NEWS IN BRIEF – MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT

Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

www.exensor.com

————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
Military And Security Developments

Feb 07.

• Lebanon-US: Hardline US stance on Hizballah will drive socio-economic, government stability risks. On 8 February, a US delegation led by deputy special envoy to the Middle East Morgan Ortagus will meet Lebanese Prime Minister-designate Nawaf Salam and likely reiterate US demands that Lebanese Hizballah (LH) and its allies have a minimal role in the new government. This comes amid local media reports that a new government will likely be announced imminently. While the inclusion of LH and allied representatives will likely moderate government stability risks and temper ethno-religious tensions, it will also reduce prospects for greater engagement and the lifting of restrictions on Lebanese banks. This will likely sustain compliance risks in Lebanon, maintaining threats to energy and food security. Significant restrictions on LH representation in the government will also likely undermine the Israel-Hizballah ceasefire agreement, driving the risk of conflict re-escalation, exacerbating regional tensions and elevating human rights risks in southern Lebanon and the capital Beirut.
• Syria-Lebanon: Border clashes underscore heightened security, armed conflict risks through 2025. On 6 February, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) government forces launched a large-scale security campaign in the towns of Al-Fadliyah, Akoum, Bluzah and Hawik (all Homs governorate) targeting cross-border smuggling networks affiliated with Lebanese Hizballah (LH). This prompted heavy clashes (extending into Lebanese territory) and local smugglers kidnapped two HTS fighters. Later, both sides exchanged detainees, but the security situation still remains very tense. The developments underscore the significant security and bystander risks along the Syria-Lebanon border where the LH-affiliated Nouh Zaiter’s drug smuggling network remains very active and backed by local Lebanese clans. We also assess that HTS is highly likely to conduct further security campaigns in the coming weeks to consolidate its control over the border and dismantle Captagon and weapon smuggling networks. However, the rugged terrain and the hostility of Lebanese clans along the border are highly likely to pose significant security challenges to the HTS government and sustain armed conflict risks through 2025.

Feb 06.

