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Military And Security Developments
Feb 19.
- Iraq-US: Sanctions warning underscores elevated compliance risks, increased instability. Earlier on 19 February, Iraq’s foreign ministry confirmed US warnings of sanctions if former prime minister Nouri al-Maliki is reinstated. The ministry stated that measures would target specific individuals and institutions, without providing further details. This followed remarks by a US State Department spokesperson a day earlier, indicating that al-Maliki’s appointment would prompt Washington DC to reassess bilateral relations. Al-Maliki, the leading nominee of the Coordination Framework (Iraq’s largest parliamentary bloc) for the premiership, maintains close ties with Iran. His return to office would signal ongoing Iranian influence in Iraq, likely prompting the US to sanction Iraqi institutions linked to Iranian proxies. These will likely include the central bank and the state’s oil marketing company. Such sanctions will elevate compliance risks among international companies operating in Iraq, particularly those in the energy sector. Furthermore, the US will likely also withdraw other forms of support for Iraq, including military training. This will elevate the risk of terrorism resurgence, attack risks and security instability in the coming two years.
- Iran: Further anti-government demonstrations likely in coming days, driving personnel security risks. On 18 February, Shia mourning ceremonies (Chehelom, held 40 days after an individual’s death) were held across Iran for protesters killed during January’s anti-government demonstrations. Although communications restrictions are in place in many Iranian cities, on 16 February several social media accounts published footage allegedly showing small-scale anti-government demonstrations in Abdanan (Ilam province), where security forces reportedly opened fire on mourners. Similar clashes were reported in Hamadan (Hamadan province) and Mashhad (Razavi Khorasan province). Further gatherings and demonstrations are likely over the weekend (evening of 19 February through to 20 February), particularly in cemeteries in Abdanan, Hamadan, Isfahan (Isfahan province), Mashhad, Shiraz (Fars province), the capital Tehran and Zahedan (Sistan and Baluchestan province). The security forces will almost certainly violently disperse demonstrations with anti-government sentiment, elevating security risks for locally engaged staff and compounding human rights concerns. Widespread crackdowns on demonstrations will increase the risk of US military intervention in Iran in the coming days and weeks
Feb 18.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
IRAN
- Despite diplomatic engagement, the risk of US airstrikes targeting Iran remains substantially elevated.
- The US continues to bolster its military presence in the Middle East, increasing tensions with Iran and undermining prospects for rapid diplomatic de-escalation.
- Continued Iranian military drills in the Strait of Hormuz will likely drive energy price volatility.
- In Iran grieving observances for individuals killed during anti-government demonstrations in early January will increase the risk of further small-scale protests and crackdowns.
ISRAEL
- Ultra-Orthodox riots and attacks against soldiers in Bnei Brak (Tel Aviv district) underscore the elevated risk of further clashes with the police and wider violent unrest.
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
- GAZA STRIP: Indonesia’s preparations to deploy troops into Gaza by April will possibly prompt other states to join the International Stabilization Force (ISF), though delays remain a realistic possibility.
- GAZA STRIP: The confirmed suspension of Doctors Without Borders (MSF)’s non-essential activities at Nasser Hospital in Khan Yunis (southern Gaza) highlights elevated risks to NGO personnel.
- WEST BANK: The Islamic month of Ramadan (from the evening of 18 February to 20 March) will moderately increase travel and operational disruption, particularly in mid-March.
- WEST BANK: Persistent and intensified Israeli security operations in the West Bank and Jerusalem areas during Ramadan will increase disruption and attack risks.
- WEST BANK: The Israeli government has adopted several measures to facilitate increasing purchases of land in the West Bank, likely compounding ethno-religious and regional tensions over the longer term.
