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Military And Security Developments
Oct 24.
- Syria-Israel: Persistent cross-border smuggling will increase risk of armed clashes. On 23 October, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) foiled an attempt to smuggle firearms from Syria into Lebanon in the Mount Hermon area (Quneitra governorate, Syria). The IDF confiscated assault rifles and detained several suspects at the scene. Notably, this is the second time within a week that the IDF has foiled a smuggling operation in the same region. These developments underscore the substantial engagement in arms and narcotics smuggling by local clans affiliated with Lebanese Hizballah (LH) along the Syria-Lebanon border, elevating the risk of clashes between these groups and the IDF in the coming weeks. Israeli operations in Syria will drive an increased risk of attacks on Israeli positions in Syria by rogue jihadist elements but incidents of misfire and/or direct clashes between the IDF and Syrian security forces are unlikely.
Oct 23.
- Israel-Palestinian Territories: ICJ opinion on Israel’s obligations in Gaza will elevate reputational risks. On 22 October, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued an advisory opinion stating that Israel must ensure the basic needs of the local population and support UN relief efforts, including through the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). However, since the ICJ’s opinion is non-binding, we assess that Israel is highly unlikely to resume co-operation with UNRWA, having previously accused the agency of lacking impartiality. Regardless of Israel’s compliance, the ICJ’s opinion is likely to provoke further international scrutiny of humanitarian conditions in Gaza, increasing diplomatic tensions, particularly with Western allies. Israel’s failure to fully comply with the ICJ’s opinion will likely be interpreted as a failure to address the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. This will increase the likelihood of Western countries (particularly EU member states) imposing further restrictions and sanctions on Israel-based firms deemed to be challenging aid provisions or operating in the West Bank. This will raise compliance, operational and financial risks, especially for businesses in the banking, technology and defence sectors. A continuation of the ongoing crisis will likely heighten reputational risks for entities linked to the Israeli government and security forces
Oct 22.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
IRAN
- Following the expiration of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iran will highly likely attempt to expand its nuclear programme and work alongside China and Russia to undermine sanctions compliance.
- Iran has continued reconstruction activities at several nuclear facilities, driving the risk of a resumption of Israeli airstrikes in the medium-to-long term.
- Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei gave a speech in which he criticised US President Donald Trump, underscoring the diminishing prospects for a nuclear agreement in the short term. Khamenei’s appearance also prompted increasing concerns regarding his health and longevity, highlighting the risk of intensifying factionalism in the coming months.
ISRAEL
- A draft law to annex parts of the West Bank (Palestinian Territories) highlights increasing government instability and internal tensions, and therefore elevated policy risks in the coming months.
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
- GAZA STRIP: Efforts by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to increase the visibility of the ‘yellow line’s’ boundary will reduce the risk of civilian trespass, though security risks close to the line will remain elevated.
- GAZA STRIP: Armed clashes between militants and IDF troops, followed by airstrikes, highlight the fragility of the ceasefire and the elevated risks in Gaza’s central camps.
- PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES: On 22 October, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued an advisory opinion on Israel’s obligations as an occupying power in the Palestinian Territories; this will likely trigger renewed scrutiny of humanitarian conditions in Gaza.
IRAN
- Following the expiration of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iran will highly likely attempt to expand its nuclear programme and work alongside China and Russia to undermine sanctions compliance. On 18 October, the UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution that codified the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) expired. Subsequently, Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that Iran no longer considers the JCPOA’s restrictions, monitoring clauses and reporting mechanisms to be legally binding. The statement almost certainly indicates that Iran does not intend to allow international monitors access to nuclear facilities in the coming months and will highly likely attempt to resume the domestic enrichment of uranium beyond JCPOA-established limits in the medium to long term (see below). Also on 18 October, representatives from China, Iran and Russia announced that they had issued a letter to UN Secretary General António Gutteres disputing the legality of the UNSC’s reimposition of UN sanctions on Iran (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 29 September 2025). The letter underscores China and Russia’s likely efforts to hinder compliance from UN member states with UNSC directives to reimpose pre-2015 sanctions on Iran. Inconsistent sanctions enforcement will increase sanctions exposure risks for regionally engaged firms, particularly those in the financial and shipping industries. Additionally, firms engaging with Chinese and/or Russian intermediaries in these industries will face greater due diligence requirements and possibly increased regulatory scrutiny from states that do enforce sanctions on Iran. Even so, such efforts are unlikely to entirely mitigate the impact of Western sanctions on Iran in the short to medium term, which will likely continue to undermine socio-economic health conditions.