• On 4 February, a Palestinian gunman killed two Israeli soldiers and injured eight at the Tayasir checkpoint (Tubas governorate). An IDF fragmentation grenade killed the assailant after a prolonged small-arms exchange and the arrival of IDF reinforcements. The prolonged small-arms exchange and the use of fragmentation grenades near the checkpoint highlight elevated bystander security risks near IDF positions. Amid continued IDF operations in the northern West Bank, militants and radicalised individuals are likely to prioritise targeting of Israeli security forces over the civilian population. However, such attacks will continue to drive collateral and crossfire risks to civilians, particularly around outposts and checkpoints, and IDF soldiers positioned in high-density public areas such as bus stations and other transit hubs. Such individuals are at elevated risk of opportunistic attacks including car-rammings and drive-by shootings, elevating bystander risks.
  • On 6 February Iran officially launched its first domestically produced UAV carrier. The new vessel, Shahid Behman Bagheri (C-110-4) will be able to launch a range of unmanned air vehicles (UAVs) as well as helicopters. At 200m in length, it is the largest ship in the service of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Navy together with the Shahid Mahdavi (C-110-3). The new vessel was originally a container ship that Iran converted as part of a broader project to convert civilian vessels for military applications. Bagheri highlights Iranian efforts to enhance its Naval power and operational reach, elevating maritime security risks in the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf during periods of elevated regional tensions. These risks are likely to increase in the coming months amid President Trump’s resumption of his ‘Maximum Pressure’ policy towards Iran (see further in the political developments section).
  • On 6 February, the Shin Bet claimed it foiled a bus bombing attack in Jerusalem in late 2024. According to the security agency, in November and December 2024, it arrested five operatives of a Ramallah-based (Ramallah and al-Bireh governorate) terror cell, composed of both Fatah and Hamas members. During the arrests, the Shin Bet confiscated a makeshift submachine gun and an IED that the group planned to plant on a bus and activate remotely. The incident is notable as co-operation between Hamas and Fatah members is rare due to the long-term grievances between the two groups, although we assess this incident remains an outlier and does not reflect a shift towards greater cooperation between the two groups. The foiled plot highlights the persistently elevated risk of attacks by militant groups targeting public transport in the West Bank and Jerusalem.
  • US President Donald Trump proposed major US involvement in the reconstruction and post-war governance of Gaza, substantially increasing regional tensions. During a press conference with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on 4 February, Trump proposed that the US would ‘take over’ Gaza to facilitate reconstruction and economic development for ‘the people of the area’. Trump also reiterated his plan to permanently transfer Palestinian residents of Gaza to other countries, particularly Egypt and Jordan. However, the White House Press Secretary subsequently stated that displacement would be temporary and voluntary. Jordan, Egypt and the Palestinian Authority (PA) immediately rejected the proposal and stated that it would constitute a major violation of international law. Trump’s statements also attracted significant criticism from regional allies, including Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Despite this criticism, numerous Israeli political parties praised the proposal, including government and opposition parties, such as National Unity and Yesh Atid. Disputes over the proposal’s viability are highly likely to aggravate long-standing regional tensions vis-à-vis the Palestinian Territories and prospects for Palestinian statehood. Even so, it is highly unlikely that the Trump administration intends to implement the proposal in the coming months, given significant logistical, legal, economic and security-based constraints. Rather, the proposal likely reflects efforts to make future proposals regarding post-war governance in Gaza appear comparatively more reasonable, particularly to Saudi Arabia amid broader efforts to facilitate normalisation with Israel.
  • Delays to the resumption of ceasefire talks between Israel and Hamas will elevate risks of a resumption of IDF operations in Gaza in early March. On 4 February, Hamas issued a statement indicating it had resumed negotiations with Qatari mediators regarding the second phase of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire. Also on 4 February, Israel’s Prime Minister’s Office announced that Israel would send a delegation at the ‘end of the week’. Delayed engagement in negotiations is highly likely to disrupt an immediate transition from the first to the second phase, which would entail a complete IDF withdrawal from Gaza and establish a long-term ceasefire. As such, it is increasingly likely that IDF operations in Gaza will resume upon the expiry of the ceasefire’s first phase on 2 March. More broadly, continued sticking points within negotiations, particularly regarding the long-term governance of Gaza, will increase the risks of talks stalling in the coming weeks, undermining prospects for further agreements in the short term.
  • The resumption of daily flights between the US and Israel highlights the stabilisation of the travel risk environment, though sporadic service disruptions remain possible. On 4 February, United Airlines announced that it would resume daily flights between Newark Liberty International Airport (EWK) and Ben Gurion International Airport (TLV) from 15 March. This will mark the first resumption of daily flight services between the US and Israel. Delta Air Lines has also announced that it will resume daily flights between John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK) and TLV from 1 April. The resumptions highlight the stabilising travel risk environment within Israel and the broader region as the Israel-Hizballah ceasefire continues to hold. Although flight services will likely continue operating in the coming months, further temporary service disruptions or suspensions remain possible, particularly during periods of elevated regional tensions.