IRAN • Despite diplomatic engagement, the risk of US airstrikes targeting Iran remains substantially elevated. On 17 February, Iranian and US delegations engaged in a second round of indirect talks in Switzerland. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Aragchi subsequently characterised the talks as productive and stated that both parties had agreed on ‘guiding principles’ for further discussions. Conversely, US Vice President JD Vance stated that Iran had been unwilling to ‘acknowledge and work through’ US red lines, referring to Washington DC’s position that Iran must halt domestic uranium enrichment, limit its missile programme and curb support for regional proxies. Although both parties have indicated that they are willing to pursue further negotiations, no date has been publicly announced for a third round of talks. While the BBC and the Washington Post cited unnamed US officials in reporting that Iran aims to present a proposal to the US within two weeks, we assess that Iran is highly unlikely to meet US negotiating positions fully within this timeframe. Hardline positions are likely to continue undermining prospects for a diplomatic breakthrough in the coming weeks, particularly amid an ongoing US military build-up in the region (see below). Consequently, the risk of US strikes targeting Iran will remain elevated in the near term, sustaining the potential for escalation and broader regional disruption (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – Iran-US Special Edition – 11 February 2026 for scenario analysis).
- The US continues to bolster its military presence in the Middle East, increasing tensions with Iran and undermining prospects for rapid diplomatic de-escalation. On 13 February, US President Donald Trump confirmed that the USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) – as part of Carrier Strike Group 12 (CSG12) – would imminently move from the US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM)’s area of responsibility to that of the US Central Command (CENTCOM); this remit includes the Middle East. This marks the second carrier strike group deployment to CENTCOM’s area of responsibility in recent weeks, as Carrier Strike Group 3 (including the USS Abraham Lincoln) has been positioned in the region since 26 January. The US has also continued to deploy aerial assets to the region, including numerous fighter jets, tanker aircraft and intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance (ISR) platforms. In the coming days, the US will likely continue concentrating aerial and naval assets in the Middle East in order to maximise pressure on Iran to make concessions in the nuclear negotiations. Although there is a realistic possibility that increasing US military and economic pressure will result in Iran softening its negotiating position in the coming weeks, further build-ups will also likely trigger allegations that the US is attempting to strong-arm Iran. We assess that rising diplomatic tensions will increase the risk of deadlock and US airstrikes thereafter, compounding regional spillover risks (see above).
- Continued Iranian military drills in the Strait of Hormuz will likely drive energy price volatility. On 17 February, the naval arm of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC-N) engaged in live-fire exercises in the Strait of Hormuz and partially shut the waterway for several hours. Iran will engage in further drills (alongside Chinese and Russian forces) in the Strait of Hormuz on 19 February. These exercises likely serve to improve Iran’s operational readiness and responsiveness amid concerns of imminent US airstrikes. They also signal its capacity to restrict the navigability of the Strait of Hormuz in the event of military escalation with the US. In the coming weeks, further Iranian naval drills, drone operations and live-fire exercises will likely increase market concerns regarding the continuity of oil and gas exports via the waterway, triggering price volatility and increasing energy costs for consumers. Efforts to expedite shipments and avoid partial closures will increase the risk of bottlenecks, vessel collisions and delivery delays, undermining export continuity in the short term. Furthermore, increasing Iranian military drills (particularly in the vicinity of US naval assets) will increase the risk of miscalculation, collision and unintentional escalation between the US and Iran. Amid significantly elevated regional tensions, we assess that such incidents would increase the risk of rapid escalation into armed conflict, undermining the continuity of energy exports and regional air travel.