- Iran has continued reconstruction activities at several nuclear facilities, driving the risk of a resumption of Israeli airstrikes in the medium-to-long term. On 16 October, the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) published reports indicating that Iran has begun to re-establish tunnel access to the Isfahan nuclear facility (Isfahan province). During the Israel-Iran war, Israeli and US airstrikes caused significant damage to the facility, which had previously held stockpiles of medium-enriched uranium. While the ISIS’ findings indicate that Iran is not seeking to re-establish access to damaged centrifuges or stockpile storage facilities, satellite imagery indicates that Iran is attempting to reinforce access tunnels and possibly protect the facility against future airstrikes. Subsequently, on 20 October, ISIS published a report indicating that Iran has resumed construction activity at the former Taleghan 2 site within the Parchin nuclear complex (Tehran province). Israel destroyed the Taleghan 2 site in an airstrike in October 2024, and subsequent reconstruction efforts ceased during the Iran-Israel war. The Parchin nuclear complex is central to Iran’s nuclear research and development programme, and reconstruction efforts possibly indicate that Iran aims to resume limited nuclear research activities in the coming months. Concerns that Iran seeks to reconstitute its nuclear research and development programme rapidly will increase the risk of Israeli strikes targeting nuclear facilities in the coming months, particularly if Iran attempts to access stockpiles or construct advanced centrifuge facilities within hardened facilities.
- Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei gave a speech in which he criticised US President Donald Trump, underscoring the diminishing prospects for a nuclear agreement in the short term. Khamenei’s appearance also prompted increasing concerns regarding his health and longevity, highlighting the risk of intensifying factionalism in the coming months. On 20 October, Khamenei criticised public offers from President Trump to resume nuclear negotiations and characterised the US’ approach to negotiations as an ‘imposition’ and ‘bullying’. The speech underscored the diminishing prospects for productive nuclear negotiations between Iran and the US in the short term. The speech also marked one of Khamenei’s first public appearances in recent weeks, amid rising concerns regarding his well-being and longevity. Lately, the former president, Hassan Rouhani, has become an increasingly vocal critic of Khamenei’s leadership, prompting speculation that he is attempting to reassume leadership of Iran’s reformist political factions. In the coming months, Rouhani will likely continue to try to establish himself as a key figure in succession proceedings following Khamenei’s death or incapacitation, contributing to entrenched high-level factionalism within Iran’s executive. Increasing competition between reformist and principalist factions will likely continue triggering deadlock within Iran’s executive in the coming months, compounding the risk of major government instability in the event of Khamenei’s death.
ISRAEL
- A draft law to annex parts of the West Bank (Palestinian Territories) highlights increasing government instability and internal tensions, and therefore elevated policy risks in the coming months. Earlier on 22 October, two draft bills to apply Israeli law to the West Bank and to the Ma’ale Adumim settlement (Jerusalem governorate, West Bank) passed a parliamentary reading in the Knesset. To enter into law, the bills will need to pass another three readings and several committees, rendering annexation in the immediate term highly unlikely. The bills passed despite the opposition of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who ordered his party (the Likud) to abstain from voting, signalling that future tensions within Israel’s ruling coalition are likely. This will increase the risk of legislative stasis and lead to broader policy risks. However, governmental collapse remains unlikely. While one of the draft laws in question referenced the whole of the West Bank, it passed by one vote (25 to 24). As such, it is unlikely to pass a third and final reading in its current form. By contrast, the second draft law only focuses on Ma’ale Adumim and is far more likely to pass in its current form, as it secured a large majority (31-9). As these bills remain in their early stages, they are unlikely to exacerbate tensions between Israel and the international community significantly. However, their progression would increase the likelihood of states (particularly EU members) initiating further legislation or sanctions targeting Israeli operations in the West Bank. This would in turn exacerbate compliance risks for businesses that are either directly or indirectly operationally active in the West Bank.
