued a statement warning of possible attacks on US citizens and assets in central Baghdad over the next 24 to 48 hours by Iraqi militia groups aligned with Iran. The statement highlights security and operational risks for US and Western-affiliated businesses, universities, diplomatic facilities, hotels and high-value infrastructure targets such as airports. Additionally, the statement advised US citizens not to visit the embassy or the US consulate general in Erbil (Erbil governorate) due to significant security risks. Although the statement also urged US citizens to leave the country, restrictions on consular support will likely complicate personnel evacuation efforts in the coming days. The statement follows the kidnapping of US freelance journalist Shelly Kittleson in Baghdad on 31 March by an individual associated with the Iran-backed militia Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH). This underscores kidnapping risks, particularly for Western individuals in public-facing roles without additional security (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 1 April 2026). The significant influence of the Iran-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) within the Iraqi security apparatus will undermine the security forces’ capacity to interdict plots. Consequently, there is an increased risk of attacks succeeding and causing substantial damage in the next 24 to 48 hours. More broadly across Iraq, drone and missile activity have continued on trend. On 1 April, a drone crashed near the capital’s Baghdad International Airport (BGW), underscoring persistent threats to civil aviation and nearby military-linked infrastructure. In the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), the governor of Erbil governorate reported at least 25 attacks overnight on 1-2 April, highlighting the scale and consistency of militia activity targeting the region. Over the same period, there were multiple reported US and/or Israeli airstrikes targeting PMF units in Al Anbar and Nineveh governorates. Such strikes are likely to continue in the coming days, particularly in Al Anbar, Babil, Kirkuk, Nineveh, Saladin and Wasit governorates.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

US-IRAN: Conflicting messaging regarding US ambitions for a ceasefire will undermine prospects for conflict de-escalation in the coming days. On 1 April, US President Donald Trump again claimed that the US is ‘nearing completion’ of its war goals regarding the destruction of Iran’s missile, drone, naval and nuclear programmes. However, Trump also stated that the US will escalate its operations in Iran in the coming two to three weeks if Iran does not agree to a US-proposed ceasefire (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 25 March 2026). Despite mounting pressure on Iran and increasing US brinkmanship, we continue to assess that Iran is unlikely to agree to US terms to end the conflict unconditionally, particularly in the absence of guarantees regarding permanent conflict cessation. This deadlock will increase the likelihood of the US escalating airstrikes against Iran in the coming days, as well as expanding its current targeting to include routine strikes on Iran’s energy and water infrastructure; key industrial installations vulnerable to such strikes include Iranian cement, metal and construction material production facilities. There is also a realistic possibility that the US will mobilise ground troops to take control of Iranian territory in the Persian Gulf as part of an effort to secure concessions from Iran vis-à-vis the navigability of the Strait of Hormuz. While this approach would possibly form part of the US’ ambition to ‘escalate to de-escalate’ the Israel-US-Iran war, Iran is highly unlikely to capitulate in the event of US ground operations. Rather, we assess that Iran would be highly likely to intensify attacks targeting US military personnel and assets, as well as broader installations in the Gulf thereafter. Such conditions would increase the risk of conflict escalation and protraction beyond the coming two to three weeks, undermining regional stability and operational continuity.
IRAN-US: Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian published an open letter to the US, reflecting efforts to undermine US domestic support for operations targeting Iran. On 1 March, the Iranian president issued a public letter to the US, stating that Iran does not represent a threat to US interests and that US operations targeting Iran represent Israeli rather than US ambitions. Pezeshkian issued the letter shortly before President Trump addressed the US via television, likely as part of an effort to undermine domestic support for US operations targeting Iran. Pezeshkian’s statement also likely forms part of a drive to exacerbate strategic misalignment among Congressional Republicans vis-à-vis US foreign policy, particularly ahead of the November 2026 midterm elections.