- In Iran, grieving observances for individuals killed during anti-government demonstrations in early January will increase the risk of further small-scale protests and crackdowns. On 16 February, numerous social media accounts published footage allegedly showing small-scale anti-government demonstrations emerging at grieving observances (Chehelom) for individuals killed during the crackdown on anti-government protests and unrest in early January. Although the Iranian authorities have acknowledged approximately 3,000 casualties, international NGOs estimate that the security forces likely killed at least 7,000 individuals; as such, numerous such observances will take place in the coming days. Gatherings and resultant demonstrations will likely centre on cemeteries throughout Iran, particularly major cities such as Isfahan (Isfahan province), Mashhad (Razavi Khorasan province), Shiraz (Fars province), the capital Tehran and Zahedan (Sistan and Baluchestan province). The Iranian security forces will almost certainly maintain an elevated posture in major cities, with uniformed and plainclothes officers violently dispersing demonstrations associated with anti-government sentiment. Individuals associated with anti-government protests will face elevated risks of surveillance, harassment and detention in the coming days, with knock-on risks affecting locally engaged staff and compounding human rights concerns. Crackdowns on ad hoc demonstrations, commemorative gatherings and anti-government activism will also likely exacerbate tensions with the US, moderately increasing the risk of US intervention amid Washington DC’s military build-up in the region (see above)
ISRAEL
- Ultra-Orthodox riots and attacks against soldiers in Bnei Brak (Tel Aviv district) underscore the elevated risk of further clashes with the police and wider violent unrest. On 15 February, hundreds of ultra-Orthodox rioters attacked two Israeli soldiers in Bnei Brak; police officers were subsequently deployed to extract the soldiers. The incident also prompted the deployment of additional police reinforcements to the city (including a police helicopter) and the use of stun grenades against the crowd. Following the riots, the police arrested 23 individuals. The incident comes amid growing tensions between the ultra-Orthodox community and the Israeli security forces over military conscription. Further protests and riots are likely in the coming months, particularly in and around major ultra-Orthodox population centres such as Bnei Brak and Jerusalem (Jerusalem district), driving increased physical security risks for bystanders and assets near protest locations. Protests are also likely near Israel Defense Forces (IDF) recruitment centres and along key highways, particularly Highways 1 and 4. Additionally, in the coming weeks, the Israeli police are likely to intensify their response to such protests. A strong police response will increase the likelihood of protests against the police and in support of detained individuals. Such protests will also face elevated risks of violent escalation, further increasing bystander security risks in their proximity.
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
- GAZA STRIP: Indonesia’s preparations to deploy troops into Gaza by April will possibly prompt other states to join the International Stabilization Force (ISF), though delays remain a realistic possibility. On 16 February, Indonesia’s army spokesperson announced the prospective deployment of 1,000 troops to the ISF in Gaza by early April. The spokesperson also added that a total of 8,000 soldiers will be ready for deployment by June. This marks a positive development for the ISF initiative; it will possibly prompt other states to announce their participation and contribution to the force in the coming months. However, we assess that ongoing international discussions about the ISF’s mechanisms and responsibilities will possibly delay the launch of its operations in Gaza over the coming two months, prolonging reliance on the IDF for security operations in the strip. Such operations will periodically elevate tensions within the ceasefire process, sustaining the risk of a breakdown.
- GAZA STRIP: The confirmed suspension of Doctors Without Borders (MSF)’s non-essential activities at Nasser Hospital in Khan Yunis (southern Gaza) highlights elevated risks to NGO personnel. The organisation stated that the presence of armed and masked men inside the hospital has increased since the ceasefire began. Furthermore, MSF reported a rise in security-related incidents, including arbitrary arrests of patients, intimidation and suspected movement of weapons within the facility. MSF’s decision to suspend non-essential activities underscores heightened reputational and security risks for NGO staff operating in areas exposed to militant activity. The presence of armed actors within the hospital also increases the likelihood that Israel could perceive the site as a legitimate target in the event of renewed hostilities. However, amid the current ceasefire, we assess that an Israeli strike against the hospital remains unlikely in the coming days.
- WEST BANK: The Islamic month of Ramadan (from the evening of 18 February to 20 March) will moderately increase travel and operational disruption, particularly in mid-March. Although the Palestinian Authority (PA) has announced that its ministries and schools will continue operating throughout Ramadan, adjusted hours and schedules will likely undermine operational capacity. Administrative delays and service bottlenecks will likely impact license issuances, customs processing and clearance times, disrupting supply chain continuity. Increased road usage after evening prayers will also likely result in increased congestion, disrupting travel continuity and delaying overland movement, particularly near major mosques. This risk will be particularly acute in the last ten days of Ramadan (i.e. between 10 and 20 March), when religious observance typically peaks. More broadly, this will likely undermine labour flexibility for locally engaged entities, increasing the risk of operational disruption, particularly in mid-March (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 17 February 2026).
