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Military And Security Developments
Feb 14.
- Lebanon: Authorities’ prevention of Iranian plane landing at Beirut will drive further protests. Late on 13 February, protesters waving Lebanese Hizballah (LH) flags blocked the road to Beirut-Rafic Hariri International Airport (BEY) after the authorities prevented an Iranian Mahan Airlines plane from landing. The refusal follows allegations by Israel that Iran is transferring significant funds to LH via civilian flights arriving at the airport and indicates concerns of an Israeli airstrike against BEY. However, we currently assess an Israeli strike is unlikely; Beirut is likely leveraging Israeli threats to curtail LH’s influence. In addition, the Lebanese army clashed with demonstrators; they used tear gas to disperse participants. In the coming days, further demonstrations are highly likely, elevating significant travel disruption risks at BEY and its surrounding suburbs. We assess this will likely heighten tensions between the army and protesters, increasing the risk of sporadic clashes and elevating bystander security risks in the vicinity.
- Egypt-US: Increasing anti-US sentiment will raise risk of wide boycott campaigns in coming weeks. On 13 February, Arabic media, citing Egyptian officials, claimed that US military aid will possibly be restricted if Cairo does not accept US President Donald Trump’s plans to displace Palestinians from Gaza. While there are no official statements from the Trump administration concerning this claim, there is a realistic possibility that Washington DC will attempt to pressure Cairo through such an approach. However, Egypt is highly unlikely to accept Trump’s plan. Furthermore, any aid restrictions are unlikely to impact the Egyptian army’s operations significantly as Cairo diversifies its weapons importers, which include China, France and Germany. Nevertheless, Trump’s plan will continue to exacerbate anti-US sentiment in Egypt, likely prompting further boycott campaigns against US brands, specifically fast food, apparel and appliances. Any such campaigns are likely to impact sales and local operations for US franchises in Egypt in the coming weeks. Nevertheless, we assess that protests and attacks against the US embassy, as well as US assets and businesses, are highly unlikely.
Feb 13.
EXPANDED MILITARY AND SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS
- On 11 February, local reports indicated that Israel has established a security corridor in Syrian territory, underlining efforts to facilitate a long-term presence, driving security risks. The corridor includes nine outposts in advanced stages of construction, two on the Syrian side of Mount Hermon (Quneitra governorate) and seven within the United Nations. Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) zone. Currently, three Israel Defense Forces (IDF) brigades are operating in the area. The reports indicated that Syrian civilian movement within the zone is permitted under IDF approval, underlining a high level of control and likely reflective of an intention to maintain a prolonged presence. While attacks on IDF troops in the area remain rare, an extended deployment will likely increase tensions and elevate attack risks over the coming months. There is a risk that such attacks will result in mass casualties given currently elevated levels of IDF confidence and, as such, possible vulnerability (reports suggest IDF troops are travelling in unarmoured vehicles). This will elevate the risk of a substantial IDF response, including the use of airstrikes, elevating bystander risks in Syria’s border regions.
- On 12 February, an IDF strike on a drone and two suspects in southern Gaza highlights possible misidentification risks. The IDF struck the two suspects as they were in the process of retrieving the drone, which travelled from Israel into Gaza before landing. This has raised questions about the identity of the impacted individuals and whether or not these were civilians using a private commercial drone. However, in recent weeks, attempts to smuggle weapons into Gaza using drones have increased. As such, while it is likely that the individuals were militants, the event highlights misidentification risks for civilians (particularly those affiliated with NGOs or media outlets) operating drones in Gaza.