  • US President Donald Trump announced the resumption of the ‘maximum pressure’ campaign against Iran, increasing sanctions exposure and vessel seizure risk in the Strait of Hormuz. The campaign aims to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon and neutralising its proxy network through economic sanctions. In the coming months, the US will likely increase efforts to enforce sanctions targeting Iranian and Iranian-linked entities, particularly those associated with oil exports. The US will also likely expand sanctions targets, increasing exposure risks and compliance concerns for locally and regionally engaged firms, particularly financial entities. US efforts to ensure allies enforce sanctions will also increase the likelihood of high-profile asset freezes and detentions of Iranian-linked oil tankers. Sanction enforcement efforts are highly likely to trigger retaliatory Iranian action targeting entities associated with enforcing countries. This will possibly include cyber-attacks targeting public and private sector entities, as well as hijacking attacks targeting flagged vessels moving through the Strait of Hormuz. Disruption to vessel navigation through the Persian Gulf is highly likely to exacerbate concerns regarding global oil and gas supply chains, triggering periods of price volatility and increasing regional tensions.
  US President Donald Trump’s proposal for US involvement in Gaza will increase pressure on ceasefire negotiations between Israel and Hamas, undermining prospects for extension. Trump’s proposal will likely embolden hard-right and pro-settlement factions within Israel’s coalition government, such as the Religious Zionism party. These groups will likely maintain pressure on Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to resume IDF operations in Gaza in the coming weeks, undermining ceasefire negotiations. Failure to extend the ceasefire and secure the release of the remaining hostages will almost certainly trigger large-scale anti-government demonstrations in Israel’s major cities, elevating risks of operational and supply chain disruption, particularly in Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) and Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district). Expansionist settlement groups will also likely interpret Trump’s proposal as an endorsement of settlement expansion in the Palestinian Territories, driving ethno-religious tensions and risks of clashes with Palestinian civilians in the West Bank in the coming weeks.
  Trump’s statements will also likely increase anti-US sentiment in the region, driving risks of unrest and hostility to foreign investment. Risks of protest and related unrest will be particularly elevated in states with highly active pro-Palestine movements, such as Jordan, Iraq, Turkey and Tunisia. Protests will likely target US army bases and embassies, particularly in Iraq and Jordan, elevating travel disruption risks, and possibly triggering clashes with security forces therein. Although localised bystander security risks will increase during major gatherings, widespread unrest and violence remain unlikely in the short term. Even so, there is a realistic possibility that hostility to US-linked foreign investment will increase in the coming days, increasing risks of attacks targeting US-affiliated businesses, particularly in Iraq.
• The IDF’s Iron Wall operation is likely to continue into Ramadan (28 February – 29 March), elevating security risks across Israel and the West Bank. In the coming days, the IDF is likely to expand its Iron Wall operation further across the northern West Bank. IDF military sources have confirmed that currently there is no timeline for withdrawal from Jenin (Jenin governorate) which is the central hotspot for militant activity in the West Bank. The IDF has claimed that militants are active within medical facilities across the city, elevating the likelihood these will be targeted in the coming weeks, elevating security risks to bystanders and proximate assets. As such, it is likely that intensive IDF operations in the northern West Bank, particularly in Jenin (Jenin), will continue into Ramadan. Such operations during the Ramadan period are likely to further exacerbate radicalisation risks, driving attack risks across the West Bank and the Jerusalem area. Risks of low-capability, sole perpetrator attacks such as stabbing and car-ramming will also be elevated within Israel, particularly in large urban centres in central Israel such as Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district). IDF operations during Ramadan will also likely elevate regional domestic unrest and protest risks, particularly in Iraq and Jordan. Furthermore, there is a realistic possibility that the Iran-backed Houthis will escalate their threats to resume attacks in the Red Sea if the operation in the West Bank continues, driving insurance costs and maritime operational disruption. Houthi attacks targeting Israel or shipping in the Red Sea remain a realistic possibility, though attacks are likely to remain sporadic. The risk of more frequent Houthi attacks will increase in the event of a breakdown in the Israel-Hamas ceasefire.