Apr 01.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

ISRAEL-US-IRAN: US and Israeli airstrikes targeting steel and pharmaceutical facilities increase the risk of tit-for-tat Iranian retaliation in the Gulf region.
ISRAEL: The co-ordination of Houthi attacks highlights the elevated risk of strike intensification against Israel in the coming days.
IRAQ: The kidnapping of a US journalist in the capital Baghdad underscores elevated militia-linked abduction risks; attacks and interceptions continue in line with established trends.
US-IRAN: US President Donald Trump has claimed that the US will soon cease military operations targeting Iran, though a bilateral diplomatic breakthrough remains unlikely.
ISRAEL-US-IRAN: US and Israeli airstrikes targeting steel and pharmaceutical facilities increase the risk of tit-for-tat Iranian retaliation in the Gulf region. In the past 24 hours, US and Israeli airstrikes have continued to target locations throughout Iran, with local media sources reporting repeated explosions in Ahvaz (Khuzestan province), Amol (Mazandaran province), Bandar Abbas (Hormozgan province), Bushehr (Bushehr province), Isfahan (Isfahan province), Karaj (Alborz province), Shiraz (Fars province) and the capital Tehran. The US’ and Israel’s airstrikes against Iran will almost certainly continue over the coming hours, targeting Iran’s missile and drone supply chains, including dual-use and manufacturing facilities. On 1 April, Iranian media reported that airstrikes had targeted Mobarakeh Steel Company (Isfahan). In the coming hours, Iran will likely initiate missile and drone attacks against major metal processing facilities in the Gulf region, increasing damage risks to nearby installations and critical infrastructure (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 29 March 2026). Also on 1 April, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced that they had targeted a manufacturing facility in Iran that was involved in the production of ‘chemical weapons’. The Iranian authorities have disputed this characterisation, instead stating that the IDF targeted the Tofigh Daru Research and Engineering Company (one of Iran’s largest pharmaceutical manufacturers). In the coming hours, there is a realistic possibility that Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) will issue statements characterising pharmaceutical production and storage facilities in Israel and the Gulf region as ‘legitimate targets’. In the Gulf region, attack risks will be most acute against manufacturing facilities in Abu Dhabi and Dubai emirates (both UAE) and the Qatari capital Doha; attacks against manufacturing facilities in Saudi Arabia’s Jeddah and King Abdullah Economic City (both Mecca province) also remain possible. Iranian hostilities targeting pharmaceutical facilities will increase the risk of localised hazardous incidents due to potential compound ignition. This will also disrupt global medical supply chains and increase the risk of medical goods shortages in the coming weeks.
IRAN-REGION: IRGC-linked media has continued to publish reports threatening various economic installations across the Middle East, underscoring widespread operational risks. On 31 March, the IRGC published a list of 18 US-linked technology, industrial and financial entities that will ‘be targeted’ in the event of further high-ranking assassinations among Iran’s leadership. The list references firms including Apple, Boeing, Cisco, Dell, IBM, Google, JP Morgan, Meta, Microsoft and Tesla. The statement underscores the increasing risk of Iranian hostilities targeting high-profile US-linked entities with operations in the Gulf region and Israel, including kinetic attacks and cyber attacks. Also on 31 March, IRGC-linked media announced that the Iranian security forces are considering plans to target energy infrastructure in the UAE, specifically the Habshan-Fujairah pipeline and export terminals at the Fujairah port facility (Fujairah emirate). Taken together, these statements underscore Iran’s ongoing efforts to maximise operational disruption in the Gulf across key sectors. This approach will likely continue undermining the prospects for diplomatic resolution, while maintaining upward price pressures on global oil, gas and commodity markets. Such conditions will sustain critical operational disruption risks for locally engaged entities. They will also increase operating costs for companies worldwide, particularly in energy-intensive industries such as transportation, manufacturing and aviation.
ISRAEL-LEBANON: An IDF warning highlights elevated bystander security risks near currency exchange services in the coming days and weeks. On 1 April, the IDF published a warning for currency exchange services working for Lebanese Hizballah (LH) and anyone coming in contact with them. The IDF warned that it continues to target LH sources of funding, emphasising that the network of currency exchange services is the organisation’s primary and most important financial source. The IDF also named two central figures, Mohamad Noureddine and Hussein Ibrahim, who are affiliated with the network. These two individuals are also affiliated with Lebanon-based companies Trade Point International S.A.R.L and BOA CHANCE, which operate outside Lebanon. In the coming days and weeks, bystander exposure to blasts and debris will be elevated near currency exchange stations affiliated with LH, particularly branches of the above-mentioned companies. There is also a realistic possibility that the IDF will conduct targeted strikes against personnel affiliated with LH’s finance network, further elevating bystander risks in urban areas, including during overland movement and within residential areas.
LEBANON: UN peacekeepers’ deaths in a roadside explosion in southern Lebanon highlight a deteriorated security environment and elevated attack risks during overland transit. According to initial findings presented to the UN Security Council on 31 March, a roadside explosion killed two Indonesian UN peacekeepers near Bani Haiyyan (Nabatieh governorate) on 30 March. The findings indicate the evolution of the threat environment in southern Lebanon towards the increasing use of indiscriminate attack methods, such as planted explosive devices. The incident highlights the rising risk of exposure to attacks during overland transit amid the continued intensification of the Israel-LH conflict. We assess that the conflict’s intensification is likely to continue over the coming days and will increase security risks for bystanders nationwide, particularly in southern Lebanon.
ISRAEL: The co-ordination of Houthi attacks highlights the elevated risk of strike intensification against Israel in the coming days. On 1 April, the Yemen-based Iran-backed Houthis claimed that they conducted a joint strike together with Iran and LH against Israel. On the same day, reports from the IDF’s Home Front Command signalled that the Houthis launched a small number of missiles, of which only one required interception. Nevertheless, the claim highlights the three parties’ increasing efforts to co-ordinate their attacks against Israel to penetrate its air defences. We continue to assess that the intensification of attacks against Israel during the Passover festive period (1-8 April) is likely, increase nationwide security risks.
GULF: Commercial vessels face sustained targeting risks, while persistent interceptions underscore elevated physical security risks for personnel. On 1 April, an Iranian cruise missile struck the Panama-flagged crude oil tanker Aqua 1 leased to QatarEnergy while it was anchored approximately 17 nautical miles (32km) north of Ras Laffan Industrial City (Al Khor municipality, Qatar). The strike caused damage above the waterline; there was no environmental impact or injuries reported. Qatar’s military intercepted two additional missiles targeting the same vicinity. The incident underscores the continued risks facing commercial and state-linked vessels operating near major Gulf shipping lanes, key ports and industrial hubs; this includes exposure to direct strikes, mistargeting and interception debris. Also on 1 April, the authorities in Umm Al Quwain (UAE) confirmed that debris from a drone interception injured one person. This followed an earlier incident in which a drone interception killed a Bangladeshi national at a farm in Fujairah emirate (UAE). These incidents highlight persistent risks for on-the-ground personnel stemming from interception debris and shrapnel. In Kuwait, Iranian drones struck fuel storage tanks at Kuwait International Airport (KWI), triggering a large fire. Initial reporting indicates material damage but no casualties. The incident underscores continued targeting of transit infrastructure across the Gulf. Bahrain’s interior ministry confirmed that an Iranian attack on a commercial facility at an undisclosed location in that country caused a fire, highlighting persistent threats to business operations in the region. Meanwhile, Iran’s targeting of Saudi Arabia and resulting interceptions in the kingdom’s Eastern and Riyadh provinces has continued in line with established patterns during the reporting period.
IRAQ: The kidnapping of a US journalist in the capital Baghdad underscores elevated militia-linked abduction risks; attacks and interceptions continue in line with established trends. On 31 March, US freelance journalist Shelly Kittleson was kidnapped near the Palestine Hotel in the al-Rusafa district of the capital. Iraq’s interior ministry announced that two vehicles were involved; one was intercepted near al-Haswa (Babil governorate) and a suspect was detained. The second vehicle escaped with Kittleson. The incident occurred amid heightened regional tensions linked to the Israel-US-Iran war, during which Iranian-aligned militias have intensified their activity across Iraq. Kittleson was likely abducted by an Iranian-backed militia, possibly Kata’ib Hezbollah, though no group has claimed responsibility. Efforts by Iraqi federal forces to secure her release will likely be constrained, reflecting the influence of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) within Iraq’s security apparatus. Kidnap risks facing US and other Western nationals in Iraq will remain elevated. Further abduction attempts are likely in the coming weeks, particularly against soft targets lacking diplomatic protection or dedicated security. In Baghdad and across much of Iraq, drone and missile activity continued in line with established patterns during the reporting period. In the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (KRI), a drone strike on 1 April triggered a large fire at a Castrol oil warehouse in Erbil governorate. Over the same period, there were two reported incidents of US and/or Israeli airstrikes targeting PMF units in al-Anbar and Nineveh governorates. Such strikes are likely to continue in the coming days, particularly in al-Anbar, Babil, Kirkuk, Nineveh, Saladin, and Wasit governorates.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