- On 13 February, IDF troops shot a Palestinian driver following a suspected car-ramming attempt in Nablus governorate. The driver, operating a stolen car, rammed into the IDF Shomron Regional Brigade Army Base (Nablus governorate). The incident possibly reflects the elevated risk of attacks in the West Bank, particularly targeting IDF positions. Suspected terror attacks also drive elevated bystander risks emanating from the security response to such incidents, with fire by IDF troops increasing misidentification and collateral damage risks. The IDF will likely increase its operations in Nablus area following the incident, elevating travel disruption risks on key routes.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND OVERALL FORECAST
Disputes regarding compliance with the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement have significantly increased regional tensions, elevating risks of the agreement collapsing in the coming weeks. On 10 February, Hamas announced it would indefinitely delay the release of Israeli hostages (initially scheduled for 15 February). The group claims Israel has repeatedly violated the ceasefire agreement. In response, Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz stated that delays to hostage releases would be a ‘complete violation’ of the agreement and instructed the IDF to prepare for possible re-deployment into Gaza. On 11 February, US President Donald Trump stated that Israel should ‘cancel’ the ceasefire unless Hamas releases all 76 remaining hostages in its custody by 1200hrs on 15 February. Also on 11 February, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu convened the security cabinet and announced that the IDF would resume operations in Gaza unless Hamas released hostages by 15 February; Netanyahu did not clarify whether this referred to the previously scheduled release of three hostages or the release of all Israeli hostages in Gaza. Although Hamas announced earlier on 13 February that it would release three hostages on schedule (i.e. on 15 February), tensions regarding the stability of the agreement remain significantly elevated. There is a realistic possibility that the agreement will collapse before Phase One ends on 2 March, increasing risks of armed conflict and human rights concerns in Gaza (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 10 February 2025). Delays to hostage or prisoner releases will substantially increase the risks of the agreement collapsing in the coming two weeks. More broadly, an immediate extension into Phase Two of the agreement ceasefire, which would result in a permanent ceasefire, remains highly unlikely.
- Uncertainty regarding the stability of the ceasefire agreement triggered an uptick in protest activity in Israel, increasing risks of travel and supply chain disruption in the coming days. Uncertainty regarding the stability of the deal triggered pro-agreement protests in Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district; demonstrators repeatedly blocked the Ayalon Highway. Additionally, on 11 February, demonstrations also emerged in Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) and a protest on Highway 1 temporarily restricted movement through the Hemed Junction (Central district), disrupting movement to and from Ben Gurion International Airport (TLV). As tensions regarding the ceasefire remain significantly elevated, protests are highly likely to continue in the coming days, sustaining risks of disruption to overland movement and supply chain continuity in major cities. If Hamas continues to release hostages in line with the ceasefire agreement, celebratory demonstrations will likely emerge in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv on 15 and 22 February. However, if hostage releases are disrupted and the ceasefire collapses, large-scale protest activity will highly likely emerge in major cities and intersections throughout Israel, significantly increasing operational and supply chain disruption risks. There is also a realistic possibility that the Histadrut labour federation will call a general strike if the ceasefire collapses, increasing short-term labour flexibility concerns.
- Amid efforts to improve relations with the US, the Palestinian Authority (PA) announced the end of welfare payments for individuals involved in attacks on Israel, though militant activity is highly unlikely to decrease in the West Bank. On 10 February, PA President Mahmoud Abbas signed a decree cancelling legislation that provides welfare payments to Palestinian security prisoners in Israeli prisons based on the length of their sentences. The decree also ends the PA’s stipend programme for the families of individuals killed while conducting attacks on Israel; these policies were collectively known as the ‘pay-to-slay’ system. As the US has frequently called for the termination of such payments, the declaration underscores increasing PA efforts to improve diplomatic relations with the US amid elevated tensions linked to US President Donald Trump’s statements regarding possible US administration of Gaza (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 6 February 2025). There is a realistic possibility that the dissolution of the payment system will moderately reduce the frequency of financially motivated sole-perpetrator attacks on Israeli military and civilian targets in the West Bank. However, it is highly unlikely to deter militant activity or ideologically motivated sole-perpetrator attacks for the foreseeable future, sustaining security and bystander risks. The decree will also possibly trigger episodes of anti-PA demonstrations in the West Bank in the coming weeks, particularly in militant strongholds in the northern West Bank, increasing risks of unrest and clashes with personnel from the security forces.
- Efforts to enforce compliance with conscription orders issued to ultra-Orthodox men will increase tensions within the coalition government and will likely trigger anti-conscription protest risks in the coming weeks. On 11 February, the Attorney General ordered the Labour and Welfare Ministry to stop issuing daycare subsidies for the children of ultra-Orthodox yeshiva students who have defied conscription notices by 28 February. The order highlights increasing civil efforts to promote draft adherence within the ultra-Orthodox community. The order is highly likely to increase tensions with ultra-Orthodox parties within the coalition government, increasing risks of legislative deadlock and possibly increasing government stability risks in the short term. The order will also likely trigger anti-conscription protests in the coming weeks. Anti-conscription demonstrations are highly likely in ultra-Orthodox population centres such as Bnei Brak (Tel Aviv), Beit Shemesh and Jerusalem (both Jerusalem district), elevating operational and supply chain disruption risks in central Israel. Demonstrators will also highly likely target key intersections along Highways 1 and 4, elevating the risk of temporary travel delays and supply chain disruption.