• Syria-Turkey: Likely increasing security co-operation will weaken SDF, reduce risks of incursion. On 4 February, Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa met with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey discussing forming a joint security strategy to counter terrorism in the region, increasing security and stability in Syria. Security co-operation between Syria and Turkey will likely grow in the coming months, with Turkey taking a leading role in training and providing equipment to the new Syrian army. A formalized defence pact will likely increase the presence of the Turkish military and influence in Syria, reducing the likelihood of Turkish ground incursion in H1 2025. However, this will elevate pressure on the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to disarm and integrate into the Syrian Defence Ministry (SDM). While full disarmament of the SDF is unlikely, it will possibly elevate splintering within the group, weakening it. We assess that the breaking of negotiations to integrate the SDF into SDM will elevate risks of Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) and Turkish forces significantly increasing airstrikes in northern Syria, with a realistic possibility of Turkey looking to expand its buffer zone in the area in H2 2025.
• Feb 05.
• Iran-US: ‘Maximum pressure’ on Iran will likely elevate maritime operational risks, security risks. On 4 February, US President Donald Trump signed a memorandum restoring ‘maximum pressure’ on the Iranian government, a move aimed at denying Iran nuclear weapons and neutralising its proxy network through economic sanctions. The memorandum also directs the US Treasury and State Department to drive Iran’s oil exports to zero. The memorandum elevates the risk of punitive measures on businesses and individuals operating in the shipping and insurance sectors, including port operators. Financial and business risks to maritime trade will also likely increase as will knock-on risks for regional energy security. The memorandum also elevates the risk of further sanctions on businesses and individuals operating in Iran, driving diplomatic isolation and impacting domestic economic development. We assess that attempts to enforce US sanctions against Iranian ships will elevate risks of Iranian reprisal against the vessels of enforcing countries, including hijacking attempts in the Persian Gulf, elevating security risks in the area throughout 2025.
• Feb 04.
• Israel-Palestinian Territories: Risks of copycat attacks will increase following shooting. On 4 February, a Palestinian gunman killed two Israel Defense Forces (IDF) servicemembers and injured eight others in a prolonged small-arms engagement at an outpost in Tayasir (Tubas governorate) before being neutralised after the arrival of IDF backup. In recent weeks, the IDF has conducted intense military operations in the northern West Bank (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 3 February 2025). These operations particularly focus on ‘Aqqaba (Tubas governorate), Jenin (Jenin governorate), Far’a, Tammun and Tubas (all Tubas), elevating security risks in their proximity. The latest incident will likely result in the further intensification of local IDF operations, including the proliferation of checkpoints and stop and search operations, driving travel disruption. We assess that the incident will also increase risks of copycat attacks by radicalised individuals and militants, increasing security and bystander risks near IDF positions in the northern West Bank (particularly near checkpoints).
• Turkey: IS crackdown will mitigate terror, attack risks, heightened security posture is likely. On 4 February, the Turkish police announced the detention of 46 people in four provinces including Istanbul during a counter-terrorism operation targeting alleged Islamic State (IS) members and financiers, though one suspect remains at large. As the police search for the remaining suspect, a heightened security posture is likely in parts of Istanbul (Istanbul district) elevating risks of arbitrary arrests and driving travel disruption in central and suburban areas of the city. Further police counter-terrorism operations are likely in the coming months as the government continues to crack down on IS cells in regular operations. However, these are likely to drive localised supply chain and business operational disruption as well as elevate bystander security risks and ethno-religious tensions during operations. While these regular counter-terrorism operations will likely moderate risks of international terrorism and attacks, we assess that they highlight the continued presence and threat of terrorist cells across Turkey, sustaining security risks at commonly frequented locations and near religious sites.
• Risk of domestic unrest, anti-US sentiment will rise following remarks from US president. On 4 February, US President Donald Trump suggested that the US would ‘take over’ the Gaza Strip during a press conference. Under the proposal, the US would clear the unexploded ordnance, level the destroyed buildings, and support economic development to supply jobs and housing to the ‘people of the area’. Trump also reiterated his plan to permanently transfer Palestinian residents of Gaza to other countries willing to accept them. In the Middle East, Trump’s remarks will almost certainly draw significant official and public condemnation. They will likely elevate anti-US sentiment in the region and risks of domestic unrest, though protest risks remain low in the Gulf countries. Protests will likely target US army bases and embassies, particularly in Iraq and Jordan, elevating travel disruption and risk of clashes with the security forces and driving bystander security risks. We assess that a spike in hostility to foreign investment is likely; attacks on US-affiliated businesses (particularly in Iraq) remain a realistic possibility.
• Feb 3.
• On 30 January the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) intercepted a Lebanese Hizballah (LH) reconnaissance unmanned air vehicle (UAV). On 29 January, the IDF conducted pre-emptive arrests in the West Bank ahead of the release of Palestinian prisoners.
• On 31 January, the IDF struck LH infrastructure on the Lebanon-Syria border.
• On 1 February, the pro-Assad Syrian Popular Resistance (SPR) conducted a small arms attack on IDF troops in Turnejeh (Quneitra governorate).
• POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND OVERALL FORECAST
• The Israel-Hamas ceasefire remains in place amid Israeli releases of Palestinian prisoners triggering demonstrations in the Palestinian Territories.