- WEST BANK: Persistent and intensified Israeli security operations in the West Bank and Jerusalem areas during Ramadan will increase disruption and attack risks. On 13 February, the IDF released a report detailing heightened security operations in preparation for the Ramadan period, amid concerns of an imminent uptick in militant activity. Since 6 February, the IDF, Shin Bet and police have conducted numerous arrests, weapons seizures and material searches across the West Bank, including in major cities such as Jenin (Jenin governorate), Jericho (Jericho governorate), Nablus (Nablus governorate), Qalqilya (Qalqilya governorate) and Ramallah (Ramallah and al-Bireh governorate). The Israeli security forces will likely operate additional checkpoints, stop-and-search operations and raids throughout Ramadan, driving routine travel disruption (primarily for Palestine-plated vehicles). Similarly, the Israeli security forces will almost certainly maintain an elevated posture surrounding the al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem (Jerusalem governorate), while enforcing restrictions on Muslim individuals attending prayers there. The Israeli authorities will allow 10,000 individuals to attend Friday prayers during Ramadan at the al-Aqsa mosque (i.e. 20 and 27 February, as well as 6, 13 and 20 March); efforts to restrict attendance will increase the risk of substantial congestion surrounding the compound. Any altercations between Muslim attendees and Israeli security force personnel will increase bystander exposure to crowd-related injuries and crushes, while also possibly triggering broader unrest and intercommunal violence in the East Jerusalem area. Israel’s posture in the West Bank and Jerusalem areas will sustain rising ethno-religious tensions and the risk of radicalisation among Palestinian communities, increasing attack risks in the coming days and weeks.
- WEST BANK: The Israeli government has adopted several measures to facilitate increasing purchases of land in the West Bank, likely compounding ethno-religious and regional tensions over the longer term. On 15 February, the Israeli government approved a plan to establish a land settlement procedure within Area C of the West Bank. The procedures require landowners to demonstrate ownership by submitting property and cultivation records to the Israeli judiciary; any failure to do so will result in the land’s automatic registration under the Israeli state. The move comes after Israel’s security cabinet adopted several measures vis-à-vis land purchases in the West Bank on 8 February, designed to ease restrictions on Israeli citizens’ ability to purchase land in Areas A and B. The measures substantially undermine the implementation of the 1995 ‘Oslo II’ accord, which codified the status of Areas A, B and C in the West Bank (see Sibylline Special Report – 7 October 2025). These measures will increase the risk of Palestinian residents within Area C losing their land ownership, while the sale of land in Areas A, B and C to Israeli settlers will likely facilitate the expansion of settlements, particularly in southern West Bank. This dynamic will almost certainly exacerbate ethno-religious tensions, increasing the risks of escalating intercommunal violence and staff exposure to escalating clashes. Moreover, the Israeli government will likely continue adopting legislative measures facilitating settlement expansion in the West Bank over the coming months, given its efforts to consolidate support from pro-settlement political parties (such as Otzma Yehudit and Religious Zionist Party) ahead of the general elections, scheduled to take place later in 2026. These measures will almost certainly increase regional tensions, particularly with Israel’s neighbouring states, undermining efforts to expand participation in the Abraham Accords in the coming months. Tensions between Israel and its international partners – including Canada, the EU and the UK – are also highly likely to increase, possibly triggering further sanctions targeting Israeli settlers and associated entities. Consequently, entities with operations in Israel will face increasing sanctions exposure risks as well as broader reputational concerns, particularly for firms in the financial, agricultural and construction sectors.
RED SEA
- The Iranian-backed Yemen-based Houthis are unlikely to be behind a recent security incident, though security risks will remain elevated amid Iran-US/Israel tensions. On 17 February, the UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) organisation reported gunfire 70 nautical miles (130km) to the south-west of Aden (Aden governorate, Yemen). According to the report, a white skiff with five people onboard approached and hailed a maritime vessel sailing in the area. The vessel fired warning shots and reported two additional skiffs in the area. We assess that the incident was likely a result of pirate activity rather than a Houthi operation. However, the incident highlights the persistently elevated security risks for vessels in the Red Sea. These risks are likely to increase in the event of armed conflict escalation between Iran and the US/Israel (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – Iran-US Special Edition – 11 February 2026).