- Jordan reiterated its opposition to the displacement of Palestinians from Gaza amid elevated tensions with the US. On 11 February, Jordan’s King Abdullah II met with US President Donald Trump to discuss post-war governance in Gaza and reiterated his opposition to Trump’s highly-publicised proposal regarding possible US administration of the territory (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 6 February 2025). On 10 February, Trump stated that he ‘would conceivably’ withhold aid from Egypt and Jordan if they refuse to allow Gaza’s population to settle within their territory during post-conflict reconstruction. Although a complete withdrawal of US aid from Jordan remains highly unlikely in the short term (particularly regarding military aid), tensions vis-à-vis developments in Gaza will almost certainly remain elevated in the coming weeks. Statements from Trump regarding the Palestinian population of Gaza or relations with Jordan will possibly trigger Pro-Palestine demonstrations in Jordan, particularly in the capital Amman. Risks of demonstrations will be particularly elevated in the coming week when US Secretary of State Marco Rubio travels to Israel; Rubio will highly likely voice support for US engagement in the redevelopment of Gaza. Although widespread unrest remains unlikely, large-scale demonstrations will possibly emerge, increasing risks of travel disruption through the Rabae area. There is a realistic possibility that Israel will not fully withdraw from southern Lebanon by the agreed extended deadline (18 February). In this case, the IDF’s presence will likely be limited to several (likely five) positions close to the Israel-Lebanon border. There is a realistic possibility that the withdrawal will be completed in the days following the current withdrawal deadline. However, such an event will elevate the risks of sporadic, localised armed clashes between the IDF and Lebanese Hizballah (LH) operatives in southern Lebanon. Regardless, an immediate resumption of LH cross-border rocket launches targeting northern Israel remains unlikely. A withdrawal which is delayed by several weeks (together with gradually increasing clashes between IDF and LH operatives) will increase the likelihood of a greater resumption of hostilities and a ceasefire collapse.
Feb 12.
- Turkey: Opposition arrests will drive domestic unrest risks, exacerbate ethno-religious tensions. On 11 February, the police detained ten members of the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) in Istanbul province, citing links to the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). The detentions come amid an escalation of the Turkish government’s anti-Kurdish posture ahead of a scheduled announcement by jailed PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan on 15 February, when he is likely to call for the disarmament of the group. Opposition to Öcalan’s announcement and the government’s continued repression of pro-Kurdish elements will likely drive domestic unrest in the capital Ankara, as well as Istanbul and various south-eastern cities, in the coming days and weeks. This will exacerbate the risk of arbitrary detentions, as well as localised transport and supply chain disruption; the likelihood of sporadic clashes between demonstrators and the security forces will also increase. Further arrests of opposition figures are possible, which we assess will drive human rights risks and exacerbate ethno-religious tensions within the Kurdish minority population.
- Libya: New security campaign will prompt clashes, raise bystander risks in western coastal region. On 11 February, the West Coast Military Zone militias (affiliated with the Government of National Unity, GNU) launched a security campaign against criminal groups in the city of Zuwarah (Nuqat al Khams district). This comes weeks after similar operations targeting smugglers and human traffickers in Ajaylat (Nuqat al Khams) and Zawiya (Zawiya district). We assess there is an elevated likelihood of armed clashes during the campaign, further increasing already elevated security and bystander risks in Zuwarah in the coming days. The authorities will also likely maintain an overnight curfew between 2100hrs and 0700hrs (local time) that was implemented earlier this week until the end of operations. There is a realistic possibility of mobility disruption during the day due to the establishment of new checkpoints in the city centre and the possibility of sporadic clashes. We assess this disruption will also possibly impact the movement of goods vehicles transiting from Tunisia through the nearby Ras Ajdir border crossing to the capital Tripoli, disrupting supply chains.
Feb 11.
- Israel: Large-scale data breach sustains elevated security, disruption risks from pro-Iran hacktivists. On 10 February, international news outlets reported that the pro-Iran hacktivist group ‘Handala’ claimed responsibility for a large-scale data breach against Israel’s police force and Ministry of National Security. The Israeli police denied Handala’s claims that it infiltrated these entities, stating that the breach likely originated from a supply chain attack. The breach allegedly resulted in the exfiltration of around 2.1 terabytes of sensitive employee data, underscoring the potential scale of the breach. Handala also claimed to have distributed around 350,000 stolen documents (including identity documents and personal data), possibly elevating the risk of follow-on social engineering and account-hijacking attacks in the short-to-medium term. Handala has consistently targeted Israeli organisations in disruptive cyber operations since the onset of the Israel-Hamas war in October 2023, often temporarily disrupting critical functions such as emergency alert systems. The operation in question underscores the increased security, operational and disruption risks facing Israeli entities amid the ongoing Middle East crisis.