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
- GAZA STRIP: Efforts by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to increase the visibility of the ‘yellow line’s’ boundary will reduce the risk of civilian trespass, though security risks close to the line will remain elevated. Since the ceasefire entered into force on 10 October, the IDF has withdrawn to the pre-agreed ‘yellow line’. However, the line was previously physically unmarked in Gaza, driving accidental incidents of civilian trespass and prompting IDF service personnel to issue warning shots (and in some cases lethal fire). On 20 October, the IDF announced it had started to mark the outline of the yellow line physically with a series of 3.5m-high yellow poles placed approximately every 200m according to terrain conditions. The IDF will likely finish placing the markers by the end of the week (25 October). The markers will increase the visibility of the yellow line, reducing the risk of accidental trespass (though the latent risk of such incidents will persist). Additionally, the placement of the markers, together with recent militant attacks against IDF troops (see below), will possibly prompt the IDF to relax its rules of engagement, further empowering service personnel to open fire on perceived threats and elevating security risks close to IDF positions.
- GAZA STRIP: Armed clashes between militants and IDF troops, followed by airstrikes, highlight the fragility of the ceasefire and the elevated risks in Gaza’s central camps. On 19 October, the IDF conducted intensive airstrikes across Gaza after militants launched three attacks in Rafah (southern Gaza) earlier on 19 October, one of which resulted in the death of two IDF servicemen. The airstrikes primarily targeted Khan Yunis, Rafah (both southern Gaza) and Gaza’s central camps (Nuseirat and Bureij, both central Gaza). Hamas denied responsibility for the attacks and claimed that it had no contact with local cells in Rafah. Later that day, the IDF announced that the ceasefire would resume, but threatened substantial retaliation against any future violations. The ceasefire remains highly vulnerable to allegations of violations and mutual hostilities by both sides. In the past week, the IDF highlighted several events where servicemen opened fire on suspected militants approaching their positions along the yellow line. Additionally, Israel’s continued efforts to collapse militant tunnels will sustain elevated risks of further armed clashes with militants located therein. Efforts by rogue Hamas cells or Hamas-affiliated factions to suppress anti-Hamas militias will also increase the risk of misidentification and armed clashes with IDF troops. Such events will elevate the risk of further IDF airstrikes, driving security risks throughout the strip. These risks will be particularly elevated in Gaza’s central camps, which the military largely avoided throughout the war due to assessments that living hostages were being held therein. Additionally, uncertainty regarding the fulfilment of the ceasefire’s most contentious terms (such as Hamas’ disarmament and the future governance of Gaza) will sustain elevated risks of ceasefire collapse throughout November and December.
- PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES: On 22 October, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued an advisory opinion on Israel’s obligations as an occupying power in the Palestinian Territories; this will likely trigger renewed scrutiny of humanitarian conditions in Gaza. The UN General Assembly (UNGA) requested that the ICJ issue the opinion after Israel adopted legislation in 2024 banning the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) from operating in Israel and areas it administers in the West Bank and prohibited Israeli officials from co-operating with it (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 31 October 2024). The court opined that Israel has an obligation to ensure that Palestinians are adequately supplied with essential aid, but that the population of Gaza has not been adequately supplied with aid during the Israel-Hamas war. The court also stated that Israel has an obligation to work with the UN, UN bodies and impartial NGOs to deliver aid to Palestinian communities. The court rejected Israel’s claims that UNRWA is not an impartial NGO and stated that Israel has an obligation to co-operate in good faith with the agency, given its central role in providing aid and humanitarian services to Palestinian civilians, particularly in Gaza. As the ICJ’s advisory opinions are not legally binding, Israel is highly unlikely to resume co-operation with UNRWA or increase benchmarks for aid deliveries outlined in the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 15 October 2025). Even so, the court’s advisory opinion will likely trigger further and sustained scrutiny of humanitarian conditions within Gaza, increasing reputational concerns for entities with direct and tangential links to the Israeli government and security forces. The ICJ’s criticism of the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation’s operations will also likely trigger renewed criticism of donors associated with the GHF, as well as security, construction and logistics firms tendering Israeli-issued contracts within Gaza.
RED SEA
- RED SEA: An explosion on a vessel suspected of carrying Iranian liquified petroleum gas (LPG) highlights sustained security risks in the Red Sea. On 18 October, an explosion caused a fire on board the Cameroon-flagged LPG tanker MV Falcon, which was sailing approximately 116 nautical miles (215km) east of Aden (Aden governorate, Yemen). The explosion and subsequent fire killed two crew members and forced the rest of the crew to abandon the ship. The source of the explosion remains unclear; the Houthis have denied involvement. Furthermore, maritime trackers suggest that the vessel was carrying Iranian LPG and was part of Iran’s shadow fleet, which is key to Iranian sanction-evasion efforts. The Houthis are highly unlikely to target Iranian assets directly. While the source of the explosion remains uncertain, the incident highlights the sustained security risks across the Red Sea, particularly in the Gulf of Aden, as well as the heightened insurance premiums and operational risks for shipping companies sailing through the Red Sea in the coming month.
REGIONAL AND GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS
- ISRAEL-IRELAND: A recent court ruling highlights the global compliance risks facing companies linked to Israeli settlements. On 16 October, Ireland’s High Court overturned a decision by the Garda (police) not to investigate the legality of Airbnb operations in Israeli settlements in the West Bank, rejecting a previous claim that it lacked jurisdiction. Although the ruling does not automatically mandate a police investigation, it does underscore the compliance and legal risks for global businesses linked to Israeli settlements, which are deemed illegal under international law. These risks will be particularly acute for Europe-based companies in the hospitality, retail, fresh produce, tech and construction sectors, given deteriorating relations between Israel and several EU member states. This will drive the risk of further divestitures and capital flight, impacting operations for firms with local operations in Israel (and especially the West Bank) in 2026. Furthermore, Israeli-linked companies will also continue to face increasing reputational risks and media scrutiny, driving exposure to global boycott campaigns through 2026 and subsequent financial losses.
- Syria: Campaigns targeting jihadists will increase in coming days, elevating retaliatory attack risks. Earlier on 22 October, the Syrian security forces launched operations targeting the stronghold of the Firqat al-Ghuraba jihadist group, which is largely comprised of foreign fighters from France, in the city of Harem (Idlib governorate). The casualty figures have not yet been released, but heavy clashes were reported. We assess that the Syrian authorities will likely increase the scope of raids targeting foreign jihadist groups who are not integrated within the new security institutions. Further raids are highly likely to take place in Idlib, which hosts various pockets of rogue foreign fighters, increasing the risks of armed clashes across the governorate in the coming weeks. Retaliatory attacks against military and governmental posts are also likely in the capital Damascus and Idlib. The tendency of foreign jihadist groups to co-ordinate with local al-Qaeda and Islamic State (IS) cells will further augment these risks, with attacks possibly expanding across Syria more broadly.