US-IRAN: US President Donald Trump has claimed that the US will soon cease military operations targeting Iran, though a bilateral diplomatic breakthrough remains unlikely. On 31 March, Trump stated that the US will possibly ‘leave’ Iran in the next two to three weeks, should the US assess that Iran no longer has the capacity to develop a nuclear weapon. Trump also stated that the US will not require a ceasefire deal with Iran to end the conflict, while reiterating claims that US and Israeli airstrikes have ‘decimated’ Iran’s military capabilities. Despite these statements, however, the US continues to augment its military posture in the region. On 31 March, the US Navy’s Carrier Air Wing Seven (CVW-7), including the USS George HW Bush (CVN-77), which left its home port in Virginia (US) to deploy to the Middle East. This deployment likely reflects ongoing US efforts to demonstrate its capacity to intensify operations, in an attempt to maximise pressure on Tehran to make concessions regarding the Strait of Hormuz’s de facto blockade and its missile, drone and nuclear programmes. Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian stated on 31 March that he would be willing to agree to a ceasefire if it receives guarantees that de-escalation will be permanent. However, the US is highly unlikely to provide such guarantees in the coming days, undermining the prospects for an imminent diplomatic breakthrough. Consequently, we assess that the US will likely continue with preparations to adopt an ‘escalate to de-escalate’ approach to the Israel-US-Iran war in the coming days, with escalation becoming increasingly likely in the absence of Iranian concessions. US escalation will possibly include the intensification of airstrikes targeting Iran’s security forces, the expansion of airstrike targets to include Iran’s critical national infrastructure and the mobilisation of ground troops to take control of Iranian territory in the Persian Gulf and/or Strait of Hormuz.
GLOBAL-STRAIT OF HORMUZ: The UK will convene an international conference on restoring freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, though an associated multilateral intervention in the Persian Gulf remains unlikely. On 1 April, UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer announced that the UK will convene a conference with 35 states to discuss efforts to facilitate the resumption of commercial transit through the Strait of Hormuz on 2 April. The conference will include the signatories of a 19 March joint statement, which affirmed their commitment to collective and ‘appropriate’ efforts aimed at ensuring a safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz, as well as to co-ordinated steps to stabilise global energy markets. The signatories include Canada, France, Germany and the UK, as well as several Gulf states such as Bahrain and the UAE. The upcoming conference underscores the increasing multilateral efforts to restore freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf. However, this initiative is highly unlikely to result in a collective commitment to intervene in the Strait of Hormuz during the current phase of the Israel-US-Iran war. We assess that the conference will possibly produce a joint statement whereby participants commit to deploying a multinational naval coalition to protect vessels attempting to transit the waterway, following conflict de-escalation. Nevertheless, such a commitment is highly unlikely to stabilise international energy markets in the coming days. Rather, the security risk environment in the Persian Gulf will continue to be determined primarily by US, Israeli and Iranian hostilities, sustaining price volatility for global consumers.
IRAN-UAE: Restrictions on Iranian nationals entering or transiting the UAE will constrain freedom of movement and complicate regional evacuation routes. On 1 April, the UAE-based airline Emirates stated that Iranian nationals are not permitted to enter or transit the UAE. Meanwhile, flydubai indicated that Iranian nationals holding a UAE ‘Golden Visa’ are exempt from the restrictions. The measure likely reflects a broader UAE-initiated directive implemented across various airlines amid the heightened tensions. The restrictions will significantly limit freedom of movement for Iranian nationals, particularly via major transit hubs such as Abu Dhabi (Abu Dhabi emirate) and Dubai (Dubai emirate). This will adversely affect regional mobility and evacuation pathways, especially for individuals seeking to transit through the UAE.
BAHRAIN: A revised UN Security Council (UNSC) draft resolution signals a shift towards coalition-based maritime operations, increasing the likelihood of naval activity in the Strait of Hormuz. On 1 April, Bahrain circulated a revised UNSC draft resolution on protecting commercial shipping in and around the Strait of Hormuz, retaining language authorising ‘all necessary means’ while removing an explicit reference to binding enforcement. The move follows an initial ‘zero draft’ circulated on 23 March that sought authorisation for the use of force. While Gulf states and the US reportedly supported the original draft, it was deemed unlikely to pass due to China’s and Russia’s veto powers. We assess the revised draft signals a shift away from seeking explicit UN-authorised force towards enabling coalition-based maritime operations, underscoring growing willingness across the Gulf to act militarily while attempting to avoid a UNSC veto. This development increases the likelihood of naval deployments, including escort operations and maritime patrols, in and around the Strait of Hormuz in the coming days and weeks. Such activity will elevate the risk of naval confrontation, miscalculation and disruption to commercial shipping.

Israel-US-Iran: Conflict escalation risks will remain elevated during ‘off-ramp’ period in coming weeks

On 31 March, US President Donald Trump stated that the US will possibly end the Israel-US-Iran war within two to three weeks, adding that Iran does not need to agree to a deal for the conflict to conclude. Meanwhile, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that the conflict has ‘smashed’ Tehran’s ability to produce nuclear weapons. That said, the US will possibly increase military pressure within this timeframe to accelerate war fatigue in Iran and strengthen the US’ future negotiating position, likely with a greater focus on targeting economic and energy infrastructure. Trump’s statement also comes as the US repositions personnel in the region ahead of possible ground operations (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 26 March 2026). As such, while both the US and Iran are possibly seeking ways to exit the conflict in the coming weeks, we continue to assess that the likelihood of a US ground operation will remain elevated. Such an operation would possibly include the seizure of strategically significant locations in the Strait of Hormuz, such as the Greater and Lesser Tunb islands, Abu Musa and/or key energy infrastructure sites (including Kharg Island) prior to any unilateral declaration of an end to hostilities.

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Iran-US: Speech highlights possible ‘escalate to de-escalate’ approach, elevating escalation risks

On 1 April, US President Donald Trump indicated that the US will intensify its strikes against Iran in the coming two to three weeks. Trump also threatened that such escalation will possibly include the targeting of Iran’s energy and oil infrastructure. This comes amid ongoing indirect negotiations between the US and Iran, ahead of the expiration of the US’ extended deadline for Iran to open the Strait of Hormuz by 6 April. We continue to assess that this rhetoric is part of Washington DC’s preparations to adopt an ‘escalate to de-escalate’ approach to the conflict in the coming days. However, this will likely prompt intense Iranian retaliation, likely targeting energy and dual-use infrastructure across the Middle East region, including ports and production plants. In his speech, Trump also claimed that the Strait of Hormuz will open ‘naturally’ after the war ends. This indicates there is a possibility of a US unilateral withdrawal without achieving an agreement on the strait’s navigability. In this scenario, there is a realistic possibility that Iran will continue targeting transit through the Strait of Hormuz and attempt to establish a toll, sustaining elevated disruption to global oil supply chains and elevating the risk of conflict resumption.