- Israel-Palestinian Territories: Delay of hostage release elevates conflict escalation risks in Gaza. On 10 February, Hamas indefinitely postponed further hostage releases, accusing Israel of violating the Israel-Hamas ceasefire by obstructing humanitarian aid flows and targeting civilians in Gaza. In response there is a realistic possibility that Israel will impose restrictions on movement at the Kerem Shalom, Rafah and West Erez crossings, disrupting aid deliveries and NGO operations while exacerbating humanitarian concerns and food security risks in Gaza. The announcement came five days before the next scheduled hostage release (15 February), indicating that Hamas is likely aiming to maximise pressure to negotiate further concessions and secure second-phase ceasefire discussions. While there is a realistic possibility that mediation efforts will ease current tensions and the ceasefire will remain in place, an immediate transition to the ceasefire’s second phase remains highly unlikely. As a result of current tensions, we assess that there is a realistic possibility the ceasefire will collapse in the coming weeks, driving conflict escalation risks and resumption of IDF operations in Gaza.
- Yemen: UN aid suspension will exacerbate food, health, socio-economic health risks. On 10 February, the UN announced the suspension of its humanitarian operations in the Houthi-held Saada governorate due to the lack of necessary security guarantees for its staff. The move likely aims to pressure the Iran-backed group to release the recently detained UN staff in Saada along with dozens of other UN staff arrested in other Houthi regions over the last 12 months. However, the decision will highly likely exacerbate food, health and socio-economic risks in the governorate, where a large portion of the population is highly dependent on UN food aid and World Health Organization (WHO) facilities. There is a realistic possibility that the UN will implement similar steps in other Houthi regions in Yemen if the group continue detaining UN staff. We assess that there is also a realistic possibility that the UN decision and Houthi hostility toward UN staff will prompt other international NGOs in Yemen to suspend operations, further exacerbating humanitarian concerns.
Feb 10.
- Overnight on 8-9 February, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) withdrew from the Netzarim Corridor.
- On 9 February, the IDF struck Khalkhalah Air Base (as-Suwayda governorate, Syria).
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND OVERALL FORECAST
- Hamas released three Israeli hostages from Gaza; increasing concerns over hostages’ wellbeing is likely to bolster attendance at pro-agreement rallies in the coming weeks.
- Despite renewed engagement in Qatari-mediated negotiations, an immediate extension to the Israel-Hamas ceasefire remains unlikely.
- Although aid deliveries into Gaza have significantly increased during the Israel-Hamas ceasefire, the possible resumption of IDF operations in the coming weeks will sustain broader humanitarian concerns.
- The formation of a government in Lebanon will likely decrease government stability and socio-economic health risks, though Lebanese Hizballah (LH)’s exclusion will likely drive ethno-religious tensions.
- Increasing tensions between Israel and Hamas will elevate the risk of conflict resuming in Gaza in the coming weeks.
- The resumption of the Israel-Hamas war would highly likely trigger a spike in protest activity, particularly across the Middle East, North Africa and Turkey region.
- Overnight on 8-9 February, the IDF withdrew from the Netzarim Corridor. Following the completion of the withdrawal, the IDF’s presence in northern Gaza will be limited to Division 162, which will deploy to the buffer zone between Gaza and the Gaza Envelope. The IDF continues to monitor the passage of Palestinians into northern Gaza, while the risk of airstrikes facing vehicles travelling along unauthorised roads remains elevated. Furthermore, the IDF will likely maintain an elevated level of alertness and respond forcefully to those who approach its forces in the buffer zone. This will sustain elevated security and bystander risks near the buffer zone, including for members of international organisations who are travelling without permits or who do not clearly and fully identify themselves beforehand.