REGIONAL AND GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS ISRAEL-LEBANON: Phase 2 of the Lebanese Hizballah (LH) disarmament process will likely remain constrained by the Lebanese Armed Forces’ (LAF) capacity and LH’s unwillingness to co-operate, driving increased Israeli airstrikes against Lebanon. On 16 February, the Lebanese government stated that the LAF will need at least four months to implement the second phase of its plan to disarm LH in Lebanon. However, while the LAF announced the completion of the first phase of the disarmament process on 8 January, it is highly likely that LH retains weapon depots, logistical infrastructure and command-and-control (C2) assets south of the Litani River. Progress on Phase 2 will likely be constrained by limited manpower, as well as a lack of intelligence, logistical reach, political cover and LH’s refusal to co-operate with inspections. Furthermore, with LH retaining the capacity to rebuild its military posture via Iran and domestic resources, any successful LAF disarmament efforts are likely to be reversible and unsubstantial. As such, Israel will likely increase the rate of its targeted strikes against LH assets in Lebanon in the coming months, including south and north of the Litani River, as well as in Baalbek-Hermel governorate. Furthermore, LH has recently escalated its efforts to smuggle weapons, increasing the risk of strikes against ships and ports, particularly in the Sidon area (South governorate), as well as against targets along the Lebanon-Syria border. This would elevate maritime supply chain disruption, as well as delays to overland movement, driving knock-on operational and financial risks for reliant businesses. Strikes targeting LH leadership in the Dahieh district of the capital Beirut are also possible, elevating security risks for proximate assets, facilities and personnel. Regardless, we assess that significant armed escalation between Israel and LH remains unlikely in the coming months.
- Iran-US: Maintained red lines, force build-up will drive risk of US attack in coming days. Earlier on 18 February, Iranian state media reported that Iran and Russia will conduct a joint naval exercise in the Gulf of Oman and the northern Indian Ocean on 19 February. The announcement comes as the US continues to deploy additional aircraft and naval assets to the region. Although the exercise is in the same maritime area as the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) aircraft carrier strike group, direct interaction between vessels is highly unlikely, especially given Russia’s participation. Meanwhile, Iran’s foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, claimed that Iran and the US had reached an understanding on the main ‘guiding principles’ of nuclear discussions following talks on 17 February. However, US Vice President JD Vance subsequently cautioned that key US red lines remain in place. Amid rising military tensions, a large-scale force build-up, strategic posturing and with discussions not yet moving beyond procedural issues, we assess that the risk of US military action against Iranian military, dual-use and political assets will remain significantly elevated in the coming hours and through the weekend (20 to 22 February.
- Lebanon: Government price hikes will elevate domestic unrest risks, operational costs. On 17 February, protesters blocked key highways in the capital Beirut in a demonstration over fuel price and VAT increases. Earlier that day, the Lebanese government increased the price of 20 litres of gasoline by LBP 361,000 (around USD 4), bringing the total cost to approximately USD 20 per 20 litres. The government also decided to increase VAT from 11% to 12%, although the measure remains subject to formal legislative endorsement. The adjustments aim to finance wage and pension increases for public sector employees, including military personnel. The measures are likely to trigger further protests in Beirut and potentially in other urban centres in the coming days, sustaining elevated risks of roadblocks and travel disruption. Furthermore, the tax and price increases will likely raise operating costs for businesses, particularly in the logistics, manufacturing and transport sectors over the coming months, elevating financial and operational risks.
Feb 17
- The disarmament process alone is unlikely to succeed as Lebanese Hizballah (LH) retains sufficient military capacity and political leverage to obstruct or resist its enforcement.