- Yemen: Al-Qaeda attack underscores persistent militant threat, heightened security risks in south. On 21 October, militants from the Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) group killed at least four soldiers and injured 15 others in two car bomb attacks against a compound belonging to Yemen’s internationally recognised government (IRG) in Al Mahfad district (Abyan governorate). The Yemeni security forces killed five militants wearing explosive belts. The scale and co-ordination of the attack underscore AQAP’s enduring operational capacity and the ongoing security fragility in Abyan, despite sustained efforts by the government and its allies to dismantle the group. The attack possibly marks the beginning of a new campaign, with AQAP exploiting the security vacuum in southern Yemen, where co-ordination between the IRG and the Southern Transitional Council (STC) remains fragile. Further attacks will possibly target military and dual-use infrastructure, including oil and gas transit nodes, elevating security risks to associated personnel due to crossfire and blast impacts, while also increasing energy security risks. Such attacks would likely prompt a response from the UAE and Saudi-backed forces, increasing the risk of conflict escalation.
Oct 21.
- Israel: US vice president’s visit will trigger major travel disruption in coming days. Earlier on 21 October, US Vice President JD Vance arrived in Israel for a three-day visit. Vance’s visit to Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) on 21 October will trigger major travel disruption. Several roads and entrances to the city are due to close from 1500hrs (local time), including Agron Street, Ben Zvi Boulevard, the Customs Intersection, Gaza Street, King David Street, Paris Square and the Shazar Tunnel. These closures also include parts of Highways 1, 6 and 35, as well as several roads inside the Old City. Roadblocks are highly likely to persist intermittently through 23 October. During his visit, Vance will likely travel to southern Israel, triggering further travel disruption in the country’s Southern district (particularly in Kiryat Gat). Vance’s planned departure on 23 October will trigger significant travel disruption along the roads leading to and from Ben Gurion International Airport (TLV, Tel Aviv district) between 1230hrs and 1500hrs due to closures and roadblocks. We assess that disruption to flight operations is also likely, particularly from 1130hrs, increasing the risk of travel delays.
Oct 20.
- Israel-Palestinian Territories: Persistent triggers for hostilities will drive risk of ceasefire breaches. On 19 October, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted tens of airstrikes in the Gaza Strip following an attack by militants in Rafah (southern Gaza) that killed two IDF soldiers. The IDF accused Hamas of the attack; Hamas denied the allegation and said that it had no contact with local cells in Rafah. Shortly after, the IDF announced that the ceasefire would resume, but threatened to retaliate substantially to any future violations. Nevertheless, the ceasefire remains highly fragile, with both sides at risk of allegations of violations and mutual hostilities. Israel will likely attempt to collapse militant tunnels, possibly driving clashes with militants that are hidden within them. Furthermore, efforts by rogue Hamas cells or Hamas-affiliated factions to suppress anti-Hamas militias will also drive risks of misidentification and clashes with the IDF troops. Additionally, uncertainty regarding the fulfillment of the ceasefire’s most contentious terms (regarding Hamas’ disarmament and the future governance of Gaza) will increase the risk of a ceasefire collapse throughout November and December.
- Morocco: Youth-led protests will likely subside due to draft budget, moderating domestic unrest risks. On 19 October, the Moroccan government unveiled its draft budget for 2026. Although the draft still requires parliamentary approval, it allocates USD 15 bn for health and education, a significant increase from the 2025 budget. The decision comes after weeks of youth-led protests calling for comprehensive reforms to Morocco’s economy, education, governance, and health systems. The parliament will almost certainly pass the budget, likely reducing the incidence of mass demonstrations in the coming weeks. This will likely lower the risk of sporadic clashes between protesters and the security forces, reducing staff exposure to water cannons and tear gas in proximity to large gatherings in major cities. Additionally, the increased spending on key public services will likely moderate socio-economic health risks, reducing inequality and supporting sustainable economic resilience. In turn, this will possibly ease long-term anti-government sentiment and lower the risk of sustained domestic unrest. However, there is also a realistic possibility that the concessions will embolden protesters, driving an expansion of demands and sustaining demonstrations and associated exposure to clashes between demonstrators and the security forces in the coming weeks. (Source: Sibylline)
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