• In southern Gaza, the Rafah border crossing has re-opened; however, disputes linked to the facility’s administration will possibly disrupt cross-border movement.
• In Israel, the IDF’s continued efforts to draft ultra-Orthodox men will increase the likelihood of anti-conscription protests and unrest amid broader government stability risks.
• Former LH leader Hassan Nasrallah’s funeral will take place on 23 February, significantly increasing operational disruption risks in Lebanon, in the capital Beirut.
• The Israel-Hamas ceasefire remains in place amid Israeli releases of Palestinian prisoners triggering demonstrations in the Palestinian Territories. On 1 February, Hamas released three Israeli hostages; all three were dual nationals, holding Argentine, French and US citizenship. Hostage releases triggered celebratory demonstrations in Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) and Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district); similar demonstrations are highly likely upon further hostage releases, sustaining risks of temporary operational and travel disruption in the coming weeks. Also on 1 February, the Israeli prison authorities released 183 Palestinian prisoners; 150 detainees were released into Gaza and the remaining 33 into the West Bank. The releases triggered celebratory demonstrations in Khan Yunis (Khan Yunis governorate, Gaza) and Ramallah (Ramallah and al Bireh governorate, West Bank), despite IDF bans on such demonstrations in the West Bank. In the coming weeks, continued prisoner releases will almost certainly trigger further celebrations and parades in the Palestinian Territories, elevating risks of travel disruption through major population centres. In the West Bank, IDF efforts to prevent and possibly disperse such gatherings will increase risks of clashes and unrest, including in the East Jerusalem area.
• In southern Gaza, the Rafah border crossing has re-opened; however, disputes linked to the facility’s administration will possibly disrupt cross-border movement. On 1 February, the border crossing re-opened; the World Health Organization (WHO) announced that 37 sick and injured Palestinians had left Gaza with 39 companions. The WHO estimates approximately 14,000 individuals (including 5,000 children) require medical treatment currently unavailable in Gaza due to the widespread destruction of medical facilities. The EU mobilised its Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point (EUBAM Rafah) on 2 February; the mission will assist with transporting sick individuals out of Gaza in co-operation with the Palestinian administrators. Initial reports characterised these administrators as individuals who were unaffiliated with Hamas and who had been authorised by the Israeli authorities to administer the crossing. However, earlier on 3 February, Israeli media began reporting that administrators were Gaza-based Palestinian Authority (PA) personnel. Such a development would mark a major departure from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s stated opposition to PA personnel operating the border crossing facility. Disputes regarding the administration of the border crossing will possibly disrupt cross-border movement, increasing bilateral tensions with the EU and driving risks of protests in Egypt’s North Sinai governorate.
• In Israel, the IDF’s continued efforts to draft ultra-Orthodox men will increase the likelihood of anti-conscription protests and unrest amid broader government stability risks. Earlier on 3 February, an IDF spokesperson confirmed that of the 3,000 ultra-Orthodox men who received conscription notices in 2024, only 461 have presented themselves to IDF recruitment centres (see Sibylline Israel-Hamas War Update – 11 July 2024). During testimony to the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, the spokesperson also stated that arrest warrants had been issued for 1,200 individuals for non-compliance. Efforts to detain ultra-Orthodox men for non-compliance will highly likely trigger localised clashes with the military police, increasing security, bystander and collateral risks. These risks will be particularly acute in ultra-Orthodox population centres including Beit Shemesh (Jerusalem), Bnei Brak (Tel Aviv) and Jerusalem’s Geula, Kikar HaShabbat and Mea Shearim areas. More broadly, the IDF’s conscription efforts will substantially increase the risk of anti-conscription protests and domestic unrest in central Israel in the coming weeks. Protesters will highly likely target major thoroughfares including Highways 1 and 4, elevating risks of temporary disruption to overland movement and supply chain continuity. In the coming weeks, the Shas and United Torah Judaism ultra-Orthodox parties will likely attempt to leverage their positions within the coalition government to gain concessions on conscription exemptions, undermining government stability and increasing risks of legislative deadlock.
• Former LH leader Hassan Nasrallah’s funeral will take place on 23 February, significantly increasing operational disruption risks in Lebanon, in the capital Beirut. On 2 February, LH leader Naim Qassem announced that the group’s former leader, Hassan Nasrallah, will be buried in Beirut on 23 February. Qassem stated that Nasrallah will be buried in an unspecified location between the Old Saida Road and the Beirut-Saida Highway, both key thoroughfares connecting to Beirut-Rafic Hariri International Airport (BEY). Nasrallah’s funeral process will almost certainly attract mass gatherings in southern Beirut, significantly disrupting overland movement (particularly in the Dahieh area). Restricted access to BEY will also elevate risks of broader travel disruption; funeral attendance will possibly increase operational disruption and labour flexibility risks for locally engaged firms. Mass attendance will increase risks of crowd mismanagement, crushes and minor altercations between attendees. However, widespread unrest and violence remain unlikely.