Mar 31.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

ISRAEL-US-IRAN: US and Israeli airstrikes on Iran have continued to escalate, with the potential shift towards maximising economic pressure increasing the risk of escalating Iranian retaliation in the coming days.
ISRAEL-LEBANON: The Israeli defence minister’s comments highlight the risk of long-term displacement in southern Lebanon and the possible expansion of IDF operations to the north of the Litani River.
ISRAEL-IRAN: Iran’s intensification of attacks targeting Israel during the first evening of Passover is likely, elevating energy and physical security risks in the coming days.
US-IRAN: US President Donald Trump has threatened to target Iran’s critical national infrastructure if it does not immediately agree to a ceasefire, underscoring rising diplomatic tensions and risks of conflict escalation.
ISRAEL-US-IRAN: US and Israeli airstrikes on Iran have continued to escalate, with the potential shift towards maximising economic pressure increasing the risk of escalating Iranian retaliation in the coming days. Throughout our reporting period, the US and Israel have continued to engage in airstrikes targeting locations throughout Iran, including security force positions in Bandar Abbas (Hormozgan province), Isfahan, Najafabad (both Isfahan province), Tabriz (East Azerbaijan province), the capital Tehran, Yazd (Yazd province) and Zanjan (Zanjan province). In Isfahan, the US reportedly employed bunker buster munitions to target an underground missile storage facility. Meanhile in Tehran, collateral damage to transmission infrastructure triggered power outages overnight. Airstrikes are highly likely to continue in the coming days, with blackouts in major cities becoming increasingly likely amid mounting pressure on Iran’s domestic energy infrastructure. On 30 March, the Times of Israel news outlet reported that Israel’s political and military leadership has ordered the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to focus airstrikes increasingly on undermining Iran’s economic standing, given their perceived progress in targeting Iran’s conventional military installations. In the coming days, this approach will likely result in increasingly frequent and intense Israeli airstrikes targeting dual-use and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-linked commercial installations, particularly banking, construction, education, mining, metal production, port management and telecommunications facilities. Attacks targeting IRGC-linked agricultural and agrochemical facilities will remain possible, while hostilities targeting IRGC-linked oil and gas installations will become increasingly likely in the coming days. In response to airstrikes targeting commercial and dual-use facilities, Iran is highly likely to intensify hostilities targeting similar facilities in the Gulf region and Israel, increasing risks of cross-sector operational disruption and localised environmental hazards, particularly around metal processing and agrochemical production facilities.
ISRAEL-LEBANON: The Israeli defence minister’s comments highlight the risk of long-term displacement in southern Lebanon and the possible expansion of IDF operations to the north of the Litani River. On 31 March, Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz stated that the IDF will establish a security zone across areas up to the Litani River, where they will also maintain a presence. Katz also stated that displaced residents of southern Lebanon will not be allowed to return until northern Israel’s security is ensured. Katz added that all houses in Lebanese villages along the Israel-Lebanon border would be demolished, in accordance with the model followed in Rafah and Beit Hanoun in Gaza (Palestinian Territories). Katz’s statement highlights the prospects for a prolonged IDF presence in southern Lebanon lasting several months, during which over 600,000 Lebanese residents will remain displaced, with their homes and assets subject to substantial damage. We assess that the IDF will likely take months to establish full control over southern Lebanon. Furthermore, a long-term IDF presence in the area is almost certain to elevate tensions between Israel and the Lebanese state, as well as between Israel, the international community and the local Lebanese population. This will increase risks of radicalisation and attacks on IDF troops, including after Israeli forces have fully established military control of the area. Additionally, there is a realistic possibility that the IDF will further expand its ground operations and manoeuvres to the north of the Litani River in the coming months. Such an expansion will exacerbate population displacement and worsen humanitarian conditions across southern Lebanon. While we assess that clashes with the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) remain unlikely in the coming weeks, the IDF’s further expansion and long-term presence will gradually increase this risk over the coming months.
ISRAEL-IRAN: Iran’s intensification of attacks targeting Israel during the first day of Passover is likely, elevating energy and physical security risks in the coming days. On 31 March, local media reported that the Israeli defence establishment is preparing for an Iranian intensification of attacks targeting Israel during the Passover Seder feast (on the evening of 1 April). While the defence establishment has stated that there is no specific intelligence confirming an imminent intensification of Iranian strikes, such an escalation would be consistent with Iran’s missile launch patterns, with large-scale barrages conducted every few days. Given these observed patterns and the significance of Passover, we assess that such an intensification is likely. There is a realistic possibility that this will take the form of co-ordinated simultaneous attacks by Iran, Lebanese Hizballah (LH), the Iran-backed Yemen-based Houthis and possibly pro-Iran Iraqi militias. Such attacks are likely to target large Israeli population centres, particularly Beersheba (Southern district), Haifa (Haifa district), Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) and Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district). Attacks are also likely to target Israeli ports, particularly the ports of Eilat (Southern) and Haifa (Haifa), as well as power stations and energy infrastructure, particularly Orot Rabin Power Station in Hadera (Haifa). Chemical plants and compounds, as well as nuclear facilities such as the Shimon Peres Negev Nuclear Research Center in Dimona (Southern), are also likely targets. A large co-ordinated attack will increase the risk of ordnance penetrating Israel’s air defences, particularly bomblets of cluster munitions. These will elevate physical security risks across Israel and particularly near the above-mentioned locations, as well as along overland routes. Furthermore, these attacks will elevate the risk of power cuts across Israel, with damage possibly prolonging disruption over several days. The risk of hazardous materials leakage will also remain elevated in the coming days, sustaining elevated risks to personnel and assets near chemical plants.
GULF-IRAN: An oil tanker attack near the UAE and an attempted strike near Saudi Arabia underscore the continued risks to commercial vessels operating near major Gulf shipping lanes and key ports. On 31 March, Kuwait Petroleum Corporation (KPC) stated that an alleged Iranian drone strike on the Kuwait-flagged Al Salmi crude oil tanker caused a fire on board and damaged the vessel while it was anchored off the port of Jebel Ali (Dubai emirate, UAE). UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported that the incident occurred approximately 31 nautical miles (57.4km) offshore, meaning that the tanker was likely operating in open waters or an anchorage zone associated with the port. The authorities stated that there was no major hazardous incident or spillage, with no injuries reported. Iran has targeted several commercial vessels since the start of the Israel-US-Iran war; most attacks have occurred in open waters, particularly near the Strait of Hormuz. This incident is therefore consistent with established patterns and underscores continued risks to vessels operating near major shipping lanes and ports, including exposure to direct hits, mistargeting and interception debris. Furthermore, on 30 March, UKTMO reported two projectiles splashing near a vessel approximately 22 nautical miles (40.7km) to the north-east of Ras Tanura port (Eastern province, Saudi Arabia), signalling a similar targeting pattern. In the coming days, the US and Israel are likely to continue airstrikes targeting Iran’s energy and dual-use infrastructure. In response, Iran will likely continue targeting commercial and energy-linked assets in the Gulf region (including tankers), exacerbating global supply chain disruption and energy security risks. Meanwhile, the Iranian targeting of Gulf states and Gulf authorities’ interceptions have remained broadly consistent with established patterns, sustaining elevated regional security risks and ongoing disruption to business activity.
IRAN-IRAQ: Iran-backed militant attacks have continued along established trends, while a strike near a hotel in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) underscores persistent security risks for the hospitality sector. Throughout our reporting period, drone and missile activity have continued in line with established patterns in the capital Baghdad and across much of Iraq. In the KRI on 30 March, a drone struck near the Titanic Hotel in Sulaymaniyah City (Sulaymaniyah governorate). The incident underscores persistent security and operational risks to the hospitality sector, as well as threats to foreign nationals staying in hotels in Iraq. During the same period, there were two reported incidents of US and/or Israeli airstrikes targeting Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) units in Al Anbar and Babil governorates. Such strikes are likely to continue in the coming days, particularly in Al Anbar, Babil, Kirkuk, Nineveh, Saladin and Wasit governorates, sustaining the current retaliatory cycle.
IRAN-NATO-TURKEY: NATO’s interception of an Iranian ballistic missile following a Turkish airspace violation underscores conflict spillover risks. On 30 March, a ballistic missile launched from Iran entered Turkish airspace, before NATO air and missile defence systems intercepted it. This marks the fourth reported incursion into Turkish airspace by Iran-originated ordnance since the Israel-US-Iran war began on 28 February. The Turkish Ministry of National Defence has not specified the missile’s intended target; however, previous incidents have involved trajectories suggesting a likely targeting of Incirlik Air Base (Adana province), which hosts US personnel. Iran has previously denied targeting Turkey. We assess that it is unlikely that Iranian leadership is deliberately targeting Turkish assets; such incidents stem from siloed decision-making within Iranian military structures or missiles deviating from intended trajectories. However, these interceptions near Adana likely indicate the targeting of sites within Turkey, in contrast to Iran’s previously identified targets near Turkish territory, such as the UK’s Royal Air Force (RAF) Akrotiri base (Cyprus; see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 13 March 2026). The incident underscores the growing risk of conflict spillover and the possibility of Turkey being drawn into the confrontation. However, we assess that an immediate Turkish military escalation remains unlikely, with Ankara more likely to pursue diplomatic engagement before considering a kinetic response.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