- Israel is likely to sustain a high tempo of targeted strikes against Lebanon, including north of the Litani River and into Baalbek-Hermel governorate, though significant armed escalation remains unlikely.
- Political and diplomatic pressure on Lebanon will intensify ahead of the 2026 elections; sanctions, conditional aid and regulatory constraints targeting LH’s financial and political ecosystems remain possible.
Context
On 8 January, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) announced that it completed the first phase of the disarmament process outlined in the November 2024 ceasefire agreement between Lebanon, international mediators and Israel. The first phase targets the disarmament of non-state armed groups, particularly the Iranian-backed LH, in areas south of the Litani River. The accuracy of the LAF’s announcement has been challenged by Israel, which alleges that LH retains military infrastructure and continues to operate south of the Litani River.
LH has resisted disarmament over the past year; it has attempted to restore its military power while refusing to hand over or disclose all its military assets. Furthermore, the government’s capacity to enforce disarmament is undermined by LH’s substantial military power and political influence across Lebanon. Against this backdrop, Israel and international mediators led by the US have increasingly voiced dissatisfaction with Lebanon’s progress on disarmament over recent months. As such, Israel has substantially increased the frequency of airstrikes against LH infrastructure and operatives in Lebanon; the rate of strikes doubled between December 2025 and January 2026. This pressure is likely to escalate further ahead of May’s parliamentary elections in Lebanon, where the government is likely to face increasing domestic and international criticism over the disarmament process and its role in Lebanon.
Forecast
The Lebanese government is unlikely to achieve effective disarmament amid resistance by LH; the process is likely to remain partial, reversible and politically constrained
Despite the LAF’s announcement, LH is highly likely to retain weapon depots, logistical infrastructure and command-and-control assets south of the Litani River; progress on disarmament will likely remain limited. Current progress is more likely to reflect the selective removal, relocation or concealment of assets, rather than a substantive degradation of LH’s core military capabilities. As the disarmament process lacks clear performance indicators, verification mechanisms and defined timelines, its credibility is limited. The LAF’s enforcement capacity remains constrained by limited manpower, intelligence penetration, logistical reach and political cover. These constraints are compounded by LH’s ability to disrupt or delay operations through local collaborators and its continued refusal to co-operate fully with inspections or asset disclosures. As such, the LAF’s role is likely to remain symbolic, prioritising stability over coercion. Similarly, LH is likely to pursue a strategy of managed non-compliance, prioritising delay and ambiguity over overt confrontation. As LH retains the capacity to rebuild its military posture via continued Iranian support and its domestic resources, current disarmament efforts are unlikely to produce substantial or irreversible outcomes over the coming months.
By contrast, if the Lebanese government does attempt to impose disarmament over the coming months, this will significantly elevate domestic instability risks. Any attempt to compel compliance through arrests, intrusive inspections of sensitive sites or expanded LAF deployments would likely meet organised resistance and possibly trigger localised armed clashes. Such developments would materially elevate the risk of wider civil unrest and intra-Lebanese violence. Given these risks, the government is highly unlikely to pursue coercive disarmament in the coming months, instead favouring a risk-averse approach that prioritises political stability over enforcement. Overall, we assess that the disarmament process is likely to lose momentum over the coming months; pauses, the re-labelling of phases or reduced operational scope are increasingly likely despite intensifying domestic and external pressures.
Israel is likely to sustain an elevated rate of airstrikes, including against Baalbek-Hermel and north of the Litani River, though escalation into armed conflict remains unlikely
Israel is likely to sustain an elevated rate of airstrikes in southern Lebanon; the frequency of said strikes is likely to increase gradually in Baalbek-Hermel governorate and north of the Litani River. LH currently uses approximately 250 cross-border points along the Lebanon-Syria border to smuggle weapons. As such, we assess that strikes across the Lebanon-Syria border region are also likely. Furthermore, LH has escalated its efforts to smuggle weapons through maritime routes in recent months, driving the risk of strikes facing ships and ports, particularly in the Sidon area (South governorate). However, we assess that strikes are likely to remain very sporadic and are unlikely to disrupt or impact commercial shipping into Lebanon severely.