- On 9 February, the IDF struck Khalkhalah Air Base (as-Suwayda governorate, Syria). Additionally, and on the same day, local sources claimed the IDF conducted airstrikes in the Qalad al-Sabaa area (Rif Dimashq governorate, Syria) near the Lebanon-Syria border. Together with the strike in Deir Ali (Rif Dimashq, see map), this is the third IDF strike in Syria in 48 hours. The increase in strikes likely reflects a spike in efforts by militants to smuggle weaponry from Syria’s former Assad government to Hamas and Lebanese Hizballah (LH) with the support of Iran. As a result, security risks in border areas straddling Lebanon and Syria, as well as in the vicinity of ports and airports, will remain elevated in the coming week.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND OVERALL FORECAST
- Hamas released three Israeli hostages from Gaza. Increasing concerns over hostages’ wellbeing is likely to bolster attendance at pro-agreement rallies in the coming weeks. On 8 February, Hamas released three male hostages from Gaza. The releases triggered celebratory demonstrations in Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district, Israel), with participants calling for the government to immediately secure additional releases. Demonstrators primarily gathered at Begin Road, Habima Square, Hostage’s Square and the Tshala area, underscoring the sustained risks of localised travel disruption during pro-agreement demonstrations. The IDF later confirmed that the released hostages were being treated for malnutrition, while Israeli media reported Hamas militants had engaged in acts of torture during the hostages’ detention. Increasing concerns regarding hostages’ wellbeing will likely bolster attendance at pro-agreement rallies in major Israeli cities in the coming weeks, particularly Jerusalem (Jerusalem district, Israel) and Tel Aviv (see FORECAST). Although demonstrations will likely disrupt localised overland movement, protest-related unrest and violence remain highly unlikely.
- Despite renewed engagement in Qatari-mediated negotiations, an immediate extension to the Israel-Hamas ceasefire remains unlikely. From 8 to 10 February, an Israeli delegation travelled to Qatar for renewed ceasefire negotiations. Israel and Hamas were initially scheduled to resume indirect negotiations on extending the ceasefire into its second phase on 4 February. The re-engagement in negotiations is unlikely to signal an imminent extension to the ceasefire agreement. Several Israeli media outlets reported that the delegation sent to Qatar did not receive a mandate to discuss the transition to the ceasefire’s second phase. Rather, the delegation has been instructed to engage with Hamas to ensure the release of hostages in the first phase. The short and likely low-level engagement is unlikely to have resulted in an agreement on an immediate transition from the first to the second phase of the ceasefire, increasing the likelihood of the IDF resuming operations in Gaza in the coming weeks (see FORECAST).
- Although aid deliveries into Gaza have significantly increased during the Israel-Hamas ceasefire, the possible resumption of IDF operations in the coming weeks will sustain broader humanitarian concerns. On 6 February, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) announced that since the Israel-Hamas ceasefire began on 19 January, at least 10,000 aid trucks have entered Gaza. This indicates that an average of 550 trucks have entered Gaza per day, marking a significant increase in aid deliveries. Although this is below the daily target of 600 trucks included in the ceasefire’s text, the OCHA also reports that the increasing availability of food aid has triggered a partial decline in food prices, moderately improving food security conditions. Even so, food prices remain significantly elevated compared to pre-October 2023 levels and will remain extremely sensitive to fluctuations in aid deliveries in the coming weeks. Despite continued efforts to bolster the provision of aid during the ceasefire, the IDF will likely resume operations in Gaza following the expiry of the agreement’s first phase (2 March). The resumption of operations is highly likely to disrupt cross-border aid deliveries and NGO efforts to distribute aid within Gaza, exacerbating food insecurity and broader humanitarian concerns in the coming weeks.
- The formation of a government in Lebanon will likely decrease government stability and socio-economic health risks, though Lebanese Hizballah (LH)’s exclusion will likely drive ethno-religious tensions. On 8 February, Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam formed a government, following 30 months of political deadlock. The government includes four ministers from the Amal Movement, an LH-aligned political party, though it does not include any LH representatives. This marks the first time since 2005 that the Lebanese government has not included LH, amid significant pressure from the US to exclude the group from the cabinet. The formation will decrease government stability risks in the short-to-medium term and will likely bolster access to international financing for reconstruction and infrastructure development, particularly from France, Qatar and Saudi Arabia. In the long term, access to such finance will likely improve socio-economic health risks and moderate food, energy and water security concerns. Similarly, the formation of a government in line with US policy preferences will likely further strengthen diplomatic relations, increasing prospects for further bilateral diplomatic and economic engagement. This will possibly include the easing of US restrictions and sanctions targeting Lebanese financial institutions, moderating compliance risks for locally engaged firms. However, there is a realistic possibility that LH’s exclusion will aggravate ethno-religious tensions and trigger episodes of intercommunal violence, increasing localised security and bystander risks, particularly in mixed neighbourhoods. Increasing tensions between Israel and Hamas will elevate the risk of conflict resuming in Gaza in the coming weeks. On 10 February, a Hamas spokesperson stated that the group would indefinitely delay further hostage releases until Israel ‘retroactively compensates’ for alleged ceasefire violations. In response, Israel will almost certainly announce in the coming hours the indefinite suspension of corresponding Palestinian prisoner releases under the ceasefire agreement. The IDF will also possibly announce restrictions to civilian movement via the Rafah border crossing and/or to aid deliveries via the Kerem Shalom and West Erez crossings. These measures are highly likely to compound tensions between both parties, increasing the risk of the ceasefire agreement failing in the coming days (with the IDF resuming operations in Gaza thereafter). Although there is a realistic possibility that Egyptian and Qatari mediators will successfully moderate elevated tensions and the ceasefire will remain in place, an immediate transition to the ceasefire’s second phase is highly unlikely. Consequently, IDF operations will highly likely resume in Gaza in the coming weeks.