US-IRAN: US President Donald Trump has threatened to target Iran’s critical national infrastructure if it does not immediately agree to a ceasefire, underscoring rising diplomatic tensions and the risk of conflict escalation. On 30 March in a social media post, Trump stated that unless Iran announces the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz and agrees to US ceasefire proposals, the US would target ‘all of their Electric Generating Plants, Oil Wells and Kharg Island (and possibly all desalinization plants!)’. The statement almost certainly forms part of US efforts to maximise pressure on Iran to concede to US demands regarding the Strait of Hormuz’s navigability, as well as Tehran’s missile, drone and nuclear programmes. Iran is unlikely to concede to US demands without broader guarantees of permanent conflict de-escalation, moderating the prospects for an imminent diplomatic break. In response to the diplomatic deadlock, the likelihood of US airstrikes targeting Iranian critical national infrastructure will increase, particularly ahead of the expiry of a US deadline postponing strikes on Iranian energy facilities until 6 April (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 27 March 2026). In response to rising hostilities and threats to water and energy infrastructure, the likelihood of intense Iranian retaliation targeting oil, gas, manufacturing, water desalination and port facilities will substantially increase, presenting critical threats to operational continuity throughout the region. Given Gulf states’ broad dependence on water desalination facilities in the region, attacks targeting such plants and associated energy infrastructure would likely trigger a rapid deterioration of water security conditions, particularly in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE. Attacks targeting energy infrastructure on Saudi Arabia’s western coast would also trigger significant price volatility on global energy markets. If sustained, this degree of hostilities will increase risks of worldwide energy insecurity and broader regional escalation.
US-EUROPE-STRAIT OF HORMUZ: Despite increasing pressure from the US to secure the Strait of Hormuz, European allies are unlikely to deploy naval assets imminently to the Middle East, compounding diplomatic tensions. On 31 March, Trump reiterated criticism of US allies for not assisting in his efforts to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. Trump also called for states facing jet fuel shortages due to the strait’s de facto closure to buy US exports and to take independent action to secure key shipping routes. The statement comes amid mounting criticism from figures within the Trump administration of key US allies, including France, Italy, Spain and the UK. Despite mounting criticism, however, we continue to assess that US allies remain unlikely to deploy naval assets unilaterally to the Strait of Hormuz at this stage of the Israel-US-Iran war. Consequently, US criticisms are highly likely to continue, undermining the prospects for broader co-operation, including with logistics support and defensive operations. On 31 March, Trump claimed that France had declined US requests to use its airspace to deliver military supplies to Israel. Similarly, unnamed sources reported that Italy recently refused to authorise the landing of several US aircraft travelling to the Middle East for combat operations at Naval Air Station Sigonella (Sicily region, Italy). In the coming weeks, further similar refusals are likely, compounding tensions between the US and European allies.
IRAQ: Shia leader’s call for protests underscores elevated domestic unrest risks in the coming days. On 30 March, Muqtada al-Sadr, the leader of the Iraqi Shia Islamic nationalist Sadrist Movement, called for nationwide protests on 4 April to denounce ‘US-Israeli aggression’ in the context of the Israel-US-Iran war. While al-Sadr urged protesters to remain peaceful and organised, large-scale demonstrations will elevate domestic unrest risks, given the heightened anti-Western sentiment and ongoing ethno-religious tensions tied to the November 2025 general election. Some protests will possibly escalate into localised clashes, including the use of road blockades, tyre-burning and stone-throwing, particularly if demonstrators engage the security forces, who are likely to respond forcefully. This will raise security risks for nearby personnel, especially those near public squares and major intersections. These risks will be most acute in areas of Baghdad near the Green Zone and in Basra (Basra governorate).

Mar 30.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

IRAN-REGION: Iran’s threat to target the private residences of US and Israeli officials has increased the likelihood of further attacks targeting residential areas and hospitality venues across the region.
ISRAEL-IRAN: Iran’s continued targeting of chemical plants will increase contamination risks in the coming days, in turn raising the risk of conflict escalation.
KUWAIT-IRAN: Iran’s likely targeting of desalination infrastructure in Kuwait has elevated conflict escalation, water and energy security risks; further attacks on Gulf countries’ water security assets are possible in the coming days.
US-IRAN: Despite characterising diplomatic engagement with Iran as positive, US President Donald Trump has also reiterated claims that he is considering ordering the capture of Kharg Island (Bushehr province, Iran), underscoring increasing brinkmanship and the risk of conflict escalation.

MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

ISRAEL-US-IRAN: Strikes targeting Iran have continued in major cities, with power outages in the capital Tehran underscoring the increasing pressure on energy security conditions. Israeli and US airstrikes have continued at pace across Iran over the past 24 hours, with local media sources reporting that airstrikes have been particularly intense in Bandar Abbas (Hormozgan province), Chabahar (Sistan and Baluchestan province), Isfahan (Isfahan province), Karaj (Alborz province) and Tehran. On 29 March, shrapnel and debris from US and Israeli airstrikes damaged electricity pylons in the Karaj area, resulting in several hours of blackouts in Karaj and Tehran. As the blackout stemmed from incidental damage to transmission infrastructure rather than from airstrikes directly targeting energy facilities, Iran is unlikely to retaliate immediately by intensifying attacks on energy infrastructure in the Gulf. However, Israeli and US airstrikes are highly likely to continue in the coming hours, exerting pressure on Iran’s infrastructure and increasing the risk of cascading failures, particularly of the electricity grid and water management systems. Deteriorating energy and water security conditions within Iran will increase the risk of increasingly frequent Iranian attacks targeting energy and water management systems in Israel and the Gulf region in the coming days, driving conflict escalation risks. On 30 March, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) assessed that airstrikes have destroyed or disabled approximately 70% of Iran’s ballistic missile launchers. However, Iran highly likely retains the capacity to sustain missile and drone attacks targeting Israel, regional US military installations and the broader Gulf region. Consequently, Iran is unlikely to cease attacks unilaterally in the coming days, sustaining threats to regionally engaged staff and assets.
IRAN-REGION: Iran’s threat to target the private residences of US and Israeli officials has increased the likelihood of further attacks targeting residential areas and hospitality venues across the region. On 29 March, a spokesperson for the Iranian Armed Forces stated that Iran would consider the residences and offices of US and Israeli military and political personnel as ‘legitimate targets’, due to alleged airstrikes targeting civilian residences within Iran. The statement underscores the increasing risk of Iran engaging in increasingly frequent attacks targeting residential areas, particularly those with an identified US or Israeli presence. In recent days, Iran has also issued statements indicating that it considers installations such as universities and hospitality venues as legitimate targets (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 29 March 2026). We assess that Iranian attacks targeting such locations are a realistic possibility in the coming days, increasing civilian exposure to missile fire, drone incursions and interception-related shrapnel, including in densely populated residential areas in the Gulf region. Repeated attacks will also likely undermine operational continuity for locally engaged entities, particularly those without remote working capabilities, such as retail outlets and delivery firms.
ISRAEL-LEBANON: The uptick in Israeli strikes targeting medical and media personnel affiliated with Lebanese Hizballah (LH) highlights significantly elevated security risks in southern Lebanon. On 28 March, an IDF strike killed nine paramedics operating near an ambulance in southern Lebanon; the IDF subsequently claimed to have struck a cell of LH operatives dressed as paramedics. Allegedly, further such incidents have taken place since. Reports from 29 March suggest that an IDF strike in southern Lebanon killed a paramedic working for the LH-affiliated Islamic Health Organisation. This comes amid the recent reiteration of earlier IDF warnings to LH to refrain from using medical assets, facilities and staff for military purposes (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 16 March 2026). In addition to these incidents, on 28 March, an IDF targeted strike killed three Lebanese reporters linked to the LH-affiliated Al-Manar and Al Mayadeen news channels. These incidents highlight the uptick in the IDF’s targeting of organisations affiliated with LH and its personnel, particularly those in protected sectors such as healthcare and the press. Such strikes are highly likely to continue over the coming weeks and will severely increase security risks across southern Lebanon, including due to misidentification, particularly for NGO personnel. Additionally, on 29 March, unspecified ordnance killed an Indonesian peacekeeper from the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and injured three others in southern Lebanon. On 30 March, local reports claimed that an additional unspecified number of Indonesian peacekeepers were injured in a separate incident along the Israel-Lebanon border earlier on the same day. These incidents highlight the severe security risks derived from the conflict’s expansion in southern Lebanon, as well as associated crossfire risks to bystanders, particularly along the Israel-Lebanon border.
ISRAEL-IRAN: Iran’s continued targeting of chemical plants will increase contamination risks in the coming days, in turn raising the risk of conflict escalation. On 30 March, Israel’s Ministry of Environmental Protection announced that it has ruled out a possible hazardous materials leak incident at the Haifa oil refinery (Haifa district), owned by Bazan Group. The announcement came shortly after an Iranian missile hit an oil tank and an industrial building within the refinery’s complex. In a similar incident on 29 March, fragments of an Iranian missile hit a chemical plant in Ne’ot Hovav (Southern district). The incident prompted the Israeli authorities to halt all traffic and issue warnings to civilians near the plant to remain indoors due to concerns of a hazardous materials leak, which have since been ruled out. The incidents come amid Iran’s growing targeting of Israeli chemical industry and energy infrastructure over the past two weeks (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 18 March 2026). Iran will likely continue targeting chemical plants across Israel in the coming week, increasing the risk of a hazardous materials leak. Such an incident would severely increase population health risks in several cities near the incident’s location. This would severely increase pressure on Israel’s emergency services, including firefighters and medical personnel, further increasing the impact of Iranian and LH strikes. We assess that any such incident resulting from Iranian ordnance will significantly increase the likelihood of Israel intensifying its attacks on Iran, including possibly targeting Iranian energy infrastructure and power plants.
GULF-IRAN: Attacks and interceptions have continued in line with established trends, sustaining elevated security risks and operational disruption. Throughout our reporting period, Iranian targeting of Gulf states has remained broadly consistent with established patterns, sustaining elevated regional security risks and ongoing disruption to business activity. Previously on 28 March, Qatar’s Ministry of Defence announced that it had intercepted several Iranian drones. This indicates a possible resumption of attacks following a temporary lull since approximately 19 March.
IRAN-IRAQ: Iran-backed militant attacks have continued in line with established trends, underscoring persistent security risks to on-the-ground personnel. On 30 March, a drone crashed near the capital’s Baghdad International Airport (BGW), with additional explosions reported near the Baghdad Diplomatic Support Center (BDSC). The incidents are consistent with established targeting patterns and underscore ongoing threats to civilian aviation infrastructure, as well as security risks to personnel from direct hits and shrapnel from interceptions. Further such attacks are highly likely in the coming days, particularly near dual-use and military infrastructure in densely populated and heavily staffed areas, including the Baghdad Airport. In the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), drone and missile activity over the past 24 hours have continued in line with recent trends. Throughout the same period, there have been two reported incidents of US and/or Israeli airstrikes targeting Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) units in Nineveh and Saladin governorates. We assess that such strikes will almost certainly continue over the coming days, particularly in Al Anbar, Babil, Kirkuk, Nineveh, Saladin and Wasit governorates, sustaining retaliation risks.
IRAQ-SYRIA: A reported drone attack from Iraq into Syria underscores conflict spillover risks and reinforces the conditions for Gulf states’ possible retaliation against Iran in Iraq. On 30 March, Syria’s military reported that a large-scale drone attack had targeted several army positions along the Iraq-Syria border at dawn, claiming that they intercepted most drones. While no group has claimed responsibility for the attack, it was likely conducted by Iran-aligned militant groups operating along the Iraq-Syria border, attempting to degrade threats to their cross-border smuggling operations. As Iranian attacks against Gulf states continue, the incident will possibly increase the likelihood of Gulf states’ involvement in Iraq. On 25 March, Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE issued a joint statement calling on the Iraqi government to take immediate action to halt attacks launched by Iran-backed militias from Iraqi territory towards neighbouring states. We assess that this statement likely serves as a political and legal basis for potential future action against such groups. This latest incident will likely vindicate such demands, particularly given the broad framing of ‘neighbouring states’ in the joint statement. Gulf states will possibly use this to justify retaliatory measures against Iran-aligned militias operating from Iraqi territory in the coming days and weeks.
BAHRAIN: An overnight curfew on small-vessel maritime activity will reduce misidentification risks, while exacerbating economic pressure. On 29 March, the Bahraini authorities announced a maritime curfew between 1800hrs and 0400hrs (local time), effective immediately. The curfew applies to fishing and leisure vessels, with the authorities urging compliance to ensure safety and avoid legal penalties. The measure underscores the credible risk of Iran-linked hostilities within Bahraini waters, as well as the risk of misidentification of small vessels as hostile actors, including Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) fast boats or smuggling craft, particularly at night. As such, the curfew will reduce the risk of friendly fire incidents and accidental targeting. Other Gulf states will possibly implement similar restrictions in the coming days or introduce adjacent measures, such as maritime exclusion zones and port controls. Such restrictions will likely disrupt the fishing sector, small-scale maritime trade and coastal logistics, with knock-on disruption for local food supply chains and port-adjacent services.
KUWAIT-IRAN: Iran’s likely targeting of desalination infrastructure in Kuwait has elevated conflict escalation, water and energy security risks; further attacks on Gulf countries’ water security assets are possible in the coming days. On 29 March, an electricity and desalination facility in Kuwait was struck, causing significant damage and killing one Indian national employee. The authorities have not confirmed the specific site; however, open-source reporting suggests that the Doha West power and water desalination station was possibly affected, located in the capital Kuwait City’s Doha district. On 30 March, Iran denied involvement and attributed the incident to Israel, without providing evidence. Kuwait relies almost entirely on desalination for potable water; the incident therefore elevates risks to both water and energy security nationwide. Desalination infrastructure depends on a stable power supply and seawater intake, with facilities typically located in coastal areas, increasing their exposure to drone and missile strikes. As such, desalination represents a critical vulnerability within Gulf infrastructure systems. Further Iranian attacks targeting water and power infrastructure across the Gulf region are possible in the coming days, raising the prospect of rationing or other such measures to mitigate the risk of shortages, particularly in the event of further escalation, including a possible US-led ground operation (see above).