• On 4 February, negotiations to extend the Israel-Hamas ceasefire will begin in Qatar; however, an immediate extension remains unlikely. Per the agreement, Israel and Hamas will begin negotiations regarding a transition into the ceasefire’s second phase, comprising a longer-term ceasefire, a complete IDF withdrawal from the enclave and the release of all remaining living Israeli hostages. However, despite substantial international pressure to extend the ceasefire, Israeli negotiators have not publicly confirmed their attendance or engagement in renewed negotiations. Delays to negotiations will highly likely undermine efforts to extend the agreement, increasing the likelihood of the IDF resuming operations in the coming weeks. While such a resumption would possibly be temporary or smaller in scale compared to previous operations, pressure from hard-right elements in the Israeli government to resume broader IDF operations in Gaza will continue to undermine efforts to secure a long-term ceasefire. A failure to extend the ceasefire will highly likely trigger substantial anti-government protests in Israel, though risks of violence remain low. More broadly, failure to extend the ceasefire will likely sustain pro-Palestine protest risks throughout the region, particularly in Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Jordan and Morocco.
• On 4 February, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will meet US President Donald Trump, possibly triggering protests and unrest in the Middle East and North Africa. Netanyahu and Trump’s discussions will almost certainly concern developments in the Israel-Hamas war, tensions with Iran and prospects for normalisation between Israel and Saudi Arabia. In recent weeks, Trump has repeatedly called for the displacement of ms of Palestinians into Egypt and Jordan to allegedly facilitate reconstruction in Gaza (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 27 January 2025). Further statements to this effect will increase risks of pro-Palestine protests throughout the region in the coming days, particularly in major urban centres. Demonstrations will possibly target Israeli and US-linked installations, increasing hostility to foreign investment and localised unrest. Risks of protests and unrest will be particularly acute in Jordan, in the capital Amman. Demonstrators will possibly target the US and Israeli embassies, driving security and bystander risks.
• An intensification of the IDF’s Iron Wall Operation is likely in the coming days, elevating bystander security and radicalisation risks. Following the expansion of Iron Wall operations to Tammun (Tubas governorate), the IDF issued evacuation orders to residents of 15 buildings in the town for three weeks. This comes as the IDF destroyed 23 buildings allegedly being used by militants in Jenin (Jenin governorate). IDF operations in the northern West Bank will likely further intensify in the coming weeks, elevating bystander security risks as well as energy and water security risks, driving humanitarian concerns. The increasing scale of damage across Palestinian population centres in the northern West Bank will likely elevate radicalisation risks among the Palestinian population in the coming weeks. These will likely drive risks of militant and sole-perpetrator attacks against Israeli civilian and military targets. Attack risks will be elevated near Israeli settlements, key roads, security checkpoints and positions and transport hubs (such as bus stations across the West Bank). There is a realistic possibility of attacks also in the southern West Bank due to a spillover of militants and radicalised individuals. The attack risk in large urban centres across Israel will also be elevated, particularly from sole perpetrator stabbing attacks.
• Iraq: Drone attack on gas field elevates energy security risks; heightened security posture is likely. On 2 February, the Kurdish Regional Government’s (KRG) Ministry of Natural Resources confirmed that unknown assailants conducted a drone attack on the Khor Mor Oil and Gas Field (Sulaymaniyah governorate). The field is one of the largest in Iraqi Kurdistan and supplies a significant portion of its energy needs. There is no reported damage to the field or production capacity. The attack comes amid growing concerns over the region’s critical energy infrastructure; a successful attack will likely result in power cuts, driving energy security and operational risks for businesses across the region. The Iraqi authorities and local Peshmerga are investigating the incident. A heightened security posture is likely near the field in the coming days, including stop and search operations and increased risks of arbitrary detention driving bystander security risks. We assess that there is a realistic possibility of further attacks targeting foreign-owned oil fields, particularly those intending to increase production, underscoring possible increased hostility to foreign investment in the coming weeks.
•  Syria: Uptick in car bombings underscores significant armed conflict risks in northern Syria. Earlier, on 3 February, unspecified assailants detonated a car bomb in the city of Manbij (Aleppo governorate) killing at least 15 civilians and injuring 15 others. No group claimed responsibility. This comes three days after a similar car bomb targeted a military position of the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) in the city, killing seven civilians. We assess that the Kurdish elements within the Syria Democratic Forces (SDF) likely carried out both attacks amid broad clashes with the SNA on the nearby front. The attacks underscore the significant security and armed conflict risks around Manbij city as the SNA tries to cross the Euphrates River by capturing the nearby Tishrin Dam (both Aleppo governorate). The SDF is attempting to capture Dayr Hafir (Aleppo governorate) to encircle the SNA. As the disarmament talks between Damascus and the SDF are stalling, we assess that there is a realistic possibility that Turkey will launch a ground operation against the Kurds, further augmenting security instability in northern Syria. (Source: Sibylline)