- The resumption of the Israel-Hamas war would highly likely trigger a spike in protest activity, particularly across the Middle East, North Africa and Turkey region. In the event that the ceasefire fails and the Israel-Hamas war resumes, the cessation of hostage releases would almost certainly trigger large-scale anti-government protests in Israel, particularly Haifa (Haifa district), Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. This would substantially increase the risk of temporary travel and operational disruption, while possibly limiting labour flexibility. Protesters would also likely gather in smaller population centres, including Beersheva (Southern district), Caesarea (Haifa), Herzliya (Tel Aviv), Raanana, Rehovot and Rishon LeZion (all Central district), elevating supply chain disruption risks along major thoroughfares. Despite this potential uptick in anti-government protest activity, threats to government stability would likely decrease, given the significant support for the resumption of the Israel-Hamas war from hard-right parties within the coalition government. The resumption of the Israel-Hamas war and the suspension of prisoner releases would also highly likely trigger protests in the West Bank, particularly in Ramallah and in the vicinity of Ofer Prison (both Ramallah and al Bireh governorate). Demonstrations would increase the risk of unrest and clashes with the security forces, driving bystander and collateral risks in central parts of the West Bank. In the broader region, concerns regarding the resumption of IDF operations in Gaza are likely to trigger an uptick in pro-Palestine protest activity, particularly in Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Turkey and Tunisia. Israeli-linked businesses and entities will face elevated risks of targeted protests and vandalism, increasing collateral risks for proximate installations. There is also a realistic possibility that pro-Palestine protest activity will target US-linked installations, including embassies and private sector entities, driving hostility to foreign investment.
- Iraq: New operation against IS will exacerbate security, bystander risks. Earlier on 10 February, the Iraqi security forces launched a large-scale operation in southern areas of Kirkuk governorate to follow up on airstrikes targeting the group’s hideouts in the region and to identify those killed. The operation covers Zghitoun Valley, situated between Rashad and Daquq districts (all Kirkuk governorate). We assess that the Iraqi army will highly likely conduct further airstrikes in the region to provide aerial cover, significantly increasing security risks in the valley. Localised armed clashes between both sides and the use of IEDs targeting Iraqi forces will further exacerbate such risks, particularly during overland movement, in the coming days. Additionally, the valley’s rugged terrain will likely hinder Iraqi clearing operations, prolonging armed conflict risks. We assess there is a realistic possibility that the Iraqi security forces will set up temporary checkpoints along the provincial highways leading to Kirkuk city (Kirkuk governorate) this week, moderately elevating travel disruption risks.
- Lebanon: New government will reduce socio-economic, energy risks, elevate violence risks. On 8 February, Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam formed a new government following two-and-a-half years of political deadlock. The cabinet includes four ministers from the Amal Movement, an ally of Lebanese Hizballah (LH), but excludes LH itself following US demands for minimal involvement by the group and its allies. Reduced LH influence will decrease the likelihood of policy deadlocks, improving governance efficiency. The government’s conformity with US demands will increase prospects for greater diplomatic engagement with the US and the removal of restrictions on Lebanese banks, reducing compliance risks. The new government signals Lebanon’s readiness to access funds for post-war reconstruction, moderating long-term socio-economic, energy and food security risks. We assess that Amal’s inclusion in the government will likely mitigate an Israel-Hizballah ceasefire collapse, moderating the risk of conflict re-escalation in southern Lebanon. However, there is a realistic possibility that LH’s exclusion will drive intercommunal violence, elevating domestic security risks. (Source: Sibylline)
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