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

US-IRAN: Despite characterising diplomatic engagement with Iran as positive, US President Donald Trump has also reiterated claims that he is considering ordering the capture of Kharg Island (Bushehr province, Iran), underscoring increasing brinkmanship and the risk of conflict escalation. On 29 March, President Trump made numerous statements regarding the trajectory of the Israel-US-Iran war. Trump stated that negotiations are progressing and that he believes Iran will soon agree to a ‘deal’ with the US. Contrastingly, and on the same day, Trump also gave an interview to the Financial Times in which he stated ‘maybe we take Kharg Island, maybe we don’t’. Trump’s statements come as the US continues to surge military assets and personnel to the region (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 29 March 2026). Taken together, these developments likely reflect US efforts to maximise military pressure on Iran by credibly threatening to seize strategically significant territory in the Persian Gulf in order to secure concessions in ceasefire negotiations. Even so, increasing brinkmanship is highly likely to compound pressure on diplomatic backchannels between the US and Iran, undermining prospects for an imminent diplomatic breakthrough. Subsequently, on 30 March, President Trump stated that the US has achieved ‘regime change’ by eliminating numerous members of Iran’s leadership, before announcing that his administration has engaged Iran’s Speaker of Parliament Mohammed Bagher Ghalibaf as its negotiating partner. Ghalibaf is a long-time regime insider associated with Iran’s hardline principalist movement; he maintains strong relations with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Although President Trump stated that the US will assess Ghalibaf’s suitability as a negotiating partner over the coming days, Ghalibaf’s status as a long-time regime insider will undermine the prospects for an imminent shift in Iran’s policy regarding its missile, drone and nuclear programmes. Deadlock over the central tenets of US ceasefire proposals will increase the likelihood of further conflict escalation in the coming week, sustaining broad volatility across the global market and undermining regional stability. Even so, we continue to assess that there is a realistic possibility that President Trump will unilaterally declare victory over Iran in the coming days, which would likely trigger rapid conflict de-escalation thereafter. However, in such a scenario the risk of further Iranian efforts to curtail maritime movement through the Strait of Hormuz would persist.
BAHRAIN-IRAN: A force majeure declaration on metals operations in Bahrain underscores the industrial impact of Iranian strikes and highlights supply chain disruption risks. On 29 March, Bahraini industrial group Foulath Holding, the parent company of Bahrain Steel and SULB (United Steel Company), declared force majeure on selected operations due to the ongoing Middle East conflict. This highlights the Israel-US-Iran war’s secondary impacts on the metals sector and downstream industries such as construction, manufacturing and energy infrastructure. Iran is likely to continue targeting industrial and dual-use facilities in the Gulf region, including steel, aluminium and other metal production sites in the coming days. This will increase the risk of prolonged production delays and supply chain disruption in the coming weeks.
BAHRAIN: The death of a detainee and allegations of his torture highlight a broader state crackdown on anti-war sentiment and will elevate domestic unrest risks. On 27 March, the body of a man detained by the authorities on 19 March was released to his family, after over a week without information on his whereabouts or condition. The man was detained alongside six others at a checkpoint, reportedly as part of a wider crackdown on opposition to the war. The status of the other detainees remains unclear. Rights groups have alleged that the man was tortured while in custody, which possibly led to his death. The Bahraini authorities have disputed this, though they have not fully clarified the circumstances surrounding the incident. The case underscores a broader pattern of repression linked to heightened security measures during the ongoing conflict, increasing risks of arbitrary detention and torture of on-the-ground personnel, particularly those protesting the war. Public anger over the detainee’s death will elevate the risk of domestic unrest in the coming days, especially in Shia-majority areas and the capital Manama. Any widespread protests will likely meet with heavy-handed policing, increasing security risks for nearby personnel, while mitigating the risk of critical threats to government stability.

Mar 26.

MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

ISRAEL-US-IRAN: Airstrikes targeting Iranian naval facilities and personnel are unlikely to trigger a rapid resumption of commercial traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. Airstrikes have continued to target locations throughout Iran, with strikes impacting Bandar Abbas (Hormozgan province), Hamadan (Hamadan province), Isfahan (Isfahan province), Jam (Bushehr province), Kermanshah (Kermanshah province), Mashhad (Razavi Khorasan province) Shiraz (Fars province) and the capital Tehran. Local media reports also indicate that the frequency of airstrikes has substantially increased in Mazandaran province in the past 48 hours, with explosions reported in Babolsar, Chamestan, Fereydunkenar, Kelardasht, Nowshahr and Sari. Sari hosts the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)’s Ghadir Operational Base, which functions as the IRGC’s regional command headquarters for the Caspian Sea coastline (i.e. Gilan, Golestan and Mazandaran provinces). Intensifying airstrikes in Mazandaran likely reflect efforts to disrupt the IRGC’s operability in northern Iran, including its naval operations in the Caspian Sea (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 19 March 2026). Earlier on 26 March, Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz announced that Israeli airstrikes had killed the commander of the IRGC Navy (IRGC-N), Alireza Tangsiri and several other senior commanders. Although Katz characterised Tangsiri as being ‘directly responsible for blocking the Strait of Hormuz’, his death is highly unlikely to trigger the rapid re-opening of the waterway to commercial vessels. Despite mounting pressure on Iran’s conventional naval capacity (including support infrastructure on the Caspian Sea coastline), Iran’s other security forces are highly likely to retain the capacity to attack vessels attempting to traverse the strait without permission from the Iranian authorities. This dynamic will likely continue to restrict commercial traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, amid critical threats to vessel, crew and cargo safety as well as substantially elevated insurance costs.
IRAN-US-REGION: Iran is likely increasing preparations for potential US ground operations, underscoring acute risks of conflict escalation. On 25 March, Iran’s parliamentary speaker, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, issued a statement claiming that the US and Israel are preparing to occupy ‘one of the Iranian islands’ with the assistance of an unnamed Gulf state. Ghalibaf also announced that Iran would retaliate by targeting critical infrastructure in that state with ‘relentless attacks’. Ghalibaf’s statement underscores increasing concerns within Iran regarding the prospects of imminent US ground operations targeting strategic islands in the Persian Gulf, such as Kharg Island (Bushehr province; see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 21 March 2026). Subsequently, on 26 March, an IRGC official announced on state television that the IRGC’s 27th Mohammad Rasulullah Division (based in Tehran) has lowered the minimum age for participating in non-combat support roles to 12 years of age. These roles will include manning checkpoints in major cities and service support roles for IRGC units, including logistics tasks and medical assistance. The announcement likely indicates that the IRGC is attempting to redirect experienced combatants towards preparations for US ground operations and/or intensifying attacks targeting the Gulf, while maintaining a sufficiently repressive posture in major cities to deter unrest. In the event of US operations attempting to take control of Iranian territory, Iran is highly likely to retaliate by intensifying attacks against US military assets in the region while also increasing the frequency and intensity of missile and drone attacks on critical infrastructure in the Gulf, particularly oil and gas installations. Such conditions will undermine prospects for rapid conflict de-escalation, while compounding price volatility on global energy and commodity markets.
ISRAEL-LEBANON: Lebanese Hizballah (LH) is increasingly directing its rocket strikes against the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in Lebanon, signalling continued conflict escalation and elevated security risks in southern Lebanon. Over the past 24 hours, LH has launched approximately 500 rockets, of which only around 100 crossed into Israel. While the number of rockets signals a peak in LH launches, it also points to the group’s growing concentration of military resources against Israeli forces in southern Lebanon. Over the past few days, LH has conducted between 150 and 200 rocket launches a day, directing approximately 70% of these against IDF personnel inside Lebanon. Meanwhile, over the past week, the IDF has expanded its ground operations deeper into southern Lebanon and up to the Litani River, resulting in daily clashes with LH operatives. We assess that the IDF’s military operations and armed escalation in Lebanon are likely to continue in the coming days. These will continue to increase security risks in southern Lebanon, including from misidentification and exposure to crossfire, particularly for medical, media and NGO personnel.
ISRAEL-IRAN: Concerns that ceasefire negotiations will impede further military operations are likely to drive Israel to intensify its strikes against Iran ahead of the weekend. In the past 24 hours, local reports have indicated that Israeli officials are concerned that prospective ceasefire negotiations will lead the US to demand that Israel either reduce or halt its strikes against Iran. As such, Israel will likely intensify its strikes against Iran in the coming days, in an attempt to fulfil as many military objectives as it can beforehand. Such action will increase the likelihood of Iran intensifying its retaliation against Israel in the coming days, elevating security risks and operational disruption across the country. Iran’s targeting of energy infrastructure and ports across Israel is also likely, which will elevate energy security risks in Israel in the coming days (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 25 March 2026).
GULF-IRAN: Debris from interception has killed two individuals in the UAE, underscoring persistent security threats to personnel in the Gulf region. In the UAE earlier on 26 March, falling debris from a successfully intercepted ballistic missile killed two people, injured three others, damaged several vehicles and caused property damage on Sweihan Road in the capital Abu Dhabi. The interception followed at least three separate missile and drone attacks overnight on 25-26 March targeting the UAE. The incident underscores persistent security risks to on-the-ground personnel, from both interception-related debris and from direct hits. We assess that Iran’s continued targeting of urban centres in the UAE and the wider Gulf region will increase the likelihood of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states becoming directly involved in the Israel-US-Iran war in the coming weeks. Meanwhile, on 25 March, an Iranian attack caused a fire at a facility in Muharraq (Muharraq governorate, Bahrain). The Bahraini Ministry of Interior has stated that civil defence teams extinguished the fire and has reported no injuries. While the precise impact location remains unclear, Iran previously targeted fuel storage infrastructure in Muharraq on 12 March, underscoring its persistent targeting of energy infrastructure in the Gulf region. Overnight on 25-26 March, there were also reports of interceptions in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. This pattern of recurrent strikes and interceptions is likely to continue in the coming days, particularly near major urban areas, airports, military bases and industrial and energy infrastructure sites. Within our reporting period, no interceptions were reported in Qatar. However, since 19 March, the Qatari authorities have not reported any Iranian missile or drone attacks targeting the country, possibly indicating a de facto de-escalation or ongoing indirect engagement between Doha and Tehran. The resumption of Iranian strikes against Qatari energy infrastructure remains a realistic possibility in the event of significant US escalation, such as a ground operation on Iranian territory or offshore positions.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