Strikes in the Dahieh district of the capital Beirut remain possible. However, these are likely to be highly limited and sporadic. Furthermore, we assess that the IDF is likely to issue evacuation warnings one to three hours before striking targets in Beirut. Nonetheless, in the possible event of strikes targeting LH leadership figures in Beirut, including Secretary General Naim Qassem, early evacuation warnings are highly unlikely. We assess that there is a realistic possibility of limited LH retaliation against Israel in the event that Israeli strikes kill LH leadership figures, though such retaliation is likely to be limited to IDF outposts within Lebanon and throughout the Israel-Lebanon border area.
- Iran-US: Cautious diplomacy is unlikely to offset possibility of military action in coming weeks. On 15 February, an Iranian government official said Iran is seeking a nuclear agreement with the US that would deliver mutual economic benefits, including co-operation in the oil and gas, mining and aircraft sectors. Meanwhile, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said on 14 February that the US prefers diplomacy and a negotiated settlement with Iran, but acknowledged that a deal may not materialise. Both comments came ahead of a second round of nuclear negotiations scheduled to take place in Geneva (Switzerland) on 17 February. Although cautious diplomatic language from both sides will possibly generate conditions for continued talks in the coming days and weeks, significant differences remain, especially over Iran’s nuclear enrichment and the scope of discussions, including Iran’s missile programme. Furthermore, the US has deployed additional military assets, including a second aircraft carrier strike group to the Middle East in recent days, underscoring the heightened possibility that discussions will fail and that the US will strike Iranian military, dual-use and nuclear facilities in the coming weeks (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 11 February 2026).
- Middle East, North Africa and Turkey region: Ramadan will drive business disruption, elevate risk of jihadist terrorist attacks. On the evening of 18 February, the Islamic month of Ramadan will begin in most Islamic countries; it will last until 20 March (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 17 February 2026). Most government services and state-owned entities will likely operate at a reduced capacity during Ramadan, disrupting business operations across the Middle East, North Africa and Turkey region. Delays to overland movement are also highly likely, particularly before and after evening prayers, especially near mosques and central squares and in heavily populated cities. We assess that terrorist attacks by jihadist Sunni armed groups targeting Shia mosques, religious gatherings and prayer congregations are also possible throughout Ramadan. This will elevate personnel security risks and the threat of collateral damage to business assets, particularly in Iraq, as well as in Kuwait, Oman and Syria. In Israel and the Palestinian Territories, the authorities are highly likely to enforce restrictions on Palestinian Muslims seeking to attend the al-Aqsa mosque (West Bank). This will increase the risks of ethno-religious violence, rioting and associated sporadic clashes with the security forces in Jerusalem and the West Bank.
- Israel-Palestinian Territories: Land settlement plan will increase attack, sanction risks. On 15 February, the Israeli government approved a plan to establish a land settlement procedure within Area C of the West Bank. The procedure will require landowners to prove ownership by submitting property and cultivation records; any failure to do so will result in the land’s automatic registration under the Israeli state. We assess that this procedure will increase the risk of Palestinian residents within Area C losing their land ownership, exacerbating ethno-religious tensions in the West Bank. These rising tensions will increase the risk of radicalisation within Palestinian communities, as well as the likelihood of attacks targeting Israeli individuals, settlements and assets. As per the 1995 ‘Oslo II’ accord, Area C of the West Bank falls under Israel’s civil and security administration, until its eventual transfer to Palestinian jurisdiction. However, the new land settlement procedure will likely undermine the implementation of the Oslo II accord. Furthermore, while land registration by a state authority represents an exercise of sovereignty, international law constrains it in situations of occupation. As such, the plan’s approval will likely increase tensions between Israel and its international partners, particularly amid increasing recognition of Palestinian statehood (see Sibylline Special Report – 7 October 2025). The risk of sanctions targeting Israeli entities operating in the West Bank will increase in the coming year, particularly in the construction sector. (Source: Sibylline)
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