04 Feb 25. Yemen’s Information Minister Visits CENTCOM to Discuss Countering Iran-Backed Houthis. Yemen’s Minister of Information, Moammar bin Mutahar Al-Eryani, met with officials at U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) on Monday to discuss strategies for countering the Iran-backed Houthis, according to U.S. military officials. During the meeting held at the CENTCOM headquarters in Florida, Al-Eryani, who represented the internationally recognized Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG), emphasized the ongoing danger posed by the Houthis, stating: “Regional and international interests will remain threatened as long as the Houthi militia possesses military capabilities.” Al-Eryani’s visit aligns with ongoing efforts by Yemen and its allies to mitigate the influence of the Houthis, who have been accused of using disinformation and propaganda to destabilize Yemen and the broader Middle East. The Trump administration recently reinstated the Houthis’ designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), reversing a previous decision by the Biden administration to revoke the designation. Trump first labeled the Houthis as an FTO in the final days of his first term, citing the group’s attacks on U.S. allies and maritime shipping in the Red Sea. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

05 Feb 25. U.S., DOD’s Commitment to Israel Includes Munitions Previously Withheld. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth hosted Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu today at the Pentagon for a discussion following last night’s meeting between the prime minister and President Donald J. Trump at the White House.

“We’re honored to stand alongside you and stare down many of the same threats that you do, and under President Trump’s leadership, just like you, we are totally committed to achieving peace through strength,” Hegseth told Netanyahu.

He noted that the relationship between the U.S. and Israel is longstanding, and he expects it to continue and grow as the U.S. steps up its commitment to the country.

“We are going to continue to grow our defense industrial base,”Hegseth said. “We’ve supplied munitions that were previously not supplied that are useful in eradicating radical enemies, and we are committed to continuing to do so.”

The U.S. authorized the release of 2,000-pound bombs to Israel, Jan. 25, 2025, a munition that had previously been held back. The president told reporters at the time that those weapons had been paid for and that Israel had been waiting “a long time” for their delivery.

Hegseth also highlighted the mission given to him by the president, which is to achieve peace for the United States by building a stronger military.

“I hope you’ve noticed here at the Defense Department, under President Trump, we are laser-focused on reviving the warrior ethos, on rebuilding America’s military and reestablishing deterrence, which is something you … have done in your neighborhood in impressive, aggressive and important ways,” Hegseth said.

Peace through strength is a concept Israel shares with the United States, Netanyahu said.

“The only way to get peace, and enduring peace, is by being very, very strong,” he said. “And with our alliance and your support, including the decision … of supplying Israel the much-needed tools for our defense, we are a lot stronger than we’ve ever been.” (Source: U.S. DoD)

——————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-
Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Home land Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————