US-IRAN: US brinkmanship ahead of the upcoming expiration of US President Donald Trump’s cessation of attacks on Iranian energy infrastructure will increase risks of conflict escalation in the coming days. On 25 March, Trump reiterated claims that Iran is seeking a ceasefire, despite Iranian officials stating that no direct or indirect negotiations have taken place. Subsequently, White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt stated that the US is ‘very close’ to meeting its war goals and that combat operations are progressing ahead of schedule. However, Leavitt also emphasised that if Iran does not accept the US’ ceasefire proposal, US airstrikes will rapidly escalate in the coming days. Taken together, these statements reflect increasing US brinkmanship amid efforts to maximise pressure on Iran to agree to US ceasefire proposals (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 25 March 2026). Despite this approach, we continue to assess that Iran is unlikely to agree unconditionally to the US’ proposals, undermining the prospects for an imminent diplomatic breakthrough. The failure to secure a ceasefire in the coming days will substantially increase the likelihood of the US imminently escalating airstrikes targeting Iran and/or launching ground operations targeting Iranian islands in the Persian Gulf. Risks of conflict escalation will be particularly acute on 28 and 29 March, when Trump’s ceasefire against Iranian energy infrastructure expires and international markets are closed. However, we also assess that there is a possibility that Trump will unilaterally declare victory over Iran and end US engagement, rather than pursue further escalation. Regional security conditions will likely remain fluid amid uncertainty regarding the US’ plans for engagement with Iran, sustaining elevated regional tensions.
IRAN-STRAIT OF HORMUZ: Despite a statement from Iran’s foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, indicating that vessels from ‘friendly nations’ can transit the Strait of Hormuz, Iran is highly likely to continue limiting vessel passage over the coming days. On 25 March, several Iranian embassies and consulates issued a statement attributed to Araghchi’s statement, indicating that Iran will continue to allow vessels from certain states to transit the waterway, amid its de facto closure since 2 March. This is highly unlikely to represent a shift in Iran’s approach to the navigability of the Strait of Hormuz; Iran is highly likely to continue allowing passage on a case-by-case basis, likely in exchange for facilitation payments. Notably however, earlier on 26 March, state-affiliated media in Iran reported that officials are preparing legislation for levying tolls on vessels transiting the waterway. If implemented, such legislation would substantially increase governance risks for regionally engaged shipping firms, given regulatory framework shifts and the risk of sanctions exposure for those making payments to the Iranian authorities. Iran is also highly likely to leverage inconsistent application of the legislation to continue restricting the navigability of the Strait of Hormuz, sustaining risks of price volatility on international energy and commodity markets, even in the event of conflict de-escalation.
KUWAIT: Arrests underscore the persistent threat posed by Iran-linked terror cells in the Gulf region, increasing risks of hybrid plots, sabotage and assassination attempts. On 25 March, Kuwait’s Ministry of Interior stated that it had uncovered a LH plot to assassinate senior state officials, leading to the arrest of six individuals (including five Kuwaiti nationals) who reportedly confessed to involvement in espionage and terrorist activities. The authorities announced that they have identified a further 14 suspects based outside Kuwait, including Kuwaiti, Lebanese and Iranian nationals, as part of the same network. According to the authorities, suspects have confessed to receiving advanced military training abroad, including the use of weapons and explosives, as well as surveillance and assassination techniques. The incident follows the arrest of 16 individuals in Kuwait on 16 March linked to a separate LH-associated sabotage plot, during which law enforcement personnel also seized firearms and ammunition. We assess that this will sustain elevated personnel exposure to hybrid security threats, given that similar cells likely remain active in Kuwait and across the Gulf region. This will include the targeting of political and military figures, as well as military installations, dual-use infrastructure and high-visibility civilian sites such as national landmarks and tourist locations. The Kuwaiti authorities are likely to intensify counter-terrorism operations in the coming days and weeks, including in Shia-majority areas. Such measures will increase the risk of domestic unrest, ethno-religious tensions and possible clashes between local populations and the security forces.
GULF-IRAN-IRAQ: A joint statement condemning Iranian hostilities underscores increasing regional tensions; Gulf states’ retaliation against Iraqi militias remains possible in the event of conflict escalation. On 25 March, Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE issued a joint statement condemning Iran’s attacks against their territories. Specifically, the statement calls on the Iraqi government to take measures to immediately halt attacks launched by Iran-backed factions, militias and armed groups from Iraqi territory toward neighbouring countries. On 4 March, the Iraqi Shia militia group Saraya Awliya al-Dam, part of the Iran-aligned Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), claimed responsibility for a drone attack targeting Jordan in support of Iran. While this provides at least one confirmed example of Iran-backed proxy activity against a third country, reporting on similar attacks by Iraqi militant networks against Gulf states remains limited. Furthermore, the joint statement reaffirms signatories’ right to self-defence under international law. As such, we assess that the statement likely serves to establish a political and legal basis for the possible use of force against Iran-aligned militias operating from Iraq in the coming weeks. This framing would possibly enable Gulf states to escalate their response to Iran-linked threats, while avoiding direct military engagement with Iran, reducing the risk of substantial regional escalation. (Source: Sibylline)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Home land Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

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NEWS IN BRIEF – MIDDLE EAST – CONFLICT

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